Genschel, Philipp
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Item-typ:Veröffentlichung, Postfunctionalism reversed: solidarity and rebordering during the COVID-19 pandemicPostfunctionalism posits a tradeoff between the functional scale of governance and the territorial scope of community: functional scale is large and transnational for efficiency reasons; community is small-scale and (sub-)national for reasons of social trust and collective identification. COVID-19 has turned this tradeoff upside down: it has shrunk functional scale to the (sub-)national level in the name of security, while lifting expectations of community to the grand transnational scale in the name of solidarity. This reversal of scales has resulted in a rapid rebordering of the Single Market and the Schengen area on the one hand, and a significant debordering of fiscal risk and burden sharing on the other. We reconstruct the evolution of this double-movement from January to August 2020, contrast it to historical trends in the scale-community tradeoff of European integration, and discuss implications for postfunctionalist theory.Wissenschaftlicher Artikel118 295 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item-typ:Veröffentlichung, Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration(Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2015-07-21); ; ; This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over the agent, however, orchestration relies on the soft control of like-minded intermediaries through material and ideational support. The two models overlap, and governors mix them in practice, but distinguishing between them analytically can broaden and deepen analysis of indirect forms of governance. This article discusses the circumstances under which each model provides a better fit for real-world problems, as well as the key limitations of each model. Among other things, orchestration is relatively more likely in democratic than authoritarian systems, when governors have limited direct capacities of their own and when veto players are more numerous. Orchestration is not always more desirable than delegation, but it provides an important alternative in some circumstances. Multiple examples from both domestic and international settings are used to illustrate this claim. The article closes with key considerations regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration.Wissenschaftlicher Artikel94 205 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item-typ:Veröffentlichung, Competence versus control: The governor's dilemmaMost governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits they can create (or the trouble they can cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor control constrains intermediaries. The governor thus faces a dilemma: emphasizing control limits intermediary competence and risks policy failure; emphasizing intermediary competence risks control failure. This “governor's dilemma” helps to explain puzzling features of indirect governance: why it is not limited to principal–agent delegation but takes multiple forms; why governors choose forms that appear counterproductive in an informational perspective; and why arrangements are frequently unstable.Wissenschaftlicher ArtikelBand:14Heft:490 297 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item-typ:Veröffentlichung, EU-Solidarität in Zeiten von Covid-19Der Beitrag berichtet anhand neuer Umfrageergebnisse (April 2020) über die öffentliche Zustimmung zu EU-Solidarität in 13 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und in Großbritannien. Die Analyse ergibt u. a. diese Erkenntnisse: Die Befürwortung variiert je nach geografischer Entfernung, Problematik und empfundenem Nettonutzen für das eigene Land ; sie ist eher durch die Erwartung gegenseitigen Nutzens motiviert als durch Gefühle moralischer Verpflichtung oder gemeinsamer Identität ; die meisten Befragten bevorzugen dauerhafte EU-Vereinbarungen zur Risiko- und Lastenteilung gegenüber einzelfallbasierter Ad-hoc-Hilfe ; eine relative Mehrheit zieht ein beschützendes Europa einem marktschaffenden oder einem globalen Europa mit internationalem Führungsanspruch vor.Wissenschaftlicher ArtikelBand:73Heft:697 102 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item-typ:Veröffentlichung, Bellicist integration? The war in Ukraine, the European Union and core state powersKelemen and McNamara claim that the imbalance between the EU’s strong regulatory authority and weak capacity in core state powers reflects its peaceful origins: the EU lacks coercive force, fiscal autonomy and administrative grip because it never had to confront a serious military threat. Will the emergence of such a threat suffice to correct the imbalance? As I argue theoretically, military threats have ambiguous effects on integration. They can fuel center-formation and capacity-building, as Kelemen and McNamara suggest, but also block it. As I show empirically, the military threat posed by the Russian attack of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered very little EU capacity-building so far. I observe almost no centralization of core state powers but rather a strengthening of national powers with the support of EU institutions: ‘bellicist integration’ rather than ‘bellicist state-building’.Wissenschaftlicher ArtikelBand:29Heft:12204 120
