Phenomenology meets logical semantics: what Husserl's and Tarski's theories of truth do have in common

The aim of this paper is to draw out some connections between phenomenology and logical semantics in respect of the theory of truth. Jan Wolenski has discussed several continuities from Brentano to Tarski and this paper is a further development of his approach.1 Wolenski’s account fails to take Husserl into consideration and I shall argue here that a comparison between Husserl and Tarski proves to be a particularly fruitful means of drawing out the commonalities between phenomenology and logical semantics; commonalities that concern the idea of philosophy as a formal, scientific enterprise, the notion of self-evidence and the bringing about of Aristotle’s programme of a theory of truth. Of central importance is the concept of ‘Erfüllung’ (‘fulfilment’, ‘satisfaction’), which is used by both Husserl and Tarski. Once this concept is properly understood, it is possible to see how much the two theories have in common and how the term ‘correspondence’, when applied to these accounts, is somewhat misleading. Finally, the philosophical significance of the parallels drawn gets discussed.