

Political Demobilization and the Welfare State:  
Criminal Disenfranchisement in Perspective -  
North Carolina Case Study

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# Abstract

The issue of felon disenfranchisement has grown considerably over the past two decades. The following thesis places (criminal) disenfranchisement in the US, and those affected, firmly in the sphere of political economic studies. That is, this work takes the issue of felon disenfranchisement in the United States as a case in point regarding the relationship of political (de)mobilization and the welfare state. Utilizing a multi-method approach, this study contextualizes the place of political participation within welfare policy, integrates correctional systems into a welfare state framework, and reports on the detailed political and economic preferences of those removed from the electorate on account of felon disenfranchisement policy. This study is to the knowledge of the author the first to approach this issue from the political-economic lens of welfare state studies.

In what follows, I illustrate the significance of political agency for the welfare state, as well as the role which welfare policy plays in fostering that same political agency. In addition, I provide a new framework for conceptualizing the welfare state, enveloping those services previously omitted from the accounting of welfare state effort into one coherent structure. Finally, this work provides detailed quantitative and qualitative data on the preferences of the politically disenfranchised not previously recorded. In particular, the evidence strongly suggests that the political demobilization of low-income workers through the institutionalization of criminal disenfranchisement is of special interest to political scientists and scholars of the welfare state in general. In addition, it is argued that such policies may in fact benefit particular interests in the Democratic party and negatively impact the Republican party. Far from removing these voices from public discourse, the state may indeed benefit from their particular preferences - themselves products of their experiences with the state. In as much, the politically demobilized clients of the social corrections tier should be viewed not as destructive to democracy, but instructive to welfare policy oversight and development.



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# Introduction

I begin this work with a central note which is key for the reader to keep in mind from the outset. This work is concerned with the *relevance of democratic participation for the welfare state, and its converse*. It is also a work dedicated to *producing information from primary sources* to enable answers to previous assertions. While it targets those removed from the political environment by criminal disenfranchisement statutes in the United States (and explicitly in the state of North Carolina), it is not a work explicitly of felon rights nor the *restoration* of those rights. On the contrary, this work endeavors to disentangle the concept of *offender* from the topic of felon disenfranchisement, re-positioning these citizens in the context of welfare state clients. While it uses custodial and community supervisory institutions as sites of investigation, it is not a work on prisons or other supervisory facilities. In fact, this work is much less about the citizen as *offender*, and moreso explicitly (and concertedly) dedicated to the phenomenon of the political disenfranchisement of clients of the welfare state. The offender as the subject of political demobilization is, to a degree, ancillary to the study of felon disenfranchisement herein.

The distinction is crucial to clarify before delving further into this work. It defines the aims and the intended scope of research for the remainder of the analyses presented. That is, while this thesis does explore the *situation* of felon disenfranchisement extensively, it does so from an angle of political economic concern. In as much, it also looks to introduce alternative perspectives about the origins, impacts, and recommendations regarding its practice. While much of the literature and data concerned herein pertains to citizens under the supervision of prison authorities (as opposed to those supervised within the community), it is not a study of prisons or their genesis, though some discussion is unavoidable for the aims of this research. To put this into plainer terms, while felons form the delimiting status for the analysis, such status is readily reproducible in the status in other contexts (e.g., Roma/Sinti populations across Europe; aboriginal populations in Australia or elsewhere;

or female citizens in states which continue to disallow their full incorporation into democratic society).

## Research Problem and Questions

**Overview:** A *felony* is defined by the US federal government as any criminal offense which is subject to one year or more of imprisonment.<sup>1</sup> Offenders who are subject to such a conviction are considered as *felons*, though they may or may not serve their time in custodial supervision - fully two-thirds of such offenders do not (Uggen and Manza 2012). Offenders who fall outside this category are considered *misdemeanors*. The loss of one's right to participate in elections is governed at the state level in the US, creating levels of severity across the nation - discussed in more detail within this work.

According to the latest reliable figures, at the time of this writing, nearly 2.5 percent of adult citizens (5.85 million persons) in the US remained ineligible to participate in the elections of federal, state, and local officials due to felony disenfranchisement (Uggen, Shannon and Manza 2012). In 11 southern states, that figure moves up towards roughly 7 percent of the voting age population, and still higher when aggregated to the level of the minority proportion of the electorate.<sup>2</sup>

As with many aspects of social phenomenon, these numbers must be taken in perspective of their "true" impact. While the issue of felon disenfranchisement is first and foremost an issue of political citizenship, this citizenship is often not situated in terms of its practical importance. Political rights are often touted as the cornerstone of modern welfare states, and most nation-states in general. In as much, political rights and capabilities are not merely symbolic gestures of community membership, they are functional components of the regulation of systems of social protection. The abrogation of those rights must, then, be taken seriously, especially when removal is non-random. These issues have important consequences which are, for the most part, extremely localized. The spatial and socio-economic exceptionalism of crime and poverty predict the spatial and socio-economic

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<sup>1</sup>US Code:Title 18 ; PART II; Chapter 227; Sub-chapter A; Sec. 3559

<sup>2</sup>To put that figure into context: such is the equivalent of the entire US active military service, worldwide, fourfold (Defense Manpower Data Center 2014 ); or roughly the population of Denmark (CIA 2014) ; or (and more comparably) two-thirds of disabled medicaid recipients in the US (KFF 2010).

exclusiveness of disenfranchisement. This spatial exclusiveness further exacerbates the loss of political power among felony offenders. The evidence of this is readily apparent. Across the US, approximately 50 percent of criminals return to only five states. Within counties, offenders originate predominantly from inner-city, urban environments. Inside these cities, the disenfranchised originate from only a few specific communities. For example, the Brooklyn Borough of New York City accounts for approximately 20 percent of the city's population yet contains 50 percent of parolees (Burch 2007). In California, with 28 percent of the state's population, Los Angeles supplies 34 percent of the state's prisoners (Wagner 2004). In Illinois, of the 97 percent of released offenders whom returned to the state, 75 percent returned to only six counties. 62 percent of those released returned to Cook County - home to the state's largest city, Chicago, the 3rd largest city in the country according to 2014 US Census reports. In the case of Chicago, felons were found to originate particularly from only 6 of the 77 communities in the city (Horn 2007). Such phenomenon are not limited to the case of the United States. As Behan (2012) notes, "one percent of electoral districts accounted for nearly 24 percent of prisoners; but less than 5 percent of the population" (Behan 2012: 22). These communities tend to be the worst off communities in the city economically and in a range of other areas. Furthermore, their composition is not constrained by any one particular racial or ethnic identity.

The loss of political rights by such focused populations is not inconsequential. Political and civil rights are not separate from social rights. They are circular, reciprocal and self-reinforcing - and in some cases self-defeating. This conception alters our understanding of redistributive systems by focusing on more inter-connected dynamics than simple demographic and/or financial matters. If we evaluate welfare systems as reflexive phenomena, we come to a discussion where political citizenship re-enters the discourse. That is, political capability/agency enables the creation of institutions to manifest themselves into self replicating cultural phenomenon (Olson 2006). Institutions are not only created by those who have decisive power (e.g., over agenda setting, social protection legislation and other means of controlling the overall definitions of benefits and required contributions), they also contribute to the creation of the political agency of contributors and beneficiaries. The decisions made by governments pertaining to who may or may not participate in democratic governance continues to play an instrumental role where the redistribution of resources - and thus life chances - are concerned. As societies across the world become more culturally diverse and spatially clustered, the impact of this reciprocity is increased. That is, no system of social protection exists in a vacuum. Rather, they participate in a

symbiotic relationship with the political agency and deliberative capabilities of the population which it benefits and relies on for its provision. The welfare state is created by political and social institutions and relations, just as it creates and reinforces those very same institutions and accepted norms of citizenship. While the welfare state can empower citizens in one instance, its design also makes it possible to undermine and disenfranchise in another.

**Questions:** Considering this, we ought to inquire about which interests, if any, the systematic denial of political rights affects. Such an endeavor is, however, beset with intricacies. As will be elaborated on in depth over the following chapters, a multitude of work has stopped short of exploring the political economic dimensions of this breed of political demobilization to the favor of more popularized cleavages among the electorate - race in particular. This research goes further, examining the political-economic identities of the disenfranchised, while re-positioning these citizens within the overall welfare state framework.

I set out to explore the ramifications of the large scale political demobilization of clients of the welfare state in the United States, using the state of North Carolina as the site for investigation. I argue that because those affected by these policies are exclusive to particular (spatially clustered) socio-economic groups, their interests are likely not inconsequential for policy making. Felon disenfranchisement matters precisely because mass demobilization of any group, and particularly the lower income classes, impacts predominantly social welfare policy which in turn forms a cornerstone of the maintenance of political agency at the individual and group level. Due to the nature of the subject matter, and the novelty of the approaches necessitated to obtain sufficient data on the population under investigation, multiple hypotheses are tested herein. I lay these out in the order they are tested in this work.

I first test the hypothesis that political participation, in the form of electoral turnout, is integral to the development and maintenance of the welfare state. This hypothesis is tested in a three-stage approach wherein a reflexive relationship (Olson 2006) is tested. These hypotheses are:

- H1: Political turnout and spending towards public welfare policy are positively related.
  - H1a: This policy effect, in accordance with existing literature, will be most noticeable at the level of welfare policy.

- H1b: Increased spending on welfare services responsive to public demand will lead to a decrease in aggregate levels of income inequality.
- H1c: States with lower levels of inequality after transfers will exhibit higher rates of electoral turnout, owing to positive feedbacks for the political agency of beneficiaries.

These three stages are tested using a unique dataset for all 50 US states, covering over a decade of data on state accounts. The results build on the theoretical underpinnings presented in Chapter 1. With these items accounted for, two further hypotheses are then tested in the primary research areas of this work (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). These hypotheses pertain to the policy preferences and political identity of the disenfranchised voter. That is:

- H2: The blanket de-mobilization of felony offenders represents a demobilization of non-random preferences.
- H3: The political disenfranchisement of criminal offenders is spatially aggregated as to affect those communities which would stand to benefit materially through increased participation.

These final hypotheses necessitate, to no small degree, a determined gathering of primary data by which to test these assumptions.

## Organization of Study

Due to the nature of this study, each chapter includes in it a summary of the relevant background literature, gaps in research, and other relevant information which pertains to its core purpose. These chapters are structured from larger macro-issues pertaining to welfare state theory and participation, towards more detailed study of the disenfranchised themselves. The reader is advised to keep such a structure in mind as it greatly assists in comprehending the intention of each of the following chapters and sections. A brief summary of each chapter follows below. An overall schematic of the structure of this work can be seen in Figure 1. This work is delivered in two parts. Part one delivers more macro-level considerations for the study at hand, and outside the specific research area of felon disenfranchisement. Part two focuses on issues directly related to felon disenfranchisement and shapes the argument towards the re-conceptualization of this policy from racial animus (in particular) towards political-economic importance.




Figure 1: Thesis Progression

**Part One:** Chapter one focuses on a selection of core debates and discourses involved within the field of welfare state research. It develops the core competencies which help the reader situate the relevance of political agency (at the group and individual level) in respect to that of issues concerning the political economic theoretic of welfare states. This chapter expands on theories of justification and legitimization of state intervention in the economic affairs of society by elaborating on political agency based arguments. More so, this chapter promotes the examination of research which focuses on the citizen's role not only in creation of policy movements, but also on the citizen as product of her environment. These considerations inform the work in the following chapter.

Chapter 2 empirically tests the assumptions of the theoretical arguments laid out in the preceding chapter. Following from the overview of political reflexivity outlined in the preceding chapter, this chapter delivers more specified literature supporting this view - establishing the research base by which to empirically test these arguments. The focus is on analyzing if and how political participation is relevant for contemporary welfare state programs. I pursue this effort by using an original time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset consisting of economic, political, and comparative (income) inequality data. This chapter bolsters the arguments in favor of conceptualizing the welfare state as a reflexive system of policy and agency, one which relies on and is contributory to the electorate's well-being. The results confirm much of the existing arguments towards a more political agency based model of welfare states, while admitting of those concerns in opposition.

Chapter 3 follows with an exercise in incorporating correctional systems with the larger framework of the welfare state. The rationale for this chapter lays in the dearth of theoretical and empirical literature regarding the proper place of correctional systems (and thus those under its authority) within the welfare state. This chapter informs the debate on the following chapters by re-positioning the client of custodial and community supervision authorities into a functional conception of welfare systems. In as much, this chapter condenses a large amount of literature from those fields which focus on criminology and prison studies into a political-economic understanding. It covers a large amount of theoretical and empirical ground in short course; however, without such a concept included, the remaining arguments for understanding the impact of the political demobilization of felons on public policy would be incomplete. As such, this chapter covers the recent growth in punitiveness in the United States, leading arguments in its explanation, and the evolving political economic discourse in analyzing its connection with social protection systems. It leaves off with a reconditioned framework of welfare systems which incorporates correctional services (and therefore clients) into *one*, unified framework. This chapter ends part one.

**Part Two:** Chapter 4 begins the more dedicated analysis of political disenfranchisement of felons in the United States. This chapter lays out the development of policies of political demobilization in general, and felon disenfranchisement in particular. Notably, this chapter approaches the popular debates on these policies from the logic of class agitation. After address-

ing the existing literature on felon disenfranchisement, this chapter embarks on an exploration of the legitimacy of this policy from a political-economic perspective. The leading position herein is that challenges to felon disenfranchisement have found little support from courts due to their focus on racial and ethnic arguments. Instead, I argue that opponents of felon disenfranchisement might be better served by accepting the underlying class dimension of political demobilization as a basis for challenging the removal of voting rights. This is considered after a more in-depth treatment of criminal disenfranchisement from a labor relations perspective, dating to the period before the Civil War in the US and onwards. This chapter forms a combination of historical and theoretical literature which establishes an alternative view for the disenfranchisement of citizens based on criminal conviction.

Chapter 5 moves from the historical-theoretical arguments of the previous chapter to begin the primary analysis of the political and economic identities of the affected citizens. This chapter lays out the rationale for exploration more in depth and provides the methodological and process issues related to the primary research conducted as part of this work. It defines the methods used to approach the gaps in the research to date. The process and choices of using survey, qualitative interviewing, and Geographic Information Systems is given in turn. Sampling techniques and project design are all reported here, while some room in the remaining chapters is given for issues better addressed closer to their respective reporting.

Chapter 6 reports on the quantitative findings from the survey portion of this research. It is divided into five major sections. Section 1 presents descriptive results from the survey research. Section 2 reports the results of responses to items covered by the American National Election Survey. Section 3 follows with responses to items taken from the International Social Survey Programme's *Social Inequality* module. Section 4 reports on participant attitudes on items taken from the International Social Survey Programme's *Role of Government* module. As the largest item donor of this stage of the research, this section forms a more comprehensive area of findings. Section 5 reports on more specific policy areas concerning benefit levels and expenditures, taken from the International Survey of Economic Attitudes. This is followed by section 6, which reports results on unmatched and matched control groups. This section also reports the predicted political party membership using items supplied to both control and participant groups.

Chapter 7 reports on qualitative results from interviews carried out with participants over the course of research. These interviews are combined with

primary data obtained from Manza and Uggen's (2006) study to both triangulate the results from the survey stage of this research, as well as supplement those of Manza and Uggen (2006) using a Qualitative Secondary Analysis (QSA) technique. The results report on respondent preferences and own perceptions of conditions of political and economic issues.

Chapter 8 rounds off this work with the results of a detailed study of the geographic exclusivity of felon disenfranchisement. After a closer analysis of the literature on spatial processes and democratic participation, this chapter uses detailed census tract level data to illustrate the clustering of political demobilization at near electoral district levels. As such, this chapter builds on the research base regarding the neighborhood level effects of criminal disenfranchisement statutes. Furthermore, this chapter informs the reader on the importance of political agency and spatial aggregations of power for welfare systems. In particular, I find that not only are the politically disenfranchised clustered into particular areas of the urban environment, they are particularly so in areas of depressed turnout and extreme partisanship. The ramifications for this are discussed in turn.

Chapter 9 wraps up this work with a discussion of the main findings presented across this work. It discusses the implications of these findings and the relevance for welfare states and the scholars thereof. Particularly, the findings from this work show considerable need for concern from academics and practitioners alike for policies which affect clients of the lower tiers of the welfare state at a rate far outpacing those of racial or ethnic considerations. Given the empirical research on political participation and welfare state design, these findings imply that the disenfranchisement of large swathes of welfare system clientele at the lower ends of the income distribution is an important area of concern. In addition, it discusses why the attention of welfare state researchers and political scientists must turn towards considering more than just those institutions which are facially connected to welfare systems. Researchers may find valuable insights while adjusting their attention towards that of periphery areas which are necessarily instrumental to the maintenance of welfare systems across time and space.



## Part I

# Welfare, Political Participation, and Correctional Systems in Perspective



# Chapter 1

## Political Participation and Welfare Systems

### 1.1 Introduction

Welfare states are at their most basic level “political artifacts”. They occupy a theoretical and normative purgatory, leaving them in a precarious space of arguments based on conflicting viewpoints and justifications, “theoretical orphans” (Powell and Barrientos 2008:8) traveling uneasily across political economic landscapes, temporally and spatially. Since the mid 20th century, arguably with the work of Wilensky and LeBeaux (1958), the welfare state has increasingly become the subject of intense academic and social debate. Over the course of the recent past, scholars have debated the *origins*, the *intent*, and *viability* of systems of social protection in the advanced capitalist democracies. The insights gained from the myriad of studies is not able to be reproduced in its entirety here, however the work presented herein does go some distance to familiarize the reader with major contributions to the field.

This chapter looks at selected debates which have preoccupied much of the academic debate on the welfare state until the present. In as much as it endeavors to provide a broad range of debates to facilitate the main argument in relation to this thesis, only a fraction of the entirety of scholarly literature is presented. A full description of the myriad of issues which occupy this field is better left to the numerous and voluminous works on the issue. Here I address, first, what it is that we term the “welfare state”, at its more basic level, and further into the more complex system of social transfers and services which more adequately describe the overall system. Following

this, an exploration of the core literature is provided as a primer for what follows in the descriptions of the various theoretical approaches to explaining the growth and analysis of welfare states. An overview of welfare typologies is delivered covering a selection of the most prominent research in the field.

This chapter continues with a more thorough look at the underlying rationales of state intervention. While the major strands of theories are discussed briefly, a more in depth view is taken of two leading strands of research (i.e., Power Resource Approach and Varieties of Capitalism) as these two approaches have considerable meaning for our understanding of welfare state dynamics. Following this, this chapter leaves off with an exploration of the underlying areas of justifications for state intervention. The first of these delves heavily into a discussion of two opposing views of the role of the state and the individual, especially as this pertains to actionable policy. This initial sub-section relies considerably on an analytic which places historical developments in line with ethical and moral arguments for and against concerted state effort at the alleviation of market forces on the individual. In as much, it provides a useful backdrop for later discussion of the particular focus of this thesis - i.e., political disenfranchisement of particularly at-risk citizens. More succinct discussion is provided of two other leading areas, that of the economic and political justifications of state intervention. A brief summary of the implications are then given before moving to Chapter 2 - empirically testing the importance of citizen engagement and state policies.

## 1.2 Defining Welfare States

Analysis of why welfare states vary across space and time entails deep investigation into the underlying purposes of organization (e.g., equity vs. efficiency), normative justifications for such organization, operationalization of the process by which to accomplish these purposes, and assessment of performance against appropriate measures. Approaches abound for the assessment of each of these components, and undoubtedly this description is a simplistic one at best.

Common metrics of analysis are useful for comparative analysis, however no approach is perfect; take for instance the measure of welfare state effort as measured by approximating welfare delivery using direct spending as a variable set. The United States differs markedly from its European counterparts, and less so with its Liberal Democratic associates (Esping-Andersen 1990), however the yardstick by which we measure this difference is continuously

under question. It has been argued that a pure accounting measure of the US welfare state is biased in favor of a generally *European* developmental standpoint. That is, judged from the institutional organization of many European and Scandinavian welfare systems, the US and other Liberal Market Economies differ considerably in the effort they exert towards social welfare provision. The search for comparative metrics has led to numerous modes of measurement, both empirically (e.g., financial shares of expenditures) and substantively (e.g., benefit policies and regulations). Perhaps the most common metric for state intervention is that of welfare state effort measured as the share of total Gross Domestic Product devoted to social welfare services - take for instance the comparative data illustrated in figure 1.1. This figure represents the share of GDP spent on total public expenditures directed at public welfare compared with percent of households in poverty *after* taxes and transfers have been processed.




Figure 1.1: Comparative Social Spending

Source: OECD - Statistical Database - accessed 3/2/2014

From this standpoint, it is clear that the US typically lags when compared to its international counterparts. Why this is so has sparked an immense amount of research across academic disciplines. The US, more than any other similarly situated nation, spends considerably less on the social protection of citizens. Analysis of services and benefits outside mainstay measurements of welfare state effort, however, has revealed that the US expends considerably more effort than is generally acknowledged (Howard 1999;

Castles 2008). The massive amounts which the US devotes to military expenditure, for instance, obscure the many social benefits and services which are embedded within these costs. Approximately USD 42 billion of defense outlays were directed at military health, and are expected to reach USD 92 billion by 2030 (CBO 2011).

This does not include the costs for housing and other services provided to active and retired personnel including their dependents. In addition, as Howard (1999) has succinctly explored, the US relies heavily on a system of tax financed benefits and services which accrues mainly to middle and upper middle class households. Additionally, and importantly for the population covered in this research, welfare effort is further discounted when incorporation of correctional services are taken into account. This area of public spending has received only surface attention previously, at least as regards welfare state scholarship, and is treated in depth in chapter 3. Thus, while parsimonious definitions provide useful comparative standards to measure states against one another, one must remember that they are first and foremost guides to understanding welfare state dynamics. Our commonly held metrics of welfare state “effort” does not provide a definitive picture of modern systems, but rather useful aides in deciphering the extent of social protection. Indeed, what to include in welfare systems remains a contentious issue.

Given the many nuances of accounting for welfare states, a definition of the topic is useful if not pragmatic as a basis to pursue further investigations. Three conceptual definitions of the welfare state are applied herein, two of which provide commonly accepted interpretation of welfare states. Provision of welfare services can take the form of one or a combination of options: regulation, price subsidy, public production, and/or income transfer (Barr, 1991). These functions, according to Barr, must wrestle with delivery of benefits and services while avoiding distortion of the market (efficiency), ensuring distributive justice (equity), and ensuring administrative feasibility. The issue of equity, that of social justice, is a particularly salient issue and is almost exclusively an issue addressed in Barr’s opinion by income transfers. Once the objectives of the system are defined, the state intervenes when, almost invariably, a market failure materializes. The state may intervene for one of many reason, including imperfect competition, information asymmetry, independent probabilities in risks, moral hazard, and other issues which the market will fail to reconcile adequately.

Intervention reasons aside, it is possible to ascribe a practical, general

definition of welfare states which helps to form a starting point for analysis. A welfare state is “a set of institutions, policies and programmes aimed at reducing potential losses in population welfare” (Cichon, Office. et al. 2004). It is differentiated from other states in that (a) it exists within the context of a market economy and (b) forms a set of compulsory, collective, and largely non-discriminatory means of welfare provision (Goodin 1988). Such institutions are neither private, voluntary, nor charitable enterprises. Their benefit is available to all who meet the legislated criteria. To this end, states pursue variable purposes with their welfare institutional structures. The most inclusive definition of the welfare state, according to Wilensky and LeBeaux (1958), is then considered “those formally organized and socially sponsored institutions, agencies and programs, *exclusive of the family and private enterprise*, which function to maintain or improve the economic conditions, health or interpersonal competence of some parts or all of a population” (Wilensky and LeBeaux 1958:17; emphasis added).

In this vein, scholars have largely settled on, after Esping-Andersen (1990), three main categories of welfare states/regimes to focus their attention on - the Liberal/Residual, Conservative/Christian Democratic, and Scandinavian/Social Democratic states/regimes. Residual varieties have at their core an ethos of minimum intervention, leaving only the most distressed situations to be alleviated by collective arrangements of the state. Neo-liberals follow residualists but with an emphasis on intervention in those circumstances where the market has overtly failed - such is marked by use of social insurance schemes such as unemployment, old-aged pensions, and so forth. A third category, that of a socialist variety, emphasizes the ideal of equality and/or solidarity as the guiding rationale for institutional design. These states provide universal benefits and services with minimal means testing.

### 1.3 Theories of Welfare Systems

Within the field of welfare state studies, many scholars have worked within or around the comparative framework provided by the seminal work of Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990). Steeped in the tenants of the Power Resource Approach (PRA), *The Three World's of Welfare Capitalism* propelled comparative research in the political economic realm of welfare state studies.

PRA, as with Esping-Andersen's typological framework, has not been without its detractors. Like the typological framework, however, PRA re-

mains an influential force in scholarly research. Whether we believe that state typologies are useful or not (Kasza 2002), they have become a standard facet of research agendas in the study of the welfare state. The following section lays out the main theoretical movements in the field in a chronological manner as typically treated in the literature, providing a background on which to contextualize current debates on which this thesis incorporates. A comprehensive list of all movements and intricacies regarding the issue is left to the dedicated and numerous works on the subject. Readers are advised consult Leibfried and Mau (2008); Pierson, Castles and Naumann (2013); and Castles et. al. (2010) for detailed treatment of theoretical developments. Powell and Barrientos (2008), Arts and Gelissen (2002), and Bamba (2007) are recommended for a detailed treatment of typological accounts.

### **1.3.1 Logic of Industrialization (LOI)**

Proponents of LOI, also termed modernization theory, view the welfare state as a function of industrialization and an increasingly “needy” society. As states became increasingly affluent, they are able to afford the bureaucratic and institutional capabilities which facilitate expanding services to those in the midst of the market economy. This occurred as states moved from an agrarian society to an industrialized one (Wilensky 1965, 1974), increasing their capacity to intervene with “tooled-up” administrative capacities (Aidt 2009). LOI proposes a rather deterministic, if not optimistic, explanation of the functions of welfare state institutions, in that it proposes that such institutions are natural prerequisites for advanced market capitalism (Brooks and Manza 2007). Such viewpoints share similar deterministic interpretations of the work of TH Marshall’s view of citizenship, while Marshall had a decidedly normative justification for welfare state development, LOI gives little room for the necessity of rights. Development is a result of replacement by the state for dismantled non-state welfare provision (Flora and Alber 1981). It is those advancements in economic circumstances and demographic changes that account for the bulk of welfare state evolution (Wilensky 1975). This matter-of-fact nature, devoid of political culture, also informs LOI’s counterpart, the logic of capitalism.

### **1.3.2 The Logic of Capitalism (LOC)**

The logic of capitalism approach, inclusive Marxist and Neo-Marxist viewpoints, also holds that the welfare state has evolved as a result of industri-

alization and growing affluence, however it has done so to serve the needs of the owners of capital (Brooks and Manza 2007). As a set of institutions, the welfare state represents a network of remedial benefits and services which diffuse tensions inherent between capital and labor. The resulting system adjusts to workers' needs, but it does so at the bequest of the dominant capital class. Variants of this approach view the development and variation of programs and benefits as results of conflict and negotiation between the classes. The welfare state is shaped by these conflicting demands and owes its existence and maintenance to the ability of the laboring classes to demand concessions from capital. The welfare state is a functional tool of capitalism which quells social unrest, maintains the legitimacy of the system, and provides an environment conducive to markets. Class is reproduced as much as it is necessary. Here the necessity of political party or agent interaction is minimized, if not considered circumstantial.

A national values supplement (Brooks and Manza 2007) maintains that the varieties of norms particular to each state and their cultural values shape what citizens consider appropriate. These values form the support, or at least aversion to rebellion, which society has for particular modes of action by the state (discussed further). Public preference research, linking preferences to developments in welfare policy, owes much to this national values view and a large body of scholarly work has found public opinion highly correlated to variances in welfare state typologies (Svallfors 1995, 1997, 2004). In as much, preferences are indicators of class distinctions and potential demands.

### 1.3.3 Power Resource Approach (PRA)

LOI and radical/LOC approaches gave forth to the Power Resource Approach to welfare state development. PRA focuses on class differences and the resources available to particular classes of citizens, aggregated to groups, to advance their interests (Korpi 1984). For PRA, modernization, industrialization, and even some facets of Marxist theory all find their place within its explanatory framework. Political power on the left has acted in chorus (where strong universalistic states exist) to constrain the ability of capital to subsume labor to the market. Policies are enacted which decommodify one's exposure to the market and achieve marked equalization of incomes (Esping-Andersen 1990).

With the aforementioned *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990), PRA took center-stage as the dominant framework in comparative welfare state studies, launching what some have termed as a new "business" of wel-

fare modelling (Abrahamson 1999). Variations of the Worlds of Capitalism (WoC) typological classification are numerous, major contributions are listed in tables 1.1 and 1.2.




Figure 1.2: Typologies of Welfare Systems  
Source: (Schröder 2009:29)

Supplementary approaches have been merged with PRA to provide further explanatory power to the approach. Of the criticisms of PRA is its failure to take into account the extent which political/institutional structures affect welfare state development. The polity centered compliment stresses the importance of political structuring for welfare state development and maintenance. This variant is concerned with how the political environment in which welfare states arose and exist interact with policy decisions. “New policies create new politics” (Schattschneider 1935), and as Myles and Quadango (2002) summarizes, “when filtered through very different political systems, similar economic forces produce very different outcomes in the same way that an electrical charge produces a different effect in a refrigerator and a stove” (Myles and Quadango 2002:52; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993). The manner in which political systems are structured affect the way in which needs are not only articulated, but also how those needs are transformed (if at

Table 1.1: Welfare State Typological Studies 1/2

Year	Author	Metrics	Classifications			
1958	Wilensky and Lebeaux	System Maturity Total Social Expenditure % GDP	Residual: USA	Institutional: UK		
1974	Timuss	Service Provision Social Outcome	Residual: Anglo-phone States, CH	Industrial Achievement- Performance: Continental States (DE*)	Institutional Redistributive: TZ	
1977	Furniss and Tilton	State - Market Collaboration	Positive State: USA*	Social Security State: UK*	Social Welfare State: SE*	
1981	Flora and Alber	Government Types Enfranchisement	Constitutional Dualistic Monarchies: GR, ES	Liberal Democracies: USA, AU	Mass Democracies: Scandinavian States	Constitutional Dualistic Monarchies: DE, IT
1981	Mishra	Benefit Generosity State Responsibility Role of Non- Statutory Agencies	Residual: USA	Institutional: UK		
1990	Esping - Andersen	Decommodification Social Stratification Private-Public Mix	Liberal: AU, CA, IE, NZ, UK, USA	Conservative: FI, FR, DE, JP, IT, CH	Social Democratic: AT, BE, NL, DK, NO, SE	
1992	Leitfried	Poverty Social Rights Basic Income	Anglo-Saxon: AU, NZ, UK, USA	Bismarck: AT, DE	Scandinavian: DK, FI, NO, SE	Latin Rim: FR, GR, IT, PT, ES
1993	Castles and Mitchell	Aggregate Welfare Expenditure Benefit Equality	Liberal: IE, JP, CH, USA	Conservative: DE, IT, NL	Non-Right Hegemony: BE, DK, NO, SE	Radical: AU, NZ, UK
1994	Siaroff	Family Welfare Orientation Female Work Desirability Share of Benefits Directed at Women	Protestant Liberal: AU, CA, NZ, UK, USA	Advanced Christian- Democratic: AT, BE, FR, DE(W), LU, NL	Protestant Social- Democratic: DK, FI, NO, SE	Late Female Mobilization: GR, IE, IT, JP, PT, ES, CH
1994	Kangas	Decommodification - Cluster Analysis	Liberal: CA, USA	Conservative: AT, DE, IT, JP, NL	Social Democratic: DK, FI, NO, SE	Radical: AU, IE, NZ, UK
1994	Ragin	Pensions Decommodification - BOOLEAN Comparative Analysis	Liberal: AU, CA, CH, USA	Corporatist AT, BE, FI, FR, IT	Social Democratic: DK, SW, NO	Undefined: DE, IE, JP, NL, NZ, UK

Adapted from Bambra(2007) and Arts and Gelissen (2002); (a) Abrahamson also includes Central and Eastern EU Non-OECD grouping, not included here.

Table 1.2: Welfare State Typological Studies 2/2

Year	Author	Metrics	Classifications				
1996	Ferrera	Coverage Replacement Rates Poverty Rates	Anglo-Saxon: IE, UK	Bismarck: AT, BE, FR, DE, LU, NL, CH	Scandinavian: DK, FI, NO, SE	Southern: GR, IT, PT, ES	
1997	Bonoli	Social Expenditure (% GDP and Contribution Based)	British: IE, UK	Continental: BE, FR, DE, LU, NL	Nordic: DK, FI, NO, SE	Southern: GR, IT, PT, ES, CH	
1998	Korpi and Palme	Social Expenditure (% GDP) Institutional Characteristics	Basic Security: CA, DK, IE, NL, NZ, CH, UK, USA	Corporatist: AT, BE, FR, DE, IT, JP	Encompassing: FI, NO, SE	Targeted: AU	
1999	Pitzarello	Decommodification - Cluster Analysis	Liberal: CA, IE, UK, USA	Conservative: DE, NL, CH	Social Democratic: BE, DK, NO, SE	Conservative- Bismarckian: AT, FI, FR, IT, JP	Radical: AU, NZ
2001	Hall and Soskice	Production/Market Coordination	Liberal Market Economies: AU, CA, IE, NZ UK, USA	Coordinated Market Economies: AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, JP, NL, NO, SE, CH			
2001	Navarro and Shi	Political Tradition	Liberal/Anglo- Saxon: CA, IE, UK, USA	Christian Democrat: BE, NL, DE, FR, IT, CH,	Social Democratic: AT, DK, FI, NO, SE	Ex-Fascist: ES, GR, PT	
2002	Kautto	Service and Transfer Expenditures	Transfer Approach: BE, NL, AT, IT	Service Approach: FI, DE, NO, SE, UK	Low Approach: IE, GR, PT, ES		
2005	Bambra	Decommodification Healthcare Services	Liberal: AU, JP, USA	Conservative: AT, BE, CA, DK, FR, IT	Social Democratic: FI, NO, SE	Subgroup (Conservative): DE, CH, NL	Subgroup (Liberal): IE, NZ, UK
2006	Cavadino and Dignan	Decommodification Punitiveness	Neo- Liberalism: AU, NZ, ZA, UK (BandW), USA	Conservative Corporatism: DE, FR, IT, NL	Social Democratic Corporatism: FI, SE	Oriental Corporatism: JP	
2010	Abrahamson(a)	Total Expenditure as % GDP	Atlantic Europe: IE, UK	Continental Europe: AT, BE, FR, DE, LU, NL	Scandinavia: DK, FI, NO, SE	Southern Europe: GR, IT, PT, ES	Visegrad Countries: CZ, HU, PL, SK

Adapted from Bambra (2007) and Arts and Gelissen (2002); (a) Abrahamson also includes Central and Eastern EU Non-OECD grouping, not included here.

all) into policy. Proportional representation, federalist structuring of government, and diffusion of decision points to more and lower levels of authority, for instance, create substantial veto points which impede both evolution and retrenchment of welfare policy (Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Lijphart 1999; Immergut 1992; Tsebelis 1995).

**New Politics and Vested Interests** Such structural phenomenon inculcate norms of reciprocity and engender “new politics” on account of vested interests (e.g., the growth of political action groups for seniors safeguarding old-age pensions in the US - AARP, Inc.) (Pierson 1993; Mau 2004; Hacker 2004). Such developments create a “perpetual motion” phenomenon which enable a ratcheting up of social spending policies (Rothstein 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001). Vested interests are often embedded in politically and socially defined segmentations in society, such that a defined group is seen as the primary beneficiary of a policy or program which they themselves must be mobilized to perpetuate. Such segmentations and establishment of vested interests can and do lead to periodic backlashes of public sentiment where programs are seen as exclusive to one group to the detriment of (real or imagined) others. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), and others, show (for instance) that the degree of racial heterogeneity and prejudiced electorates can negatively impact welfare spending when minorities are viewed as primary beneficiaries of welfare policies (Fox 2004; Gilens 1999). While this is clearly evident in the race-based political climate of the United States, similar research has shown evidence of immigration and welfare expenditure - focusing on the antipathy of native populations - in the Nordic regions (Eger 2009). In addition, a gender compliment illustrates how women’s participation and labor force involvement has created strong demand for social protective institutions across regimes (Miles and Pierson 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001). Together, these areas of focus look at the position of groups based on a variety of cleaving factors (e.g., old-age/pension or bias in labor market advantage) which segment recipient citizens.

**Trust Matters** More recently, Rothstein (2010) has offered a further addition to PRA which incorporates quality of government into the approach. From this perspective, citizens must believe that institutions are fair, responsive to them as equals, and whether system is adequately guarded against abuse. In order for individuals to turn to the state, they must trust the state to work. In order to trust the state to work, they must be aware of the

competency of the state apparatus to facilitate such demands. The image portrayed of ‘the state’, then, is a crucial component of increasing or decreasing support for the *use* of the state (Rothstein 2010). In particular, this compliment illustrates that incorporating this facet of investigation tends to deflate the explanatory power of left parties and increases the effect of Christian democratic governments on welfare state formation.

**Feedback Effects** Finally, recent trends in research have begun to develop the scholarship on feedback effects and their impact on policies (e.g., Campbell, 2003; Soss 2000). This area looks at how welfare states impact upon themselves, reflexively. This literature focuses on the welfare state as an explanatory variable in constituent activity and support for welfare policy. The work in this area is supported by several recent findings concerning the deleterious effects of poverty and inequality (i.e., scarcity) on mental and emotional ability to inform their choices. Scarcity, and by extension inequality, consumes “mental bandwidth” which constrains the ability of those to perform optimally in economic and social decision making activities. As social policy design inherently consists of varying degrees of stress points on the individual or household, construction of cumbersome or demoralizing policies further taxes the ability of the poor to perform at optimal levels in decision making (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). “The very condition of [scarcity of resources]”, according to Kelly (2013), “can actually be a cause of poverty”. Thus, the multitude of rules and regulations which accompany many poverty relief policies may perversely increase the handicaps of many. The creeping normality of stringent regulatory actions on beneficiaries constrains their ability to appropriate their needs from government.<sup>1</sup>

These compliments to PRA make for a comprehensive set of theoretical and empirical avenues of exploration. PRA, however, has faced a significant challenge from within the field of comparative welfare state research. The most pronounced challenger to PRA comes from scholarship which has splintered from PRA and WoC approaches, towards the firm centered varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach of Hall and Soskice (2001). VoC differs from PRA in both focus and assumptions. The following sub-sections address these issues.

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<sup>1</sup>These recent developments entice further questions. If the poor cannot make quality decisions about the common types of situations that directly concern their immediate lives, how does it effect the types of choices that effect the political agenda.

### 1.3.4 Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)

As opposed to focusing on political power constellations across welfare regimes or families, VoC advocates a bifurcated model based on how firms, embedded in markets, have organized themselves and led to the development of welfare types with the *assistance* of cross-class coalitions (Hall and Soskice 2001; Korpi 2003, Mares 2003). The primary types of groupings are liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). VoC posits that the employer-employee nexus forms a causal stream for welfare state development – where companies are “the crucial actors in the capitalist economy” (Korpi 2006:169).

Workers do not demand protection from the market in LMEs because they invest in general skills demanded by employers and can thus insure themselves with access to employment. Workers in CMEs, on the other hand, have specific skills and thus demand security for their risks of not being readily able to transfer their skill portfolio to other employers. Employers act on the basis that individuals will not invest in (hard to transfer) skills if they are rational, as companies will not insure them against unemployment. Hence, the welfare state intervenes to provide security to invest in human capital. As opposed to PRA, VoC views parties and other political agents as concentrated on particular industry/sector interests, not class divisions. While they both cite risk aversion as a driver, they differ on which side (employer/employee, capital/labor) is the author of policy. While VoC proponents, notably Iversen and Soskice (2009), have vehemently defended the VoC approach as distinctively separate and superior to the PRA approach, while others have argued convincingly for incorporation of the two.

## 1.4 PRA v VoC - Contrast or Compromise

Earlier debates between PRA and VoC have most notably taken place between Korpi(2003, 2006), Iversen and Soskice (2009), and Iversen, Cusack and Soskice (2010). The discussion has been dictated by the fundamental difference of opinion regarding where welfare state development originated. Following Lash and Urry (1987), investigating changes to welfare states with relation to the initial organization of capital and labor relationships, VoC interprets social protection as a set of complimentary institutions which firms agree to voluntarily in order to satisfy their own interests. As opposed to PRA, which views development as an essentially competitively organized framework - where left party mobilization imposed demands on reluctant

employers, VoC proposes that firms (not class-based mobilization), were the driving force behind welfare state development. More so, the two theoretical approaches are reluctant to come to terms with the correlation of proportional representation systems and welfare state variation.

As opposed to the PRA, VoC views parties and other political agents as concentrated on particular industry/sector interests. “Scholars within this perspective reject the hypothesis that welfare state development reflects any particular balance of power between and labor and capital” (Korpi 2006:170). PRA views employers as consenting in CMEs, but certainly not protagonists, and more often than not antagonists, for social rights. “VoC scholars ...have mistaken employer’s consent to expansion as evidence of their first-order preferences” (171). In PRA, employers have access to the bulk of economic power and laborers sell their labor/human capital to them. By creating a reserve wage, welfare states bring employers to the negotiating table to the advantage of labor. Importantly, PRA starts out by accepting that “socioeconomic class generates differences in risks to which citizens are exposed during the life course” (173). What is at issue is a “politics of markets” and not “politics against markets”.

#### 1.4.1 PRA’s Defense:

Regarding early welfare state developments and the emergence of Christian (confessional) parties, Korpi argues that the Catholic Church supported efforts to defuse growing affinity among the likely constituents with socialist and communist parties with a logic of “corporatist thinking”. Confessional parties sprang up in response to an overt policy of “counteracting the socialist threat by creating societal institutions that would generate cooperation between employers and employees and split the base for working-class collective mobilization by segmenting the dependent labor force into separate occupational communities.” (175).

This instigated, in essence, a European “separate but equal” institutionalization which manipulated religion as a cleaving factor in attracting the allegiance of the working class to the detriment of socialist factions. While many critics of PRA see it as a zero-sum game, Korpi (2006) argues this is not the case and as much is indicated by a closer reading of the supporting literature. Furthermore, the risk pools for VoC are narrow and based on occupational standings, whereas those of PRA are broad and class based. Instead of *detracting* from PRA, Korpi argues that the work of Mares (2003)

and Swenson (1991, 2002), which has been held up as proof against PRA, actually proves PRA's claim that it was not employers who moved welfare, but rather merely that employers *consented* to development. VoC, argues Korpi, should not be seen as a contender to PRA, but as a complement.

### 1.4.2 VoC Response

The VoC response by Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) and Iversen and Soskice (2009) forms a dual pronged attack on the argument laid out by Korpi. First, the authors lay out an extended interpretation of how proportional representation is critical to understanding firm involvement. Second, VoC, argues Iversen and Soskice, should not be confused in any sense with PRA as (1) PRA assumes that firms are captive by left party demand and (2) PRA cannot account for the frequent violations of the Meltzer-Richard median voter theorem, a common assumption on PRA research - "data for advanced democracies consistently show equality in market income to be associated with high redistribution" (Iversen and Soskice 2009:440).

The Meltzer and Richard model, they argue, does not address why redistribution is negatively related to market income inequality.<sup>2</sup> The historical narrative of Iversen and Soskice puts economic coordination ahead of political developments – including the franchise and the choice of electoral system.

“Coordinated capitalism and proportional representation determine distribution and redistribution. . . [Employers and the right] chose [proportional representation] because of the opportunities this representative system created for collaborative arrangements with labor” (Iversen and Soskice 2009:443).<sup>3</sup>

In this view, where the right did not fear the left (in the presence of unions and trades/craft industries interested in regulation), the right welcomed the

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<sup>2</sup>However, following Marshall (1950), such violations may be accounted for by proximity to accomplishment. That is, “diminution of inequality [strengthens] the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social welfare” (Marshall 1950, found in Manza and Sauder 2009:153). In essence, success encourages confidence in the ability of the state, while failure discourages faith in the policy.

<sup>3</sup>A further interpretation of the rationale for the choice of PR and franchise extension is given by Rodden (2010), elaborated in Chapter 8; one which relies more on strategic linkages of party based interests.

opportunity to collaborate with the left. Decisions to pursue majoritarian representative systems followed where the right feared the left because of threats from unions and their supporters, in turn they chose systems to hold onto power and protect their interests. Subsequent developments in political representation is itself a reflection of power struggles between conflicting sides. Injecting presidencies into PR systems helps to claw back losses incurred from proportional representation. Federalism with high labor mobility increases tax competition among states and with immobility it allows for differences but “limits and compensates for competition” to ensure investments won’t be lost (Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007).

“Economic interests are the ultimate drivers” of the institutionalization of PR, coordinated economic systems, and coalitional patterns. As the (self-proclaimed) first “real” challenge to social cleavage theory of Rokkan (1970) and the framework offered by Esping-Andersen (1990), the respondents to Korpi’s defense claim to offer a “bridge between party politics and the economic interests that are embedded in production systems” (457). The existence of exclusionary minimum winning coalitions determines distributive outcomes, while the consensus aspect of PR relates to the regulatory politics if other interest incorporation is deemed appropriate or desirable. All states that are now PR/CMEs were previously locally coordinated and were *Standestaaten*.

In analyzing the American liberal developments, they cite the role that weak unions and lack of pressure on the political system (in the 19th century) to form PR.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to PRA, Iversen and Soskice (2009) find no evidence of intense battles of contestation between the left and right. “Political parties representing [both the right and left] for the most part agreed on the move to PR.” (465).

In addition, the Christian Democratic parties which emerged as part of the Kulturkampf against the Catholic church was necessary, but not sufficient, for its continued existence. Thus, they assume that economic linkages cemented the supporters of confessional parties in line with Korpi’s analysis, but devoid of the strategy of short circuiting class-power. In essence, VoC views political parties as servants, but not drivers, in the initial construction of welfare state institutions. Firms agree to institutions and high replace-

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<sup>4</sup>This, however, begs the question of how the out-migration of workers from continental Europe, and the in-migration to the Americas, fits into their account, given the absence of political participation of early labor in the American states.

ment rates as insurance for high-end skill development.

Ironically, Iversen and Stephens (2008) argue that there is no reason why PRA and VoC (Welfare Production Regimes (WPR)) cannot be combined. Using educational investment to analyse the merit of the two theories, the authors find that the two competing theories are complimentary. Thus, the VoC CMEs are divided into two sub-groups, while LMEs still form the ideal type. Proportional representation continues to play the most vital role as it allows for the type of coordination in human capital formation which firms take advantage of, and enables the environment where left and center left coalitions (minimum winning coalitions) can come to power and pursue redistributive policy agendas.

By shifting the focus from the traditional view of working class mobilization and left party power, VoC scholars have challenged the field to view alternative perspectives as viable subject matters. This path has not gone unused, many inside and outside the field of welfare state research have begun to investigate evidence from this evolving perspective. PRA, however, remains a powerful perspective and one which this thesis finds ample evidence to support its focus on the political powers and capacities of constituent members of society to form and alter welfare state institutions - directly or (more often) indirectly. These two approaches (rather recent, in relative terms) are useful in two aspects. First, the starting points they represent in terms of why both systems of redistribution and political inputs have come about affect how we approach the study of political processes and welfare systems. VoC, with its emphasis on firm influence and negotiation to favor skill formation and protection, implies that political participation takes on a more minor role in the development of social protective institutions. PRA, on the other hand, focuses on the abilities of actors and labor groups to use their resources to facilitate welfare state formation and development - not least of which is their political power. Thus, the two views are particularly useful in deciding which mechanisms the researcher should best focus on.

Having briefly surveyed these issues, I turn to a substantively more involved concern regarding welfare system formation - the underlying normative basis for (and against) state intervention - i.e., legitimacy. Whereas the preceding discussion has focused on the development of approaches to understanding the establishment of welfare systems in a comparative perspective, the following section involves a discussion on the normative considerations for why the state ought or ought not involve itself in the financing and/or provision of services. This section thus provides a large degree of interpretation

and historical reference.

## 1.5 Legitimacy of the Welfare State

Justifying state intervention has proven to be a burning bush and an achilles heel to the development of welfare systems. On the one hand, calls for social justice and equality resonate with citizens at all levels of society. However, establishing fairness (whether normative, procedural, or economically), deservingness (income thresholds, physical distress, behavioral standards), scope (targeted or universal benefits), and content (duration of benefit receipt and generosity) are issues which can, and often do, unhinge gains made by proponents of engaged state action. Justifications for the creation of particular variants of welfare systems which have taken on moral, economic, and (more recently) political themes are discussed in turn.

### 1.5.1 Moral Debates and Norms of Reciprocity

Issues of redistribution invariably involve matters of moral prerogatives regarding the “just” (re)distribution of resources. Social justice is an intensely contentious area of debate, and as such this subsection delves deeper into this issue than others. Development and reforms of the welfare state and its corresponding institutional structure, then, imply unavoidable debates around how moral justifications are developed and transmitted to constituents. Mau (2003, 2004) demonstrates how debates around such moral considerations have taken on, primarily, one of two genres of viewpoint. One approaches the legitimacy of the welfare state from a rationalist perspective where individuals act in accordance with their own (known) preferences and for their personal benefit. Here, individuals are agents of their own material benefit maximization and expect others to act accordingly. A second approach perceives of individuals as inherently concerned with moral objectives and normative understanding of individual and community identity. Individuals in this view have as their first order preferences the mutual association of betterment, a ‘quasi-Titmuss paradigm’ (Mau 2004:56; Deacon, 2002:22).

This thesis posits that these two “camps” of legitimization of welfare are two sides of the same coin, and arguably pre-date that of the modern welfare state as discussed here. That is, welfare institutions, and the welfare state itself, are manifestations of the morals and normative goals which are right and just to each society (Katznelson 1988). The contrasting modes of justification shape and enforce the very institutional structures which members

must interact with. It is important then to view the welfare state as not simply a practice of political and economic accounting, but as a process by which ideals of morality and reciprocity are congealed into operative systems. The worlds of *homo economicus* and *homo reciprocus* stand at polar ends of a continuum on which most members of the polity find themselves. The intractable dilemma involves an endless struggle between those who see welfare institutions as legitimate on the grounds of solidarity and the betterment of the community, and those who contest the same institutions as representations of individual utility calculations with legitimacy based on value for money (Marshall 1964; Titmuss 1974; Mau 2003, 2004; Rothstein, 1998).

These two competing approaches have shaped modern welfare states at least since the early 20th century if not well before. At their core, these theses embody two opposing views of the nature of the individual's place and role in society, and what society itself "naturally" embodies. For the rationalist camp, individuals are seekers of their own profit. Their view follows from a Malthusian Social Darwinism of survival of the fittest. Society's role is to protect morality and reform deviants punitively and to the fullest extent of the law. On the other hand, those who espouse a solidaristic moral viewpoint operate from a Kropotkin Social Darwinistic approach, which sees individuals as cooperative by nature and seekers of mutual agreements. Society's role is to promote morality through its institutional structure and reintegrate deviants as full members of community. As such, measuring welfare states need not rely solely on how much or how often a state allocates resources for assistance or insurance. Rather, a normative approach is useful in tackling the more contentious nature of establishing why the state ought to intervene at all. Thus, as others have detailed the various clustering of states based on selected outcome variables, so too can one just as readily use ethical considerations to also build segmentations. A pragmatic framework, diverting from typical quantitative typological accounts, is provided by Mau (2003) - Figure 1.3.

As such, it is not necessary to follow a singular metric of welfare regime measurement, and indeed we gain by constructing and fusing different approaches. While institutional effort and programmatic reach and efficiency are certainly valuable for our ability to grasp the reality of welfare states (especially in a comparative studies framework), it is also possible to view different systems for what and how they view the individual's and state's role in benefit structures. The immediate subsections focus on two main strands of justification from a moral viewpoint - one based on atomized agency, and the other on collective organization.




Figure 1.3: Welfare Regimes and Norms of Social Exchange  
 Source: (Mau 2004)

### Malthus and the Perversity of Poverty

Hard as it may appear in individual cases, dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful - Thomas Malthus

The rationalist strand of discourse is often (though not exclusively or always so vehemently) dominated by a market fundamentalist tone of debate. Emphasis is given to the direct effect of institutional arrangements on economic resources and moral behaviour. The latter issue is often subsumed to the former. Benefit take-up is couched in terms of individual idleness or intentional abuse. Historically, market fundamentalism, be it in the guise of the Austrian borne neo-liberal variant or its Victorian predecessor, is transfixed by the morality of social citizenship as much as its egalitarian counterpart. The critical difference between these two poles of perception is the view of the state as destructive (residualist) or instructive (universalistic) to morally desirable behaviour.

**Victorians and Neo-Victorians:** The evidence of this extends into the recent past, at least back to the advent of industrialization and the rise of market capitalism; it is instructive to appreciate how far debates have *not* come. Of the many antagonists of welfare provision (i.e., poor relief), there

may be no more articulate of opponents as Thomas Malthus - of whom many fervently followed in spirit and teachings. Malthus arraigned the poor laws themselves for poverty and followed others to promote the subjugation of social policy to the market. Like Hayek and the Austrian School of economists who ousted pragmatic American liberals, early market fundamentalists saw the practicality, if not necessity, of letting “nature” take its course.

Wars and famines, unemployment and recessions, were nature’s way of thinning the herd and any attempts to interfere with that were doomed to failure. With strong support in the Royal Commission, and a larger enfranchised population of upper class voters, the Malthusian 1834 New Poor Law (NPL) reforms “broke the institutionalist social compact and replaced it with a market-based one” (Somers and Block 2005:276). It did so by “joining the moral categories of desert, merit, and self-sufficiency to the material status of poverty and the volatility of the labor market” (ibid.).

Queerly, the political and economic changes in the US (which culminated in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)), like the NPL, were based on analogous events in the US. Beginning with the Mount Perelin Society (founded by the Austrian economist Hayek) classical liberals began to construct an alternate narrative purporting deficiencies in social and economic situations. Joined by Friedman, who saw a “middle way” between the evils of collectivism and the failure of Victorian liberalism, the neo-liberal narrative began to take tangible form. As opposed to Adam Smith, who saw a role for governments to pro-actively pursue public projects and establish the institutional structures necessary to defend against market failures. Friedman believed that such endeavors belonged to the private market. This coupled with Hayek’s view that the longstanding tradition of Keynesianism, which reigned into the Great Society, was inherently flawed - precisely the way in which market fundamentalists in the 1800s saw the mercantilist policies before them (Jones 2012).

Poverty, for *Neo-Victorians* (neo-liberals) as with their classical liberal predecessors (Morone 2003), is not so much an economic condition as it is a moral condition. The poor are, and remain so, as a result of their inability to say “no” to vices and “yes” to long-term hardships and hard work. The neo-liberal intellectual base (having developed narratives in think tanks, disseminated to journalists, and then promoted by political operatives) working in tandem with conservatives (who had found a common banner to unite under via anti-communism and shocks to the established order - e.g., Brown

vs Board of Education), was propelled to the center of the political arena where not previously possible.

The social and economic turmoil of the 60s and 70s were reframed as products of failed policy guided by erroneous judgments of how the system actually worked. Just as the “Lockean-inspired social naturalism” of Joseph Townsend propagated the failure of the Poor Laws in 1786 (i.e., once the poor were subjected to the harsh realities of their moral and behavioral inferiorities, they would be impelled to lift themselves out of their situations), so too works such as Charles Murray’s *Losing Ground* instigated renewed acceptance of stigmatizing the poor for their situation in light of, and often in the face of, any evidence to the contrary. The “culture of poverty” thesis, propagated by Murray and others, contends that the poor and their value structures are to blame for their circumstances.

**Free Market Morality:** The culture of poverty position disguises, argue Crutchfield and Pettinicchio (2009), a more insidious phenomenon operating in the background of social and political discourse. They offer a “culture of inequality” thesis which posits that a permissiveness towards inequality (both social and economic) depresses demand for government intervention to reduce the effects of such inequality. It “reaches its highest form among those modern-day social Darwinists who believe that the problems of the poor, the unemployed, and the uneducated are due to their own failures” (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio, 2009:135).

The *conversion narrative* of conservative arguments framed the aspiration against market capitalism in the 1970s as ignorance and incompetence on the part of the intellectuals who derided the system (Somers and Block 2005:266). Quoting Friedman at the Southern Industrial Relations Conference in Blue Mountain, NC, Powell notes:

“It (is) crystal clear that the foundations of our free society are under wide-ranging and powerful attack — not by Communist or any other conspiracy but by misguided individuals parroting one another and unwittingly serving ends they would never intentionally promote.” (Powell, 1970; p.18)

Such opinions alone are (for all intents and purposes) only personally held views and not actionable in the policy sense. Ideas require a catalyst moment to become actionable political issues. They must, according to Fraser (1989),

break out of the private (non-political) arena and find a place in public (political) discourse. The crises of the 1970s provided the opportunity for the launch of these ideas into mainstream politics. The depth and breadth of the turmoil of the decade swept across the globe, and took a notable toll on US domestic (and international) policy agendas. While welfare retrenchment was encountered by all industrialized nations in the 1970s and 1980s, this retrenchment was virulently ideological in the US and UK (Huber and Stephens 2001). In the US, Ronald Reagan's indictment against "welfare queens" in his 1976 presidential campaign found resonance among middle class voters and deficient reaction in the subsiding efficacy of political power at the lower end of the income distribution (Quadagno 1984, 1996; Hays 2003; Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001).<sup>5</sup>

Reagan had long advocated the need for the poor to be given self-respect and spiritual dignity through work, however low-paid that may be. He proposed, as early as 1972, that "all able-bodied welfare recipients should be required to work on highway construction and other public service jobs without additional pay" (UPI 1972). Such rhetoric coalesced with growing sentiments that the problem with welfare was the "reward" given to those (predominantly mothers) on social welfare for having more children. This view was shared among conservative and liberal opinions, that the AFDC recipient did not live in the "real world", but instead in one that created dependency through laziness and lack of foresight.

Reagan saw an opportune moment to dismantle the Nixon administration's agenda on welfare reform, which sought to establish a guaranteed income. Across the Atlantic, Thatcher and the New Right equally set upon a welfare system believed to be inept in an effort to "remoralize" not just welfare, but society as a whole - notably by privatizing public assets (Abrahamson 2003). While Reagan failed in his election bid, the real victory of his campaign was the breakout of market fundamentalist policies backed by social and religious conservatives. The *epistemic privilege* (Somers and Block

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<sup>5</sup>For this market-based turn in policy, neo-liberals brought the ideal of personal responsibility firmly about face from the progressive era. Reagan castigated welfare beneficiaries during his bid for the presidency in which he claimed that "She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is collecting veteran's benefits on four nonexistent deceased husbands. And she is collecting Social Security on her cards. She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free income alone is over USD 150,000" (AP 1977). Lynda Taylor, who surfaced around 1974 in Chicago, Illinois (St. Petersburg Times 1974), was arraigned on 31 counts including grand theft, perjury, and bigamy (ibid.).

2005:265) bequeathed to neo-liberal doctrine has (despite its critics) all but overrun all other competing narratives in the United States. The attack on the institutions of the American welfare state has everything to do with an absence of a solidaristic understanding of the moral purpose of the welfare state and a constant derision of government intervention. One might say that a focus on Reagan and Thatcher surely fall short of the entirety of participants, however their contributions were significant.

**A Never-ending Story:** Thus, when Michael Tanner (2003) and others present their propositions of limited government, they continue to pander to audiences with matter-of-fact arguments which, ironically, utilize self-fulfilling prophecies engineered by their co-opponents of state intervention in conjunction with the logic of proponents of the universal welfare state (i.e., that poverty is undesirable and solutions must be effective) (Orbach, 2006). It is unsurprising that Tanner closes his *Poverty of Welfare* (2003) with reference to the archetypal welfare state antagonist, Charles Murray: “A return to limited government should not be confused with ending communal efforts to solve social problems. In a free society, a genuine need produces a response. If government is not seen as a legitimate source of intervention, individuals and associations will respond” (Tanner, 2003:158). “Charities”, according to Tanner, “operate far more efficiently than do their government counterparts” (Tanner, 2003: 103).

The views of Tanner, and others, reflect the dogmatic manner in which conservative/neo-liberal, residual government proponents frame and disseminate their arguments for a renaissance of an elusive, if not imaginary, market economic moral core - for an “American dream”. The overt failings of many of the market friendly policies to alleviate distress were, according to Somner and Block (2005), simply ignored by their supporters. “Data are not essential to certain arguments about social policy and indeed can get in the way.” (Murray 1984; found in Somners and Block 2005:p.278). The utopia of a neo-liberal, market-driven policy universe thus accepted positive feedback while blatantly ignoring, or categorically refuting, any evidence to the contrary. The result is a system where beneficiaries are increasingly subjected to ever more stigmatized and demeaning bureaucratic processes on the basis of restoring work-ethic. Claimants are “screened, diagnosed and treated for their dependence on welfare.” (Schram 2006:6).

At its core, these issues are based on a certain preoccupation with the

efficiency of the market and reciprocity divorced of egalitarian objectives. In this view, the welfare state is detrimental to morality. The location of solidarity is isolated to the informal institutions of society (churches, volunteer organisations, and so forth) (Notten, Geranda, and de Neubourg 2007). The “new regime” of governing marginality is explicitly paternalistic at the lower (e.g., social welfare) income levels and laissez faire at the higher (i.e., occupational and fiscal welfare) levels of the welfare state (Titmuss 1965, Wacquant 2001b, Schram 2006).

This has contributed to leaving the American institutional system relatively weak and distrusted by large swathes of the population, a fact that is as much a function of actual institutional incapacity as it is ideological rhetoric (Table 1.4). Diminished trust in institutions and targeted benefits and services perpetuate this situation, but importantly have not led to its demise (Rothstein 2010). While Americans tend to favor less government intervention into welfare than their European and Scandinavian counterparts, they have not abandoned it, despite concerted efforts from the political right.

This brings to light a considerable question: Why have Americans not turned their back on the state when the chorus of market fundamentalist supporters have rallied so diligently to dismantle even the most basic trust in government? Two considerations are particularly relevant here. First, Americans, according to Feldman and Steenbergen (2001), are humanitarian but not necessarily egalitarian. Thus, Americans support welfare policies instituted with the goal of moralized assistance to the needy, but not large structuring of social policy to interfere with market mechanisms. There is good reason for this. Humanitarianism is compatible with capitalism, whereas egalitarianism evokes images of (incompetent) state interference and control. However, are these preferences particular to Americans, and if so, why? One possibility, according to Mau (2004) and Rothstein (1998), lies in the fundamental nature of individuals to organize a “moral economy” of welfare institutions.

Individuals have personal experiences with welfare policies and these experiences inform their attitudes regarding the normative justifications of policies. More so, these experiences inform the potential beneficiary voter about her status in the social order, impacting her attitude towards politics and her propensity to participate in communicative political activities (Mau 2004, Kumlin 2004, Soss 2002). The beneficiary’s perception that his claim is backed by moral justification, that he has a defined entitlement to receive benefits, is itself a function of the prevailing norms of social justice. Where




Figure 1.4: Trust in National Institutions Among OECD Countries 2010  
Source: OECD Social Indicators

the client is perceived as the “other” in society, he will likely feel the inherent stigma attached to claim making (Rothstein and Stolle 2003).<sup>6</sup> While arguments against perverse effects of state intervention on the economy and the moral well-being of society clearly help to understand how and why *op-position* to the welfare state has developed and persisted, it fails to account for why the welfare states persist.

### Community and Collective Protection

“The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been maintained by mankind up to the present

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<sup>6</sup>These issues are further elaborated in 2.1.2

time, notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history” (Kropotkin, 1902)

Developments in the US, following the decline of the Great Society and New Deal coalition, illustrate the effects of declining trust and moral legitimacy on the welfare state. The concerted effort of a dedicated core group of neo-liberal scholars and policy makers shifted welfare debate considerably away from universal provision and the reciprocal norms attached with it. Juxtaposed to the view of welfare institutions as antagonistic towards social morality lies the view of welfare institutions as virtuous arrangements, supportive of societal solidarity and cohesion. This view is espoused, notably, by TH Marshall and Richard Titmuss, among many. From this perspective, the state is guarantor of an institutional setting which facilitates full citizenship. Welfare institutions are legitimate on the basis of social justice, and this social justice is underwritten by the morality of collective assistance. That is, the responsibility to care for those in need lies at the institutional level. Ensuring just institutions is at the heart of ensuring just outcomes. As such, procedural justice is paramount for maintaining the legitimacy of institutions (Rawls 1999; Rothstein 2010, 2013).

In democratic market economy states, this entails that the responsibility lies at the feet of government and focuses on areas which the market cannot or will not provide at a socially satisfactory level. That is, “the main purpose of welfare state institutions is to achieve a balance in the quality of life between members and groups in a given society by means of organized and institutionalized reciprocity” (Mau 2004:59). In contrast to the punitive and stigmatizing nature of minimalist welfare systems, universalistic systems operate from a basis of shared entitlement and wellbeing.

Marshall’s oft cited work focuses on the development of social rights, in an English context, from civil and political rights. This account is largely interpreted to entail that social rights are the result of a progressive evolution of society to incorporate individuals into the full status of citizens. An alternative understanding to the three component argument views this framework not as a *static* evolutionary relationship, but as a *dynamic* process in perpetual flux. According to Marshall, the constituent elements of citizenship were established sequentially: civil (with the Reform Act of 1832), political (universal suffrage: 1918;1928), and social(Beveridge report 1942 and subsequent legislation). Marshall was attuned to the functional purpose of social citizenship, acknowledging the explicit remedial effect of welfare provision in capitalist economies. Citizenship, for Marshall, stood outside and against the development of market economies. “In the twentieth century,” Marshall

argues, “citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war” (Marshall 1950:92). This conflict is more perceptible in recent history due to the antagonistic nature of the welfare state and capitalist economies. Social rights, according to Marshall, subordinate market price to social justice. The market is constrained from commodifying individual risk over one’s life by the establishment of collective arrangements.

The establishment of these collective arrangements is a product of the three components of citizenship acting in unison. Individually, these components are not necessarily potent enough to disturb the market. The first element of citizenship, civil rights, did not pose a threat to capitalism because they did not interfere with the system. Civil rights buttressed capitalist claims that the basis for society lay in contractual agreements and that individuals were solely responsible for their own well-being based on their value. “Differential status...was replaced by a single uniform status of citizenship ...which the structure of inequality could be built” (Marshall 1950, found in Manza and Sauder 2009:151). The rights of the 19th century did not impede inequality as no recourse to the failure to achieve one’s right existed.<sup>7</sup> However, political rights gave action to the guarantees made possible by of civil rights.

The traditional view... was that a man had a right to earn a living, and if unable to do so, a right to be kept alive by his community. The view of the middle-class liberal economists was that men must take such jobs as the market offered (Hobsbawm 1999:67).

The collective nature of individuals (i.e., the resilience of cooperative survival) was and is part and parcel to the advancement of the components of rights, and particularly the advancement of political and social rights. The *old* Poor Laws were a barrier to *industrialist* interests; industrialists who were seeing not only the expansion of their own political power, but also the movement towards that of the laboring classes. Thus, the extension of the franchise in the mid 1800s meant not only would parliament represent more numerous and poorer interests, it also entailed that elites would need increasingly indirect means of “incentivizing” the changing work force. The Poor

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<sup>7</sup>That is, a property right is a right to acquire property and defend it. A right to speech is a right to voice one’s opinions without fear of reprisal. However, this does not entail others have a duty to provide another with property or attend to another’s opinion.

Law Reforms provided a vehicle to these ends at the bequest of the enfranchised industrialist class. “The [new] poor law was an aid...to capitalism, because it relieved industry of all social responsibility outside the contract of employment, while sharpening the edge of competition in the labor market” (Marshall 1950, found in Manza and Sauder 2009:151).

Growing inequalities had very little impact on the capitalist system because “the mass of the working people did not wield effective political power” (ibid.). As labor developed political power, a program to replace the latter Poor Law progressed (Korpi and Palme 1998). This proved to be a significant problem for capital. Political rights, unlike civil rights, contained inherently precarious issues for the growing capitalist system. Those extending the franchise were, most likely, woefully unaware of the full weight of their “generosity”. Political power enabled, among other things, collective bargaining which strengthened the established, and cherished, civil rights regime of citizenship. Organized labor interests, acting as mobilized political forces, represented a powerful force underwritten by the contractual ideology of the market. Collective political rights reinforced collective bargaining ability, harnessing the communal preferences of the laboring classes in new and unsettling ways.

The Poor Law created “others” who were outside the realm of respectable citizens. Beneficiaries were of a separate status, effectively that of non-citizen (Preuss 2003). With the advent of political rights, however, such a status was increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to sell to the electorate - especially an electorate now comprised of the previously morally reprehensible. Citizens, needy or otherwise, were legally and politically *equals* - at least as far as political representatives were concerned. Democratic participation is instrumental because, notes Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006), it “channels the ‘demand’ for public spending by granting citizens voice” (274). A politician faced with an enlarged electoral pool operates from a different calculus than one in a narrow field of interests. As such, argue Lizzeri and Persico (2004), political actors aim their pledges at the widest possible audience. The morally defensible duty of the state to protect citizens from distress is by far one of the most broad campaigns one may think of. Put simply, a larger pool of electors incentivizes the prospective candidate and/or party to make electoral promises which are inclusive of that electorate. As clientellism diminished, actors adjusted their platforms correspondingly. Much more has been written, and will be addressed, on the place of franchise extension and welfare policy. What is key to grasp here is the centrality of such political developments for earlier developments in very real ways.

The “moral economy” of the welfare state is enabled by the extension of the civic and political rights of citizenship. By constructing institutions based on the lowest common denominator such as citizenship, states promote reciprocity based on a common shared status. Electors are not only self-calculating agents of their own personal utility, they are also members of a moral community. The identification of themselves in the community as equals is cemented by shared expectations of morally acceptable behavior. With the advent of social rights, supported by the configuration of moral sentiments which shoulder institutional frameworks, states construct institutions of welfare on top of society’s norms. As Dobelstein (1999) argues, “welfare cannot go beyond what [citizens] believe to be right and wrong ways to live... welfare does not define the [system], the [system] defines welfare” (Dobelstein 1999:xiv, 6). Norms of reciprocity are informative to creating appropriate policy. Additionally, these norms not only communicate the “proper” etiquette of social citizenship, they are also sensitive to the *experience* of social citizenship (Soss 2000, Rothstein 1988, 1999). While the system defines what welfare is and ought to be, the beneficiaries of the system integrate institutionalized norms of reciprocity into their actions and reactions. Thus, increased equality of citizens, supported by their rights, enables the possibility of realizing communal protection. As the role of the state is no longer seen as one of agitator to moral soundness, institutional development is given room to evolve and build (ideally) trust as it develops competency.

### Summary

It is clear that attitudes towards morally appropriate behavior and norms of reciprocity lie at the heart of welfare institutions. Citizens work from a menu, so to speak, of morally justifiable and normatively acceptable policy solutions which satisfy to one degree or another the expectations of how members ought to be treated by each other (Jaeger 2006, Mau 2004). The advent of modern social rights, according to Marshall, are expressions of the community’s moral duty to each other. They are, which I will discuss further, more so expressions of those who are “politically relevant”. While residualist interests see the natural state of society as an atomized world of individual effort and reward, collectivist/universalist interests perpetuate state organized mutual aid on the basis of the benefits which mutual achievement brings. As with Hythloday explaining the lessons of Utopia, the two logics seem at constant odds. The atomizing mode of thought produces systems designed

to reduce the interplay of state interaction against the “natural” processes of the market; in contrast to the collective mode of survivalist thought which sees organized activity as the normal and necessary course for maintaining progress. That said, and having laid out the expose of the moral nuances for and against state interference, it is necessary to detail economic justifications for the legitimacy of the welfare state which have been forwarded for degrees of state action - counterpoints will not be discussed.

### 1.5.2 Insurance

“The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy.” - Oscar Wilde

Another strand of research bases the justification and legitimacy of the welfare state on its functional aspect. That is, while the previous view posits that welfare institutions are essentially moral and normative manifestations, this economic or insurance view sees the welfare state as a functional necessity. This posits that society demands and creates welfare institutions to mitigate the failures of the market. As such, this view espouses more questions of efficiency and trade-offs related to state intervention (Sandmo 1999). For VoC, for instance, social insurance and assistance schemes are necessary compliments to the nature of the business world and not expressly the rewards of class struggle against capital interests (Iversen 2006, Mares 2003). Citizens continue to support redistribution on the basis of reciprocity, however their motivation to do so is essentially one arrived at by calculation of the costs and benefits of participation (Miller 1995).

The changing nature of employment patterns and household structures necessitates welfare institutions which enable individuals to participate fully in economic life. Greater female participation in the labor market entails less production of welfare services in the home, thereby necessitating and releasing more labor into the social protection sector to compensate for this loss (Huber and Stephens 2001). As women make up a large portion of the bureaucracy devoted to the supply of welfare services, the welfare state operates as the largest employer of women - in effect instigating a vested interest cycle noted in the politics centered compliment of PRA (Huber and Stephens 2001). Policies which enable women to enter the labor market, independent of male income, is not entirely an explicit result of feminist movements (Sainsbury 1996). Rather, policies driving services, such as childcare, are strategic measures to ensure maximal use of labor (Morgan 2006; Orloff 2002). The

changing nature of the economy and family structures justifies institutional welfare provision to enable workers not only to increase their human capital, but also (for instance) to stave off declining fertility rates - both integral components of economic success (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Recent research has also indicated that changing economic opportunities, notably in Sweden, is leading to a “masculinization” of poverty among the younger segments of the population (Broström 2012).

Thus, services are provided by the state, according to Barr (2001), because of the imperfections of the market. The state has legitimate reasons to intervene as information asymmetry implies that there are risks that the private market cannot or will not insure, or that consumers cannot afford. Adverse selection of clients by private market insurance firms or other enterprises create a need, for instance, for governments to impose mandatory unemployment insurance (Akerlof 1970). Whereas debates regarding the moral legitimacy of welfare institutions revolve largely around normative meanings of behavior, debates from an economic viewpoint revolve largely around behaviors which violate theories of economic principles. A justification that unemployment insurance is necessary because of market failure is weighed against moral hazard. Here the design of policy becomes based on the expected likelihoods that an individual will select out of employment to free ride on the system - the oft proclaimed *benefit cheat*. As with attempts to target policies at morally undesirable behaviours, issues arise when systems attempt to target *inefficient* behaviours.

The push to activate as many unemployed as possible essentially filters the hardest to employ into the existing social protection system. In which case, the system can either choose to accept that they are unable to be employed and continue to support those individuals, or it can cease to support the individual and remove them from the system – itself an administrative hassle. These hard-to-employ individuals invariably find themselves in an “assisted equilibrium” where they find state help when they can, and other means of living to “get by” in the meantime. In many cases, this leads to “abuse” and fraud. In addition, this can lead to extremely criminogenic environments which themselves can prove economically detrimental to society (Downes 2006, Lacey 2008). I will address these criminogenic effects further in chapter three.

## Summary

Inman (1987) noted that “the institution of market trading cannot enforce cooperative behavior on self-seeking, utility-maximizing agents, and cooperation between agents is often required for beneficial trading”. From the perspective of legitimization, the welfare state is a system of insurance which provides protection to workers against the unknowable risks of both market forces and life course events. It is a set of *ex ante* risk pooling arrangements since the risks are unknown for current, let alone future, members. As such, the welfare state may be said to enjoy legitimacy on the grounds of complementarity for economic prosperity.

### 1.5.3 Political

“It is not enough to provide people with abstract political rights if ...inequalities undermine their ability to use their rights” (Olson 2003:6)

“Democracy gave birth to demagogism, anarchy, and communistic attitudes towards property” - US Army training manual ca. 1920 (found in Keyssar 2009:181)

A lesser debated justification for welfare state legitimacy concerns that of political agency. While political power is central to theories of welfare state creation (elaborated on in more detail in Ch. 2), recent studies transfer it, and particularly in the form of participation, from an explanatory variable to a dependent variable. That is, welfare states are drivers of political agency in very real and important ways. The reflexive democracy theory, posited by Olson (2006), implies that welfare states can be seen as legitimated and justified under the grounds of their intrinsic reflexive nature. The theory incorporates a variety of areas of scholarship from Amartya Sen’s capability approach, Habermas’s conception of political agency, Fraser’s paradox of participation, and Marshall’s tri-fecta of citizenship. It represents a unique position regarding how one may conceptualize the welfare state as an outcome of political processes, and/or even as an input to political processes. Such a position provides a justification of welfare states on the basis of their interaction with the political community. Similar to the defense of residual systems for the promotion of individual responsibility, or of the comprehensive insurance model as guarantor against risk and uncertainty of market solutions, proponents of maximized democratic participation may utilize the welfare state’s impact on individual and group political agency as a pretext

for system design.

More detailed discussion regarding the effects of political participation on the welfare state and the alternate effect of the welfare state on political participation is given in Chapter 2. Here I present the theoretical framework as proposed by Olson, combined later with a system analytic model proposed by Easton (1965). In addition, I combine this theoretical and analytic framework to include a functional model of welfare state operation as proposed by the International Labor Organisation's Department of Social Protection.

### **Components of Citizenship and Reflexive Democracy**

Olson's conception of reflexive democracy parallels (intentionally or not) Marshall's previously mentioned model of citizenship. It is worth reviewing how notions of citizenship have shaped discourses on social rights and therefore welfare states as underwriters of those rights. Marshall's argument has received criticism from those who interpret the three elements of citizenship from a static and deterministic evolutionary perspective. Additionally, some criticism has been leveled that the model which Marshall delivered relied too heavily on the case of England. Marshall's conception of citizenship is considered to be too weak, conceptually, and overly focused on entitlements as opposed to duties and actual political activity (Powell 2002; Janoski 1998; Oldfield 1990; Breiner 2006). However, a more dynamic conception of Marshallian citizenship leads to an incredibly flexible and useful starting point to understand political agency and how this is intertwined with welfare state institutions.

The political sphere, according to Marshall, is the primary location of conflict between proponents of egalitarian policies and those of market determined outcomes. Each side attempts to advance their own interests, and each adapts new strategies to impede the other. Campaign contributions come to mind. Political citizenship impedes attempts to metastasize social and economic advantage into "differences of protection, power, or wealth, the exact reverse of what classical liberals were trying to accomplish through restrictive suffrage" (Breiner 2006:17). Political equality is undermined once real income (life chances) are limited. In a market based economy, this most readily occurs through (monied) income inequality.

The benefit of universal welfare rests in its capacity to (potentially) subsume income inequality to the realm of symbolic significance. As politi-

cal power is realized by those with differential risk profiles and preference sets, more favorable to universalistic policy, elites increasingly employ what Hirschman calls the “jeopardy argument”. To stoke resistance to social rights, elites begin to play on fears that the extension of social citizenship will damage other areas of benefit. More extensive social rights mean less individual rights because of an ever increasingly intrusive government. This jeopardy argument works in tandem with the perversity thesis to produce skepticism, whether validated or not, about the scope and depth of social rights. “In the 19th century, the struggle over social citizenship was in fact collapsed into a struggle over political citizenship” (Breiner 2006:23).

**Dynamic Social Rights:** The negotiation over the extension of social rights and political rights was not sequential, and many of the day (especially those of higher economic means) were pitted firmly against extension of both social and political rights - the one contingent on the other. John Stewart Mill, to cite one example, argued for disenfranchisement as a person who had failed in the market should not be allowed to participate in power sharing. According to Mill, those who did not pay taxes or accepted public assistance had neither the moral qualifications nor risk of sharing the cost of their requests. The wealthy Mill was a staunch opponent of universal franchise. Herbert Spencer went one further, openly advocating for direct taxation for services. These user fees, essentially, were designed such that the poor would never have enough resources to pay for services they demanded. “The incidence of taxation”, Spencer argued, “must be made more direct in proportion as the franchise is extended” (Breiner 2006:26).

If the elites were, in their view, forced to share political power with the common man, than the common man ought to share the burden of financial responsibility. Decentralizing taxes performs a simple task of putting the burden of assistance on those who need assistance. This results in making the state so weak that it cannot afford services even in the face of massive support and makes the realization of political power ineffectual at best and useless at worst. Opponents of full citizenship proposed and used a range of strategies to “short circuit” the development of full citizenship and its inherent threat to the class order. “Equality of opportunity” was (and still is) promoted as a central aspiration, with concomitant differences between market success and failure, thereby diverting claims away from “equality of condition” (Moynihan 1965).

These feelings were revisited in the midst of the turbulent 1960s, especially so in the United States. So much was noted by the Moynihan Report of 1965. The political upheaval of the long decade demanded not just political rights, but institutional change to ensure equality of outcome for groups. Liberty (civil rights), for conservatives, had been the watchword of American political and economic life. It ensured that the state would not obstruct the individual from success, while also enabling the justification of protection of states' rights against the intervention of the Federal government - the US's 18th century framework was designed to ensure exactly this weakness of centralized state power.

Equality, however, is a different animal altogether. As liberty does not ensure equality (and in fact may lead contrary to it), equality does not necessarily depend on liberty. "Much of the political history of the American nation can be seen as a competition between these two ideals, as for example, the unending troubles between capital and labor" (Moynihan 1965:2). While Marshall may not have foreseen the new types of social inequalities that social citizenship would create, it is clear that many opponents of full Marshallian citizenship were not as naïve about the slippery slope of entitlements (Runciman, Bulmer and Rees 1996).

**Reflexive Political Agency:** For Olson, the dynamic between political and social rights is a "reflexive" arrangement which must take into account competing conceptions of citizenship. In a *liberal democratic* view, citizenship is a legal status "that confers particular rights, obligations and benefits...often seen as the result of political processes ...but no attention is paid to the ways people are shaped to fit particular models of what a citizen is" (Olson 2006:16). The *governmental* view, on the other hand, proposes that citizens are constructed and from very different starting points across the continuum of society. However, for Olson, the governmental view "focuses so intently on the construction of citizens that it verges on liquidating the citizen and her agency completely into the process of construction" (Olson 2006:4).

A further *libertarian* approach conceives of citizenship as a natural right, and thus as something society attempts to codify and that governmentals suppose is dependent on external factors. A *reflexive* theory of citizenship, according to Olson, in the spirit of Rousseau, unites the competing theories of citizenship and posits a unified approach where individuals are simultane-

ously both subjects and authors of their own governance.

Olson's theoretical approach addresses Fraser's concept of "participatory parity" - wherein an adequate theory of justice must take into consideration the inequity in economic and cultural participation among groups in society, particularly as it relates to class bias in the electorate. "Class" according to Fraser, "is an order of objective subordination derived from economic arrangements that deny some actors the means and resources they need for participatory parity" (Fraser and Honneth, 2003:48). The existence of such structures in society debilitates members from full enjoyment of the rights of citizenship. The concept of reflexive citizenship, then, is to bypass what Olson sees as the *paradox of enablement*. That is, participation cannot be the solution to enabling participation - participation requires an external mechanism to provide the basis for the enabling of democratic participatory behavior/agency.

The existent cycle which distributes capabilities in society must be constructed such that it creates a virtuous rather than vicious cycle. As much can be likened to Rawls' concept of the veil of ignorance, given uncertainty of one's position in the final distribution of power and resources, as well as the principle of equal participation (Rawls 1999). Of the many modes of demand articulation, political participation is the most direct and appropriate area of participation to focus on, as it is most overtly connected to the process of registering the demands of individuals in order to achieve resolution/outputs. As Olson argues, "it is not enough to provide people with abstract political rights if ...inequalities undermine their ability to use their rights. .. equal opportunity can only be guaranteed when people are sufficiently equal in the abilities and resources that enable participation" (Olson 2003:6).

It is participation, and specifically political participation, that takes center stage in justifying the welfare state. The participatory ideal, then, requires a welfare state which maximizes and safeguards participation. How this welfare state is to be constructed, however, poses a dilemma for Olson and he resorts to a pseudo-promotion of (at least initially) an expert (i.e., social scientist) designed system based around the goal of participation maximization. Though stepping short of a call for action, Olson does illustrate successes in the past (the Johnson era's espousal of maximum feasible participation and the subsequent formation of the National Welfare Rights Organisation (NWRO)) and advocates at least the concept of such an undertaking, while admitting the potential pitfalls and possible repeats of historical failures. Despite these limitations, the proposition marks a unique approach

to legitimization of the welfare state from a primarily political standpoint. Furthermore, such an approach combines well with TH Marshall's (dynamic) view of citizenship, and one which places the welfare state firmly in the field of political discourse. Or to use Olson's own words: "the primary task of the welfare state...is to enact the necessary rights and guarantee the corresponding dimensions of participatory agency" (13). What this entails is that claims for state intervention to decommodify daily lives need not be limited to calls for individual autonomy, community cohesion, morally defensible support structure, or matters of market efficiency. Rather, such claims are able to be forwarded on the basis that welfare systems are themselves agency promoting processes and it is this end which justifies the means.

### Systems Theory and Reflexive Democracy

Having combined the formative theory of Marshall with the philosophical justification of Olson, what remains is a practical mode of application of the two towards the study of welfare states from a primarily political viewpoint. Knowing what the subjects of study are, how they have evolved together, and how their functions matter for each other, I now employ a final branch of theory to complete the process of my approach. With the background of the Marshall-Olson theory, I incorporate a model for the study of both political participation and institutional design. For this, I use David Easton's systems analysis of political systems.

This general theory of political systems has proved an enduring contribution to the field of political science and the study of the political economic framework of the welfare state. It informs the empirical investigations in Chapter 2. Figure 1.5 shows a graphical representation of Easton's model.

**Easton's System Adapted:** The following descriptive of Easton's work is brief at best, and readers are advised to consult the primary works for further information and clarification of terms and concepts. Here I take into account those parts which directly influence the analysis of political processes and welfare system policy. In a rather simplistic account, Easton's model consists of *demands* and *supports*, which are primary *inputs* into the production of *outputs* in the form of policy decisions. Outputs do not terminate after production, but inform the following sequence in an additive manner. "Unless a system is approaching a state of entropy...it must have continuing inputs to keep it going" (Easton 1957:385). Authorities, "by virtue of their




Figure 1.5: Adapted Systems Model

status in all systems,. . . have special responsibilities for converting demands into outputs". (Easton 1957:31). Demands, however, are not necessarily solved politically. Many demands never make it to the political arena and are either solved or dissolved in the private sphere or parallel institutions, indeed some are never fully politicized successfully (See Fraser 1989). More so, authorities are responsible for demands when the weight of society is brought to one side, then the demand becomes political (Easton 1957:40).

**Non-Demands:** While supports are inputs, they stand apart from demands. They are not active in the way a demand is an active element in the political system. Of those issues which are not considered rightfully, or necessarily, demands on the system are expectations, motivations, ideology, interests, preferences, and public opinion. This aspect of Easton's distinction clarifies the various approaches in comparative studies regarding welfare state development and functioning. It is not uncommon for studies of political participation and welfare effort to be framed in terms of "political support" for welfare institutions.

Indicators of political turnout may be considered as demands made on the system, or perhaps even support given voice, however they ought not be confused with political support in this sense. Likewise, investigations into public preference or attitudes, typically via national or international survey instruments, represent a measurement of support, but these cannot be considered demands. An unmet expectation may form a stimulus, but it cannot be considered a demand. Likewise, *motivations* are not reasonable demands, as a political actor may find the thought of redistribution (for instance) appalling; however, if such a policy stance increases her chances at re-election, her motivation for pro-redistributive policies is apart from the motivations of the poor electorate supporting the same action.<sup>8</sup>

*Ideology*, as well, is not a demand per se, but a set of beliefs about the "proper" demands. *Preferences* may be seen as innate feelings of what one would like to see, but again, they are not demands at this level. Like preferences, *public opinion* is also not considered at the level of demand, but rather that of supportive input. This remains important for research into public preferences and the relationship with welfare policy formation, as public

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<sup>8</sup>Thus, as Korpi (2006) has argued, acquiescence (consent) by capital to the demands of labor, or even the underlying support for such policies, cannot be said to have demanded expansion of the welfare state.

opinion is not recorded representatively across the population, let alone the electorate (Berinsky 2002). Conservative voices are more likely to participate in public opinion surveys than more liberal opinions, mirroring discrepancies in other input dynamics. Supports may be (and often are) transformed or converted into demands by active participation. These converted supports may take a number of forms such as writing letters to officials, organizing interest groups to lobby legislators, or simply by voting (Easton 1957; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The latter activity forms the subject of the following chapter, as the most basic element in the demand area of inputs.

**Demands:** “To become a demand, there needs to be voiced a proposal that authoritative action be taken with regard to it.” (Easton 1957:47). In this view, both opponents and proponents of increased state intervention have two avenues of pursuing their goals. The perversity thesis as advocated by market fundamentalists in the previous section, for example, can be seen as a strategy to alter support in the face of electoral threat - i.e., it would be imprudent to attempt to alter the preferences of politically irrelevant individuals or groups. Strategies of voter (de)mobilization are, however, more appropriately deployed for those groups which remain unchanged in their real or expected preferences (support) towards policies. Demand and support strategies often work in tandem, however they need not be invariably deployed together nor simultaneously.

Finally, political activity originates from external systems such as the environment, economy, culture or otherwise. These external demands, then, emanate from experiences with systems outside the political system and inform their demands upon it and its authorities. People may have strong cultural affiliations with certain norms of behavior, and these cultural preferences or opinion when in conflict with other preferences and opinions become demands when they are voiced to political processes for resolution. Taken together, these elements produce a framework by which to approach the understanding of how various aspects of political agency can and do affect policy formation. Integrating Easton’s understanding of inputs (both at the level of demand and support) helps to disentangle the myriad of issues inherent in studying the relationship between political activity and redistributive systems. More so, it helps us to isolate what it is we mean when we discuss the act of electoral participation via voting, as compared to the multitudinous activities which may also be considered as inputs, but which are not to be confused with demands (e.g., public opinion or elite/laymen preferences). It

enables this work to focus on a single dimension for the remainder of this study.

### Summary

The preceding section has laid out viewpoints for the development of welfare states in comparative perspective, as well as various approaches to legitimization of institutions. A central tenet common to all theories is that of political power. The concept of political power, however, carries varieties of meanings depending on the context it is used. Thus, we say the poor lack political power, the young are a potential source of political power, or that the rich hold the reins of political power.

These statements carry a variety of messages about the types of access and ability to manipulate the policy agenda. While elites lack the numeric strength of the middle or lower classes, they garner significant amounts of political power in respect to their influence on political processes. Their political power is located in their position in the social and economic hierarchy and the amount of resources they can or do contribute to particular policy formulation either directly from consultation, translated through special interest groups, or through clientellism and campaign contributions. Similarly, the elderly may lack positional prestige; however, their numeric strength and electoral threat carry significant weight with political actors. As such, their power is measured not on their resources, but rather on their propensity to turn-out on election day. A wealth of literature documents the axiom that participation is contingent on one's command of resources (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995), and these resources are not distributed evenly across the electorate.

This section has given an overview of the leading theories of welfare state formation, as well as delving into two particularly insightful approaches - e.g., PRA and VoC. Further to this, key areas of welfare state intervention have been detailed which illustrate the various strategies which voices in society can and do legitimize various applications (or abstentions) of state policy towards individual and group well-being. While justifications based in the ideal of securing efficient markets in the face of present or potential failures is readily apparent, other concerns regarding the moral and political justifications of state interference provide alternative manners to address the impetus behind (non)action. Moral justifications for and against state action remain contentious issues, and certainly this area interacts with many

other areas of social policy outside the parameters of welfare systems. Of these justifications, the political agency approach forms a far less explored avenue of research. Indeed, these latter issues (i.e., moral and political legitimization) appeal for exploration of how current systems are structured and perpetuated (and even deconstructed). If maximal democratic participation is encouraged (for instance) by particular policy regimes, it is prudent to explore how such policies are developed and (indeed) how policies which decrease such activities are perpetuated. More to the point, we ought to be interested in how the inclusion and/or exclusion of preferences impacts and is impacted by welfare state policy. The following chapter explores these issues more explicitly, taking the issue of political agency as a centering issue.



## Chapter 2

# Political Participation and Welfare Systems - Testing Theory

Of the arguments presented earlier for welfare system formation and justification, political agency remains central to comparative and case study research. It surpasses the aim of this work to investigate all forms of political agency, and in as much I leave the subject for future consideration. I focus here on the key argument put forward in the matter of systematic political demobilization, the situation of the political demobilization of convicted felons. The following analysis focuses on political participation as the main variable of interest, leaving aside other forms of political agency. Following the reflexivity outlined in Olson's work, and using a systems analysis approach provided by the adaptation of Easton's framework, a three stage process is empirically tested to explicate how political participation functions as both an input of welfare policy and an output of the feedback process. In particular, I propose that political participation can be viewed as a proxy for the effects of welfare policy on beneficiary populations. It is, in essence, in and of itself an indication of policy performance.

Political participation is often considered a merit good because it entails that all are able to contribute to the laws which they must abide by. "The right to [vote]", wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights" (Reynolds v. Sims - 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). To respect it solely as a symbolic token of citizenship, however, is to lose sight of its substantive purpose, and hence its true value (Dobelstein 1999). While voting is no doubt a particularly blunt instrument for policy formation, it remains *the* basic form of input available

to promote representative policy formation and/or extract concessions from elites. In as much, it is a value in and of itself if it can shape policy in favor of the less fortunate who lack alternative means to influence policy making (Bennet and Resnick 1990). To what degree and in what ways the franchise is important is, however, another matter. Surely we may value voting as a fundamental precondition for democratic governance, but as with fiscal and demographic inputs, it is important to know in which ways electoral participation (if at all as Gilens and Page 2014 argue) moves social policy. Preference for policy may be a necessary component of policy creation, but it is not sufficient. In a democratic state, it must be backed by electoral pressure - i.e., demand. While the crowd may certainly not be efficient or even necessarily completely aware of the proper policy course of action (especially in the case of contentious social policy decisions), “we cannot go the next step and conclude that collectively-decided allocations...are inferior to individually-decided market allocations” (Inman 1987). Political participation remains an essential component of representative policy formation.

## 2.1 Review of the Literature

The United States supplies a particularly useful, if not cruelly ironic, case in point. On the one hand, its foundations are built on the assumption of political rights; on the other, the realization of these rights constantly engender threats to the status quo. In the early years of the republic, industrialists pained over the prospect of Jefferson’s political experiment, leaving the English historian Thomas Macauley to allege that the time would come when the US would run out of land to expel the raucous, disaffected, laboring classes. The US, in Macauley’s view, would suffer not least because of the congestion of inequality and labor shortages, but because the “unwashed multitude possessed the ballot and therefore the political power”, which in the end determined the ability to submit the poor to state (and particularly police) control (Huston 1983:38). The connection between labor, class, and the vote (which will be discussed further in chapter 4), has remained central to the American experience.

Political equality has many facets: equal rights, equal capacity, equal voice, equal chance. Voting in general is the lowest common denominator in the game of political inputs; it is “the political act least dependent on skills and for which the opportunity to act is most clearly presented to the citizen at election time” (Verba 2003:665). Allowing access to the vote is one matter,

ensuring citizens participate is another. It is widely accepted that voluntary participation is positively correlated with socio-economic status. Wealthier and higher educated individuals vote at consistently high rates (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Wolfinger 1980; Verba 2003), while economic adversity decreases one's probability to turnout on election day (Rosenstone 1982). Education, in particular, plays a pivotal role in participation. However, because differentials in education are themselves related to the quality of educational institutions created from previous policies, it is endogenous to participation. Indeed, previous work has shown that cross-national variation in educational spending is a function of the median voter (Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 2010).

Despite these disparities, electoral participation remains essential. It is a basic capability in that it facilitates the ability to acquire other desired goods and outcomes which themselves can then be translated into further capability promoting policies (Verba 2006, Sen 1985, 2000). Of all the inputs delivered into the black-box of policy making, it remains the least reliant on socio-economic status. It is also the most difficult input to target covertly. Indeed, *hidden* disenfranchisement is extremely difficult to hide, given the personal nature of the exercise of the franchise. Opponents of full turnout must tread carefully, and strategically.

The basic nature of the vote, then, makes it a significant indicator of how politics are performing, and how much of the policies enacted are representative of the will of the masses or of the control of the few. The reserve army of the electorate is overwhelmingly and universally located at the lower ends of the socio-economic spectrum. Where the poor are more important to political actors (i.e., when their votes form a real and meaningful force), programs aimed at basic needs are more likely to show up on the policy agenda (Verba 2003). All this leads to a playing field which is far from level, meaning that the median voter is not the median citizen. She is more likely to have greater wealth at her disposal, longer years of education, and greater social status. What's more, political participation among the needy crosses racial and ethnic divisions - an ever present issue in American politics and an increasingly apparent development in Europe.

For the United States, this is an essential point, not least on account of the traditionally race-based politics permeating American life. While some racial groups may be observed to participate at lower levels than others, this is due less to their racial designation than their market position. According to Verba (2003), the relationship of race on participation is moderate to

weak among the “needy”. Higher turnout rates are almost entirely reliant on lower class turnout, as the higher strata of society are rarely disassociated from elections and therefore are at or near their natural limits. A reflexivity of social and political rights emerges in electoral competition. That is, “socio-economic inequality produces inequality in political voice; this in turn fosters policies that favour the already advantaged; and these policies reinforce socioeconomic inequality” (Verba 2003:675). However this is not a truism, *per se*. The less advantaged sometimes turn out in droves, the case of pro-life/anti-abortion movements which mobilize many lower income citizens is one such example of mass mobilization of this type. Well articulated issues have the ability to foster participation in the face of the known predictors of non-participation. Thus, turnout (or lack thereof) is not a foregone conclusion, but it is a function of a vast array of elements which are institutional in nature. Varying the (institutional) rules of the game affects who will turnout on election day and in turn what groups will carry the weight of decision making for policy (Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995).

*Non-participation* is also driven by pragmatic reasons, and among those is lack of agreeable candidates. Where candidates do not represent decisive issues to the voter, turnout may decrease as voters abstain from participating instead of voting for the least-worst choice. This is particularly troubling for social policy, as a key campaign issue area amongst the less advantaged generally and among the worst off in particular. Political actors, pandering to the electorate, compromise their ideologies to win pivotal votes (Dixit and Londregan 1998). If the pivotal vote (i.e., the median voter) is left to political actors to manipulate at will, a potentially vicious cycle of voter corraling becomes a dangerous possibility. To put this in simpler terms: where the avenue exists to depress the participation of a group possible voters, political actors may reduce their risks by rolling back the electorate which they must satisfy. This is an issue which some research concerning welfare policy has (and should) come to consider. Social protection systems must at some point conform to the will of the people, and the people ought to have a vested interest in the design and implementation of beneficial welfare programs.

### 2.1.1 Political Participation and Welfare Spending

This leads to the question of how political inputs impact upon social policy, especially in the realm of welfare state programs. In highly competitive races, the pivotal vote is likely to belong to the less well-off members of society - unless of course it is possible to create a floor of the electorate which is income

determined. Higher income voters already turnout nearer to their natural limits than the poor. The pool of poorer participants, or non-participants, is substantially more numerous. Hobolt and Klemmensen (2006) show that when an executive is under threat of being replaced (i.e., losing re-election), she is more receptive and beholden to the public's preferences. Higher levels of contestation, therefore, lead to increased responsiveness by executives. Conversely, where the executive is under little to no threat, she will not be motivated to act in the interest of the public at large.

An ideal strategy would be to simply remove the possibility of threat altogether (i.e., the disenfranchisement of Blacks in pre-Civil Rights era Southern states, residency requirements for traveller groups, or the disenfranchisement of women in (even contemporary) male dominated societies).<sup>1</sup> Therein lies the use of political disenfranchisement in political communities - the culling of potentially disruptive or disagreeable preferences. Politicians are not nescent machines. They are strategic actors keenly aware of their surroundings. They take notice of which citizens are active in the polity and in what ways these activities affect their own concerns. The support side of inputs plays a vital informational role in this respect (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Piven and Cloward 1988). Regardless, real or imagined electoral threat forms a real (not imagined) force for social policy. The question that should be addressed is whether or not the extent of inclusive democracy impacts social policy. We must explore whether the parameters of the electorate make a difference.

**The Borders of the Electorate and the Welfare State:** This issue benefits from a large degree of historical work conducted concerning the impact which electoral reform has had on state processes. Franchise extension, notes Kim (2008), has shaped not just what type of policy welfare states have adopted, but also the form of that policy. An enlarged electorate in Europe during the formative years of welfare states (1880 - 1945) increased the probability of adopting some form of unemployment insurance program; however, it significantly decreased the use of voluntary programs in favor of compulsory unemployment schemes after roughly half of the adult population had been enfranchised. Under increased enfranchisement, governments adopted more compulsory insurance schemes which cover all of society, including those with very little risk of unemployment. As the electorate is enlarged, the risk

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<sup>1</sup>Regarding the success of the maternity bill in the US, Dobelstein (1998: 99) suggests "what seemed to push the balance of power in favor of the maternity bill was women winning the right to vote in national elections".

portfolio of voters changes and becomes more heterogeneous, making a voluntary scheme untenable and compulsory schemes develop (Kim 2008).

Such historical work is complimented further by studies focused on the development of US policies and democratic participation. Research by Husted and Kenny (1997) found that the amount which US states spent on welfare for the period 1950-1988 was significantly and positively related to the extension of the vote down the income distribution. In their own words, “eliminating poll taxes raised welfare spending by 11-20 percent and eliminating literacy tests...brought about a 13 percent increase in welfare spending” (Husted and Kenny 1997:76). Special consideration should be give to the non-effect on *non*-welfare spending, indicating a potent connection between welfare policies and democracy. Similarly, Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) found that (at the sub-state level) voter turnout has a distinguishable impact on policy. Importantly, this effect is not felt at the level of developmental (e.g., tourism enhancement projects) or maintenance (e.g, roadworks or utility upkeep) areas, but is focused on redistributinal spending (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005, 2010). Thus, while there is evidence that elite voice is given undue weight compared to those of “modest means” (if they listen to the poor at all (Bartels 2005, Gilens and Page 2014)), the case for a significant effect for participation on social policy spending remains strong. Significant historical work has also shown that during the birth of the American welfare state (i.e., the New Deal era), the presence of (or lack thereof) electoral threat greatly contributed to the amount which local citizens could expect to benefit from expanded social citizenship (Fleck 1999; 2000; 2001).

The lack of political power (i.e., the vote), according to Fleck, had a distinguishable impact on early US welfare spending and policy formation. Fleck, examining distribution of Federal Emergency Relief Assistance (FERA) spending during the New Deal era, notes that by limiting the political capacity of the least well off (i.e, disenfranchising African Americans) “the . . . political system weakened politicians’ incentives to respond to the preferences of blacks” (Fleck 1999; 2001; 2002). Furthermore, according to Fleck, though need had a strong influence on spending, “increasing the level of turnout by one standard deviation (.072) in a county. . . [represented] an increase of about 16 percent [in relief spending] for the typical county”. Put simply, areas with more political power, here measured by the franchise, could expect more relief spending to be distributed to their areas.

**Contentions Among Authors:** The findings of those who pursue the importance of political participation are not without their dissenters, and the results for the effects on welfare spending are not entirely unanimous. Scruggs (2007), using unemployment insurance as a measure of state generosity concluded that several of the mainstays which one might consider natural drivers of social spending did not stand the test. That is, analyzing unemployment generosity across states (testing union density, democratic control of government, per capita income, unemployment rate, and racial heterogeneity), Scruggs found that racial heterogeneity was the chief determinant of generosity. Other authors have removed, or at least obscured, the electorate from consideration, advancing the centrality of party control of states as a primary variable in spending allocation. According to Primo and Snyder (2010), party strength is significantly and negatively related to federal aid to states and state spending. Specifically, states which are party strongholds (Democratic or Republican) are less attractive recipients of dollars for aid or spending. Tighter electoral races produce increased incentives for policy makers to target distributional goods to important voters.<sup>2</sup> In comparison, others have posited, and in line with the Power Resource Theory approach, that it is the bias at the polls which produce discernible results. That the poor turn out *less* is more relevant for social policy outcomes than whether or not the rich show up on election day. Hill and Leighly (1992), incorporating a turnout component and a bias in the turnout component, conclude that turnout accounts for 16 percent of the variation on four measures of state generosity for public social spending (AFDC). Similarly, Fellowes and Rowe (2004) show that income bias in the electorate, among other predictors, has serious consequences for cash expenditures (TANF). Ideologically liberal states and those with less high-income bias are less likely to set stringent standards on the receipt of benefits (flexibility) and are more generous with expenditures - reaffirming the pre-PRWORA reform findings of Hill and Leighly (1992).

Electoral turnout affects the redistribution of income and reduction of poverty. Representatives obtain and target monies to their constituents in deliberate ways, and they are under no compulsion or even desire to see an increased electorate to increase the difficulty of such a task (Martin 2003). Thus, it is not necessarily in the best interest of political actors to increase either the borders or the participation of the electorate where such developments might lead to weakened ability to mobilize the entirety of their

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<sup>2</sup>A contention with Primo and Snyder (2010) is the lack of inclusion of a variable for political turnout in their analysis.

supporters. The skew effect of turnout constitutes a central aspect of how electoral turnout impacts redistribution. According to Mahler (2008), a “1 percent increase in turnout is, on average, associated with a 2-gini-point increase in redistribution”, explaining 35 percent of the variation (Mahler 2008: 174). “If the lower class makes a relatively strong showing in elections, it can demonstrate its electoral clout to lawmakers and help neutralize the natural tendency for states with large lower class populations to restrict access to welfare programs” (Avery and Peffley 2003:10). That is, “by not voting, citizens make the jobs of political actors easier by providing politicians a relatively clear way to minimize their workload” (Martin 2003:123). The tendency of the poorer classes to shy away from the polls due to lack of agreeable candidates or favorable policies is therefore counterproductive to their interests. Thus, while some authors have contended that turnout has no effect on (cross-national) redistributive spending (Iversen 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Gilens and Page 2014), Kittel and Obinger (2003) find inconclusive evidence to rule out any certain assertions.

Those investigating public participation and policy need not be dissuaded from exploring these aspects. Turnout has not only been shown to matter, but to matter differentially. The evidence from comparative welfare studies has shown a clear impact of the type of parties which are elected into office, however those parties act *within* electoral environments. Political parties must be put in context of the larger environment they act in. That is, party matters when there is a competitive environment, but not without (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002). For decisions to spend or not to spend, ideology comes first, and governmental strength comes second (Moon and Dixon 1985). While the bulk of studies have focused attention at the national level, there is a more dynamic structure to states, and especially the US, in terms of redistributive policy making. As former Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, once proclaimed: “all politics is local”. It is sensible then to attend more to the types of policies which are more apt to influence policy at the local level, especially when those policies increase the distance between income groups at the voting booth. Unsurprisingly, competitive races and more devolved powers of spending coincide with this realization. Using data from the International City/County Manager Association’s 1986 survey, Hajnal (2010) found that voter turnout matters where races are thought to be tight. The tighter the race, the more important is the otherwise absent voter. This electoral threat impacts government spending in the area of redistributive spending particularly more than in other areas of allocation. Thus, we see that not only does political participation matter across time and space, it matters discriminantly for policy areas. This particular force of political

agency is nourished by one's situation.

### 2.1.2 Welfare States and Political Participation

“We get confused because we assume that the fight for democracy was won a long time ago. . . the battle for democracy is still going on but has now assumed a new form” Schattschneider (1960:100).

The effect of political participation on the welfare state is only one side of the coin. Given the theorized nature of political activity and the state's ability to manipulate personal (and therefore group) agency, it is vital to model the reciprocal effect of macro-economic forces on turnout. Such endeavors are clearly manifested in the expansive literature on economic voting. Voters are thought to be (a) punitive and rewarding (the disadvantaged electorate punishes elected representatives in bad times by ousting them from office, or rewards them for good policies by returning them to office), (b) “gunshy” (voters retract from participation because of increased financial burden and the costs of participation on mental and physical resources), or (c) neutral (the electorate is not discernibly reactive to macro-economic forces and changes in voter turnout are primarily the result of personal level factors as the population does not attribute the state to the resolution of personal economic dilemmas) (Rosenstone 1982). The notion of neutrality of the public seems contentious, given that we know that the electorate is not neutral when it comes to participation (i.e., non-participation is not randomly distributed), the “punishing at the polls” and the “disengaged voter” positions remain viable propositions.

While scholars have debated whether or not political participation has an effect on government spending priorities, the same cannot be said for the issue of economic adversity and political participation. The consensus among political scientists is that economic hardship depresses political participation across the board, with recipients of welfare services particularly less likely to have their day at the polls (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). This is, or ought to be, particularly troubling for scholars of the welfare state, and for instrumental reasons. The design of services impacts not just on the empirical measurements of the incidence of poverty and/or labor force participation, they also carry signals to the labor force about their position in the political-economic super-structure of the state (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 2007). The psychological stress and demoralization of being

“down and out” leaves many distressed voters reluctant to participate.

**The Ramifications of Non-Universality and Self Reliance:** Policy, and especially social protection policy, carries with it a message in its creation, design, and administration. Particularly for the US, this is part and parcel to the perpetuation of the “go it alone” philosophy of the American ethos. The good citizen is the productive citizen, and that citizen has made the most of her opportunities. Those who do not contribute should not have a say in society, in the vein of the atomistic moral view of legitimization of the welfare state. A message is transmitted to those who are suffering economic hardship, and especially those who have been made redundant or lack satisfactory access to the labor market – they are off the team. As much has been shown in dedicated work on recipient behaviors and attitudes. Secombe, James, and Walters (1998) show how TANF recipients are caught in a vicious cycle wherein they acknowledge that they are aware of how society sees them (i.e., as lazy, unmotivated, and devoid of human capital); however, study participants excluded themselves from this association by a belief in the uniqueness of their situations. That is, interviewees were unable to perceive of others in similar situations as similar cases, nor were they accepted by the non-claimant population. They adapted to the “ideological hegemony” even when faced with experiences which ought to dislodge this ascription (O’Connor 2001: 18; Gramsci 1971). Means testing, in this view, is a form of parasitic stigma for participants which divorces any notion of entitlement to benefit provision. This is particularly troubling for political citizenship. The belief in entitlement to protection from the market or other risks, notes Gordon (1994), “is the attitude of citizenship, the essence of independence; without it we would have subjects, not citizens” (Gordon 1994:288).

**The Ramifications of Mutual Security:** As a formative institution of voice and demand, welfare policies - unintentionally or not - impact the deliberative capabilities of participants to interact with institutional dynamics. According to Mettler and Soss (2004), “some policies actively encourage or discourage demand making” (Mettler and Soss 2004:63). Thus, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC - a decidedly pro-market program) is designed to minimize state intervention and thereby distance administration from client interaction, this has a knock-on effect of diminishing the political agency of recipients (Hotz and Scholz 2001). The ramifications for this are not inconsequential in a representative democracy. Stratifying the interaction with the

state between income classes produces not only dissimilar experiences, but also dissimilar messages.

There is a perverse side-effect to distancing the citizen from government administration in some cases. By and large, social assistance take-up is a particularly labor intensive activity. Administrators, counselors, and myriads of inspectors must be employed to certify compliance with social policy. For the sake of efficiency and the promotion of self-reliance among clients (or at least deferment of social assistance), governments may reduce resources and encourage distance between client and administrators. That is, clients are reconceptualized into abuse risk groups within the system itself, as opposed to universal standards of treatment. Those who have the most experience with such situations are not just those least likely to voice these experiences in the political arena, they are (intentionally or not) conditioned to refrain from activity by the messages inculcated by such programmatic design (Metzler and Stonecash 2008, Soss 1999; Soss and Schram 2007).

The distance created between client and provider, through intentional restrictions and policy mandates, socializes recipients to perceive of their situations as deplorable, and (even worse) themselves as inferior citizens. At the same time, the exclusion of the non-least worst off (i.e., those who do not meet the subsistence level income requirements to participate in social assistance programs) from interaction with welfare administration *increases* the distance between the general population and the policies which they are called to support or oppose in the political arena (Soss and Schram 2007). Means-tested programs must by their very nature impose a stratification of the electorate. Thus, while it may seem logical that if government wishes to attack poverty, it should pursue targeting strategies (Goodin and LeGrand 1987), the *paradox of redistribution* entails that real reductions in inequality succeed only when the *non-poor* are brought into the equation as well (Korpi and Palme 1998). Poverty, and inequality, are symptoms of larger processes which enable their existence. That is, social policy itself cleaves away citizens from mutually sympathetic associations.

**The Message of Deservingness:** The framing of the terms of deservingness, explicated previously in Chapter 1, forms an added facet of social policy with implications for political processes. The universality of social security in the United States, for instance, enables senior citizens to maintain their cognitive and participatory capacity, as opposed to more demoralizing

means-tested benefits in the social assistance tiers (Campbell 2003). The effect of this agency maintaining phenomenon entails constraints for political actors. As Campbell (2003) notes, those with vested interests in the continuation of universalistic schemes (e.g., senior citizens) are not limited by the stigma of receipt; this may be a more poignant issue for conservative (Republican) representatives with large numbers of interested voters (i.e., elderly) within their districts. The features of universalistic policy as a force of decommodification are also seen at play in such areas. Consider that deciding to participate is a luxury good that the affluent have time and resources to take advantage of, and additionally are solicited by the major parties in the US. It is here that universalistic policy structures come into play in the political arena.

Because universalistic schemes create a floor both financially and socially, their effect is a stabilization of political agency not replicated in the means-test programs. Political parties set out to mobilize those who have not just the ability, but the will to use their vote.<sup>3</sup>

The universalistic nature of social security bucks the trend in the resource perspective of voting behavior by illustrating the stabilization and participation effects decommodification has on political agency (Campbell 2003a, 2003b). Strategically, legislators have increasingly ignored popular approval for increased taxation to fund social programs which they may benefit from in the future and instead listened to more affluent interests disfavoring social policies. By cutting back financing options, conservatives have possibly been able to lock the spicket of funding for social welfare programs which might otherwise create a ratcheting up effect (Campbell and Morgan 2005; Huber and Stephens 2001).

**Trickle Down Participation:** Voters, who do vote (Kumlin 2004 ), are motivated to a large degree by their sociotropic concerns(i.e., concerns about the larger economic environment). These sociotropic perceptions, especially in lieu of objectively informative inputs, are informed by default by one's

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<sup>3</sup>Not surprisingly, many conservatives fervently attempt to block movements to simplify and expand access to the polls - voter ID legislation, curtailing early voting policies, and de-funding voter outreach programs are but a few strategies. This is most particular in America where both parties cater to the median voter; whereas in Europe, left wing parties play a substantial role in mobilizing the poor (Kohler 2010). Where the poor are mobilized in the US, it is often by faith-based organizations which reinforce (primarily protestant) moralistic preferences.

personal experiences. These personal experiences are in turn informed and reinforced by one's position in the social hierarchy. Thus, the dominant view of the worthy voter is one which is very much based on one's value in the market, value which trickles down to the lower ends of the income distribution through various modes of communicative channels. This facet of policy design has at its core an underlying moral message from the top of the income distribution. The strings attached to receipt of means-tested benefits are as moral as they are economic, in turn creating the political aspect of such policies. Individual responsibility and rationality are assumed characteristics of all persons, including (and detrimentally so) those most affected by commodification. The tenants of *homo oeconomicus* demand that citizens be in control of their own choices and their own fate, and as such atomizes the relationship between market failure and remedial efforts (Garland 1981 ).<sup>4</sup> Citizens also vote retrospectively based on their sociotropic concerns (e.g., national and regional economic situations), their ideological position in relation to available candidates or parties (i.e., voters choose candidates close to their own policy preference set), and their resources - or what Lewis-Beck terms "patrimony" (voters with more assets vote differentially than those without) (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011).

That is, voters may take on the same *value* of the national well-being, however they diverge on *how* to achieve that national well-being. Positional voting leads to different voting with votes going to those parties which most closely represent their policy position. Patrimony, an alternative measure of class defined as ones available assets, plays an important part in selecting voters into a more right-wing vote (i.e., the Republican camp). All of these facets are interconnected with where one falls on the spectrum of income distribution in society and how the state reacts to mediating (or not) commodification. The welfare state offsets positional starting points.

This message is brought firmly to the fore in a powerful analysis by Schwartz, Blackstone, Uggen, McLaughlin (2009). Using the Youth Development Survey (YDS), the authors investigate variant types of welfare provision on political participation. The authors are able to measure actual participation rates (not reported rates) and control for past participation. In the midst of one of America's most progressive states, stigmatized/means tested welfare programs were significantly related to depressed political activity across time. Importantly, this effect is seen only in voter turnout rates, not volunteerism; whereas those who received non-means tested bene-

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<sup>4</sup>This holds for welfare as much as it holds for criminal policy, as will be discussed later.

fits showed no significant differences from non-welfare recipients in terms of participatory activities. The “welfare effect” may not be all encompassing. Rather, it may have a discerning characteristic which is particularly virulent for *electoral* participation. It should be noted, and will be shown further, that political participation is not a panacea for all policy choices; it does not effect to a noticable degree decisions regarding shopping mall zoning or whether to increase imports of oil from particular foreign states, for instance. The impact of political participation is felt at the level of welfare policy, and welfare policy itself impacts upon political participation - not discernibly on areas such as volunteerism. With the evidence that public welfare policies are indeed consequential for political participation, we are left with a problem of pin-pointing just how such an effect imposes itself on citizens. That is, in what ways ought we measure policy in order to disentangle detrimental from beneficial effects.

**Understanding the Mechanisms:** We presuppose that politics are responsive to electorates or their preferences. This is a particular issue in utilizing expenditure as an outcome variable for welfare effort. As noted previously, increasing expenditures across dissimilar social protection systems will produce dissimilar results. It is thus the design of the system, and therein its constituent programs, that remains important. According to Mettler and Soss (2004), to understand the feedback effect of policies, we need to know the exact character of these policies. We need to know what elements are conducive to political participation and which are deleterious. When we understand the mechanism, we can understand how processes may be manipulated to serve particular ends.

The myriad of regulations and bureaucracy attached to means tested policies in the name of “value for money”, for instance, correlate with a series of rituals of power (Staples 1997) which further demoralize and create a situation where programmatic choices stimulate unwanted benefits. That is, such designs can promote a situation where eligible citizens bypass benefit claiming and depress take-up rates, further legitimizing “tough love” conservative policies as successful (Orbach 2006). However, in order to change such policies, citizens must be mobilized to hold those in power accountable. Indeed, the system itself must be receptive to such preference articulation for such a result to be possible. Since, as Olson (2006) shows, we cannot rely on participation to cure the lack of participation among the least well off, scholarship must focus on creating institutions which create beneficial feedback effects.

However, the connection between welfare policy and political participation need not be necessarily direct. It may be that the experiences which social policies enable play a decisive role in mediating not only preferences, but also their articulation. Such a circumstance is argued to be inherently measured with metrics designed to capture the degree of inequality in a population.

**Inequality as a variable:** It is clear that scholars of the welfare state, and especially political actors, must pay greater attention to the externalities which policies create for areas other than the market or endogenous measures of policy success. It is useful to forward a further matter in the discussion of political inputs and outputs - that is, the measurement of the problem itself. Measures of inequality, and specifically *incomed* inequality, provide one such measure. Inequality as a dependent variable is, arguably, a straightforward affair. The differences between incomes can be measured, as can the differences in a multitude of other areas. As a dependent variable, inequality is not a particularly difficult concept to grasp. However, the operationalization of inequality as an independent variable is quite another task. The debate on inequality and political agency takes on two areas of research. Scholars tend to focus either on the relationship between public opinion and inequality, or on political participation and demand - the two are related but separate areas of inquiry. Whereas scholars of public opinion find mixed results between the relationship between increases in inequality and support for more welfare spending (Kelly and Enns 2010; Taylor-Gooby 1982, 1983, 1985; Svallfors 1995, 1997, 2004, 2011), scholars of participation frequently cite the vast disparities in participation rates and income levels.

While universal welfare states have discernible differences in *attitudes* in support of welfare policies, liberal welfare regimes (with high levels of inequality) show little class specific attitudes. According to Svallfors (2004), this is possible as the liberal market economy of the US (for instance) has not politicized the class differences in policy, as compared to other states, which is corroborative of the perceptions of means-tested beneficiaries towards other recipients noted earlier. The relationship of class differences in *voting*, however, is somewhat more uniform. Lower income classes vote at lower rates than the higher income in the developed industrial economies, though most noticeable in the US. It is the degree to which these rates differ that forms the primary question for many researchers.

### 2.1.3 Inequality and Participation:

Inequality has become a standard measure of welfare state effort and political mobilization. While inequality and voter turnout at the state level in the United States has been explicitly investigated at least since 1972, scholars have recently begun to investigate the intricacies of these two aspects of American life in more detail. For the US, several studies have found that state level inequality is significantly related to democratic share of the vote after controlling for both state- and period-fixed effects (Galbraith and Hale 2006). In addition, how much states incorporate their citizens, or do not exclude, affects political activity as well. Using supplementary welfare provision in the United States (i.e., food stamps), Plutzer (2010) found that states with higher inclusivity had much lower political inequality (i.e., bias in electoral turnout) (Plutzer 2010). Moreover, inequality has been shown to diminish the capacity to actively participate in civic activities. Solt (2008) shows that not only does (monied) inequality lead to inequality in turnout, it also depresses both interest and discussion of political issues. “Inequality saps the will to conceive of ambitious solutions to large collective problems” (Packer 2011).

States might adjust their priorities to optimally reduce inequality, especially if doing so might improve the representativeness of the democratic process. However, attempts at state intervention to reduce or relieve inequality will likely encounter opposition from interests which benefit from the existence of such inequality.<sup>5</sup> As Tilley (2006) suggests, a concerted “political program to attack, subvert, bypass, or buy off [opposing] interests” may be required to pursue inequality reduction policies (Tilley 2006:22). Additionally, party platforms are themselves contingent on an interaction effect of inequality and likelihood of lower-class mobilization. Left parties move to the left (relative to the center of political gravity) when participation by the lower income groups can be expected. In the absence of this, left parties have a tendency to move to the right with their right party counterparts (Pontusson and Rueda 2010) - a matter explored further in chapter 8. As such, the ability of left parties, and the policies they espouse, to maintain their position are compromised by demobilization of lower class citizens and they drift away from policies amenable to their situations. It would be erroneous however, as Solt (2008) argues, to assume that the issue of redistribution is on the agenda in the first place. It is plausible that in the absence of

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<sup>5</sup>As Dobelstein (1998) notes, “it was not until 1965 that there was sufficient [political support] from older citizens to overcome the opposition of the organized medical community” to medicare.

decommodification and presence of punitive means-tested policies (thereby increasing the cognitive stress on the poor), inequality further limits the incentive of political participation by removing options from the agenda.

Taken together, these inter-connectivities entail that welfare policy, political participation, and inequality form a palpable force. To investigate these concerns, an in depth analysis of the United States at the sub-national (i.e., state) level is carried out for the years 1992-2008. This analysis explores a tri-partite relationship wherein policy change in the previous year (T-1) affects the experience of voters who then either participate or abstain from participation at year (T). This participation or lack thereof then informs the subsequent (T+2) formation and implementation of policy which informs the next round of experiences of the electorate.

## 2.2 Data and Methods

The analyses in this section follow from the documentation that (a) political participation impacts welfare state development, while (b) welfare state (institutional) design impacts political agency (e.g., political participation). The approach here is based on three separate regression stages which utilize data from various sources compiled into a unique data set for the 50 states of the US, spanning the time period 1992 to 2008. Variable descriptions are also located in appendix 9.3.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the path diagram tested in the following sections.

Financial data is taken from the US Census Bureau's (USCB) State and Local Finances database. The data has been combined to form a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset covering 16 years and all 50 states. This data gives the reported revenue and expenditure for each state across the entire universe of revenue and expenditure categories. The main variables of interests are expenditure categories. Within this category, I focus on those labeled as welfare functions and those whose *function* relates to welfare provision. That is, though unemployment, for instance, is not included under the reporting category of welfare expenditure, it is used with this function in mind.

Furthermore, aggregate state and local finances are used instead of state or local only. The decision to proceed with the combined data was taken after consideration for other variables used which are not available at the local level. The advantage of using disaggregated local or state fiscal data lies




Figure 2.1: Path Diagram of Welfare System and Political Activity

in the fact that states devolve some responsibilities to local authorities and maintain some taxing and spending powers for the centralized state level. High spending for cash benefits in one state may not necessarily be comparable with similar spending in another due to the fact that one may devolve the majority of spending responsibilities to the local authorities, thus leaving discretionary powers at the level of the local instead of state levels.

While it would certainly be advantageous to exploit this aspect of the data, a current lack of corresponding political data prohibits making good use of such expenditure. As such, I have reverted to use of the aggregate estimates. To compensate for this shortcoming, an expenditure “burden” of each state on each spending variable of interest has been calculated. States are given values ranging from 0 to 1 depending on the share of the overall contribution to the total amount of resources used between local and state authorities to provide the given function. Also, as the USCB reports current prices in their accounts, I have taken the *shares* of of revenue and expenditure derived by (a) dividing the amount financed and spent by function from the total general revenue of each state at time (T), as well as (b) the share of expenditure by function of total direct expenditures. This alleviates the necessity of accounting for inflation over time and changes in prices across regions - that is, as shares, the data reports the percentage of total effort that a state devotes to each function and not the dollar amounts it spends. Data has also been taken from the USCB on demographic variables. Political

variables, such as share of numbers of Democrats versus Republicans in office, are taken from the USCB statistical abstracts for each year. These are used as a check against data from the University of Kentucky's Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR). Data from the UKCPR is integrated which provides information on state level AFDC/TANF rates, unemployment rates, benefit expenditure limits, benefit caseloads, and minimum wages for both state and federal levels. Importantly, this data provides the means to assess the generosity of states across space and time. The analyses are divided into political participation and spending (2.2.1), state spending and inequality (2.2.2), and inequality and political participation (2.3.3).

### 2.2.1 Political Participation Effect on Spending

This research follows similar studies that have explored the impact of political participation on welfare spending. As Mule (2001) noted, "the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies" (Mule 2001:6). Personal preferences aside, in situations where the poor turnout to vote at higher rates, political actors (through the logic of universalizing/broadening campaign promises) may amend their strategies and take on more pro-welfare spending stances. That is, those who wish to win election and stay in office will face the threat of electoral pressure to adapt policy in favor of those with greater possibility to be or become welfare clients. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

- H1: If welfare systems are sensitive to electoral turnout variation, I expect a positive relationship with the amount a government spends on *welfare spending* as a proportion of their overall expenditure budget and voter turnout at T-2.<sup>6</sup>

**Directional Influence:** Determining causal flow is laden with complications, and this analysis is no exception. Directional flow between turnout and redistribution relies on the assumption that institutions are (a) responsive to turnout, and (b) that this relationship is not bi-directional. That is, redistribution, according to the literature on the effects of the welfare state on turnout, intrinsically implies that turnout (and of course public opinion) is

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<sup>6</sup>Budget and policy are large ships and do not move so quickly. It is also conceivable that these processes take even longer since many budgets are made in 2-year intervals. Therefore I use a lagged turnout variable of 2 years to estimate the effect of increased turnout on budgetary outlays. I also test for the effect which turnout might imply for benefit generosity.

an endogenous variable impacted by welfare institutions. This proves problematic, to say the least. Fortunately, however, a portion of this dilemma has been resolved by Mahler (2008: 174-175). Applying an instrumental approach, Mahler confirms that, cross-nationally, the causal direction of voter turnout for welfare spending (redistribution) is from turnout to redistribution. Given the voluminous literature on the theoretical direction of turnout, I proceed with the assumption of causality in the theorized direction.<sup>7</sup>

For the turnout and spending analysis, eight categories of spending are taken as dependent variables: three **Formal welfare programs**: *Cash benefits, Vendor payments, Other payments*; and five **non-formal welfare programs**: *Health, Hospital, Assistance and Subsidies, Corrections, and Unemployment*.<sup>8</sup> To control for other possible explanations, I include a **Demographic variable** to account for the racial heterogeneity of each state - *percent black* ; a **Collective Bargaining** variable - *union density* - to account for the degree of organized labor interests; one variable for **Urbanization** - *population per square mile* - to control for densely populated states; two **Demand** variables - *unemployment rate* to account for increases in demand for expenditure related to the labor market and *AFDC/TANF rate* to account for pressures on state resources; two variables to account for the **Ideological** make-up of states, *citizen ideology* and *institutional ideology* (Berry et.al. 1998 ); two variables which measure **Partisan Control**, the share of *Democratic control* of the *House* and *Senate* in each state; and a final control variable for **Federal**, the *percentage federal monies* of a state's general revenue. These variables most closely recreate other studies investigating similar issues of electoral competition and public spending (Browning 1983; Moon and Dixon 1984; Hill and Leighley 1992; Fording 1997; Jacoby and Schneider 2001; Barrileaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Martin 2003; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Bartels 2005; Avery and Peffley 2005; Ross 2006; Scruggs 2007; Mahler 2008). Additionally, some analyses makes use of a lagged dependent variable to account for the possibility that state spending is a function of previous levels of state spending (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001).

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<sup>7</sup>The analysis here is taken with a degree of caution. Even with causation primarily in one direction, causality in the opposite direction can bias estimated coefficients.

<sup>8</sup>Definitions for these variables are available at <http://www.census.gov/govs/local/definitions.html>

### 2.2.2 Welfare Effects on Inequality

Data and analysis for the effects of public spending on inequality are rather more straightforward than the preceding operationalization for the effect of political participation on welfare spending. Data used for these analyses come from the same TSCS dataset, however the analysis here also includes the measure of income inequality in a state at year T. Such an effort is complicated by two primary reasons. First, data on the actual distribution of income inequality over states is, surprisingly, still in its infancy. This stems from the nature of data collection in the US and across states. Second, because data for inequality measurement comes primarily from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a degree of caution is necessary when deliberating the coding of income levels. “Top coding”, as it is referred to, may bias income inequality estimates down. Also, there is no sure method of taking into account the myriad of taxation schemes and transfer methods used across the US simultaneously - though the work of Saez (2013) has gone some distance to unravel these complexities.

The USCB reports decennial gini coefficients for states, however a more reliable source of data was sought out for this analysis. While it might also be useful to utilize the Theil index of inequality, which is more sensitive to top incomes and decomposable by region into between and within region inequality, the gini measure has been adopted as the preferred reporting variable. This measure is less comparable or intuitive for the purposes at hand. I use two measures of income inequality for the analysis, one of which is used as an aside for the main analysis. This aside gini data comes from the University of Texas Inequality Project for the years 1992 - 2004. Years following 2004 are then supplemented with reports directly from the USCB. These measures are for pre-tax and transfer incomes, and as such measure the initial earnings inequality of states. The second (and primary) gini data comes from John Voorheis at the University of Oregon. Voorheis utilizes a “best behaved” series that incorporates information from three sources: the March CPS, the Decennial Census (connected via cubic spline interpolation) and the American Community Survey (ACS), where each component with data for a given year is given equal weight. All three sources are top-coded in the public use microdata, with an extension applied of the Jenkins et al (2009) generalized beta multiple imputation method, adapted to state-level data. The CPS, ACS and Census microdata includes transfer payments, but earned income is reported as gross (pre-tax) income. The inequality measures are for the household level, where household income has been deflated by an equivalence

scale equal to the square root of the household size.<sup>9</sup>

The analysis here tests whether transfers, sensitive to electoral turnout, significantly impact the reduction of income inequality captured in the Voorheis estimates. If so, it goes one step further to understanding the path of depressed electoral participation and public spending outcomes. That is, I hypothesize that:

- H2: Those areas of spending which are positively affected by electoral participation will negatively effect associate with inequality, post-transfer, controlling for other factors.

In addition to the spending variables under consideration, I control for the *density* of the state's population (assuming that larger populations will increase the likelihood of income inequality by increasing the diversity of division of labor), the *prison rate per 100,000* (assuming that the removal of bread-winners from the community will contribute to decreased earnings and aggravated inequality), *per capita income*, whether a state is in the *south/southeastern region* of the US (given historically high levels of income inequality and rural populations based around agricultural economies), *percent black* (controlling for racial heterogeneity which may or may not lead to discrimination in the labor market), and *union density* (collective bargaining agreements which may affect income outcomes).

I include those variable which are most directly targeted to welfare of registered recipients. *Correctional spending* is included as only supervised populations are the beneficiaries of the budgetary outlays for correctional spending.<sup>10</sup> *Unemployment* is targeted specifically to the insured population or workers, and as such increased spending on this area should predict less post-transfer income inequality. *Cash transfers* are expected to produce negative effects on inequality, while *vendor* spending is likely to produce increased inequality since it is an indirect benefit which is not designed to mitigate inequality but rather the results of inequality. The same can be said of correctional spending - what I term as reactive institutions. Other spending is not hypothesized to have any effect, however is included to complete the formal welfare category variable listing. The results are presented

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<sup>9</sup>As reported by J. Voorheis

<sup>10</sup>That said, the dynamics of correctional spending are highly contentious. For one, prisoners - who account for 1/3 of the supervised population across the US - are not accounted for in labor or census surveys. As such, it is controversial whether to include this variable as a predictor of income inequality as the beneficiaries are not receiving a benefit as such. None the less, I include this variable to investigate any potential impact

in Table 2.3.3.

### 2.2.3 Inequality Effects on Political Participation

The literature on inequality and voting is an evolving one. For one, there is a strong consensus that economic hardship differentially impacts voters at different parts of the income distribution; however, how and why this is so remains a bit of a mystery to be reconciled. This thesis takes as its point of view that the *manner* in which policy makers attempt to resolve inequality shapes the participatory and ideological nature of the electorate. Thus, the measure of income inequality in a society post-tax and transfer constitutes a crude but effective measure of how governments attend to the needs of their constituents. A more adequate measure would investigate the degree to which various programs stack up against each other after accounting for program delivery, benefit levels and types, and eligibility requirements - e.g., the Social Policy Indicator Database (SPIN). Under this assumption, changes to welfare eligibility and generosity shift the burden of proof for assistance away from firms and towards the individual. As income inequality is measured at the household level, increased burdens on households are expected to be captured by this coefficient. For this analysis, I hypothesize that:

- H3: Higher levels of post-tax income inequality at T-1 will associate with lower levels of political turnout at T.

To investigate the impact of inequality on voting behavior, and hence the realization of inequality reduction through welfare related spending, I use the Voorheis gini coefficient as my main explanatory variable with other variables as controls. The independent variable is the *turnout of the voting eligible population at time T*. The main explanatory variable is the *post-transfer income distribution per state*. Additionally, I control for factors which have been shown to increase one's probability of participating. As individuals who are wealthier and more educated are more likely to turnout on election day (Verba, Schlozman, and Key 1995; Lijphart 1997), the *percentage of 25 year olds and above who report some or more college/university to the USCB* and the *per capital income* of the state are included. Population density (*population per square mile*), population stability (*change in population from previous year*) and population heterogeneity (*percentage state population which is black*) are included as demographic controls following Geys (2006).

*Union density* is included to control for the possibility that unions, aside from their collective bargaining capacity, also perform a mobilization role. It may also be the case that as the electorate becomes more politically and socially liberal, their tendency to voice their concerns are also increased. As such I continue to use the citizen ideology variable. Given the entrenched culture of real or perceived discrimination in the former Jim Crow states, I include a control for *South*, which is supplemented with a variable controlling for the degree to which states are rigid in their electoral institutional setting - a measure of a state's level of *felon disenfranchisement* is included which is equal to 0 for no restriction on felon voting to 5 for state that restrict all felons and ex-felons from the vote. As Lewis-Beck et al (2011) illustrates, voters are, among other things, concerned with the state of the economy, and vote both by the pocket book and by the national state of the economy. To account for economic downturns, I include a measure of *unemployment* which differs from the previously used measure as it measures the unemployment rate in the month *before* an election. Finally, I include a dummy variable to account for *presidential elections* which are known to raise turnout substantially. A separate model is then run with a *lagged dependent variable* to control for turnout in the last election as a measure for path dependency.<sup>11</sup>

## 2.3 Results

### 2.3.1 Political Participation Effect on Spending

#### Formal Welfare Spending

Table 2.3.1 reports the results from the pooled regression analyses using panel corrected standard errors. Typically for studies of this type, most researchers utilize a standard corrected standard errors with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) (Beck 2001). However, since these methods have been argued to sap other explanatory variables of their power (Huber and Stephens 2001), I have opted to reserve such a method for those models where the variable of interest shows initial signs of promise. Three out of four of the regressions on the specified welfare categories refute the hypothesis that voter turnout at T-2 has any statistically significant impact on spending allocations as measured by percentage share of total expenditure. These are discussed first.

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<sup>11</sup>Note that the lagged dependent variable is the election turnout at T - 4 years to account for the nature of presidential and mid-term elections.

**General Welfare:** Results for general welfare expenditures reveal no significant effect of participation on the share of expenditures spent on overall welfare functions.<sup>12</sup> Union density plays a significant and negative role for spending, while population density has a significant and positive effect on general welfare spending. This may indicate that as states urbanize, citizens come into more frequent and closer contact with social problems which create demands on some forms of welfare spending. This would fit with the significant and positive effect of citizen ideology on general welfare spending. Per capita income, conceptualized as the wealth of the population, is significant and negatively associated with spending on general welfare. While greater wealth is theorized to lead to increased ability to afford public spending on services, these initial results are contrary to this line of argument. However, confirmatory results are borne out once the dis-aggregated spending categories are analyzed.

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<sup>12</sup>Cash assistance paid directly to needy persons under categorical programs - Old Age Assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and any other welfare programs.

Table 2.1: State Welfare Spending and Political Activity

	(M:1) General	(M:2) Cash	(M:3) Vendor	(M:4) Other
Turnout	0.043 (0.48)	0.093** (2.53)	0.006 (0.07)	0.058 (1.08)
Perc. Black	-0.058 (-1.17)	-0.060 (-0.95)	-0.032 (-0.49)	-0.048 (-1.12)
Union	-0.147*** (-3.42)	-0.042 (-1.24)	-0.202*** (-3.71)	0.176** (2.32)
Pop Density	0.195*** (3.38)	-0.037 (-1.14)	0.241*** (3.21)	-0.085 (-1.53)
Per Cap Inc	-0.224*** (-2.72)	0.205*** (3.23)	-0.244*** (-2.77)	-0.123* (-1.66)
Cit. Ideology	0.405*** (5.41)	0.081 (1.45)	0.270*** (4.28)	0.437*** (6.04)
Inst. Ideology	-0.004 (-0.08)	0.026 (0.55)	0.021 (0.44)	-0.098* (-1.66)
Unempl. Rate	-0.026 (-0.40)	-0.053 (-1.31)	0.089* (1.67)	-0.325*** (-4.03)
House Dem	0.247*** (3.08)	-0.061 (-1.04)	0.304*** (3.39)	-0.091 (-1.46)
Senate Dem	-0.124* (-1.81)	-0.010 (-0.13)	-0.092 (-1.24)	-0.116* (-1.74)
AFDC/TANF	0.015 (0.17)	0.821*** (12.64)	-0.240*** (-2.87)	0.219*** (4.23)
Federal	0.307*** (4.21)	0.022 (0.51)	0.299*** (4.14)	0.063 (1.27)
$R^2$	0.373	0.548	0.437	0.299

 Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in parentheses

 \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Both measure for partisan effect on spending (the share of upper and lower houses controlled by Democrats) are significant, in line with the literature, however in opposite directions. A 1 Std.Dev. increase in Democratic representation in the lower house (approximately 16 percent) increases the share of spending on general welfare by roughly a .25 SD. Unexpectedly, increased representation in the upper house decreases spending by half that rate. Federal funding as a percentage of overall general state revenue is positively and significantly associated with general welfare spending. The percentage of the state's population which is Black has finds no significant effect on general spending.

**Cash Benefits** Despite these discouraging findings for voter turnout on general welfare spending, the model for cash expenditures is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction (i.e., positive). Of the predictor variables used, AFDC/TANF rate has a substantial and significantly positive effect on spending on cash benefits as a share of total expenditures, while per capita income has a positive effect on spending. This is in line with what would be expected. States with more resources are expected to be able to finance more redistribution, as increased wealth may also mark less strain on resources. Turnout is the only other predictor variable to have a significant, and positive, effect on cash spending at roughly .10 SD. Interestingly, and in contrast to much of the literature on state spending on welfare, percentage black continues to have no significant effect on cash spending. Additionally, citizen and institutional ideology, as well as the share of control of government by Democrats, have no significant effects. The amount which states receive from the federal government in transfers also appears to play no significant role in cash spending.

**Vendor Payments:** The results for vendor payments are markedly different from cash benefits.<sup>13</sup> Union density, per capita income, and the rate of AFDC/TANF recipients are significantly and negatively related to spending in this category. Population density, citizen ideology (social liberalism), the unemployment rate ( $p < 0.10$ ), share of Democrats in the lower house, and the proportion of revenue received from the federal government are all significantly associated with vendor payments. Voter turnout, percent black,

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<sup>13</sup>Payments made directly to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other commodities and services provided under welfare programs; inclusive provision and operation by the government of welfare institutions.

institutional ideology, and the share of Democrats in the upper house are not significantly associated with vendor payments.

**Other Spending:** Other spending, that is spending on all other welfare needs not covered in the previous categories, appears more related to cash spending than vendor payments.<sup>14</sup> AFDC/TANF rates, union density, and citizen liberalism (socially) are significantly and positively related with increased spending in this category. Per capita income, institutional ideology, the level of unemployment, and the share of Democrats in the upper house are negatively associated with increased spending. One might assume that because this category is a conglomeration of rather non-specific areas of spending (e.g., transfers to administration and services not covered by the previous two categories), that this area would be largely insulated from public pressure.

### Functional Welfare Spending

These welfare programs are, however, not the sole means by which states redistribute resources to citizens. In addition, states provide for hospital care, health, housing, unemployment, and cash assistance accounted for in local level efforts. Additionally, I include correctional expenditures to investigate welfare system expenditures. This facet will be explained in detail in the following chapter; suffice to say, correctional departments across the US (and internationally) provide many comparable welfare maintenance programs to their clients. The interpretation herein is complex, however in order to assume that the services provided by the correctional services of states are to be viewed as a component of aggregate welfare system provision, it would seem counter to this claim to omit this area from analysis.

I expect that those areas which provide broad benefits will be affected by electoral turnout. By contrast, areas of spending which are highly exclusive should not exhibit a reaction to political participation. Specifically, I expect that hospital expenditure will be insulated from electoral politics, as the expenditures reported apply primarily to administrative capacity and other areas which would not be overtly on the agenda of political competition.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Payments to other governments for welfare purposes, amounts for administration, support for private welfare agencies, and other public welfare services.

<sup>15</sup>Administration is also affected by technological capital and other improvements which may increase costs for particular components while being offset by reductions in others.

I expect that voter turnout will not have any substantive effect on correctional spending, but for different reasons as these programs are set by policy decisions made “behind closed doors”. This is not an ad hoc rationalization. Correctional budgets are autonomous from other welfare provision budgets. Judging from the findings of cash benefits, I expect to find similar results for assistance and subsidies, as this area represents direct expenditure to constituents and is highly correlated to the categorical area of cash benefits - that is, assistance and subsidies make up cash benefits to recipients and as such this is in a matter of sense a redoubling of the analysis on cash benefits. No impact is expected on unemployment, as these programs are insurance based and do not represent the same nature as cash benefit redistribution programs.

Given that health care expenditure is likely to reflect more so the demand for medical treatment and factors less likely to rely on electoral threat, I do not expect this area to be significantly related. That said, I do expect that political ideology of the states, that is the degree to which electorates are more politically liberal, and the share of Democratic Party control of government (excluding the governorship) to have a positive and significant impact on spending across categories including corrections. Two analyses are shown, with only the predictor variables for unemployment and corrections altered to reflect their explicit beneficiaries. AFDC/TANF rates are substituted for corrections and instead include a measure of total supervised population per 100,000 voting age population. For unemployment, I drop AFDC/TANF rates and only maintain the included unemployment rates. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the panel corrected standard error pooled OLS regressions.

The results for the non-formally delimited welfare programs are telling. Across categories, voter turnout shows, as expected, only significant effects with assistance and subsidy spending and, surprisingly, correctional spending. Because the measure of voter turnout is based on the eligible population which excludes disenfranchised (ineligible) offenders, it cannot be that an increase in turnout entails a decrease in offender populations, though this may well travel together. That is, my measure of voter turnout is “insulated” from overlap with felon populations. Citizen ideology is a significant predictor of share of expenditure across all but two categories, corrections and unemployment, with institutional ideology filling in where citizen ideology falls short.

Table 2.2: Functional Spending and Political Activity (1)

	(M:5)	(M:6)	(M:7)	(M:8)	(M:9)	(M:10)
	Hospital	Health	Corrections	Unemp.	House	Assist
Turnout	-0.015 (-0.49)	-0.003 (-0.06)	-0.139** (-2.07)	0.014 (0.11)	0.059 (0.79)	0.109*** (2.61)
Perc. Black	0.416*** (10.84)	0.183*** (5.37)	0.148*** (3.04)	-0.191*** (-3.79)	0.175** (1.97)	0.064 (0.92)
Union	-0.030 (-1.01)	0.202*** (4.71)	-0.211*** (-3.17)	0.228*** (3.12)	0.102* (1.79)	-0.100*** (-3.09)
Pop Density	-0.152*** (-6.11)	-0.099 (-1.09)	0.010 (0.18)	0.398*** (6.64)	-0.033 (-0.63)	0.010 (0.34)
Per Cap Inc	0.062 (1.50)	-0.121 (-1.53)	0.204*** (3.38)	-0.171* (-1.65)	0.380*** (4.75)	0.078 (1.12)
Cit. Ideology	-0.450*** (-7.52)	0.206*** (3.78)	-0.072 (-0.81)	0.033 (0.59)	0.126* (1.93)	0.242*** (3.76)
Inst. Ideology	-0.014 (-0.32)	0.082 (1.19)	0.133** (2.25)	0.155*** (3.38)	-0.005 (-0.07)	-0.002 (-0.05)
Unempl. Rate	0.074** (2.50)	-0.072 (-1.45)	0.114 (1.17)	0.337*** (4.02)	-0.119** (-2.00)	-0.042 (-0.80)
House Dem	0.139* (1.69)	-0.179 (-1.58)	-0.096 (-1.49)	-0.100* (-1.78)	-0.009 (-0.13)	0.016 (0.28)
Senate Dem	0.036 (0.65)	0.104 (1.07)	-0.071 (-1.04)	0.062 (0.97)	0.110 (1.11)	-0.178** (-2.48)
AFDC/TANF	-0.059 (-1.58)	0.063 (0.94)	-0.024 (-0.28)	0.052 (0.35)	0.259*** (3.11)	0.757*** (11.58)
Federal	0.083*** (3.16)	0.025 (0.61)	-0.375*** (-3.43)	0.092 (0.77)	0.205** (2.44)	0.027 (0.52)
$R^2$	0.502	0.097	0.254	0.516	0.273	0.450

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 2.3: Functional Spending and Political Activity (2)

	(M:11) Hospital	(M:12) Health	(M:13) Corrections	(M:14) Unemp.	(M:15) House	(M:16) Assist
Turnout	-0.015 (-0.49)	-0.003 (-0.06)	-0.144** (-2.25)	0.018 (0.14)	0.059 (0.79)	0.109*** (2.61)
Perc. Black	0.416*** (10.84)	0.183*** (5.37)	0.047 (1.15)	-0.193*** (-3.77)	0.175** (1.97)	0.064 (0.92)
Union	-0.030 (-1.01)	0.202*** (4.71)	-0.208*** (-2.85)	0.246*** (2.88)	0.102* (1.79)	-0.100*** (-3.09)
Pop Density	-0.152*** (-6.11)	-0.099 (-1.09)	-0.024 (-0.41)	0.409*** (6.04)	-0.033 (-0.63)	0.010 (0.34)
Per Cap Inc	0.062 (1.50)	-0.121 (-1.53)	0.167*** (3.85)	-0.201 (-1.59)	0.380*** (4.75)	0.078 (1.12)
Cit. Ideology	-0.450*** (-7.52)	0.206*** (3.78)	-0.095 (-1.06)	0.030 (0.48)	0.126* (1.93)	0.242*** (3.76)
Inst. Ideology	-0.014 (-0.32)	0.082 (1.19)	0.151*** (2.68)	0.161*** (3.49)	-0.005 (-0.07)	-0.002 (-0.05)
Unempl. Rate	0.074** (2.50)	-0.072 (-1.45)	0.076 (0.91)	0.349*** (4.03)	-0.119** (-2.00)	-0.042 (-0.80)
House Dem	0.139* (1.69)	-0.179 (-1.58)	-0.070 (-1.12)	-0.099* (-1.75)	-0.009 (-0.13)	0.016 (0.28)
Senate Dem	0.036 (0.65)	0.104 (1.07)	-0.072 (-1.11)	0.067 (0.98)	0.110 (1.11)	-0.178** (-2.48)
AFDC/TANF	-0.059 (-1.58)	0.063 (0.94)			0.259*** (3.11)	0.757*** (11.58)
Federal	0.083*** (3.16)	0.025 (0.61)	-0.331*** (-3.63)	0.080 (0.71)	0.205** (2.44)	0.027 (0.52)
Supervised			0.324*** (10.52)			
$R^2$	0.502	0.097	0.340	0.515	0.273	0.450

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Hospital Spending** Citizen ideology and heterogeneity of population (as measured by the percentage of the population which is black) are the strongest relative predictors (standardized betas of -0.450 and 0.416 respectively) of hospital expenditure.<sup>16</sup> Share of the lower house represented by Democrats, unemployment rate and federal revenue all contribute positively to hospital spending. Population density contributes, as with citizen ideology, to less spending on hospitals. This may signify a tradeoff between investment in operations and that of health, which is predicted by citizen ideology.

**Health Spending:** Only three predictors proved significant for health expenditure in the model tested.<sup>17</sup> Citizen ideology, union density, and the share of the population which is black are all positively and significantly related to increased spending on health spending  $p < .01$ . However, the strength of the model is considerably weak ( $r^2 = .097$ ). A more specified model would benefit from inclusion of a myriad of variables to account for research and development costs, education programs and so forth. From the results here, it seems evident that what drives spending on the formal welfare programs is largely separate from health spending across states.

**Correctional Spending:** As mentioned earlier, correctional spending is a contentious area, and one which is not covered in welfare system literature.<sup>18</sup> One exception is Paul Norris' examination of public order and safety (see Castles 2007; Ch.6). However, Norris' focus does not include expenditures within corrections, but rather their macro-social determinants. Chapter 3 points out the current flaws in welfare accounting for correctional institutions, many of which must necessarily be dealt with to gain an accurate picture of this area. Model 3 shows that racial heterogeneity of states have a significant and positive effect on correctional spending. Additionally, union density and federal spending have significant negative effects on correctional spending, while institutional ideology and per capita income both have positive effects. Unexpectedly, voter turnout has a negative effect on correctional spending which is significant at  $p < .05$ . This finding is explored further in the lagged dependent variable subsection. However, it may suggest that a

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<sup>16</sup>Financing, construction acquisition, maintenance and operation of hospital facilities, provision of hospital care, and support of public or private hospitals.

<sup>17</sup>Outpatient care including public health administration, research and education, categorical health programs, treatment and immunization clinics, nursing and environmental health activities, and other general public health services inclusive school health services provided by state agencies.

<sup>18</sup>Confinement and correction of adults and minors.

more engaged citizenry and electoral threat play a role, though small, on restraining expenditures on corrections. This relationship holds when the total supervised population is included into the model.

**Unemployment:** As expected, voter turnout at T-2 has no impact on spending for unemployment.<sup>19</sup> Institutional ideology, union density, population density, and the unemployment rate are all positively associated with higher levels of spending on unemployment. Percentage black, per capita income, and (rather surprisingly) the share of the lower house represented by Democrats are negatively associated with spending. This holds even when unemployment rate is the only measure of demand (i.e., when the AFDC/TANF rate is dropped).

**Housing:** Looking at housing expenditure, there remains no significant effect of turnout or any of the political variables besides from citizen ideology.<sup>20</sup> Percentage black, union density, per capita income, rate of AFDC/TANF beneficiaries and federal revenue are all significantly and positively associated with higher housing benefits. Unemployment is the only negative predictor of housing expenditure. This however makes sense, as housing and development are largely state funded programs, and as such it would not be expected that political actors have much discretion at diverting these funds to constituent pressure.

**Assistance and Subsidies:** Finally, looking at assistance and subsidies provided by states, there is a significant and positive effect of turnout on this category.<sup>21</sup> This is in line with my expectations owing to the results from the analysis on cash benefits. The effect of turnout is reproduced in this model. Union density plays a more significant, and negative, role, while the share of the upper house represented by Democrats is negative. AFDC/TANF rate per 100,000 is strongly associated with increased spending, while citizen ideology is also related to higher spending.

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<sup>19</sup>Payments made to beneficiaries under basic provisions of unemployment compensation programs and special program payments, such as extended benefits triggered by economic conditions.

<sup>20</sup>Construction and operation of housing and redevelopment projects, and other activities to promote or aid housing and community development.

<sup>21</sup>Cash contributions and subsidies to persons. Local government: Direct cash assistance to public welfare recipients. State government: veterans' bonuses and direct cash grants for tuition, scholarships, and aid to nonpublic education institutions.

### **Lagged Dependent Variable Analysis**

Having fleshed out which programs are most sensitive to electoral turnout, I run an additional set of regressions using lagged dependent variables (LDVs). The LDV approach is widely used in comparative welfare state and political analysis (Beck 2001). Because of its tendency to “knock out” the explanatory power of other independent variables (Huber and Stephens 2001), it has been reserved to thresh out the significance of voter turnout where it has been found in the non-LDV analysis. I therefore run three additional analysis which attempt, in essence, to invalidate the effect of turnout on my dependent variables. While this by no means entails that the effect of turnout is no longer significant if negated by the LDV regressions, it does provide a check for robustness of my assumptions.

Table 2.4: State Welfare Spending and Political Activity - Lagged Variables

	(M:17)	(M:18)	(M:19)
	CashLDV	AssistLDV	CorrectionsLDV
Turnout	0.00274* (1.96)	0.00422** (2.42)	0.000763 (0.97)
Perc. Black	-0.00109 (-0.84)	0.00111 (0.69)	-0.000364 (-0.23)
Union	-0.0000140 (-0.92)	-0.0000344* (-1.91)	0.0000297 (1.28)
Pop Density	-9.46e-08 (-0.22)	-5.44e-08 (-0.13)	0.00000620* (1.82)
Per Cap Inc	5.42e-08* (1.78)	5.55e-08 (1.55)	
Cit. Ideology	-0.00000306 (-0.37)	0.0000107 (1.10)	-0.00000979 (-0.62)
Inst. Ideology	0.0000169 (1.62)	0.0000161 (1.38)	0.00000694 (0.62)
Unempl. Rate	0.0000255 (0.21)	0.000131 (0.89)	0.00000236 (0.02)
House Dem	-0.000822 (-0.86)	-0.000951 (-0.86)	-0.00275** (-2.28)
Senate Dem	-0.00116 (-0.96)	-0.00193 (-1.35)	0.00158* (1.76)
AFDC/TANF	0.000000384 (1.22)	0.000000435 (1.62)	
Federal	0.00164 (0.49)	0.00350 (0.88)	-0.00387 (-0.83)
Per Cap Inc			-3.67e-08 (-1.37)
Cash Lag	0.824*** (11.75)		
Assist Lag		0.794*** (12.94)	
Supervised			1.93e-08 (0.19)
Correction Lag			0.964*** (31.18)
_cons	-0.00268** (-2.05)	-0.00303 (-1.63)	0.00292* (1.89)
$R^2$	0.874	0.830	0.901

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

As table 2.3.1 shows, the effect of voter participation at T-2 for cash spending (both cash benefits and assistance and subsidies) remains after inclusion of the respective LDVs. This washes out all other effects, leaving only the turnout variable as a significant predictor of cash benefit spending. The results for corrections removes the significance of voter turnout, and shifts the significance of population density to better than  $p < 0.10$ . Additionally, the significance of Democrats in both houses of government are now significant at the  $p < 0.05$  (House) and  $p < 0.10$  (Senate) level.

Turning from these results, I now turn to the analysis of an alternative measure of potential electoral effect on welfare systems. The results to this point indicate that cash spending is partially predicted by electoral turnout at T-2. However, this aggregate measure of welfare masks an important feature of different welfare systems. States receive federal block grants under the 1996 PRWORA reforms which they are able to use, with some restrictions, largely at the discretion of the state governments. This provides a valuable proxy by which to judge how electoral participation is related to welfare outcomes. That is, by employing these methods, it is possible to calculate (roughly) how generosity within programs relates with political participation.

### **Welfare Generosity and Political Participation**


Continuing under the assumption from previous research that political participation and inputs are directional into welfare policy, I extend the analysis by focusing finally on the effect of electoral turnout and other variables on the benefit level of AFDC/TANF for a family of four as a percentage of the federal minimum wage at full-time hours (40 hours per week). The same variables are chosen for this model as the previous analysis on spending.<sup>22</sup> This information is not reliant on the data obtained from the USCB, and is solely based on analysis from the UKCPR data with own calculations. As a percentage of the federal minimum wage, it provides a standardized measure of states against a single level. States have uniformly migrated from direct cash transfer to vendor payment methods. Table 2.3.1 illustrates the potent impact which voter turnout has on cash benefit expenditure and the generosity of that benefit. Union density, per capita income, citizen ideology and the AFDC/TANF rate all play positive roles in benefit generosity. Percentage

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<sup>22</sup>An alternate specification was performed with the exception of Alaska due to the disproportionate impact which oil revenue and citizen subsidies have on spending. Results did not vary significantly and are available on request.

black significantly decreases benefit generosity.

Figure 2.2: AFDC/TANF Benefit as Share of Full-time Employment at Federal Minimum Wage



Source: UKCPR. Data is AFDC/TANF benefit for family of 4 / full-time employment (40 hours/week); Excludes Alaska

Using the LDV panel-corrected standard error model as proposed by Beck (2001), I find that, controlling for other variables, electoral turnout continues to have an impact at the level of generosity in policy decision while the previously significant factors all turn insignificant, while democratic share of the two houses and federal revenue enter as significant. After inclusion of the LDV, the main political variables make up the significant predictors of cash benefit generosity, with both lower and upper house Democratic representation becoming significant in different directions. States with higher electoral turnout at T-2 have more generous spending levels holding all other variables constant.

The robust results for electoral effect on cash spending, the consistent significance of political ideology both at the institutional and citizen levels, and the importance of party control of legislatures confirms the assumptions of previous works concerning the importance of political factors in welfare spending in the face of both demand and resource explanations. Having explored these relationships with alternate specifications, I now turn to analysis of these categories of spending on the reduction of post-transfer income inequality.

Table 2.5: State AFDC/TANF Generosity

	(M:20)		(M:21)	
	Generosity		GenerosityLDV	
Turnout	0.161**	(2.35)	0.054**	(2.16)
Perc. Black	-0.303***	(-5.42)	0.010	(1.05)
Union	0.269***	(5.64)	0.000	(0.02)
Pop Density	-0.124***	(-2.88)	0.015	(1.30)
Per Cap Inc	0.346***	(3.89)	-0.024	(-1.00)
Cit. Ideology	0.127***	(3.48)	-0.019	(-1.11)
Inst. Ideology	-0.049	(-0.97)	0.004	(0.30)
Unempl. Rate	0.009	(0.23)	0.008	(0.42)
House Dem	-0.080	(-1.56)	0.044**	(2.21)
Senate Dem	0.066	(0.91)	-0.036**	(-1.97)
AFDC/Tanf	0.388***	(4.63)	-0.026	(-0.96)
Federal	-0.048	(-0.90)	-0.034*	(-1.79)
LDV			0.985***	(46.72)
$R^2$	0.665		0.975	

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Beginning with an initial analysis of the formal welfare programs, I have isolated that the impact of electoral participation at T-2, a time which allows for budgetary policy making process to be enacted, significantly impacts welfare spending on cash and correctional spending. Using a lagged dependent variable approach to wash out "weak" variables, I find that electoral participation remains the most consistent predictor of expenditure as a share of a state's total expenditures in terms of non-demand variables. This serves to answer one part of the path explained in Figure 2.1. The next sections provide analysis for the subsequent pieces of the puzzle. That is, the following sections investigate the effect of welfare spending on income inequality, and the subsequent effect of income inequality on political participation.

### 2.3.2 Welfare Spending and Inequality Reduction

Moving to the analyses of welfare spending on post-transfer income inequality, I set out 4 models. Model 1 includes the control variables (all of which are significant at the  $p < 0.001$  level, aside from union density which is significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level) and the main categorical and functional spending

variables of interests. The results indicate that spending on service oriented spending - corrections and vendor payments - are positively associated with higher post-transfer inequality, while those which focus spending on cash spending are negatively associated with post-transfer income inequality - unemployment benefits, cash benefits, and other. All are significant at at least  $p < 0.10$  or better.

Model 2 presents results from including the burden of expenditure of spending programs between state and local governments. It is the share of state level spending as a percentage of total spending between governments. Thus, higher values indicate more centrally organized (at least by expenditure provision) spending programs, while lower values indicate more local autonomy. Unemployment is not included as it is unitary across states (i.e., an overwhelmingly state level spending program). These variables suggest that the degree of centrally organized spending programs have, across the board, significantly negative relationships with post-transfer income inequality. The inclusion of these variables reduces the significance of unemployment on inequality. This provides an interesting development in the interpretation of the effects of these centralization variables. It suggests that the degree to which state level governments have control over their spending processes, as opposed to devolving such control to local authorities, is significantly related to the state's ability to reduce income inequality.

Model 3 reports the results when the spending categories are omitted and only the degree of centralization remain.<sup>23</sup> The non-significance of unemployment remains, however the strength of the centralization coefficients are weaker than the previous model. Model 4 then uses a multiplicative interaction term for the spending categories, besides from unemployment, and finds a significant effect of the interaction variables on gini reduction. That is, in the states where cash benefits are responsive to voter turnout, inequality reduction is most responsive when the two work together. Both cash and other spending are negatively associated with post-transfer inequality, while vendor and correctional spending are positively associated with post-transfer gini inequality.<sup>24</sup> The results here validate the expectations that cash spend-

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<sup>23</sup>I do not specify a LDV model for this analysis as I have not found theoretical evidence that a previous year's level of inequality would necessarily predict a rise or fall in the following year. It has thus been omitted from consideration.

<sup>24</sup>For corrections, as the dynamics of what is exactly included on all the budgetary spending in this category, this seems to indicate that in some way correctional spending effects those outside the correctional supervised tier. How this might be, and indeed if it is so, is a matter which is left for future investigation.

ing is a significant, and electorally dependent, variable in the reduction of income inequality; supporting the proposition of the path model presented earlier.

Table 2.6: Spending Effects on Post-Transfer Inequality

	(M:22)	(M:23)	(M:24)	(M:25)
Pop Density	0.129*** (3.84)	0.091*** (2.67)	0.208*** (4.93)	0.133*** (4.08)
Per Cap Inc	0.281*** (4.82)	0.293*** (5.16)	0.352*** (4.28)	0.251*** (4.27)
South	0.269*** (11.13)	0.290*** (12.39)	0.403*** (26.58)	0.332*** (18.58)
Union	0.076** (1.99)	0.070* (1.92)	-0.037 (-0.83)	0.021 (0.58)
Correctional	0.227*** (7.89)	0.202*** (7.38)		
Unempl. Rate	-0.092* (-1.69)	-0.057 (-1.04)	-0.095 (-1.31)	-0.024 (-0.45)
Cash	-0.114** (-2.48)	-0.098** (-2.32)		
Vendor	0.290*** (7.95)	0.313*** (7.98)		
Other	-0.164*** (-5.74)	-0.149*** (-4.86)		
Cash Burden		-0.259*** (-8.62)	-0.231*** (-8.23)	
Vendor Burden		-0.159*** (-8.29)	-0.173*** (-7.15)	
Other Burden		0.197*** (7.24)	0.276*** (10.22)	
Correctional Burden		-0.104*** (-6.17)	-0.167*** (-7.79)	
Cash Int.				-0.276*** (-9.63)
Vend Int.				0.233*** (7.04)
Other Int.				-0.125*** (-4.36)
Correctional Int.				0.129*** (5.79)
$R^2$	0.434	0.502	0.409	0.440

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### 2.3.3 Inequality and Political Participation

Finally, I investigate the assertion that inequality affects voter turnout. As I put forth, I hypothesize that the experience of income inequality, and the institutions which are conducive to it, affect individuals' probability of voting, of which the actual measure of inequality is a proxy to perceive of these effects. It is the *experience* of inequality (institutional and social) which give the process much of its weight. A more adequate research agenda would certainly benefit from a more qualitatively defined set of measures which operationalize the capacity increasing or decreasing aspect of welfare institutions and the impact on electoral participation - the work of those scholars investing into capability approach modes of analysis (e.g., Amartya Sen) comes to mind. As I have suggested previously, and as others have diligently illustrated (Campbell 2003; Soss 2002; Soss, Fording and Schram 2011), it is likely that the experiences which the poor have with the state (or even forego having with the state) form a part of the negative relationship with political activity.

Inequality travels uneasily in universal-redistributive institutional environments, it is thus logical that the level of inequality, especially *post-tax and transfer* performs as a proxy of this environment.<sup>25</sup> Measurements of inequality have had a large amount of heavy lifting to do, and it is impressive that they have accomplished as much as the bulk of the literature indicates. As such, I expect (despite the arguments against inequality as an explanatory factor for turnout; for a critical assessment see: Stockemer and Scruggs 2012) a significant effect for inequality following transfers with the advanced measures provided by Voorheis (forthcoming).

The operationalization of these models were conducted against a backdrop of extensive scholarly debate on the importance of particular variables in determining turnout (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Key 1995; Lijphart 1997; Geys 2006; Galbraith and Hale 2006; Schneider and Ingram 1993, 2007). As such, only two of the hypothesized predictors, union density and citizen ideology, failed to achieve significance in Model 1. Presidential years elections, per capita income, unemployment rate just before an election, felon disenfranchisement laws, and the share of the population who have college education are all positively and significantly related to turnout. Of these, the level of felon disenfranchisement seems the most out of place. However, considering that the measure of turnout here is the eligible population, this finding is in line with what should be expected. It would stand to reason though that by removing potential low-turnout voters from the voter pool,

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<sup>25</sup>Currently *post-transfer* is the only accessible measurement at hand.

states are essentially creating artificial distortions in turnout rates - reducing the denominator of voting age electors.

Table 2.7: Effects on Voter Turnout of Eligible Population

	(M:26)		(M:27)		(M:28)	
Union	-0.053	(-1.21)	-0.077*	(-1.92)	-0.074*	(-1.96)
Cit. Ideology	0.060	(1.51)	0.073*	(1.74)	0.065	(1.47)
Unempl. Rate	0.113**	(2.08)	0.178***	(3.39)	0.153***	(2.86)
Presidential	0.674***	(9.75)	0.696***	(11.12)	0.958***	(8.58)
Per Cap Inc	0.151**	(2.26)	0.207***	(3.62)	0.166***	(2.84)
Pop. Change	-0.172***	(-5.86)	-0.177***	(-6.04)	-0.128***	(-4.51)
Pop Density	-0.201***	(-6.03)	-0.169***	(-5.14)	-0.131***	(-3.42)
South	-0.129***	(-5.33)	-0.072**	(-2.45)	-0.045	(-1.55)
Felon Dis.	0.043*	(1.92)	0.054**	(2.13)	0.046*	(1.93)
College	0.161***	(4.53)	0.172***	(4.68)	0.111***	(2.93)
Perc. Black	-0.179***	(-5.08)	-0.125***	(-3.51)	-0.071*	(-1.74)
Post-Trans. Gini			-0.240***	(-6.08)	-0.145***	(-3.63)
LDV					0.368***	(2.96)
$R^2$	0.732		0.764		0.801	

Standardized beta coefficients;  $t$  statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Model 2 tests for the impact of the post-transfer gini coefficient. As can be seen in Table 2.3.3, the introduction of the gini variable is significant and negative for voter turnout. In addition, introducing this variable makes both union density and citizen ideology weakly significant ( $p < 0.10$ ). Finally, Model 3 attempts to “wash out” any weak variables by adding the LDV to the specification. Only citizen ideology and the dummy for South fail to reach significance with the included LDV. The model is exceptionally strong, accounting for approximately 80 percent of the variation in turnout across states.

### 2.3.4 Summary

This chapter has laid out a conceptual model for the reciprocal path of political participation and welfare state effects. I have theorized that instead of simply an indicator of income distribution, the measure of income inequality represented by the (post-tax) gini coefficient represents a *proxy* by which

to track the ebb and flows of policy movements. It has been shown that the effect of *political participation on welfare spending*, in contrast to findings by Huber and Stephens (2001) at national levels, are significant and positive at the *sub-national* level for cash benefit expenditures. This is corroborated by Toikka et. al (2004) who also found that decisions to allocate resources towards cash spending were primarily politically in nature. It would seem premature then to rule out political participation as a non-starter in discussions of welfare state dynamics. Second order effects of political participation may also be apparent in the impact of democratic seat share in government, itself dependent on electoral competition. That is, where voter turnout/electoral threat is not directly instrumental to service policies such as vendor payments, there is considerable evidence that the offices of policy makers who sign off on decisions are sensitive to electoral participation. It is viable that their agency filters and even diminishes the first order effects of electoral threat. As such, it is not outside the realm of reality that the variance of cash expenditure, even at the level of nation states, is to a degree a function of the political participation of the (working aged) electorate (See Castles 2009 for variance of cash expenditure cross-nationally).

Secondly, this chapter has shown that the effect of *welfare policies on inequality* after transfer distribution is significant and variant over spending categories. While spending on *cash* and *other* spending are significantly related to decreases in post-transfer income inequality, the service spending category of *vendor* spending is significantly and positively associated with inequality. Clearly all spending is not created equal. In addition, the results on spending and inequality illustrate that it is not only the amount of money which states spend on these areas which matter for income inequality reduction, but also the *centralization* of these policy responsibilities which help predict reduced inequality measures. That is, the degree to which spending is concentrated at the local level affects the effectiveness of welfare spending. This is enticing to say the least. It would suggest that the *degree of devolution* for autonomy for welfare spending to the various authorities at the local level creates a democratic paradox. While communities demand more control over the way they spend their welfare dollars, increased local control of spending may accentuate inequality. The multiple veto points inherent in localizing welfare administration resonate in this account. I find ample room to support this approach from the Power Resources Approach (Immergut 1990; Jochem 2003).

Finally, this chapter shows that, in contrast to Horn (2011) and Stockemer and Scruggs (2012), income inequality *does* appear to have significant effects

for democracy. This is reasonable as redistributive politics likely take time to manifest themselves. Where Stockemer and Scruggs find that “income inequality does not have much impact (substantive or statistical) on turnout in Western countries”, I find that it does have a significantly positive effect at the sub-national level in the US. This holds even after utilization of a lagged dependent variable intended to “wash out” the predictive ability of the main independent variable (i.e., Post-Transfer Gini). The findings of Stockemer and Scruggs may be due to the variable sample which the authors employ, or perhaps the level of aggregation masks the extent to which inequality operates at the lower levels of government (i.e., an ecological fallacy). In any case, these findings satisfy the theoretical assumptions of the reflexive citizenship approach proposed by Olson and the components of citizenship which Marshall and others have long argued. This chapter has shown that (H1) political participation does not affect all areas of public spending equally, but rather is concentrated on areas of spending that are distributed directly to constituents (i.e., cash benefits). In turn, (H2) cash benefits are associated with reductions in income inequality by both aggregate spending measures and more detailed generosity measures. The *reduction* of income inequality (H3) is associated with increased electoral turnout, which most likely stems from a greater showing by lower-income constituents. It stands for future research to investigate such relationships at the same or even more disaggregated levels of authority. The prospect for larger comparative research of local level authorities nested within state typologies looks promising. Such an endeavour remains outside the scope of this work.

One further matter remains from the analysis: the interaction of correctional spending and inequality reduction. That is, as the amount of spending increases for correctional services, the level of post-transfer inequality increases as well. Institutional populations are not counted in labor market surveys, nor are they present in their communities. However, as inequality produces environments which are conducive to social unrest and criminality, the increase in expenditure would be considered a result of such increase in policing efforts in the face of lean social protection institutions. This brings to light a substantial issue (or rather non-issue) in the current agenda of general welfare state research. Aside from passing commentary on the correlation of correctional populations and inequality, the services which correctional agencies provide have largely been ignored as concerns welfare systems. This, as I will lay out in the next chapter, is both theoretically and practically unwarranted. As such, welfare state scholars have lost out in fully interpreting welfare system dynamics because of the omission of this institution in the general field of inquiry. As I will explain further in chapter 3,

correctional institutions have a distinctive place in welfare systems and are not inconsequential for our understanding of how many political economic developments have come to pass, especially for the United States. For the argument I present further in this thesis, that of the fundamental role of political rights in redistributive policy making, the clientele of correctional spending programs comprise one of the least understood groups in political science, let alone welfare state research. I examine first the theoretical debates surrounding correctional systems, and then forward my argument for its inclusion into welfare systems as a formal structural component.

## Chapter 3

# Incorporating Corrections Into the Welfare State

### 3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have outlined the explanations and justifications for welfare states and their intersection with political agency. Chapter 1 has focused on the the definitional aspects of welfare states, the ways in which their formation have come to be studied, and key streams in interpreting how to legitimize state intervention on behalf of citizens. Importantly, this chapter introduced the areas of moral and political justification for state action. These two areas often interact to produce conjoining policy outcomes. Of these, this thesis has focused increased interest on the political agency aspect of welfare state legitimization. Following from the growing field of feedback-policy research, this area emphasizes the role which welfare states have on shaping the very political inputs which form the basis for policy manufacturing. Thus, in chapter 2, empirical tests were conducted to ascertain to what degree such a conception of the relationship of political agency and welfare states would hold up. As opposed to a direct relationship of policy to politics, or politics to policy, this chapter posited that (in fact) the path to political feedback is only partially available through policy institution. That is, chapter 2 defined the relationship as one in which the state makes policy which either negatively or positively affects spending in particular areas. Of these, direct cash benefits (as both shares of aggregate state expenditure and in terms of comparative generosity) were shown to associate (negatively) with the measure of gini inequality. This state of inequality, explored in the final analysis, impacts the citizen negatively - reducing political turnout at the state level.

These steps in the thesis form the background theoretical basis for exploring the focal point of this research - the en masse political disenfranchisement of criminal offenders. However, before such an analysis can be presented, one further theoretical challenge remains. That is, citizens of this status are rarely, if ever, conceptualized in terms amiable to the political economic research agendas inherent in the field of political sciences - and much less so as pertains to the narrower field of welfare state studies. This chapter disputes this omission and presents a detailed case for (re)inclusion of social corrections into formal welfare system accounting and mainstream academic analysis.

As Frances Fox-Piven has so rightfully noted, “we really should continue to [the] inquiry about what welfare does, how it’s related to labor markets and which programs are the welfare programs after all. . . is it also the penal system?” (Fox-Piven 2012). This introduces a rather taxing issue for the task at hand. Correctional systems have been (by and large) the domain of the criminological sciences and scholars of penal and legal policy. Rarely do scholars of the political sciences, let alone those of the welfare state, pursue issues in this area. While it has occurred - notably Marie Gottshalk (2006), Vanessa Barker (2009), and Jonathan Simon (2007) - it is certainly not an issue commonly explored through the political economic lens of welfare state studies – though it may be surveyed as a minor side comment.<sup>1</sup>

The disciplines of welfare state research and penal/correctional scholarship, though long divided, have begun to emerge as functional compliments to uncover the role of political economic developments and social policy in the management of disadvantaged groups. In line with the innovative work of Nicola Lacey, David Downs, Loïc Wacquant and others, this chapter presents a theoretical framework for such inclusion biased heavily in favor of the political economic research arena of the welfare state.

Rather than overlaying worlds of “prison states” on existing typological accounts, this work proposes a framework for reconciling redundant research agendas to the benefit of multiple research areas. It argues that welfare and penal policy have not *come to form* a unified policy regime at governing the new advanced marginalized populations as a result of emergent advanced

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<sup>1</sup>Addressed in some detail in Castles (2007), the issue is rarely in scholarly work, and remarkably absent from other compilations of welfare state anthologies and readers, with exceptions of where it forms a location crime deterrence - see Castles (2007).

market fundamentalism policies. Rather, penal policy *is and has been* indivisibly connected to the welfare state as it is a functional component of the system – what I term as the *social corrections tier*.<sup>2</sup>

**Outline of Chapter:** I first address central arguments pertaining to the increasing use of punitive sanctions via social corrections (Section 3.2), and argue that one of the more controversial areas amongst these explanatory theses, that of racial control (3.2.1) yields to more operationalizable, political economic explanations (3.2.2) (e.g., employment patterns, education, social spending). The goal is not to argue that the issue of race is either irrelevant or inconsequential. Rather, I forward that while racial prejudice *is* a phenomenon in the US, its use as a malleable variable is limited. These issues are addressed while recognizing claims that the changes to policy in the United States since the 1970s has come to form a new form of governance over the most disadvantaged in society. I also investigate the assumption that the decline in AFDC/TANF recipient rates across time has coincided with welfare reform policy, finding a changing relationship with enrollment and incarceration rates at the state level.

Section 2 specifically addresses arguments which consider the punitive movement in policy to be a genuine and new phenomenon. I argue that it is unnecessary to recast correctional institutions as new or novel compliments to the ascendant neo-liberal state. I argue that the neo-liberal policy transformation over the past four decades has affected both welfare and penal policy alike because the two are indivisible components of a single welfare system. In as much, I trace key points of the neo-liberal trajectory and *raison d'être*, to not necessarily the creation of market friendly institutions, but the conversion of communitarian ones into traversable obstacles. In as much, this section has variable crossover with arguments laid out previously in chapter 1.

Section 3.3 looks at the burgeoning cross-pollination of ideas, notably within the field of correctional studies, and examines claims of connections

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<sup>2</sup>I thank the participants at the Howard League for Penal Reform conference at Oxford 2013 for their insightful comments regarding this topic. Specifically, I must strongly emphasize that as the term “social corrections” is a contentious phrase, it is used throughout this work to describe the place of correctional systems within the welfare state institutional structure. As such, the term “social” is used as a signifier of institutional placement, while “corrections” implies not corrections to the individual for any socially or politically defined “deficiencies”, but rather to the concept that this institutional setting operates to correct for institutional failures outside of the individual but in which s/he ultimately must inhabit.

between punishment and the macro-political economic institutions of the welfare state. This section turns to the level of cross national comparisons, as opposed to the predominantly US focus of previous sections. I first illustrate the accuracy of claims by others that nations cluster not just on political economic patterns, but also on punitive variables. This relationship is largely a matter of governmental willingness and ability to alleviate monied inequality. Examining disaggregated welfare options across time for the US, I illustrate that the relationship of social programs with crime rates (property and violent) have changed in the post-PRWORA era. Governments which devote a larger portion of their resources towards the reduction of monied income exhibit lower rates of incarceration . In addition, I show that it is likely the extent to which inequality is brought under control (i.e., pre- vs post-gini scores) that contribute to clustering regime typologies. This section then returns to the US to illustrate similar findings at the subnational level.

Section 3.5 argues for a (re)incorporation of correctional systems with welfare systems. Penal systems should be brought directly into a framework of welfare state studies to increase understanding and comparability of welfare providing institutions. This calls for the incorporation of penal systems into welfare accounting (in both financial and participation definitions), which I have conceptualized using an adaptation of the framework provided by Titmuss (1965) and Abromovitz (2001) (3.5.1). I show that this tier of the welfare state, using the United States as a working model, is an area which is almost entirely left to the direction and resource allocation of the individual states - notably with clientele who have no voice in the political arena to negotiate their treatment. This entails that because their political voice is muted directly by political disenfranchisement, and indirectly through the mechanism laid out in chapter 2 (i.e., depression through punitive welfare policy feedback loops), the distortion created by omitted demand registration is greater than would otherwise be the case. As chapters 6 and 7 report, these preferences are significantly biased towards more government intervention, particularly in the social protective areas of public policy.

Finally, I provide a descriptive analysis of the workings of this area using a case study of the state of North Carolina, exploring the dynamics of correctional spending allocations and program participation (3.5.2). While inexhaustive, it is an initial step towards a more comprehensive assessment changing activities of social corrections - not addressed in the current debate on welfare states. By citing ballooning correctional budgets and growing populations, media outlets, policy makers, and academics do not accurately depict the (functional) realities of these costs outside punitive goals. By

presenting social corrections as a component of the larger welfare state, it is hoped that, as with some Scandinavian nations, clients of this tier may be “upgraded” from social science *civis non grata* to an investigated beneficiary population. Section 3.6 provides discussion points and concludes with highlights of the chapter.

## 3.2 Penal System Growth

The analysis of the growth, let alone the function, of correctional incarceration – especially in the contemporary United States – is a topic of which the breadth of the matter is only matched by the depth of the scholarship dedicated to it. A central problem stems not necessarily from the multitude of functions of the prison, but rather the breadth of theories developed to account for its growth. One important caveat must be pointed out before proceeding. The bulk of the work here focuses on one aspect of correctional systems. This decision is made due to the massive amount of variety at play in dealing with both community and custodial research areas. Thus, much of the research presented explicitly reports on *custodial* issues, leaving aside community supervision areas. I leave the work in that field to future and more dedicated research agendas.

What the prison does, from a functional point of view, seems straightforward: it is an institution which confines convicted (and on occasion those awaiting sentencing) offenders to a spatially delimited area to serve out their allotted sentences. As I will discuss further, social corrections are much more than this. A primary concern for many scholars in the area of prison studies is that of the path to prison - that is, who is going to prison and why. Many notable theories have developed around these topics, and the key points are discussed herein. I begin, however, with a survey of the topic of racial disparity. Perhaps one of the most enduring legacies in the US is that of slavery, and more specifically the centrality of racism. It seems appropriate, therefore, to begin the analysis by addressing racial explanations. A complete survey would surpass the limits of this thesis. Instead, I look primarily at key works which have provided arguments which revive debate around the racial correlates of punitive correctional policies. This is followed by an overview of debates which provide a more contextual analysis of race in criminal justice.

### 3.2.1 Racial Correlates - Hyperghetto and the New Jim Crow

Racial critiques of the American penal system have been popular rallying points in both academic and mainstream debates. The disproportionate number of minorities, especially African American men, under supervision of the criminal justice system is and has been cause for concern among policy makers and academics alike (and for good reason). While some view a different interpretation of the War on Drugs as something other than a war on minorities, Michelle Alexander (2012) - a leading advocate of the New Jim Crow (NJC) thesis - is firmly in opposition. Alexander dismisses those who offer alternative explanations for the war on drugs as anything other than a new form of racial oppression of America's African American population. In her words, "the triumphant notion of post-racialism is... nothing more than fiction... the mass incarceration of poor people of color in the United States amounts to a new caste system" (Alexander 2012:1). These are strong sentiments indeed, and they are reminiscent of Wacquant's earlier work (Wacquant 1997a; 1997b; 1998).<sup>3</sup>

For proponents of the NJC analogy, America's incarceration growth is conceived of as a return to the oppressive legislation and social interactions which consolidated all African Americans into a single group of second-class citizen, regardless of other factors. While the arguments laid out by Alexander and NJC advocates are compelling, they focus largely on prisons and the beleaguered welfare system, while providing anecdotal evidence in support of matter-of-fact racial intent. This analogy, argues Forman (2012), does disservice to both the subjects of investigation (criminal offenders) and the tyranny of Jim Crow (Forman 2012). In this view, it is jeopardous to copy and paste the lessons from the complex rationales and operating logistics from Jim Crow and apply them where they appear to fit best, especially so where such use supports an accusation of a new caste system in an entire country. First, under Jim Crow, the second class citizenship demarcation was all-encompassing. Low-income African Americans were treated the same as high-income African Americans. Such blanket segregationist policies did not discriminate on the basis of income or circumstance.

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<sup>3</sup>To be fair to Wacquant, his interpretation of race, racism and racial domination across time is so immersed in the complexities of political and economic factors that racial delimiters (i.e., black or African American) lose nearly all conventional meaning. It is not clear how important race really is for Wacquant, and as such including this "thesis" of hyperghettoization risks distorting the depth of his work on political economy and punishment.

Secondly, the NJC analogy fails to take into account the punitiveness of African American communities themselves, perpetuating the alternative *spoiled collective identity* of “white America” as irredeemably ignorant of, or actively participant in, the amplification of tough-on-crime policies (Loury 2002).<sup>4</sup> That is, African American communities are not necessarily *victims* of white preference for harsh penalties. If white preferences were concretely related to punitiveness, in this view, one would expect that a dearth of any white preferences would lead to an abundance of soft-on-crime policies. This proposition, then, reduces the agency of citizens to that of racial factors. Hypothetically, if the solution to more lenient and egalitarian criminal policy consisted of increased racial parity in government, one would expect that (given a situation where the power of African American communities was dominant) we would see quite different policies (Forman 2012).

However, while African Americans occupy such a position in the city of Washington D.C., Forman notes that criminal policy does not vary the way advocates of racial prejudice might expect, and in fact mirrors other major American cities. Compared to Detroit, a predominantly African American inhabited city in a majority white state, Washington D.C. has higher rates of adults under criminal justice supervision.<sup>5</sup>

Of course, some may regard this as evidence that African American communities and their representatives are merely “going along” with punitive policy trends. That is, this might indicate that African American communities are merely complicit with tough on crime policies, while in fact disagreeing with them below the surface. This certainly may have some support from evidence of efforts by defense attorneys and practitioners devoted to staving off disparate racial sentencing rates. However, while legal professionals may regularly advocate for softer punishments and alternatives to incarceration, their pleas fall on largely deaf political ears, even in a legislative body dominated by African American representatives. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the average community member who happens to be non-white

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<sup>4</sup>Loury’s spoiled collective identity thesis posits that groups identify with manufactured stereotypes of racial groupings, which inform their decision making process. In addition, members of the group may assimilate the characteristics of these “spoiled” collective identities, which reinforces the process. This is a bimodal process

<sup>5</sup>“The Jim Crow analogy, which attributes mass incarceration entirely to the animus or indifference of white voters and public officials toward black communities...might explain the sky-high incarceration rates in Baltimore and Detroit, [but] they do not explain those in Washington D.C.” (Forman 2012:121)

is less punitive than their white counterpart after controlling for other factors such as exposure to crime, employment security and satisfaction, education, and so forth. If the NJC thesis is to hold for areas with extremely high rates of African American incarceration, it seems that it cannot include the government of Washington D.C. unless the status of “white” is a *power* status and not a racial one.<sup>6</sup> Here the congruency with the NJC thesis and Wacquant’s own approach diverge.

According to Wacquant’s hyperghetto thesis (which has since its original publication been supplemented and refined), the massive expansion of police power has come to form a core instrument for the subjugation of precarious low-wage labor from the 1970s on-wards – overwhelmingly focused on African Americans and other minorities. The prison has come to form the most recent attempt to isolate and control African American communities as the most vulnerable of the *precariat*, ensuring their place as a permanent sub-proletariat. From slavery (1619 – 1865; slaves as the dominant social type), to the Jim Crow south and Ghetto north (1865 – 1965, 1915 – 1968; sharecroppers and menial workers as dominant social types, respectively), to the modern era of Hyperghettos and Prison (1968 to the present; welfare recipients and criminals as dominant social types); the American experience for African Americans evokes despair and outrage (Wacquant 2002:42). This has been enabled by a “double movement” across welfare and penal systems to regulate the poor (Piven and Cloward 1972) - to the disadvantage of the poorer, disproportionately minority, members of society.

While the (black) men of these communities are regulated by the punitive arm of the state; the wives, sisters, daughters and mothers are managed by an increasingly stigmatized and punitive social assistance and (inaccessible) social insurance arm. The prison apparatus is the final effort begun by slavery, perpetuated by Jim Crow, and extended into the 21st century in the form of the urban ghetto and the emergence of the *carceral-assistance* complex at the hand of hyper-incarceration (Wacquant 2001b; 2002; 2008). This has been accomplished by the paramilitary brand of operations against illicit narcotics, of which African American communities far outweigh all other affected communities.

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<sup>6</sup>Interestingly, Penner and Saperstain (2013) find that this indeed has some merit. Social status and race combine to form a type of confirmation bias wherein successful persons are more likely to be thought of as white: “receiving welfare reduces the odds of a woman being classified as white, but doesn’t matter for men. Prison time reduces the odds of a man being classified as white, but doesn’t matter for women” (Munsch 2013)

While Wacquant places African American communities within the structural setting of wage labor and institutional arrangements (thereby attaching one argument on the heels of the other), the NJC thesis does not. This is not to say that the NJC thesis does not provide an impressive array of research, Alexander and other scholars have done an impressive job of calling attention to race disparities and the persistence of mass incarceration. However, it subsumes other relevant details to its main argument- the observation that African Americans make up a disproportionate share of the correctional population compared to their share of the general population. Wacquant's approach has multiple points which intersect and interact, but are difficult to disentangle. As I will discuss further, Wacquant's arguments do not rely on a single focal point for addressing the rise in punitive social control. Rather, racial disparities are descriptive of mutating economic class within institutional structures, which gives an enormous flexibility to advanced marginality (an area Wacquant elaborates on in later works) as an approach. The NJC thesis is, however, firmly convinced of the explanatory power of racial animus in society and especially in institutional arrangements.

The main benefactor of the NJC thesis is the argument against the War on Drugs, and this is borne out in statistics. Much of the NJC thesis relies on the war on drugs. Certainly, it is difficult to look at the extraordinary impact of policing for narcotics on minority communities without some empathy with the NJC thesis. Figure 3.1 illustrates this vividly. Taking the percentage point difference of new court commitments between non-hispanic whites and non-hispanic blacks to state prisons from 1993 to 2009, the disparity of new commitments for drug offences falls squarely on the shoulders of African American men. However, aggregation often obscures more elemental facets of issues. The devil, as they say, is in the details. Using data from the FBI Uniform Crime Survey, I have disaggregated the numbers for arrest and new court commitments by offense. First I investigate arrest rates, excluding drug offences outside drug abuse.

Values represent the percentage point difference of the percentage of each racial groupings share of their own categories of total offences. For example, robbery offences made up .86 percent of all offences charged in 2010. For whites alone, robbery offences made up .54 percent of all offences within their racial category. The score for white robbery offences in figure 3.2 represents the difference of whites from the total share of robbery offenses (i.e., .54 percent - .86 percent = -.32 percent). This captures the relative occurrence of offences by grouping – white robbery rates are .32 percentage points lower than the average. Racial grouping by income would provide a more reliable

estimate.

African Americans are, on average, arrested at higher rates for violent crimes and “other” crimes than their white counterparts, with whites more likely to be arrested for violations involving alcohol. Are these arrest rates translated into more disproportionate punishments? Data is taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics to investigate the incident of commitment to state prisons between whites and blacks by offence category. This decomposition allows investigation into trends disaggregated from the ambiguous titles of “violent” or “property” crimes. The composition of commitments to state prisons of black men in the US remains intractably higher for drug offences compared to whites. Beginning around approximately 2000, African Americans began to pull away from their white counterparts for commitments as a result of violent offenses, while the difference for commitments for drug offenses remains high, but at a declining rate - figure 3.1<sup>7</sup>




Figure 3.1: Disparities in Prison Sentencing 1993 - 2009

Whites continue to make up the lion’s share of commitments for property offences and public order offences. Notably, the rise in violent crime com-

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<sup>7</sup>Values indicate higher percentages for blacks; negative values indicate higher percentages for whites.

mitments since 2000 is largely attributable to the increase in commitments for robbery, with all other violent crimes showing negligible differences between groups (i.e., less than or equal to 1 percent). Within drug offences, convictions for trafficking remain the most serious qualifier, at an average of approximately 7.5 percentage points above their white counterparts.<sup>8</sup>

Once disaggregated, the main disparity in the rise of violent crime between groups (at least in terms of commitments to supervisory institutions) falls into two categories. On average, African American men are 5.5 percentage points more likely to face commitment to prisons as a result of robbery, with white males 3.6 percentage points more likely to be committed for sexual assault not including rape (Figure 3.2). *Arrest* data from 2010 shows, with the exception of robbery and gambling, whites made up the overwhelming majority of arrests for all crimes. However, one could argue that the rationale for including robbery as a violent crime, as opposed to property, is misleading. When robbery is disassociated with violent crime counts, arrests for property crime and violent crime converge.<sup>9</sup>

In addition, if we were to simply reclassify drug trafficking and possession in the class of property crime – that is if illegal sales of controlled substances were considered more a form of “market bypassing” (Posner 1985) – our picture of property and violent offences committed to state prisons shifts to depreciate the lead of punished property offences for whites and punished violent offences for African Americans. In other words, things may not be as racially skewed as they appear - but skewed none-the-less. Reconceptualization does not put all races on par - non-Hispanic whites make up approximately 63.4 percent of the population compared to 13 percent for blacks in 2011 (Census 2012). They are less skewed *racially*, I contend, because one must reconcile with factors which are *policy* driven, as opposed to

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<sup>8</sup>According to UCR: “Violent crimes are offenses of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes are offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.” Robbery has been included in the class of property crimes for this analysis.

<sup>9</sup>In 2010, the white/black make up for violent crime was 59.3 percent / 38.1 percent respectively. When robbery is removed from the calculation, that distribution becomes 63.4 percent / 33.8 percent. Property crime arrests, similarly are reported at 68.4 percent / 28.9 percent before, and 66.8 percent / 30.6 percent after robbery is included (FBI 2010). This is not to say racial disparity is not a cause of concern. While African Americans were only slightly more likely to be arrested on drug offences (1.73 percent; 2010), their commitment to state prisons are higher than that of their white counterparts (9 percent). Whites, however, were committed for property offences 9.8 percentage points more than blacks.




Figure 3.2: Disaggregated Commitments to State Prisons - White/Black

static variables such as race or ethnicity. In particular, I refer to the instance of relative poverty. That is, the instance of poverty in the US is unequally distributed and this facet of the life-course is much more approachable than that of race. Nationally, 35 percent of African Americans are categorized as living in poverty, compared to 13 percent of white Americans (Kaiser 2013). It is this disparity, as compared to personal or group based prejudices, which social policy stands a better chance of resolving - at least as far as welfare




Figure 3.3: Actual and Adjusted Property and Violent Crime Arrests (2010)

systems are concerned.

Certainly, rearranging definitions, and hence data, is a convenient method of proving any theory one has interest in, and this is much the point I would like to make. We should ask how much arrests and convictions become intertwined with racial explanations because of the classifications used for both offender and offence. That the drug war affects minorities more than whites is not disputed. However, it is one thing to attribute the enormous policing effort to prosecute illicit drug use and sales to racial control and caste establishment; it is quite another to focus on causal factors of criminal intention and activity. This point, and the preceding paragraphs outlining it, are not simply incidental arguments. These factors are central if we are to explicitly understand criminal offenders and the institutions which operate with and around them as functional elements of the larger welfare state superstructure.

A substantial portion of the crime problem is a labor market problem, which is exacerbated by the externalities created by the incorporation of criminal justice policies into this area of policy making (e.g., denial of occupational licenses and other opportunities, loss of educational grant opportunities, and so forth); notably by advocates of diminished government intervention in the welfare sphere. Individuals with a criminal background in the United States are at a severe disadvantage, especially where racial animus might be embedded in the employer/hiring process. The compounding, vicious cycle effect that this has on minorities is apparent, with 1 in 3 African American men carrying a serious criminal record (Wakefield and Uggen 2010). With the increasing ease of criminal background checks, the barriers to employment (and the concomitant pressures to adapt to such exclusion) become manifold

(Lageson and Uggen 2013). Thus, as Bruce Western eloquently frames the issue, America has a poverty problem, not a drug problem - and it has this poverty problem *because* of a welfare system which is unwilling or incapable (and perhaps both) of decommodifying individuals from the market. That is, policy “must begin to restore order and predictability to economic and family life” (Western and Pettit 2010:2), and an effective way of pursuing this goal is to insulate individuals and families from the effects of a commodified life.

This leads to a principal concern; that is, how much attention should be given to race? One cannot change race, and cultural transformations aimed at reducing inter-group hostility demarcated by racial or ethnic characteristics are undeniably difficult (and perhaps impossible) for short term policy to address. The NJC thesis, like the hyper-ghettoization thesis, is a compelling narrative, but with considerable policy limitations. Though African Americans and other minorities make up a disproportionate share of correctional populations in relation to the general population, such a focus itself tends to discriminate against certain political, economic and social realities. “The conventional measure of disproportionality is only useful assuming all racial groups are on equal social footing” (Russel-Brown 1998:29; Wolfgang and Cohen 1970); African Americans and minorities make up a larger share of the incarcerated population because of their position in society (Uggen 2007). This is exacerbated by devolution of governing responsibilities which have coincided with increasingly disciplinary policy regimes aimed at the poor (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Statistics referencing race as indicative variables can be misleading, calling our attention to visible indicators of segregation rather than areas of policy which are more readily tenable. While race is certainly a readily evident variable, its importance should not overshadow other variables which social policy is able to resolve.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>This is not to say that segregation is not an area where social policy is removed from. Indeed, racial and ethnic segregation was endemic in the US before the advent of neo-liberalism. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HLCO), set up under the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB), spurred increased ethnic and racial spatial segregation, in combination with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) – both New Deal programs (Greer 2013; Hiller 2005). Government officials literally “redlined” particular areas of cities where investment was either recommended or discouraged. That is, officials with the help of real estate experts would, in many cases, literally draw red lines on maps around areas which were considered not acceptable loan considerations. While secret, these hidden maps were known to some interests and assumed by others (i.e., private lenders).

### 3.2.2 The Poverty of Welfare (Systems)

A vast amount of the literature on the disproportionate impact of tough on crime policy has focused on African American communities, African American men, and the poor. Even within these studies, a seemingly tacit interpretation of the role which poverty reduction programs play in the amelioration of criminogenic environments and the overwhelming numbers of poor under correctional supervision all but elude direct attention. To put this in simpler terms, the disparities in criminal activity and punishment seem artifacts of classification. While a large percentage of offenders are black, nearly the entire population is poor.<sup>11</sup> Even the war on drugs, undoubtedly a (if not *the*) major driving force in increasing punitiveness, focused its massive efforts on the black market of narcotics and made an “enemy of the poor” (Western and Pettit 2010).<sup>12</sup> Returning to a proposition made earlier in this work - if one considers drug trafficking a result of disassociation with the formal economy - and a form of protest against low-wage, discriminatory labor activity - then the dramatic skyrocketing of correctional supervision among Americans is particularly a problem of regulating the marginalized members of society who have little alternative to crime and less allegiance to a system which perpetuates their situations. This is in large part due to the fact that the war on drugs, and its effect on minority communities, was largely a result of political maneuvering, devolution, and above all the resurgence of a more virulent form of market fundamentalism (Tonry 1994). Thus, while the NJC

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<sup>11</sup>This is not to say that there are not gross racial disparities in criminal justice. Mauer (2011) and others have reported extensive disparities in racial criminalization rates. Even without racial bias in policing, such bias is perpetuated in other areas of criminal justice such as bond levels and availability for African American offenders (Hawfield Foster 2008). However, as with Mauer, I contend that reconciling these issues relies on more political and economic policy making instead of strictly dedicated race neutral agendas which prove difficult to operationalize for practitioners and policy makers alike.

<sup>12</sup>The lessons from the entirety of the formation of the narcotics war is telling in its own right. “The War [on Drugs]”, according to Simon (2007), “was fought largely from partisan political efforts to show that Bush and Reagan administrations were concerned about public safety”. (Simon 2007:27). It is important to note that the groundwork for much of the Drug War was laid well before the dawn of the ascension of neo-liberals, with the diligent efforts of Harry J. Anslinger (the first official drug czar) who remained the center point for narcotic legislation in the US from 1930 until 1962. Anslinger consistently evoked racist imagery of Mexican outlaws, reprehensible Jazz musicians and psychotic criminals to create sentiment to pursue a series of legislative moves to prohibit and maximize the criminality of Marijuana and other narcotics. Ironically, Anslinger himself admitted that the prohibition of Alcohol had led to the creation of illegal supply chains and markets - organized crime. The drug trade, and the war against it, had created a “substitute economy for the populations most affected by the shrinkage of the low-skilled industrial labor market” (Caplow and Simon 1999).

and the hyperghetto thesis pick up on these trends, their conclusions may be so of the symptoms of causes and less the causes of symptoms.

According to Lageson and Uggen (2013), “almost 90 percent of serious offences reported in the USA concern remunerative crimes” (202). Readjustment for robbery pushes African American property crime arrest rates further away from whites, and this is what we ought to expect. These rates are understandable given what is known of the connection between poverty, inequality and property offences. Property offences are particularly responsive to income inequality, unemployment and one’s perception of economic well-being, more so than violent crimes (Uggen and Thompson 2013; Uggen 2012; Cantor and Land 1985; Brush 2007; Rosenfeld and Fornango 2007). What’s more, relative income inequality is robustly associated with robbery and burglary (Choe 2008; Brush 2007; Deutsch, Spiegel and Templeman 1992). Add to this that property and violent crime victimization are increasingly concentrated among the poor, as the rich have been able to employ more risk reductionary measures (e.g., security services, relocation, property security devices), and stratification of crime is increasingly more a class issue than a racial issue (Levitt 1999). This is not simply an aspect of American Exceptionalism. Similar evidence has been found even in the quintessential egalitarian stronghold of Sweden (Nilsson 2004).

### Political Economic Correlates

“Crime is social rather than individual” - Uggen and McElrath  
(2013)

A compelling argument which incorporates political economy into its purview has also been forwarded by Wacquant and others.<sup>13</sup> The “advanced marginality” thesis – what Wacquant sees as a *new* regime of urban marginality – attributes increasing punitive policy (and subsequent rising penal trends) to the close of the Keynesian, Fordist era, and has a definite political and economic trajectory to it. It is in line with a branch of research that focuses on direct political and economic factors (i.e., educational attainment, labor market activity, social networks, etc). It is an approach which is more policy friendly, so to speak, and more historically consistent (in an operationalizable

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<sup>13</sup>Wacquant is certainly not the first scholar to incorporate the integration of political economic developments into the study of penal systems. Here the focus on his argument of the advanced marginality is taken as an argument which overlaps with the majority of other scholars in the field.

sense) than race based approaches. This advanced marginality is produced by neo-liberal doctrine and policies emanating from therein. This argument is one firmly rooted in the analysis of labor relations and the dynamics of economic inequality. From this approach, one is able to dissect the intricacies of policy choice and outcomes, of which criminal deviancy is both.

The debate turns, essentially, on the following arguments. The global restructuring of capitalism, and the growth of technology, enables producers to minimize labor at astounding rates and depth. It is characterized by growing inequality with extreme rewards to the highly educated, technical worker and the elimination of lower end, unskilled opportunities for uneducated workers. This is a product of the desocialization of workers by increasing competition for low-skill employment on one hand, and the reduction of social protection for losers on the other. Economic growth without socialized employment has been, and will continue to be, a driver of increased real and relative poverty.

**Policy Transformations - Welfare and Penal Changes** These macro-level events are important as they illustrate the significance which policy has downstream, not least of which pertains to the manner in which welfare systems must adapt in order to meet the demands placed on it by policy makers of any ideological stripe. “States do make a difference...when they care to”, and this is welcoming news for scholars of social policy. States are “major producers and shapers of urban inequality and marginality...[they] are major engines of stratification in their own right” (Wacquant 1999b in Crompton 2000: 112). Specifically, welfare state retrenchment and disarticulation are drivers of inequality. The “triple transformation” of the state – “amputation of the economic arm...retraction of the social bosom...expansion of its penal fist” (Wacquant 2008a:4) – as seen in the US, results in a double regulation of the poor via disciplinary programs and the deployment of the penal net. This “new government of social insecurity”, according to Wacquant, “does not mark a historical reversion to a familiar organizational configuration, but heralds a *genuine political innovation*” [emphasis added] (Wacquant 2008a: 12). Corrections, and prisons in particular, have found ardent patrons in the neo-liberal/conservative political revolution. This, unavoidably, leads one into a more protracted analysis of what exactly neo-liberalism is and how it operates, a complicated endeavor for even seasoned scholars (Lacey and Soskice 2013). The *epistemic advantage* that Neo-Liberal doctrine holds is that it is itself an un-provable thesis. Here again the moral justifications of the state are called into the fore with the recognizable Malthusian thought

experiment - that is, the poor will change when they are no longer protected (i.e., welfare state retrenchment) (Somers and Block, 2005: 275).

Neo-liberalism, in contrast to the progressive liberalism of the late 1800's and early 1900's which saw the rise of penal-welfarist tradition, is a much more determined breed of liberalism.<sup>14</sup> This is a central feature of the correctional system, its manifest use to cope with changes in upstream policy. The correctional system, and the prison in particular, provides a useful package for the creation of the neo-liberals' desired offenders – *homo oeconomicus*. The prison works as a sort of magic show for measurement in such a regime. It can, for instance, conceal “inequality by removing low-wage men from the labor market” (Western and Pettit 2005:574).<sup>15</sup> Thus, gains over a variety of metrics (e.g., unemployment, wage differentials, voter turnout, and welfare take-up) can be presented to the public as proof of the superiority of market-oriented policies, while hiding the true scope of the shortcomings of market friendly policy (Pettit 2012; Shannon and Uggen 2013).

**Neo-liberalism Ascendancy and Rising Penalty:** One may then question how the rise in such seemingly detrimental policies came to be. A complete answer to this is more satisfactorily addressed in dedicated works such as Harvey (2005) and the numerous writing of Wacquant and others on the subject. However, for the sake of contextualization, I give a only brief exposé of the argument as it pertains to welfare and penal policy, the morality argument having been addressed previously in Chapter 1.

**Declining Trust in Institutions** The emergence of the policy regime in the 1970s and afterwards was a hydra of circumstances for which free-market solutions were seen not as the problem, but as a panacea for social

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<sup>14</sup>However, the state never really retracts, it just moves the furniture. Reality, in the philosophy of the Austrian-borne neo-liberalism, ought to adapt to theory, and not the other way around. This is in stark contrast to the previous domestically bred pragmatic liberalism of the progressive era under Dewey and others who saw theory as a means and not an end. The pragmatic liberals would certainly not object to complete market control if it proved itself to be in the best interests of society. They would equally not object to state intervention and massive redistribution if this proved a better option to govern society (Thorsen and Lie 2006; Harvey 2005; Andersen. C 1980).

<sup>15</sup>“Almost invariably, the unemployed have a high probability of being criminalized and a high probability of being sent to prison. Once they are there, they do not show up in the unemployment statistics...Crime has become an outcome of dysfunctional and misguided social policy.” (ILO, 2004)

disorder and economic distress. Support for such programmatic change resulted from declining trust in public institutions, efforts to decentralize the state, and a curtailment of protective social policies in favor of restrictive social arrangements. These facets worked in tandem to perpetuate a system of organization which is most readily apparent in the social corrective tiers. As confidence in the penal-welfarist era deteriorated, political elites on the right, and academic elites as well, began to question the framework of the rehabilitative ideal.<sup>16</sup> The developing conceptions saw the system as paternalistic and robbing the individual of their freedom, rather than specialized and tailored to the circumstances of the individual as had been the norm during the formative progressive era. (Garland 2001).<sup>17</sup> It called for the end of deterministic sentencing in favor of uniform rules (to address abuse of local cultures), the de-professionalization of corrections in favor of more populist control of criminal policy, and the replacement of specialized treatment with an overriding focus on efficiency.<sup>18</sup>

**Decentralization and Punitive Politics** The US is unique in the extent to which offices are exposed to the electorate, making greater decentralization precariously meaningful for offices such as school boards, planning, and (crucially) public order administrations. Political accountability for public order offices coupled with movements to standardize punishment. Power to the courts under (low-turnout) elections created two reinforcing events: First, the diffuse nature of politically elected offices promoted a “blank check” response by elected officials by claiming to only be acting in accordance with the demands of constituents. This “governing through crime” phenomenon encouraged a “don’t blame us” culture among political actors, leaving many in the lower end of the electorate to ponder the usefulness of their ballots (Lacey 2012; Simon 2007). Second, a further message of standardized punishment disassociated policy makers from the idea of “just deserts” for criminals, regardless of the socio-economic background of origin

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<sup>16</sup>In 1975, based on the book by Ken Kesey (1962), *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* epitomized two movements underway. A popular view of mental institutions as oppressive and intolerable institutions, and criminals who were primarily concerned with circumventing their punishments by any means and avoiding their debt to society.

<sup>17</sup>Gottschalk(2006), p.37: “The [Struggle for Justice, a 1971( report by the American Friends Service Committee)] [charged] that the rehabilitative model perpetuates race and class discrimination by giving criminal justice professionals, the majority of whom are white and middle class, enormous power to decide who has been ‘rehabilitated’ and who has not, and thus who is deserving of early release and who is not.”

<sup>18</sup>It comes as no surprise that calls for efficiency and “consumer choice” are red flags for opponents of neo-liberal reforms (Larsen and Stone 2011).

(Simon 2007). The tough on crime rhetoric of “do the crime, do the time” harmonized with a belief in *homo oeconomicus*, a “rational, utility-maximizing individual”, allowing the public, academics and policy makers to generalize “micro-behavior into macro-phenomenon” (Kittel 2006:657).

However, the culpability of these movements cannot be entirely put on the shoulders of conservative politicians, business interests, or victim’s rights advocates - all of whom shared in the benefits of streamlined, punitive policy movements. The academic community deserves to share some responsibility for the propagation of policy movements as well. The calculus of the rational actor model of crime, legitimized through research by Becker and others, (over)emphasized the individual’s capacity to resist vices. That is, individuals from low-income and sub-urban communities ought to be able to resist the same temptation towards criminal activity regardless of external pressures. The message shifts from communal fidelity to personal responsibility. Targeting such *mala prohibita* as intolerable “gateway” offences hid a slippery slope of punitiveness (Lacey 2007). These seemingly neutral policies do not violate any non-discriminatory precepts, legally, as such laws apply to all regardless of race, age or income (i.e., it is illegal poor or wealthy to sleep under bridges) (Tonry 1994).<sup>19</sup> Ironically, such processes were backed by similar pro-scientific methods which brought about the particularistic methods during the advent of the penal-welfarist era. However, the more economic based theories were centered on ideals of atomistic conceptions of personal agency.

**The Timing of Change** Americans in the 1970s were not so much inclined towards more punitive policies, so much as those who *were* became much more vocal and dogmatic in the midst of retrenched public tolerance, asserting increasing control of the legislative agenda. The drug war allowed sweeping changes to be made for both welfare and penal policy in line with a changing economic and political strategy (i.e., the disciplining and dismantling of organized labor, low-wage employment growth, and stigmatized social protection legislation). Popular media stoked public anxiety of crime,

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<sup>19</sup>In contrast, Progressivist policy makers in the late 19th and early 20th century, and Theologians such as Walter Rauschenbusch, resisted interpreting personal vices as causal and instead attached the issue of poverty to the issue of “the competitive system” and “the industrial machine”. The vices of the poor were not sins, so much as they were ways to cope with the harsh living conditions of life at the bottom. (Schwarz 2000)

which political figures readily co-opted for their gain (e.g., Willie Horton).<sup>20</sup> Manufactured fear of crime and media driven disgust for dependency moved popular opinion and policy in opposition to a professionalized corrections system, for the ill advised deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment, and enabled the drastic stigmatization and cuts to social assistance and insurance (Wacquant 2009; Raphael and Stoll 2010; Harcourt 2009).<sup>21</sup>

**De-funding and De-populating Mental Health** Perhaps one of the most telling targets of this new era was the curious assault on institutions of mental health care. Mental illness facilities were among the first casualties in the neo-liberal revolution. Reagan's policies in the 1980s served "special interest groups and the demands of the business community, but failed to address the issue: the treatment of mental illness." (Thomas 1998:Abstract). The resulting burdens which politicians, well-intentioned or not, placed on community and family resources were enormous. "Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of thousands of mentally ill people concentrated in the inner cities" (ibid). For all intents and purposes, it appeared that the *welfare state* had been demoted to passenger with the *penal state* at the wheel.<sup>22</sup>

**Compliance or Custody** With the end of the Fordist era, and the ascendancy of neo-liberal doctrine, the welfare state has, according to many, retrenched and left its citizens in a precarious economic dilemma (Huber and Stevens 2011; Iverson and Soskice 2001; Wacquant 2001b). Citizens may either accept increasingly low-paid and insecure employment or face a life of destitution – or the alternative (i.e., illegal activity). "This neo-liberalist,

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<sup>20</sup> "Rampant" criminality was linked with devastatingly stigmatized representations of welfare recipients and the systematic abuse of social assistance. Ronald Reagan's indictment against "welfare queens" in his 1976 presidential campaign found resonance among middle class voters and deficient reaction in the subsiding efficacy of political power at the lower end of the income distribution (Quadagno 1996; Hays 2003; Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2001).

<sup>21</sup> Ironically, much of the support for the end of the progressivist mode of care, rooted in more social democratic policy than the replacement, was advocated by intellectual elites (Fuller 2012; Harcourt 2011).

<sup>22</sup> "The Left hand" of the state, that which protects and expands life chances, represented by labor law, education, health, social assistance, and public housing, is supplanted (in the United States) or supplemented (in the European Union) by regulation through its "Right hand," that of the police, justice, and correctional administrations... (Wacquant 2009: loc.391). See also the comparable "hydraulic" process approach, akin to double regulation. (Whitman 2009)

paternalist regime, of poverty governance or management is very carceral, very punitive, very much focused on saying to the poor: 'shut up and go along'" (Schram 2012; 56min). The alternative is either a life dependent on charity (private or state subsidized "faith-based" organisations), or one of criminal activity.<sup>23</sup> The losers of labor market competition, primarily the less educated, are pressed into a proverbial finger-trap, where welfare institutions cannot/ will not decommidify the individual's exposure to the market, and where exit options are limited to those with higher human capital investments.

**Labor Market Participation and Crime** Because criminality (and hence probability of incarceration) is a function of motivation and opportunity, employment (especially in unprotected labor markets) has become a proxy for predicting crime rates. "When labor markets are slack and unemployment rises, the prison population expands" (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). Conversely, when individuals have employment, and more so for adults, the incidence of criminal activity declines. Interestingly, Lageson and Uggen (2013) note, the employment effect is not a constant, its effects are not uniformly beneficial across the lifecourse. For young adults, individuals benefit from having employment which occupies their time and introduces them to life skills, but in less amounts than adults, and particularly not in positions which lack the promise of skill progression. In addition, these jobs should not replace scholastic opportunities. In essence, the more the youth are commodified, and the more they are absorbed into adult roles early on, the less they adapt to their "age-appropriate roles".

Thus, the shift in many communities to low-paid service sector jobs may have left many young adults in precisely the situation which is detrimental to their own development. The effect of work is greater for adults. Here the *quality* of employment is key. That is, individuals require work that is respectable and more than "just enough". In other words, "labor markets characterized by high unemployment rates and low-quality jobs are associated with increased crime, even after statistically controlling for various sources of selection and background characteristics" (Lageson and Uggen 2013:203-204). The relationship with labor markets, and the importance of labor for

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<sup>23</sup>During the New Deal Era, spending on social protection, "[crowded] out religious based private charity during the 1930s" (5). Spending "so carefully targeted at the lower end of the income distribution during a major economic crisis, appears to have [staved off criminal activity] during the 1930s" (Johnson, Kantor and Fishback 2007:20).

personal well-being, is thus remarkably intertwined. This facet contributes to the difficulties which many encounter in the face of decreased social protective institutions. Figure 3.4 illustrates the association of shifts in the unemployment rate in the United States with increases in incarcerated populations.

The dramatic rise in incarceration rates from the 1970s onwards is clear and,





Figure 3.4: Historical Unemployment and Incarceration Rates


as seen in figure 3.5, the connection with unemployment remains relatively consistent across time until approximately the close of the 1980s.<sup>24</sup> Towards the early and mid 90s, the relationship between incarceration and unemployment began to change. Whereas in the past, movements tracked each other, with enormous leaps in magnitude during the ascendancy of the neo-liberal policies. Following the devolution of welfare policy, however, something in the mixture took on a different form. Clearly much more research is needed to truly find how social protection policy is tied to these phenomenon.

It is this dramatic rise in incarceration which illustrates possibly the starkest use of social corrections - as the true final layer in the social safety system,

<sup>24</sup>According to Frances Fox-Piven: "...large segments of the American population... have become redundant in the American labor market... One reason is that their work can be replaced, easily and cheaply by low-wage workers everywhere, including migrant workers. And the other reason is, indeed, that they are rebellious and so we have undertaken a program of mass incarceration at a cost somewhat higher than what it would cost to send these young men to Harvard..." (Fox Piven, 2012; 21min)



(a) Unemployment Rates and Male Incarceration Rate Change Over Previous Period 1925 – 2009



(b) Incarceration Rate Change and Unemployment Rate Change 1949 - 2009

Figure 3.5: Unemployment and Incarceration Historical Trends

which shall be explained further. Whereas its European counterparts have traveled a criminal justice road which reserves heavy punishment for typically only the most serious offences, the US has included lesser violations into its criminal sanction regime (Lacey 2007). This propensity to use criminal policy as a replacement for softer measures has resulted in a meteoric rise in arrests and sentences - leading some to conclude that the welfare state has been uprooted in favor of a *penal state*. In fact, when one adds the share of incarcerated to the unemployed population, the US has not outperformed its EU counterparts as has been touted in the past - a central argument of free-market/minimal state advocates.<sup>25</sup> The rate of change in male incarceration briefly changes directions around the close of the 1990s.<sup>26</sup>

**Client Shifting** Particularly intriguing is the break around the early 1990s with previous trends. This break occurs in close temporal proximity to introduction and implementation of the PRWORA policies. Such a movement of clients would certainly support the advanced marginality thesis' claims of client migration (i.e., movement of clients of welfare programs into custodial services).

Figure 3.6 tracks AFDC/TANF recipient and Prison rates per 100,000 of the population across 50 US states for the time period 1992 – 2008.<sup>27</sup> The percentage of African Americans in the population is included to simultaneously investigate claims from the NJC thesis. From 1997 to 1998, the relationship of AFDC/TANF to prison populations changes direction completely and had not reversed as of 2008.

This initial evidence (weakly) supports the hypothesis that the decentralizing welfare reforms post-1996 coincide with the changing relationship of social assistance and rates of incarceration. That is, as welfare client

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<sup>25</sup>The US, in particular, has developed its criminal justice system to handle not just criminal activities, but also those activities considered more “forbidden” (*mala prohibita*) than truly criminal (*mala in se*) (Lacey 2007).

<sup>26</sup>Some have argued for what would best be termed as “target absence”. Levitt (2004) has offered an intriguing interpretation of this pattern, where the rapid decline (and in this case decoupling) during the period can be largely attributed to “increases in the number of police, the rising [nominal] prison population, the waning crack epidemic and the legalization of abortion”, the latter of which has garnered no small amount of media and academic attention (Levitt 2004). Others have argued that increasingly popular video games account for significant decreases in crime rates (Cunningham, Engelstätter and Ward (2011), see also (Uggen and McElrath (2013)).

<sup>27</sup>The analysis here draws from the same TSCS data used for Chapter 2 analysis

# Political Demobilization and the Welfare State




Figure 3.6: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates Selected Years

numbers were curtailed, social corrections rolls rose. The results do not necessarily help or hinder the NJC thesis. The application of this thesis seems most relevant to the southern states, where populations of African Americans are historically high. It is difficult to know for certain, however, if the results are indeed indicative of racial animus or merely an artifact of residential and ideological stability - not to mention labor market deficiencies. This further adds doubt to the merit of the NJC thesis compared with that of the more political economic arguments.<sup>28</sup> These trends have implications for systems outside the correctional sphere, especially when such evidence is used to corroborate theories of “prison states”. This is evidenced with calls by some to see these processes as unique, as an institutional revolution in governing that is “not a simple return to a past state of affairs, but a genuine institutional innovation” (Wacquant 2009b:327).

Indeed, such processes are not a simple return to the past; however, such processes are not as genuine as it is claimed. *If* such arguments entail that the disciplinary strategies honed in the punitive policing and judicial areas of the state are being increasingly adopted in the social insurance and assistance areas of the welfare system, then such a position garners little opposition. It would seem undeniable that welfare policies are coming under increasing pressure to exhibit more targeted and punitive measures to ensure client behavioral compliance and reduced participation. The definitive answer on whether scholars of correctional systems believe in an actual set of institutional devices segregated as autonomous and new phenomenon is less clear.<sup>29</sup>

However, the popular view posits that penal and welfare policy work in tandem with each other, “penal and welfare institutions form a single policy regime aimed at the governance of social marginality” (Beckett and Western 2001:55). This argument, while extremely supportive of aligning institutional settings in a cooperative setting, fall short of the extra yard in fully integrating services. That is, such arguments are correct, but not necessarily for the right reasons. Demarcation of borders between *welfare* institutions and *penal* institutions suggests independent institutional settings. Such logics are conducive to propagating notions of prison states vs welfare states, a situation which has developed in recent debates. If there is such a thing as a prison state, one must be able to demarcate its borders. Furthermore, as with wel-

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<sup>28</sup>That is, it is tremendously problematic to operationalize racial bias in most studies. See Loury (2002)

<sup>29</sup>Whether such autonomous institutions work together or are merely working with the same clients still requires that we see them as two distinct settings effected by the same policy regimes, not as unified institutions.

fare states, such a conception must inevitably involve some temporal stage where such institutions began, as well as their functional purposes. That is, they would be novel and autonomous statuses not subsumed to the welfare state framework. The following section argues against novelty and examines how scholars are looking to reconcile the autonomy with the larger welfare state framework. For the sake of brevity, the historical novelty and autonomy are addressed simultaneously (See Morris and Rothman (1998) for detailed reading).

### 3.3 Correctional Institutions and the Welfare State

“Poverty, as Disraeli once said, was declared a crime by industrialism. Laws about poverty became associated with laws about crime” (Titmuss 1965:15). This story has been retold by those who see the crushing effect of the return of market fundamentalism as a new hydra to be thwarted. However, historical research clearly indicates that correctional institutions have been far from separate institutions of welfare systems, where the main mode of public service provision was either through workhouses or charitable sources. As such, this thesis disagrees with the view of these arrangements as peculiarly new or parallel “states”. It is not that neo-liberalism is creating a *Prison State* (or multitudes of), but rather reviving an old relationship. As the American state has rolled back the ability and scope of social assistance and social insurance, it has come headlong into a re-emergent state of punitive affairs.<sup>30</sup>

**Novelty and Autonomy:** Penalization of poverty has occurred before, though the modern implementation is obviously evolved with technological and administrative developments. The step-wise description of this transformation is convincing in a strategic game setting, however it may afford too much credit on the part of policy makers in terms of (intelligent) design capabilities. Capitalism, like the neo-liberalist school which promotes it, is in

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<sup>30</sup>As Titmuss later noted about early welfare state developments: “. . . with the limited instruments of policy and administrative techniques to hand in the past, the system could only function by operating punitive tests of discrimination; by strengthening conceptions of approved and disapproved dependencies; and by a damaging assault on the recipients of welfare in terms of their sense of self-respect and self-determination. Within the established pattern of commonly held values, the system could only be redistributive by being discriminatory and socially divisive” (Titmuss, 1965:15)

many ways a creature of opportunity. Such policies advocating policies echoing survival of the socially fittest, it does not necessarily (or actively) create successors to defunct institutions. If anything, it contorts existing institutions to the point where, no longer being fit for purpose, they face collapse from the weight of their own inadequacy. That is, opponents of policies, in the political arena, often allow institutions to *drift* or pursue *conversion*, rather than overtly challenging the status quo of institutional bases (Hacker 2004; Hacker, Thelen and Pierson 2013).<sup>31</sup>

This produces an environment where inequality becomes the accepted norm. This increased tolerance for inequality, and even a glamorization of it, results in more punitive measures which thereby enlists the corrective component of the state to compensate for *institutional* deficiencies; that is, those institutions better suited for the reduction of real or monied inequality.<sup>32</sup> It turns on a “culture of inequality” as opposed to Murray’s (1984) culture of poverty (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio, 2009). This breed of social Darwinism, which was touched upon earlier, destroys barriers to its realization and leaves the communitarian policy of the Kropotkin (1902) Social Darwinian camp to pick up the pieces. The mutual aid inherent in the alternative [Kropotkin] conception of society is rarely conceptualized in terms of social institutions, let alone in punishment settings. Thus, the expansion of the *penal fist* is less strategy than necessity, constrained by lack of a better (or available) option.

That prisons and other correctional institutions are increasingly called in to deal with social distress seems much more the result of a beleaguered and punch-drunk social welfare system attempting to stay afloat than finding ways to control unwitting citizens by outsourcing the problem to a distinct institutional setting. Furthermore, such arguments promote an over-inflated novelty of the role which penal institutions play in the larger scheme of governance and social order.

**Past Can be Prologue** It is worth revisiting the history of correctional institutions to properly contextualize their modern operation. While mass incarceration is truly surprising, it is novel only in so much as concerns its

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<sup>31</sup>Drift refers to situations where institutions are not adjusted in respect to the changing environments of their intended coverage area. Conversion refers to the use of institutions outside their intended goals.

<sup>32</sup>Tolerance for inequality, argue Crutchfield and Pettinicchio (2009) “reaches its highest form among those modern-day social Darwinists who believe that the problems of the poor, the unemployed, and the uneducated are due to their own failures” (135).

magnitude - not function. We can draw much from revisiting these historical legacies. The early houses of correction, it should be noted, which developed in the 16th century were not solely institutions of punishment, but institutions for poverty management. The Pennsylvania system at Cherry Hill, which lasted well into the 20th century (until 1971), was primarily reform based – in stark contrast to the Auburn system which among many things was as profitable as it was retributive. Elmira, as well, was based on the ideal of rehabilitation not retribution (Morris and Rothman 1998). It does not seem at all that contemporary penal institutions have evolved from separate institutional bases. So much was argued by Garland (1981, 1985). Penal systems, as with welfare systems, continue to hold a functional role for political and economic interests well before the prison explosion in recent decades.

Recalling the previous assessment of the policy transformation in the US in the later part of the 20th century, one can decipher a distinct co-incidence of policy movements across penal and welfare policies. The neo-liberal policy transformation which transpired in the 1970s onwards sought to dismantle the social protections and regulations which were seen as impediments to competitiveness. In so doing, those who espoused this view reproached the welfare state as a barrier to the free-market and prosperity, leaving many more open to the forces of market competition. This at best illustrates a return to market fundamentalism with greater tools at its disposal than classic liberals had.

**Recycling Market Losers** From Walnut Street Jail to the Cherry Hill and Auburn contest for supremacy, Americans have been well aware of the function of penal policy in accommodating capitalism and the labor market. Across time, correctional institutions have supplied the most basic means to absorb and repatriate the laboring classes back into the political economic system from which they came. They have done so, as with the Quaker led administration in Pennsylvania and the Theodosian code long before, with an aim of *rehabilitation* at their core – despite movements to extract retributive justice. Thus, novelty and autonomy seem excessive typifications of this joined up policy movement. In academic debates, it appears that the focus of welfare state institutions and penal systems are converging. The evolving trends in research clearly seem to indicate a need to conceptualize penal systems as literally part of the the larger state network of services, as opposed to a (semi)sovereign area under the explicit and exclusive concern of criminal justice researchers and penal policy experts. In the final part of

this chapter, I lay out this argument with this explicit purpose.

### 3.4 Merging Political Economy and Correctional Institutions

A growing sub-set of literature has increasingly focused on the importance of welfare states and punishment, incorporating the work of welfare state scholars in their own attempts to understand how the macro-political economic policy world interacts with their own interests. It is no surprise then that many scholars view the welfare state as an antithesis or accomplice of the *Prison State* (Downes and Hansen 2006; Useem and Piehl 2008), *Penal State* (Lacey 2012,2013; Wacquant 2001b, 2001a, 2000c;2002,2002b, 2001b, 2000a, 2003, 2008; Owens and Smith 2009; Simon 2007; McLennan 2008 2001; de Koster et al. 2008), *Carceral State* (Gottschalk 2008, 2006, 2007, 2013, 2009; Owens and Smith 2009; Simon 2007; Mukamal 2007; Uggen 2007; Weaver and Lerman 2010; Dolovich 2001; Thompson 2011, 2011b; Weaver 2009; Murch 2012; Beckett and Murakawa 2012; Ross 2010; Martin and Wilcox 2012; Dillon 2012; Fortner 2013; Metcalf 2011-2012; Glassey-Tranguyen 2011; Sim 2009), *Carceral-Assistential State* (Wacquant 2008a), *Centaur State* (Wacquant 2010), *Punitive (Un)WelfareState*(Rosenthal 2004) and even an *Androgynous State* (Owens and Smith 2009).

The proliferation of terminologies describing the interplay between the state's presumed responsibility to protect its members from harm, and its obligation to prevent those same citizens from doing harm, thrives in academic debate. However, where it concerns an analysis of what welfare systems *do* – and moreso what social corrections does outside of the punishment of crime – these terminologies make incorporation unnecessarily complicated. Many scholars are now directly overlaying research of penal systems directly on welfare state typologies.

This interest has come forward because of the significant effect which neo-liberal policy has had on the fundamental practices of institutions. Rightly so, leading researchers in the area of criminal justice and penal policy are aptly concerned with *outcomes* - i.e., crime reductions and re-integration. The welfare state for them is a tool, but still seemingly outside penal policy.

This conception of the welfare system is misguided, at least as much as those who work for the rehabilitation of offenders are performing paral-

lel functions of their colleagues in the social assistance and social insurance tiers, albeit with differing tools at their disposal. Fortunately, the process of acknowledging the unity of welfare institutions and penal policy looks to be developing rather than waning. According to Rosenfeld and Messner (2013): “the most effective and realistic way of producing enduring crime reductions in the developed nations is to reduce the dependence of populations on the performance of the market economy”. Or as Lacey (2012) has eloquently promoted, we must construct an “institutional account of the defining features of political systems integrated within a broad comparative political economy of punishment” (Lacey, 2012). Pratt (2008a, 2008b) has laid out a thoroughly significant argument in respect to Scandinavian Exceptionalism in both welfare and punishment strategies. Downes and Hansen (2006) show that prison rates, cross-nationally, are negatively correlated to spending on welfare as a share of GDP, and that the relationship is increasing. Cavadino and Dignan (2006) exemplify attempts to incorporate correctional systems with welfare state institutions, advancing our ability to conceptualize measurement of correctional systems in the larger state apparatus.

Lacey (2006) has illustrated, using the VoC approach (Hall and Soskice 2001), discernible differences between Liberal Market Economies, Northern European Coordinated Market Economies and Scandinavian Coordinated Market Economies. Furthermore, we are starting to see the joining up of political economic research fields and penal system studies. Barker (2009), Tonry (2007), Lacey and Soskice (2013), and Gottshalk (forthcoming) have even more recently moved debate into the realm of political institutional settings.<sup>33</sup> That said, and given the research that is proliferating outside of welfare state research, I investigate these findings using, first, data from the OECD and the International Prison Centre for the years 2000 - 2009, 2012. This is followed with an analysis using the previous TSCS data in chapter 2 investigating the corresponding measures for the 50 US states over the time period 1993 - 2008.

### Comparisons of Prison Rates, Inequality and Welfare Policy

**Cross-National:** Data has been taken from the OECD Social Expenditure Database for the years 2001-2009 and 2012, corresponding to the regime typologies outlined by Esping-Andersen (1990). These typologies have proven robust over time and are desirable in this respect. Four measures are

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<sup>33</sup>Marie Gottshalk: *Caught: Race, Neoliberalism, and the Future of the Carceral State*

## Political Demobilization and the Welfare State




Figure 3.7: Welfare v Incarceration Rates for Selected OECD Countries

plotted against the rate of imprisonment per 100,000 of the population obtained from the International Centre for Prison Studies for the respective years. Prison rates are plotted against total public spending on welfare as percentage of GDP (Figure 3.7a), pre-tax/transfer Gini (Figure 3.7b), and post-tax/transfer Gini (Figure 3.7c). Figure 3.7d plots the relationship between the point reduction from pre- and post-Gini measurements.

As with previous findings, Figure 3.7a indicates that the amount states devote to welfare services correlates with their respective prison rates. Nations which spend more as a percentage of their GDP on public spending (i.e., welfare) exhibit lower incarceration rates per 100,000. Furthermore, nations which have lower degrees of market income inequality also exhibit lower degrees of the use of imprisonment. However, this pre-governmental intervention is less striking than the result of post-tax/transfer income inequality and imprisonment rates. That is, there is less of a relationship, at

least from the data presented here, between the market wage inequality and imprisonment rates than the post-governmental intervention relationship and imprisonment rates. Clearly, incarceration is a function of criminal policy. However, the evidence here - which supports Downes and Hansen (2006), Cavadino and Dignan (2006), and Lacey (2008)- demonstrates that welfare systems matter.

The result in Figure 3.7c poses interesting insights. It suggests that the degree to which a country reduces inequality (i.e., the total effect of the system's design), and not just the amount it spends on public services, brings about stronger clustering among the regime typologies. Rather unexpectedly, the Mediterranean regime states cluster with their Liberal counterparts. At first this clustering may seem incongruous. However, once we take into account the functional aspects of correctional services, the phenomenon becomes quite rational. It might be assumed that the inability of these states to address inequalities of low-wage (foreign and domestic) workers by means of transfers is absorbed by their prison facilities. Due to eligibility policies, many migrant workers are unable to benefit from social welfare institutions and as such will find themselves housed and fed (albeit against their will) by those institutions of last resort. These findings are shared across the Liberal regime typology and the (largely understudied) Mediterranean grouping.

While we might assume that the clustering might be the result of similar justice systems in the Liberal regimes, it does not fit so well with the systems of Spain, Italy and Portugal - countries which do not share the same common ancestry (so to speak) as the Anglo-Saxon-Liberal states. It may be more appropriate to consider that the ability of the welfare state to accommodate precarious life-courses in the low-wage sectors accounts for some of this variation - though the mechanisms and collateral influences are not readily given in the literature. Thus, in the case of Spain, for instance, the growth in Spanish inmates has come largely from the influx of migrant background workers who, for lack of work and/or social rights, are more prone to illegal activity. Indeed, the foreign born population, in Spain and across Europe, has historically seen much higher rates of incarceration than native populations (Wacquant 1999a). Here the advanced marginality thesis returns to the fore as a powerful tool in understanding these trends.

Also interesting to note is that the amount by which states reduce inequality does not generate the same relationship seen in post-tax/transfer Gini. This may suggest that the type of message which is sent to beneficiaries of these systems, in the vein of the *policy design matters* camp. The

fact that the decommodification characteristics first introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990) are so strikingly inline with another (seemingly external) outcome (incarceration) proves an exciting new avenue for research both in the fields of penal policy and the welfare state research. Taken together, the amount of resources as a percentage of the country's GDP does coincide with lower imprisonment, however there are obviously many other subaqueous variables involved. Future research may do well to focus on how political and economic negotiating configurations act in tandem to impact not only reductions in inequality, but systems of punishment. This would be in line with those who posit that the economic and political nature of governments are important to punitiveness both in social corrections and social welfare. For the purposes here, it corroborates the proposition that vulnerable populations are systematically rerouted into more capable welfare institutions.

**Sub-National - The United States:** Pushing further, I investigate whether these trends are also apparent for units which vary less in cultural and historic, not to mention political, backgrounds. In particular, I focus my attention on the US. Preliminary analysis on the US as a whole shows that the previous findings are consistent over a comparably long time period (1947 – 2009).

**Trends in Inequality and Imprisonment** Plotting the Gini coefficient against male and total incarceration rates (Figure 3.8), I find a relatively stable relationship until the end of the 1970s, where upon the rate for males begins its upward climb. It is clear that changes made to the nations' institutional structure have significantly coincided with a dramatic increase in incarceration, especially among males. In contrast to the fluctuations in the data from unemployment, the correlation with income inequality and incarceration rates is consistent across time. Additionally, adding unemployment rates to the time series data indicates that whereas income inequality is highly correlated to (total, male, and female) incarceration rates ( $r(62) = .976$ ,  $p < .01$ ;  $r(62) = .976$ ,  $p < .01$ ;  $r(62) = .968$ ,  $p < .01$  – respectively), unemployment is not statistically significant. However, the unemployment rate *does* correlate strongly with changes in the *rate* of incarceration for men ( $r(43) = .459$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and women ( $r(43) = .341$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

In addition, taking the bi-variate relationship between Pre-Tax/Transfer and Post-Transfer Gini's plotted against the population of prisoners per




Figure 3.8: Income Inequality and Male Incarceration Rates : 1947 - 2009




Figure 3.9: Regressed Income Inequality and Male Incarceration Rates : 1947 - 2009

100,000 (overlaid with measurements of citizen ideology), the relationship found with those regime typologies cross-nationally hold for individual states. As figures 3.10a and 3.10b indicate, the difference between the inequality measures remain closely related, with the post-transfer measurement showing a slightly higher degree of clustering.<sup>34</sup>

Replicating the analysis on welfare expenditure as with the analysis on the cross-national data, I find a weak, yet significant, bi-variate relationship  $r(675) = -.217, p < .01$ - as also seen in the cross-national findings. Additionally, looking at the generosity of states (as defined by the amount of the average AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of four to a full-time worker at the Federal minimum wage), I find that more generous states also exhibit, generally speaking, lower prison rates - Figure 3.11.


Generosity comparisons were also run with an alternative variable comprised of a *state* minimum wage level in place of the federal (to account for the possibility that the state set minimum wage might better approximate state-wide living costs), however the differences were only slight. While the nature of the data used does not allow for the difference of pre- and post-transfer gini to be directly assessed (given the different sources of these measurements), the evidence here supports the contention that the dynamics at work at the cross-national level also appear to apply with individual US states. Thus, even at the sub-national level, the degree to which states are able to reduce the income inequality of their citizens, the smaller their prison populations.<sup>35</sup>

As Rosenfeld and Messner(2013) have argued, “if criminal opportunities are proximate causes of crime, criminal motivations and the conditions that stimulate them are closer to ultimate cause” (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013:np). The take-away message is clear: Welfare states which (a) resolve income inequality on (b) an increasingly egalitarian (or social capitalistic) basis, reduce the take-up in correctional populations (e.g., prisons) more successfully by preventing the criminogenic effects which market fundamentalism (be it in the guise of classical liberalism, neo-Victorianism, or neo-Liberalism) instigates (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). One could go further, as Steve Hall has commented, and argue that “any abrupt move to a neo-liberal form of political economy will result in almost immediate increases in property crime, violence and homicide in the regions most badly hit by unemployment and the breakdown of the family, community, and collective


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<sup>34</sup>Two states (Alaska, New York) were omitted from the analysis as outliers.

<sup>35</sup>No relationship was found for probation and parole rates in separate analysis.




(a) Pre-Tax/Transfer




(b) Post-Transfer

Figure 3.10: Income Inequality and Prison Rates 2008



(a) Spending on General Welfare



(b) Generosity

Figure 3.11: Welfare Expenditure and Prison Rates 2008

civil and political organizations” (Docksai 2010).

This owes itself, on the one hand, to the observed relationship between criminality and economic conditions. As noted earlier, crime (property and violent) has increasingly become concentrated among the poor, while the rich have been able to employ more risk preventative measures - “target hardening” (Uggen 2012; Levitt 1999). Reduction in income disparities decreases property crimes in general (Choe 2008; Brush 2007; Scorzafave and Soares 2009; Ehrlich 1973), and reductions in income inequality between racial groupings further reduce the distortion in violent crime rates (Blau and Blau 1982; Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D’Alessio, 2006). On the other hand, more egalitarian and less discriminatory policies based not on norms of efficiency and targeted assistance, but stability and protection, promote trust and “the discipline of delayed gratification” (Soss 2002; Sennett 2006:31).

These issues return us to earlier discussion of the effects of means-tested systems. Because of its very nature, a targeted welfare system must select out citizens as worthy or not worthy, as it must assign determination of eligibility. That is, the targeted welfare system coincides *de facto* with stratification. “The very act of separating out the needy almost always stamps them as socially inferior, as ‘others’ with other types of social characteristics and needs, and results most often in stigmatization.” (Rothstein 1998:158). Thus the targeted system produces a question which is fundamentally different than universal policy: one that focuses on how do we fix *their* problem, rather than how do we fix *our* problem. Or taken to its extreme, how do we avoid *their* problems from becoming *our* problems. By reducing inequality, universalistic welfare systems increase social and political solidarity and participation, exactly the types of support network dynamics which offender reintegration efforts seek to maximize (Horn, 2011). This leaves the task of fitting correctional institutions into the structure of the welfare state.

### 3.4.1 Summary

It is clear that external welfare services and policy have a direct effect on penal institutions. The literature on the repercussions of slack social protection systems in the face of inequality producing market economies is well documented. The argument which this chapter has put forward thus far is modest but distinct compared to other views of correctional systems. While a large amount of scholarly work implies a *connection* between correctional systems and welfare systems (and a growing amount of work has questioned

*how* to interpret this connection), this thesis argues that the correctional system *is* an explicit *internal* component of welfare systems - as opposed to parallel and/or substitutive institutions. This view is built upon extensive readings of the literature and (more importantly) on first hand accounts of the services experienced in this tier. Interviewees (conducted with survey respondents and expert/practioners) consistently reported that many supervised offenders had achieved professional qualifications for their present work while incarcerated, many had achieved their high school equivalency while supervised, and all had received medical care while “guests” of the NC Division of Prisons. These results are presented in detail in Chapter 7. This evidence bolsters the work presented here, and prompts a further exploration of the concept hereafter.

From a welfare system accounting perspective, a central matter of interest concerns the share of resources which these services make up in the total amount of welfare services. These are explicitly welfare maintenance programs. As such, these programs and services are necessarily (or ought to be) included in a country’s National Accounts. However, this is currently not the case. What is more, these services are in some cases explicitly sought out by clients who cannot access services in the social assistance, insurance and private welfare markets.

The following section combines the arguments in favor of viewing criminal justice services as primarily remedial of other institutional (i.e., welfare system) deficiencies with the larger political economic developments in research agendas to form a unified conception. The unique contribution of this is the *direct* incorporation of this area into welfare state research so as to concomitantly reframe offenders as continuant clients of the system as opposed to outcasts. This small facet is central to understanding the importance of the political demobilization of felony offenders. That is, with the following incorporation of correctional services into welfare systems, as opposed to a passing acknowledgement of its parallel functions, we necessarily and formally accept that political demobilization falls on a definable class of welfare system client - citizens reliant on the state for assistance.

### 3.5 Functional View of Correctional Systems

The chief contribution which this section proposes is the disambiguation of “what” the realm of correctional systems means for political economic stud-

ies. The difficulty in such an endeavor lies not in the justification of service accounting (i.e., which services ought to be included), but rather how these services are categorized across authorities. This is an area ripe for investigation and harmonization, as cross national differences abound, as well as sub-national differences. Across countries and sub-national entities, the practice of harmonizing services within prisons with those on the “outside” is a central part of penal policy. They are pivotal programs to reintegrate the offender as best as possible into the communities where they have originated. However, these services vary widely across nations and across sub-national jurisdictions. Examples taken from personal communications with correctional officials and examination of national cases are particularly instructive. In Europe, basic healthcare services are continuously in flux, with administration and support continually shifted between public and private financing and provision (Coyle 2007). In the UK, prison health services are under a national umbrella which works in parallel with local authority providers (NHS CB as of 2013).

Additionally, the NHS CB has authority over children’s homes, training centres, immigration removal centres, police custody suites, and courts (NHS 2013). In Norway, local authorities are charged with the provision of healthcare since 1980. More tellingly, Norwegians operate on an “import model” for their social corrections which directly situates corrections as part of the network of welfare institutions. This model utilizes resources from the local community funded by those ministries involved (i.e., the same process is applied for education and other services to inmates). Prisoners serve their sentence as close as possible to their home municipality. As such, there exists consistent contact between the prisoner and the service provider on release. This has knock-on value as well for both community and corrections client.

... the community becomes more involved in the prison system, so that some possible prejudices about prison may be removed or weakened ... The same goes the other way around, the prisoner may learn that service providers actually want to do something for them instead of chasing them around with bureaucracy.

In addition,

...correctional services do not have to buy these services... provision is the right of any person legally living in Norway, and prisoners are no exception to this rule – this is known as the principle of normality (Norwegian Ministry of Justice, Personal Communication, 2012).

Finland, in contrast, operates from a particularized budget scheme, where all expenses are paid for by the state and not the municipality. Health services, psychiatric services, and dentistry are under the budgets of the Criminal Sanctions Agency. Education and childcare are provided for by external agencies in coordination with the relevant prison authorities (Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency, Personal Communication, 2012).

For the US, the situation is particularly more discommodious. As with many European countries, the US states provide healthcare to their social corrections clients via the budgetary allowances of the respective ministries of Justice – with only a few countries handing over this authority to their ministries of Health (COE 2014). With a *federal* corrections system and 50 *state* systems (not counting special systems and other administrative authorities), provision of services to correctional populations is vast and uncharted for the most part. The fact is that under custodial supervision, the average client is entitled to a social protection package which is not shared by those not under this supervision. Prisoners in the United States, unlike non-institutionalized offenders or non-offenders, are constitutionally guaranteed health care (*Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 US 97 (1976)). Add to this the required, though increasingly cost re-appropriated, services of food, clothing and shelter, and the distinction between the Prison State and Welfare State becomes even less defined.

Welfare functions, not punitive services, are the main budgetary concerns for penal systems. “Medical care is one of the principal cost drivers in corrections budgets. . . From 1998 to 2001, healthcare spending in state prisons grew 10 percents annually” (Warren 2008:12). This is true across the board. For the US, with a reported one of every 99 persons behind bars, this is a considerable service provision issue (Warren 2008). In 2002, nearly 2.3 million persons were reliant on their jailers for medical treatment. Roughly 38 percent of federal inmates and 43 percent of state inmates suffered a chronic medical condition (Wilper et al., 2009). Forty-four percent of state inmates, compared to 39 percent of federal inmates, reported having medical problems, of which 70 percent and 76 percent respectively sought and received medical attention. From 1998 to 2001, healthcare spending in state prisons grew 10 percent annually. In 2004, medical costs accounted for USD 3.7 billion annually and, with the ageing of inmates, that number is on the rise (Warren 2008).

Correctional services are better seen as remedial of other sectors of the welfare state, mediating deficiencies in many social programs such as health

and education. As much can be seen once we look at what happens between entry and exit from this tier. Chronic medical conditions (for instance) are, across the board, generally worse for the incarcerated compared to that of the general populations. As much is readily known about prison populations across space and time. However, upon entering custodial supervision, offenders are brought up to levels above those “on the outside”. According to Patterson (2010), “the mortality rate of African American men in prisons is actually *lower* than among African American men outside of prison” (found in Schnittker, Massoglia, and Uggen (2011:3)). In addition, the racial disparities in mortality essentially disappear in prison. The fact that so many in prison arrive in poor health and are then elevated to a level not only on par with the non-incarcerated population (and this does not begin to include the myriad of counseling and other services provided post-incarceration), but above the level of some non-offenders is a clear indicator of the functional merit of this area of the welfare state. Social corrections - as a component of the welfare system - is corrective from an institutional standpoint in that it ultimately corrects for shortcomings in the overall system.

Thus, while there is evidence that many correctional environments suffer varying degrees of health ( physical, mental, and emotional) conditions, overall it must be said that much should be touted for the ability of correctional institutions across the US (and other countries) to appropriate means to deal with some of the most extreme outcomes of (politically created) deficiencies in the greater welfare system.<sup>36</sup> As Uggen and McElrath (2013) have noted, and the historic record attests to, “under the right or, more precisely, the wrong social conditions, we are all prone to commit criminal acts”. The following is an effort to contextualize its placement not only for researchers of criminal policy, but also for scholars of the welfare state that we do not limit our understanding of welfare to those locations where we feel most comfortable.

### 3.5.1 A Framework for Inclusion

One problem to surmount within the fields of welfare systems and correctional systems research is one of perception. There exists an allure with

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<sup>36</sup>As such, this chapter (and this thesis) aims not to lambaste correctional establishments as locations of social control and abusive power relations - though these issues are undeniably present. Rather, given the overwhelming evidence of the larger political economic restructuring of the American welfare state, it is difficult not to see correctional services as unwitting victims of market fundamentalist restructuring.

viewing welfare systems as magnanimous institutions which exist divorced from punitive systems. The idea that correctional facilities can equate to welfare facilities is often overlooked by researchers of the welfare state. Prisons, youth group homes, detention centers and even jails provide beds, food, medical care, psychiatric treatment, recreational activities, and a host of other services. Except in special circumstances, these are provided to the beneficiary from the resources of the general population, (i.e., tax revenue - thus redistribution between identifiable populations). By a strict welfare accounting philosophy, this makes the field of social corrections immediately entitled for inclusion. This section illustrates the *placement* of this component into an analytical framework and presents evidence of this tier from the United States.

The Welfare State, according to Titmuss (1965), consists of not only social welfare (the social assistance and social insurance tools of policy), but also fiscal and occupational welfare. These varying tiers of welfare provision are beneficial to differentiated groups of households depending on their risk portfolio. Taking this as a starting point, I posit a conceptual framework which situates social corrections at the base of an adapted schedule. This adaptation of Abramovitz (2001) and Titmuss (1965), Figure 3.12, includes four areas (tiers) of welfare involvement. In ascending order of clientele delimited by socio-economic status, they are: the *social corrections* tier (prisons and non-institutional settings), *social welfare* (social assistance and social insurance), *fiscal welfare* (predominantly tax credits and other policies aimed at market subsidization), and *occupational welfare* (those benefits defined by Titmuss as accruing to higher income households).

The objective of this framework is to layout a comprehensive schematic to record, analyze and compare beneficiary/client take-up rates across tiers. This framework incorporates a holistic treatment of state welfare services which include social corrections (custodial and non-custodial) and other tiers of benefit receipt. The impetus, laid out in the arguments presented in this work, is the inclusive treatment of welfare systems to establish cross-tier migration rates and policy impacts. In as much as we may wish to study how the state is involved in enabling or disabling citizens, it is key that policy makers, and those who inform their decisions, reconcile the entire system in their investigations. Resources and policy reform patterns in the social insurance tier impact on costs and take-up rates in the social assistance and/or fiscal welfare tiers, as well as the social corrections tier. Additionally, this framework enables simpler comparisons (within and between states) by registering funding and service provision characteristics of each tier. This framework

does not create new accounting items. It is meant to be mapped to existing national account data available from each country. As such, it represents an initial effort to begin mapping the entirety of the welfare functions of the state where social corrections makes up an internal and integral component on par with other tiers.

**Sourcing Funds:** Using this framework, analysis of social corrections becomes comparable to other services. One of the defining features of this tier is its revenue stream, shown below. First, a look at the state programs by funding source. Figure 3.13 shows the breakdown of state total expenditures including all sources of funding. Clearly educational services make up the bulk of state spending on public services, however further inspection reveals what states actually spend their resources on. As figure 3.14 illustrates, federal monies received in the way of transfers account for a substantial amount of state financing of services to constituents. Of these, medicaid is by far the largest recipient of federal dollars. State own sources, on the other hand (figure 3.15), devote nearly half of their indigenous resources to education - and within that, the majority (36 percent) goes to elementary and secondary education. Public welfare programs, in contrast, make up 24 percent of general fund financed expenditures.

Taking these three categories of spending together (i.e., medicaid, public assistance, and correctional spending), one can see that the responsibility for each is dramatically heterogeneous. While medicaid and social assistance are heavily funded by federal redistribution, the social correction tier is nearly exclusively indigenously financed.

“State funds (general funds and other state funds combined, but excluding bonds) accounted for 95 percent of total state corrections spending in fiscal 2009” (NABO 2010:54). Thus, as an expenditure of state budgets, social corrections is by far the most reliant on state resources to provide goods and services, making it the one component of the welfare state (at least in the US context) which sub-national actors possess the overwhelmingly legal and financial authority. Put another way, correctional budgets (on average) absorb mental healthcare, medical care, housing, nutrition, and education services at a fraction of the cost of its social insurance and social assistance counterparts. States, naturally, vary considerably in the amount of resources they devote to social corrections of their own resources. While deeper inspection is outside the scope of the present work, it is clear that simply assuming

states spend more because they have higher correctional populations does not help us understand the entire picture.<sup>37</sup> Just as one can analyze variance among program costs and take up rates in the social assistance and insurance tiers, or the money deferred through the oft referred to *Hidden Welfare State* of tax benefits and exemptions, so too can we decipher the social correction tiers of individual states.<sup>38</sup>

The evidence illustrates the vast differences in the responsibility for funding and provision which exists across the tiers; however, they fall short of uncovering the inner workings of the tier of social corrections. Returning to a previous point: in terms of comparable costs, social corrections are, at least at first glance, more expensive than their social welfare tier counterparts (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013; Wacquant 2002). This view is imprecise. That is, according to Wacquant (2002), for example:

“In California . . . each state prisoner costs USD 21,400 per annum, or three times the maximum AFDC benefits paid out to a family of four before the elimination of that program (USD 7,229, inclusive of administrative costs). . . . in Mississippi, for example, the yearly price tag for one prisoner comes to USD 13,640 but that sum represents nearly ten times the annual AFDC benefits per family, which averages a princely USD 1,400.” (Wacquant 2002:21)

This assumption at first seems logical. If we take the cost of total corrections and divide it by the aggregate population, it appears that prisons are substantially more expensive operations compared to the benefits received in the social welfare tier. This would be a very attractive argument, and to many it is, if it were not for the evidence that the social corrections tier provides *more* services and goods than AFDC/TANF did/do directly, at least in their functional outlays noted earlier.

In particular, there is a central component of social corrections which makes it a far more dynamic participant in citizen welfare maintenance than other areas of the system. Aside from the services listed above, the social corrections tier also provides (and this is perhaps a much more significant objective of this tier) employment training and experience - predominantly in the manual labour sector. This component is by far the largest, longest

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<sup>37</sup>This is a pertinent point in fact. Analyzing correctional populations primarily as a beneficiary group, it is simpler to decompose this area of welfare spending by looking at the consuming components of expenditures within the sub-fields of this tier.

<sup>38</sup>For further reading see (Howard 1997)

running and most resilient feature of the social corrections tier and has not been presented previously due to the sheer magnitude of analysis it deserves. This is not to mention the ramifications it has on the functioning of other areas of the welfare system in general.

As noted previously, *incarcerated* persons are, generally, not counted in labor market statistics. As such, arguments have been made that this disguises unemployment. However, more importantly, the correctional tier disguises *employment* as well. In light of this, it difficult to account for exactly how much of prison employment can be considered *training*, how much is *underpaid employment*, and in some cases, how much is simply publicly *subsidized income replacement*.<sup>39</sup> Whatever the uses of labor in the correctional tier, the practice is historic, universal and international.<sup>40</sup>

That said, it is worth knowing what the internal operations of social corrections are. In so doing, we obtain a glimpse into what this tier contributes to the aggregate welfare package of states - as we cannot rely on statistics of other areas of the welfare state to account for these services in measuring the extent of welfare system effort. To address this, I use the case of North Carolina to illustrate over a sufficiently long time period.

### 3.5.2 North Carolina: Mapping Program Usage

North Carolina (as with the many correctional departments) provides inmates with a menu of services and programs with the aim to both occupy inmate time as well as promote integration back into the “outside” world. While it is itself a unique case, North Carolina provides an adequate illustration of the types of programs and services which clients use and at which rates across time. The following tables show the growth and diversification of programs for North Carolina for the years 1993 – 2006.<sup>41</sup>

Since 1992 there has been a general increase in service programs and work programs among inmates in North Carolina (Figure 3.19). Many of the pro-

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<sup>39</sup>Many states allow workers to accumulate money into savings accounts for use both inside and outside the social corrections tier. Those making at or near market wages are more often than not required to use their earnings to pay for accommodation at their supervisory institute, in an effort to “make crime pay”.

<sup>40</sup>The UK also terms this ‘prison industries’ and maintains approximately 300 workshops, employing roughly 10,000 persons each week. (MOJ 2012). For an excellent overview of prison labor, see Rothman and Morris 1998

<sup>41</sup>The data presented are based on publicly available data from the North Carolina Department of Correction’s Office of Research and Planning. All calculations are my own.

grams experienced a shift in 1996. This is due, officially, to changes in the reporting system used by the department of corrections. However, coincidentally, this data shifts around the same time as PRWORA was signed into law.<sup>42</sup>

Figure 3.20 shows that participation rates in certain service programs fare better than others, with academic education dropping dramatically in both real and relative terms, and vocational education witnessing moderate declines and then stabilizing after 1997. A variety of programs came into play after bottoming out in 1996. In their place came drug rehabilitation programs and personal development programs, of which drug rehabilitation programs increased dramatically as a share of the social corrections menu of services. Figure 3.21 shows the corresponding information regarding work programs in the state, with unit services taking the lion's share of participation in both real and relative terms. Work in kitchen and food services took a considerable drop in relative terms.

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<sup>42</sup>Work programs are categorized as those activities which involve labor that would receive waged income outside correctional supervision. Service programs entail participation in well-being programs such as education or personal counseling.




Figure 3.12: Adapted Framework




Figure 3.13: Total State Spending by Major Category 2010




Figure 3.14: Federally Funded




Figure 3.15: State Funded




Figure 3.16: Spending on Medicaid by Source 2010




Figure 3.17: Spending on Social Assistance by Source 2010




Figure 3.18: Spending on Corrections by Source 2010




Figure 3.19: Participation Rates of General Population in Work and Non-work Programs




Figure 3.20: Participation in Service Programs




Figure 3.21: Participation in Work Programs

The breakdown here of the actual functions performed in this particular area of the social corrections tier is twofold. One, it lays out the dynamic variation in programmatic structure that has taken place over time, enabling comparison with other tiers in the welfare state (e.g., vocational rehabilitation for social assistance beneficiaries). Second, it illustrates that the aggregate costs which are budgeted for social corrections should not be “lumped together” and compared to the costs allocated to other welfare programs in the neighboring tiers without due respect to *which* types of programs are on offer in the respective units of analysis.

Within this mode of analysis it is easier to analyze the effectiveness of different strategies regarding assistance to clients. It is already documented that correctional services reduce the mortality rates of those under supervision, and eliminate racial disparities - thus indicating that the rehabilitative services provided within the social corrections tier is able to somehow intervene more effectively than those in the social, fiscal, or occupational welfare tiers for particular cases. It could very well be, hypothetically, that those facilities which provide inmates with low rent housing while on work-release are actually more efficient at the reduction of long-term unemployment than social welfare unemployment schemes. It may also be that the converse is true, and that encroachment of such methods actually further perpetuate disadvantage and high-unemployment trends and other maladies. Clearly deeper investigation is needed within and between the distinctive tiers of welfare systems. What I have endeavored to illustrate is what the social corrections tier is *doing*, in at least one state in the US. Thus, while assertions are right that the costs of incarceration are outpacing costs per AFDC/TANF recipients (one of many social welfare *programs*), they overlook that these costs are not directly comparable due to the *variety* of programs and services within their calculations.<sup>43</sup>

Without due accounting, it is possible to believe that the state is rampantly throwing good money after bad in an effort to repress an entire (sub)proletariat class brought into the social corrections tier via the neo-liberal doctrine of marketization and individual responsibility. States *do* face increasing costs in incarceration due to declining client turnover (residents remain in prison for longer durations, requiring longer and more expensive late-years care) and fluctuations in sentencing trends.

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<sup>43</sup>AFDC/TANF is only one program within the social welfare tier, the way the Earned Income Tax Credit is but one program within the fiscal welfare tier.

However, even these headlines fail to come to terms with fundamental economic calculations. First, the idea of steep increases in correctional budgets are somewhat distorted. When correctional budgets (North Carolina; 1992 – 2010) are adjusted to constant prices, we see that while the amount being invested into social corrections has risen over time, it has not done so at such an alarming rate. The difference lies, for example, between reporting that the costs for social corrections has increased by USD 570 million (current year prices) between 1992 and 2010, and saying (in constant 2011 USD) that spending has increased USD 289 million over those years, Figure 3.22.




Figure 3.22: Current and Constant Prison Spending with Population

Second, budgets do not necessarily represent increased client uptake. That is, budgets are not increasing per inmate, but have rather a ceiling defined by programmatic concerns which are not contingent on democratic oversight. The clients which make up this area of spending simply have no personal political power and very little external support. When the functional services are broken down to their constituent parts, it appears that (in fact) the social corrections tier is providing services to its beneficiaries with less money per inmate, Figure 3.23. Increasingly, programmatic choices come at the expense of of certain “non-essential” programs such as academic education.

These figures illustrate particularly insightful issues. Contrary to popular belief, prisons seem *less* expensive than many would have us believe. Whilst only one state out of 50, and one country out of many welfare regimes, the case presented here signifies that scholars of the welfare state must look deeper into those areas which are traditionally “off limits” to our investi-




Figure 3.23: Constant (2011) Spending Per Prisoner and Population

gation. It also entails that, as Uggen and Inderbitzen (2010) have argued, there is a place for criminologists in the field of welfare state research - one which ebbs and flows with the waxing and waning of policy regimes across the history of the US and other countries (Pratt 2011)

### 3.6 Discussion

What I have posited here is that social corrections, far from existing as a separate entity from the Welfare State, is an essential component of the it. The use of social corrections to manage the urban (sub)proletariat is neither unique historically (as seen in the growth in houses of corrections and poor houses beginning around the 16th and 17th century in Europe), nor spatially (as seen with varying uses of incarceration internationally). The correlation between welfare regime and “prison state” are so distinctly clear not because they are separate systems competing for clientele, but rather because researchers are measuring the same system with different indicators. One might also imagine announcing a “maternity leave” state or a “flexible work” state. Thus, as scholars look to unravel the impact of rising incarceration rates (not to mention the grossly disproportionate rise in mass convictions), they do so outside this framework of understanding the welfare state’s true reach. I find the separation of Welfare State and Prison State difficult to accept in light of the evidence to the contrary.

There is ample evidence that punitiveness increases as we move from a Social Democratic to Liberal regime, at least using the indicators available

thus far. That the Scandinavian co-ordinated markets incarcerate at a lower rate than their North European coordinated market and Liberal market economy counterparts should not be so surprising. Rather, it may merely serve as further proof that scholars have overlooked a portion of the Welfare State puzzle. While past logic did tend to interpret social corrections in terms of part of the aggregate Welfare State in America in the early 20th century, if not before (Garland, 1981), the focus of attention has moved away from such a unitary model. Garland's *Culture of Control* marked a clear shift to this direction (Garland 1981, 2001). Clearly, penal policies are moving in tandem with other welfare policies across time and space, and an investigation into the types of policy changes across all tiers, jointly, would greatly compliment our understanding of welfare systems across regimes.

In terms of the surface data I've presented here: states acquire more social corrections clients as they enact stricter penalties for new and existing criminal violations. These policy changes develop in tandem with broader attitudes towards social, fiscal and occupational welfare and definitions of the deserving and undeserving poor. Welfare system generosity constricts, in the case of neo-liberalism, citizens witness a system wide effort to control costs while managing the precarious (sub)proletariat who have been displaced by larger macro-economic developments. In contrast to its social, fiscal, and occupational welfare counterparts, the social corrections tier is (a) able to reduce costs literally overnight, (b) reduce these costs even with an increasing beneficiary population and (c) do so without large scale political opposition. Such total control of a segment of the welfare system, with resources almost entirely at the discretion of sub-national elected officials - themselves by-and-large unaccountable to the citizens whom are under their remit. This latter fact is the focus of the rest of this thesis and its importance for both political and economic studies is functional as much as, if not more than, its symbolic value.

That prisoners often go without say in public discourse, are unattractive recipients of political affection, receive the most highly discretionary and controlled social benefits, and are highly sensitive to fluctuations in sub-national politics and budget shortfalls brings to mind Foucault's earlier observation that the prison persists not because of its *successes*, but because of its *failures* (Foucault 1977). Such a reduction of costs in the face of growing usage would be highly questionable in the other tiers and makes social corrections the last stop for the needy and the first stop for the state's accountant.

The social corrections tier, in this view, is entailed as a warning to those

who would fall prey to dependence on the social welfare tier, and as a tool for disciplining those who the social welfare tier has failed to deliver from the commodified life events, as opposed to becoming claimants of the social rights arduously won by preceding generations. However, this does not exclude it from the welfare state, it merely entails that the welfare state might not be as complaisant as might be imagined. Where the system is well funded and universally available to citizens, we find the lack of such growth in this (social corrections) tier. As states construct ever more restrictive welfare regimes and move to the neo-liberal ideal, we witness a ballooning in the bottom end of the social corrections tier as the system adjusts to the criminalization of poverty. Further research into social corrections linkages is necessary including a better understanding of the programmatic structure and developments for this tier.

The social corrections tier as an area of inquiry, especially as relates to its interaction with the entire welfare state, has many gaps and opportunities for study. Perhaps it is the case that mass imprisonment and increasingly punitive criminal policies, paralleled with ever increasing cuts to basic programs such as elementary education and healthcare, is the natural complement to the type of neo-liberal welfare state regime which the US has embarked on since the early 1970s. There can be no meaningful change for the social corrections tier without simultaneous modifications in the adjoining tiers. If the social corrections tier is conceptualized as an integral component of the welfare state, as I have argued, then opening this field to investigations concerning the dynamics between this tier and others enables pragmatic study for the state as a whole.

### **3.6.1 Summary**

This chapter has been intended as a bridge between understanding the importance of appreciating the centrality of political participation on the one hand, and the need to reconceptualize the area of social corrections on the other. Whereas the preceding chapter has shown that political participation remains an important component in welfare state processes, and that the welfare state itself becomes author to such participatory dynamics, this chapter has illustrated that citizens involved with this area of the state are indeed recipients of welfare services and are (as such) necessarily important for feedback processes. However, these constituents are the last and largest politically demobilized group of citizens in the US. This chapter has analyzed initial data comparing the two lower tiers of the welfare system (social assis-

tance/insurance and social corrections), primarily in the United States across individual state entities. It has shown that changes in the policy of other tiers is significantly related to outcomes in the social corrections tier. Having assessed core arguments describing the increasing use of punitive sanctions via social corrections (in the form of incarceration), I have argued that racial control as an explanatory thesis yields to more operationalizable variables such as employment patterns, education, and above all social spending in the area of welfare which reduces monied inequality. This work has investigated the assumption that the decline in AFDC/TANF recipient rates across time has coincided with welfare reform policy, supported by surface observation and further called into question by deeper analysis.

Furthermore, this work has argued that the neo-liberal policy transformation over the past four decades has effected both welfare and penal policy alike because the two are inseparable. In as much, this chapter has traced key points of the neo-liberal trajectory and *raison d'être*, to not necessarily the creation of market friendly institutions, but the conversion of communitarian ones into traversable obstacles. In as much as the private market is allowed and encouraged to overtake the responsibilities of the state, this work proposes that these processes are not novel events but adaptations of previous strategies enabled by new methods and emergent technologies.

This chapter has found, supporting Downes and Hansen (2007) and Cavadino and Dignan (2008), initial evidence that (as with states in the US) countries which devote a larger portion of their resources towards the reduction of monied income inequality exhibit lower rates of incarceration. In addition, I have shown that it is likely that it is not the *amount* of spending which states exert to reduce inequality, but the extent to which this inequality is brought under control (pre- vs post-gini scores) that contribute to clustering regime typologies. Importantly for the study of welfare states, this entails that incorporation of penal systems, which I have conceptualized using an adaptation of the framework provided by Titmuss (1965) and later Abramovitz (2001), is a viable effort which increases our ability to understand the welfare state.

I have shown that this tier of the welfare state, for the United States, is an area which is almost entirely left to the direction and resource allocation of the individual states, notably with clientele who have no ability in the political arena to negotiate their treatment. I have described cross national variation in the financing and provision of social corrections services from selected cases (owing to the absence of readily available comparative data). I have carried out an initial exercise in exploring how such a schema can re-

veal pragmatic information on the functioning of social corrections, using the state of North Carolina as a case study. The findings from this exploratory analysis have shown that the view of social corrections as a location of coercive power relations and uneconomical policy planning forms only one part of a larger story. The alternate view, which deserves due consideration and investigation, regards those functions which successfully correct for external (inter-tier) deficiencies. The investigation which follows into the preferences of these clients could not proceed without an understanding of how it fits in with other considerations that stand out in the current literature. These areas were addressed first to provide the conceptual and practical comprehension which validate the importance of political demobilization, especially of the very citizens *most* needy of it.



## Part II

# America's Electorate Non Grata



## Chapter 4

# Political Disenfranchisement

Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere,  
diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies. -  
Groucho Marx

The preceding part of this thesis laid out the three central themes concerning the welfare state and political participation. First (Chapter 1), a duality of arguments has persisted across time. As opposed to political or insurance rationales of legitimizing state intervention, moralistic debates have persisted well before the advent of the modern welfare state. Two strands are discernible: one of which has found a particularly strong resonance with market capitalism, emphasizing (often in the extreme) individual agency, and removal of impediments; and the other, a more collectivist camp, emphasizes the place of social protection as a bulwark against inequality. It is these latter strands which have informed, as well, the debates surrounding political rights in the arena of public opinion. Second (Chapter 2), it has been shown that, even by conservative accounts, political participation remains significant for social policy. More so, political participation matters precisely for programs which, counter-intuitively for many neo-liberal critics, *positively* impact the agency of the less advantaged members of society. The condition of relative deprivation in modern capitalist economies has a nocent effect on political agency. This reduced agency, when aggregated to the group level, reduces the probability that citizen preferences (especially of the lower economic classes) are registered or even solicited for inclusion.

While these effects are often considered to be minute at the national level, the nature of policy making in a federal structure entails that impact must be evaluated at the sub-national and even sub-state level. As an additional point, if we are to take seriously any effect which the welfare state has on

citizen agency, as well as the importance of democracy on policy making, we must be concerned with *all* institutions which contribute to the services of the welfare state - not solely those whose clientele are seen as “worthy”. Thus (Chapter 3), a framework of welfare states incorporating correctional services provides an encompassing picture of modern welfare systems which admits those whose service and benefit take-up is supervised and administered (in most situations) by authorities outside the formal social assistance and social insurance tiers. In so doing, the clients of the correctional tier are formally brought under the umbrella of programs aimed at negotiating the conditions created by market capitalism in a democratic system. For the purposes of investigating political activity and redistributive policy, this entails that offenders continue as clients of the welfare state rather than temporary (or in some cases permanent) exclusions.

The second part of this thesis is devoted to addressing the issue of political demobilization, specifically in the US. In particular, this chapter is interested in the rationale behind the extension of the right to vote from the elite classes to the lower rungs of society.<sup>1</sup> Political rights form an integral component to understanding how systems of welfare provision develop, and consequently how they may be dismantled. As Scher (2010) has pointed out “the existence of social pathologies, including inequality and discrimination, is not a matter of inevitability or a result of “naturally occurring” conditions, but one created by the deliberate decisions—or nondecisions—of human beings.” (282-284). Thus, if we are to discuss seriously about political disenfranchisement (and for the purposes here, criminal disenfranchisement) we must contextualize how the franchise has been conceived of and which parts of society disenfranchisement benefits. While the extension of the franchise in the US may seem a natural progression to many, the long march of democracy does not proceed straightforwardly, but rather proceeds in ebbs and flows. The seemingly radical franchise extension in the early years of the nation’s history, before the Civil War and ahead of European states, was not the result of benevolent elites who saw democracy as a universal good to be advanced for the sake of the nation. Rather, the extensions were due in large part to the mistaken belief that the US would remain a static, largely agricultural nation. As Keyssar (2009) points out:

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<sup>1</sup>As Scher 2010 argues, “the pillars of the American economy want regularity, consistency, and predictability in elections. They don’t want hordes of new voters coming to the polls, especially if they are poor, marginalized, less-educated groups ...[who] might not ascribe to the centrality and importance of big business, big labor, big agriculture, big financial services, big banking and insurance, big medical care, big oil and gas, big media, and all the other major sectors of the U.S. economy.” (Scher 2010:loc 508)

The constitutional conventions that removed property and even taxpaying requirements did not aim or intend to enfranchise the hundreds of thousands of factory operatives, day laborers, and unskilled workers who became such a prominent and disturbing feature of the economic landscape by the mid-1850s—certainly not immigrant, and especially Irish Catholic, operatives, laborers, and unskilled workers...The broadening of suffrage in the United States took place in the absence of a large or very developed industrial working class. (Keyssar 2009:1777-1780; 1806)

As will be illustrated in the following chapter, the right to vote, following an impending clash between two distinct political-economic systems of production, progressed into a practical necessity.

**Means of Exclusion:** There are essentially two manners in which political power can be wrested from the electorate - *restricting* the electorate or *reducing* their effective power (i.e., through fraud, disproportionate individual or interest group influence, and/or outright non-compliance on the part of political actors). Both, according to Scher (2010), are viable methods of depreciating the power of given groups in society. Of the two, restricting access to the ballot is a much simpler, if not philosophically tedious, task. The most common manner is that of membership requirements for electors. In order to be qualified in the US, as with many other nations, voters must be citizens and have reached a (rather arbitrary) defined age. These are the most basic of qualifications. From there the electorate can also be restricted by mental capacity and residency (many short term residents in local elections and expatriates of certain nations may not participate).<sup>2</sup>

These exclusions are arguably based on universal application and, with the exception of mental incapacity, are all generally temporary statuses.<sup>3</sup> Further, the restriction of voting can be, and has often been, defined by means testing (e.g., poll taxes, literacy tests, tax liability). These exclusions are more tenuous as they can and often have been used to target particular groups in society. Residency also deserves a mention herein, as it is used to exclude many transient persons who would otherwise be eligible to participate, *ceteris paribus*.<sup>4</sup> Literacy tests and income tests have a partic-

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<sup>2</sup>While some nations still exclude women and minorities from the right to vote, these are the exceptions and not the rule.

<sup>3</sup>Naturalization, residing for the qualifying amount of time, and of course aging all enable the individual to become electors.

<sup>4</sup>The homeless in the US, and travellers (e.g., Roman and Sinti groups in European

ularly ominous history in the United States. These exclusions aside, more stationary exclusions have also been implemented in the lead up to universal enfranchisement - gender and race based exclusions. Both of these strategies deserve their own treatment in dedicated works, and it is outside the work here to delve far into their use. Needless to say, the justifications used to legitimize gender and race based exclusions have long since been refuted in the United States and other nations; however, racial exclusions remain at the forefront of many challenges to voter exclusion strategies in contemporary discourse.

A final status, however, carries with it a permanent attachment unlike the means tested or physical characteristic based exclusions; one particularly based on a person's past behavior - criminal disenfranchisement. Because of the intersection of this form of political disenfranchisement with criminal justice policy, and the disproportionate impact which the latter has on minority populations, felon disenfranchisement has become interminably mired in debates about the racial impact of voter disqualification.<sup>5</sup> Challenges to criminal disenfranchisement based on racist intent have repeatedly failed, and perhaps for good reason. The continuing existence of criminal disenfranchisement is, I argue, a hold over from earlier *liberal* and *republican* conceptions which shaped the formation of today's democratic structure in the United States. Disentangling this connection is thus central to discussing the exclusion of citizens based on criminal activity.

The focus of this thesis is, at its core, the relationship of political demobilization and social protection policies. As "the single largest group of disenfranchised adults in the [US]" (Scher 2010:1350), felons represent a unique opportunity to investigate the types of preferences which continue to be excluded by state sanctioned policies. The existing work devoted to criminal disenfranchisement is a small yet succinct collection of scholarly attention, much of which focuses on a small band of related issues. As with the alternative focus of correctional systems and institutions laid out in Chapter 3, I endeavor in the following chapter to lay out an alternative interpretation of felon disenfranchisement. In as much, this chapter attempts to steer away from racial narratives of felon disenfranchisement, or even general po-

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nations, especially in Eastern Europe) in other nations are often excluded precisely because of their perceived disconnection with their host communities

<sup>5</sup>It is surprising that such exclusion has not been also attached on the merit that it overwhelmingly affects the male vote in affected communities. The male disenfranchisement rate is well over the 95 percent threshold of the disenfranchised criminal population. However the racial narrative remains the most publicized challenge to these policies.

litical disenfranchisement for that matter. This thesis offers a decidedly more socio-economic, *class* based narrative of the origins and impact of felon disenfranchisement, one which draws attention to the place of the lower, laboring classes of the electorate and these policies.

This is not to say that racial factors do not exist or are not palpable explanatory phenomena for the institution of economic or electoral exclusionary policies. The case of racial discrimination as relates to political disenfranchisement is well documented, to say the least.<sup>6</sup> However, as with the discourses regarding welfare reform and prison policy, race based narratives overwhelm almost any other investigative viewpoint. The sheer conspicuousness of racial disparities and indicators of prejudicial motivations across time and space has made inquiry outside this narrative a prospectively pernicious undertaking. That is, while a substantial amount of the work to date appears more amenable with discussing race and racism as a central feature of welfare retrenchment, punitive penal policies, and the political demobilization of citizens, this thesis sees these phenomena through the lens of class based narratives involving political economic motivations.

To contextualize this alternative view, I proceed by embedding the development of political rights, and by extension the exclusion of criminals from them, in historical accounts of policies and movements which sought to differentially impact the strength of conflicting factions in labor relations. I begin with a brief overview of the current research on felon disenfranchisement to provide the reader with a sense of the positioning of scholarly work on the issue at hand. Following this, I proceed with a historical construction of a labor perspective of political rights as they have developed in the United States. As much of the foundation of critiques of criminal disenfranchisement stem from the crucial period of the pre- and post-Civil War years, this section treats this time period from the perspective of labor relations as well. This Chapter ends with a treatment of the constitutional amendments which form much of the basis for arguments for and against criminal disenfranchisement; the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments - and to a lesser extent the 1964 Voting Rights Act. It concludes with a view that the labor market position of many offenders, and therefore disenfranchised, should move from an ancillary issue to a more principal concern, especially in light of the findings of political mobilization and social protection policies.

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<sup>6</sup>Volumes have been devoted to the overtly racist violence meted out on the poor of African decent who attempted to cast their ballots - from the countless individuals intimidated by paramilitary supremacist groups, to the several hundred gassed in Selma, Alabama.

## 4.1 Current Discourses on Felon Disenfranchisement

La plus belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu'il n'existe pas.<sup>7</sup> - Baudelaire

Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect. - Mark Twain

A substantial amount of the literature on the subject of criminal disenfranchisement focuses on its justifications (Dilts 2008) philosophically (e.g., Katzenstein, Ibrahim, and Rubin 2010; Lippke 2001; Mauer 2011a, 2011b; Manfredi 1998; Clegg, Conway, and Lee 2006; Furman 1997), strategically (e.g., Hasen 2007; Siegel 2009; Katz 2007), or from interests of offender reintegration (e.g., Uggen, Manza and Thompson 2006; Uggen and Inderbitzin 2009; Kerrison 2008; Dhami 2005). These studies overwhelmingly acknowledge the racially disparate results of the escalated trend of punitive criminal justice policies, whether as primary themes to address or as secondary considerations to corroborate their main arguments. That is, while racial disparity has not been shown to be intentional, it is argued that its existence is enough to merit the same conclusion.

The time span of the debate on felon disenfranchisement, at least the bulk of publications in scholarly literature, is equally rather narrowly defined. Of the 103 sources surveyed, only 9 were published before the Gore-Bush election of 2000.<sup>8</sup> Earlier works focused on the issue of felon disenfranchisement as a violation of the 8th Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment (Reback 1973; Demleitner 1999), violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) due to racial impact (Shapiro 1993; Harvey 1994; Hirschfield 2001), the political and legal philosophical underpinnings and incongruities of criminal disenfranchisement (Manfredi 1998; Fletcher 1998), and the barriers created by such policies for reintegration of the offender (Mauer 1999).

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<sup>7</sup>“The greatest trick of the devil is to convince you that he does not exist”

<sup>8</sup>Literature was chosen using the latest annotated bibliography of resources on felon disenfranchisement available from the Sentencing Project and a Google Scholar search of a series of key terms (e.g., felon voting, felon disenfranchisement, criminal disenfranchisement, felon political rights), as well as a detailed reference tracing of key literature sourced from both previous modes. While it does not represent the complete listing of existing works, I have endeavored to provide a thorough account of the work to date available to the public and academic community at large.




Figure 4.1: Surveyed Works on Criminal Disenfranchisement

The emergence of the sudden “popularity” is not surprising. Following the events in Florida, the field of discussion opened up across the board.<sup>9</sup> Over half (54 percent) of the works surveyed occurred between the years 2001 and 2006, with nearly all of those citing the racial impact facets of criminal disenfranchisement. Many of these either directly assert (Uggen and Manza 2002; Manza, Uggen and Britton 2001; Manza and Uggen 2004) or indirectly infer that criminal disenfranchisement plays a role in electoral outcomes (McDonald and Popkin 2001; Burch 2007).<sup>10</sup> Beginning around 2004, likely due to the interest which these earlier works enabled and/or were sparked by public interest, a growing number of authors began focusing on the partisan factors underlying criminal disenfranchisement (Stuart 2004; Conn 2005; Uggen, Behrens, and Manza 2005; Yoshinaka and Grose 2005; Ewald 2009).

With the mixed bag of arguments currently available (ranging from explanatory narratives, to descriptive statistical accounts, to challenges of constitutionality) it is surprising that a more in depth treatment has not occurred from the political sciences regarding what is at its very core a matter

<sup>9</sup>In the Presidential election of 2000 between George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore, nearly 600,000 citizens were barred from the vote based on criminal disenfranchisement policies. Because of the closeness of the race - George W. Bush won the popular vote by just over half a thousand votes - and the instances of citizens being wrongfully denied their vote because of inaccurate felon purging techniques, the election became a catalyst for social commentary and research.

<sup>10</sup>For the sake of brevity, only those works with explicit mention of their reasoning are listed.

for the field. Where political scientists do interject, it is primarily to assert that the deleterious effects of political disenfranchisement are inconsequential to election outcomes (Miles 2004; Haselswerdt 2009; Burch 2012) or that voting rates among felons and pre-felons is so low as to essentially entail irrelevance on the political landscape (Burch 2011; Behan 2011; Haselswerdt 2009). Closer investigation bears out some of the reasoning that lies behind challenges to criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.<sup>11</sup>

#### 4.1.1 Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement

There are generally three themes which the discourses on felon disenfranchisement follow: (1) its justifications, (2) affected populations, and (3) its impact. Of those, the second has weighed in considerably in the scholarly literature. Arguments for its rationale (1) and those concerning its impact (3) remain in flux, with considerable room for debate on either side of the issues. A more stable certainty is witnessed in the remaining area of debate, resulting principally from its enumerative character.

#### Disproportionate Racial Impact

Felon disenfranchisement currently affects massive numbers of citizens, with the overwhelming majority of those affected serving their time in the community. In 2008, the Pew Foundation found that 1 of every 99 adult persons in the US were behind bars. This statistic pails in comparison to the number of adults who are denied the right to vote. Uggen, Shannon, and Manza (2012) found that 2.5 percent of the voting age population in the United States was disenfranchised due to criminal disenfranchisement - or 1 in every 40 adults. Furthermore, 2.6 million of those who lack the vote are based in only eleven states, accounting for 45 percent of entire disenfranchised population. The rise of these numbers has been astronomic with the rise of *mass convictions* in the US (Chin 2011).<sup>12</sup> Rates have risen by nearly 400 percent between 1976 and 2010. For African Americans in particular, these rates are truly alarming. One in every thirteen African Americans of voting age, nearly

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<sup>11</sup>A subset of literature approaches the effects of the criminal justice system on political participation and civic education. These are described in chapter 5.

<sup>12</sup>While mass incarceration is truly an astounding phenomenon, mass convictions presents a much more significant issue for political rights. In an effort to decrease government spending, states have begun to reassign those convicted of lesser crimes to community supervision instead of prison sentences.

four times the rate of the non-African American voting age population, is politically disenfranchised. In three states (Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia) 23, 22, and 20 percent of African American males were disenfranchised respectively. Uggen, Shannon, and Manza (2012) contend, “when we break these figures down by race, it is clear that disparities in the criminal justice system are linked to disparities in political representation” (Uggen, Shannon and Manza 2012:15).

In this vein, Owens and Smith (2009) find that larger black *incarcerated populations* indeed correlate with narrower citizenship rights. However, the descriptive representation that such an increase in minorities is often expected to entail (i.e., that more minority representatives, presumably elected by a larger minority electorate, will diffuse racist policies) does not impact punitiveness in felonious citizenship (Owens and Smith 2009). Rather, it is the overall institutional punitiveness that drives such citizenship.<sup>13</sup> A particularly intriguing development is the increasing conviction, incarceration, and disenfranchisement of the growing Hispanic population in the United States (Martinez 2004). This development is not simply a statement of contributory work to the field; rather, it illustrates a particular instability in racial animus challenges. It poses a central dilemma with the position of past racial narratives, one that the racial narrative adjusts itself to. As Hispanics are increasingly facing the fate of the black inner-city populations, the narrative changes to advance the idea that institutional racism is adapting to include Hispanics, regardless of the fact that other racial divisions at varying geographic locations are not facing the same fate. Here a subtle difference is perceptible between race and class narratives, one not often expounded upon. The race narrative becomes flexible to incorporate developments, whereas the class narrative only requires that one recognizes the commonality of the class position and lack of social protection for the “new” laboring class. The explanation provided by the race-based narrative revolves around the idea that elites have always intended to expel other races, despite the fact that other races have experienced varying degrees of success and failure in the political and economic arena.

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<sup>13</sup>Owens and Smith find that the racial composition of the *electorate* is not particularly relevant as regards punitiveness, while the punitiveness of the correctional system correlates with punitiveness in welfare policy (Owens and Smith 2009). This finding further corroborates the inclusion of correctional institutions into the overall welfare system in Chapter 3

### **Partisan Impact**

The logical conclusion many draw from this is that these glaring differences in criminal convictions entails significant effects for the electoral process. That is, given that the general population of African Americans tends to support Democratic candidates, it is expected that the impact of criminal disenfranchisement is particularly partisan in nature. It has been suggested that the contested election of George W. Bush, mentioned previously, would have swung in favor of former Vice-President Al Gore (Manza, Uggen and Britton 2001; Manza and Uggen 2006). However, Burch (2012) counters that Bush would have still defeated Gore by five to seven thousand votes in the absence of restrictions. Additionally, Burch finds that not all those barred from the vote are necessarily Democratic supporters. In the state of North Carolina (2008), for example, Burch (2011) finds that “56.3 percent of registered ex-felons signed up as Democrats, compared with 22.8 percent as Republicans and 20.9 percent unaffiliated or Independent” (Burch 2011:720). Of that, blacks registered at 72 percent Democratic, while their white counterparts were split evenly across categories. Equally, Manza and Uggen (2006) also find that the disenfranchised turned out to be more Independent than would be expected by population characteristics. Thus, the conventional wisdom that felon disenfranchisement is particularly detrimental to the Democratic vote share is not a given. Indeed, the impact on a partisan level might not be as extreme as many would assume (Gottschalk 2006).

The lack of understanding of the political orientations of the disenfranchised population has a tendency to promote the notion that one party exploits the criminal justice system to its own ends (i.e., directly utilizing disenfranchisement laws for strategic purposes).<sup>14</sup> This despite the fact that it was a Republican Governor, George W. Bush, who liberalized felon disenfranchisement policies in the state of Texas in 1997, eliminating the 2-year waiting

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<sup>14</sup>For example, under these assumptions, Lacey (2010), one of many authors, proposed that “the widespread practice of felon disenfranchisement inevitably excludes a disproportionate number of African Americans from political participation. Disenfranchisement laws, which tend to take more votes from Democratic than Republican candidates, played a decisive role in Senate and presidential elections from the 1990s, thus creating a clear incentive for Republican politicians to support extensive criminalization and incarceration, even in the context of diminishing crime rates.” (Lacey 2010:107). This is certainly supported sentiments on the right. In an interview with disenfranchisement proponent Norman DeForrest, Abramsky records: “the felon leftist axis has its dream scenario in place...the majority of felons, I’d say about 75 percent of them, are liberals or Democrats. Only about 25 percent are conservatives or Republicans. Democrats will go out of their way to put anybody to vote for them” (Abramsky 2006:91-92).

period for restoration; and it was the Republican Governor of Florida, Charlie Crist, who instigated an automatic restoration in 2007 of former felons who had satisfied all other requirements.

While it is yet to be proven that any Machiavellian strategies have been deployed with such explicit intent, it is certainly plausible (and suggested) that criminal disenfranchisement laws are intended to reduce the natural limit of the Democratic party's support. However, the fact that policies persist regardless of Democratic or Republican controlled governments would call partisan interest into question. While it may be that a large portion of the disenfranchised may be projected to support Democratic candidates, the reality may be somewhat disappointing. The results from Burch (2011) and Manza and Uggen (2006) clearly indicate that the disenfranchised population deviates from expectations. Indeed, the results presented in Chapter 6 indicate that, at least for the state of North Carolina, felons are much less likely to *self-identify* with the Democratic party than might be expected.

### Turnout Depression

Yet another aspect of criminal disenfranchisement, which might work against theories of impact, is that of the low probability of participation of felons both before (Burch 2012) and after (Burch 2007, 2011; Behan 2012). Burch (2007) found that the effect of conviction halves the registration rates of ex-felons, while controlling for registration before first conviction reveals that "pre-felons" are additionally less likely before their convictions to vote (Burch 2012). Registration rates are equally low in work conducted in Ireland by Behan (2012). Following the re-enfranchisement of prisoners by the Irish government, only 15 percent of the 3200 eligible offenders registered to participate. However, of those who registered, 75 percent turned out to vote (Behan 2012). That is, the potential impact of felon voters may simply be a figment of the imagination. Felons, in this view, are simply not likely to use their time to support any party or candidate. However, participation itself is a variable state, and many election upsets have occurred because of premature discounting of participation likelihoods.

As Behan (2012) notes, the leading reason for demobilization among felon voters for non-participation was the belief that they were "neglected by politicians in general and parliamentary candidates in particular", as it is "not politically advantageous to be seen to be supporting the rights of prisoners" (22,29). These sentiments were echoed in interviews conducted for this

research (Chapter 7). Burch's findings are enticing in another aspect, one which relates to the effects noted previously on program participation and political agency. That is, it may be that the same mechanism at work for clients of other tiers of the welfare system are replicated in the correctional tier. It could be (1) that the low participation rates cited Burch may be tapping into the effects of the welfare system effect on pre-conviction offenders (which is reasonable considering the criminogenic environment which means tested systems are shown to aggravate) and/or (2) Soss and other may be also picking up the residual effects of felon disenfranchisement on the community. The two effects may, as well, be working in tandem. Obviously more investigation is needed to address this area.<sup>15</sup> Thus, we ought to expect a sliding scale of participation rates as clients move to ever more stigmatized and agency reducing programs. The final, and perhaps most active, area of debate concerning criminal disenfranchisement finds its home in the legal fields of scholarship.

#### 4.1.2 Legal Challenges

Court challenges to the practice of felon disenfranchisement are among the most concrete examples of reasoning behind the practice. They inform the public about the professional views of the rights and proper place of those with felony convictions, as well as setting precedent for future challenges. One of the pitfalls, however, is that unsuccessful challenges (based on incomplete reasoning on the side of either party) create barriers to future challenges. Opponents of felon disenfranchisement, and political disenfranchisement in general, must therefore make strong cases, strategically placed, to avoid fighting against themselves in the future. To date, the bulk of legal challenges have focused on the racial disparity of criminal disenfranchisement.

**Legal Rulings:** In *Washington v The State of Alabama*, the court ruled in favor of maintenance of criminal disenfranchisement as a protective measure against the corruption of government. As Furman (1997) points out, in *Washington v The State*, the court upheld the ban on criminal voting by touting the civic republicanist interest in preserving the purity of the ballot. More so, it was not the offender's own lack of requisite moral qualification that formed the threat, but the prospect of her "lack of moral fortitude to

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<sup>15</sup>That is, post-disenfranchisement demobilization may be in part due to interaction with this tier of the welfare state, as well as a function of the *documentary disenfranchisement* which Allen (2011) has cited.

spread to others” (12). The Court ruled

It is proper, therefore, that this [criminal] class should be denied a right, the exercise of which might sometimes hazard the welfare of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in close political contests... the manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the sure foundation of republican liberty...exclusion is imposed for protection, and not for punishment.

Two years later, the Court in *Yick Wo v Hopkins* (1886) would contradict this ruling, on the basis that even though policies may be facially race neutral, the context in which they arrive at their conviction may not be so - thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause (Section 1) of the 14th amendment. What is particularly interesting in *Yick Wo v Hopkins* is that the case itself was not brought to the court on the basis of voting rights, and yet the court felt the need to exemplify the importance of the right to vote. In the delivery of the opinion of the Court, Justice Matthews stated: “The case of the political franchise of voting is one. Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, because it is preservative of all rights.”.

This early case lost significance after the *Plessy v Ferguson* ruling established a popular conception of “separate but equal”. In *Trop v Dulles* (1958), the Court ruled that the rights of citizenship are not forfeited unless by explicit intent. That is, “citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior...as long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship...his fundamental right to citizenship is secure” (Furman 1997). In *Carrington v Rash* (1965), the Court further solidified the permanence of electoral participation by invalidating a Texas statute which barred those serving in the Armed Forces, and making their residence in the state, from participating in state elections while serving. According to Manza and Uggen (2006), the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for a state to deny the vote based on how prospective electors *might* use their ballot.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile,

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<sup>16</sup>According to the text of the opinion delivered by Justice Stewart: “The theory underlying the State’s first contention is that the Texas constitutional provision is necessary to prevent the danger of a “takeover” of the civilian community resulting from concentrated voting by large numbers of military personnel in bases placed near Texas towns and cities. A base commander, Texas suggests, who opposes local police administration or teaching policies in local schools, might influence his men to vote in conformity with his predilections. Local bond issues may fail, and property taxes stagnate at low levels

in a complete turn around, *Green v Board of Elections* (1967) ruled against a communist party member who was denied his civil rights based on his conviction under the Alien Registration Act (aka: The Smith Act) of 1940. The Court ruled that because those who violated the law would pose a threat to the standing of laws by concerted effort, the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement stood; quite in the face of *Carrington v Rash*.

However, these rulings were not the nail in the coffin of challenges to criminal disenfranchisement. That came from the 1975 ruling in *Richardson v Ramirez* which would effectively bar any further challenges under the 14th amendment. The interpretation of “other crimes” by the Court in *Richardson* has led many subsequent challenges to the practice of criminal disenfranchisement. Hinchcliff (2011), which will be argued below, contends that the courts have mistakenly miscontextualized the meaning of the phrase, and that due concern should be given to the actual conception that the framers had in mind.

Two further contradictory cases based on racial intent followed *Richardson*. In *Wesley v Collins* (1985), Tennessean plaintiffs were rebuked in their claims that “as a consequence of centuries of racial discrimination, Tennessee’s blacks have suffered under debilitating socioeconomic pressures which account, in part, for the significantly higher rate of felony convictions – and disenfranchisement – among blacks as compared to whites”. The court rejected the claim on the basis of a lack of proven connection between the disenfranchisement of ex-felons and discriminatory intent of the laws. The historical past of discrimination did not, in the Court’s view, lead to invalidation of felon disenfranchisement laws (Harvey 1994).

In the same year, the Court invalidated Alabama’s felon disenfranchisement policy in *Hunter v Underwood* (1985) declaring the state’s “moral tergiteude” reasoning to be racist in intent (Manza and Uggen 2006). It would be another 20 years until a resurgence of challenges would materialize. The first of these, *Johnson v Bush* (2002), stemmed from the aforementioned 2000 election scandal. Eight plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of 600,000 disenfranchised citizens in the state of Florida. The plaintiffs argued that the

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because military personnel are unwilling to invest in the future of the area”. The Court went further to state, “Fencing out” from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. “[T]he exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions,” *Schneider v. State*, 308 U.S. 147, 161, cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents.”

state's disenfranchisement policies and clemency provisions violated the 1st, 14th, 15th, and 24th Amendments, as well as Sections 2 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court ruled against all claims. In *Hayden v Pataki* (2003), the Court again dismissed the arguments for racial discrimination due to the lack of evidence that the policy was purposely discriminatory in nature. A later ruling in *Farrakhan v Gregoire* (2010) would further solidify the legal perspective that felon disenfranchisement could not be challenged under the existing amendments and, in this case, the Voting Rights Act. The ruling claimed that the VRA did not intend to apply to felon disenfranchisement. Rather, it was the criminal justice system which would bare the burden of challenges and, as such, plaintiffs must show "that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent" (Sgro 2012:162). Such a necessity from the courts is often disputed.<sup>17</sup>

Others have argued that it is perhaps better to avoid litigation in favor of legislation, and there is some merit to this strategy (Gottlieb 2002, Hasen 2004).<sup>18</sup> Given the fickle history of legislative success, such a strategy appears fraught with peril. A key impediment remains the causal assertions necessary to invalidate the policies under the current system. Courts have consistently ruled the necessity of clear intent to discriminate based on race or color in order to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws from a racial narrative. Because the policies themselves, which shall be elaborated in depth, are the results of a filtering process of criminal justice, such intent has proven impossible to show.

**Detrimental Impact:** Legal challenges, however, remain the predominant strategy in favor of repealing parts or all of current policies and as such a large portion of the literature favors these events and their interpretations. Where the optimism of reform of these policies is substantial among legal scholars, the perspective from the political sciences seems decidedly less enthusiastic. The findings are quite mixed as to what, if any, effect dissolution of criminal disenfranchisement policies would have on current and future election results. Taking an alternative tact, others have suggested the negative impact which such policies have for the individual, the community,

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<sup>17</sup>See: Manza and Uggen (2006); Chin 2011; Re and Re 2011; and Sgro (2012) for more detailed review of legislation.

<sup>18</sup>For a detailed list of court cases predating 1987, see The Brennan Center's *Right To Vote: Key Decisions in Felony Disenfranchisement Litigation*

and the reintegration of the former into the latter. These include the damaging aspects of felon disenfranchisement on the extension of democracy, the incongruity with public sentiment, and the reduction of racial disparities in representation (Uggen and Inderbitzin 2009). Such challenges, however, have not played out robustly in legal or social scientific research; however, the field remains open for investigation.

American liberalism is infused with exclusionary practices, thus defenses based on it are fraught with peril (Katzenstein, Ibrahim, and Rubin 2010). Those in favor of maintaining the ban on felon voting operate from legal precedent laid out in both philosophical and legislative debates. The criminal, so it goes, has willingly broken the social contract and therefore becomes a “slave of the state”. She has proven her inability or unwillingness to abide by the rules established by the body politic. Thus, as seen in *Washington v The State of Alabama*, the act of disenfranchisement and exclusion is a boundary setting process which solidifies and protects the community from collapse (Altman 2005; Katzenstein, Ibrahim, and Rubin 2010; Clegg 2001; Clegg, Conway, and Lee 2006). To cite Senator McConnell (R) of Kentucky, “we are talking about rapists, murderers, robbers, and even terrorists or spies...those who break our laws should not dilute the vote of law-abiding citizens” (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003:572-573). However, they are also policies which remove the agency of individuals and their communities by predicating their participation on a selective view of how their votes *might* be utilized, a position clearly refuted in *Carrington v Rash*. That said, it is not the purpose of this work to argue the constitutional validity of criminal disenfranchisement laws.

What has been cited here has introduced the prevalence of challenges based on racial narratives and the many defeats they have faced. However, the successes of the earlier *Yick Wo v Hopkins* and *Madison v Washington* (2006) challenges may bear out productive fruits. In *Yick Wo*, the Court acknowledged the environmental circumstances of the plaintiff as contributory factors; while in the preliminary *Madison* case, the Court ruled that discrimination based on wealth violated section 1 of the 14th amendment. It should not be taken without merit that the few successes to challenging felon disenfranchisement are not those based on race but on class. Given the historical foundations of political rights, opponents of criminal disenfranchisement may seek to propose arguments which sidestep racial narratives and focus on the evident class nature of these policies in both intent and outcome.

## 4.2 Labor and Disenfranchisement

As the eminent historian James Lowen has noted, the history of American exceptionalism is flavored with the *absence* of events and actors who led to subsequent possibilities. History books teach of how Helen Keller (blind and deaf from birth) learned to read, write and orate; but fail to detail her radical Socialist advocacy or condemnation of the individualist ethos long since perpetuated. Lincoln is seen as a proponent of racial equality, in the face of historical records to the contrary; and Woodrow Wilson as a progressive leader reluctant to enter the First World War - not as an avid believer in white supremacy, race segregation, and opponent of women's suffrage.<sup>19</sup>

The role of class conflict in American political and economic development runs a parallel course. Class, and in particular the laboring class, has played a central role in the formation of political dynamics in the US - arguably more broadly and at greater length than cleavages such as race or ethnicity. Unfortunately, this often goes under-emphasized. Class status intertwines with ethnic, religious and racial factors, often subsuming its place as a mere incidental characteristic of those facing exclusion both politically and economically. In a sense, we lose sight of class not because of the fluidity of the groups affected, but rather because of the mercurial character of class and its attachments to variable ethnic and racial groupings across time and space. In much of American political discourse, mentioning class differences is a taboo subject.<sup>20</sup> This is endemic to racial debates regarding felon disenfranchisement. The plight of African Americans, to cite the most popularized example, is inextricably married to the nature of their labor market position; in conflict with ever increasing numbers of immigrant laborers vying for political, economic and social position. Indeed, the perpetuation of subsuming and repudiating the presence of class positions very likely contributes to a myriad of disadvantages which in turn author the fate of many lower and working class (especially male) citizens.

Obstacles to voting have been a primary strategy for dis-empowering

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<sup>19</sup>Wilson eventually supported women's suffrage after eventually understanding the political costs of opposition. So too have many glossed over the avowedly anti-communist/socialist stance of his administration and US intervention to overthrow the Soviet Revolution and his belief that "there are apostles of Lenin in our own midst. I can not imagine what it means to be an apostle of Lenin, It means to be an apostle of the night, of chaos, of disorder" (Lowen 1995, 16)

<sup>20</sup>"There are three great taboos in textbook publishing...sex, religion, and social class" (Loewen 1995: 24).

labor and their threat to the higher classes when their interests did not coincide. Such was the interest of the emerging capitalist classes in political power that at various points striking workers were threatened with disenfranchisement owing to their unemployment and hence participation in social assistance (pauper exclusion policies), or driven to the polls by political machines. The exclusion of the electorate based on property ownership or other socio-economic factors forms arguably a much more potent approach to understanding the current use of felon disenfranchisement than race based issues. This is not to say that race and prejudices therein were not and are not employed to tap into latent attitudes among the electorate. However, race as a driving force gains its momentum from underlying economic insecurity and competition among various classes, especially in the evolution of American political rights.

This proposition is put forward more forcefully in the following section, illustrating the degree to which vested interests saw the instrumental value of the vote. Others, however, saw the solidifying effects of the vote for the lower classes, emphasizing this facet as many in contemporary debates continue to extend. As reformer JT Austin put forward in the early 19th century, “by refusing this right to [laborers in factories], you array them against the laws; but give them the rights of citizens . . . and you disarm them.” (Keyssar 2009:45). But the apprehension of the landed classes in the early US ran deep. There was growing concern that the rise of industrialist capitalism brought crowds of uneducated and manipulatable masses to the states which would lead to the decline in wealth of the powerful.

“Universal suffrage [would jeopardize] property, and [allow] the poor and the profligate to control the affluent” (48). The property-less poor, so the thinking went, would be sent to the polls by their employers and would vote in their interests if the restrictions based on property were not left standing. Where race had a place in restricting the vote, it was as an unhappy side-effect of their labor market position. For early American communities, the right to vote was an evolution in progress, and the attractiveness of having a say in the distribution of collective resources was a significant issue. More so, states were acutely concerned that allowing blacks to vote would lead to mass exoduses, their states would be “overrun with runaway slaves from the South” (57). Such a rush of labor from the Southern states loomed large on the minds of many laborers, both “native” and immigrant alike.

In the build up to democratic governance in the US, labor worries played a significant role in constructing the American political system - enfranchise-

ment is a recent addition, and universal enfranchisement even more so. This fact often goes under-appreciated in the literature on voting rights.<sup>21</sup> The applicants to the franchise may have pursued the extension for symbolic reasons, however the record shows that there were much more pragmatic reasons for pursuing the right to vote. For instance, during the shifts to disenfranchise African Americans across the US, affected communities vocalized their demands to halt discrimination not only because it separated out their particular racial category, but also (importantly) because it dispossessed them of control of public resources. One appeal from the black community facing the prospect of blanket disenfranchisement in the city of Philadelphia petitioned the people of Pennsylvania: “We ask a voice in the disposition of those public resources which we ourselves have helped to earn” (loc. 1552).<sup>22</sup> The right to take part in controlling the collective resources of society has been at the heart of restrictions of the vote. It is curious how such concerns have found themselves excluded from debate.

Southern states which disenfranchised blacks, but allowed whites of the same socio-economic background to participate, did so strategically - to maintain the status quo and to avoid having to court an enlarged working-class vote. The upper classes feared that a “biracial alliance of blacks and non-elite whites would superintend the erection of a new and inhospitable economic and political order” (92). Elsewhere, outside the South, opponents of universal suffrage sought to “limit the political participation of the Irish and Chinese, Native Americans, and the increasingly visible clusters of illiterate and semiliterate workers massing in the nation’s cities.” (102), primarily for economic gains.

Race, in America, forms one of the most central issues in nearly all narratives on social, political, and economic life - criminal disenfranchisement

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<sup>21</sup>In a review of works directed at felon disenfranchisement, none provides a significant treatment of the subject from a class based perspective. Typically, authors focus on disparities enumerated by race or ethnic characteristics, while class affiliation and market position occupies, by and large, a cursory examination of the initial treatment of newly arrived immigrants.

<sup>22</sup>Notes Keyssar: “A gathering of African Americans issued an angry public statement called the Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens, Threatened with Disfranchisement, to the People of Pennsylvania. ‘We ask a voice in the disposition of those public resources which we ourselves have helped to earn; we claim a right to be heard, according to our numbers, in regard to all those great public measures which involve our lives and fortunes,’ the statement declared. Similarly, New York’s African-American population protested against the state’s discriminatory property qualification, and in Providence, blacks — thanks to an extraordinarily complex political situation — succeeded in getting their political rights restored.” (Keyssar 2009: loc.1552)

has proven to be no exception. In order to understand why “race is a logical culprit” (Uggen and Manza 2006:44), it is instrumental to trace the historical evolution of these laws, and not simply their disproportionate impact on minority populations. Given the recurring failures of legal challenges against the practice on the basis of racial impact, such an inquiry helps to uncover not only possible avenues for future challenges, but also provides contextual background for the findings of this work concerning the preferences of disenfranchised felons.

“Understanding why the Civil War began informs virtually all the attitudes about race that we wrestle with today” (Loewen 2011). Exploration equally informs our understanding of the role which labor relations played in the construction of political rights in the contemporary United States. The failure to adequately include the historical significance of labor relations into the debate on the political disenfranchisement of criminals illustrates an important gap in contemporary debates, covering this area aims to partially rectify this.

If opponents of criminal disenfranchisement wish to advance their cases against the practice, it may serve their purposes better to refocus efforts away from causal claims of racial animus and towards other considerations. This section explores the historical evidence that the disenfranchisement of felons, in contrast to many legal challenges, poses primarily a threat to that of the political influence of the (increasingly unprotected) worker. The racial disparity evident in criminal justice statistics and further witnessed in disenfranchisement levels is evident of disparities manufactured by weak employee relations in the labor market, which were exacerbated by the (re)emergence of the market fundamentalist policies of the 1970s and onwards. This reading places felon disenfranchisement as an outcome of contests between political-economic interests, where race has formed a secondary consideration. The failure of legal challenges to successfully dispute felon disenfranchisement on the grounds of racist intent should be taken seriously, and not as a misinterpretation of the related amendments and acts which these arguments forward.

#### 4.2.1 Antebellum Labor Disputes

The American government had set out to fight the slave states in 1861, not to end slavery, but to retain the enormous national territory and market and resources. (Zinn 2008:181)

The Civil War and its aftermath are monumental events in the development of US society. As such, it is useful to develop the context in which both the onset of hostilities began, and from which Reconstruction sprang. Understanding this informs the logic of how political disenfranchisement is viewed from a class based approach (Uggen, Manza and Thompson 2006). While racial oppression certainly played a significant role in allying many to the cause for and against abolition, it was not the idea of racial *equality* which moved support in favor of war or emancipation and the subsequent amendments. Rather, the impetus for action lay in more fundamental concerns for the the new nation - political economic systems and the idea of Manifest Destiny.

Manifest Destiny, the idea that growing republic had the moral authority and obligation to spread enlightened ideas and civilization across the new continent, resonated with elites north and south of the Mason Dixon line. The distinguishing characteristics of interests of these two sides were not solely their racial, religious or ethnic compositions (though these were undeniably important contributory factors). Their discerning characteristics, rather, rested in their political and economic systems of production.

On the one hand lay the industrializing Northern states, with booming immigrant populations (originating largely from Europe), urbanized population centers, significant degrees of capitalist development, and (importantly) a system of “free labor”. On the other hand sat the agricultural Southern states with an increasingly “home-grown” population, rural settlements of small farm owners and large plantations, stagnant capitalist development, and an ingrained system of slave labor. These two systems faced one common problem – in order to continue to prosper, both must spread further into the interior of the continent and towards the shores of the Pacific.<sup>23</sup>

The rapidly industrializing, immigrant laden, Northern states required new lands to act as a pressure valve against the social ills which industrial-capitalist urbanization brought. In the words of then Chair of moral philosophy at Harvard, Frances Bowen, the growing “class of laborers, who must always form the majority in any community, and who, with us, also have the control in politics, will not be satisfied without organic changes in the

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<sup>23</sup>According to Zinn: “It would take either a full-scale slave rebellion or a full-scale war to end such a deeply entrenched system. If a rebellion, it might get out of hand, and turn its ferocity beyond slavery to the most successful system of capitalist enrichment in the world. If a war, those who made the war would organize its consequences.” (Zinn 1980: 155)

laws, which will endanger at once our political and social system” (Huston 1983:43). As opposed to their former English rulers, whose “police power... was firmly in the hands of the propertied class” (38), the structure of the American system put the policing authorities, at least in theory, at the whims of the common man.

The South, on the other hand, suffered from a slightly different dilemma. Her system of labor required a continuing supply of fertile land if she was to progress. In addition, and compounding this issue, was the “natural growth” of the African slave population within her boundaries. If the Southern agricultural economic labor system were to survive, it must spread into new areas and alleviate the threat to the oligarchy from growing discontent from poor white farmers and African slave labor. As much was evident during the era. In a speech at the Secessionist Congress, Senator Toombs of Georgia expressed an all too real concern among many in the region - “In fifteen years...without a great increase in slave territory, either the slaves must be permitted to flee from the whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves” (Marx 1861). If Southern Elites could not disperse the discontent, it would be their property – and lives – under threat. Thus the two systems were destined to impasse. The tensions inherent between the two played out on a number of fields, but to one end.

Both systems needed to expand, however the North needed the support of the working class vastly more than the South. The Republicans, who were fresh from the solidarity enforcing events of Kansas, pushed forward their program against the idea of unfair competition and for the respect of the laboring man. They began with defining the issue of slavery as an affront to not only the value of working men as antithetical to the popular European conception of labor, but also as a diminution of the theory of popular governance by the people. Then Senator William Seward of New York gave his now famous “Irrepressible Conflict” speech at Rochester, illustrating the separation of the two systems based not on racial equality, but on moral legitimacy:

The laborers who are enslaved are all negroes, or persons more or less purely of African derivation. But this is only accidental. The principle of the system is that labor in every society, by whomsoever performed, is necessarily unintellectual, groveling, and base; and that the laborer, equally for his own good and for the welfare of the State, ought to be enslaved. The white laboring man, whether native or foreigner, is not enslaved only because he

can not as yet be reduced to bondage. (NYHN 2013)

Two years later, before the US senate, Seward (on the heels of a visit from the Kansas Legislature endorsing its prospective statehood) argued again, this time defining the political consequences of the opposing systems:

The State protects not the slave as a man, but the capital of another man, which he represents. On the other hand, the State which rejects Slavery encourages and animates and invigorates the laborer, by maintaining and developing his natural personality in all the rights and faculties of manhood, and generally with the privileges of citizenship. In the one case, capital invested in slaves becomes a great political force, while in the other labor thus elevated and enfranchised, becomes the dominating political power. It thus happens that we may, for convenience sake, and not inaccurately, call Slave States capital States, and Free States labor States. (NYT 1860)

Eschewing the North as a respectable *labor* system, and the South as an unjust *capitalist* one, Seward and others had readied the powder kegs for political warfare and then found the means to light the fuse. For the Republicans, the challenge lay in dislodging the marriage between Northern merchants and capital which were against Lincoln's election. They were challenged with whipping up enough electoral support to ensure control of the Whitehouse. As the eminent historian, Richard Hofstadter, argued in 1938, "commercial and financial capital in the North was, on the whole, strongly opposed to Lincoln's election. Merchants were apprehensive that it might result in the cancellation of orders from the South, and bankers expected the repudiation of Southern debts amounting to over USD 200,000,000 [approximately USD 5.5bn in 2011 dollars]" (Huston 1983: 54).

In addition, the Republicans, in the wake of the decline of the Whigs and Federalists, were hard pressed to persuade the masses of the working-classes outside the South to take the issue of slavery to heart. Writing soon after the events of the civil war, Fox (1917) noted that in New York, it was the working class man who refused to back enfranchisement. This was not based on race so much as on the threat that the allegiance which the association of enfranchised former slaves would have with the upper classes. Because slaves were a luxury and not a necessity for Northern slaveholders (though the case could be argued that it was equally so on a monumental scale for their southern counterparts), manumission meant that former slaves threw their support behind Federalist party members, who in turn backed efforts

to enfranchise them.

Not surprisingly, machine bosses, Republicans (pre-federalist dissolution), and Democrats all rallied against enfranchisement. When Republicans gained the backing of freedmen, Democrats stood fiercely against enfranchisement. “The Democrats had every reason to subscribe to the opinion the Negroes, born in slavery, and accustomed to take orders, would now vote according to the dictates of their employers” (260).<sup>24</sup>

In New York, it was the elites who fought for enfranchisement, along strict party lines. Party leaders knew that the black voter “would recall that it was the Democrats of 1821 who had excluded them, when ‘every Federalist in the convention strenuously opposed the proscription’” (266). The Whig/Federalist party leaders, on the other hand, fought for the enfranchisement of freedmen, but exclusion based on property ownership. It was a win-win for the party of the elite. When first-order (strategic) reasons for disenfranchisement failed to gain momentum, opponents turned to embedded racial prejudice. With this derivation from the true schism came arguments citing biblical verses and criminal tendencies. The division of enfranchisement was based on strategic concerns, and “acquaintance with the black man seemed to count for little” (272). “The Democratic party in the cities was the party of the little man, the day worker and the mill-hand...reason was supported by race prejudice in the heart of the mechanic” (274). It was the existence of the massive population of slaves in the south, accustomed to the severe plantation labor economy, which the Democrats (North and South) feared, and which both enabled Republicans to pursue emancipation by framing the issue with the core concerns of the Democratic supporters in the North – labor.

The Republican strategy was as simple as it was powerful. The system of slavery in the south threatened working men everywhere because it put waged laborers in direct competition with forced labor and degraded the status and therefore claims of laborers in the political sphere. Prejudice no doubt existed among many whites both north and south of the Mason Dixon Line.

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<sup>24</sup>The anxiety of how groups of potential voters might vote as a reason for extinguishing the right to vote at conception is a recurring theme in the history of franchise extension. The case has been used for former slaves, youth, women and most consistently convicted felons. The call for disenfranchisement contained prejudice, without doubt, but prejudice was a second order (and possibly even third order) reason for their hostility. Paupers also faced exclusion as their reliance on the state made them open to coercion. Women also faced disenfranchisement for nearly the same reasons.

This was an ever changing landscape with immigrant groups constantly allying against “others” from successive waves nearly (almost literally) on top of the next. The rise of the Republican party, and especially the Radical Republicans, presented a more active voice. “To [the Republicans], the man who worked for wages all his life was indeed almost as unfree as the southern slave” (VanderVelde 1989: 474). The unified Democratic party, however, left very little room to maneuver for Republicans.<sup>25</sup>

**Trade Winds:** An important opening came in the form of trade policy. At least in the Northern view, if the premise for government in the burgeoning American nation was popular representation (as had been evidenced from the gradual enfranchisement of its citizens), and if those classes making up the bulk of the population were toiling in the factories, then the political order of the day was pacification of the laboring man’s interest – or strategic exclusion. In the South this was less an issue owing to the iron fist with which the roughly 300,000 slave owning oligarchs ran the region. Thus, Northern elites found themselves precariously positioned. On the one hand, they could not tolerate a stronger Southern system which also had its eyes set on Manifest Destiny.<sup>26</sup> On the other, growing labor dissatisfaction threatened the stability of the Northern system. Faced with these issues, elites took the moral high ground.

Following the conflict in Kansas, Republicans rallied and pushed a protectionist agenda in trade policy, leading to the passage of the Morrill Tariffs. The move attracted both working class support and industrialist acquiescence. The argument was put forward thus: by raising tariffs, the US would raise the wages of domestic workers and encourage the development of internal competition. In parallel to this strategy, an altogether different view of the laboring man was put forth by American capitalist thinkers, such as Henry Charles Carey and *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley, which

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<sup>25</sup>Lincoln, notes Loewen (1995), played all sides of the debate to gain support for the elimination of the slave economy. Speaking to abolitionists in 1862, Lincoln pleaded: “We shall need all the anti-slavery feeling in the country, and more; you can go home and try to bring the people to your views, and you may say anything you like about me, if that will help. . .”. (164). While for the less religiously based audience, Lincoln would argue, “Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration.” (194).

<sup>26</sup>This was especially crucial in a bicameral system where one house based representation not on population, but on territorial allegiance (i.e., Senatorial distribution of 2 seats per state regardless of population)

emphasized the exceptionalism of American labor. This theory presented a considerably more optimistic view of labor than their European counterparts – which they sought outright to discredit.<sup>27</sup>

According to Huston, Carey differentiated England's political economic foundations on the premise that “the primary objective of England's economic system was the establishment of a class of nonproducers whose sole purpose was to transport goods from one nation or colony to another”, in order to provide employment to (non-producing) merchants (Huston 1983:42). High tariffs, argued Carey, were essential to protect the American laborer from the products gained from “‘the ill-fed and worse-clothed workmen’ of England and Europe” (42).<sup>28</sup>

Democrats, fully aware of the dangers to their power in the North, equally saw an opportunity in tinkering with trade policy. As an adviser to President Buchanan counseled, “the only way to outmaneuver the Republicans was ‘to raise the tariff, so as to concentrate and keep attached to the [Democratic] party the working masses’” (52). However the tariff issue belonged to the Republicans, and with the secession of the Southern states following the election of Lincoln, the Morrill tariffs were destined to pass the Senate devoid of Southern opposition.

The Morrill tariff legislation was itself part of a tri-partite menu of policies explicitly designed around the interest to marry labor with the Republican party. It aimed at maintaining “the capitalist system and yet advance the lot of the laborer”, in order to “create a national economic climate that would provide industrial workers with sufficient reward so that they would never disown their loyalty to the state and to society” (54). Like Bismarck before, policy makers were designing a welfare program to ensure political and social continuity and pacification. The Morrill tariffs were joined with the *Homestead Act* (to encourage westward movement and depressurize the

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<sup>27</sup>The evolving political-economic thought of the North Americans first disassembled European assumptions and at the same time altered the conceptual status of the laboring man. They argued that Britain, primarily, had failed because it sought to subordinate producers to merchants. By forcing its colonies to produce only raw materials, which it then manufactured and sold back to colonies and other consumers, Britain forced pauperism on its subjects.

<sup>28</sup>For the protectionists, the Malthusian and Ricardian naysayers missed out on a critical element of the free laborer – the *spirit* of men. Laborers in the United States were not simply inputs into the machinery of production to be used towards the cheapest possible production costs. Idleness was condemned and industry was acclaimed as the path to virtue and reward.

urban centers in the East) and the *Morrill Land Grant College Act* (to provide an overall better material wellbeing of workers). Together these acts formed what Huston considers “the nation’s first positive use of the federal government’s powers to combat the social ills that attended the rise of the factory system; it was the government’s first positive response to industrialism” (ibid.), predating the later New Deal era by nearly 70 years.

While war was certainly directed against slavery, slavery is better understood as it was suggested at the time of agitation than against a modern race-based conception. This contention was not premised solely on the subjugation of one race to another, to the contrary. Many in the North, like their Southern neighbors, had little desire to see equality between the races instituted— a fact which survived long into the 20th century. Instead, the ideal that slavery was an unacceptable exploitation of labor was a central argument for intervention, one that resonated strongly outside the South.

With the election of Lincoln, the South declared war on the Union. The Union responded in kind, though in defense. The Republican stance on pre- and post-civil war issues, while incorporating moral calls of abolition, were at their root pragmatic measures to ally the working classes with the party. The strategy to bring in working class support, prosecute the destruction of the free labor system’s rival (including halting its westward expansion to preserve its own interests in the opening territories), and quell class tensions was a top-down strategy from the middle classes which relieved some of the pressure from growing unease produced in the face of industrialization.<sup>29</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Felon Disenfranchisement and Reconstruction

The consideration of the grounds on which the Civil War in the US was prosecuted allows us to approach the challenges to the legality of felon disenfranchisement from an alternate perspective. The import of the issue of labor’s role for the Civil War, and that of the entire political economy of the US, bled over into the drafting of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the constitution. Given that much of the contemporary challenges to felon disenfranchisement has attempted to justify the abolition of the policy on the basis of violations of these amendments, it is instructive to

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<sup>29</sup>The reforms brought in were not sufficient to subdue labor tensions, and it was clear “even by the 1850s...that workers had determined their economic salvation lay in organizing trade unions....The Republican labor policies...constituted a middle-class solution for working class problems” (Ibid.)

explore these developments. The following draws heavily from the work of VanderVelde (1989) and Re and Re (2011).

### **The 13th Amendment and the Labor Floor**

Following the close of the war, Union victors were quick to draft and implement the terms of the South's surrender and the framework for which the future of the nation would be constructed. The first of these, the Thirteenth Amendment, abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, "except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" in the United States or any area under its jurisdiction. This amendment, argues VanderVelde, was steeped in the pro-labor vision embedded in the Radical Republican vision for the nation. According to this view:

The Reconstruction Congress could not have contemplated the abolition of slavery without anticipating the profound affect this action would have upon the entire legal structure of labor relations...the abolition of slavery raised the floor, and in turn altered the internal logic of the remaining [labor market] structure.(441).

"The pro-labor interests...coalesced in the grounding of the Free Soil party[;] the Radical Republicans of the 1860s evolved from the politically oriented Free Soil movement rather than the religious-centered Abolitionist movement" (447). For the Republican Party of Reconstruction, "the degradation of one worker was the degradation of all working people"(445). They unabashedly pandered to the interests of the growing working classes (whether out of conviction or strategy). While racism was not absent, the conception of race at the time was far from contemporary standards. The (literal) unchaining of the mass of the laboring class in the South brought with it very real consequences which did not escape those charged with formulating the highest laws of the land.

While the abolitionists "eschewed politics" and advocated emancipation on grounds of moral righteousness, the Radical Republicans - having evolved from more politically oriented populist roots - had larger concerns, not least of which was the conflict between capital and labor. The conglomeration of support which amassed to enable the passage of the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments stemmed from interests which sought to see the opening of the western areas to the free laborer (e.g., the Barnburners), more strategic interests which sought to limit the growing power of industrialists (e.g., the Conscience Whigs of Massachusetts), and (significantly) the mass of Free

Soilers who saw the existence of slavery as a degradation of labor of any race and an impediment to wage levels, upward mobility, and social improvements.

“Labor autonomy was [the goal of the Radical Republicans]. Slavery was the obstacle to attaining this goal...free labor meant not just upward mobility of a few workers but the leveling of class differentials between laborer and employer, by raising the status of laborers” (452 - 459).<sup>30</sup> The strength and irony of the Radical Republican ethos was its focus on *acquired* virtue, of nobility through action. When Bingham spoke of property and the constitutional protection of it, he spoke from a standpoint which saw all property as the product of the efforts of labor and “attacked all class systems that subordinated laborers to those who did not labor” (461). Property was to be valued only as it was the creation of the effort of the laboring class.

Obviously, such a rhetoric struck less than accommodating sentiments from the landed Southern gentry. In the defense of their political and economic system, Southern advocates would draw comparisons to the forced labor of their slave class and that of northern laborers under a wage-system – asserting that theirs was superior and less debilitating. Whereas the abolitionist was rather unconcerned as to the political or economic fate of former slaves following emancipation, “Labor groups...found poverty to be as debilitating and objectionable as slavery” (464).

With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, the process turned to the specifics of defining what degree the Freedmen ought to be protected. While divisions arose in the ranks of the Republicans, the Radicals maintained that the Freedmen could not be left to the law of supply and demand. The implications were consequential. No sooner had the amendment passed than employers in the South began a program of reconstituting their grip on employees by limiting their work opportunities (thereby curtailing their prospects of terminating their employment voluntarily), creating stricter employment codes (normalizing obedience and subordination to the employer), and strategies designed to restore the employer-employee relationship which reconstruction had aimed at overturning.

The post-amendment debates were not solved with the passage of the amendment, and they were not limited to the South. Efforts to establish

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<sup>30</sup>As one commentator of the time elaborated the Southern employment relationship problem: “You will find that this question of the control of labor underlies every other question of state interest.’ Former masters were neither prepared nor disposed to deal with former slaves on the grounds assumed by free labor ideology” (452)

national labor rights flourished. The Anti-Peonage Act and prohibitions on imprisonment for debt were created to solidify the rights of labor above capital.<sup>31</sup> In the South, however, organized control over labor continued to hamper the realization of a free labor economy. Area wage levels were set by large-scale agricultural employers and state legislatures which “prevented the freedman’s wage from rising in response to competitive demand...[and] under the [James River Farmer’s Compact], employees could be discharged for drunkenness or statements of indicating want of respect that occurred in the privacy of their homes. Other agreements provided for the discharge of employees who exercised the right to vote” (493-494).

### **Removing Barriers and Excluding Vice - the 14th and 15th Amendments**

The Thirteenth Amendment had a rather perverse knock-on effect for the North’s efforts to stabilize the political economic system of the US. The Reconstruction Congress had released slaves from bondage, but it had not established the fate of the addition to free labor. If former slaves were to avoid a return to their previous labor relations, they would need to be cloaked in the protection of civil and political rights. The Fourteenth Amendment attempted to resolve this deficiency, but not without due consideration of the effects to the power of the victorious Union.

**The 14th Amendment:** In slavery, and as a concession to Southern states for joining the Union, the black laboring class was a discounted population for allocation of seats in the houses of congress. The three-fifths rule meant that southern states could use their slaves to gain representation even while considering them as chattel property devoid of political input. The electoral college further helped them retain influence in central government and the continuation of strong “state’s rights” policy – with a strong judiciary to ensure the status quo (Manza and Uggen 2006). This was explicitly established protect the south from being outbid by the industrial/populous North. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, made the new freedmen citizens of the United States and henceforth enumerable for the purposes of apportionment - increasing at once the allotment of seats to the defeated

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<sup>31</sup> “[In New Mexico], white settlers captured Native Americans and forced them into service. Refinements of this practice involved lending money, goods, or credit to Native Americans and holding those individuals to work off their debt” (490)

southern states.

The apportionment calculations for the South would make the North realize that by freeing the masses of laboring blacks, the South would actually *gain* in influence - obviously an undesirable prospect. As a result, the reconstruction congress could: (1) enfranchise all freedmen - a proposition which the divided North, still dealing with divisions among its own laboring classes and the special attachment of freedmen in the North with the past Whig and Federalist elites, did not relish; (2) apportion states based on the number of *eligible voters* - however this would obviously still negatively effect northern states with large numbers of recently arrived aliens and women; or (3) set up an apportionment penalty - imagined to be a catch-22 for the southern states.

The rationale for the latter, and ultimately executed, option was strategic. Southern states could choose to bar citizens from the exercise of the vote and/or the occupancy of public office; however, in so doing, "the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State" (Amendment XIV; Section II). Many states, even in the North, still disenfranchised on the basis of race. Should the Southern states choose to disenfranchise their former slaves, they would face a massive loss of political power at the federal level. To further press their hand, Section 3 (a Senate version) stripped the elites of the Southern political (and economic) order of any future participation in government.<sup>32</sup> The latter option became the basis for the ratified amendment (Section 2).

The contemporary mindset which exalted the value of the working man over non-producers found its way into the formation of Reconstruction policy and the subsequent amendments. It is here that the strong contractarian philosophy of formal equality came into play. Combined with the standing of the Radical Republicans that free labor deserved the utmost respect, the Reconstruction congress enshrined in the language of the 13th and 14th amendments the exclusion of *criminals* from the protection of the constitution. The basis for these exclusions was both a matter of philosophical consistency, political maneuvering, and legislative expediency. Consistent with the view that virtue was a status conferred through one's own labor and determination, and that by freeing laborers from barriers to realization

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<sup>32</sup>An alternate, House measure advanced, but which ultimately failed, advocated stripping all rebels of their ability to participate in government. In addition, many southern states flouted reconstruction directives and returned rebel officials to office, infuriating many in the North from lack of deference in defeat.

of the fruits of their labor, it was natural to exclude those who proved their unworthiness through acts of vice.

Congress certainly intended for the laboring class, freedmen or otherwise, to enter into the halls of political power.<sup>33</sup> However, the egalitarian mood of the time aimed “to defend the disenfranchisement of criminals even as [legislators] fought for the enfranchisement of black Americans” (1592). Only a handful of legislators are noted as opposing the continuation of political disenfranchisement on the basis of criminal conviction. The Radical Republicans viewed the right to vote as part of their *impartial* and just system of governance, which viewed “willful violators of the law – criminals – as enemies and outsiders” (Re and Re 2011: 1596). Their reasoning was steeped in the Lockean contractarian ethos of the time, justified using moralistic concepts of good and evil, and backed by a firm belief that the common man had only but to lack barriers to his achievements to advance in the new nation. Virtuous policies and rights, as a consequence, ought not be extended to those devoted to vice as evidenced by conviction under the rule of law. Likewise, the “formal egalitarianism” espoused by these authors drew lines at loyalty. Such a condition is all the more reasonable given the times these policies were constructed, in the shadow of nation building.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>To re-administer states into the Union, congress instituted legislation which turned the former confederate states into military jurisdictions. States were assigned to appoint delegates to administer state conventions to draft their respective constitutions. One of the stipulations of re-admittance was the ratification of the 14th amendment which explicitly included the exclusion of criminal disenfranchisement.

<sup>34</sup>The issue of felon disenfranchisement might well have been thwarted by a single amendment at the very beginning of the reconstruction process, and thus never making its way into current debates. What is known about the reconstruction era is that the occupying military were directed to create a register of eligible voters to elect delegates to draft their reconstruction constitutions. Registeres were mandated to take oaths to the effect that they had not occupied state or federal office before the rebellion or been convicted of crime. African Americans voted in droves, however repressive strategies persisted. While former slaves were allowed to be registered, current criminals were not, nor were former confederate operatives.

What is less well known, according to Re and Re, are the debates concerning the extent of the exclusion of criminal disenfranchisement from protection under the reconstruction amendments. Notably, Thaddeus Stevens - already renowned for his adamant prosecution of the rights of labor leading up to the civil war - moved to strike this exemption from the amendments language. According to Re and Re, Stevens urged the adoption of an amendment which would provide that “the conviction for crime except for treason shall not take away the right to vote”, arguing that he had received information “that in North Carolina and other states where punishment at the whipping-post deprives the person of the right to vote, they are now every day whipping negroes for a thousand and one

That the drafters of the amendments anticipated the extent to which criminal convictions would pervade the American landscape is hard to imagine. From the evidence at hand, and considering that such an amendment covered the entirety of the Union - of which many states still barred blacks from voting in elections - it seems evident that the precepts of contemporary theories of governance formed the prevailing justifications of excluding criminals from protection against disenfranchisement policies.

Thus, as Re and Re argue, felon disenfranchisement is not a mistake of negotiation or racist intent. Rather, the existence of such policy is a result of the desire to enshrine, in even the extensive policy horizon of constitutional amendment processes, the ideal concept of a contractarian system while reconciling their current predicament with a shifting market hegemony. The authors of the reconstruction amendments could not have envisaged the type of mass convictions which are now so common in the US. They certainly could not have imagined the ease with which plea bargains and conspiracy charges are brought against the many (predominantly poor and alarmingly minority) who lack resources to pursue their defense through adequate representation. Thus, as Hinchcliff (2011) argues, the 14th amendment does affirmatively sanction criminal disenfranchisement; however, a textual interpretation of the legislation would lead to reasoning that the framers did not and could not have imagined the extent to which this sanction would reach, “when a much smaller portion of the population had a criminal record” (235). By preceding the “other crime” stipulation with rebellion, Hinchcliff argues, it is most likely that the framers intended the *severity* of “other crimes” to reflect the nature of the preceding disqualification (i.e., acts against the solidarity of the Union). Though even this challenge faces evidence to the contrary. As Re and Re and others have pointed out through the historical record, many advocates for maintenance of the ban on criminals frequently cited crimes which made explicit reference to particularly heinous crimes as murder and rape - extending the definition to crimes less akin to rebellion and treason as advocates of a textual interpretation argue.

**The 15th Amendment:** The deficiency of the 14th amendment came to light following the resounding (Electoral College) defeat of Democrat Horatio Seymour to Republican Ulysses S. Grant in 1868. As one sided as the

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trivial offences” (1625-1626). Stevens may or may not have foreseen the implications of the exclusion of criminal disenfranchisement, but his argument was an eerie foreshadowing of the events to come.

Electoral College defeat was, Grant only narrowly won the popular vote, even with many Southern whites disenfranchised at the time.<sup>35</sup> Political operatives, Democrat and Republican alike, quickly recognized the strategic importance of the black vote, both North and South. The 15th Amendment took shape to remedy this fact. However, argue Re and Re, the congress was unambiguous about its intent to leave criminal disenfranchisement intact. Former slaves were to be included explicitly for the same principles under which criminals were to be excluded - the logic of contractarian government. Even the most radical of the Radicals sanctioned the rights of states to disenfranchise citizens on the basis of criminal convictions. Rep. James Ashley of Ohio, a staunch opponent of President Johnson and avid abolitionist, had argued that “each state...may disenfranchise any person for participation in rebellion against the United States, or for commission of an act which is a felony at common law” (Re and Re 2012: 1634). This from the supporter of the repeal of section 2 of the 14th amendment and replacement text which would have enfranchised all residents (including women), and made a constitutional right of public education. Consequentially, the 15th Amendment, which explicitly set out to resolve political disenfranchisement on the basis of race, was also not devoid of debate regarding the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement powers. It is, in light of this duality of debate rhetoric of the time, difficult to attribute the existence of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States to racist intent, as the evidence put forward calls into question the basic arguments made be many. That is, the right of states to politically disenfranchise its members on the basis of criminal conviction is not convincingly *a priori* a result of racist intent. This is not to say that the *manipulation* of such policies have not been racist in nature, only that the construction of such policies were based on alternative concerns outside the domination of a particular racial grouping.

There is, it ought to be noted, a degree of danger that such an interpretation downplays the very real impact which racism has had for political participation in the US; not least of which stemmed from the brutal repression of African Americans and other minorities leading up to the advent of the revolutionary period of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>36</sup> In the decades following reconstruction, and accelerated by the premature removal of Federal protection following the election of President Hayes, southern states would redefine

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<sup>35</sup>Re and Re note “Grant bested his rival by only 300,000 popular votes - fewer than the 450,000 Southern blacks who overwhelmingly voted Republican” (1630).

<sup>36</sup>This second reconstruction (Manza and Uggen 2006) was the result of the deficiencies of the first reconstruction. I would argue that it may also be seen as simply a continuation of the first.

many crimes as felonies which were explicitly intended to attach themselves to the probability of commitment by minority communities (Manza and Uggen 2006).<sup>37</sup> From this perspective, those who see disenfranchisement laws as a racial project could be forgiven for confusing its manipulation with its intent - however, such a view should not, in the view of this work, perpetuate beyond reason.

**Prisons as Labor Profiteering:** What is particularly interesting from the perspective of the use of Reconstruction Era policies is the effect which the re-tooling of criminal justice policies had on not just the electoral opportunities of freed slaves, but also on labor-employer relations in general. Legislative action aside, the South remained in dire straits. The economic impact of the war was unprecedented and social and political stability in flux (Goldin and Lewis 1975). With the war over and Reconstruction Administrations in power, much of the South was opened to the efforts of industry and capitalist interests from both regions, to which the Federal government had at least attempted to make provisions for the protection of those recently moved into the free labor market.<sup>38</sup> When the chains of slavery were lifted, the shackles of the chain gang were fitted. The need for dependable (read expendable) labor was required for the construction of many Reconstruction projects, and courts answered in the manner in which elite economic interests saw best - the re-subjugation of former slaves and poor whites. Where the North had long developed their industrial prison workforce (e.g., under the Auburn system of prison labor), the South soon caught up and surpassed its northern neighbors. This resubjugation was embedded in an environment where capital and labor remained at war long after the Civil War ended. A telling example is the Southern Homestead Act of 1868, a central piece of legislation which spurred vehement disdain among economic interest in the North and South.

According to the act, nearly 48 million acres of Federal lands in the South were “off the market” for non-homesteaders and, for one year, ex-confederate soldiers. Southern Redeemers despised the act, viewing it plainly as an ob-

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<sup>37</sup>Following the reversal of reconstruction policy following the pull out of Federal forces, the state of Mississippi alone saw black turnout rates plummet from 66.9 percent in 1867 to 8.2 percent in 1896. The comparable white turnout rates were 55 percent and 72.4 percent respectively. (Emerson, Haber, Dorsen, and Greenwalt 1967)

<sup>38</sup>The scale of destruction was one thing, the sudden influx of new corrections clients was quite another. Previous to the war, prison institutions were reserved for white offenders, blacks were dealt with within the slave apparatus (McShane and Williams 1996).

stacle for “capitalist groups that would otherwise come south and develop the region’s rich resources” (Les Benedict 1980). Concerns in the North, however, saw a different incentive for the capitalists and their Southern Redeemer allies, that of economic and political exploitation. The interminably frugal Democratic Representative from Indiana, William S. Hollman, led the call to maintain the act, arguing that its repeal would “enable capitalists to monopolize large portions of the public domain at a price greatly disproportionate to its value”, resulting “in the impoverishment and wretchedness of the multitudes” (ibid.). Hollman was no socialist. It would take the Great Betrayal of Tilden to Hayes in 1877 by Southern Democrats to move the Reconstruction forces out of the South and usher Southern elites back to full power, ultimately resulting in the grave race-based inequities which dominated long after Reconstruction ended.

The compromise, however, did not come overwhelmingly from the Southern Democrats, but from “weak-kneed bondholding [Northern] Eastern Democratic capitalists” (510).<sup>39</sup> Hayes’ reward was the sidelining of the Republican regulars (i.e., Radicals who wanted to keep to the party’s founding principles, including their affiliation with labor) to the benefit of his reformer Republican members, with a peaceful transition into power following the contentious election through the Electoral Commission. Regardless of whether or not southern Democrats were more or less in favor of fighting Hayes’ election (or for Tilden’s), it was the business elites in the South and the North who moved the election in Hayes’ favor. What split the Democratic party was less sectional than ideological.

**Race to the Top:** The propositions forwarded here are by no means novel. Indeed, they are at the core of Marxist views of the purposes of racial divisions in society. Racism on a systematic scale was enabled by the reaction of elites to popular demands during and after Reconstruction. “Populists, either alone or in combination with Republicans, threatened Democratic supremacy, and a situation emerged in which the plea for white supremacy could be made effectively” (Key 1949: 541 – found in Brown-Dean 2003:

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<sup>39</sup>The victory of Hayes in 1877 over Southerner Tilden has been seen as a betrayal of southern capitalists to Tilden. But it was also a means to survival following the war. In the south, Southern Democrat elites tried to salvage as much out of their defeat as possible and maintain their hold on power by ridding any northern interference in their affairs. “Fear of violence, or at least instability, played a large role in moderating the belligerence of the Democratic businessmen whose influence predominated in the northeastern wing of the party as southern Democrats disgustingly recognized” (Les Benedict 1980:520).

64). This was a direct effect of political maneuvering against the anti-elite populist movements of small-scale cotton farmers and others who opposed the reach of the industrialist railroad capitalists and their drive for capital.<sup>40</sup> As Horance Mann Bond found in Reconstruction Alabama

...after 1868, [there was] “a struggle between different financiers.” Yes, racism was a factor but “accumulations of capital, and the men who controlled them, were as unaffected by attitudinal prejudices as it is possible to be. Without sentiment, without emotion, those who sought profit from an exploitation of Alabama’s natural resources *turned other men’s prejudices and attitudes to their own account*, and did so with skill and a ruthless acumen.(emphasis added)” (Zinn 2008: 190)

The deliberate exploitation and intensification of divisions among the laboring classes pushed penal policy in the South following Reconstruction. To ensure their dominance, the ruling elite would co-opt habituated prejudice and insecurity to funnel former slaves into penal servitude where possible, sever any ties with similarly situated whites, and decimate their electoral and economic power to restore class power in the South.<sup>41</sup>

The collapse in the main markets in the South, labor migration westward, the boll weevil pestilence, and the dramatic decline in European immigrant laborers (not to mention the ramifications of foreign military operations) led a massive migration of black laborers North. The infirmity of exclusion based on race was not shed as these laborers moved to their new northern

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<sup>40</sup>Business interests were not passive in advancing their interests, even outside the tumultuous South. In late 19th century Chicago, the Chicago Union League Club, backed by the city’s commercial establishment, wrote and passed legislation that set out a package of regulations for qualification for voting that included house to house inspection and a diffuse board of non-elected officials to oversee voter registration. The package of restrictions were so numerous and rigid that one only need move several blocks or be suspected of being a fraudulent voter to be removed from the register of eligible voters, a fact that bore heavily on socialist supporters. Similarly, San Francisco Republicans designed an act to remove the power of Workingman’s Party by vesting power in a mayor and appointed public servants.(Keyssar 2009)

<sup>41</sup>As McKelvey (1935) notes: “Now the vicious character of the race conflict... rapidly increased the number of Negroes in the criminal population until it exceeded ninety per cent of the total. Slave methods naturally suggested themselves as the logical patterns for penal discipline...there were no annual investigations by disinterested citizens, as in the North, to uncover the harsh realities. Slave standards and race hatreds were to debase Southern penal practices for a generation...many thousands of happy-go-lucky Negroes awoke from rosy dreams of freedom and forty acres and a mule to find themselves shackled to the task of reconstructing the South in hopeless penal servitude.” (McKelvey 1935: 154)

worksites. To the contrary. The dramatic rise in southerners coming into the urban North posed a severe problem for political machines, especially as the influx of cheap labor undermined previous gains. This competition at the lower ends of the labor force led to “tensions between Black migrants and the lower-class whites that felt threatened by the attractiveness of this new Black labor class” (Brown-Dean 2003: 92). For the employer, a heterogeneous labor force enabled wages to be lowered for both black and white laborers. As Peter Bohmer notes:

By hiring both white workers and black workers, but paying a lower wage to the black workers, employers as a class gain by racism and racial inequality, and each individual employer also maximizes profits. Paying unequal wages in a firm based on race divides workers, makes unity weaker than it would be if all workers received the same wage or if the workforce was racially homogeneous. The resulting disunity from racial division lowers average wages and increases profits. (Bohmer 2005: 97)

Thus, while racial animosity may have existed among laborers in the North (of which there is very little doubt), the exaggeration of those cleavages by employers contributed to disunity. The race riots did not evolve from inherent racial prejudices, but rather from the manner in which the recent arrivals from the South were used to undermine social gains made by established (European) laborers (Brown-Dean 2003: 92). As Wacquant (1997) has stated: “race’ is a fiction that has been made real” (Wacquant 1997: 228), the strategic play of prejudices against one another certainly did not help to stave off the creation of such a reality.<sup>42</sup>

During the heavy days of the anti-communist purges, law enforcement was particularly keen to pursue those who were believed to harbor sentiments of racial equality, noting the congruency with socialist and communist agendas (Lipset and Marks 2001).<sup>43</sup> The duality of the war against organized crime, with the monumental expansion of the criminal justice apparatus, and the effort to fight the “enemies within” are telling. The civil rights movement was made possible by the stability of the social protective order of the New Deal

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<sup>42</sup>According to Scher (2010), “it was the development of American racial attitudes and views, not just the existence of slavery, that gave rise to policies of disenfranchisement of blacks.” (866).

<sup>43</sup>“Because the Communist party had been strongly committed to racial equality, many [McCarthy era] loyalty investigators believed that party members could be identified by their support for civil rights and participation in interracial activities” (Schrecker 2004: 47).

Era and the official anti-colonialist stance of the US in foreign policy.<sup>44</sup> By adapting the lessons learned from India and elsewhere in the midst of global decolonialization, the Black Power movement was able to “redefine the meaning of racial identity” and address the degraded status that had emerged as a result of the sub-division of the laboring classes by employers and elites (Omi 1994: 99; Harvey 2005; Chang 2010). With the decline in confidence in the rehabilitative ideal and the social upheaval of the 1960s, neo-liberal and neoconservative forces were able to co-opt growing anxiety and escalating crime to devastating ends.<sup>45</sup> While Friedman and others promoted their views of an unregulated market which would necessarily wipe out racism by sheer force of profit margin, the advocates of social protection and collective responsibility were not able to make compelling cases for why the welfare state did not entail ruin, especially in the midst of the apparent failures of communist governments around the world.<sup>46</sup> The race-coding which ensued following the changing of the guard has ensured that discussions of political-economy have remained mired in what Cornel West (2001) has termed the problem of “racial reasoning”, which has permeated public discourse. This infestation has depressed the political agency of the black community by incubating a market driven nihilism; both neo-liberals/conservatives and minority community leaders over-emphasize the importance of race and ignore more fundamental splits in American society.<sup>47</sup> That is, race as a driving factor has evolved from earlier efforts to subsume class differences by splitting the laboring classes.

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<sup>44</sup>As Harvey 2005 points out, Roosevelt’s New Deal message saw “the primary obligation of the state and its civil society was to use its powers to allocate its resources to eradicate poverty and hunger and to assure the security of livelihood, security against major hazards and vicissitudes of life, and the security of decent homes” (Harvey 2005: 183).

<sup>45</sup>As Thomas Edsall noted in 1985: “During the 1970s, business refined its ability to act as a class, submerging competitive instincts in favor of joint, cooperative action in the legislative arena. Rather than individual companies seeking only special favours...the dominant theme in the political strategy of business became a shared interest in the defeat of bills such as consumer protection and labour law reform, and in the enactment of favourable tax, regulatory and antitrust legislation” (found in Harvey 2005: 48)

<sup>46</sup>As Chang (2010) has argued, much of the opposition to an enlarged and active welfare state stems from the accusations (primarily from business interests) that “When the rich are taxed to pay for [welfare programs], this not only makes the poor lazy and deprives the rich of an incentive to create wealth, it also makes the economy less dynamic”. However, what the opposition to such accusations have been lax to retort is the stabilizing nature of the welfare state for laborers who are more able to develop greater human capital and increased skills, rather than gravitating to low-skill, low-wage employment.

<sup>47</sup>“The gangsterization of America results in part from a market driven racial reasoning that links the White House to the ghetto projects. In this sense, George Bush, David Duke, and many gangster rap artists speak the same language from different social locations” (West 2001: 48)

Looking now at the evolution of disenfranchisement as a policy with a revised history of the setting in which those policies were rooted in the United States informs us about how their effect can best be interpreted. Furthermore, understanding the centrality of labor relations and class tensions is crucial when discussing the importance of democratic participation and redistributive politics. While race-based inequality has evolved disturbingly virulently in the United States, I argue that such evolution is under-examined with respect to the role which class conflict and the containment of labor has contributed to its existence.

## Summary

This chapter has outlined an alternative narrative of felon disenfranchisement, drawing on historical findings to underline the importance of labor relations in the formation of political enfranchisement boundaries. These historical details provide a contextual understanding for the evolution of political disenfranchisement, particularly as it pertains to criminal disenfranchisement today. Opponents of criminal disenfranchisement based on the proposition that such laws are rooted in *racist* intent have met with disappointing results in the courts. As Re and Re (2011) and others have illustrated, challenges to current criminal disenfranchisement policies based on accusations that such laws are inherently racially motivated, and thus unconstitutional, will likely continue to face substantial barriers to success. While such policies may have and/or continue to be manipulated by racial prejudices is insufficient (in this view) to adequately challenge this policy. The record of debates following the 13th amendment concerning political rights evidences that criminal disenfranchisement was not an unintended side-effect of negligence on the part of the drafters. Rather, such policies were supportive of the rationale at the time which saw the virtuous status of free labor, ostensibly, as the defining qualification for enfranchisement. Whereas this virtue was, and still is, used to enfranchise those who had by their labor proven their worthiness, those who had violated the social contract were seen as antithetical to this ideal and unfit to participate in political decision making.

By removing the support which underpinned the protection of political and economic rights for former slaves and sympathetic whites, Federal authorities and elites turned their back not just on the re-subjugation of former slaves; they had helped instigate an evolved, free-market system of exploitation of labor steeped in racist propaganda which played on anxieties amongst the working classes and enabled the atrocious acquiescence to discriminatory

legislation which split the laboring classes along racial and ethnic lines. As many authors cite in their advance of the difficulties of racism in the US, “The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line” (DuBois 1903: 1).

Because later efforts to equalize rights and opportunities between the races were important to social democratic and socialist movements, the issue of race in America would become indivisible from the issue of anti-capitalism, but for the wrong reasons. Later accommodation, as advocated by Booker T. Washington, led many blacks to “accept” their plot in life and acquiesce to their subordinate roles in the market economy guarded by Jim Crow legislation - not least of which was the exclusion from political participation.

DuBois’ “color line” certainly pertained to racism and the many manifestations of its septicity; however, many scholars appear less likely to cite DuBois’ political and economic concerns. DuBois recognized the dubious nature of racial division in the US, and he also saw Washington’s “propaganda” as expediting the “disenfranchisement of the Negro, the legal creation of a distinct status of civil inferiority for the Negro, and the steady withdrawal of aid from institutions for the higher training of the Negro” (25). Indeed, many of DuBois’ concerns were concentrated in the political, civil and (at that time) the social rights afforded to all other citizens. DuBois was opposed to Washington’s programme and derided his efforts at education as a means to give the capitalist class the type of obedient laborer which the promises of the Radical Republicans stood in opposition to.<sup>48</sup>

The aim of this chapter has been to contrast racial narrative based explanations of criminal disenfranchisement, which downplay the role of class tensions and development, and situate criminal disenfranchisement in the context of larger projects of political disenfranchisement. Similarly, it has been an effort to emphasize the prospective to operationalize a more class oriented view of felony disenfranchisement. The following chapters lay out the findings from field research in the state of North Carolina. Using a battery of tested survey items and interview guides, it has been possible to measure the preferences of the disenfranchised felon population in both community and institutionalized settings. These findings corroborate the theoretical ar-

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<sup>48</sup>According to DuBois in an interview just before his death in 1963: “I went with [Washington] to see some of the Eastern philanthropists who were helping him with his school [the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute]. Washington would promise them happy and contented labor for their new enterprises. He reminded them there would be no strikers.” (McGill 1965)

guments presented herein and illustrate the types of policy attitudes which inference based on general survey results of the general population may overstate. As such, these findings provide the first known effort to record the explicit policy preferences of offender populations, especially as it concerns the redistributive policies which are effected most by political (non)participation.

## Chapter 5

# The Political and Economic Preferences of Felony Offenders - Rationale and Methods

The preceding chapter illustrated the class weighted nature of the creation of modern electoral policies, and with it the explicit use of racial narratives which have subsumed class awareness to divisions of ethnicity and other cleavages - not least of which is the conception of the criminal actor as homo oeconomicus. The difficulties which opponents to criminal disenfranchisement have faced in the courts stem from the firm opposition of judges to interpreting the basis for such laws as inherently and intentionally racist. The historical evidence outlined in the previous chapter certainly supports such argumentation. However, the impact which these policies has for policy formation (as well as the impact of these policies on communities) forms another facet of the issue. That is, by refusing to allow felon disenfranchisement policies to be dismantled on the basis of purported racial intent, they have inadvertently brought to the surface questions about the identity of the disenfranchised voter. More specifically, the controversies have enabled discussions regarding what the disenfranchised felon voter would support, with speculation in both directions. This chapter gives the reader information on the underlying rationale for pursuing the issues at hand, as well as the means and methods used to acquire the primary data which will be reported in subsequent chapters.

## 5.1 Rationale

Regarding political orientations and views on government, there does exist a certain degree of evidence available to decipher the potential leanings of the disenfranchised. In particular, using the Youth Development Survey (YDS), Manza and Uggen (2006) point to significant differences between groups based on criminal activity. These center on issues of political efficacy, political orientation, and trust in government. They indicate that respondents differ significantly in the percentage who self-identify as independent, rather than Democrat or Republican. This is perhaps the most important of the items for political actors. They also reveal that those arrested and not imprisoned, and those imprisoned are less confident in the trustworthiness of political and administrative officials. Not surprisingly, these respondents also ranked lower on levels of confidence regarding the criminal justice system. Bolstered by Burch (2008, 2012) and others, there is clearly a growing body of work suggesting that what many have thought as givens is clearly over-estimated - i.e., that the majority of felons (especially non-white felons) are Democratic. Add to this the evolving literature on the effect of interaction with criminal justice systems and civic education, and the picture of depressed political agency among the most marginalized becomes somewhat more precarious. As Weaver and Lerman (2010) ascertain, increased “criminal justice contact weakens attachment to the political process and heightens negative perceptions of government” (Weaver and Lerman 2010:817; See also: Justice and Meares 2014).

These studies are insightful and provide a strong basis for continuing investigation, however much of the focus skirts around the edges of political economic concerns of democratic participation. The evidence to date regarding what policies the *electorate non grata* might prefer in terms of real spending and priorities remains elusive. There is some respite for this dilemma. In a fitting, and surprising, brief remark at the end of their seminal work on socialism in the United States, Lipset and Marks (2000) note that a disproportionate amount of convicts surveyed in the beginning half of the 20th century identified themselves as socialists, and many could identify themselves as a discernible class (Lipset and Marks 2000). The remark is as brief as it is curiously included. It does, however, provide a compelling reference point for investigation, and one which overlaps directly with what is known about political disenfranchisement policy historically - that the franchise has been used as a strategic tool by the powerful to suppress the collective voice of those it sees as detrimental to the standing order.

There is simply little debate as to whether the modern day incarcerated or non-incarcerated voter has a class consciousness, especially considering the near universal absence of class debate in contemporary American discourse. Steinmetz (2003) found, however, that many of the incarcerated felons she interviewed expressed the view that the elite denied their right to vote because the policies which they enact do not favor persons in their socio-economic category. Interviewees exhibited perceptible understanding of the role of political decisions and redistributive issues, pointing to an intrinsic appreciation of class divides despite the lack of articulated ideologies (Steinmetz 2003). Though not explicitly investigating class issues, Steinmetz (2003) illustrates a valuable facet echoed in the historical findings of Lipset and Marks. Uggen (2010) also confirms a considerable knowledge of and demand for redistributive policies among female respondents, and a noticeable leaning towards libertarian ideologies among male respondents.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the findings by Manza and Uggen, Steinmetz, and others, the current state of research into this area suffers several significant shortcomings.<sup>2</sup> The primary gaps in the current research remains:

- First, the lack of detailed and comparative data related to policy relevant areas persists. At the time of this research, no dedicated data existed which recorded the political and economic preferences of political disenfranchised felons in the United States.<sup>3</sup>
- Second, while there exists a vast collection of detailed spatial information collected on the origins of offenders, this data has not been incorporated to investigate directly where the loss of voting power stems from.

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<sup>1</sup>As questions were not directed towards specific types of policies, Uggen's observations were limited to freely expressed opinions. Libertarian characterization of male respondents was observed by their reference to rights such as rights to own firearms and freedom of speech. No indication was given of respondent views towards redistributive spending. Source: Personal Communication, August 15, 2010.

<sup>2</sup>As Manza and Uggen note: "Felon disenfranchisement would be almost certain to have a more dramatic electoral impact in the urban legislative districts which the largest share of felon population is drawn. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable data regarding the exact locations and legislative districts in which the largest concentrations of voters are lost. . . . disenfranchisement surely plays a role in the election of mayors, city councils, state representatives, and other officials." (Manza and Uggen 2006)

<sup>3</sup>According Manza and Uggen (2006), "the main problem is that there is simply no nationally representative survey or polling data that contains information about both the respondents' criminal behavior and their political participation and voting behavior".

There is good reason for this lack of opinion data. Felon populations are generally excluded from social and economic surveys distributed both nationally and sub nationally. Many, if not all, surveys exclude this group from their sampling either by failing to oversample on the basis of their felonious status, or due to the restrictions of sampling respondents from group quarters. Essentially, when it comes to many surveys, especially those regarding items of interest to social scientists, including prisoners implies an additional layer of complexity that is seen as providing too little added benefit for the cost (Bialik 2012).<sup>4</sup>

Omitting potential respondents from surveys removes, in no uncertain way, non-random actors from analysis. Incorporation of inmates into surveys can alter commonly held assumptions of American life (Western 2006; Pettit 2012). While Western, Pettit, and others delve into questions regarding the potential impacts of excluding *incarcerated* offenders on the view of American realities, there is value in pushing forward. There is beneficial information to be gathered from those who are least likely to be represented either in popular surveys or political legislatures. These excluded citizens, occupants of the most marginalized communities, are in essence *markers* of the outputs of government policies - most prominently, the output of the coordination (or lack thereof) of the welfare system and the larger economy. In simpler, comparison terms, we might imagine this exclusion akin to silencing or disregarding the feedback of customers of private services who report near identical failings with their experience. Unlike private services, however, the welfare state does not generally rely on personal feedback, but rather incorporates policies driven by political actors, themselves driven (at least in some degree) by electoral stimuli. As political voice and mobilization of that voice shows a clear effect on the redistribution of income, it is useful to take into account not only which voices are being mobilized and registered, but also those which are excluded or demobilized.<sup>5</sup>

The main assertions regarding political disenfranchisement of felons in the United States revolve around two core hypotheses:

- H1: The blanket political disenfranchisement of felons represents a

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<sup>4</sup>Also, there are, as illustrated further, many institutional and methodological barriers which impede access to this population of interest, making any effort at inclusion too complicated for consideration by many researchers and their organizational sponsors.

<sup>5</sup>There are of course variations in the source of that voice and the degree to which it is mobilized. In the Jim Crow South, for example, the predominant political voice was that of affluent, white, males – reflected in the policies which came to dominate that region and to some degree persist to this day.

demobilization of particularized interests.

- H2: The political disenfranchisement of criminal offenders is *spatially* unique across political-geographic space.

Answering these assumptions is the focus of the remainder of this work. H1 necessitated the employment of two primary methods of research, one quantitative and one qualitative. H2 employs the data gained from the processes involved in H1 research, however the analysis of the data has been managed with techniques appropriate for the issue addressed (i.e., GIS Data techniques). The methods and techniques employed in this research forms the subject of this chapter. It is followed further by the quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) results in Chapters (Chapter 6) and 7. Analysis addressing those of H2 are addressed in Chapter 8.

## 5.2 Methods

The primary research activity of this project employed a self-administered, paper based survey to measure the political and economic preferences of current felons in the state of North Carolina. The sampling and procedural methods implemented for this project were developed to conform to the concerns of sample access and reproducibility. That is, given a similarly situated felon population in either the same context or another, this process is able to be reproduced to ascertain the reliability of this analysis - insuring a main tenant of research, the ability to replicate a study. This was necessary due to the complexity of circumstances involved with the unique situation of felons as a protected population.<sup>6</sup> Because of the idiosyncratic nature of the population characteristics, the following section is divided into respective sub-samples - i.e., those incarcerated (DOP-S), those under community supervision (DCC-S), and those under supervision but approached outside the authority of the department of corrections (CSI-S). I note beforehand the practical caveats which accompany conducting research with hard-to-reach populations in general, and protected subjects in particular.<sup>7</sup> Following this, a description of the population under consideration is given. This is then followed by more detailed description of the individual sampling processes

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<sup>6</sup>This survey benefited enormously from advice from the Odom Institute at the University of Chapel Hill, the National Centre for Social Research (UK), and the Community Success Initiative of Raleigh (without whom this research would not have been possible.)

<sup>7</sup>The purpose of relating these issues is intended less to preemptively address any controversy with the methods and approaches employed, but moreso to inform the reader of concerns which are not normally associated with primary research with survey instruments.

employed, accompanied thereafter by a description of the instrumentation employed. Following this, the exact procedure by which the project was conducted is outlined, followed by results from the stratification stages, including spatial representation of the project participants. To note, descriptive results of response rates are not reported here, but are instead located in Chapter 6 Section 6.1.1. The choice of setting rests on the desire to aggregate all findings of the research as much as possible. Given the nature of this population as hard-to-reach/hard-to-survey, such reporting is consistent with efforts envisaged here.

### 5.2.1 Caveats

#### General Issues

As discussed previously, felon populations represent a unique population of investigation, even within the category of hard-to-reach populations.<sup>8</sup> Unlike the general population of the surveys used to create the combined survey for this study, felon populations are a uniquely complicated set of individuals to contact and entice to participate using available methods. As opposed to other populations (e.g., homeless persons or children), working with felon populations is further complicated by their legal status.

First, because of past ethical misconduct, supervised populations are considered a protected population under the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulation *45 CFR 46.301 – 306 – Subpart C - Additional Protections for Prisoners*. Permission to access potential respondents requires significantly longer and more in depth considerations regarding the composition and delivery of research materials; these strategies are detailed further in the description of subsamples. Second, the population under study is not fully incarcerated. While some felony convictions carry a sentence of incarceration, many convicted felons receive community supervised sentences. Indeed, the vast majority of felonious offenders, 2/3 of the entire population, serve their sentences outside custodial supervision. This fact differentiates between the phenomenon of *mass incarceration* and *mass convictions*, the latter arguably less the focus of popular attention. Thus, for a study which seeks to gather the attitudes of individuals politically disenfranchised because of felony convictions, both custodial and community supervised populations

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<sup>8</sup>Hard-to-reach populations are most generally defined as populations of interest which are not easily accessible or participant for research and data gathering. For a more detailed review of this topic, see Brackertz 2007

must be targeted. For this reason, strategies must be made as uniform as possible while complying with the situation of access and security restrictions.

### Specific Issues

In addition to these general concerns, more local issues were encountered which necessitated further planning and strategy. These areas were broadly found in the procedural requirements particular to the North Carolina Department of Corrections (NCDOC), the adjuvant material issues inherent in administering the survey instrument, and the resource constraints placed on the field research for such an appetant project. These are described in order.

**DOC Procedural Requirements:** The NCDOC maintains a comprehensive, though accessible, system of safeguards to protect the supervised population from potential ethical abuses which may occur over the course of the scientific research process. This process is included here to illustrate the additional constraints implicit when working with protected participants - Figure 5.1. These procedural stages are in addition, and parallel, to those processes required by academic Institutional Review Boards (IRB).<sup>9</sup> First, an application for research is submitted to an internal Merit Review Board, laying out the specifics of the study and benefits to the prospective respondents. Following approval, a second review is then carried out after acceptance from the previous by an internal Human Subjects Review Board. This process ensures that the project goals are reasonable and in the interests (or at least not against the interests) of the granting authorities. Following this, information is sent to each institution (i.e., individual prison administrations) for which access is requested.

Further, all direct contact with an incarcerated respondent requires a re-allocation of prison staff from their routine duties for supervision of both the researcher and the respondent. This proved to be a significant barrier to access approval from the DOC for obvious reasons.<sup>10</sup> Further to this, it is questionable whether or not the presence of staff during a survey interview would affect respondent returns (e.g., response bias). Additionally, in order

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<sup>9</sup>This project was underwritten by the Ethical Ombudsman of Jacobs University and the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Science, Germany as well as the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's official IRB.

<sup>10</sup>During the course of this research, the DOC was faced with considerable limitations on their resources as a result of budget decisions by the NC Legislature. This prompted concerns about even minor re-allocations of staff for research purposes.




Figure 5.1: NCDOC Research Application Process Diagram

to facilitate such face-to-face interviews, the size and costs of the research team would be considerably larger, thus making such a short study of felon populations both temporally and financially prohibitive. This concern is also reflected for the DCC-S study. Incentivization for survey participation was prohibited under DOC guidelines. This meant that all participation was entirely un-coerced, and more so in the case of DCC-S.

For the state of North Carolina, a survey of all inmates in state correctional facilities would require approval from each of the 66 correctional locations. Even after excluding those facilities for which access is restricted (i.e., Close/ Maximum Security prisons for more serious offenders), the time needed for approval can increase exponentially. Following consultation, this research study selected 15 sites for inclusion, for which approval was forwarded to. A parallel IRB process under the cooperation of the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill was undertaken correspondingly. Taking these factors into account, an abbreviated list of facilities was chosen with guidance; these facilities are discussed further. These requirements eventually necessitated the development of a parallel sub-sample outside the NCDOC authorized project, discussed below.

**Material Issues:** Conducting surveys with self-administered questionnaires with felon populations under supervision has additional, though ultimately slight, stipulations not normally required of otherwise similar projects. This fact owes itself to the specific concerns of security of both staff and clients in the respective survey sites. The survey itself necessitated appropriate security measures itself, while maintaining the features needed for functionality. The design of the survey booklets themselves was tailored to the target populations for this project. In consultation with a community re-entry organization (discussed further) and other community actors involved with current and former offenders, booklets were designed to maximize comprehension by potentially lower literacy enabled respondents, while maintaining their measurement validity or reliability. That is, every effort was made to maintain the original format of the items taken from the respective survey instruments while creating an attractive format for hard-to-reach subjects. Furthermore, delivery and collection methods for instruments were regulated under the security guidelines of the NCDOC. This consideration necessitated its own strategy for administration. These issues are discussed in more detail below.

**Time Constraints:** The brief time horizon inherent in the field research phase of this project obliged that appropriate measures be taken to combine maximum coverage with minimal administration.<sup>11</sup> The geographic spread of research sites also needed to be taken into consideration when developing strategies for delivery and retrieval of materials. In addition, while those participants at custodial institutions (DOP-S) were (for the most part) stationary, their community counterparts (DCC-S) were only accessible during their assigned, periodic reporting moments. That is, DCC-S participants are accessibly only to the extent that materials are present at the time of their mandated visits to the respective reporting offices. These occurrences are spread over 30-, 60-, and 90-day periods. The allotted time frame for this research was 8 months. The sampling and procedural strategies outlined below reflect this reality.<sup>12</sup>

### 5.2.2 Population Characteristics

At mid-year 2011, the number of individuals supervised by the DOP and the DCC in North Carolina was 36,520 and 39,042 respectively - excluding supervised individuals who were non-citizen, under the age of 18, or non-felons (e.g., misdemeanor offenders).<sup>13</sup>

Males accounted for roughly 93 percent of the DOP supervised felon population, compared to approximately 80 percent of the DCC supervised felon population. Blacks make up larger shares of both supervised populations, however make up a significantly larger portion of the incarcerated population compared to whites. The ratio between sexes appears constant across racial groupings, with some exception for white females for both DCC and DOP populations compared to their counterparts. There is a clear difference between reported educational attainment between DCC and DOP respondents, with incarcerated offenders reporting greater instances of educational attainment less than a highschool degree or equivalent.

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<sup>11</sup>In addition to time constraints, this research was conducted without the assistance of research staff outside the primary researcher. This facet was less the result of time or resource constraints, so much as the security process necessary to recruit associates with proper clearance to enter facilities and interact with personnel.

<sup>12</sup>None of the cases here are weighted and are not intended to be taken as representative of the population at large (i.e., the entire correctional population) in the state of North Carolina. Control groups (those respondents from the respective surveys in Chapter 6) are also unweighted.

<sup>13</sup>Note that groups are mutually exclusive.

Table 5.1: Aggregate Numbers of DCC and DOP Populations by Sex and Race

	DCC			DOP		
	F	M	Total	F	M	Total
White	4606	13039	17645	1427	11699	13126
Black	3194	16699	19893	981	21078	22059
N.Amer.	143	584	727	42	722	764
Asian	14	92	106	6	59	65
Other	94	528	622	22	443	465
UNKN	12	37	49	1	40	41
Total	8063	30979	39042	2479	34041	36520

Table 5.2: Percentage of DCC and DOP Populations by Sex and Race

	DCC			DOP		
	F	M	% Total	F	M	% Total
White	26.1%	73.9%	45.2%	10.9%	89.1%	35.9%
Black	16.1%	83.9%	51.0%	4.4%	95.6%	60.4%
N.Amer.	19.7%	80.3%	1.9%	5.5%	94.5%	2.1%
Asian	13.2%	86.8%	0.3%	9.2%	90.8%	0.2%
Other	15.1%	84.9%	1.6%	4.7%	95.3%	1.3%
UNKN	24.5%	75.5%	0.1%	2.4%	97.6%	0.1%
% Total	20.7%	79.3%	100.0%	6.8%	93.2%	100.0%

Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the percentage of felony offenders across the state at the county level - symbols represent the felony offenders based on the exclusions mentioned previously as a percentage of the total of the state population of the same criteria at county centroids. As expected, the distribution of both DCC and DOP felons are noticeably concentrated in those counties with large urban communities.<sup>14</sup> This preliminary data enables a more data driven process. That is, by mapping out the social, economic, and spatial variables of the population of interest, it is possible to confirm that the sampling process has indeed located, approximately, those of interest. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report the distribution of educational attainment by both gender and race. These variables are presented to illustrate the primary variables related to socio-economic status available on this population. The goal of the sampling process which follows is to obtain the closest approximation to the population of disenfranchised citizens in urban districts, based on the assumptions of previous authors (See: Manza and Uggen 2006).

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<sup>14</sup>The public use data available for offenders via the online resources at the NC DOC Office of Research and Planning does not facilitate disaggregated geographical data analysis. All information is given at the county level. However, the NCDOC Research and Planning Office, as will be illustrated later, has allowed access to disaggregated data for the year 2008 for the purposes of this research.

Table 5.3: Educational Attainment (by Year) by Percent of Gender Groups

	DCC			DOP		
	F	M	% Total	F	M	% Total
0	4.8%	3.2%	3.5%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
1	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
2	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
3	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
4	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
5	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%
6	0.3%	0.5%	0.4%	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%
7	0.7%	1.1%	1.0%	2.0%	1.9%	1.9%
8	4.1%	5.7%	5.3%	7.9%	9.3%	9.2%
9	8.5%	11.9%	11.2%	14.0%	16.6%	16.4%
10	12.1%	16.3%	15.5%	18.4%	20.9%	20.8%
11	14.0%	18.4%	17.5%	19.2%	21.4%	21.2%
12	54.1%	41.7%	44.2%	36.7%	27.1%	27.7%
13	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%
14	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%
15	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
16	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
17	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
18	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
19	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
20	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
% Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.4: Educational Attainment by Race

	DCC						DOP					
	White	Black	N.Amer.	Asian	Other	Total	White	Black	N.Amer.	Asian	Other	Total
0	4.2%	2.8%	2.6%	8.5%	6.6%	3.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%
1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.1%
2	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
3	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
4	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
5	0.2%	0.1%	0.4%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.7%	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%
6	0.5%	0.2%	1.0%	0.9%	2.3%	0.4%	1.2%	0.5%	2.1%	0.0%	2.8%	0.8%
7	1.5%	0.6%	1.9%	0.0%	1.4%	1.0%	2.9%	1.2%	3.0%	0.0%	2.8%	1.9%
8	6.6%	3.9%	11.3%	3.8%	7.7%	5.3%	11.9%	7.3%	16.9%	4.6%	10.8%	9.2%
9	11.8%	10.4%	18.8%	9.4%	15.1%	11.2%	17.5%	15.5%	22.5%	10.8%	18.1%	16.4%
10	14.2%	16.6%	14.9%	14.2%	15.8%	15.5%	19.1%	21.9%	18.3%	30.8%	17.6%	20.8%
11	13.8%	21.0%	15.5%	10.4%	13.8%	17.5%	16.1%	24.5%	15.6%	9.2%	18.9%	21.2%
12	45.9%	43.4%	33.3%	51.9%	36.0%	44.2%	28.9%	27.3%	19.5%	44.6%	26.0%	27.7%
13	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	1.1%	0.4%
14	0.5%	0.4%	0.1%	0.9%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	0.5%	0.5%	0.0%	0.2%	0.5%
15	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
16	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
17	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
18	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
19	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
20	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%




Figure 5.2: State DCC Population Geographic Distribution




Figure 5.3: State DOP Population Geographic Distribution

### 5.2.3 Sampling Process

Sampling of the respective sub-populations was based on a number of restrictions and practical considerations. These issues are discussed below pertaining to their respective groupings. As noted earlier (5.2.1), this research was subject to specific access restrictions. As such, sampling was conducted on the basis of noted issues stemming from the literature on felony populations. The decision was made to limit sampling to urban centers *if* there was sufficient evidence to support claims that offenders come largely from these areas. Judging from the assertions from Manza and Uggen (2006), and the evidence from the geographic mapping of felon populations in the state, this selection criteria proved satisfactory for the purposes of this research. All other sampling decisions were driven by access possibilities communicated by the DOC Office of Research and Planning (NCDOC-RP). NCDOC-RP staff retrieved data based on the exclusions agreed upon during application for research. This data was then used to randomly sample for the following research. The following is a description of those processes.

#### DOP Sampling

This sub-sample was chosen using a stratified random sample approach. In accordance with the concerns NCDOC-RP, DOP-S respondents were restricted to minimum and medium security facilities. Close facilities (i.e., those housing heightened security offenders) were excluded from the sampling process. Jails and other facilities holding inmates not considered correctional institutes or centers were also excluded from this sub-sample, not least due to the high rate of turnover in these facilities. Additionally, due to time constraints attached to the study period, the number of facilities in total which could be sampled was limited to suggested number of 15.

Facilities were chosen so as to maximize the number of potential respondents from each of the six chosen Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).<sup>15</sup> As the NCDOC does not keep track of the exact residences of origin of offenders in their supervision, or at least does not make this information publicly available, targeting was conducted by selecting the offender's county of

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<sup>15</sup> Respondents were sampled on urban populations which are indicated by areas known as metropolitan statistical areas. These areas are defined by the US Census Bureau as areas consisting of "a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic integration with that core. Metropolitan areas comprise one or more entire counties, except in New England, where cities and towns are the basic geographic units." (USCB 2014 ).

residence at the time of their conviction. While not ideal for limiting the sample frame to urban populations only, this was determined to represent the optimal method available to draw a sample of respondents which would represent the disenfranchised of urban populations in North Carolina. Respondents were then further narrowed to those with sentences remaining of three months or more to ensure likelihood of contact. That is, without this restriction, there would be a good chance that some of the selected participants would not be at the locations given in their files. Out of the fifteen facilities chosen, one facility (NC CI Women) was further excluded due to a combined supervision operating system (i.e., this facility acted as a heightened security and minimum-medium security facility. Female offenders were thus excluded from this sub-sample. This was deemed non-critical to the study as the female population made up 6.8 percent (2,470) of all felons otherwise able to participate in an election, and 6 percent (891) of the felon population from urban counties. Two further facilities (Durham CC and Charlotte CC), both minimum security facilities, were later excluded due to planned closures which therefore produced uncertainty regarding the ability to contact respondents and retrieve materials as necessary.

Restrictions for sub-sample:<sup>16</sup>

- Gender: Male and Female
- Race: ll
- Age range: 18+
- Security: Minimum – Medium
- County of Residence (at time of conviction): New Hanover (Wilmington MSA), Wake and Durham (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill MSA), Guilford and Forsyth (Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point MSA), Cumberland (Fayetteville MSA), Mecklenburg and Gaston (Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill MSA), Buncombe (Asheville MSA)
- Unit: 15 units of minimum to medium security covering suitable population sizes
- Sentence: Persons with at least 3 months of supervision remaining

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<sup>16</sup>The term *restriction* is a technical denotation for criteria which potential respondents must meet to be included in the sampling process. This process is required by the NCDOC

The results of sampling for DOP-S are given in the appendix of for this chapter.<sup>17</sup> A sample frame (N = 5163) was supplied by the DOC of the final 13 facilities chosen. Omitting persons not resident in one of the urban MSA and with at least 3 months left to release resulted in a final sampling frame of 2437 persons.

### DCC Sampling

The community correction sub-sample was selected using a purposive sampling method suited to the dynamics of this population (Teddlie and Yu 2007; Barbour 2001). The DCC-S sub-sample was selected from nine districts covering the MSAs in the corresponding DOP-S sub-sample, with an estimated 9,400 persons eligible for participation as of mid-year 2011. DCC districts are divided into units at which supervised offenders are required to report in 30, 60 and 90 day intervals dependent on their sentences. In contrast to DOP-S respondents, it was not viable to sample respondents based on supplied information from the DOC. There is one primary reason for this. The DOC does not allow the distribution of contact information for offenders supervised in the general population to research interests that are outside the direction the DOC itself, for obvious reasons. Thus, it was not possible to perform a similar stratified random sampling method as with the DOP-S. As such, a separate approach was designed in which respondents were solicited via a posted study advertisement placed in the waiting area for the respective districts and units. Units were restricted, as much as possible, to the top five units scaled by available numbers of supervised felons, above the age of 18. While some units are based at separate locations, many units are housed in the same locations as other units, and others house all units in a given district. Locations were selected with the assistance of DCC staff to optimize responses and coverage. In total, 15 locations were used for this sub-sample. 40 percent of DCC-S respondents were female.

The selected method provided contact with all 30-day reportees and a random sampling of 60- and 90-day reportees. Taken together, the nine dis-

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<sup>17</sup> *Total Med-Min* indicates the number of available Medium and Minimum security supervised individuals available for sampling. *Init. S. Frame* indicates the sampling frame delivered to the investigator by the NCDOC following approval. *S. Frame Urban* indicates those available from Urban MSAs; while *S. Frame Urban-2* indicates those following the exclusion of those facilities which became inaccessible over the course of research. The final column, *Random Sample*, indicates those randomly sampled from the preceding stage. *X* indicates that the institution was dropped from the stage. Appendix table 3 reports total counts of individual available by stage, while table 4 reports these amounts as percentages of the total to provide more comparative understanding

tricts selected supervise approximately 42 percent of the state's entire DCC felon population. In contrast to DOP-S, there was no way to assess the background information of DCC-S respondents prior to participation.<sup>18</sup>

Restrictions for sub-sample:

- Gender: Male and Female
- Race: All
- Age range: 18+
- Security: Minimum – Medium
- County of Residence (at time of conviction): New Hanover (Wilmington MSA), Wake and Durham (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill MSA), Guilford and Forsyth (Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point MSA), Cumberland (Fayetteville MSA), Mecklenburg and Gaston (Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill MSA), Buncombe (Asheville MSA)
- Unit: minimum 18 units – maximum 45 units per county of residence
- Sentence: Not possible; Time frame adapted to solicit 30 day reporters; random selection of 60 and 90 day reporters.

### CSI Sampling

During the course of authorization to access participants under the supervision of the NCDOC, circumstances outside the tolerance of the research agenda arose which necessitated the design of a second option to gather data from felon populations. This sub-sample (CSI-S) became a parallel project to the main survey sample and provided access to persons outside the responsibility of the DOC. There are important differences between the strategies used for this sub-population and the sampled populations in the original survey design.

For one, no IRB or other formal institutional approvals based in the US were needed as individuals were independent of the DOC's responsibility.

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<sup>18</sup>While the use of sampling technique for this sub-sample may be considered much less statistically valid, especially compared to the DOP-S, the exclusion of this sub-sample from the study would only hinder research on the political and economic attitudes of politically disenfranchised persons. As such, the benefits of inclusion greatly outweighed the costs against incorporation of this sub-sample into the study, despite its shortcomings.

All approval was therefore based on institutional regulations at the home institute level, mentioned previously. Meetings with CSI-S were arranged via local, non-governmental, re-entry organizations across the state; part of a larger network of organizations in connection with CSI. Thus this sample represents a convenience sampling strategy. Additionally, and in contrast to DOP-S and DCC-S respondents, CSI-S respondents were given incentives of 10 USD for completion of surveys.<sup>19</sup>

Further to this, and in relation to the selection of qualitative interview respondents, CSI-S respondents were also solicited for participation in 1-hour, face-to-face interviews covering the themes of the questionnaire. 33 of the 52 respondents indicated a desire to participate in an interview. 15 interviews were arranged; however, only six interviews were achieved due to a variety of reasons.<sup>20</sup> While this number is small for an in depth qualitative analysis of its own, the findings do provide a useful insight into the motivation behind the answers given to the survey items and corroborate similar qualitative interviews conducted by Manza and Uggen (2006).<sup>21</sup> Participants in interviews were given 20 USD for their participation. 21 percent of CSI-S respondents were female.

Restrictions for sub-sample:

- Gender: Male and Female
- Race: All
- Age range: 18+
- Security: not applicable, Felon status.
- Area of Residence Replications of DOC study sampling using major cities in urban counties: Wilmington, Raleigh, Charlotte, Asheville, Tarboro.

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<sup>19</sup>Analysis of differences between the DCC-S and CSI-S to investigate these two community supervised populations revealed only minor differences between the two.

<sup>20</sup>Many participants had little time to meet because of transportation issues, childcare arrangements, job seeking appointments, or other issues.

<sup>21</sup>Additionally, I have added the qualitative data from my findings to those of Manza and Uggen; as many of the questions asked in the interviews were taken directly from their own interview script. The results build on the findings of their research and indicate that attitudes towards the government and politics are similar across time and region in the United States – even from a relatively liberal northern state as Minnesota and a conservative southern state such as North Carolina.

- Unit: not applicable
- Sentence: not applicable

Figure 5.4 shows the spatial distribution of sites of research differentiated by community supervision (DCC - asterix), medium security facilities (MED - black flag), and minimum security facilities (MIN - blue flag). Major cities are labeled for reference.




Figure 5.4: Sampled Locations - DOP and DCC Units

### 5.2.4 Instrumentation

The instrument used for this study consisted of a self-administered, paper-based survey. It is a combination of selected items from the American National Election Study (ANES), the International Social Survey Project (ISSP) 2006 Role of Government series (ISSP06), the International Social Survey Project 2009 Social Inequality series (ISSP09), and the International Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA). Wording of items remained in their original formats so as to maintain comparability with previously surveyed populations and avoid distorting the reliability and validity of the tested items.

Items were chosen for their relevance to political and economic issues useful in deciphering the placement of respondents' views in relation to political preferences and attitudes towards welfare state policies. The ANES, ISSP 06, and ISSP 09 are nationally representative for the United States and the US South, however not for individual states. This makes comparison directly to the specific population of North Carolina tenuous. Results for comparisons between survey and control samples must be taken as comparisons and not inferences to the larger population of felons across the region or the country. As this is largely and exploratory study, more rigorous statistical analysis of items is aleatory to the intentions herein.

**ISSP 2006 Role of Government (ISSP06):** The ISSP06 is one module among eleven run by the International Social Survey Project. It was first run in 1985 and consists of four waves (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006). This module deals exclusively with measuring respondent attitudes towards the state, the role government plays (or ought to play) in the affairs of citizens' lives, and issues of civil liberties and market balance. The ISSP06 was administered by face-to-face with a multi-level stage sampling process (4 or more stages), and was conducted at the household level. Interviews lasted 3 months or longer and did not cover institutionalized persons (Scholz, Faass, Harkness, and Heller 2008).<sup>22</sup> The ISSP06 formed the main supplier of items to this survey - 16 of 44 question groups.

**ISSP 2009 Social Inequality (ISSP09)** The ISSP09 is one module among eleven run by the International Social Survey Project. It was first

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<sup>22</sup>Only five of the thirty-three countries which administered this survey included institutionalized persons.

run in 1987 and consists of four waves (1987, 1992, 1999, 2009). This module is dedicated to attitudes regarding income inequality, legitimization of inequality, societal conflicts, and class position. For the United States, the ISSP09 was administered by self-completion via the interviewer, with stratified sampling at the household level. The 2009 version was used as the basis of items and forms a smaller contribution to the final survey - 4 of 44 question groups.

**American National Election Study (ANES):** The ANES is one of the most renowned sources of political attitudes for the United States. Beginning in 1948, the ANES has been collecting survey data on a range of topics of political and economic import with national representative samples.<sup>23</sup> The selection of items from this survey project was entailed to utilize those items tested on the US population across time. In all, 16 items (i.e., not question groups) were used from the ANES.

**International Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA):** The ISEA is a collaborative project which has collected attitudes on issues of income inequality, social class, and economic policy. The ISEA has, to the knowledge of the researcher, not been run in the US - as such the results are not compared in this survey. However, its battery of items specifically targeting attitudes on welfare state policies, including the level of effort respondents would wish to see, was chosen as the most suitable and tested items for this study. Six question groups were borrowed from the ISEA, with changes made only to the currency calculations for current and regional coherence.

**Self-Created Items:** Self created items included items addressing community of origin, gender, religious background, education, most recent income, current employment status, and feelings towards housing policy. Six question groups were self-created.

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<sup>23</sup>This project used items from the ANES Cumulative file which employed a variety of methods: "Cross-section sample constructed with area probability (face-to-face) and RDD (telephone) components. CAPI laptop instrument administered in person or by telephone; quaire adjusted to suit administration by mode." Pre-election and Post-election weights are each the product of household selection weighting, a nonresponse adjustment factor, and a post-stratification factor (by age and education)(ANES Study Notes)".

### 5.2.5 Procedure

The procedure to address hard-to-reach populations is substantively different than research with “normal” populations. Obtaining access to felons is, however, not a straightforward endeavor. The various legalities and stipulations which needed to be adhered to in order to access participants have already been given. However, steps were also needed to ensure the appropriateness of the instrument itself.

**Gatekeepers:** In the year preceding the main field research (2010), a one month gatekeeper exploration was conducted in the state of North Carolina. The process involves first identifying interested parties and stakeholders whose interests are connected to that of those involved in felony offenses. These interviews were conducted in an appreciative manner to allow information to evolve from participants own experiences (Cooperrider, Whitney, and Stavros 2008). Only one organization encompassed the desired criteria for direct cooperation for future research, the *Community Success Initiative* based in Raleigh, North Carolina.<sup>24</sup> Once a suitable gatekeeper organization was established, work began on constructing an instrument for administration.

**Cognitive Levels and Item Comprehension:** A primary concern with implementing such a survey utilizing established items from several survey sources is whether those exhibiting or suspected of exhibiting lower than average reading and comprehension skills are able to understand items given to them. As offenders are known to exhibit these characteristics, care was taken to select items with as little complexity as possible. Once selected, an additional round of visitation to the gatekeeper organization was arranged after establishing suitable individuals to test the item lists. Cognitive interviews consist of administering the proposed survey instrument to likewise situated individuals in an environment where their thoughts on items may be recorded and analyzed for pertinent issues. To this end, CSI arranged (through its network of ex-offenders) a group of participants who participated in this part of the research process. Participants were given a USD 10 gift card for a local merchant to participate. Overall, 7 interviews (Table 5.5) were conducted with both men and women offenders and no serious misunderstandings were found in the item selections. This was to be expected given that these items had already been fielded and vetted by previous surveys. The results of this cognitive testing confirmed that respondents understood the context of the

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<sup>24</sup>Organizations included: Democracy NC, NC Housing Coalition, Southern Coalition for Social Justice; Individuals - upon request.

items.<sup>25</sup> With the validation of the items supported, the process moved to establishing the format of the instrument.

Table 5.5: Participant Descriptives of Cognitive Testing

	Age	Gender	Race	Education	Residence
Participant 1	35	Male	Black	9	Raleigh
Participant 2	32	Male	Black		Raleigh
Participant 3	51	Male	White	12	Clayton
Participant 4	20	Male	Black		Raleigh
Participant 5	37	Male	Black	GED	Raleigh
Participant 6	19	Male	Black		Raleigh
Participant 7	30	Female	Black		Raleigh

**Survey Material:** In addition to testing of the reliability of items, other considerations necessitated attention. For one, the population under study is not unfamiliar with forms and exhaustive questionnaire style applications. In consultation with the UNC-CH Odum Institute, a plan of construction was developed which would address several concerns. First, the layout of the instrument itself should be careful not to appear as an official document (i.e., appearing to be from a state department). This concern stemmed from any inherent distrust that might be attributable to the nature of the participant population. This entailed that the instrument was designed to incorporate:

- Colored elements to break up the visual space
- “Soft” shapes (e.g., boxes) to focus attention space
- Directional arrows to assist in item transition

Because of security concerns, the instrument itself was not allowed to contain any binding mechanisms which might be transformed into illegal objects. This meant that the survey must take on an unbound format. As such, a

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<sup>25</sup>One item remained elusive to respondents, however. The liberal-conservative self-placement item elicited responses that indicated that participants viewed the answer “liberal” to entail an active and aggressive attribute, while “conservative” elicited an understanding of socially respectful and amenable to society. However, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the control population participants viewed these items differently than the cognitive test group, or potentially the main survey (sub)samples

booklet format was designed to maintain functionality.

Booklets contained an opening description of the study and its rationale. As incentivization was prohibited, it was necessary to entice those sampled (as much as is possible) to participate with appeals to an intended sense of activism and opportunity to have their opinions heard. Institutional booklets contained a single insert sheet which laid out the exact process to follow in clear, easy to understand terms, using graphics and minimal text. This insert also relayed information to respondents on where and when surveys were to be collected (See the appendix for samples).

As pre-distribution contact was not possible, consent to participate was implicit in completion of the survey by participants. A waiver of written consent was approved on the basis that the project presented no more than minimal risk of harm to participants and involved no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context. This was noted in the survey booklet itself. Participants were informed that their participation would be completely voluntary and that they would not receive any direct material benefit from participation. The following subsections relate to the specific processes used to administer the survey instrument to the respective sub-samples.

Additionally, as respondents would not be able to (i.e., were not supplied a method by the researcher) to return their booklets via post, drop-boxes were placed at each facility where the survey was conducted. These drop-boxes were non-transparent, 10-gallon poly-urethane tubs with insertion openings removed from the tops. Lids were securely sealed using non-reusable security ties and were fastened at the time of delivery to the respective locations. All drop-boxes were unsealed by the researcher at the time of collection to ensure confidentiality. Locations are shown in figure 5.4

### **DOP Procedure**

**Delivery:** The DOP-S represented the most direct approach to access participants. because of the availability of known addresses and personal information, a direct mail-in system was employed. Questionnaires were mailed via UNC-CH mailing services to the respective respondents in individually addressed envelopes. Return envelopes were not provided as providing postage for return (i.e., stamps) was also prohibited and metering was unavailable for this study.

**Return Process:** Prior to the mailing of sampled packages, secure drop-boxes were supplied to the respective correctional institute and placed in a secure area at the advice of institutional staff. These drop-boxes were sealed with marked security ties by the researcher and securely fastened to universally accessible areas at the institution. These areas were typically at or near the security station of each facility. Participants were provided with a personalized description of where to find their respective return locations.

**Collection:** Collection of surveys were conducted following 90 days from delivery, coinciding with the projected collection of DCC-S materials. Each drop-box was unsealed by the researcher at point of pick-up and inspected for tampering. Surveys were recorded and marked immediately collection.<sup>26</sup>

### DCC Procedure

**Delivery:** As it was not possible to perform a similar stratified random sampling method as for the DOP-S, a separate approach was designed in which respondents were solicited via a posted study advertisement placed in the waiting area of the respective districts and units. Survey booklets, self-addressed envelopes and writing materials were left for 6 weeks in an open area at the head of the respective unit's reporting desk. These stations were positioned outside any barriers.<sup>27</sup> These materials were accompanied by identical secured drop-boxes as in the DOP-S. Materials were delivered at the same time as opposed to the DOP-S process.

**Return Process:** Respondents returned their booklets to the available dropboxes where the survey materials were listed. As opposed to the DOP-S and CSI-S, participants for DCC-S were given two other modes of return - delivery by self-addressed envelope (without postage), or via an online survey site.

**Collection:** Following the allotted 90 day waiting period, all sites were visited and drop-boxes were collected following the same procedure as with the DOP-S. No respondents chose to utilize the online survey option, while two respondents chose to return their booklets via US Postal mail.

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<sup>26</sup>One respondent returned via mail-in to the researcher's host address.

<sup>27</sup>Many DCC reporting offices have closed reporting areas where reportees are not allowed before entering. Also, there is little chance that a potential participant would have time to participate during their official reporting appointment.

### **CSI Procedure**

The CSI-S involved a wholly separate strategy than the previous DOP-S and DCC-S. For CSI-S, respondents were gathered in group settings at a specified time at the partnering organizations in the respective cities. Thus, delivery, return and collection were achieved at the same time. Respective groups were convened by CSI with their partner organizations in a public setting with the researcher remaining in the room but outside the survey area. This also allowed observation of any difficulties with the survey instrument itself. In total, only one participant was noted having difficulty with the item lists.

### **5.2.6 Quantitative Results:**

#### **Coding**

Once received, responses were re-coded to appropriate spectrum respondent opinions. That is responses are coded as integers, with negative values indicating more liberal/left views and positive numbers indicating conservative/right views. Here, support for state intervention is considered a leftist view and is coded accordingly. Benefit levels are coded using natural numbers with no negative values.

#### **Descriptive Results:**

Analysis of the respective groups proceeds by first delivering an overall descriptive analysis of survey respondents. These results report on basic demographic variables, followed there after by the percentages of responses by item against the respective control group. Control groups are defined as those respondents from the survey series of origin - the American National Election Survey Time-Series 2008; the International Social Survey Project 2006 Role of Government; and the International Social Survey Project 2009 Social Inequality.

#### **Group Comparisons:**

**Analysis of Groups - Felon Sub-Samples:** To allow the merging of sub-samples, one must assume that there are no differences between the responses of those in the two treatment groups (CSI-S and DCC-S). While there is a clear difference between the situations of CSI-S, DCC-S, and that of DOP-S (in terms of the obvious supervision type), there is good reason to also include the third treatment environment in overall tests of equality.

Given the non-normality of the data distribution, a series of non-parametric analyses were carried out to ascertain the difference, if any, between (primarily) the two community sub-samples.<sup>28</sup> The analyses also included the institutionalized condition. As no female respondents were sampled from the DOP, a further series of tests was carried out excluding females from the Homogeneity of Variance (HOV) analysis.

Two tests were selected to run the non-parametric analysis - the Kruskal Wallis (KW) test and the Median Test (MT) of equality. These parallel tests ensure the robustness of the findings and assumption about comparability. The MT also substitutes the KW where the assumptions of the KW are not met. That is, while the KW method is robust against violations of normality and unequal sample size, it *is not* so against violations of HOV. The KW test for multiple groups assumes that the variances of the samples are distributed equally.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, it is not that the non-parametric test would necessarily provide robust answers in the face of non-normality. As such, the data must first meet the requirement of HOV in order to proceed with the KW. Where the HOV is not met, the MT is opted for to provide results between the groups. Since the (parametric) Levene's test for HOV is sensitive to skewness and unequal sample sizes (both considerations for the data used herein) and the robust Brown-Forsythe test also suffers from violations, a non-parametric Levene's test is used which is shown to be the most robust against non-normally distributed and unequal sample sizes (See: Nordstokke and Zumbo 2010).<sup>30</sup>

Following the tests of HOV, 24 significant differences in means were discovered between all three subsamples, with only 4 found between the two community subsamples. Of these 4, one conflict was for an item from the ISEA, one from the ANES, and two from the ISSP06. The bulk of the significant differences (22 out of the 24) were seen between the DCC-S and the DOP-S (Table: 5.6). The results provide convincing grounds to combine the two community subsamples based on the theoretical and empirical ev-

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<sup>28</sup>Shapiro-Wilks tests for normality indicate universal non-normality among the subsamples. Normality tests on the ISSP survey items also reveal that the selected items from selected samples also reveal statistically significant non-normality. It should be noted that the respondents selected from the comparison surveys have not been weighted, as no such weights exist once extracted from the overall region.

<sup>29</sup>The Levene's test has been shown to be less sensitive to deviations from normality than the Bartlett test. A significant Levene's statistic indicates a deviation of variances between groups (Fields 2009).

<sup>30</sup>Results of these tests are available in the appendix for this chapter.

idence.<sup>31</sup> The remaining results are based on this configuration. Only the ISEA comparison reports the segmented results for felon subsamples.

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<sup>31</sup>Supplemental analysis was conducted on males and females to assess whether the preferences of female respondents and male respondents differed significantly from each other. The rationale being that it is possible that there is an inherently different desire among female and males as regards welfare related areas of spending or public policy. Only 11 of the 107 items changed their significance. Of those, 5 of the 11 changed from significant to non-significant deviations of variance.

Table 5.6: Significant Differences Between SubSamples

	CSI	DCC	DOP	Sig.
Provide a job for everyone...		-1.14	-0.54	.035*
Provide health care ...		-1.81	-1.49	.039**
Provide industry with the help...		-1.44	-1.12	.009**
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed		-1.32	-0.77	.001*
Reduce income inequalities ...		-1.31	-0.63	.024**
Provide decent housing ...		-1.60	-1.24	.014**
Taxes for highest earners...		-0.10	-0.57	.020*
Gov Spending:Health		-1.34	-1.09	.080*
Gov Spending:Unemployment		-1.23	-0.68	.035*
Finance projects...		-1.72	-1.33	.024**
Reducing the working week ...		-0.69	-0.13	.006*
Gov. pension... 10 years		2.98	3.33	.031*
Elderly care...Some other relative?		2.51	2.90	.026*
Childcare...Some other relative?		2.50	2.82	.071*
Childcare...Gov. Day-care?	3.06	2.46		.001**
Childcare...Neighbor, Friend or Work-mate?		3.07	3.46	.034*
Government should provide housing ...		-1.51	-1.07	.035*
Gov.should provide cash assistance...		2.60	3.32	.035*
Diff. between parties...	1.36	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.16</b>	.009/.026**
Conflict: Management and Workers		2.00	1.88	.008**
Mistakes of justice...	-0.39		-0.68	.041**
People like me...	-0.18	<b>-1.06</b>	<b>-0.93</b>	.009/.014**
Trust...	-1.12	-1.63		.040**

(\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni. Bold = pairs versus singled group.

**Analysis of Groups - Respondent and Control Groups:** The process carried out for the analysis of group differences was replicated for those of respondents and control groups. Each pairing was analyzed using both a traditional Levene's test for homogeneity of variance, as well as the non-parametric equivalent test. Where the non-parametric test was passed, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used as the test of comparison. Where this test fails, the Median test option is substituted. Post-hoc tests were supplied by the statistical software using Dunn-Bonferoni corrected methods. Results are shown following the descriptive results.

In addition, as is explained in more detail in Section 6.6, a matching process was used on each series of comparisons to adjust for background variables which might distort group comparisons. That is, the control groups were manipulated using the case matching routine in SPSS to distort the distribution of demographic variables (i.e., race, income and gender) to match that of the respondent groups. While case matching has evolved primarily from the medical sciences to control for confounding variables with the (typical) aim to infer causality, it is employed herein to test whether differences between groups remain after matching respondents on available invariant background variables.<sup>32</sup>

**Political Party Identification:** Because a primary concern of this research is to establish the political identity of respondents, a further two analyses using the items provided (again from the 2006 Role of Government module) were conducted in order to assess likely party affiliation. This process was especially useful as respondents, as will be shown in the following sections, reported overwhelmingly Independent in their self-classifications. Using a selection of items from the ISSP06, one analysis calculated respondent scores on two "super-variables" using a derivation of the MANOVA process in SPSS. A second process used the Discriminant Function Analysis in SPSS to predict the probable 3-category membership of respondents. Details follow below.

**Canonical Variates/ Super-Variables:** MANOVA was used to reveal the raw discriminant function coefficients. Two processes were undertaken that used the largest items groups (i.e., government responsibility and

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<sup>32</sup>The results are more conservative than many such analysis of groups in other projects, however the results provide useful comparisons.

government spending) to create these variables. The process involves SPSS running a MANOVA on respondents' (only ISSP06 respondents were used in both analyses) answers to reveal the eigenvalues and canonical correlations of 1 minus the number of groups used as the independent variable. Party self-identification has been collapsed into a 3-category group, labeling respondents Democrat if they had identified as some measure of Democrat, Republican if they had identified as some degree of Republican, and Independent if they had explicitly identified as Independent. The process uses a set of items (the dependent variables in the MANOVA) and linearly extrapolates roots (canonical variates) based on 1-Independent Categories. Thus two roots are created for each analysis to maximally discriminate between the 3 groups based on the given dependent variables (responsibility and spending variables).

**Discriminant Function Analysis:** An analysis was first run using the entire US sample of the ISSP 2006 to investigate which variables (overall) contribute to the most robust discrimination of the 3 states (i.e., Democrat, Republican, or Independent). Only those variables which attempt to measure preferences (e.g, what the government *ought* to do), as opposed to experiences (e.g., items which are more likely to measure the impact of personal experiences), are included in the analysis.

Using the full sample (step-wise, Wilk's Lambda method, exclusion of cases at 0.10), an overall "hit-rate" of 58.1 percent original and 57.2 percent cross validated was given, with 75.3/ 74 and 64.7/64.4 percent Democrats and Republicans correctly classified original and cross validated respectively. This analysis was repeated using Mahalanobis distance as well as using separate covariance matrices, however no discernible (greater than 5 percent) hit rate was achieved. An analysis which included all variables produced similar results (78.5 and 68.5 correct classification for Democrats and Republicans respectively).

This process was repeated for the South Atlantic sample with a greater return for the step-wise analysis - 81/72.7 and 72.8/63 percent correctly classified for original/cross-validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the decision was made to utilize the South Atlantic subsample to clas-

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<sup>33</sup>Analysis using all variables entered. Repeated model was run using the step-wise entry with fewer correctly classified cases: 81.9/79.2 and 65.7/61.6 percent original/cross-validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.

sify the corresponding sample of felons.<sup>34</sup> In all, 34 variables are used to discriminate between groups, containing items from government responsibility, government spending, government intervention in the economy, views of taxation, views of justice, attitudes towards civil rights, and attitudes on extremism.

### 5.2.7 Qualitative Results

**Purpose:** Because responses to items provide only a snapshot of respondents' views on a selection of items, a further analysis of interviews was conducted using a group of individuals who had participated in the survey, and using primary data from Manza and Uggen's (2006) research focused in the same area.<sup>35</sup> As background for the present project, the findings of Manza and Uggen (2006) provided a starting point by which to combine a positivist (quantitative survey) approach with a more constructivist (qualitative interview) approach - utilizing respondent interviews to provide deeper interpretations of item responses.

The interview guide for this stage of the research process used interview items from the interview guide reported in Manza and Uggen (2006), as well as a selection of topics which pertained to that of the issues directly covered in the survey itself (see Appendix for interview guide). While the primary aim was intended to gain deeper insight into respondent results, a secondary purpose consisted of comparing views from North Carolina offenders to that of those from Minnesota offenders from the Manza and Uggen (2006) research. That is, the results from the qualitative analysis represent a complementary Qualitative Secondary Analysis utilizing both primary data and data from the previous Manza and Uggen (2006) study (Heaton 2000; Irwin and Winterton 2011a, 2011b). The analysis here is based on an inductive approach, utilizing semi-structured interviews from both North Carolina community supervised offenders and Minnesota institutionally supervised offenders. All analysis was carried out using Atlas.ti. Coding followed a limited depth of

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<sup>34</sup>The results show a Box's M value of 2191.42,  $F= 1.181$ ; however log determinants are approximately equal between Democrat and Republican categories (-26.124 vs. -27.424). As such I proceed to use this configuration to classify following Burns and Burns (2008). A parallel analysis using multinomial logistic regression produced no better classification results and the predicted group membership is not calculated on those scores from the control group (i.e., ISSP 06 respondents).

<sup>35</sup>In fact, the survey itself was compiled using the original interview guide from Manza and Uggen (2006 Ch.6) to inform a degree of the selection of variables for instrumentation.

analysis, using only two stages to first categorize descriptive aspects of the data and then a further step to group coded segments into decipherable patterns (Saldaña 2009). That is, a deeper investigation into the *meanings* of respondents' answers were not pursued given the purposes of the qualitative analysis - triangulation of responses from the quantitative research. As such, this process was not intended to produce or confirm any existing theory, as much as to contextualize items in the views of felon respondents. This is especially important to consider in the perspective of the secondary use format of the Minnesota interviewees. A brief overview of QSA is given in Section 7.1.

### 5.2.8 GIS Analysis:

**Purpose:** A final aim of this research was the analysis of offender populations at the state and sub-state level. This process involved three stages. The first stage involved data gained from the North Carolina Department of Corrections through an intermediary organization (i.e., Justice Mapping Center). This data consisted of offender entry rates into prison for the year 2008. This data was available only at the census tract level for the state. The data is then joined with electoral administrative data to analyze the district level impact of felony disenfranchisement, using prison entries as a rough proxy for felony status, for the state. A final stage of the analysis involved the geocoding of respondent current or former addresses. Respondents were provided an option to provide their current or most recent address in the survey instrument. Overall, 90 percent of respondents were successfully processed. This data enables both the determination of sampling accuracy (i.e., whether respondents were sampled from the desired areas of investigation) and analyses of responses superimposed onto geographic coordinates. That is, by obtaining their communities of origin, this research is able to more accurately assess not just the results of respondents attitudes, but also where those attitudes are located. A more detailed explanation of processes is given in Chapter 8.



## Chapter 6

# The Political and Economic Preferences of Felony Offenders - Results

The following chapter reports the results from the field research outlined previously. These are the first findings of such a survey done exclusively on supervised persons (to the knowledge of the author). Section 6.1 proceeds with a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of participants. First, response rates and spread of survey participation is reported, including a detailed account of the stratifying process of the DOP-S which is enabled by matching respondents with their official records available from the NC Department of Corrections public database (6.1.1). Matching the background variables available from the NCDOC, with the data from the publicly available offender information and the information provided by respondents, it is possible to follow the representativeness of (at least) the institutionally supervised sampled respondents (Tables: 6.2 and 6.3).<sup>1</sup>

A detailed portrait of respondents is then given, providing a picture of the survey participants on key demographic variables (6.1.2). Following this, the aggregated results are delivered in 5 stages corresponding to item sources. Items taken from the ANES are given in section 6.2, followed by the ISSP09 items on social inequality in section 6.3. Following this, the more numerous results of items taken from the ISSP06 are presented in section 6.4, followed by results from the ISEA items which present more detailed preferences regarding the generosity and provision of social benefits in section 6.5.

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<sup>1</sup>Future research in this area should consider appropriating time and resources to better track respondents by these identifying variables to better assess the spread of take-up by this particular category of hard-to-reach population.

These sections are followed by analysis of the variance between groups based on both unmatched and matched (sub-section 6.6.1) samples. The description of these processes are given in the beginning of section 6.6. Finally, an analysis of the predicted partisan affiliation is reported in subsection 6.6.2. This chapter finishes with a discussion of the results. Following this chapter, a more substantive analysis of disenfranchised preferences is given with qualitative interviews carried out with participants and secondary sources. These qualitative results assist in exploring the preferences of disenfranchised citizens in their own words.

## 6.1 Descriptive Results of Respondents

### 6.1.1 Response Rates

**General Rates:** Of a total possible participation of 2100 (for DOC and DOP only), 221 individuals completed and returned survey booklets. Of those, 96 individuals from community corrections returned survey materials compared to 134 institutionally supervised participants (See Table 6.1).<sup>2</sup> Comparable statistics are not available for CSI-S given the alternate methods used. After controlling for drop-outs and those with total item response on less than two-thirds of total items, 10 participants from the DCC-S were dropped from the analysis.<sup>3</sup> The remaining descriptives are from the amended dataset. Figure 6.1 shows the geocoded current or last known residence of respondents from all sub-samples. While response rates were, on the whole, less than optimal - the consistency of the recorded background variables matched with the spatial clustering of respondents salvages a certain degree of faculty lost by low-response rates and lack of simple random sampling.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>*Type* refers to the level and nature of supervised respondent sites, note figure 5.4

<sup>3</sup>This decision was made so as to normalize the data as much as possible across sub-samples for the purposes of analysis.

<sup>4</sup>Not to repeat the entirety of confounding issues dealt with when researching hard-to-reach and protected populations, however these results augment the existing research with this population, especially as it concerns primary data generation.

Table 6.1: Return Rates for DCC and DOP by Unit

	Distributed	Returned	Rate	Type
District 21	37	10	27.03%	DCC
District 18	55	9	16.36%	DCC
District 14	55	8	14.55%	DCC
District 18	55	7	12.73%	DCC
District 26	57	7	12.28%	DCC
District 12	110	12	10.91%	DCC
District 14	55	6	10.91%	DCC
District 27	110	9	8.18%	DCC
District 10	115	7	6.09%	DCC
District 21	37	2	5.41%	DCC
District 21	37	2	5.41%	DCC
District 26	57	3	5.26%	DCC
District 10	100	5	5.00%	DCC
District 5	110	5	4.55%	DCC
District 28	110	4	3.64%	DCC
NASH CI	120	22	18.33%	MED
HARNETT CI	125	19	15.20%	MED
ALBEMARLE CI	135	20	14.81%	MED
COLUMBUS CI	108	8	7.41%	MED
BROWN CREEK CI	193	12	6.22%	MED
BUNCOMBE CC	32	14	43.75%	MIN
WAKE CC	61	13	21.31%	MIN
ROBESON CC	37	5	13.51%	MIN
NEW HANOVER CC	52	7	13.46%	MIN
Forsyth CC	57	7	12.28%	MIN
GASTON CC	44	5	11.36%	MIN
DAVIDSON CC	36	2	5.56%	MIN
<b>Total</b>	<b>2100</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>10.52%</b>	
<b>DCC</b>	<b>1100</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>8.73%</b>	
<b>DOP</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>13.40%</b>	




Figure 6.1: Participant Geocoded Addresses w/ Census Tract (2008)

**DOP-S Specific:** Following the DOP-S through the staging processes, an option unavailable for the DCC-S and CSI-S subsamples, it is possible to examine the distortion of participants by stratifying, at least on educational and racial variables (i.e., these are the only publicly available data which are matched for the respondents).<sup>5</sup> As seen in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the overall representation of offenders by education and racial groups remains relatively consistent across the sampling process.

Respondents are slightly more educated than the entire DOP population, 32.84 percent having at least a 12th grade education compared to 27.32 percent of all DOP supervised individuals; respondents are also more likely to be black than with the DOP population, 61.94 percent compared to 57.69 percent. Disparities in these rates seem to be a function of the stratifying process, with education ratios changing at the first and third stage of sampling. The selection of specific institutions based on county of residence first shifts the highest education received upwards, followed thereafter by the random sampling from the adjusted sample frame.

Racial ratios first change noticeably at the second stage, with the exclusion by county of residence to narrow the focus to urban communities. Particularly interesting, given the data gathered on educational attainment, is the disparity between what level DOP-S respondents reported and what their DOC provided biographical data reports. A full 22 percent of respondents indicated they had completed some college or university, compared with approximately 2.1 percent who reported higher than 12th grade (high school or GED) by the DOC for the same respondents (these descriptives are partially repeated below in Figure 6.2.). No such discrepancy was found with the reports on racial variables.

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<sup>5</sup>A supplementary breakdown of response rates by criminal activity, characteristics of supervision, and other pertinent factors remains forthcoming. The results from such an analysis is not deemed relevant for the overall purposes of this work.

Table 6.2: Stage Descriptives: Educational Attainment for DOP

	All DOP	Selected Inst.	Final SF	Sample	Resp.	Official	Resp.	Given
0	0%	0.47%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1	0%	0.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2	0%	0.26%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3	0%	0.52%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4	0%	0.26%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
5	0%	0.62%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1.50%	0%
6	2%	3.19%	3%	3%	3%	1%	0%	0%
7	2%	1.98%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2.2%	2.2%
8	9%	7.72%	6%	7%	7%	6%	2.2%	2.2%
9	16%	14.96%	14%	14%	14%	14%	6.7%	6.7%
10	20%	17.34%	17%	15%	17%	17%	4.5%	4.5%
11	20%	19.67%	24%	23%	26%	26%	7.5%	7.5%
12	27%	30.6%	31%	33%	33%	33%	53.0%	53.0%
13	0%	0.71%	0%	1%	0%	0%	22.4%	22.4%
14	1%	0.88%	1%	1%	1%	1%	-	-
15	0%	0.23%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	-
16	0%	0.2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	-	-
17	0%	0.05%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	-
18	0%	0.03%	0%	0%	0%	1%	-	-

Table 6.3: Stage Descriptives: Racial Category

	All DOP	Sel. Inst.	S. Frame	Sample	Resp.
<b>WHITE</b>	34.44%	32.95%	22.04%	23.28%	32.09%
<b>BLACK</b>	57.69%	55.22%	67.75%	65.73%	61.94%
<b>INDIAN</b>	2.01%	2.23%	0.33%	0.20%	0.75%
<b>ASIAN</b>	0.28%	0.46%	0.57%	0.70%	0.00%
<b>OTHER</b>	4.9%	7.75%	7.71%	8.29%	2.99%
<b>UNKN</b>	0.68%	1.38%	1.52%	1.60%	0.75%

### 6.1.2 Characteristics of Respondents

Respondents were generally in their late to mid-30s, with an overall mean age of approximately 38 years: DCC-S mean age was 33.69, DOP-S was 40.59, the corresponding age for CSI-S was 38.43. Respondents were predominantly African American (Figure 6.2), and largely reported having at least a high school education or equivalent (i.e., some respondents indicated that they had obtained a General Education Diploma (GED) at the time of the survey) (Figure 6.3a). Parental educational attainment, overall, was reported largest among the mothers of participants, with 32 percent reporting at least some college or more for mothers (Fig: 6.4a) as compared to 20.8 percent overall for fathers (Fig: 6.4b). The percentage reported for father educational level achievement was particularly higher for incarcerated individuals (20.8 percent) than for community supervised respondents (8.3 - CSI-S; 18.3 DCC-S) (Fig:6.4).

Respondents were not overwhelming religious, with just under 60 percent (59.8) reporting that they either do not attend religious services (15.9 percent) or do so infrequently (43.9).<sup>6</sup> Of those who reported a religious denomination, the overwhelming majority of respondents reported belonging to the Baptist denomination (79.2 percent). This is compared to 81.6 percent for the ANES control group (Fig: 6.3b). Additionally, respondents were overwhelmingly drawn from the lower ends of the income distribution, with a full 77.6 percent of respondents reporting current or past incomes of less than 25,000 USD; 45.5 percent of respondents reported incomes below 10,000 USD annually, below the national poverty threshold set by the US Census

<sup>6</sup>Responses counted as infrequent attendance included: *attend once a month, a few times a year, and only on holidays.*

Bureau (Fig: 6.5).<sup>7</sup> Fully three-quarters of respondents were non-violent offenders (75.7 percent), with 33.5 percent drug related offenders at the time of survey (Fig:6.6)<sup>8</sup>





Figure 6.2: Reported Racial Groups by SubSample

The following sections lay out the responses of participants, divided into groups based on the original survey instruments. First, those items taken from the ANES (primarily the 2008 Time-Series data file) are given, followed by those from the ISSP09, and the ISSP06. ISEA responses follow last. An important note is needed in the following sections. For the sake of parsimony, results from the CSI-S and DCC-S have been merged to form the category of *Community*, representing those individuals who are supervised under the remit of the Department of Community Corrections, as opposed to those of the Division of Prisons. This decision is based on an analysis of means carried out between the three sub-sample groups mentioned previously.


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<sup>7</sup>According to the US Census Bureau, the poverty threshold for individuals under 65 years of age in 2011 was 11,702 USD

<sup>8</sup>Reported convictions were reclassified into a three category variable for property, violent, and drug related offenses. A full breakdown of these categories is available in the appendix for this chapter.




(a) Education




(b) Denomination

Figure 6.3: Respondents Education and Religious Affiliation



(a) Mother



(b) Father

Figure 6.4: Educational Attainment of Parents




Figure 6.5: Reported Income by SubSample




Figure 6.6: Main Crime Type by SubSample

## 6.2 ANES Results

The American National Election Survey is the oldest and, arguably, most renowned source of opinions of the American public. Beginning in 1948, the ANES has measured public perceptions continuously with both pre- and post-election surveys; capturing a range of attitudes about preferences regarding candidates, issues *de jour*, and modes of participation (to mention a few areas). For the purposes of the research here, only 11 variables were selected for inclusion into the compiled survey instrument. These variables were selected so as to measure areas of political interest and activity which were not overtly emphasized in the associated items from the ISSP06, ISSP09, and ISEA.

**Political Identification:** The item measuring political self-identification was taken from the ANES 2008 pre-election survey, obtained from the 2008 Time-Series dataset. The item asks:

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: [Check one] - followed by seven Lickert scale choices ranging from *Strong Democrat* to *Strong Republican*.<sup>9</sup>

Regarding the self identified political partisanship, both felon groups report considerable differences from the ANES control (Fig:6.8a). Almost half of both community and institutionally supervised participants (46.3 and 54.5 percent respectively) identified with neither the Democrats nor the Republicans. This is in contrast to 12.8 percent of the ANES control which identified themselves as Independent. These results, and those in the following sections, bolster the research that the disenfranchised are not necessarily a windfall for the Democratic party, though there is an obvious skew in favor of the Democrats for those who do not identify themselves as Independent. That is, 32.5 and 43.4 of community and institutional participants identify themselves as Democrats to some degree, while only 13 and 10.3 percent identified as Republicans of some degree (respectively).

**Ideological Divide:** When asked about their political ideological position, respondents do not appear markedly dissimilar from the ANES control group (Fig: 6.8b). Posed with the item, *When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as: [options]*, respondents reported nearly equal positionings across the spectrum; with community groups reporting 30.7 percent

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<sup>9</sup>Refer to the appendix for this chapter. Items are recoded to range from -3 to 3.

liberal to some degree, 33 percent middle of the road, and 36.3 percent as conservative to some degree. For institutional groups, the results are 31.7, 30.5, and 37.8 respectively. For the ANES control, the scores were 22.2, 32.9, and 44.9 percent respectively. Thus, while the disenfranchised identify as somewhat more liberal to some degree than the control group, it is not a considerable amount (nor is it significantly so, as shown in Subsection 6.6.1.). Additionally, when asked if they saw any difference between the two major parties, respondents mirrored the answers of the ANES control group (Fig: 6.7 ).






Figure 6.7: Differences Between Democrats and Republicans

**Contact with Political Parties:** One of the more under-emphasized facets of political disenfranchisement is the unattractiveness of these groups to political actors. As Abramsky (2006) asserts in interviews with political actors (i.e., politicians), the disenfranchised, aside from being unappealing on account of their criminality, are equally disadvantaged because of their lack of value to elected officials. That is, there is very little reason for elected officials to court the preferences (sincerely or not) of those who cannot contribute to their electoral success. The effort of campaigning and canvassing must weigh the return to investment in any political campaign. The evidence here, however, is not sufficient enough to categorically support this

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
(a) Party Self-Identification



(b) ANESLIBCON

Figure 6.8: 7-Point Party and Ideological Responses

contention. The results show that both community and institutional populations report having been contacted by one of the major parties at approximately the same rate, however the institutionally supervised population does report lower levels (22.3 percent compared to 33.6 and 35.4 percent for community and ANES control respectively) of contact by the Democratic party. Interestingly, both groups of respondents indicated they had been contacted by a party other than the Democratic or Republican party. The lack of contact is also reported in individual interviews and from secondary analysis.



(a) Contacted: Republicans (b) Contacted: Democrats (c) Contacted: Other

Figure 6.9: Party Solicitation and Contact

**Participation:** On the other end of the spectrum, looking at the civic volunteerist perspective, respondents report considerably high rates of intention to be involved in campaign activities compared to reported instances. Given five areas, respondents were asked:

*During the next election which you are able to participate, would you be likely to: (1) Work for a party or candidate? (2) Wear a button or put a bumper sticker on your car? (3) Attend political rallies or meetings? (4) Donate money to a campaign? (5) Talk to others and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?*

A note of caution, however. The items are not completely comparable as the ANES on these items are based on the post-election questionnaire. As such, the scores from respondents measure intent, whereas those of the ANES control measure reported occurrence. This is an important distinction.




Figure 6.10: ANES Participation


**Participation in Elections:** Given the nature of the population under investigation, items were composed to measure respondents views on the likelihood of their participation at varying levels of government. The rationale behind these items explores the aforementioned assumptions that the disenfranchisement of felons is most likely to affect those offices at the sub-national, and even sub-state, levels. If this assumption is to hold, we should expect higher intentions from respondents on those elections that are closer to the local level. As such, four items were included which were not included the ANES, however are presented here owing to their congruity with the political items reported in this section. Respondents were asked: *If you have voted/ or if you would vote, how likely do you think you would vote in the following elections: (1)City, (2) County, (3) State, (4) Federal.* The majority of respondents across subsamples report that they would be likely to participate in elections at the city and county level if allowed to vote, while the amount asserting their desire to participate at the state and federal level are noticeably higher.

Table 6.4: Would Participate in Election: Very Likely or Definitely


	CSI	DCC	DOP
City	56.82%	58.97%	64.00%
County	53.33%	56.41%	66.40%
State	68.89%	72.73%	78.40%
Federal	68.89%	72.73%	78.40%

Table 6.4 paints a very ambitious picture of respondents. Given that turnout in municipal, county and even state elections are dismally low. Even in the high profile election of 2008, in which President Barack Obama won the state of North Carolina (a key battleground state), only 70 percent of registered voters turned out to vote. In the 2010 mid-term elections, which ushered in a Republican dominated government in the state, only 44 percent of registered voters turned out to vote (NCSBE 2014). Indeed, city and county turnout rates are even more depressed. However, should this optimistic turnout rate hold, and assuming that respondents are not significantly over-biased towards participation themselves (a fact which this initial exploration of this population cannot confirm nor deny), it would provide justification for pause among some local actors who fear the participation of those who have interests directly impacted by their offices (e.g., elected court officials, sheriffs, county bonds officials, and even local school boards).


At present, and with the prodigious work conducted by Burch and others, the results should be taken with ruminative heed. Be that as it may, the results provide insight to a measure of political interest among the disenfranchised not previously reported.




(a) City Elections



(b) County Elections



(c) State Elections



(d) Federal Elections

Figure 6.11: Reported Likelihood of Electoral Participation

While these results are interesting in their own right, they form only a part of the identity of respondents. In essence, the results so far indicate only where respondents place themselves on the political spectrum and possible, and likely abeyant, modes of participation. What is more useful for the analysis of the political disenfranchised is not their placements on metrics of participation, or even items of group membership, but rather what these respondents see as the role of those who govern. These items describe in more detail, and with more precision (as will be shown in Subsection 6.6.2), the types of preferences which citizens base future action upon. These preferences are the crux of policy platforms, not to mention campaign promises, and therefore apropos to the purposes here.

### 6.3 ISSP 09 Results

The module on Social Inequality is one of eleven under the auspices of the International Social Survey Programme. Beginning in 1984, it consists of 4 waves conducted in 41 nations. Five items were selected for inclusion into the survey instrument. These items concern the amount of conflict respondents believe exists between particular categories of society, as well as their own placement on a class scale. In addition, the ISSP09 includes three items which are also covered in the ISSP06 instrument, as well as the political party identification item reported in the previous section with ANES items. The results for the ISSP09 and ANES Party Identification are nearly identical, as can be seen in Figure 6.12a.


**Social Class:** Respondents were asked:

*Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular class. Which social class would you say you belong to? (1) Lower Class, (2) Working Class, (3) Lower Middle Class, (4) Middle Class, (5) Upper Middle Class, (6) Upper Class*


As with the skew (or rather lack thereof) in the political self-identification, respondents tended to differentiate themselves in comparison to the ISSP09 control (Fig: 6.12b).

Approximately three-quarters of respondents (77.2 and 73.1 percent for Community and Institutional groups) identified themselves as Lower Middle Class, Working Class, or Lower Class; compared to just over half (53.2 percent) of the ISSP09 control. Nearly a quarter of community respondents (24.3 percent) and just under 15 percent (14.6) of institutional respondents

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(a) 7-Point Party Identification



(b) 6-Point Class Identification

Figure 6.12: Party and Class Positions

identified as lower class - compared to 4.6 percent of the control. Furthermore, while the control group shows a bi-modal distribution, the respondent groups show a singular, albeit skewed, shape. Whether this is indicative of an overall comprehension of social class standing amongst the majority of disenfranchised citizens is not possible to determine, however the results here suggest that such an awareness is not outside the realm of possibility.

**Social Conflict:** Following their views towards their own position in the social class hierarchy, respondents were asked to what degree they believed that society was faced with conflicts between certain groups. In particular, respondents were posed with the question:

*In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in America, how much conflict is there between... Poor People and Rich People; Working Class and Middle Class; People at the top of society and those at the bottom; Management and Workers; Those in power in Government and the governed.*

As Figure 6.13 illustrates, respondents were much more like the control group primarily on the issue of conflict between workers and employers (Fig: 6.15d). They differed quite substantially (and significantly) in their views on the existence of conflict in the remaining aspects of society. Community and institutional respondents were more likely to believe in strong conflict between the poor and the rich (48.9 and 40.7 versus 15.9 percent) (Fig: 6.13a), and between those at the top and those at the bottom (63.8 and 48.4 versus 13.9 percent) (Fig: 6.13c). For beliefs in conflict between the working and middle classes, the ISSP09 group manifested much lower beliefs of any conflict, a full 70 percent of the ISSP09 group reported *very little* conflict, as opposed to the 33.1 and 40.5 percent of community and institutional groups respectively (Fig: 6.13b). While there is no comparison available for the final item (governing vs. the governed), the finding that the strongest beliefs in strong conflict are reported between those in power (i.e., government) and those governed (the people) is an interesting one (Fig: 6.15e).




Figure 6.13: Conflict in Society

Taken together, it is apparent that respondents do have particular views on their place in society. In addition, they exhibit beliefs that society is not only unequal, but it is unequal in certain respects. That the differences between the views on conflict between managers and workers show no clear pattern could be interpreted as meaning that respondents and the control group simply are not extremely convinced of any conflict between these groups. It could also be that there is indeed not sufficient conflict to be observed or experienced.

However it could also owe much to the specific nature of the complexity of employer-employee dynamics in the US.<sup>10</sup> That the ISSP09 group sees very little conflict in contrast to the community and institutional groups is also interesting, especially considering that the control group exhibits higher income on average than the respondent groups. This matter is dealt with further in subsection 6.6.1. That said, there appears a firm belief amongst respondents in conflict between groups in American society which stands at odds with those of the control group. I turn now to the more extensive grouping of items, those of the ISSP's Role of Government module.

## 6.4 ISSP 06 Results

As mentioned earlier, the ISSP Role of Government module comprises the single largest item source for the research into the preferences of the disenfranchised felon population. Indeed, the entire item list of this module is used in the present survey. This inclusion facilitates further analysis used in subsection 6.6.2. The results follow by reporting items pertaining to the role which respondents believe government ought to play in the general management of social life (6.4.1), followed by items reporting the degree to which respondents see the incidence of taxation (6.4.2). Subsection 6.4.3 details respondents' preferences on items of government spending, subsection 6.4.4 reports the degree to which government ought (not) to involve itself in the functioning of the economy, while 6.4.5 reports the degree to which respondents approve of government's handling of particular public issues.

These items are then followed by a selection of items which measure respondents' views on citizen agency and their own subjective agency. Subsection 6.4.6 reports on respondents' views on the extent to which citizens ought

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<sup>10</sup>The region, and particularly the state of North Carolina, is not known for strong employee centered politics. The state is part of a band of states in the region which are dubbed "right-to-work" states, designed to limit the power of unions.

to be allowed to freely exercise their autonomy, 6.4.7 reports on items which measure the degree to which the average citizen has an impact on government and their own governance, while 6.4.8 details respondents perceptions of their own personal agency.

### 6.4.1 Government's Responsibility

Views on the government's responsibility in the realm of governance are measured by ten items ranging from protecting the environment to providing assistance to the unemployed. Overall, respondents were more liberal about the proper role of government in the daily functioning of the country. On the issue of whether the government ought to ensure full employment, respondents were drastically different than their control counterparts. 51.5 and 42.2 percent of community and institutional respondents indicated they believed that it *definitely should be* the government's responsibility, compared to just 18.1 percent of ISSP respondents.


This skew is not as pronounced in the area of price control, where respondents differed only slightly in trend compared with the control group (95.6 and 83.2 percent of community and institutional versus 77 percent ISSP06 in support of government responsibility). Respondents also track their ISSP06 counterparts in the area of providing healthcare to the sick, but are measurably more in favor of this area as well. Almost all community and institutional respondents (98.5 and 90.2 percent respectively) report that the government has a responsibility to provide healthcare to the sick, compared to a nearly identical rate for ISSP06 respondents (89.3 percent). However, community and institutional respondents reported that they believed the government definitely had the responsibility at much higher rates. 83.8 and 72.7 percent of community and institutional respondents (respectively) reported they thought it *definitely should be* the government's responsibility, compared to just over half of ISSP06 respondents (55.8 percent).

The degree to which respondents see the proper role of government responsibility is mirrored again by their ISSP06 counterparts, and again in an area which is not necessarily limited in scope to their particular demographic profile. When it comes to protection for the elderly (i.e., the responsibility of government to *provide a decent standard of living for the elderly*), similar levels are witnessed in aggregated support. 89.3 percent of ISSP06 respondents, compared with 97.8 and 93.8 percent of community and institutional respondents, answered affirmatively for government responsibility. The skew in opinions returns when posed with the proposition that the government

has the responsibility for providing sufficient assistance to help industry grow (97.8, 93.8, and 89.3 percent of community, institutional and ISSP06 respondents respectively).

One trend is particularly visible. The support among felon respondents towards the responsibility of the state to interact with facets of the lives of citizens is nearly stationary as compared to that of the ISSP06 control group. What's more, this stationarity is witnessed in the community group more than the preferences of the institutional group. When looking at support for government responsibility for providing a *decent standard of living for the unemployed*, the ISSP06 group shifts drastically to less responsibility, with just over half (52.4) supporting government's responsibility. In contrast, institutional preferences shift to 73.9 percent, while the community preference remains strong at 86.3 percent.


The preference for government responsibility remains stable when asked whether it ought to be government's responsibility to reduce inequality. 86.3 percent of community compared with 66.7 percent and 52.3 percent of institutional and ISSP06 respondents. On the issue of providing financial assistance for university to those from low-income families, there is near universal agreement. 90.7 of ISSP06 respondents and 97.8 and 93.9 percent of community and institutional respondents supported the proposition. However, again, it is the intensity with which the support is given that differentiates the community and institutional respondents from their ISSP06 counterparts. 80 percent of community and 74.8 percent of institutional respondents felt that it *definitely should be* the responsibility of government, compared with 55.2 percent of the control group. This "intensity", as it were, dissipates for the proposition that government ought to *provide housing for those who cannot afford it*, with 66.7 of community and 50.8 of institutional respondents opting for definite government responsibility, compared with 34.5 percent of ISSP06 respondents (total support was 94.8, 89.2, and 75.8 percent respectively). Finally, both the intensity and overall support re-align for the most non-discriminatory (i.e., non-targeted) area of public policy (environmental protection). Indeed, it is the only instance where the ISSP06 respondents have higher rates of support for government responsibility (93.8 percent) than the community (93.2 percent) and institutional (92.1 percent) groups.



(e) Industrial Protection

(d) Security for Elderly

Figure 6.14: Government Responsibility to Provide (1/2):



(a) Security Unemployed

(b) Reduce Inequality

(c) Financial Aid

(d) Security Housing

(e) Environmental Protection

Figure 6.15: Government Responsibility to Provide (2/2):

Clearly, the general population taken from the ISSP06 persists in a much more conservative role for government than that of the community and institutional groups. The fluctuations seen across policy areas in the ISSP06 responses appear to measure quite dynamic views on the role of government. It might be that felon respondents simply mark down the ranks regarding government responsibility. That is, it might be argued that respondents are, essentially, not deliberating on the items with the same sincerity. This supposition seems more than marginally dismissive of participants' views. However, should this be the situation, it would also apply to those in the control population which consistently rank in high support for government responsibility. Moreso, it would stand to reason that such inconsistencies would be borne out in the remainder of items given to respondents. Such item responses are given in the following subsections.


#### 6.4.2 Government Redistribution

Perhaps one of the most straightforward areas of public debate, especially in the years surrounding the timing of the research project (e.g., the Occupy Movement and others), is that of the incidence of taxation. More specifically, the issue of whether the rich are taxed enough and whether the poor are taxed too much. Respondents were posed with the question:

*Generally, how would you describe taxes in America today? (Taxes include all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, taxes on goods and services and all the rest. (1) First for those with high incomes; (2) Next, for those with middle incomes; (3) Lastly, for those with low incomes.)*

If the previous responses suggested a possibility of stationary views concerning other policy areas, the responses concerning the incidence of taxation clearly do not evince any such ambivalence among participants. Respondents are not significantly more likely to “soak the rich”, at least not more so than the control group. Interestingly, community respondents were more likely to voice the opinion that taxes were *too high* or *much too high* for the rich (33.3 percent) compared to the institutional (20.5 percent) and ISSP06 respondents (18.4 percent). 52.8, 43.9, and 53.1 percent of respondents, respectively, said taxes on the rich were *too low* or *much too low*. Community respondents also viewed taxes as too high for middle income earners at a greater percentage than their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts (70.4 percent compared to 54.8 and 62.1 percent respectively). Finally, when asked whether they thought taxes were too high for those of low income, respondents were all

firmly of the opinion that taxes were *too high* or *much too high* for low income groups; 87.1, 78.2, and 66.6 percent of community, institutional, and ISSP06 respondents respectively.



(a) Taxes: High

(b) Taxes: Middle

(c) Taxes: Low

Figure 6.16: Tax Rates for Income Groups

While respondents are more likely to support lower taxes in general, this is assuredly not surprising given the anti-tax environment characteristic of many communities in the US in general. Most surprisingly is the strong (near triple) response towards taxes being *much too high* for the high income. While 5.2 percent of ISSP06 respondents viewed taxes as much too high for the rich, 17.9 percent of community respondents and 12.3 percent of institutional respondents voiced such a view.

### 6.4.3 Government Spending

Given that respondents, thus far, view a solidly positive role for the government in society, and taken with the results that respondents across community and institutional groupings do not view the incidence of taxation similarly, the subject turns now to the area of specific areas of government spending. The items concerning spending are particularly valuable as they encourage participants to assess areas of spending which would have a direct benefit to them or their communities, as opposed to more abstract concepts such as the proper role of government. Respondents were posed with a list of areas of spending:<sup>11</sup>

*Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much more”, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.*

Examining the results for government spending, the similarities between felon respondents and the ISSP06 control are striking, with the exception of one telling item. Community and institutional respondents were similarly concerned with spending levels for culture and arts, environment, and military and defense. The exception lies with spending on law enforcement. Community respondents were more in favor of increased spending for the arts (37.1 percent) compared to the institutional (27.5 percent) and ISSP06 (28.4 percent); while all groups ranked roughly evenly for spending on environmental issues (60.8, 58.7, and 59.1 percent respectively). These similarities are also witnessed in the area of military and defense, with all three groups averaging around 40 percent in support of increased spending (38.8 (C), 38.5 (P), and 41.8 (I)), and approximately 25 percent in favor of reductions (23.9 (C), 26.9

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<sup>11</sup>The iteending (i.e., healthcare, education, unemployment,ms here are grouped into areas of spending which reflect more welfare oriented areas of public sp and retirement) and those which are considered not directly welfare functions (i.e., environmental, culture and arts, law enforcement, and national defense).

(P), and 26.2 (I)).<sup>12</sup> When it comes to spending on law enforcement, however, suspicions of a *criminal voting bloc* may find a degree of solace that, at least for the participants in this project, both community and institutional groups support reduced spending. While 63.4 percent of ISSP06 respondents reported a desire to see some increase in spending for law enforcement, the percentage was only around 25 percent for respondents (25.4 (C) and 24.8 (P)percent). 28.5 percent of community and 29.5 percent of institutional respondents indicated they would like to see less spending on law enforcement, compared with only 6.5 percent of ISSP6 respondents. That said, the majority of respondents actually prefer to keep spending levels the same, with 46.2 percent of community and 45.7 percent of institutional respondents preferring to maintain spending at current levels. Thus, one might conclude that, yes, the disenfranchised would prefer less spending on law enforcement; however, this is only relative to that of the general population. In fact, respondents do not call for a total evisceration of resources towards law enforcement. To the contrary, it appears that respondents prefer (rather) alternative modes of solutions. Moving to the second grouping of spending areas, the profile of the disenfranchised begins to materialize.

When it comes to public welfare goods, as much as they can be determined from those items provided by the Role of Government instrument, respondents are much more similar to their ISSP06 counterparts. The strength of those preferences, however, is worth noting. While all respondents favor increased spending on healthcare (87.3(C), 84(P), and 81.3(I) percent), community respondents were particularly more keen on *much more spending* being appropriated (51.5 percent compared to 35.1 (P) and 39.1 (I) percent). While all groups wish to see increases in education spending (86.7 (C), 90.2 (P), and 86.7 (I) percent), respondents are much more adamant about increased spending - with 60.7 percent of community and 55.3 percent of institutional groups preferring *much more spending* compared to 40.6 percent of the control group. The distribution for spending on retirement is nearly evenly distributed across groups, with 68.7, 64.3 and 66.5 percent of community, institutional, and ISSP06 respondents favoring increases. The final category of spending, unemployment, sees a return of skewed distribution between respondent and control groups. While 40.4 percent of ISSP06 respondents preferred any increase in spending for unemployment, 79.1 percent and 60 percent of community and institutional respondents preferred increases. The skew is particularly strong for community respondents, with 44 percent favoring *much more spending*, compared with 26.2 percent of in-

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<sup>12</sup>C = Community, P = Institutional, I = ISSP06

stitutional and only 14.7 percent of ISSP06 respondents.

These results, of course, should always be taken with caution. However, it is evident that on those areas of spending which are not, with all due respect, directly weighing on the daily lives of respondents - those preferences generally reflect the same distribution seen in the control population. When it comes to spending on health, education, law enforcement, and unemployment, there is a discernible (and statistically significant, see Section 6.6) discrepancy between groups. More advanced statistical tests are presented later. The following section reports those preferences concerning the interaction of government and the economy.




Figure 6.17: Government Spending Non-Welfare




Figure 6.18: Government Spending Welfare

#### 6.4.4 Government and the Economy

Continuing on preferences regarding the role of government in areas of policy which, for all intents and purposes, intrudes into the free-market, I turn now to those preferences on the degree to which government should interact with the economy. The ISSP06 provides six items which measure government interaction with the economy. Respondents were presented the following item:

*Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. (1)Cuts in Government spending; (2)Government financing of projects to create new jobs; (3)Less government regulation of business; (4) Support for industry to develop new products and technology; (5) Support for declining industries to protect jobs; (6)Reducing the working week to create more jobs and technology*

The results for the government's role in the economy, by and large, conform to those of the control group. Generally, all groups prefer cuts in spending (77.5 (C), 73.4 (P), and 67.4 (I) percent *in favor* or *strongly in favor*), while paradoxically supporting government financing of projects to create more jobs (97.7(C), 90.2(P), and 86.5(I) percent *in favor* or *strongly in favor*), deregulation of businesses (54.5(C), 40.7(P), 54.3(I) percent *in favor* or *strongly in favor*), government support for industry to develop new technology (70.5(C), 80.2(P), and 87.7(I) percent *in favor* or *strongly in favor*), and investment in declining industries to protect jobs (75.6(C), 71.9(P), and 68.4(I) percent *in favor* or *strongly in favor*).

This consensus splits when it comes to views on the role of government and work hours. When faced with the question of where they stood as regards government reducing the work week to stimulate jobs and technology, community respondents break distinctively from their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts. 54.9 percent of community respondents were *in favor* or *strongly in favor*, compared with 39.7 and 37 percent of the institutional and control groups. On the other end of the spectrum, 42.2 percent of ISSP06 respondents were *against* or *strongly against* reducing the work week, compared to only 18.9 percent of community respondents, institutional respondents fell approximately midway between the two at 26.4 percent. What is most evident from the reported preferences concerning government intervention in the economy is the distinct division between community respondents and ISSP06 respondents. This is confirmed also by looking at the over-

all means between groups, with community respondents accounting for the largest absolute difference between ISSP06 means on all items of economic intervention, with the exception of the regulation of businesses.<sup>13</sup> Community and, to a lesser degree institutional respondents are, by and large, more liberal in their preferences for government intervention.

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<sup>13</sup>As will be discussed in Section 6.6, and specifically in Table 6.9, mean community responses were significantly different than ISSP06 respondents on all items save one.




Figure 6.19: Economic Policy

### 6.4.5 Government Success

Turning away from respondents' views on the role and scope of governmental interaction, the shift here turns to how respondents see government performance. That is, the following subsections, beginning here, revolve around respondents' views on how successful government is in producing and implementing policies, how much the government ought to be allowed to infringe on the individual's rights, how much influence the average citizen has on their government, and how respondents see their own personal agency. Here I begin with items concerning government success in selected policy areas. A crucial consideration must be kept in mind as concerns the comparisons reported between the respondents for this survey and that of the ISSP06. First, the ISSP06 is a regional sample and not specific to the state of North Carolina. Because assessment of government successes and failures likely vary significantly state by state, and locales, these comparisons are illustrative more than declarative. Unfortunately, state level identifiers were not available in the ISSP06 dataset to directly compare responses across states to test data. Second, and extremely important, is the item concerning views on the nation's security. Because the ISSP06 was run in a particularly different period of time than the present study (i.e., in terms of the war on terror and associated political rhetoric), the comparison between the two is even more contentious than others. It is especially important to keep such issues in mind when interpreting these specific results.<sup>14</sup>

Responses on the success of government to carry out its remit is especially interesting given the nature of the participants. One might expect those who have experienced the heavy "right hand" of the state, and the disparate effects of the vanishing "left hand", to espouse particularly negative assessments of their custodians. However, this is surprisingly not the case. In fact, it is these respondents who see the government as doing a more adequate job than their ISSP06 counterparts. While respondents poll just about even on the issue of protecting the environment (34.4(C) and 26.6(P) versus 30.1(I) percent favorable assessments); when it comes to seeing government as *successful* or *very successful*, community and institutional respondents respond more positively on government's achievements in providing healthcare to the sick (34.1(C) and 27.9 percent compared to 23.9(I) percent) and providing a decent standard of living to the elderly (29.5(C) and 25.8(P) percent versus 22.9(I) percent). They are even more so concerning efforts in dealing with

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<sup>14</sup>One solution would be to analyze responses over multiple waves to compare average responses amongst respondents. However, the items presented here were only included in the 2006 wave of the Role of Government survey. As such, this strategy is no viable.

threats to the nation's security (61.1(C) and 76.4(P) percent versus 47.4 percent (I)) and crime (42.3(C) and 47.2(P) percent compared with 33.3(I) percent).<sup>15</sup> This latter finding is especially interesting given respondents' legal status, and the trend of ISSP06 respondents in the opposite direction. The final item, government success in fighting unemployment, is also telling. This item evoked the strongest response from respondents from both community and institutional groups. 72.7 percent of community respondents and 82.8 percent of institutional respondents indicated their view that government was either *unsuccessful* or *very unsuccessful* in fighting unemployment (the ISSP06 rate was 44.9 percent). This finding matches responses on employment related items previously reported. They paint a picture of respondents that are only drastically dissimilar from their ISSP06 counterparts on one thematic aspect, that of employment protection; a theme that has become apparent across the course of these reportings. If respondents do hold negative views of government, it has not been revealed in their responses to items on government performance.

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<sup>15</sup>As noted earlier, these comparisons must be taken with a certain degree of caution. Assessments of government's successes are undoubtedly a function of local experiences and changes in state policy. Crime and especially the item concerning national security are time variant.




Figure 6.20: Success in Policy Areas

### 6.4.6 Scope of Citizen Freedoms

The following group of items represent issues which concern how respondents view the place of citizens in society. They focus on such topics as whether one ought to obey the law in any circumstance, whether the government has a right under certain circumstances to impinge on the rights of citizens, and how they value freedoms of speech and protest. These items are, as opposed to the previous grouping, less temporally sensitive; however such temporal differences are no doubt still an issue of concern.

Asked whether they believed it was a better for persons to always follow the law, or whether there were some occasion which provide grounds for illegal actions, fully three fifths of community respondents (62.4 percent) believed that people should obey the law without exception, mirroring ISSP06 respondents (60.4 percent). Institutional respondents, on the other hand, were almost evenly split on the issue, with 49.5 advocating for absolute compliance and 50.5 of admitting of some circumstance in which it is acceptable to contravene the law. Posed with the proposition of whether it is worse to convict an innocent person or let a guilty person go free, respondents echoed the preferences of the ISSP06 group, with institutional respondents voicing opposition to “convicting an innocent person” at 89.4 percent, compared with 81.1 percent and 73 percent for the community and ISSP06 respondents.

Three items were posed to respondents regarding cases where the government (i.e., the police) might require the abrogation of civil liberties to protect public security. Respondents were given the item:

*Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen. Do you think the authorities have the right to:*  
*(1) Detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial; (2) Tap telephones without a warrant; (3) Stop and search people in the street at random.*

The results are evident of a skew much more in favor of protecting civil rights than is apparent in the ISSP06 group. While ISSP06 respondents were approximately equally split on items concerning detainment and surveillance (52.6 and 56.2, percent for), community and institutional respondents were much less ambivalent (detainment/surveillance: 65.6/65.9 and 68.3/60.5 against respectively). ISSP06 respondents were slightly more inclined against government stop and search (58.1 percent), on par with institutional respondents (60.5 percent). Community respondents, however, were further against such policies, with 77.9 percent against such policies. These results should

be taken in context, with nearly half of community and institutional respondents very strongly against such policies.

The final two item groups measure respondents' views on the scope of citizen rights to protest and the right to speech for those considered extremist. The latter grouping may, as with the previous findings on government success in national defense, need to be taken with caution, as these items refer to matters which may be duly be considered matters of national security. In the first item grouping, respondents were asked:

*There are many ways people or organizations can protest against a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed: (1) Organizing public meetings to protest against the government; (2) Organizing protest marches and demonstrations; (3) Organizing a nationwide strike of all workers against the government.*


While all groups were strongly in favor of the right to publicly organize and demonstrate, institutional respondents were particularly adamant about maintaining such rights. 95 percent supported the right to organize public meetings, while 92.6 supported the right to demonstrate. This compares to 81.9 and 82.8 percent, and 75.8 and 83.9 percent for community and ISSP06 respondents for the respective items. When posed with the proposition of organizing nationwide strikes, all groups declined in support for such rights, however just over half of ISSP06 respondents (46.4 percent) answered against allowing strikes, while 54.9 and 57 percent of community and institutional respondents supported such rights. As concerns the second group of items, respondents were asked:

*There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the majority. Consider people who want to overthrow the government by revolution. Do you think such people should be allowed to: (1) Hold public meetings to express their views; (2) Publish books to express their views*

Across the board, all respondents were firmly in support of protecting civil rights, even when contextualized as extremist activity. While community respondents were more inclined to support these rights (86.1 percent for holding public meetings compared to 75 and 75.7 percent for institutional and ISSP06 respondents), the general trend is overwhelmingly in favor of the protection of free speech, even for extremists.

Whether the items concerning the unconditional compliance to the law and mistakes of justice can be applied to solid policy questions is debatable. What is certain, however, is that the evidence here provides a snapshot of views by those who actually bear the brunt of policies which are philosophically based on these assumptions. As such, the views of the affected may form a good in their own right. Where they may have an impact, assuming a hypothetical situation wherein the disenfranchised were included into the policy making process, it is not inconceivable that an enterprising actor would not devise policy platforms to address which might indeed reflect preferences for more lenient legal policy. Items concerning the civil rights of citizens are concerning.

Whereas the former items showed no dramatic divergence with the control population, those of authorities' powers to infringe on personal liberty in extreme circumstances are directly relevant in public debate. Felon respondents were clearly unambiguous about their support for the protection of individual rights. While these findings may not come as much surprise, actual reports are more salubrious than conjecture. Leaving these areas aside, I turn now to the final two areas of findings from the Role of Government item list.



(e) Stop/Search

(d) Wire Tap

(a) Obey Law

(b) Worse Error

(c) Detain

Figure 6.21: Justice and Civil Liberties (A)




Figure 6.22: Justice and Civil Liberties (B)

### 6.4.7 Citizen Agency

Turning to perceptions of citizen effect on government (i.e., on areas such as reliable commitments from politicians and corruption), there appears to be across the board consensus on all but two facets of citizen interaction with the government. Categorically, illustrated in Fig: 6.23, respondents are on par with their ISSP06 counterparts. However, community and institutional respondents are minutely less pessimistic about the impact which everyday citizens have on politics. 58.9 percent of ISSP06 respondents *disagreed* or *strongly disagreed* with the proposition that *the average citizen has considerable influence on politics*, compared to 55.7 and 52.8 percent of community and institutional respondents.

Similarly, 71.4 percent of ISSP06 respondents disagreed to either degree when faced with the proposition that members of congress were committed to election promises once in office, compared with comparable community and institutional feedback at 67.4 and 68.6 percent respectively. Likewise, respondents share near identical views on the reliability of government administrators, an area which respondents would be assumed to have more personal (and presumably negative) perceptions. While 32.6 percent of ISSP06 respondents held favorable views of the reliability of administration, 28.2 and 27.7 percent of community and institutional respondents share such support.

Thus, it is clear that while respondents do differ on their views on administrators, their views are not out of step with comparisons of others. Respondents are equally in line when it comes to the idea of “social corruption”, here measured by the proposition

*Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in America depends on who they know?* Approximately half of respondents in each group were of the opinion that treatment definitely depended on one’s social capital (47.5(C), 53.7(P) and 50.7(I) percent - *definitely does*)

When we turn to explicit views on corruption, however, a disparity of reflections begins to emerge. Community and control groups are not overly divergent on their views, with 19.3 percent of community respondents and 17.6 percent ISSP06 respondents of the impression that *almost all* politicians are involved in corruption (larger differences are seen in the view that *almost none* were involved - 31.1(I) compared with 19.3(C) percent). Institutional respondents, however, are almost completely reversed from the ISSP06 respondents. 30.2 percent of institutional respondents were of the opinion that

nearly all politicians were involved in corruption, while only 11.6 percent believed *almost none* were involved. 43.7 percent of ISSP06 respondents believed *a few* or *almost none* of non-elected officials were involved in corruption, compared to 27.2 and 22.9 percent of community and institutional respondents.

What emerges from these items is a picture of the disenfranchised as not as thwarted by interactions with government as one might think. That is, it is not entirely unrealistic to suspect that those who have had experiences with government officials in a wholly unique way than many other citizens (e.g., court dates, lengthy and/or cumbersome administrative documentary procedures, and so forth) would have increasingly negative views of the system. The results, however, do not suggest that respondents are so different from those respondents from the control group. Of the items shown here, the two concerning corruption among both elected and non-elected officials stand out as areas of disparate opinion. As much as can be said here is that for all but these two areas, respondents are generally similar to their ISSP06 counterparts.




Figure 6.23: Citizen Agency/Influence

### 6.4.8 Personal Agency

The final item group in the Role of Government has been categorized as the personal agency side of respondents' views. These items are concerned with measuring topics such as interest in politics, subjective impact on government, and comparative understanding of issues. It also reports on the degree to which respondents feel secure in their attachments to others.

Beginning with general interest in politics, respondents were posed with the question: *How interested would you say you are in politics?* In all, respondents were, again, not markedly dissimilar to their ISSP06 counterparts. More so, the disinterest in politics is relatively equal, with 14.4 percent of ISSP06 respondents indicating they were *not very interested* in politics, compared to 13.0 and 15.7 percent of community and institutional respondents (by comparison, 21.3(I), 33.0(C), and 28.7(P) percent reported being *very interested* in politics). The next items (i.e., how respondents feel treated by public officials and their subjective impact on policy making) are not as analogous with the control group. While opinion is essentially flat for ISSP06 respondents on the issue of their treatment by public officials, respondents (and particularly institutional respondents) have a much less ambivalent viewpoint.

23.8 percent of ISSP06 respondents felt that public officials *rarely* treated them fairly, 43.0 percent of community respondents and 48.3 percent of institutional respondents felt they were *rarely* treated fairly. These differences are matched also in respondents' views on their impact on government. When asked to how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement *People like me don't have any say about what the government does*, 45.3 percent of community respondents and 52.1 percent of institutional respondents indicated they *strongly agreed*, as opposed to just 10.6 percent of ISSP06 respondents.

In all, 68.9 and 75.2 percent of community and institutional respondents (respectively) agreed with the statement, compared to less than half (47.6 percent) of the control group. If subjective perceptions are anything to go by, it cannot be assumed that the lack of agency is on account of interest or understanding of politics. While 78 percent of ISSP06 respondents felt they had a *good understanding of the political issues* facing the country, 87.2 percent of community respondents and 81.6 percent of institutional respondents indicated the same.

The distances between the two felon groups are equally close to the

ISSP06 respondents when asked if they believed others were *better informed about politics* than themselves. 52.7 percent of ISSP06 respondents felt others were better informed, compared to 54.8 of community and 59.3 percent of institutional respondents. Again, the similarities of respondent views are as important as their differences. Community and institutional respondents have lower opinions of their value as citizens from their treatment by public officials, but this does not seem to be related to their general interest in politics nor their feeling of understanding of the major issues. If such a treatment effect is being measured herein, as the research by Soss and others would certainly imply here, then a valuable strand of civic educative processes is not without promise.

Turning to the final two measures of personal agency, respondents were asked first whether *there are only a few people [they could] trust completely* and whether if they thought that *if [they were]not careful, other people would take advantage of [them]*. Community and institutional respondents were clearly more likely to feel they were limited to only a few trusted persons, with 94.2 percent and 90.5 percent agreeing in some degree, compared to just over two-thirds of ISSP06 respondents (78.9 percent). While the percentages of respondents across all groups was high when it came to being guarded to avoid extortion (90.5(I), 91.6(C), and 91.9(P) percent in general agreement with the statement), community and institutional respondents felt decidedly stronger about potential abuse. 66.4 percent and 67.7 percent of community and institutional respondents strongly agreed with the statement, compared with 46 percent of ISSP06 respondents.




Figure 6.24: Personal Agency (A)




Figure 6.25: Personal Agency (B)

## 6.5 ISEA Results

The results so far have focused on the views of the government's role in society, and how citizens interact with it. They have looked at the ways in which respondents see the government as a guarantor of their rights and collective goods. In many respects, community and institutional respondents are very close to the control groups used to compare them, despite the obvious issues of comparison at a disaggregated level. Such analysis has indicated that while many assumptions look to have some merit, others lack some credibility - as far as the data here are concerned. It has been shown that felon respondents are supporters of welfare policies, and that these areas are likely policies of special concern for those who find themselves under the supervision of social corrections.

While the results presented thus far have given a detailed overview of preferences for this group of citizens, they are still relatively vague questions of policy - especially that of welfare policy. To address these concerns, a final series of items is presented which has taken questions asked in the International Survey of Economic Attitudes. Though a comparison group is unavailable, as with the previous sections, these results are useful to decipher how such policies would be manufactured by these citizens. At the very least, they provide some indication as to what policies are more or less important for those very likely to come into contact with them. That said, I now present results of items which focus on levels of benefit generosity for working age individuals, benefits for the elderly and childcare, and finally on the issue of

housing policy.<sup>16</sup>

### 6.5.1 Benefit Generosity

The following results are telling. Respondents were given the proposition:

*The average wage in North Carolina is about USD 35,300 per year. (percent of average NC Wages, Bureau of Economic Analysis) Should the government pay benefits: (1) To workers who lost their job through no fault of their own; (2) To people who quit their job because they did not like it, and can't find another one; (3) To healthy people who have never had a steady job; (4) To someone who is physically handicapped and unable to work; (5) A child allowance for any family with two young children, where the father works and the mother stays home to care for the children; (6) To single mothers who stay home to care for their children*

For each item in this grouping, respondents were given seven options from zero to 100 percent (categories were replicated from the ISEA questionnaire). Fig: 6.26 shows graphs of the responses given. In all, these results are a thermometer of the generosity of respondents. What is most striking is the rather austere preferences of respondents across the board. If one expected that the disenfranchised would soak society by demanding high benefits regardless of scenario, they would be mistaken.

Respondents were in general favorable towards providing benefits towards workers who had lost their job through no fault of their own, with 30.7 percent (overall) endorsing a benefit 50 percent of the average state wage (i.e., approximately USD 340 per week), and just over 35 percent favoring even higher benefits (approximately 37.8 percent). When faced with levels of benefit for those leaving employment of their own accord and are not able to find work, respondents are universally less generous than for individuals who have been dismissed. 65.9 percent of community respondents and 71.4 percent of institutional respondents would provide no assistance to a voluntary leaver. Just 2.6 percent of respondents preferred benefits more than 50 percent of the average wage. The situation is equally bleak for those of able body who have never held a steady job (e.g., precarious workers). 72 percent of institutional respondents, and 58.5 percent of community respondents favored no financial assistance for such persons. There is some respite for the unemployed who

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<sup>16</sup>All items are not reported here. Items have been selected which represent the most intended areas of analysis. Full results are available upon request.

are physically handicapped.

Almost two thirds of respondents (62.5 percent) support benefits levels over half the average wage, with 18.2 percent supporting benefits at half the average state wage. 7 percent of DCC-S respondents support no assistance. Responses for what is re-termed the “breadwinner” model are less clear. Respondents faced with the proposition of paying benefits to households with at least two children with a working father and a mother outside the formal labor market, were relatively flat in their preferences. For context, the 2011 TANF-SNAP benefit level for North Carolina in 2011, according to the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, was approximately USD 668 per month (approximately USD 168 per week or about 25 percent the average wage).

Just over half (53.1) of respondents supported this level and less. As is illustrated in Subfigure 6.26e, the distributions are dissimilar. A bimodal trend is seen in the CSI-S group. On the whole, however, nearly half of respondents would prefer at least half the average wage as a benefit for traditional breadwinner households (51, 54.1, and 45.9 percent for CSI-S, DCC-S, and DOP-S respectively). Finally, respondents are, overall, favorable towards benefits for single mothers who are not in employment. Over half of respondents, 62.3 percent, would support benefit levels at or above 50 percent of the average wage in such situations, with 10.4 percent preferring no assistance what-so-ever.




Figure 6.26: Benefit Generosity Working Age

## 6.5.2 Elderly and Dependent Care

Turning to the issue of old-age care, an issue which is most likely off the radar for much of the research dealing with criminal offenders, it is not readily discernible. For comparison, the average monthly benefit received in NC in 2011 for those 65 years and older was approximately USD 505 (SSA, 2012). The equivalent of that would be less than 25 percent (the lowest category available for the relevant item). Respondents, as seen in sub-figure 6.27a, would spend considerably more than this *if* there was a government pension.<sup>17</sup> Further conditional propositions were put forward to participants which asked

*What do you think of these government policies for providing income for retired people: (1) A government old age pension paid from taxes, given only to poor people; (2) A government old age pension paid from taxes, given only to families who contributed by working and paying taxes for at least 10 years; (3) A government old age pension paid from taxes, given to everyone of legal retirement age*<sup>18</sup>

Together, these items can be thought of as a measure of universality. Where the first item measures a means tested policy which explicitly demarcates special treatment for those without adequate resources, the second applies to those who have contributed through benefit credits. The final item most readily applies to a policy which is universal in character. For policy option 1, where only those who are poor receive governmental assistance, approximately a third of all respondents favored such a policy, with 42.9 percent against. For the second option, where a government pension is based on the amount of time one has paid in, slightly over half of respondents were favorable. On average 54.5 percent of all respondents favored such a contributory scheme, with a quarter neutral (25.4 percent) and just about a fifth against (20.1 percent). For the final option, 59 percent of all respondents supported a universal scheme, with 16 percent against and 25 percent neutral. Within groups, 66.3 percent of DCC-S respondents favored a universal scheme, while 58.8 of CSI-S and 54.2 percent of DOP-S favored.

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<sup>17</sup>Note: the option “no government pension” is not reported here as per the conditional of the statement. However, as it was put forward to respondents: 25.5 pct CSI-S, 12 pct DCC-S, and 13.6 pct DOP-S preferred no government pension.

<sup>18</sup>Note: An additional item proposed: *No government old age pension, people save for themselves*. This item is reported in the appendix, however is not reported here for relevancy.

Respondents were then asked a battery of items concerning the suitability of care for both elderly parents and a child of 3 years. In all, two question groups of six items each probed preferences for care provision in these two areas. Options included care provided by a daughter, a son, another relative, a government run facility, a neighbor or other acquaintance, and a privately run facility. Figure 6.27 reports on these responses in sub-figures 6.27e and 6.27f.

When given the option of whether or not they believed an elderly care facility run by the government was a suitable option, nearly a third of respondents (37.1 percent) felt that this was a suitable option, while 43.1 percent found it to be not suitable. Thus, over half of respondents 56.9 percent were willing to consider a government old age home a suitable option for the elderly (60.8 CSI-S, 60.5 DCC-S, and 53.1 DOP-S). Given the same options for a child of 3, respondents were decidedly more accepting of government provision of dependent care. Overall, 78.1 percent of respondents felt favorable towards a government provision of childcare (78.1 percent). The aggregate results mask variation between groups, however, with only 64 percent of CSI-S favoring such a policy, compared to 89.3 percent of DCC-S and 76.3 percent of DOP-S respondents. Overall, the results here suggest that when it comes to financing of pensions, respondents are generally in favor of a system paid for by taxes.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Overall, only 17.5 percent of all respondents favored a system with no government pension.




Figure 6.27: Pensions and Care

### 6.5.3 Housing Assistance


The following items were not taken from the ISEA or other instruments, but were constructed for the purposes of the research. Covering specifically issues of housing provision, these questions aimed to cover the gap in housing items in the utilized instruments. They are included here for consistency in reporting welfare policy preferences.

Respondents were asked:

*Let's assume a person is unable to afford housing. Below are several options for ways to deal with this situation. Please choose only one option for each ranking. (1) The government should provide housing for such a person; (2) The government should provide cash assistance to such a person/no housing; (3) Churches, charities or NGO's should take care of the person / no gov't; (4) The person's family should take responsibility and house them / no gov't; (5) The person should be left to fend for themselves/ no outside help*

The results (Figure 6.28) indicate strong preferences for governmental intervention when it comes to providing housing for distressed individuals. Overall, 72.45 percent of respondents were favorable to government provision of housing, with 77.9 percent of DCC-S, 72 percent of CSI-S, and 69 percent of DOP-S agreeing or strongly agreeing. Slightly under half of community respondents viewed cash benefits as a favorable option, with 48.8 percent of DCC-S and 44.9 percent of CSI-S, with 28.8 percent of DOP-S respondents.


Less than a quarter of respondents supported reliance on the third-sector (24.7 percent of DCC-S, 20.8 percent of CSI-S, and 21.09 of DOP-S in favor). Reliance on family and other social networks for the provision of housing for persons finding themselves unable to afford housing was also not well received, with 20.5 percent of DCC-S respondents, 25 percent of CSI-S respondents, and 26.8 percent of DOP-S respondents in favor. Turning to the final option, that of absolutely no intervention (i.e., complete self-reliance), respondents were unanimously against no public assistance of some sort. Overall, only 6.5 percent of respondents (9.4 DCC-S, 8.3 CSI-S, and 3.9 DOP-S) favored isolation. Resoundingly, respondents were firmly against such a policy.



(c) Third Sector

(b) Gov. Financed

(a) Gov. Provided



(e) No Help

(d) Family Provided

Figure 6.28: Homeless Policy

## 6.6 Comparison of Groups

The picture we receive of community and institutional respondents is a mixed bag. On the one hand, respondents are heavily in favor of government's role in mitigating against risks, particularly the risks associated with loss of income labor. There are also quite apparent differences in areas such as party ID, and social class issues. Advancing the descriptive statistical results presented thus far, a series of median tests was carried out to investigate which, if any, statistically significant differences exist between respondent and control groups. As noted previously in 5.2.6 and Table 5.6, performing such analysis requires a non-parametric approach, as the assumptions of normality and, in some instances, homogeneity of variance are violated. To adjust for this, the same method applied to the inter-subsample tests was repeated for community and institutional groups and all control groups. The results of these tests can be seen in tables 6.5 - 6.10.

While the results are encouraging, there are particular problems with comparisons between the control groups and respondents that need be addressed. The most apparent concern is that by drawing from the lower ends of the income distribution, the findings may be representing what would be expected should an oversampling of this population also be undertaken in corresponding surveys. There are two major ways of dealing with this population mismatch. One is the propensity score matching method, the other is a more simple control matching method.

Essentially, matching techniques have evolved from the medical sciences to adjust for confounding variables in uncontrolled observational studies. Optimally, one would be able to gather enough information on subjects in two states (i.e., treatment versus control) and then be able to isolate that effect by matching cases with each other on the relevant potentially confounding variables. For survey research, this is obviously not an optimal strategy given the multitude of potential confounding variables in any sample. Randomized designs are helpful in this regard. One would desire to match respondents when there are particular background variables which will potentially impact the dependent variable - here the responses on particular items.

Because of the limited availability of such data on the groups in question, only 3 variables could be justifiably used by which to "control" for confounders. The three variables of most concern, given the nature of the items being recorded, were selected for their availability across surveys and relevance to political and economic issues posed in the survey instrument.

These were decided as *income*, *racial grouping*, and *gender*. Using these variables, matching was carried out to, in essence, “warp” the control groups to match that of the respondent groups. Because of the large amount of data needed to match on propensity scores, this technique was ruled out. Additionally, because the aim of this method is not to forward a causal claim (e.g., becoming a felon changes one’s political and/or economic preferences), a less sophisticated method was opted for.

Using the case control matching option available in the statistical program SPSS, respondents (demanders) were matched with cases (suppliers) in each of the three control datasets (i.e., ANES, ISSP 09, and ISSP 06). These cases were matched on the basis of income, race, and gender - with income and race prioritized. The resulting match distributions are shown with their initial states in figures 6.29 (Income), 6.30 (Race), 6.31 (Gender), with an additional presentation of Age (not selected on) - Figure 6.32.

Cases were matched with no tolerance (fuzz), without replacement, and with randomized case order. The identifier used was a dummy variable coded 1 for known felon, and 0 otherwise. These matched cases should be taken with some caution. Ideally, treatment cases should be matched to control cases using as many variables as is possible without over-specifying the model. The analysis here errs on the side of caution. That is, matches were generated with zero tolerance for deviation on income, race, or gender. As such, those present in the matched analysis are only those who match a case exactly. This greatly reduces not only those from the control group, it also “warps” the respondent groups as well, resulting in a loss of data.

A significant problem is the lack of overlap between the respondents groups and the control groups. Because this research does obtain respondents largely from the lower economic strata, and a larger percentage of respondents are non-white than in the control population, these factors limit the amount of cases that can be demanded from the control groups.<sup>20</sup> While gender and age groups were not able to be matched as successfully, income and especially race were better matched.

The following presents the analysis of medians on the unmatched groups followed directly by the analysis of the matched groups. Each pairing was

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<sup>20</sup>A more robust method would have been to run two parallel projects, sampling also from the communities of origin on the key matching variables of interest to properly specify the comparison. As this was not available, the use of the original survey respondents from the selected region was chosen, as noted.

analyzed using both a traditional Levene's test for homogeneity of variance, as well as the non-parametric equivalent test. Where the non-parametric test was passed, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used as the test of comparison. Where this test fails, the Median test option is substituted. Post-hoc tests were supplied by the statistical software (SPSS) using Dunn-Bonferoni corrected methods. Bold pairs indicate situations where two groups significantly differed from the non-bold group. For example, in Table 6.5, for the item *Spending: Environment*, both institution and community respondents differed significantly from the ANES control group. The figures shown are the calculated means for each group. A + symbol indicates that both the traditional Levene's test and the non-parametric equivalent were unsatisfied. However, considering these instances were only encountered only twice outside the ANES comparisons, these were deemed not overly worrisome phenomenon. This is especially so considering the items for which this occurs in the ANES comparison should not be taken with too much statistical significance to begin with. They are given here for illustrative purposes.<sup>21</sup> In the following analysis, means are used instead of medians to provide more meaningful interpretation.

### 6.6.1 Unmatched and Matched Comparisons

#### ANES v. Respondents

Table 6.5 shows the results of the unmatched means comparisons between community and institutional groups. Of the eleven items for comparison, institutional respondents differ significantly from the ANES control group on ten, while community respondents differ significantly on seven. Cases involving both groups differing from the control group are denoted in bold font.

Going down the table in order, institutional groups are significantly more likely to gravitate to the middle than their ANES counterparts, as seen in 6.8a. Both groups would spend less on the environment and law enforcement. Institutional respondents were more likely not to have been contacted by the Democratic party, and both groups less more likely to have been contacted by a third party. Both groups were less likely, across all civic-volunteerism items, to become involved.<sup>22</sup> These results hold for all but contact by

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<sup>21</sup>That is, to repeat what has already been said, ANES respondents were asked whether they *had* participated in the respective activities; whereas felon respondents were questioned as to whether they *would likely* participate in such activities. Thus the items measure two different states.

<sup>22</sup>Note of caution: the results for civic-volunteerism items are not directly comparable

Democratic party and spending on the environment.

Table 6.5: Significant Differences Felons vs. ANES Control/Unmatched

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Party ID	-.38		-.48	.000*
Spending: Environment	<b>-.62</b>	<b>-.75</b>	-.96	.052/.002**
Spending: Law Enf.	<b>.09</b>	<b>.01</b>	-1.05	.000/.000*
Contact: Dem.	1.78		1.65	.020**+
Contact: Other	<b>1.90</b>	<b>1.92</b>	2.00	.000/.000**+
Civic: Volunteer	<b>1.7750</b>	<b>1.7143</b>	1.9417	.000/.000**+
Civic: Advertise	<b>1.5128</b>	<b>1.4667</b>	1.8034	.000/.000**+
Civic: Rallies	<b>1.5238</b>	<b>1.5465</b>	1.9272	.000/.000**+
Civic: Donate	<b>1.7297</b>	<b>1.7692</b>	1.8956	.006/.001**+
Civic: Discuss	1.3415		1.5583	.001**+

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.  
 (+ ) Violation of HOV; Bold = pairs versus singled group.

Table 6.6: Significant Differences Felon vs. ANES Control/ Matched

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Party ID	-.38		-.61	.033**
Spending: Law Enf.	.09		-1.15	.005**+
Contact: Other	1.90		2.00	.000**+
Civic: Volunteer	<b>1.7750</b>	<b>1.7143</b>	1.9507	.000/.006**+
Civic: Advertise	<b>1.5128</b>	<b>1.4667</b>	1.8028	.000/.002**+
Civic: Rallies	<b>1.5238</b>	<b>1.5465</b>	1.9296	.000/.000**+
Civic: Donate		1.7692	1.9225	.074**+
Civic: Discuss	1.3415		1.6127	.003**+

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.  
 (+ ) Violation of HOV; Bold = pairs versus singled group.

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as those given to respondents are based on intention and not recorded events, compared to the ANES respondents. It is almost certain that these scores are massively inflated if one were to record actual events. However, it may also be the case that some ANES respondents have also inflated their reports. These results are for illustrative purposes.

### ISSP09 v. Respondents

Turning to the results for respondents and the ISSP09 control, all groups are significantly different from each other on the issue of unemployment and government responsibility.<sup>23</sup> Community respondents are the most in favor of increased government responsibility for the unemployed, followed by their institutional counterparts, and then the ISSP09 control. Community respondents are significantly more apt to support the government's responsibility in reducing inequality. In addition, institutional respondents vary significantly from both ISSP09 and community respondents on the issue of taxes for the wealthy, tending towards taxes as too low for the wealthy. Interestingly, both community and institutional groups are actually significantly more to the left (i.e., Democratic party) than their ISSP09 counterparts. Both community and institutional groups score significantly more towards the lower and working class than ISSP09 respondents, and are more likely to perceive of conflict between poor and rich, the working class and middle class, and those at the top of society and those at the bottom. All groups are significantly distinct on the topic of conflict between management and workers.<sup>24</sup>

Table 6.8 shows the results of the matched analysis. As with the ANES, the ISSP09 results should be taken with some consideration of the process used to generate the analysis. However, even with the conservatism of these tests, significant differences remain between respondent groups. When only matched respondents are taken into consideration, the results (again going down the table) indicate that community respondents are separated from institutional and ISSP09 respondents on both responsibility items (i.e., government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed and to reduce inequality). Significant differences remain only between institutional and ISSP09 respondents for attitudes towards taxes for high income earners, as well as party ID. Significant differences disappear for institutional respondents on the social class membership, with only community respondents remaining versus ISSP09 respondents. On the 4 items measuring conflict, community and institutional respondents remain significantly different on the item of conflict between poor and rich, as well as for conflict between those at the top and those at the bottom of society. However, community respondents become significantly different than their institutional counterparts for the item for conflict between the working class and the middle class, and the same shift is seen with the institutional group on the issue of conflict between management and workers.

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<sup>23</sup>C-I .014/C-NF .000/ I-NF .000\*\*

<sup>24</sup>C-I .046/C-NF .033/ I-NF .000 \*

Table 6.7: Significant Differences Felons vs. ISSP09 Control/ Unmatched

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Responsible: Unemployed	-.77	-1.21	-.25	.014/.000/.000**
Responsible: Inequality		-1.25	.42	.000*
Taxes: High Inc.	-.57	<b>-.10</b>	<b>-.24</b>	.000/.001**+
Party ID	<b>-.38</b>	<b>-.79</b>	-.18	.000/.000*
Social Class	<b>2.69</b>	<b>2.46</b>	3.12	.000/.001**
Conflict: Poor v Rich	<b>2.27</b>	<b>2.37</b>	1.81	.000/.000**
Conflict: Working v Middle	<b>1.69</b>	<b>1.84</b>	1.38	.000/.000**
Conflict: Top v Bottom	<b>2.35</b>	<b>2.54</b>	1.70	.000/.000**
Conflict: Mgmt. v Workers	1.88	1.99	2.11	.046/.033/.000 *

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.  
 (+ ) Violation of HOV; Bold = pairs versus singled group.

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Table 6.8: Significant Differences Felon vs. ISSP09 Control/ Matched

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Responsible: Unemployed	<b>-.6917</b>	-1.1606	<b>-.3421</b>	.037/.002*
Responsible: Inequality	<b>-.5455</b>	-1.1971	<b>.2368</b>	.021/.001*
Taxes: High Inc.	-1.3209		-.4561	.030*
Party ID	-.3788		-.6053	.030*
Social Class		2.4559	3.1316	.003**
Conflict: Poor v Rich	<b>2.1102</b>	<b>2.3162</b>	1.8158	.000/.009**
Conflict: Working v Middle	<b>1.4574</b>	1.7333	<b>1.6930</b>	.021/.000**
Conflict: Top v Bottom	<b>2.2992</b>	<b>2.4444</b>	1.8509	.000/.000**
Conflict: Mgmt. v Workers	1.7717	<b>1.9044</b>	<b>2.5088</b>	.001/.000*

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.  
 Bold = pairs versus singled group.

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### **ISSP06 v. Respondents**

Comprising the majority of items in this survey, the ISSP06 items showed the most variation of the analysis. As shown in Table 6.11, the most frequent phenomenon was that of significant differences between community and ISSP06 respondents. Community respondents differed significantly on 40 items, as compared to 32 such differences between institutional and ISSP06 respondents. Further, community and institutional groups differed jointly on 23 items, community groups were solely different on 9 items, institutional respondents were solely so on 5 items, while community respondents differed significantly from ISSP06 and Institutional groups jointly on 5 items. Institutional groups differed from community and ISSP06 groups jointly on 1 item, and all groups were significantly different from each other on 3 items. These are presented below. Deviating from the previous reporting format, the following does not progress in a straightforward manner, but rather reports on groups of occurrences.

**Community and Institutional Groups v. ISSP06:** For the unmatched comparison of groups, community and institutional groups jointly differed significantly from the ISSP06 control on 23 items. Respondents were significantly different on items of citizen influence on government, the right to conduct national strikes, and two of the items pertaining to civil liberties - detainment and covert surveillance. Respondents also differed in their attitudes towards both forms of official corruption by elected and non-elected authorities, as well as general beliefs in unbiased treatment (i.e., social corruption). Respondents also differed on their self-identification on the 7-point party scale. Both groups were significantly different from their ISSP06 respondents on areas of government responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the elderly, control prices, provide healthcare for the sick, and provide financial assistance to students from lower income households. Both held significantly different views about the level of taxation for lower income households, government success in addressing unemployment and government success in national defense. Respondents were only jointly different from their ISSP06 counterparts on one spending item, that of law enforcement. Both were significantly different on the items pertaining to general anxiety of abuse by others - being taken advantage of and numbers of others who could be trusted. Both were also significantly different on their beliefs for subjective impact on government.

Once respondents were matched, however, joint differences only remained for opinions on detainment, the right to organize a national strike, objec-

tive impact on government, trust in others, spending on law enforcement, and government's success in fighting unemployment. In addition, following control matching, both groups became significantly different on the issue of cuts to government spending.

**Community v. ISSP06** Community respondents were solely and significantly different than their ISSP06 counterparts on eight items. These items were approval for governmental use of stop and search, spending on education, freedom for persons with extremist views to publish books and other materials, beliefs in understanding of important political issues. Community respondents also differed significantly on areas of government intervention in the economy; particularly on government's *responsibility* to provide industry with help to grow and those items which addressed supporting industry to protect jobs, general cuts to government spending, and support for industry to develop technology. Clearly, the community group has clear preferences for government action in the area of economic development in contrast to the control group and not matched by their institutional counterparts.

Once respondents were matched, however, only one primary item remained from the original analysis, that of attitudes towards government stop and search policy. Community respondents became solely significant from ISSP06 respondents in the area of attitudes on government's success on healthcare, responsibility for providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed, responsibility for providing jobs to all who want one, reducing the work week to create jobs, responsibility for providing healthcare to the sick, and attitudes towards covert surveillance.

**Institutional v. ISSP06** Institutional respondents were solely significantly different from their ISSP06 counterparts in the areas of trust in government administrators, errors in justice (i.e., sentencing an innocent person or letting a guilty person go free), and government's success in reducing crime.

Once respondents are matched, only attitudes towards the government's success in crime policy and trust in administrative authorities remain. While views of corruption amongst elected officials is no longer significant, corruption among non-elected officials is now added to this grouping. In addition, Institutional respondents are now solely different, significantly, on the issues of government's success in national defense, tax rates for lower income households, and regulation of businesses.

**Community v. Institutional and ISSP06** Respondents differed significantly on four items; community respondents were significantly different from both the ISSP06 control group and their institutional counterparts. These items were, noticeably, related to government's interaction with the market. Respondents differed from both other groups on the issues of government's responsibility to provide jobs for those who desire one, and concomitantly of financing projects to create more jobs, reducing the working week to create more jobs, the responsibility to reduce inequalities.

Following the matching procedure, community respondents only differ on one of the reported items previously mentioned (government responsibility to reduce inequality), however this group becomes significantly different from its institutional and ISSP06 counterparts on the issues of government responsibility for housing and government spending on unemployment.

**Institutional v. Community and ISSP06** Institutional respondents differed from their community and ISSP06 counterparts on only one item, that of spending on healthcare. This difference, however, disappears once groups are matched on control variables. Following the matching process, no significant differences were detected between any group.

**Mutual Exclusiveness** On three items, respondents from all groups were found to differ significantly from each other group. These items are government's responsibility to provide housing, government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, and government spending on unemployment. It ought to be noted that community respondents, as expected from the previous results, rank substantially more to the left on these issues than their counterparts. None of the mutual exclusions remain following matching process.

Table 6.9: Significant Differences Felons vs. ISSP06 Control/ Unmatched

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Responsible: Jobs	<b>-.54</b>	-1.04	<b>.20</b>	.034/.000*
Responsible: Prices	<b>-1.24</b>	<b>-1.60</b>	-.93	.000/.000*
Responsible: Healthcare	<b>-1.49</b>	<b>-1.80</b>	-1.32	.000/.002*
Responsible: Elderly	<b>-1.59</b>	<b>-1.73</b>	-1.35	.000/.011*
Responsible: Growth		-1.42	-.82	.001*
Responsible: Unemployed	<b>-.77</b>	<b>-1.21</b>	<b>-.06</b>	C-I .021//.000**
Responsible: Inequality	<b>-.63</b>	-1.25	<b>-.12</b>	.000/.000*
Responsible: Fin. Aid	<b>-1.60</b>	<b>-1.74</b>	-1.33	.000/.001*
Responsible: Housing	-1.24	-1.56	-.81	C-I .026/C-NF .000/I-NF .004*
Taxes: Low Inc.	<b>1.22</b>	<b>1.33</b>	.90	.000/.002*
Spending: Health	-1.09	<b>-1.33</b>	<b>-1.14</b>	.045/.037**
Spending: Law Enf.	<b>.09</b>	.01	-.77	.000/.000**
Spending: Education		-1.41	-1.29	.050**
Spending: Unemployment	-.68	-1.15	-.37	C-I .000/C-NF .000/I-NF .003**
Favor: Cuts		1.19	.81	.001**
Favor: Financing	<b>-1.33</b>	-1.69	<b>-1.25</b>	.001/.000*
Favor: Promote Tech.		-.97	-1.22	.015**
Favor: Protect Jobs		-1.69	-1.25	.005**
Favor: Work Week	<b>-.13</b>	-.56	<b>.05</b>	.027/.000**
Success: Defense	<b>.79</b>	<b>.53</b>	.15	.004/.000*
Success: Crime	.10		-.23	.022*
Success: Unemployment	<b>-1.08</b>	<b>-.87</b>	-.31	.000/.000**

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.

Bold = pairs versus singled group.

Table 6.10: Significant Differences Felons vs. ISSP06 Control/Unmatched (cont.)

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Party ID	<b>-.38</b>	<b>-.79</b>	-.30	.000/.000*
Civil Lib.: Detain	<b>.68</b>	<b>.55</b>	-.05	.001/.000**
Civil Lib.: Wire Tap	<b>.50</b>	<b>.61</b>	-.13	.000/.000**
Civil Lib.: Search		.90	.33	.002**
Innocent/Guilty	-.68		-.43	.039*
Treatment	<b>1.79</b>	<b>1.96</b>	2.24	.016/.000**
Subjective Impact	<b>-.93</b>	<b>-.74</b>	.16	.000/.000**
Citizen Influence	<b>.16</b>	<b>.18</b>	.33	.000/.000*
Political Understanding		-1.03	-.70	.031**
Admin. Trust	.71		.51	.025*
Corruption: Elected	<b>-.88</b>	<b>-.57</b>	-.18	.088/.003*
Corruption: Unelected	<b>-.51</b>	<b>-.36</b>	.10	.029/.003*
Protest: Strikes	<b>-.36</b>	<b>-.33</b>	.27	.000/.000**
Extremist: Books		-1.01	-1.24	.019*
Trust People	<b>-1.35</b>	<b>-1.45</b>	-.93	.000/.000**
Take Advantage	<b>-1.49</b>	<b>-1.47</b>	-1.26	.000/.000*

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.  
 Bold = pairs versus singled group.

Table 6.11: Significant Differences Felon vs. ISSP06 Control/Matched

	Institution	Community	Non-Felon	Sig.
Responsible: Jobs		-.9701	-.0733	.000**
Responsible: Healthcare		-1.7887	-1.5267	.010*
Responsible: Unemployed		-1.1618	-.2192	.000*
Responsible: Inequality	<b>-.4571</b>	-1.3333	<b>-.4459</b>	.005/.000**
Responsible: Housing	<b>-1.1299</b>	-1.5714	<b>-1.0743</b>	.041/.014*
Taxes: Middle Inc.	.7632		.6689	.019*
Spending: Law Enf.	<b>.0519</b>	<b>.0746</b>	-.7724	.000/.000**
Spending: Unemployment	<b>-.6104</b>	-1.1690	<b>-.5570</b>	.004/.000**
Favor: Cuts	<b>1.1711</b>	<b>1.0896</b>	.5570	.003/.000**
Favor: Regulation	.4133		.4354	.050*
Favor: Work Week		-.5625	-.1554	.004*
Success: Healthcare		-.1176	-.6107	.025**+
Success: Defense	.8158		.0068	.006*
Success: Crime	.1918		-.2416	.027**
Success: Unemployment	<b>-1.0000</b>	<b>-.8841</b>	-.4899	.003/.000**
Obey Law	.0857		-.2667	.041*
Civil Lib.: Detain	<b>.6479</b>	<b>.6667</b>	.1200	.051/.062**
Civil Lib.: Wire Tap		.7971	.0333	.004**
Civil Lib.: Search		1.1250	.4106	.007**
Subjective Impact	<b>-1.0286</b>	<b>-.8909</b>	.0709	.000/.000**
Admin. Trust	.88		.59	.042*
Corruption: Unelected	-.6809		.0313	.014*
Protest: Strikes	<b>-.3699</b>	<b>-.4355</b>	.0728	.031/.041**
Trust People	<b>-1.3188</b>	<b>-1.4754</b>	-.9357	.010/.016**

(\*\*)Kruskall-Wallis; (\*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.  
 Bold = pairs versus singled group.





Figure 6.29: Income Distributions Before and After Matching



(a) ANES Unmatched

(b) ISSP Unmatched

(c) ISSP09 Unmatched

(d) ANES Matched

(e) ISSP Matched

(f) ISSP09 Matched

Figure 6.30: Race Distributions Before and After Matching




Figure 6.31: Gender Distributions Before and After Matching




Figure 6.32: Age Distributions Before and After Matching

Thus far, I have given a thorough descriptive and statistical account of the distributional and group differences between community and felon groups and the ISSP06 control group. Certain facets are readily apparent from this analysis, and one particular point seems all too glaring to avoid mentioning. Community respondents, unlike their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts, are primarily concerned with the state of governmental action and spending on employment related activities. Across items, in fact, community respondents differ from their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts.

### 6.6.2 Predicting Party Affiliation

The final aspect of concern for this project is that of the likely political party membership of the disenfranchised. As has been illustrated in the research findings here, and in the literature evolving from many scholars, felon respondents tend to counter supposition that they would vote overwhelmingly Democratic. Indeed, when asked their chosen party affiliation, half of all respondents (50.4 percent) identify as independent on a 7-point scale, with 54.5 percent of institutional respondents and 46.3 percent of community respondents self-identifying as such. This compared to 21.9 percent of ISSP06, 12 percent of ISSP09 respondents, and 12.8 percent of ANES respondents. The question remains, while respondents remain openly uncommitted to either party, is it possible to infer their probably party affiliation some other way?

The comprehensiveness of the ISSP06 module on issues related to substantive questions of what government ought to do and how it might pursue those goals was a particularly important factor in its selection. To address a longstanding debate in the literature, two similar analyses were conducted which assessed respondent scores in more detail. Specifically, where the previous findings both described and compared differences across items, this section looks at concerns about which side of the fence (Democrat or Republican) respondents might end up on.

To accomplish this, two analyses were conducted: (1) the computation of two “super-variables” based on the use of canonical variates produced during a manual MANOVA procedure using items on (a) government spending preferences and (b) government responsibility preferences; and (2) the implementation of a Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA) using all items not obviously connected to what would be considered assessment scores (e.g., government success or treatment by public officials). Using these two meth-

ods, respondents were able to be classified into political parties based on their answers given in the Role of Government items.

**Canonical Variates/ Super-Variables:** Utilizing manual syntax in SPSS, a MANOVA was run to reveal the raw discriminant function coefficients of the selected items on a three-category variable - reported party affiliation. Two processes were undertaken that used the largest item groups (i.e., government responsibility and government spending) to create these variables. The process involves SPSS running a MANOVA on respondents' (only ISSP06 respondents were used in both analyses) answers to reveal the eigenvalues and canonical correlations of 1 minus the number of groups used as the independent variable. I have collapsed party self-identification into a 3-category group, labelling respondents Democrat if they had identified as some measure of Democrat, Republican if they had identified as some degree of Republican, and Independent if they had explicitly identified as Independent. The process uses a set of items (the dependent variables in the MANOVA) and linearly extrapolates roots (canonical variates) based on 1-Independent Categories. Thus, two roots are created for each analysis to maximally discriminate between the 3 groups based on the given dependent variables (responsibility and spending variables).

**Government Responsibility:** The tests for government responsibility utilized the ten items included in this group. SPSS produced two roots, of which only one was significant and accounted for approximately 27 percent (26.5) of the variation in the computed canonical variate (eigenvalue = .35982; canonical correlation = .5144). Of the variance accounted for, this root accounts for 92.328 percent. The second root ( eigenvalue =.0299; canonical correlation = .17307) was not statistically significant (Sig. F = .459), while the first was statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). Using the first root, a variable was computed using the raw discriminate function scores given by the analysis as weights for the ten responsibility of government variables, which were then aggregated.

**Government Spending:** The tests for government spending utilized the eight items included in this group. SPSS produced two roots, of which only one was significant and accounted for approximately 31 percent (30.9) of the variation in the computed canonical variate (eigenvalue = .43439;

canonical correlation = .55031). This root accounts for 92.616 percent of the variance accounted for. The second root ( eigenvalue = .03463; canonical correlation = .18295) was not statistically significant (Sif. F = .172), while the first was statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). Using the first root, a variable was computed using the raw discriminate function scores given by the analysis as weights for the eight government spending variables, which were then aggregated.

Figure 6.33 shows the plots of these two “super-variables” by each group based on their reported political identities (collapsed into three categories). We can see that based on the two variables, both community and institutional respondents tend towards the lower right quadrant of their respective graphs. The direction of these graphs is arbitrary and not representative of any left-right axis classification. It serves only to distinguish between groups using a common metric. Looking at Figure 6.33c, we can see that in the control group (i.e., ISSP06), Republicans dominate the upper left quadrant, while Democrats largely cluster in the lower right quadrant, interspersed with self-identified independents. This first step is useful, however a further step is employed to predict group membership based on a wider array of scores, using more sophisticated methods.




Figure 6.33: Scatterplots of Spending SV against Responsibility SV by Party ID and Group

**Discriminant Function Analysis:** *Independents*, as they are recorded here, are those who have not indicated a leaning towards either the Democratic or Republican party. Those respondents who have indicated as much have been categorized into those respective party categories. To advance the research on potential party preferences of the disenfranchised, a discriminant function analysis is employed to predict the likely group membership of respondents of control, community, and institutional respondents.

First, an analysis is conducted using the entire US sample of the ISSP 2006 to investigate which variables, overall, contribute to the most robust discrimination of the 3 states (i.e., Democrat, Republican, or Independent). Only those variables which attempt to measure preferences (e.g, what the government *ought* to do), as opposed to experiences (e.g., items which are more likely to measure the impact of personal experiences), are included in the analysis.

Using the full sample (step-wise, Wilk's Lambda method, exclusion of cases at 0.10), an overall "hit-rate" of 58.1 percent original and 57.2 percent cross validated was given, with 75.3/ 74 and 64.7/64.4 percent Democrats and Republicans correctly classified original and cross validated respectively. This analysis was repeated using Mahalanobis distance as well as separate covariance matrices: no discernible (greater than 5 percent) hit rate was achieved. An analysis which included all variables produced similar results (78.5 and 68.5 correct classification for Democrats and Republicans respectively).

This process was repeated for the South Atlantic sample with a greater return for the step-wise analysis - 81/72.7 and 72.8/63 percent correctly classified for original/cross-validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.<sup>25</sup> The decision was made to utilize the South Atlantic subsample to classify the corresponding sample of felons.<sup>26</sup> In all, 34 variables are used to discriminate between groups, containing items from government responsibility,

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<sup>25</sup>Analysis using all variables entered. Repeated model was run using the step-wise entry with fewer correctly classified cases: 81.9/79.2 and 65.7/61.6 percent original/cross-validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.

<sup>26</sup>The results show a Box's M value of 2191.42, F= 1.181; however log determinants are approximately equal between Democrat and Republican categories (-26.124 vs. -27.424). As such I proceed to use this configuration to classify following Burns and Burns (2008). A parallel analysis using multinomial logistic regression produced no better classification results and the predicted group membership is not calculated on those scores from the control group (i.e., ISSP 06 respondents).


government spending, government intervention in the economy, views of taxation, views of justice, attitudes towards civil rights, and attitudes on extremism. The overall Chi-square test is significant (Wilks  $\lambda = .481$ , Chi-square = 179.774,  $df = 68$ , Canonical correlation = .653,  $p < .001$ ).<sup>27</sup>

The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 6.34. Figure 6.34a shows the breakdown of self-reported party membership according to the consolidated three category arrangement, compared to Figure 6.34b which shows the predicted party membership in the consolidated categories. While a slight increase in Republican membership is predicted following the DFA, a substantial increase in Democrat membership is evident following the analysis. While Republicans look to “gain” approximately 6 percent from both community and institutional respondents, Democrat membership jumped by 25.85 percentage points for community respondents and 39.55 percentage points for institutional respondents. The computations performed previously in the canonical variant process show that, once separated into their predicted categories, respondents share clear divisions on the spending variable than that of the responsibility variable. That is, the degree of overlap between the two independently created variables is less for areas of spending than that of government responsibility in policy areas.

Additionally, further analysis was undertaken to investigate the degree to which predicted Democrat respondents differed from their predicted Democrat control group counterparts. The results indicate that, given the information available, respondents are statistically more liberal than their own predicted party counterparts not disenfranchised. While these results are tenuous, given the available data, it does go some way to suggest that not only are the disenfranchised likely to support Democratic candidates, they do so with an eye towards a broader role for government in citizen welfare (Figure 6.37b) as well as more dedicated funding of services (Figure 6.37a). As I will show in the following (and final) chapter (8), this aspect is particularly intriguing given the assertions of the spatial exclusivity of political disenfranchisement.

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
<sup>27</sup>While multivariate normality was not tested, univariate normality was within tolerance according to West, Finch, and Curran (1995). Results are based on results of valid cases. Percentage accepted because of non-missing discriminate values = approx. 52 percent of cases.




(b) Predicted Party Membership

(a) Self-Reported Party Membership

Figure 6.34: Party Affiliation Status




(a) Spending SV




(b) Responsibility SV

Figure 6.35: Overlap of Predicted Parties on SV's




(a) Predicted Party ID and Discriminant Function Scores




(b) Predicted Party ID and SV Scores

Figure 6.36: Predicted Party and Discriminant Scores



(a) Government Spending



(b) Government Responsibility

Figure 6.37: Differences Between ISSP and Felon Predicted Democrats

## 6.7 Discussion

The results from this chapter have lead to interesting findings. First, to recap, these are the first findings of such a survey done exclusively on supervised persons (to the knowledge of the author). This facet is not meant to insulate the findings of this project, to the contrary. Because of the limited amount of both quantitative and qualitative data on the specific preferences on politically disenfranchised individuals both in the United States and internationally, the knowledge base of the views of not only those who *don't* vote in a given political unit, but also (and possibly of more concern) those who *may not* participate, is simply non-existent at this time. This project, while focusing on the case of convicted felony offenders, has aimed to help close this gap. Social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, have an obligation to investigate such phenomenon.

It is difficult to say whether one ought to consider persons with felony convictions in the United States and elsewhere as members of a particular *caste* (as with the Dalits of India), a *class* (as with the Lumpenproletariat of Marx and Van Parijs), or as a particular *status* (from a Weberian point of view). It would seem, however, given the evidence on the intractability of felony status in the US, this group of citizens is inevitably consigned to the nether regions of social, economic and (even more distressingly) political life. Thus, it is hard to not consider these citizens as a class, not least owing to the fact that their status crosses racial, religious, and ethnic lines. Thus, while the New Jim Crow proponents have vehemently offered up a slew of evidence to cement the problem of mass incarceration and the “police state” as an undeniable race issue, this research questions such claims. The question, from this perspective, is not what class of citizen felons are, but rather which *class* have the majority of them originated from. Clearly a racial or ethnic delimitation does not suffice - unless we feel comfortable with relegating all other racial groupings to a subordinate position to that of the large African American presence in and out of prison walls. While social and economic opportunities are critical facets for citizenship, they cannot be guaranteed without the ability to collectively shape policies. As President L.B. Johnson remarked: “The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different from other men.” (Johnson 1965). The weight of Lyndon B. Johnson’s now immortalized speech at the signing of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has not diminished, though it might have well been largely removed from public discourse in the following decades.

**Methods:** Before commenting on the results of this research, I wish to recollect the dynamics of the methods used to address the particular issue of research with hard-to-reach populations, especially that of supervised individuals. The process by which respondents have been recorded are not simply a matter of methods, but also a finding in and of itself. First, while the focus of this research has been on the largest class of citizens removed from the franchise (as opposed to those who have not previously obtained that right - i.e., persons not yet of age, non-citizens, etc.), the justification for this research is the exploration of political demobilization en masse of any citizen, of any political unit. Because of their status, and owing to the abuses incurred in the past, this group of citizens forms one of many groups which are often under-researched in the social (and especially political) sciences. Moreover, while a good deal of research involved with this particular population uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer questions specific to their situations (e.g., research designed to predict or reduce offending behavior), less has been done to include such groups into commonly experienced research agendas. Because of the difficulty inherent in reaching respondents, a good deal of research on public opinion simply overlooks this population, especially so in the case of institutionalized populations. The conclusions drawn from this research, and in no small way informed by the invaluable cooperation provided by the supervisory authorities and interested community actors, is less cautionary than instigating. For the case of supervised individuals, the immensity of data gathered by these institutions and their offices, the networks in existence, and the comparative dearth of issues covered thus far, this research sees much promise in advancing activity in this area of research. For other areas (e.g., aboriginal groups, migrant workers, and transient populations), this research points to a larger need for advancements in techniques aimed at making hard-to-reach populations easier to approach.

**Results:** The fact that institutional and community based respondents differed on more than a few areas of measurement is a significant finding, and not just in a statistical sense. With more than two-thirds of America's disenfranchised population living outside institutional settings, it is clear that the nation does have a mass incarceration problem, but it has an even greater mass conviction dilemma. While politicians and administrators face key decisions on reducing the costs of their correctional tier costs, such decisions may not relieve the underlying problems in crime prevention - the regulation of the policies which produce criminogenic environments (Rosenfeld and

Messner 2013).

As concerns the likelihood of voluntary participation in elections at varying levels of government, the results are mixed. On the one hand, respondents indicated high levels of self-intent to participate at municipal, county, state, and federal levels. This is in contrast to the findings from Burch (2008, 2012) that clearly indicate convicted felony offenders are not particularly active before a conviction or following re-enfranchisement. It could be that respondents are particularly well intentioned to participate, but that this intent may very well end there. It might also be that respondents intend and will participate, and that these types of participants are more likely to participate in such surveys as the one they were selected by (voluntary response bias). It also might be that respondents simply respond the way they hope to be acceptable (social desirability bias). In any case, more work is certainly warranted.

For other political items, it is clear that respondents self-identified as independents, a fact which is disputed by the aforementioned discriminant function analysis. They are also more apt to regard themselves as belonging to either the lower and (especially) working class. Respondents have much stronger attitudes towards social conflict in America, Figure 6.13, when the issues arose of such conflict between the rich and poor, and between those at the top and bottom of society. Respondents were clearly in favor of a strong role for government in the management of society, even if they did desire to see cuts in government spending overall. In particular, respondents (both before and after matching) are fervent demanders of government action on unemployment and facets of social life connected to risks to personal wellbeing. These are not respondents who wish to see a minimal state, quite the contrary.

There is no ready reason why those who have been convicted for violating the compact would have such a high regard for its strengthening. On economic issues, respondents were not drastically different from the control respondents in the areas of taxation levels for the rich and middle class, however the same cannot be said for their views regarding lower income households. As the results on government spending indicate, respondents are very much similar to the control respondents on all issues besides from those concerning unemployment and law enforcement. Taken separately, these two issues are easy to dismiss as almost common knowledge. Criminals, in a hypothetical rhetoric, are lethargic non-actors, wishing to live off the law-abiding tax payer. If allowed to vote, they would soak the middle class and vote down

law and order policies to their benefit. This has been the debate of many opponents of felon enfranchisement since the earliest moments of nationhood. Taken together, however, these two policies ought to naturally form such an alliance. Increased spending on benefits to adjust the citizen to the (marketized) risk of unemployment, decommodifying her from such eventualities, reduces the onset of criminogenic environments. Nearly half of respondents chose to merely maintain (not decrease) spending levels on law-enforcement, while preferring increases in other areas which distance the client from abject destitution. Indeed, the focus on unemployment assistance is the strongest item across the respondent groups as compared to the control respondents. This class of citizen (or rather citizens from this class of society) demands *protection* from the market more than *respite* from law enforcement. They are also more apt to be strongly in favor of the core values of civil liberty and freedom of expression. They are, in addition, not the biggest believers in the infallibility of public officials, most notably among institutional respondents.

Even with these apparent (and statistically significant) differences between respondent and control groups, respondents are not willing to spread the resources of the state evenly amongst the population. Whatever their views on government's responsibility towards its citizens, and the degree to which they believe certain social issues ought to be dealt with, respondents are not out to provide all with a free ride. Leaving comparisons aside, results from the items on detailed levels of benefit dispersal show respondents who are relatively generous to the unemployed in circumstances that are outside particular acceptable boundaries. In fact, it is only when the issues of supporting a breadwinner model of households and single mother households that respondents show very little mutual direction in attitudes. Compared to the actual amounts devoted to pensions, respondents were more generous. Two-thirds of DCC-S respondents were favorable to a universal pension scheme, while well over half (58.8) of CSI-S respondents and just over half (54.2) of DOP-S respondents were so. Also on the issue of care, the majority of respondents, contrary to the expectation that their experiences might dissuade them, were supportive of government provided elderly and childcare. Finally, on the item of housing, respondents were firmly of the opinion that government played a definite role in mitigating the risk of homelessness.

Again, these results are the "first in the field", and as such it stands to see whether future research might support or negate these findings within or across other such populations. In either event, the prospect for research applications is encouraging. The issues presented here are individual policy items. they represent depictions of individuals' preferences and perceptions

of government on a piece by piece account. Political contests are neither fought nor won on single issues such as these (though this is not to say many single-issue campaigns aren't powerful strategies). Generally, it is useful to know, even in despite of conflicts over particular issues, which side of the political party fence voters will end up. With approximately half of the disenfranchised reporting as non-affiliated, it is not simple for political actors to know why they should or should not pay attention.

**Party Allegiance:** The final stage of this research used two (similar) methods to discern the political identities of respondents using not their self-reported scores, but on the aggregated/weighted scores of their preferences on policy areas. Using both a MANOVA technique to calculate two maximally discriminant variables, and a discriminant function analysis, this final step has sought to provide evidence on the likely placement of disenfranchised persons on a scale between Democrat and Republican. Both procedures are particularly similar to each other, and in fact use the same underlying methods and assumptions to operate. The reason to utilize the two, as opposed to only a single discriminatory function analysis, stems from the desire to analyze respondents based on how they view themselves. By using the MANOVA's ability to create a canonical variate, and to use the raw unstandardized values for the discriminant functions on a given list of items (i.e., spending and responsibility items), it was possible to calculate two variables which, when taken together, would be able to discriminate respondents into quadrants. This simplistic procedure was then supplemented with a more advanced discriminant function analysis to compute the predicted group memberships of participants.

It ought to be stressed that this attempt is not concrete proof that the true likelihood is given. In truth, citizens have a diverse array of preferences which make them prone to side with one political party or another (and in the US, this is largely a contest between the Democratic and Republican parties). It appears that based on the analyses, while respondents overwhelmingly report their independent party status, their scores as based on those of the control groups and their identifications entail that the majority of disenfranchised are in fact likely to be supporters of the Democratic party. In addition, as seen by the differences between the respondent and control Democrats (Fig. 6.37), there is a real concern that the disenfranchised are also a concern within the democratic party itself. This is discussed further in chapters 7 and 8. Taken with their responses on the individual items, these

Democratic supporters are likely to be ardent supporters of policies which provide government assistance to workers and the industries which provide employment opportunities. Respondents do not appear to be *laissez faire* citizens, but rather citizens deeply in favor of government intervention into the economy and social life. In addition, they are largely for the abatement of inequality and the protection of civil liberties.

As Lipset and Marks reported towards the end of their seminal work on the failure of socialism in the United States, “many convicts were imprisoned for what they considered offenses against their class enemies, and a disproportionate percentage of convicts were Socialists” (Lipset and Marks 2000: 252; see also Green 1978). The specter of socialism, at least in the dogmatic form of the early 1900s, has long since depreciated in American culture. Large swathes of the American collective psyche have been purified of thoughts of collectivism from consecutive official and unofficial ideological purges. While this account cannot follow the simple finding which Lipset and Marks (2000) were able to affirm, it has uncovered a trend in values which are not entirely congruent with the electorate at large. Indeed, given the evidence, it may be that the large socialist tendency noted in the bygone days has, for all intents and puposes, largely been returned to the community without its political voice and/or opportunity to find gainful employment or governmental assistance. The following chapter sets out to investigate the attitudes reported here by an analysis of qualitative interviews from disenfranchised persons.

# Chapter 7

## Qualitative Results

The following chapter presents the results of qualitative interviews conducted over the course of the quantitative research process. In as much as mixed methods research has come to the fore in academic studies, this mode was chosen as (first and foremost) a check on the validity of the assumptions made from the results of the quantitative analysis of survey data, and (secondly) as an extension of the limited work in the area of qualitative work on disenfranchised persons. In as much, this chapter corroborates the findings of the quantitative work and (serendipitously) bolsters the findings of previous research using approximate methods (i.e., Manza and Uggen 2006). The interviews have been presented verbatim to the extent possible and present the voice of participants and clients of the social welfare tier in their own words on items of concern for both academics and practitioners alike.

### 7.1 Overview of Methods

#### 7.1.1 Primary Data

Over the course of the CSI-S survey process, participants were informed of the possibility to participate in a further face-to-face interview at a timing of their choice. On receipt of the completed survey booklets, respondents were asked to sign a participation sheet which was used both to ensure the dispersal of a cash incentive for participation in the survey, as well as to indicate their interest in participating in further one-on-one interviews. While thirty-three participants indicated a desire to participate in these interviews, only six interviews were able to be conducted due to circumstances outside the control of the researcher. These interviews were carried out across four locations

(a residential assistance center in Wilmington, NC; a place of employment in Asheville, NC; an employment assistance center in Charlotte, NC and Tarboro, NC) and without supervision.

Given the limited number of participants, broad inferences of the deeper contextual views of this population were obviously restricted. Fortunately, because the initial quantitative survey was instrumented in parallel to key items utilized by Manza and Uggen in their 2006 study, a secondary analysis of their primary data (transcribed interviews) was possible on a large number of issues which were addressed in the primary interviews conducted in North Carolina. In addition to items asked in the 2006 study, analysis of issues which arose over the course of those interviews were also analyzed to provide evidence of the *drivers* of criminal activity as well as *policy* issues. Comparisons of the two interview guides as well as participant descriptives can be seen in the Chapter Appendix. .

### 7.1.2 Secondary Data

The use of Qualitative Secondary Analysis (QSA) was chosen to supplement the consequence of low turnout for primary interview responses. The progression of secondary qualitative methods are addressed previously in the methods section under subsection 5.2.7. A primary concern with using two sources of qualitative data concerns the comparability of circumstances. That is, the settings for interviews carried out in the primary research differed substantially from those in the secondary research. The respondents in the Manza and Uggen study were under the supervision of the DOC of Minnesota, while those for the primary study were unsupervised and from North Carolina. Additionally, the majority of respondents in the Manza and Uggen study were white, as compared to only one respondent from the primary study.

Despite these regional and demographic differences, the comparability of responses found a significant degree of coherence around many topics. The use of secondary qualitative data is recommended when populations of interest are “hard to reach” (e.g., felon populations) (Fielding and Fielding 2000; Gladstone et.al 2007) and where the use of such data augments primary data to extrapolate new findings from both sets of sources (Holland and Thomson 2009; Bornat 2010; Irwin and Winterton 2011a). While the dissimilarity of research contexts might be cause for concern in more direct comparison studies (i.e., if the goal were to compare the views of NC felons against Minnesota

felons), these issues presented less such concern for confirmatory purposes. That is, as the use of QSA here is complimentary in nature, this facet of the data does not invalidate its value. This is especially so considering the nature of the population under study. In all, the Manza and Uggen study reported views from 33 participants.

### 7.1.3 Handling Primary and Secondary Sources

It is important to keep in mind that the data from the Manza and Uggen (2006) study are used as corroborative for the purposes of this research. Effort has been made to parallel the Manza and Uggen study, while generating new insights from the data already employed. As such, primary codes were developed from the NC interviews and then applied to the QSA data.<sup>1</sup> A secondary coding process was then undertaken in a spreadsheet format with the developed codes to find grouping patterns from the codes. These groups form the sections and subsections that follow. As SQA is a rather under-utilized method, a strategy by which to utilize the two datasets was needed in order to ensure that (a) data from the primary research was not “overtaken” by that of the more numerous secondary dataset (i.e., that the secondary dataset remain a confirmatory dataset as opposed to the primary source of analysis), and (b) that inferences from the secondary dataset were not simply reproduced from the results in Manza and Uggen (2006).

Because their original study focused largely along the same lines of the primary research, and indeed formed much of the motivation for it, there is a greater than average risk that the same inferences (e.g., quotes) might be repeated in this work. The aim of this work is not to reproduce their findings, but to re-use their data to come to independent conclusions. To address this concern, each reference from the original study results were accounted for and noted for their use in the previous work. While all the information provided from the previous study were analyzed, an effort has been consciously made to defer to previously unreported accounts when possible. Instances where the topics of interest did not have a matching code for the primary interviews were omitted from reporting. This allowed for reporting topics which had at least a 1:1 rate. That is, given a particular coded response from primary interviewee X, there will also be a corroborative response from secondary interviewee Y. However, where there is no primary interviewee response to

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<sup>1</sup>Fortuitously, this initial coding sequence was sufficient to extract evidence from the QSA data without the addition of new categories.

an exact question, the code is omitted from reporting in this section. A complete list of the code frequencies is given in the appendix with indicators of which coded responses were used as quoted responses. Respondents from the Manza and Uggen study use their assigned names from the original study and are denoted with a (\*) - e.g., Laura\*.

### 7.1.4 Themes Addressed

Manza and Uggen differentiate between three main categories, with one (*Views About Government and Public Policy*) further subdivided into two areas covering *Policy Views and the Criminal Justice System* and *Political and Partisan Preferences*. The remaining two categories address the *Experience of Second-Class Citizenship* and *Rebuilding Ties* to the community. While mirroring the Manza and Uggen study, the primary study differentiated between four categories, following secondary coding. These areas are defined as issues regarding *Politics*, *Public Policy Concerns*, *Public Welfare Policy*, and the *Experiences of Criminal Sanction*.

*Politics*, section 7.2, delves into issues such as participation, views of parties, affiliation, and attitudes towards subjective impact. This section is followed by section 7.3, which looks at interviewees' views on the reach of government as well as which areas policy would be most effective in reducing the tendency towards criminal activity. That is, this section asks not only which areas of public policy are most important to respondents, but also which areas they indicate as particular drivers for criminal activity and consequent political disenfranchisement. Section 7.4 follows with evidence regarding the role of welfare policy in interviewees' lives. As the sections are not entirely exclusive, there is a degree of overlap between this section and the previous, however the issues dealt with herein relate particularly to known welfare programs. In addition, this section includes interviewees recollections of services provided for in the social corrections tier. Section 7.5 wraps up with perspectives from interviewees regarding the experiences of conviction, correction, and (most of all) political disenfranchisement. This section ends with the views of interviewees regarding how society views them on account of their legal status.

## 7.2 Political Trust, Participation, and Preferences

The evidence from the results of the quantitative research on preferences revealed that respondents were considerably more left leaning than control groups on areas of redistribution and welfare policy (especially as concerned labor market policies), but not drastically so as related to their stances on areas such as environmental spending or military outlays. Respondents were also similar to their control counterparts in terms of policies which benefited industry. In addition, respondents were considerably less trusting of not only “others”, but the government and politicians in particular. This section explores these issues in depth by reporting the responses of interviewees on related topics as those presented in the survey study.

### 7.2.1 Trust in Government

Interviewees across both primary and secondary studies were unambiguous about their distrust of government, supporting the results from the survey instrument. Consider the views of William, a 51 year old white male recently off all supervision, regarding his views on politicians:

Well, they...from what I've seen, they'll say whatever, whatever they have to to get into office. I don't know. I think there's a lot of dirty, lot of dirtiness goin on. They, they'll say whatever just to get elected, then they get elected and everything they promised they don't do. Uhm. Talking about everybody gonna have jobs and the economy gonna get better, and everything, and nothing's happened. It's like eh. I don't know. The rich are getting richer, and uhm. Everybody else is just struggling, it's just gotten bad.

Daryll, an African American male in his twenties, was equally descriptive in his distrust of the government as a whole. For Daryll, the perception of government as a reliable system had been informed not just from his own experiences, but also from his upbringing. Thus, the collective history of communities contributes to forming and maintaining perceptions of government, regardless of what one has personally experienced.

Do I trust the government...I would have to say yes and no. And the reason being is because, once again, from the age of 14, this is when I really become aware of politics. And I was aware of the negative side of politics. Once again, I was part of an organization [name omitted]. And, you were taught history starting from '68

forward. And so, we dealing with the Carter, we dealing with the Nixon history so on and so forth. And how that applied to our race in general. And of course, we're not hearing nothing positive.

We're hearing pure-t negativity. Uhm, the whole crack epidemic, how it was exposed to the streets. The theory of why it was even exposed to, in the first place type of thing. And that definitely shaped your views about the government. Getting older, as far as reading and having different conversations ... a common thing we here and start to believe is that individuals will say anything to get into office. Ok. Realistically, we know, that when a president gets into office, the first four years, more likely than not, is cleaning up the previous president's, and trying to shape his own ideas and get his own things into movement. And so, that's an ongoing cycle, and so the government is not as stable as it should be.

Lucas, 41, a father of two and grandfather, did not mince words when it came to the question about his views. For him, the popular portrayal of government as a system innately corrupted from the inside was not just a matter of media portrayal, but an accurate depiction of facts on the ground.

Nah, I don't trust government, no, uh uh. no. The government manipulate everything that's going on. These movies that you see, they not just movies. These are events that happen, or going to happen. You know, and if certain literature you read and understand, you see it. You see how crooked the government system is. It's a manipulation system... how can I trust my government? If this, the people that are supposed to be there to help for us. The taxes, you know...how they give the big corporations certain tax breaks, but then, once again, what about the middle class people? The lower class people? So, some, as I'm learning more things, the big people don't really care about the little people. So, they just want to have it their way.

However, while Lucas saw the government and politicians as corrupt and duplicitous, he also appeared to accept things as they were. While he was despondent with the system, he accepted its "reality".

...But this is America, and you gotta learn America's system to make things work for you in America. So, America becomes a beautiful place to live. And what you make outta how you do it.

While the former aspect of this perception of government is particularly telling, the latter view also merits attention. While Lucas saw the government as corrupt and dangerous, he also saw it as a matter of fact way of life in America, even to be emulated in daily situations. At the same time, his emotions towards this system were weighted by his distress over the apparent divide between those at the top of society and those at the bottom. Thus, acceptance of a perceived culture of corruption told and retold by popular media and revelations of wrong doing may contribute in some way to citizen actions. These views are not just isolated to interviewees in the primary study either. Alex\*, a 41 year old male serving a prison sentence, felt that government was unscrupulous. According to him:

Uh, no, I don't trust the government to do what's best for the country. Well, the reason why I don't think they know what's best for the country is 'cause they're not out there living with the people. They don't...They don't, um, understand what's going on in the daily life around the communities and that. They don't hear the voice of the people, the whole voice of the people.

James\*, an African American male probationer in his twenties, felt similarly about the soundness of placing faith in government officials.

Basically, no. I feel that the government's real dirty, that's for real. And, I, I don't know how the government, you know, they do a lot of sneaky things a lot of people don't know about. Underneath, you know? And, you know, I think they care more about themselves than anybody. And on the local level, if you haven't got the bucks, you're guilty.

James\* further related that he felt that while even those outside government should not necessarily be completely trusted, those in government were more likely to act untrustworthy. Of those who remarked of some trust in government, such views were either in respect to the belief that such "crookedness" was apparent in any walk of life, or that government could be trusted only in the presence of proper oversight. At least 3 of the Manza and Uggen respondents had favorable views on government, while only one of the interviewees from the primary study had positive feelings towards trust. However, this view was conditioned on the fact that the respondent was indifferent to how government operated under his current and past daily life. In general, the overwhelming consensus tended against trust in government institutions.

## 7.2.2 Trust in Politicians

Views on government were inextricably linked with views of political actors. Outside questions expressly addressing views of trust in the government, none of the interviewees from the primary study had any discernibly positive feelings towards politicians. Indeed, the views which respondents shared regarding political actors divulged more personal feelings of abandonment by politicians. That is, interviewees felt that politicians were not attuned to addressing the communities in which respondents resided. Jacob, a 41 year old African American male serving probation for drug charges, viewed politicians as largely unconcerned with the interest of the least well off, which in turn informed his views on their concerns towards him.

I mean, how you supposed to close the school for the deaf and blind? And then, you know, you eh, you give a CEO a raise. So it's kinda like, you don't care nothing about them, to the deaf and blind? I know you don't care nothing about me. If you don't even care about the disabled, and all the older people losing money and they talking about cutting medicare, and it's just eh...and these are people, not in the military, but they actually served their country... it's just, everyone's out to get their own and cover their butts and to hell with the next guy.

Such strong sentiments carried over even into the meaning of politics in general. When asked about his views on the meaning of the word politics, David, a 35 year old African American male who completed his time for larceny and assault, and Daryll (respectively) conveyed the impression that politics is something which is outside the average citizen, a power struggle in which agents are primarily self-interested and disconnected from the communities they represent.

To me, it means people who write the law. [laughter] That's what it means to me. People with the power. Do whatever they want. Not do whatever they want, but... that, mostly tell the majority of the people what to do, and what to go by.

*Scheming.* A lot of what we know is by word of mouth. And so once again, all we hear is individuals will say and do whatever necessary to achieve a personal agenda. Get into this office, get this bill passed, so and so forth. Say what sounds good. Even as individuals we do that, we say what sounds good and don't give it a second thought once it comes to our goals. It's bad enough

you have one individual doing that, here you have hundreds of individuals doing the same thing. When necessary, well, they'll change their mind, or switch over, come together, and then you know at a later time wear off again. So, yeah, *scheming*.

Markus, a 35 year old African American male on probation and working with a local non-profit, gave an even more poignant view of why he lacks faith in politicians. His views point even more towards a discontinuity between lower income voters and the political process. Markus' views are interesting as well from the aspect of his detailed view of the president who was widely considered the uncontested favorite of the African American community because of his racial background.

The wealth of this country is built on the back of people that've just been through misery. It's kinda like, how do you actually change that system, how do you get it to go into a different direction? It's wave on wave. It's the same old thing, you hear it. Politicians don't talk about anything different. They talk about the same thing.

You know, Obama came in with the "Change" campaign, which I thought, that's really what *deterred* me from him. you know, you talk about change and yet you have the same old regime. They wasn't about change...we know about hope...you know, if anything, black people are full of hope [laughter]...that's one thing I know for sure that they, when they heard that. I think that's what really got them excited, when they heard that. We all hope for a better place, but besides that, anything else is not effective.

The view that political actors are essentially beholden to the system once elected was a strong theme in the conversations regarding trust for government. Even the most high profile campaign regarding the prospect of dramatic change in the country garnered skepticism from what some might have considered Obama's most reliable supporters, inner city minority male citizens. However, as Markus illustrates, these citizens are also keenly aware of issues outside personality contests and single issue elections. The general distrust of politics finds corroboration in the Manza and Uggen study. Consider Mary\*, a 40 year old female inmate, who saw politicians equally unprincipled.

Well, when you first base an opinion about politics, I feel that the majority of the politicians are out there just trying to get money,

trying to sway, you know, the, um, people towards their beliefs and or whatever, you know, they want to portray. And I feel that the majority of them are just plain crooked.

Roger\*, a 54 year old white male on probation for “swindling”, was more considerate towards politicians. Roger saw the *effects of power* of paramount interest, while politicians should not be held to a higher standard than the average person. In addition, he voiced a central role for communication in politics.

Uh, I think politics today, they don't take into account, you know, I think if you'd take a look at everybody in the House and the Senate, how many people they all say – We've got the best age of communications. I worked for a telephone company...And yet communications is probably the biggest breakdown of everything. Whether it be, you know, having to do with politics or whatever. Communication is still...If our company loses a customer, nine times out of ten it's because we didn't communicate with them.

Roger's\* view that communication was a central concern about the efficacy of politics is useful in considering the role of parties and political participation. It also goes some way in describing the impact which ambivalence and even outright avoidance from political actors has on citizens. This lack of a communicative relationship with constituents is reflected in the views of Markus (below) on how he sees political participation affected within communities.

### 7.2.3 Political Participation

Across both studies, interviewees were questioned on their views about the effectiveness of voting to make government and politicians pay attention to their needs. Many of the answers given across studies were extensions of interviewees' views regarding trust in government, as might be expected (i.e., the one informs the other, and vice versa). In fact, the lack of trust in government is often cited as the reason for disillusionment with the political process, causing citizens to eschew participation. As seen previously, in the view of interviewees, political actors are only interested in their own gains, not of the community, and especially not of the communities which are hit hardest by social and economic deprivation. When the citizen in these communities does interact with the government, it is either through street level bureaucrats (e.g., public welfare agencies or police officers) or intermittent (at best) political actors during election cycles.

Concerning the feeling of disadvantaged community members towards voting, Markus complimented the opinions of Roger\*, in his words:

The majority [sentiment] is “no point”. Because, and the reason why the majority feels that way because, a lot of times councilmen and legislators, they’re not actually there, you know, they feel like, you know, don’t just come around one time, when it’s time for you to be elected. All of a sudden you want someone to campaign for you, you want us to be active as far as voting for you, when we haven’t even seen you for the rest of the time. So I mean, if they was active inside of those communities, where they can actually see what they are doing, and allowing people to know what laws they are trying to pass, how it will actually effect them, making people aware. You know, they don’t see that.

This lack of visible attention from political actors in the daily lives of constituents is additive with the deprivation which those constituents are occupied with. Thus, as with the studies of Mani et. al (2013), not only does the adversity of poverty reduce cognitive ability, the mental resources needed to operate in these environments overwhelms their motivations to become involved in seemingly extraneous relationships such as politics. Consider again the words of Markus:

The only thing what people, a lot of times, in those communities are concerned with is how they gonna survive, how they gonna make it from paying bills. So what it boils down to them is not, it really is not about being involved with the legislature, it’s more about being involved with survival, that’s what it basically boils down to. People that’s more concerned with their day to day activities. “How I’m gonna survive, how I’m gonna pay these bills, how I’m gonna eat. And that’s it. They’re not concerned with politicians and politics.

Interviewees expressed a good deal of concern about their perceived value to government and the necessity of negotiating more immediate concerns, as well as seeing politics as mainly a contest among actors and not competing policy agendas. Low participation rates, however, should also be seen in context of the real-life practicalities which face offenders and the communities which they originate from and return to. As William explained, “yeah, just eh, just too much goin on to worry about politics. You’re just trying to live. Everybody is just trying to get by”. In addition, a view of a rift between those in power and those from more deprived areas is a recurrent theme among interviewees. Michael\* evinced this rift provocatively:

Look at all the people in the United States, man, if everybody could vote, I don't know... If everybody could vote, man, that would be something... I think there'd be two presidents. If everybody could vote, 'cause it's like half and half. The upper class, the upper and middle class all gonna vote for the Republicans. The rest is always voting for the Democrats, minority people, but we really don't get to vote, 'cause most of us minority people got felonies. You know, that's why we really don't count sometimes. You know, I, I was always wondering that... Who the rich people, who, who did ah, Farrakhan vote for? That's what I want to know. For real. They talk about helping us, but we don't know who they voted for...

When probed whether he thought there was a racial context for voter preference, Michael\* voiced his opinion that, while not having had extensive contact with white citizens, they would most likely vote alongside their African American counterparts.

I haven't never really seen no poor white people, to tell you the truth. Not really, where I come from, it's all black people in Chicago. On, on the south side, anyway... I don't know, but I thought poor white people might, ah, vote for Democrats, too, they be in the same situation, too... be on welfare, like us, they be needing help, you know. For real.

Such views are compelling evidence, especially in light of the results reported in the previous chapter on partisan identification among felon respondents. However, knowing that felons prefer the Democratic party to the Republican, even when their explicit party identification is not that of the Democratic party (i.e., when respondents are matched to parties based on their answers to survey items), only goes part of the distance in understanding why respondents are more keen on this affiliation.

#### 7.2.4 Partisanship

The responses given to a series of questions asked from both this study and the Manza and Uggen study shed valuable light on the issue of partisanship. Interviewees, echoing Michael's\* own views, repeatedly reported a class divide between Republican and Democratic parties. When asked what candidate or party he would have voted for in the preceding election (i.e., the 2008 presidential election - Obama v. McCain), David explained that his choice was not based on race, but on vested interest. In his words:

The Democrats. Cuz they was trying to help the poor people and all that. I mean. Get the food stamps and stuff, that's why I would have went with them. Like I said, most of the issues they was talking about, like helping out, I mean. Like, you know what I'm sayin, I don't want to say just the food stamps, but like...school stuff and all that, they was hittin all those bases like that.

Similarly, James\* preferred the Democrats because of their perceived stance on welfare policies and the clients thereof; while Daryll saw the primary appeal between the two major parties as an overriding concern with money and power on the part of the Republicans (respectively)

I would probably prefer to the Democrats more because I feel they look out more for the poor. And Republicans, you know, they gonna look out more for the rich, and less for the poor really. That's how I see it.

I would have to say Democrat... Because we here that you know, democracy, Democrats are for the people. They want to listen to the people and therefore carry it out. Versus the Republicans which really don't give two cents about no one, but about lining their own pocket type thing.

Markus was more critical of the two major parties, identifying as an independent. His view was that "on paper" the two parties stood for separate policy agendas; however, in "real life", the two were essentially the same. Without openly aligning himself with a third party, Markus did explicitly support what he described as socialist policies to help communities. When asked which party he would identify with (i.e., as opposed to which party or candidate he had or would vote for), David opted for neither, explaining:

So, if I see like, like I say, like a president I know seem like he really gonna change things around here. I would vote for him. I don't, I can't really say...I don't know about the Republican, Democrat stuff, but...if he good on both parts. He's got my vote everytime, cuz he got a lot of confusion and all that, I aint gonna vote...Sometimes I believe I'm a Democrat, and then sometimes I believe I'm a Republican too, so. It be half on half. depends on like, what be, who be saying the best thing when that election time comes.

David's views point to a pragmatic view of politics which transcends party allegiances, despite his preference towards Democrats. While he would have voted for the Democratic party, it was on the basis that they supported policies which were more attuned to his own preferences. However, he (like many of the interviewees and the results from the survey responses) was not necessarily a "party supporter". There is thus a potentially tangible reason why few political actors in the Democratic party, who are assumed to benefit from an expanded electorate, do not more forcefully push for political universality. Outside of the enormous political costs of being viewed as soft on crime, there is no guarantee for either party that an increase in voters, especially from citizens who make up the bulk of the disenfranchised offender, would translate into party loyalty. For many, it is the attention which party members extend to their communities, focused on bettering their own prospects rather than temporarily exploiting their votes of resources, that motivate their support for the parties. For Thomas\*, the Republican party represented a party which exploited the lower classes for their own gain. According to Thomas\*:

The Republicans gonna, in my eyes, is gonna be like a snake, a serpent. You know, reach out for the weak. And they're gonna use you, twist you, spit you out whatever. They don't need them, throw them away.

When further probed into the how Democrats had reached out to him in his community, Thomas\* went further:

They, um, there was one guy, you know, he was a part of the organization once before, and he became, you know, he kind of turned his life around, you know? And he came and talked to us, you know? And we wasn't, we wasn't feelin' it at first. We was like "No, we don't understand that." But he said "Well, listen to me. They're having an election downstairs—" Okay, they came to Division 5, and it was like, it was like the school. It was like seventeen, eighteen was over. And they said you have a chance to make a, make a, to do some type justice because you're probably [not] gonna get this chance again.

Michael\* was clear about his views on the differences between the two major parties, consistent with the anti-welfare stereotype of the Republican party:

Well, I think the Republicans more based in the middle-class area... They try to do for them. But the Democrats, you know, try to help out with child care... They really don't want people on welfare, you know, they try to help you get off welfare and get

a stable job. Whereas, the Republicans, they just, they just want you to be based how you already is, you know. . .

These remarks reflect that of Markus and Roger\*, reinforcing the idea that a fair amount of potential positive reinforcement between participation and attention from party operatives incentivizes political participation. It also signals a clear distinction between Democrats as the party of the poor and the Republicans as the party of the economic elite. These results point to an intriguing facet, pointed out in Abramsky (2006), that voter demobilization in the form of felon disenfranchisement helps to artificially constrain the natural limits of the Democratic party - intentional or otherwise. However, considering the quantitative and qualitative results thus far, it appears likely that while there may be some truth to this assumption, it exists owing to an overlap of preferences between the Democratic party's reputation of pro-welfare policies and the needs of the communities where the disenfranchised originate from. In a manner, the adage of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" may be reflected in the support of the Democratic party as the party which opposes the perceived party of the affluent. Democratic operatives are equally strategic in their actions, avoiding those communities where they see little return for their canvassing efforts. As Abramsky records of the views of former Tennessee State Representative Larry Turner (D) regarding allocating campaigning resources to distressed communities/districts:

In those precincts [i.e., projects]...200 people turn out. In other precincts, 1500 might go to the polls. I always concentrate where there's going to be a higher turnout. (Abramsky 2006:162)<sup>2</sup>

The dearth of political attention which communities adversely affected by political disenfranchisement experience is not limited to any party or actor. Rather, such lack of communication on the part of political actors is driven by short-term goals, further bolstering interviewees' impressions about their value as constituents. This neglect may further depress policy representation and then feed back into the community by the absence of representative policy. "Trapped in poverty", in the words of Rep. Turner, "many turn to crime, and convicted of crime, they then are barred from many walks of life and remain mired in poverty" (Abramsky 2006: 164). This begs a further question which was posed to interviewees in the primary study and extracted from those of the Manza and Uggen study. That is, what do the interviewees, those who have been on the other side of the issue, see as the leading causes of criminal activity in their communities.

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<sup>2</sup>What's more, these were the words of an avowedly Democratic politician, with direct ties to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in a state where "race-based" poverty (157) forms a reality of daily life.

## 7.3 Public Policy and Perceived Drivers

### 7.3.1 Drivers of Criminal Activity

In following from the aforementioned levels of distrust of government and politicians, and the skepticism which interviewees hold towards party allegiance (though predominantly against the “wealthy” Republican party), interviewees were asked to give their own accounts of the policies (or deficiencies of) which they felt contribute to the propensity of criminal activity. In Chapter 3, it was shown that under-investment in social policies leads to criminogenic environments. This followed from Chapter 2 which illustrated the importance of political participation in producing policies which decrease income inequality, which in turn increases turnout. It has been illustrated above that interviewees relate the cause of their own political apathy, and that of their communities, to a lack of trust of and appreciation from government and politicians. Here I look specifically at the views of interviewees regarding their own perceptions of what drives criminal activity, specifically in terms addressable by public policy. From their own accounts, the preferences which they hold for desirable policy outcomes reflects their appraisals of the underlying drivers of criminal activity, and thereby political disenfranchisement. In exploring policy drivers, it is possible to better interpret the logic of policy preferences of both respondents and interviewees.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Over the course of interviewing respondents for the primary research, a hitherto unrealized facet of the criminal justice system was overlooked. In hindsight, the area seems an obvious area to inquire into. That is, while reviewing the research findings, the issue of conviction and correctional system change became apparent as an understudied area from the perspective of those who have witnessed it firsthand - specifically, the changing perceptions of race and the criminal justice system in the eyes of offenders. As only two interviewees were known to have an extensive history with supervision, it was not deemed possible to pursue this issue in full. However, given the value of these first-hand accounts, it seems an area which should be pursued more. William, with a long history of convictions and recidivism dating back to the early 1980s, tells of his own perceptions about what he sees as the waning importance of race in conviction and supervision rates.

It used to be a race thing, but now it's just, it don't matter... We're all having it bad. I mean, and it don't matter. I mean, it's just everybody now. It's not just, it used to be the blacks, just were picked on I guess...It's, it's a legal extortion to lock you up and it don't matter what color you are. They're gonna get money, the government, they're, somebody is gonna get paid from you being locked up. So they lock you up quick...But now, over the years, it don't matter. It don't matter the race. And it seems like, they lock you up for anything now because it's just like a legal racket. It don't matter. ... Child support, you know if you can't pay for it, they lock you up, you're doin time. DWIs, you know, I, they gettin hard on everything. And they're locking people up for everything. Prisons are just getting crowded,

While a few interviewees directly related the environmental conditions of communities as the driving factors for deviance, more noted the underlying factors of such community break-down, of which the burdens of weak labor market positions and social protections garnered the lion's share of attention.<sup>4</sup> As Daryll describes his own experiences:

You have some individuals. I have associates, that, you know, their parents sold drugs or used drugs, and so from a very young age they was exposed to it. ... when you see a community, we call it "hood", when you see a community struggling, you know. You take Sandy Run [lower class neighborhood]. The majority of everyone, if not everyone, in Sandy Run is connected with some type of illegal activity. And you see a whole bunch of little kids runnin around, that's what they see, that's what they do. Because, we are creatures of habit. You know. Versus someone who's in NorthWoods [middle class neighborhood], you know, where all they see is individuals going to school, going to college, going to work. This is the natural order of things. So, they conform to that.

David also saw an influence of drugs and gang culture, but went further to explicate a more instrumental role of precarious life events. In his words:

Most of it because, kids growing up without the mother and father in their life, and they be having little, they're basically hanging with the wrong crew. And then and then you got this little Blood and Crips thing out here, so, everybody want to get in with something for more protection. So. Stuff like that. Gettin little kids wide open...Like, if they make like more programs and stuff, maybe kids would not like get into a lot of that.

Going further into why these factors became prevalent, David revealed that, ironically, policies intended to alleviate social disadvantage actually contribute to further disadvantage.

Child support. You got guys out here that's tryin to pay it, then you got guys out here who don't even try to pay nothing. The

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crowded, and crowded, and people are going back. It's just like a revolving door.

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<sup>4</sup>The term *environment* applies to the experiences which individuals have been exposed to in their day-to-day lives, as opposed to specifically the life science definition.

ones who try to pay, they get the worst end of the deal, so they make them want to go steal, rob, sell drugs, do whatever they gotta do to try to make it...the majority of it's because there's no work.

David's views of the burden of child support were quite salient issues for himself. As a father of several children, he found it increasingly difficult to find a job in a labor market which formally allows for the exclusion of offenders from employment, while placing the burden of support on individual fathers for children. While receiving unemployment insurance payments of 88 dollars per week, this is reduced by half to be forwarded to his dependents of which he does not reside with. The remaining financial resources available, per month, are insufficient to cover basic necessities. The design of policies which place the burden on the individual in the name of attempting to instill personal responsibility, coupled with extreme discrimination in the labor market, therefore appear to foster one dilemma while attempting to resolve another. For Lucas, the situation was also uniquely connected to the financial instability caused by unemployment and compounded by barriers to offender employment. For him, the initial disadvantage of financial resources increases exponentially once criminal sanctions are imposed on an individual.

You get in trouble and your people got money and you can pay for a lawyer, 9 out of 10 you can ease around that to get you a misdemeanor. But if a person don't have that type of money or to have someone fight for them, you gonna get a felony conviction. That felony conviction gonna hinder you down the road. And here, being in North Carolina, I was told that they don't have a felony that can get sealed. As I was told. And if that's the case, you gonna have a hard time gettin a job, and I'm meeting guys all the time, everyday. We talk, I talk to a lot of people, and that felony conviction they saying, they can't get a job. So when you can't get a job, what are you gonna do? That's why.

Similar sentiments were repeated by Marcus, who saw the effect of not just unemployment, but the status which it brought upon as determinant of criminal activity.

We already have the idea, in the community, that ok, whatever it takes to survive, that's what a person...ok, I mean, that's for anyone, but a lot of times, the African American community sayin that, we gonna do whatever it takes to survive. so I mean, crack....rock...are a means to survive. and it makes up for the

jobs not being there...you know because of a lack of jobs, so you know. To actually do something that there's no means there, people gonna do any type of means, whatever it might be to survive. So, and a lot of times, some of the society, the community I was raised up in, you know, this is why, what people turn to. Because of a lack of, lack of jobs, lack of employment...so, uhm. And the thing was guys wasn't criminal in a sense of the term how they use the word criminal. But you know, it was kind of like, ok, this is something that they wanted. and whatever they had to do, this is what they had to do to get it.

The emphasis on crime as a method of survival, and an *accepted* method, resonates across interviewees. As William emphasized:

No work, no work you know. People can't find jobs you gonna go out and you gonna do what you do. Cuz you gonna support your habit one way or another. And if you can work you gonna do it that way, and if you don't you gonna go out and break the law.

James\*, in Minnesota, repeated this opinion - in his words:

Well, I mean, basically I mean - Some people, some people, I mean, have to try out for so long to get a job 'til they figure like, "Alright, I've been trying to get a job." And I mean they push people toward crime, you know? They figure ain't nobody trying to give them a chance to work so I mean it's hard, you know what I'm saying? It's- to stay, you gotta survive, you need money. So a lot of people resort to crime. That's how a lot of crimes get started, you know? That's how I got myself caught up between trying to get a job. A lot of people would deny me, you know? Basically it had to do with experience. They say, you know, experience, a lot of jobs. You know, you don't have the qualifications or experience that they're looking for, I mean they won't give you a chance? So I figure, you know, I've got a family, you know, I need money myself, I've got bills. So, you know, do what you gotta do.

Rita\*, a 41 year old single white female still serving a prison sentence for drug charges, was pensive about the prospect of succeeding after release even without being back in the labor market.

I have a big concern. I don't, uh, know what I'm gonna do for work or where I'm gonna live when I get out. And the easiest

thing for me to do would be to go back out to what I was doing before. Yeah. It, it would be the easiest thing for me to do is to go back out and go stay with my dope people. And I can make money, you know? And I, I mean I know how I can make money illegally and do it good, but that will bring me back here.

The lack of viable employment opportunities both before and after convictions, which builds environments of insecurity as a result of commodification (i.e., via residual welfare policies) is reflected in the preferences discovered in the empirical results of the primary research. Thus, the preference for policies which decommodify basic aspects of the life course form a discernible solution to what many of the respondents see as the central causal factor in their criminal histories (and indeed their suspected future criminal activities). This creates, in essence, a linkage of a *poverty-crime-disenfranchisement trap*. In addition, at least part of the cause of re-admittance into correctional supervision (i.e., custody) for offenders stems not from their committing offenses, but rather (and perversely) their inability to work within the existing social protection system parameters. This is particularly the case with unemployment, where probationers are often required to gain employment of some sort or be returned to custody, but also with other areas such as child support payments.<sup>5</sup> Take for instance the situation of David, the most outspoken of interviewees on the issue which affected him.

If you got to pay child support, as long as you paying something they will not mess with you. Like I say, they taking mine out my unemployment. Here, they doing the same thing, but lately I don't be getting any money. And this for one child. I been paying child support for 14 years now, been locked up for child support, now I'm feeling I'm getting to a point that I feel like I might get locked up for child support. For one child...It's neither [a misdemeanor or felony]. It's just not complying with child support. You got to do 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, 120 days. Like that. But, like I say, I'm paying for 4 other kids...

David was one participant among many in a group of potential interviewees with whom an informal discussion was witnessed over the course of this research. During these conversations, many of the respondents expressed similar attitudes - openly referring to their situations with the administration of

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<sup>5</sup>This does not include the myriad of public benefits which convicted offenders are barred from during and after their sentences. Taken together, these extra-penal policies distort the functioning of social protection systems from accomplishing their goals of wellbeing stabilization.

unemployment and court ordered obligations (e.g, child support payments). While substance abuse was brought up in both studies, the driving factor of such behavior seemed also linked to a situation of hopelessness and disparate challenges faced by interviewees in the labor market and compounded by insufficient social protections - even protections against social protections. The lessons from the Marienthal Case appear to continue to hold lessons for researchers.

## **7.4 Public Welfare Policy and the Reach of Government**

These views on the reasons for low trust in politics and government, as well as for the underlying drivers of criminal activities points to a critical role for the social protection system as a whole, and specific program areas in particular. Whereas the Manza and Uggen study focused on a deep understanding of the effects of disenfranchisement and community cohesion and similar facets, the study here sought to examine the policy areas which affected the disenfranchised citizen - as well as which policies in particular interviewees saw as the solution to the problems facing their communities. While it is impossible to represent all the possible solutions, considerable insight can be gained by registering the thoughts of interviewees on such programs.

### **7.4.1 Social Corrections**

One of the key arguments presented in this work is a reconceptualization of services provided under the auspices of correctional departments as formal components of the larger welfare system. This tier, as pointed out before, functions as a remedial tier for deficiencies in the larger welfare system, of which clients are subjects of. Over the course of research, many of the persons involved in this study related their experiences of services provided while in custody. While they themselves, and indeed many others, did not see these activities as related to the welfare system super-structure, their stories clearly illustrated the often overlooked functionality from a welfare system perspective. When asked to describe his personal views on losing the right to vote and how this affected his and others' perceptions of themselves, Jacob incidentally illustrated some of the benefits which social corrections had for his life.

You're dehumanized. I mean, you don't have anymore. Even though, you know, they give you a number, you don't matter....you don't matter, but you do. That's, while I'm in there, I'm building military trucks, while I'm in. So why you saying I don't matter? I put together MG920s. Did that for years ... dropping engines in, putting transmissions in, I mean we start on the rails from top to bottom. *I mean, I learned a lot. Like I said, it was a bad situation but was the best thing for me, cuz it gave me a bunch of skills I didn't think I could do.* I got welding, I got 4g, went through truck driving course...I learned how to sew in the lineup, inseams of military clothing, we make the clothing.

Despite the degrading effect of incarceration, Jacob was able to gain skills which helped him after his release through work experience and programs offered in prison. Similarly, David, recalling his own experiences of incarceration, reflected that he would have preferred that he had been moved to a different facility based on their programs available - primarily to offset the loss of his earnings.

I went... from [institution x] to [institution y], to [institution z]. That's the work farm... But now, things is different. When, I don't want to go back, *but* they got work release down there and everything. That's what, they should of had that when I was there, atleast I could have gone outta there with more money than what I had.

Similar pragmatic concerns were found in the secondary data. Rita\* voiced her vexation that her sentence was too short, as longer sentences would have enabled her to increase her chances of working within the social corrections programs to obtain employment and stable living accommodations:

Well, I'll have to come back here if I don't get a job right away 'cause they have, I wasn't here long enough to get set up... to try to find my one. If I would have been here for more than three or four months, I would have been eligible for the work-release program where I could have gone to a half-way house and got a job and got in a program where I'd already have a job when I was getting out. But since I was in here for such a short time, they're basically letting me out on the street. I'm one of them that's pretty much doomed to fail unless I get really lucky out there and find a job right away.

These views help to buttress the propositions laid out previously. They also go some way to illustrate the functional use of social corrections as one which essentially compensates for existing deficiencies outside the tier, one which is a widely discussed topic across interviewees. Larry\*, a 30 year old white male serving a prison sentence for murder, described his experience with imported services under social corrections:

Yeah, there's this, uh, outside non-profit organization ...that hires inmates and trains them in the computer programming field and then actually puts you on projects, or puts the inmates on projects, to work,

Such experiences were also referenced by Travis\*, in his late twenties and on parole for drug related charges. For Travis\*, the training and exposure to skills while incarcerated provided him with the direction he needed to find a suitable career trajectory.

I did take a class, ... while I was incarcerated. And I liked that. I found where I was interested in. So when I was doing this drafting work, then I got involved in the structural design. Now I'm going to school for engineering, engineering degree. That's what I want to do, and I, and I like it.

Professionals in the social corrections tier have long since recognized the needs of their clients, though their remit is largely constrained by budget cuts and the disconnect between their own work and the realities clients face after leaving their supervision. Assuredly, these programs are often instituted with the explicit goal of reducing re-offending and recidivism. What is compelling about the experiences illustrated here is the overwhelming demand citizens have for pragmatic policies, especially as concerns their ability to survive in the market economy. That is, while recognizing the knock-on effect of reducing criminality, their personal concerns are of survival in the market economy. In fact, interviewees sought more assistance in areas of remedial services to help them integrate into society.

Mary\*, in her 40s and incarcerated on drug related conspiracy charges, lamented on the reduction of programs to help offenders survive when returning to their communities, especially for women. For Mary\*, these programs provided not only a means of acquiring skills, but also as a means of combating counterproductive self-images and encouraging personal confidence.

I mean here we have nothing.... They've taken away different types of working programs where people were going on the outside

and working jobs. And yes, they were paying room and board. And yes, they were paying and things like that, okay, but they were also still paying their way and had money of their own, and they felt good about themselves. They've taken that away.

The extent of these services does not terminate at the level of skill acquisition for employment. Rather, the benefits of social correction systems, when they do benefit clients, extends also into other crucial areas of personal well-being and motivation. The vocational training which many receive assists in helping clients find and maintain themselves, which in turn (it is hoped) dissuades any further offending. However, other services are also provided which might otherwise be foregone without entering this tier.

Karin\*, almost in her 40s and incarcerated at the time of the interview, compared the circumstances which educative programs in social corrections mitigates.

I have taken college courses here at the institution because they offer them, um, and where else can you get them at five dollars a semester, you know?

Additionally, Lori\* commended the opportunity to receive personal direction from mentoring services which helped to motivate her to attend university.

I'm gonna tell you something: I, I mean never thought I would ever be in college, ever. You know? I just thought, "No. My life is, you know, being a crook." That's what I always thought. These women need to have somebody sit down with them and say, "You know what? What you've told and what you believe is right." You know what I'm saying? "I see this and this and this in you. You can do this stuff." And have somebody mentor them. A mentor is really important.

Such services are crucial in accomplishing the goal of reductions in offending, but they are conjointly instrumental in correcting for those areas in social policy which are unable or not designed to avert. For Nathan\*, not only should such programs be promoted, but these programs should be more integrated into the public discourse to provide more understanding of their benefits for communities.

I believe they've got a bunch programs out here, but they're poorly ran. Because they don't show interest to the public. The

public doesn't realize that that program could save that person from re-offending, going out in the community. But, the community don't care. The community shows ignorance towards the system. They don't want to care.

On a more thought-provoking note, Susan\*, an incarcerated white female in her 30s, went as far as to suggest that far from detriments to society, returning offenders were in some respects better situated to participate in the community *because* of their experiences in social corrections.

A lot of people come to prison and they're messed up. A lot of people change in here. We have the benefit of these walls telling us to change. There's so many people out there, they haven't done a crime, or they haven't been caught, or they haven't done a violation of law, but they're probably icky people, or mean or rude or whatever. But, you know, and they don't have four walls telling them "you need to change" We have that benefit, you know. Actually, so a lot of people come in here and they change and they go "I used to never read the paper," you know. I've done that, and I've become really interested in politics and stuff, and a lot of people have changed.

Taken together, these views illustrate an instrumental role for the social corrections tier in welfare systems. The evidence shows that many citizens rely on the services provided to conform to the prevailing standards set out by the community. In particular, the evidence suggests that labor market integration remains a strong component of social corrections among respondents, enabling many to begin or change their trajectories. This is further substantiated by the views given by respondents regarding policies they would prefer to see promised and provided by politicians and the government. From this perspective, not only do social corrections replace "state mental health hospitals as the institutions for confining most of [America's] mentally ill" (Rosenthal 2004:12), they also continue to play a crucial role in the regulation of the country's refractory labor force.

#### 7.4.2 Preferred Policies:

Overall, interviewees held clear views about the role which government ought to play and which policies they would prefer to see instituted, especially as concerns their own communities. The general areas of assistance, besides that of employment assistance, revolved around education, healthcare, and

childcare. As might be expected, interviewees were most concerned with policies which would protect the individual from financial ruin and destitution. Consider the views of William on what he considered the most important issues he would like addressed:

Healthcare for the elderly and the homeless, I believe that that would be a big issue. And schools man, people need education. I think of schooling, will be. And just help for the homeless, and the people that's havin it rough. Especially for the elderly and the people that can't work. But the people that can work, I believe that they should, I don't know, it's just the , they gotta find a job, I mean, there've gotta be jobs. People can't work, they're just gonna keep doin what they been doin.

The policies which many prefer to see are, above all else, overwhelmingly modest and pragmatic in nature. Take for instance the views of Markus. In his view, while education is a valuable asset, it should not be taken as a panacea for social problems, especially that of liberal arts education. In his view:

I know it's a thing that's loud about with bull horns and stuff, "go back to school, go back to school" , telling everybody to go back to school, but how the hell is all these people gonna go back to school when there are still no jobs? And where they gonna find work at? And not only that, like what I said, what's happening, cuz the government is a bunch of bullshit because, that's what's keeping universities running. But not only that, but these people are all in debt cuz now they gotta pay the tuition back! So now, they don't have a job, nor do they have the means to pay their tuition back, so now they're in debt. So, I mean. It's kinda like, what's the point?

Markus followed these thoughts by voicing that he did not believe that government had necessarily a responsibility, or even the capacity, to *create* jobs for all, but that it should promote the type of environment conducive to job creation, especially as concerned industry moving overseas:

...you know, make it more pleasing to these corporations in terms of actually just staying. You know, whatever happened to American owned, American built?

These views were echoed by Lucas who also believed that training, particularly vocational education, was underdeveloped. Consider his response when presenting his views on education:

Well, making more education affordable, and that people can at least go to school and educate themselves after high school, or everybody's not for college. So therefore you need trade schools. You need uh, classes for showing you better living. How to live and how to get along with people. Cuz a lot of things work with hand to hand, a lot of the things I see work with hand to hand [manual labour].

This was followed almost in lock-step with Markus' views on the industrial situation which workers faced concerning overseas competition:

A lot of the factories, the manufacturing companies that's leaving overseas. Right now you can get on the phone and 911, I mean information [411] and you might be talking to someone overseas instead of somebody here. So the jobs leave here, but all the jobs leaving here and these big corporations are together forming something just for them. What about the little people? See, nobody care about the little people. So, eventually what's gonna happen 10, 15, 20 years from now?

Concerning their views on overall welfare, that is, when asked their views on welfare policy in general, many respondents from both studies expressed *moderate* demands for institutional policy. Daryll, as with William, was supportive of the need for affordable healthcare, and even connected this view with the inequities of the economic system, in his words: "Millionaire, billionaires, or you know, these corporations, they don't, they say, you know, 500 dollars a [doctor's] visit, that's no chain off their backs, versus we need to work 2 or 3 months just to, you know, try to save and pinching". This view was equally shared by Lucas and David (respectively), with the addition of social care for children:

Definitely health insurance. Uhm, I feel everybody should have health insurance. And definitely childcare. Cuz without anybody taking your kid you can't even work, so. And some of that, fall back on us, but we can never say how long a person gonna be with us, how long, and when, whoever, which ever party decides they gonna leave [i.e., relationship breakup]. And uhm...last one, I say education. Cuz we can all be taught to do something, we have a skill. Once you obtain that skill it's up to you and your drive to make it work.

I mean, because, that's for the people, they might need that extra little help on something. Like the unemployment, like, the

daycare. Cuz some people do still work, and might can't afford baby sitting, or something like that, I mean. They need all them programs out there. But. And then it all depends. I know some people try to take advantage and stuff...Uhm, the health care, the day care, and unemployment. I'd say them three. Like I say, if a person has been working, they gonna need a little something. They gonna need gas to go and buy food, and pay bills.

However, Daryll, like others, did not advocate a far reaching benefit system to be instituted. On the contrary, interviewees juxtaposed their desire to see supportive welfare policies with practical limits. Consider Daryll's views again.

... Any services needed providing that the individual and or family is doing everything in their power to go to the same goal. You know. Welfare for instance. You find a lot of individuals on welfare. And, a lot of them just don't want to work. They know that it's there. And they utilize it and abuse it. That should be cut out in my opinion. If you're going to school, if you're trying to work, you trying to do this to the best of your ability. Then Uncle Sam should be there by all means to give a helping hand. Anything outside that, you know, you gotta get out there and get it.

Markus and William both concur with Daryll's assessment, in their opinions respectively:

[It] should mostly depend on the person's needs...and...not their wants. I don't think persons should be receiving certain amount of money, they goin' out and they spending, if you don't need any shoes or clothes then you are buying unnecessary things. Things as far as food, and housing and shelter. Food, clothing and shelter. So just making sure that there's enough that they can survive weekly. So it's maybe. I mean, if a person is only making minimum wage, and they was main person in the household. But I think, let's say they make 200 dollars, [there] should be a portion set aside cuz they have a family.

Well, atleast...atleast should, be enough to live on. I mean, I don't know a price or nothing, but it should be at least enough to live on. a week, I'd say three or four hundred dollars. At least. I mean, cuz, you gotta have enough to live on. and have a certain

class of living. I mean... I don't know about that man. I just, I feel like the government should take care of its people though, you know. Cuz, if, if they don't take care of their people. It's just, everything is going to go to hell out there. People's gonna be robbin' and stealin'. It's, it's gonna be mad, it's gonna be crazy, chaos.

The opinions presented here help to explain the responses in the survey data that show participants have increased demands for public services, however also have demands for decreased spending and assistance for businesses. These views were shared by those in the Manza and Uggen study, without explicitly intending to probe into the themes of welfare policy. Take for instance the views of Louis\*, who lamented on the need for welfare reform on the one hand, and the need to make sure working citizens received the supportive assistance from the state to lessen the burden of full-time employment, in particular, dependent care.

With the welfare benefits. I, I do agree that something should be done to reform welfare, but one thing that we fail to realize is that, uh – I was on welfare. A single parent with two kids. And it took me, not that long, but Ohio offered me child care so I *could* work. You know it wasn't penaliz- you had to cut my money, which I could have cared less, you know, they cut the money. Okay, fine. 'Cause I'm making more money working anyway, but it gave me child care, which I couldn't afford.

Indeed, even while interviewees, for example Sally\* and Paul\* (respectively), expressed positive views on welfare provision, these needs were restitutive in nature and pragmatic towards alleviating labor market pressures. Speaking on welfare reform, Sally\* felt that while she could empathize with the need for welfare reform, she also felt that persons in her situation would be particularly badly hit; while Paul\* saw that the purposes of welfare (social insurance and assistance) and social corrections as important particularly given particular contingencies in the life course.

But welfare's going to go down even further than what it had been in the first place. But it's like it's gonna affect us. It's really gonna affect us. You know we get out, we're felons. It's hard to get a job for some of us. Um, we're gonna need- Even though we are willing to work, it's hard to get a job. We can get a job pay 7 dollars, 8 dollars an hour, but that doesn't feed, feed me, my child, and pay the rent and pay the bills. It doesn't do it.

My feeling about being in prison, being a felon is my same feeling about the welfare system. Some people need help at times. Or correction at times. And they get back on their feet and they resume their role as, as a productive member in the community.

Consider also the views of Mary\*, a mother of four in her forties. For her, the programs provided, and indeed mandated, by social corrections directly impacts the wellbeing of clients, which in turn helps them return to their communities better off than when they entered.

You know and they tell you, “ Okay, you need to be in education. You need, uh, to be more self-help type of program”, you know anger management, things like that, you know. They try and, you know, focus you in a certain area based on your crime and, you know, the things that you’ve talked to them about over the period of time that you’ve been here. And they watch you grow, and they watch you develop. And, yes, you get certificates of completion so you can feel good about yourself, that you actually did something and you have something to show for your achievements. But, you know, now they’re taking those things away, and there’s going to be a lot of women here that a) don’t have a job or b) are going to be working fifteen hours, and that’s not very much money or c) they’re gonna be broke, you know. There’s going to be more fighting, there’s going to be more theft.

These views provide substantial evidence of the demand for more services by respondents. They also help to understand the nature of responses in the survey instrument by showing that while respondents do demand more social assistance to help them negotiate a competitive labor market while maintaining their own responsibilities, obviously cognizant of the effects which macro-economic policy has on their life chances. While the demand for unemployment assistance, whether in the form of cash payments or employment services, was slightly expected, the demand for childcare across both male and female participants was particularly striking. This is especially so as interviewees saw the role for childcare as a labor market strategy first and foremost.

## 7.5 Experience of Criminal Sanction

Returning to more political issues (and specifically experiences which are particular to the massive felon population in the United States), interviewees

were asked their views regarding the meaning of the loss of their voting rights, how they perceived of the underlying reason for such policies, and if they believed political actors would be receptive to their voice in the absence of these policies. Beginning with the primary study participants, Daryll expressed his feelings about losing his right to vote:

When you first hear that you lost your right to vote, even if you never voted in your entire life, just the for the mere fact that it was taken away from you. It really puts some distance between you and society. It really makes you feel like you in that “other ” category, whatever “other” may be. You know what I’m saying. You no longer see yourself as being a part of any community, any...it’s just you and your criminal activity. You and whatever got you in there. You know, well damn, they already written me off. They didn’t take, but you know, they done take my time, they done took my money, they done took all this, and now they took my right to vote. They pretty much just written me off. Fuck them. So, you know. versus some that says, well, I can’t wait to get it back, maybe I can do something different this time. You know?

For Jacob, the loss of the right to vote was more circumspect, explicitly connected to aspects of political power and control.

Well it’s kinda simple to me. They need me to pay taxes but my vote don’t matter. I’m paying a guy who’s basically saying “fuck you”. I’m paying his check. I hate to be explicit, but that’s basically what it is. I mean they make mistakes, so do we. Ours is more systematic, there’s is more [a] slap on the wrist.

Meanwhile, William again saw the overwhelming problems of daily life as too overbearing to be concerned about the loss of his vote, for him there was “just too much goin on to worry about politics. You’re just trying to live. Everybody is just trying to get by”. David, speaking for himself and others who had had their rights suspended, echoed these feelings towards the ostracism from political life.

...they think, ok, you took my rights away, well, ... that, anything I do, shouldn’t really matter. I mean, you make that person right there the lowest scum of the earth. I mean, whatever I do now, I mean, y’all don’t care. Y’all taking my rights away. Cuz I got a charge, and like I say, everybody is not, everybody is not guilty.

Some people might be innocent, just like I said, just got chopped off, or just got caught up in the wrong place. So, that's the way I look at it.

Given the strong feelings of interviewees towards the loss of their voting rights, especially in light of their general lack of trust in government and political actors, their views on the reason for such policies provide a useful insight into the mindsets of those directly affected concerning these policies. As noted in Chapter 4, several competing theories have been forwarded concerning felon disenfranchisement statutes. Four theories stand out. In no particular order, these theories revolve around the use of felon disenfranchisement as a racist policy, as a means to suppress the Democratic vote share, as a way to remove anti-law and order preferences, and (as argued in this work) as a means of suppressing a labor vote. From the evidence of the qualitative interviews, however, it is not readily discernible which theory resonates more with the disenfranchised themselves.

From the perspective of some, the racial vote suppression theory is seen as the probable cause of felon disenfranchisement policy. As Daryll viewed the issue, felon disenfranchisement was a policy of control over African Americans. In his words:

The first thing that came to mind, was that, once again, 70-80 percent of the prison populations are African Americans. And so, if you want to keep a foothold on any particular individual, then you cut off the amount of say that they have in certain things. You cut off the communication, and that is definitely an effective way to do it.

This view was echoed by James\* as well. In his view:

To be honest, I think that they, I think that they just want less blacks to vote, you know what I'm saying? 'Cause 90 percent of people's that's in jail, they's black anyway, or on probation or whatever. I feel, I feel that's what it is though. Less black people to vote, you know?

Lucas, while seeing disenfranchisement policies as a way to “weed out certain types of people ... and to bring in certain types of people”, and further more as a method of “putting [people] down” and eliminating their voice, did not draw such racial divisions. David, recalling his time incarcerated, recounted his surprise of many whom he considered capable and intelligent,

regardless of their crimes. In his view, disenfranchisement served as a method for suppressing voices which might upset the status quo. Regarding one acquaintance in particular, “Tom”, Lucas felt: “it hurts some of them, like him... yeah, he like, what I say, he might could throw some issues out there that might be good. And just, if someone with a little more power than him will listen”. Craig\* also viewed the central reason for disenfranchisement as a manner of suppressing the views of divergent preferences, though did not indicate whether this was because of racist or other motivations. In his words: “I guess the reason why they didn’t, why they don’t let offenders vote is because they, maybe they wouldn’t agree with some of their theories and they wouldn’t elect them”.

Others, such as Jacob (noted earlier), connected the loss of political voice to political-economic power relations, a theme which was also evident in the perspective of Susan\*, who linked disenfranchisement directly with the removal of rights from the poor.

So it’s like you take society and there’s this little criminal element, and then some of them change and they get better, and then they can’t vote? But they’ve seen the downtrodden, poor side of society, and it’s like, I’m sure this isn’t intentional, but it’s like the high-ups, the upper portion of society is saying “we don’t really want more people to vote” and so all of the one’s involved in crime, and you know, that’s like, most of the people involved in crime are poor. So if they change and get better and get educated we really don’t want them becoming community activists, you know what I’m saying?

These sentiments were also reflected in the views of Paul\*, who combined the previous assertions of Lucas, Craig\*, and Jacob with his own detailed perspective. For Paul\*, the use of felon disenfranchisement laws is primarily a way for powerful interests to shore up their grip on those who are most governed (i.e., those who come into most contact with the government).

Um, if people had the right to vote that were in prison, or felons that don’t have the right to vote, if they were involved in the process as much as I am – I understand that some people really don’t give a damn - Um, but if the people that do, uh, and were involved or had the right to vote, I’m sure they would not be voting for people who are passing things like the Prison Litigation Reform Act.<sup>6</sup> You know? And I know a lot, a lot of prisoners

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<sup>6</sup>The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 was a comprehensive overhaul of remedies

are involved in government just because we are governed more than any citizen and we have the least amount of say. And that's rather ironic. You know, we're governed more than anyone and yet we have no voice in that government body. Yeah. And that's, and so, you know, I think that's one reason the government does not want us to have the right to vote is because if they, if we did, we would not be, we would not allow these people to be elected. Or we wouldn't vote for them.

While felony offenders certainly cannot be regarded as a homogeneous racial or ethnic grouping of citizens, even despite the large proportion of African American males sentenced to supervision, their class positions and experiences as the “most governed” members of society does place them at a unique crossroad in the political landscape. While some see the *raison d'être* of criminal disenfranchisement through the lens of the racial theory, many more see these policies as predominantly strategies to reduce the voice that citizens and their communities have in self-government. Interviewees suggested these policies existed because political actors feared their voices would challenge their (re)election chances, as well as the policies which they pursue. Poverty and inequality in the US is interminably clothed in racial narratives and discrimination, and thus the potential impact which felon disenfranchisement has on policy agendas, and specifically welfare policy, is likely to be tinted with such overtones. That said, the voice of interviewees couches the policy of felon disenfranchisement not only in terms of racial animus, but in terms of suppression of lower and working class political power. This is in-line with the results received from the quantitative research involving corresponding items.

## 7.6 Discussion

Taken together, the views from interviewees deepens the interpretation of the quantitative survey results. One of the more unexpected findings, which is corroborated in the quantitative analysis, is the modesty of the preferences of the disenfranchised felon. That is, the disenfranchised represent a practical voice in the political discourse, not a radical overhaul of the legal or welfare systems. Respondents viewed the political process as in need of rules and regulation, but with a degree of acceptance that politicians do pay heed to

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available to prisoners to reproach states. It limited the scope of rights available to prisoners to address grievances.

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the constituents who they view as important.

Interviewees viewed welfare as an essential part of government action, and especially favored policies which enhance the ability of workers to live in relative security. As with the quantitative results, interviewees were not particularly, or overly, generous across the board. Indeed, while the topics directly covering the preferences of benefit amount and conditions were limited, those who did voice their views felt that benefit fraud was a problem from their own perspective and that limits ought to be put in place to prevent abuse or over-reliance. Thus, while respondents desired more protection from the government in terms of social assistance and insurance programs, they did so with the caveat that it ought to be provided on the basis of need and work ethic. As such, it is not that a “felon vote” would expropriate the resources of the many to encourage the idleness of the few. To the contrary. It seems all the more obvious that given their first-hand experiences, when faced with making actual policies, the disenfranchised might actually make more frugal demands on the government in more working-class friendly manners than some of the more active liberal members of the widely perceived “welfare friendly” Democratic party. Put in simpler terms, an enfranchised felon population, two-thirds of which reside in their communities, seem likely to support policies which focus on practical solutions for the poor and working class.

In terms of a constituency, from the evidence thus far, the main areas of concern for the disenfranchised felon voter appear to be those which revolve around pragmatic programs in the social insurance, assistance, and correction tiers of the state. In areas such as education and childcare, interviewees saw the benefit of such programs as ways to help citizens secure and progress in their careers, and even deride higher education in the liberal arts as counterproductive - instead voicing preference for vocational and trade oriented training programs. It is quite likely, if many others also follow the views of Markus for instance, that many of the disenfranchised would prefer more affordable, hands-on, trade programs to a liberal arts education. Aside from their preferences for welfare programs, however, one of the more interesting findings from both the primary and secondary analysis came not from what was mentioned, but rather what was *not* mentioned. None of the interviewees analyzed promoted any sort of anti-law and order preferences.

Rather, many saw policing institutions as public bodies which should respect citizens and be bound by the principles of non-discretionary power. As such, it might of course lead to a case where law and order policies *would* be

limited in their liberties to exert street level discretion in the execution of duties; however, this need not be seen as a detriment to law and order, but more so as a regulation of the policing powers of the state by those affected by it. Indeed, of the opinions raised by those interviewed, only two major themes came to the fore concerning law and order issues. One was the desire to see personal liberties safe-guarded, and the other concerned primarily greater resource allocation and management of programs to promote (re)integration. Ironically, the enormous politically disenfranchised felon population might be the biggest untapped resource in advocating for increased funding for correctional departments. Considering the concentration of constituents located within the same facility (i.e., citizens are typically supervised in relative proximity to their home communities), under the same conditions, and in direct contact with so many government administrators, it is not surprising that those who come into closest contact with these citizens are counted among their supporters for re-enfranchisement. As Gwendolyn C. Chunn, President of the American Correctional Association, has stated: “We’ve got record numbers of people who’ll be coming home this year: 600,000 people - that’s over half a million people. And when we’ve got those kinds of numbers, we need to fully engage those people in being good citizens.” (ACLU 2008) While legal and philosophical debates have gone far to ascertain the benefits and pitfalls of any such policy movement, the fields of democratic governance as concerns political economic policy making may still require further exploration. From the results here, such an inclusion of previously disenfranchised constituents may demand a change in political platforms from affected and aspiring political actors. While those who advocate enfranchisement on legal and/or moral grounds present firm arguments, it is the duty of those interested in political processes and social policy to keep a watchful eye on any success in dismembering such policies.

Finally, the secondary qualitative analysis presented here compliments the previous findings of Manza and Uggen (2006) in a variety of ways. First, while limited, the evidence from the primary research shows that the results based in Minnesota need not be limited to that state’s disenfranchised population. In fact, the results illustrate more that the findings of Manza and Uggen may be more generalizable than they assume. Certainly more work should be undertaken to validate such a supposition. Secondly, the SQA revealed numerous themes in the Manza and Uggen data than were previously reported. This is rather expected, as their study focused on highly related topics. Indeed, many more issues existed in both datasets than could be given space for in such a brief treatment. Larger qualitative projects might make use of the wealth of knowledge and insights which can be gained es-

pecially as pertains to hard to reach populations such as offenders and the unemployed by this method.

In closing this chapter, the results presented here and previously should not necessarily be taken as praise nor criticism for social correction services. Such is not the intention of presenting the views of interviewees on their experiences under supervision. Indeed, there are many instances where the well-being of the individual and the community are most likely better served in dedicated clinical, educative, and/or training environments. However, in lieu of the ability to make use of such services - either because of lack of access or dearth of provision, it appears that the services provided by social corrections do supplement and even substitute the demand for such services in their respective communities. In as much, the exclusion of the voice of such current and potential clients clearly implies a demobilization of such preferences in the political arena and particularly in areas most affected by criminal disenfranchisement policies. It is to this subject, the spatial exclusiveness of criminal disenfranchisement, which this thesis now turns.



# Chapter 8

## Spatial Exclusiveness

1 percent of electoral districts accounted for nearly 24 percent of prisoners; but less than 5 percent of the population (Behan 2012: 22)

This chapter presents exploratory work on the spatial dimensions of political demobilization in the context of felon disenfranchisement in the state of North Carolina. Using GIS analysis methods and data at the sub-county level, I present evidence which addresses two fundamental premises concerning these policies. First, building on the assertions (again) of Uggen and Manza (2006), I use data from the North Carolina Department of Corrections to locate those areas at the census tract level which have the highest rates of prison entries as a proxy for state sponsored political demobilization. Second, combining these results with census and electoral data from the North Carolina Board of Elections, I parse data on disenfranchisement and rates of social welfare take up and political partisanship to show the spatial exclusiveness which political disenfranchisement entails.

The chapter proceeds in two sections. Section 8.1 provides both an overview of applicable works in the field of spatial analysis as concerns political processes, followed by concerns related to the subject matter at hand (8.2). Particularly, 8.2 brings together the underlying concerns inherent in geographic clustering of populations and the ramifications of a disenfranchised electorate for partisan politics. While the review of the literature is a narrow assessment of existing work, and not intended to provide the entirety of the literature in the field of spatial analysis or its use in the social sciences, it provides a sufficient basis for the exploration of the importance of spatial variation in this study. Following this, Section 8.3 lays out the findings of the analysis on spatial exclusiveness in the study area. Section 8.4 concludes with

discussion of the findings and consideration of future avenues of research.

## 8.1 Spatial Analysis and Political Processes

The probability that two randomly drawn individuals exhibit the same partisanship is a function of the distance between their residential locations. (Rodden 2010)

The social sciences are rooted in contextual settings distributed across geographic space. The axiom of Tobler's law reminds us that "everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things" (Tobler 1970). This issue is particularly important for the political sciences, where the dynamics of political processes are played out at the individual level and aggregated to often arbitrary electoral units. The geographic spread of political processes are an essential dynamic of understanding the ways in which they are both input and output of democratic governance. The use of spatial analysis in political science is by no means novel. Harvard's Fredrick Turner (1914) had earlier documented the contours of the American political landscape to explore the inter- and intra-regional sectionalism which eluded views concentrated on differences between *North* and *South* (Cho and Nicley 2008). Contemporary investigations, however, trace their agendas to more familiar research topics - notably that of Valdimer Orlando Key, Jr's (1949) (hereafter Key) seminal work, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Key's work was critical in elucidating the deception caused by assuming micro-level behaviors from macro-level results - not least of which shapes the outcome of distributional policies.

A mainstay of the discipline, especially for Southern politics in the US, one of the most significant aspects of Key's work was the illustration of the fractures existing in what was otherwise considered the "solid South" (i.e., the notion that the Southern region was homogeneously supportive of conservative Democratic party principles). Key illustrated, for instance, that the distribution of support in the Alabama Gubernatorial race of 1946 was clearly split along socio-economic boundaries.<sup>1</sup> Figure 8.1 shows the distribution of support for Jim Folsom (a populist candidate advocating increased spending on elderly care, education, and infrastructure) and Handy Ellis (advocating low taxes and support for business interests). Folsom, an outspoken

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<sup>1</sup>Key's results concerned the Democratic primaries. Because of the power of the Democratic party at the time, primaries formed the "real" power in determining which preferences *inside* the party would act as the future government.

opponent of the upper class domination of the state, drew nearly all his support from low-income white areas in the northern and southern most parts of the state. Correspondingly, Ellis garnered the lion's share of support from the traditional Black Belt, those areas populated by the elite of Alabama society.<sup>2</sup> Due to the de facto disenfranchisement of African Americans during this time, the electoral power of the wealthier Whites predominated in this region. Despised by the Ku Klux Klan and segregationist whites, Folsom (following his election victory) instituted a broad policy of infrastructure development and bi-racial compromise.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 8.1: V.O.Key's Map of Support for Pro-Liberal Governor Folsom (Corbett, n.d.)

Such work has enabled the preservation of important political historical matters for the study of politics. Without such work, and without the clear illustration of clustering of preferences, the historical records often regresses to inaccurate assumptions regarding political units (e.g., states or regions).

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<sup>2</sup>The term "Black Belt" originally refers to the area of the state (and extended to the region) where the soil for agriculture was particularly rich. Because of the plantation system, this area was concomitantly populated by African Americans by which contortion of the term has arrived.

<sup>3</sup>According to Stewart (1975), Folsom pledged to "scrub out' the capitol by striking first at the autocratic power of the Black Belt by reapportioning the legislature...repeal the poll tax, ...provide free textbooks every Alabama school child, and ...pave farm to market roads in every Alabama county" (193).

While Key's work is also noteworthy for identifying the "friends and neighbors" processes at work in political campaigns, the methods of clearly reporting the demarcations of partisanship have continued to influence work in contemporary political studies, as well as revisiting historical accounts of the settling of the US and other countries (DeBats 2009).

This work has led to the advancement in understanding the problem of ecological inference in social processes. That is, aggregation of behaviors at varying levels provides the researcher with an overall feel for the dominant process at work, however it masks the underlying processes which are of more substantive interest. The attention to physical space is thus an important element in developing both theory and the models which test them (Cho and Gimpel 2012; Sui and Hugill 2002; Baybeck and Huckfeldt 2002; Cho 2003; Gimpel et. al. 2008). Indeed, spatial modelling has become an integral part of the quantitative researcher's toolkit for accurately modelling many social, economic, and political issues (Anselin and Bera 1998; Anselin 2002). Inadequately specifying spatial factors into common OLS estimates, for instance, can lead to misspecification and unreliable estimates and error terms (Cho and Gimpel 2010). Advances in spatial lag and error methods, as well as utilization of Geographic Weighted Regressions (GWR), have increased our capacity to make reliable estimates of social and political phenomena (Cho and Gimpel 2012).<sup>4</sup>

Despite the history of spatial analysis and the advances in its application, "geography", argues Rodden (2010:332), has constituted "a blind spot for political scientists". The spatial clustering of similar traits are by no means novel (a fact many human geographers and demographers have long been aware of), and Galton's problem persists in the social sciences. This is particularly true for the political sciences because, as Darmofal (2006:2) argues, data used in the study of political processes are inextricably spatial data.<sup>5</sup> Geography matters precisely because variables such as socio-economic status are not randomly distributed across space. Likewise, political *partisanship* is not distributed normally or evenly across space and this has implications for electoral systems based on representative democracy, especially those em-

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<sup>4</sup>For further reading on robust techniques of spatial modelling and specification, see Bivand, Pebesma, and Gómez-Rubio (2013), as well as Anselin and Rey (2010).

<sup>5</sup>Galton's Problem states that aggregate data on social behaviors obscure the underlying processes of the phenomenon. Phenomenon may be observed to co-exist or co-locate because they are consistent with underlying variables shared by differentiated groups, or via a diffusion process whereby one group is affected directly by another's interaction (Ross and Homer 1976 ).

ploying plurality systems - such as the US.

**Detection and Determination of Spatial Processes:** Analysis of the variation of spatial processes often takes on one of two, and often both, courses of analysis. Establishing the contours of the phenomenon of interests remains a particularly common use of spatial analysis. Findings such as those from Key's analysis of partisanship and clusters of socio-economic and demographic variables is one example of this technique. The use of describing such patterns emerges across several disciplines, most notably in the fields of epidemiology. Geographic mapping of outbreaks, for instance, are crucial in estimating the origin and intensity of infectious or contagious diseases. However, such uses are transferable to the social sciences as well. Such techniques have been employed to determine the prevalence and density of criminal activity (Ackerman and Murray 2004), incidence of poverty (Bedi, Coudouel, and Simler 2007), and the determination of resettlement areas of released prisoners (LaVigne, Cowan and Brazzell 2006). Such studies offer valuable insight into processes which can inform policy decisions more effectively. After determining whether spatial variance is significant - typically with the use of statistical methods such as Moran's I or Getis Ord - researchers can move to investigate whether such variation in spatial distribution is accounted for by first-order or second-order processes. While the present study focuses primarily on the determination of clustering of political processes, and not the more rigorous analytic endeavor of determining how and why they do so, a brief overview of these issues is presented for the reader's information.

First order processes refer to the spread of phenomena or processes over the entirety of ones data. To put this another way, first-order processes are produced by characteristics of the spatial location at which processes are observed. Lack of spatial stationarity is an indicator that one has a first order process at work. Stationarity is determined by whether a phenomenon is statistically independent of its absolute location.<sup>6</sup> Second-order processes, by contrast, are spatial processes in which the underlying mechanism is relative to each unit. Units influence other units, and this process results in the formation of non-homogeneous distributions of phenomena over space. Units cluster in space as with the first-order results, however such clustering is the

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<sup>6</sup>Take for instance John Snow's 19th century use of neighborhood mapping to determine the source of a Cholera outbreak in the Soho district of London. Because the deaths caused by the outbreak represented spatial non-stationarity, the event was an example of spatial auto-correlation. The deaths were contingent on the environment near the contaminated water source.




Figure 8.2: 1st and 2nd Order Processes

result of an interaction effect.

These two processes can be illustrated using an example of iron filings on a sheet of paper. In the first situation, the iron filings are placed randomly onto the surface of the paper with magnets placed directly under the paper (Figure 8.2a). The resulting pattern distributes the units respectively across the surface. In the second situation, iron filings are magnetized and again distributed randomly onto the surface of the paper, without underlying magnets. The attraction between the units segregates them respectively across the surface (Figure 8.2b). The processes are facially identical, however the processes involved are inherently different. Beyond the task of identifying whether phenomena are significantly clustered exists the further analytic process of determining which process produces these conglomerations. These are important aspects when seeking to understand how phenomenon congregate (or do not) in particular locations over space - and thus which administrative units agents fall in.

**Sorting the Electorate:** While some scholars have pursued the dynamics of campaign strategies and results (e.g., Thielemann 1993; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983), others have pursued agendas studying the effects of proximity on social policy, especially as these relate to partisan advantage. Such issues arise given the history of racial segregation and under-representation of minority interests globally, but strikingly so in the US. While spatial clustering is not always negative for minority populations (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006), the history of ethnic and racial segregation has corresponded

and exacerbated high rates of social, economic, and political deprivation. It is these areas which spatial research has generated insightful findings which help to shed light on many of the current questions of political behavior and geographic sorting.

*Sorting*, the process by which individuals cluster into homogeneous groupings of particular characteristics (e.g., race, religion, or political disposition), has developed beneficial insights into human interaction and non-interaction. This phenomenon, however, is one which remains a contentious issue. For the political sciences, a major concern is whether individuals actively and intentionally migrate or encourage migration to develop more homogeneous communities. For the interests here, we are concerned (primarily) whether agents select in or out of spatial locations based on political factors - e.g., partisanship. There is some indication that internal migrations do exhibit political sorting (i.e., relocation based on partisan considerations). Cho, Gimpel, and Hui (2013), using individual level data of movers with partisan identifiers, suggests that after controlling for “a host of neighborhood characteristics”, Democrats and Republicans sort for political reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this tendency is stronger amongst Republicans than Democrat movers. Bolstering this argument, Nall and Mummolo (2013) find that once “valence” issues (e.g., good schools, proximity to living conveniences, and low-crime) are taken into consideration, decisions to relocate to particular geographic settings among those who identify as partisan do play a significant role in the sorting process. They find that Republicans and Democrats prefer “Republican” and “Democratic” states and cities. While Republican partisans gravitate towards sub-urban and rural placements, Democrats tend towards more urban settings. The propensity for such environmental settings, attached to political preferences, has serious repercussions for political representation, an issue I will explore in more detail.

Despite these findings, the majority of movers simply do not relocate based on their partisan preferences. The valence issues (careers, housing, etc.) of day-to-day concerns largely outweigh positional concerns such as political co-location. While political actors may recognize the importance of boundaries of partisan geographic units, citizens seem less concerned with (and likely even less inclined to consider) the ramifications of migration into and out of partisan strongholds. Individuals thus gravitate largely towards material benefits which disperse their preferences accordingly. The resulting contours of the political geographic landscape exhibit variable characteristics consistent with gravitational models of spatial distribution. What occurs is a spatial distribution where neighboring partisan preferences are closely

related, and this clustering of partisanship (with the exception of natural boundaries such as riparian borders) traverses administrative boundaries, such that units often share similar attributes as neighboring units (Cho and Nicley 2008). Because electoral districts reflect population change and enumeration, such migrations can affect the dynamics of electoral contests and their concomitant policy developments.

**Boundaries of Political Geographic Units:** The evolving research on political geography provides a more holistic view of the dynamics of political processes which impact electoral and therefore policy results. The control over which preferences are represented by which representatives, and indeed if they are represented at all (e.g., incarcerated citizens and/or foreign born - non-naturalized residents), has been the source of numerous debates and controversies. From the infamous 1812 Gerrymandering in Massachusetts to augment Republican prospects in the Senate, to the current controversies (Eggen 2005), the strategic importance of geography for partisan politics has remained a salient issue. Figure 8.3 illustrates particularly egregious instances in four state congressional districts (CD): CD 4 - Illinois, CD 11 - Georgia (1992); CD 4 - Louisiana (1992), and CD 11 - North Carolina (1992). While Illinois' CD 4 remains intact, both Georgia and Louisiana amended their boundaries to reflect more compact districts. North Carolina's CD 12 has been only slightly modified and remains controversial. Such distortions are a serious cause for concern regarding the manipulation of spatial boundaries of political units.

In particular, these issues raise important concerns about “cracking” and “packing” districts to achieve particular ends. In the case of North Carolina, following the Republican controlled 2011 redistricting of the state, partisan interests dismantled the competitive district 11 by removing the urban center of Asheville and substituting its constituents with Republican precincts in the North. The legislature then migrated Asheville voters into CD 10, an overwhelmingly Republican district (Ohlemacher 2014). This adds to the already apparent packing (predominantly Democratic) of minorities into CD 12 to create a majority-minority district which, at 2012, maintained 50.4 percent identified African American residents compared with 37.6 percent White residents (Census 2014).<sup>7</sup> Such moves emphasize the continuing dynamics of

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<sup>7</sup>The facts surrounding the creation of District 12 in 1992 are themselves telling. Following the 1990 census, NC legislators were tasked with the redrawing of district boundaries. The creation of one racial majority district following the redistricting process was struck




Figure 8.3: Controversial Contemporary Redistricting (Source: Ebersole 2012)

political maneuvering and spatial concerns. They also illustrate the complexities of assuming micro-level political preferences from macro-level political boundaries. North Carolina marks an exceptional case in which *both* partisan interests have taken to manipulating political boundaries to solidify political gain.

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down by the US Justice Department under President Bush (Sr.), demanding the state appropriate two districts under the Voting Rights Act (Rosen 1993 ). The Democrat controlled legislature complied with the ruling by creating the 12th District along Interstate Highway 85, which protected the incumbent interests by avoiding a dissection of the Democrat power-base. Several lawsuits immediately emerged on claims that the drawing of borders based on racial concerns violated the Equal Protection Clause, ironically established to protect the interests of minority citizens (Culp 1997 ). The Supreme Court, however, maintained the legitimacy of the persistently serpentine district.

Thus, because the boundaries of political units are in fact endogenous to the political process (i.e., controlled by the party in power), sorting (and by extension, clustering) of preferences becomes instrumental in the translation of those interests into seats. These issues are at the heart of redistributive politics. By distorting boundaries of representation, partisan preferences, on either side, are able to distort the flow of public funds which accrue to the electorate and their respective communities. Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) found that due to the Supreme Court's decision in *Baker v Carr* (1962), sub-state entities (i.e., counties) received substantially altered levels of economic resources from state legislatures.<sup>8</sup> The "equalization of voting strength of counties", they argue, "produced equalization of transfers of state funds to the counties" (40). However, this expenditure differential was not captured in levels of spending, per se. Rather, what was modified on account of the equalization of democratic strength was the *distribution* of spending: "the post-Baker reapportionment redistributed billions of dollars per year [to counties]" (41). This phenomenon, they find, is universal across the US, resolving any contentions that malapportionment was an inherently Southern problem. Malapportionment grossly over-weighted the preferences of rural constituents in respect to their urban (largely Democrat and liberal) counterparts. Geographic (re)districting and apportionment, then, are not simply a reflection of underlying political power processes, but a part of the power that operatives have at their disposal. The case of North Carolina illustrates this point.

The structuring of the political-spatial landscape has repercussions for resource allocation. Chen (2010) and Chen and Malhotra (2007) show that increasing the ratio of lower house (House) representation within an upper house (Senate) district reduces the expected returns from "pork barrelling" to the respective constituency. That is, more centralized and parsimonious political boundaries increase the probability that representatives will secure special projects (and the concomitant economic benefits) for their constituencies. This occurs as the ability of actors to claim credit for such rewards is more readily ascribable. Where multiple actors compete for tribute, the incentive to return "particularistic benefits to their constituents" is abridged (Chen 2010:317). The affect of boundary limits and representational accountability, especially in majoritarian political systems, also influences whether and when constituents will punish incumbents. Where local policy is decen-

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<sup>8</sup>After Baker, states were mandated to apportion representation based on population – one person, one vote. Before Baker, it was common for rural populations to dominate legislatures at the expense of urban residents.

tralized, or where the causal relationship between social and economic policy success is largely outside policy control, such a representative is less likely to be held accountable.

Economic voting - the dynamic between the economic situation of a particular administrative unit and its lead representative(s) - is dependent on where the constituency places the blame of "failure". Ebeid and Rodden (2006) find that in states which are more dependent on primary products (e.g., agriculture and mining) as means of income are less likely to hold incumbents accountable for the results of bad crop seasons or depleted resources. States which are less reliant on primary products, and thus more integrated with industrial and post-industrial economic systems, tend to hold their incumbent governors accountable. Thus, states with higher autonomy over their economic performance are more likely to critically evaluate sub-national offices based on economic performance as opposed to the national economic situation. This entails that across the board, governors and other state level officials are increasingly held responsible for the economic performance of their own states instead of shirking performance onto the national economy or natural phenomenon. By extension, this would also entail that the benefit of excluding disgruntled constituents may be more useful in urban areas where job performance is more open for consideration in constituent voting decisions.

Rodden (2010) elaborates more forcefully on the potential impact of politically delimited spatial areas. Because individuals are clustered at different spatial locations, their median preferences are not the same as the inter-district (or inter-electoral unit) median preferences. The clustering of the left in urban districts and former centers of transportation hubs is in some respects, according to Rodden, an artifact of previous periods of industrialization where the left established primacy in these locales. This artifact has produced pockets of political preferences which persist into the present. Conventional theoretical models, posits Rodden (2010:325), excessively assume a symmetric distribution of preferences across units. In such models, the units to the left of the median are taken up by the left party, the units to the right by the right party. The strategies of both parties must be such that they attain the median voter while ensuring the extremes do not splinter off and form their own party and diminish their electoral power.

Electoral threat, then, may operate also at a more aggregate level than simply punishing at the polls. Staving off entrant parties or splinter groups may benefit from barriers to the franchise. This is where the strength of

the two-party system in the US begins to impact such issues. Entrance of alternative parties in proportional systems are more common, where issue parties may emerge to fill unsatisfied gaps in preferences. In the US, however, the dominance of the two party system discourages alternative political party formation and entails that it is the *primaries* which hold the effective power over platform decisions. With broader bases of support, parties are pressed to construct broader platforms which satisfy the greatest number of relevant constituents. Narrower differences in the distribution of supporter preferences entails that parties are able to consider and deliver more succinct platforms. In a situation where the left party in a two party contest tries to capture the support of the left-most district with an asymmetric skew (i.e., further to the left) to avoid the entry of a far-left party, it will jeopardize its supporters near the median of the inter-unit distribution. In Rodden's argument, where the party in question attempts to retain this far-left faction, opportunity arises for the entrance of a center-left party, or (in a two party contest) to right party defection. This goes some way to help explain the "Southern Democrat", and it certainly has support for the politics in the ante-bellum US (i.e., the rise of populist parties). Where national leaders are not able to enforce their will on a single coherent agenda, local representatives will "heed their constituents" and create localized policy platforms without fear of reprisal. The termagant entrance of the Tea Party in recent years, and the Libertarian party earlier, into mainstream politics comes to mind. However, these offshoots have conspicuously concentrated on the right side of the political spectrum.

This has considerable ramifications not just for partisan membership, but for preference articulation in particular. In a plurality/ first past-the-post, two party system, "the poor are distributed across [expansive Federal] House districts such that they can be pivotal in less than a quarter of them" (Rodden 2010:336). Packing low-income preferences into homogeneous districts may function as a way of diluting their strength even when the intention is morally and/or legally defensible (e.g., to promote racial or ethnic representation). Due to the manner in which districts are regulated in the US, it is much less likely for its poor to have a say in policy than in other countries like France or the UK (Juskso 2011). The diffusion of income groups over space acts in tandem with their numeric strength. "The geographic distribution of income groups", claims Jusko, "and especially low-income voters, importantly distributes the structure of party competition" (Jusko 2014:12).

For redistributive policy making, and the welfare state, these aspects have proved to be fundamental to the development of electoral rules coincid-

ing with greater electoral distribution (i.e., franchise extension). As Rodden (2010) argues, through franchise extension, the rules instituted came to reflect concerns of the established and emerging parties so as to protect their electoral prospects. In areas where Socialists were strong (in urban and mining areas), they preferred a proportional system because “their geographic concentration in a small number of high-population districts led to dramatic bias in the translation of votes to seats” (Rodden 2010:337). Moreover, this builds on an understanding of why, in some circumstances, conservatives advocated for enlarging the pool of eligible voters. Given the strength of left parties in areas under Liberal control, such a move could be expected to split the vote in those areas and hand control to the Conservative minority. To counteract this, Liberals advocated a proportional system. Thus, in this view, in Denmark (for example) where urban areas were the strongholds of Conservatives (and where Socialists would diminish their power) it was a coalition of Conservatives and Socialists who argued for proportional representation to shore up their electoral prospects.

**The Surplus Vote:** Taken together, the importance of spatial placement of preferences becomes an integral part of the story of political power. To recap, the equalization of representation has been shown to bring about a corresponding equalization of distribution of resources. While political strategists continue to “crack” and “pack” districts into favorable playing fields for their own interests, it is also the case that this is made less extreme by the “natural” sorting of partisan preferences into homogeneous spatial clusters which break across political and/or administrative borders (Cho and Nicley 2008). Simply put, even without political interference, preferences tend towards like preferences. Democrats congregate in dense urban areas and former industrial and transportation hubs; while Republicans gravitate to more sparsely populated areas surrounding these left leaning islands of Democratic support. Paradoxically, efforts to increase racial representation (i.e., minority-majority districts) leads to packing districts and reducing any partisan advantage in the *overall* contest. Furthermore, by moving racial minorities (especially lower income minorities) into majority-minority districts, voter turnout may actually suffer (Keele and White 2011).

Because such safe districts offer little incentive in the way of preference or partisan competition, the inclination to turnout may actually decline instead of rise. While the creation of such districts had initially boosted participation following the VRA, such gains have been shown to have waned (ibid.).

Where the low income vote is corralled into tight district spatial concentration, any additional vote for the dominant political group (by and large the Democratic vote in urban cores) is in essence “wasted” in such a surplus district. Thus, after redistricting in the state of North Carolina, the three remaining Democratic stronghold districts (Congressional Districts 1, 4, and 12) returned their incumbents with seventy-five, seventy-four, and eighty percent of the vote respectively in 2012 (Ohlemacher 2014). These cases are of course extreme, and produced from explicit political processes designed for such ends. The more “unintentional gerrymandering” (Chen and Rodden 2013) caused by sorting based on valence issues contribute to a more subtle partitioning of the electoral landscape. For the case of the political disenfranchisement of felony offenders, this has a particularly distressing impact. As I will illustrate further, the spatial exclusiveness of political disenfranchisement of felons has a particularly exclusive impact for those areas where partisanship is highest.

## 8.2 Co-location of Political Disenfranchisement

The issue of felon disenfranchisement, and indeed any systematic removal of electoral power, is particularly intriguing for several reasons. The moral and republican reasons laid out in Chapter 4 are often cited as paramount to the issue of felon disenfranchisement. These arguments hold that such policies are both against the rationale of republican government, and contrary to the contractarian basis of government. The partisan issues surrounding the exclusion of so many undeniably poorer and less educated, working class males also begs attention, as noted in Chapters 6 and 7. Equally intriguing, however, is where the effect of such demobilization is concentrated. Standard assumptions would depict lower income neighborhoods which, while they may suffer from lower levels of political participation, would likely support the Democratic party. While this is not inaccurate, it does obscure a potentially subtle and detrimental aspect revealed in Rodden (2010) and Junsko (2011, 2014). The removal of such constituents by and large favors Republican party interests, considering the evidence which puts support squarely in the Democratic camp. However, because of the manner in which partisan strengths are distributed (illustrated further in this chapter), the more insidious aspect of felon disenfranchisement is not the removal of Democratic supporters to the direct benefit of the Republican party, but also at the benefit of more conservative (middle of the road) interests in the Democratic party itself.




Figure 8.4: Two Party Distribution

Here I revisit the proposition provided earlier by Rodden (2010). Given symmetric distributions of two parties (e.g., Democrat and Republican), we can assume that the main effect of the removal of offenders from the electorate serves to diminish the numerical strength of the party which represents the interests of the left. In this situation, illustrated in Figure 8.4, the losers in the game of disenfranchisement are those associated with the party of the left. The blue curve represents the party of the left, and the Red curve represents the party of the right. The dotted line represents the zone of exclusion where political disenfranchised citizens are concentrated to the left.

This scenario, of course, supposes no internal distribution of preferences within the party of the left. That is, of those who identify and support the party of the left, there is no division of internal groups. All supporters are members of the same faction. Felon disenfranchisement in such a scenario implies a reduction in the overall group benefit in contests between the two parties. However, if we differentiate groups within the party (e.g., by income group), we can interpret a situation wherein not only does the removal of voters benefit the opposition party, it also reduces the prospect of entry of a more left party where the aggregate party membership fails to address its concerns. Put simply, with exceedingly divergent interest from the center and moderate factions within the party, the party may benefit by “trimming” its surplus votes in areas where it has no clear and present need to be concerned with the loss of their numerical strength. Figure 8.5 illustrates a situation where parties are divided into 3 equal factions, growing in strength away from the center of the x-axis. The y-axis represents levels of partisanship.

In this hypothetical scenario, we assume that the relative loss primarily affects the left party (Democrats) in relation to the party of the right




Figure 8.5: Two Party Distribution with Degrees of Partisanship

(Republicans). As the distributions represent political units, those where exceedingly large portions of the voting age population are removed create an artificial deficit in preference solicitation. That is, with reduced incentive to appropriate attention to their demands, political actors (unencumbered by viable third party entrants) cannot only tolerate loss of real or potential supporters, they may also prefer to do so from a strategic standpoint. The resulting scenario is one where left-party strongholds are also cradles of political demobilization brought about by conservative/right party punitiveness emanating from clustered partisan districts surrounding (and outnumbering) these “islands of the left”. Such surrounding areas are themselves relatively insulated from the criminogenic environments of commodified daily life, typically exacerbated in urban settings. According to the results presented below, not only does the geographic mapping of communities of high-density criminal disenfranchisement reveal co-location of economic and social variables (e.g., increased poverty, larger relative minority populations, etc.), it also reveals co-location of partisanship clustering.<sup>9</sup> In addition, analysis of turnout from two election cycles (the 2006 mid-term and 2008 presidential elections) indicates that the incidence of political disenfranchisement co-locates with areas of low-turnout. As such, not only are these areas more partisan than other tracts of the same party registration, their participation levels are also lower and significantly clustered to those areas in proximity of high rates of political disenfranchisement.

The resulting phenomenon is represented in figure 8.6, where high parti-

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<sup>9</sup>Results from exploratory geo-processing further illustrate the apparent segregation of partisanship by fixed environmental structures and zoning patterns; wherein (in the case of the city of Raleigh in Wake county) communities are markedly corralled by industrial and other non-residential zones, including highways and commercial estates.




Figure 8.6: Contours of Partisan Landscape

san values for the Democratic (left) party are represented in blue, and high values for the Republican (right) party are shaded in red. Values along the vertical axis represent the degree of participation across space, with negative values indicating significantly lower levels of participation. The evidence from the spatial analysis of turnout-out in the 2006 Mid-Term and 2008 Presidential election cycles indicates good reason to be concerned. The clustering of political disenfranchisement is concentrated not only in highly partisan areas (figures 8.10 - 28), such co-location also manifests itself in areas of significantly lower turnout (figures 8.11 - 38). Blanket political disenfranchisement, therefore, does not locate itself randomly across space and this is a considerable concern for systems of representation which rely on geographic aggregation of preferences within plurality structures.

### 8.3 Analysis of the Spatial Exclusiveness of Felon Disenfranchisement

Section 8.1 has laid out an overview of how spatial processes and their related units of segregation are relevant for political representation of political preferences. Such issues unavoidably affect, among other areas of policy, redistributive spending. While felon disenfranchisement is, procedurally, an outcome of criminal activity and conviction (i.e., not all crimes are prosecuted and/or assigned felony status equally or consistently), such policies are first and foremost political phenomenon. Such abrogations of rights, as discussed in Chapter 4, are intrinsic to the American system. The consequences of

such policies have only recently (i.e., within the last 40 years) developed to such a critical mass that their intentional or unintentional repercussions can be assessed. As such, the investigation into those policies must be reconciled with the gamut of research on how and why political participation matters in the system of policy making; as much as has been described previously in this work. Adding to the findings on the development and justification of such policies (Ch. 4), the quantitative results depicting the disenfranchised citizen's preferences (Ch. 6), and the elaborated views of this group on selected issues (Ch. 7); the following results illustrate the political-geographic relevance of disenfranchisement - visually mapping the co-occurrence of affected areas with their political features. This subsection provides a detailed descriptive analysis of the the 6 key metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) which the main survey and interview activities were confined.

### 8.3.1 Confirming Respondent Spatial Origin

As the data used herein to map respondents to communities of origin, and thereafter larger representations of those communities' political make-up and participation - the issue of Modified Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) must be addressed. This is due to the variable level of aggregation used across the datasets in the following analyses. MAUP, first addressed in Gehlke and Biehl (1934), is approximate to the problem of Ecological Fallacy. In the most basic terms, measuring phenomenon at different aggregations (e.g., census tracts compared to voting districts) leads to differences in results. Such issues take on the form of either a scale or aggregation affect; where the former applies to the overall area of the units used, and the latter to the shape of the units used (i.e., how an area of investigation is divided) (Taylor and Openshaw 1979; Openshaw and Rao 1995 ).


To account for this issue, electoral information has been manually aggregated to the census tract level. This was decided as registration statistics are reported at the *district* level, which does not allow for precise matching of the rates given by the North Carolina Department of Corrections. As such, the tract level registration rates based on those as of mid-year 2010 are given followed by the official district level registration rates provided by the Wake County Board of Elections. A further analysis of all counties is not pursued as the purposes herein entailed determining whether the general method used to calculate registrations at the census tract level approximated to those given at the district level. In simpler terms, the method used allows the approximation of felon disenfranchisement (proxied by prison entry

rates at 2008) and electoral statistics at the same (i.e., census tract) level of aggregation. Precinct level data available from the Wake County Board of Elections for the years 2008 and 2010, mapped to their respective polygons, confirms the overall trend generated from the geo-processing methods mentioned above (Figure 8.7). This mapping approximates well with the distribution of actual electoral participation across space.


Data on respondent addresses reported by participants in the quantitative study are compared with those tract centroids provided by the NCDOC (confirmatory findings are presented in the Appendix). The results indicate the locations of survey respondents closely approximate those areas where increased prison entries occurred during the 2008 reporting period. That is, using geo-statistical methods, it is possible to assess whether the sampling process from the quantitative research stage has successfully drawn participants from expected areas based on official records. Respondent locations and census tract rates are presented in tandem, directly for the Raleigh-Durham area (Figure 8.8), and in the appendix for the remaining MSAs (Figures 14 to 18).



(a) Tract Level



(b) Precinct 2008



(c) Precinct 2010

Figure 8.7: Partisan Registration - MAUP

Table 8.1 shows selected demographic, economic and political variables for tracts which are found to have significant clusters of high rates of prison entry (High-High) versus those exhibiting significant clusters of low prison entry in 2008 (Low-Low).<sup>10</sup> The variables, in descending order, measure the percentage of households (per tract area) receiving nutritional assistance for Over-60s (FSHH60), for persons 18 years and younger (FSHH18), the unemployment rate (UNEMP), the percentage of female-headed households (FHH), and the percentage of those 25 years and older without high-school education (NOHS). This is followed by the percentage of those of voting age (18 years and up) in poverty (PVAP), the percentage of each tract which is white (WHITE) or black (BLACK) of one race. These are followed by the median share of registered voters who are Democrat (DEM), Republican (REP), Libertarian (LIB), or Independent/Non-Affiliated (IND). The final three variables indicate the median value for the Republican-to-Democrat share of the total two-party registered count (INDEX), and a measure of turnout in the 2006 (MIDTERM) and 2008 (PRES.) elections. The first column (DIFF.) reports the degree to which the median of High-High tracts compared to the medians of their Low-Low counterparts. That is, it is the difference between the median value of High-High and Low-Low tracts divided by that of the Low-Low tracts.


The results are telling.<sup>11</sup> High-High disenfranchisement tracts are nearly 150 and 25 percent more reliant on old-age (FSHH) and dependent (FSHH18) nutritional assistance than their Low-Low counterparts. Unemployment rates (UNEMPL), low-education (NOHS), poverty among the working population (PVAP), and poverty among the elderly are all astonishingly higher for these areas. In addition, the racial mix in these tracts is considerably different than that of the Low-Low tracts. While Low-Low tracts have near four hundred times fewer black residents, this does not entail that the High-High tracts are exclusively non-white. To the contrary. The median percentage of white residents in High-High tracts is just less than half the black population.

For Low-Low districts, this ratio is drastically different, with whites at


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<sup>10</sup>The Standard error for High-High and Low-Low tracts is 0.264 and 0.845 respectively.

<sup>11</sup>These results must be taken with caution given the relevant dates used in the data, as stated previously. While all demographic data comes from the American Community Survey *estimates* for the year 2009, the data on registration and turnout are calculated using data accurate as of mid-year 2010. More robust calculations using the exact number of registered voters in a given tract for the precise year would doubtlessly return variable results, however for the purposes here, the results provide a sufficient indication of a general trend of partisanship and turnout for the related items.



(a) Respondents



(b) Rates

Figure 8.8: Raleigh-Durham MSA Respondents and Tract Rates

Table 8.1: Selected Characteristics of Clustered Census Tracts

	DIFF.	High-High			Low-Low		
		Median	Skew	Kurt.	Median	Skew	Kurt.
FSHH60	1.47	23.100	1.454	2.262	9.350	1.824	3.241
FSHH18	0.25	57.500	-0.727	-0.649	45.900	-0.087	-2.018
UNEMP	1.98	11.900	1.171	1.657	4.000	0.063	-2.256
FHH	2.97	13.900	0.397	-0.634	3.500	1.602	1.950
NOHS	3.38	16.200	0.167	-0.211	3.700	0.495	-1.973
PVAP	3.30	24.100	0.884	0.355	5.600	0.600	-1.463
P+60	3.90	20.600	0.803	0.156	4.200	0.467	-1.632
WHITE	-0.68	0.258	0.608	-0.965	0.809	-0.709	0.278
BLACK	3.90	0.595	-0.275	-1.177	0.121	0.739	-0.509
DEM	0.86	.737	-.500	-1.040	.397	.697	-1.848
REP	-0.77	.077	1.459	2.025	.340	.045	-1.616
LIB	-0.46	.001	2.421	8.935	.002	-.574	-1.693
IND	-0.30	.179	.569	-.974	.254	-1.451	3.173
INDEX	10.36	-.817	1.201	.757	-.072	-.422	-2.028
MIDTERM	-0.29	0.174	1.453	2.451	0.246	1.039	1.232
PRES.	-0.10	0.611	-0.312	0.927	0.682	1.108	1.043

four-fifths of the resident population. Disenfranchisement does affect areas of higher non-white residency, however these areas are not exclusively non-white; whereas areas of Low-Low clustering are vastly more homogeneous in racial composition. Most interestingly, and a facet which is illustrated further for each MSA under investigation, is the overwhelming partisanship of High-High disenfranchisement areas. While Low-Low areas are split nearly evenly between Republican (39.7 percent) and Democrat (34 percent), High-High areas are nearly three-quarters Democrat (73.7 percent). This is borne out in the median values for the partisanship index (INDEX), where High-High areas are over ten times more partisan than their Low-Low counterparts. These political facets are made even more concerning by the low values for turnout in not only traditionally low-turnout elections (i.e., Mid-Terms), but also for the extremely high profile 2008 presidential election.


### 8.3.2 Partisanship Distribution

I now turn to the distribution of partisanship over geographic space. Figure 8.9 shows the spread of partisanship over the Raleigh-Durham MSA study area, paired with the Moran's I analysis of clustering underneath. These results reveal a decidedly divided landscape of North Carolina's (registered) political community. Figures 19 to 23 in the Appendix report near identical distributions for the remaining MSA study areas.<sup>12</sup>


These figures, partially illustrated in figure 8.7a, reveal the divide between the Democratic strongholds located in the eastern urban communities of the cities of Raleigh and Durham as compared to the Republican dominant areas in the northern and southern segments of Wake county. The Raleigh-Durham MSA study area is useful for pointing out a significant implication of the previously mentioned issue of geographic sorting and the surplus vote phenomenon advanced by Rodden (2010). We can see that, more or less, the Raleigh-Durham MSA study area is (as measured by the index of partisanship used herein) overwhelmingly in favor of the Democratic party. Durham county reports no advantage for Republicans in a head-to-head competition between registered voters. Wake county does see variation, particularly in

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<sup>12</sup>The partisan registration index is calculated using the total number of Republican registrants within a census tract area, subtracting the total Democrat registrants per tract, and dividing by the sum of Republican and Democratic registrants per tract. The resulting index indicates the relative strength of each party for the given tract. Negative values indicate registered Democrat strength, where as positive values indicate registered Republican strength.



(a) Partisan Registration



(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 8.9: Raleigh-Durham MSA Partisan Registration


the north and south.

These cases are illustrative because, when the incidence of disenfranchisement is superimposed (Figure 8.10), they show that political disenfranchisement is particularly clustered in the most partisan areas even *within* an overwhelmingly Democratic environment such as Durham county. Using GIS methods to map these events provides useful evidence of just how discriminant disenfranchisement policies are across variable locations. The evidence for this can be seen even more apparently in figures 24 to 28 in the Appendix. The results strongly indicate that the incidence of political disenfranchisement is not only concentrated into particular communities, but is concentrated into particularly (and statistically significant) partisan (i.e., Democrat) clustered areas.


### 8.3.3 Patterns of Turnout

We can see that the incidence of disenfranchisement does not fall evenly across party dominant areas, and indeed that it clusters heavily in areas of not only Democratic support, but highly Democratic partisan support. This is one issue. Yet another issue which is able to be addressed with the use of GIS methods is the mapping of political turnout. Typically, as with the issue of mapping partisanship, these data are aggregated to election precincts which break within and across census tract areas for which more detailed information is available. However, using the wealth of data available from public repositories, it is possible to construct unique measures to identify approximate turnout rates for the level of area under study. Using this data, we can see also the approximate participation levels across the MSA study areas in relation to their partisan and disenfranchisement levels.

Figures 8.11 and 8.12 show the calculated rates of turnout among registered voters at the census tract level or the two election cycles reported in Table 8.1. These maps do not show the partisan participation rates, but rather the overall participation rates as a percentage of the total registered voter population per census tract. Figure 8.10a illustrates the distribution of turnout across the Raleigh-Durham MSA study area, while figure 8.10 shows the clustering of participation rates using the Moran's I analysis. While the first map reveals the general distribution of the turnout of the electorate across space, the second clearly draws out those areas which are significantly higher and lower turnout areas across the study area.




(a) Partisanship and Rates




(b) Clusters and Rates

Figure 8.10: Raleigh-Durham MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 8.11: Raleigh-Durham MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering



(a) Participation Rates



(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 8.12: Raleigh-Durham 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering

Table 8.1 gives a sense of the differences between the median of these units, these maps clearly reveal the gravity of the situation. The differences in rates are replicated in the high turnout election of 2008 seen in figure 8.12.<sup>13</sup> These results provide evidence that the situation of high-turnout right (i.e., Republican) and low-turnout left (i.e., Democratic) areas (depicted earlier in Figure 8.6) is a distinctively, and disturbingly, tenable phenomenon. Figures 29 to 38 in the chapter Appendix corroborate these results with the remaining study areas. As was reported earlier in Chapter 6 (Figure 6.37), respondents, while self-identifying as independents, shifted heavily into the Democratic camp. More so, comparing the inter-democratic group scores (i.e., those between the ISSP control and Respondent *predicted* Democrats) reveals a significantly leftward stance of respondents as compared to their ISSP counterparts. This work builds on the work of Rodden (2010, 2011) and others (e.g., Cho and Nicley 2008, Darmofal 2006, Ebeid and Rodden 2006) by further revealing the exclusiveness of spatial patterns of partisanship, participation, and (significantly explorations of political demobilization and/or criminality) exclusionary policies.

## 8.4 Discussion

This chapter has provided a ground-level look at the political disenfranchisement of criminal offenders in the state of North Carolina not previously supplied. With this evidence, it is possible to answer the question as to what electoral geographies this policy has at the local level. The use of GIS technology has greatly augmented the ability of researchers to investigate phenomena at various levels of complexity. V.O. Key's work has stood as a testament to the usefulness of descriptive investigations into of political issues combined with such geographic analysis of social and political processes. Through the use of these techniques, incidents of electoral migration (e.g., Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013), sorting (Nall and Mummolo 2013; Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006), and segmentation (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002; Chen 2010; Chen and Malhotra 2007) are brought further into focus for the investigation of political processes and outcomes. This chapter has connected the seemingly unrelated field of criminology and incident mapping

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<sup>13</sup>In 2008, the Obama campaign waged an extensive battle in the state which it won by only 0.4 percent against Republican candidate John McCain (NYT 2008) The win marked the first victory for a Democratic candidate since the success of President Carter in 1976 over the Republican incumbent President Ford. Obama narrowly lost the state in 2012 to Republican candidate Mitt Romney.

(as this field dominates -rather curiously - the literature concerning felon disenfranchisement) with the evolving field of political-spatial research. In as much as political geographies impact the creation and sustainability of policy regimes, the spatial exclusiveness of political disenfranchisement should necessarily be extracted from the field of criminal justice studies and placed firmly in the field of political studies. Political demobilization is, after all, first and foremost an electoral policy, and only secondarily (if at all) a retributive or rehabilitative policy for affected citizens.

Furthermore, as Rodden (2010, 2011) has pointed to, geographic distributions of partisanship and participation are key issues for redistributive politics, particularly in plurality systems.

By creating winner-take-all districts with a sufficiently skewed distribution of district medians, a society can create policy bias, such that plurality elections with a single national district, or elections using proportional representation, would yield different equilibrium policies. (Rodden 2010:136)

Recall the illustration in figures 8.4 and 8.5 regarding the distributions of district preferences. In a two district scenario, the loss of members of either party is detrimental to the party as a whole. That is, where one party competes entirely against another or multiple parties, it is in the interest of the party to mobilize the maximum number of supporters to gain seats. However, where parties are internally cleaved, it is not necessarily the case that all supporters need to be (or indeed are even desired to be) mobilized. This is especially so where parties operate in “safe” political units where competition is muted.

In such districts, increasing numbers of surplus voters are generated. In a situation where the distribution of preferences are not normally distributed across units (i.e., districts or precincts), those at the tails of the distribution away from the inter-unit and inter-party medians create tangible threats as concerns entrance of emergent new or splinter parties/groups. In proportional representative systems - where the entrance of emergent left, right, and/or center parties are the norm - the inter-unit difference is likely to find a political party which best represents its interest. In plurality systems, by contrast, barriers for entrant parties inhibit constituent defection to emergent groups and thus constrain the choices available to dissident preferences. That is, the preferences on the periphery of the inter-unit distribution are unwilling or unable to contribute any meaningful support to an emergent

party or internal faction.

Where demobilization occurs within districts which are known to tend towards distinctively left preferences (for instance), demobilization effectively mutes the interest of the dominant left party in soliciting the support of those constituents. The preliminary results using predicted group memberships between ISSP control respondents and survey respondents reveals precisely such evidence - i.e., significant differences not only between Republican and Democratic partisans, but differences *within* the Democratic party itself. Respondents predicted to be Democratic supporters were significantly more left leaning on the index of spending ( $p < .05$ ) and government responsibility for provision of public services ( $p < .001$ ) - see Figure 6.37.

The results of this chapter show that (using prison entries as a proxy) political demobilization is concentrated in areas which are highly partisan in their party preference measured by registration parity between the Republican and Democratic parties. These differences are measured in urban areas (MSAs) which are typically more politically liberal than rural areas. Even within (urban) areas that are expected to lean more Democratic than other (rural) areas (Rodden 2010), distinct segregation of partisan and mobilization are evident across study areas. Republican strongholds are distinct from Democratic areas, and vice-versa.

This pattern is seen across the six MSA areas investigated. What is particularly interesting about this phenomenon (i.e., congregating left preferences within particular districts) is the potential ramifications it has had for the development of political preference articulation. While conservative groups have seen particular success in forming independent and near-autonomous factions (i.e., the Libertarian party and Tea Party), the left has not managed to field a vibrant or even articulated faction within the Democratic party or outside the party. If the views of respondents in both the primary and secondary qualitative analysis, and those of elected representatives (Abramsky 2006), are any indication of the value which political actors see in surplus votes, then the proposals of Rodden and those of this work are telling. It would suggest that while the demobilization of supporters of the Democratic party (i.e., the dominant left party) is of interest to *national* contests, their value to the party at *sub-national* levels is of less interest or desire - especially in cases where districts are created so as to decrease competitiveness in both or either party.

The dissuasion of constituents through punitive social welfare and assis-

tance policy, increased commodification of daily life, and the explicit removal of political rights from the clients of the social corrections tier curtails the consideration of preferences of the left by the custodial Democratic party simply by culling their ability to demand attention. Removing surplus voters who have vested interests in the extension of governmental services which decrease the impact of marketized living conditions does not hurt (and even helps) conservative party members seeking re-election and/or compromise with an increasingly rightward Republican party. To be tough on crime wins votes by sacrificing the very preferences which help anchor the leading party of the left from migrating to the center. This may help to build on our understanding of the stagnant and even rightward movement of the Democratic party in recent decades compared to the strikingly right shift among the Republican party (Steinglass 2012).

Taken together, these findings suggest that not only do disenfranchised respondents differ in their preferences for policies and the extent of governmental intervention, they are also significantly clustered in areas of high surplus votes.<sup>14</sup> To put this another way, political disenfranchisement of large swathes of disaffected, unemployed, under-educated young men across the United States (clustered overwhelmingly in Democratic strongholds) may not necessarily warrant attention from incumbents or other political actors who have no need of their votes. Districts simply are not competitive enough to value such voters, while the limited resources to make convincing campaign promises to assuage their likely demands would further demote their value as electors. This leaves a precarious situation where the entirety of the blame for declining relevance of electors in these areas is placed on their (real or imagined) apathy towards political processes, itself a product of disengagement by political actors.

What is particularly interesting, and perhaps somewhat ironic, is that it may be the Republican party itself which loses out by inadvertently allowing the Democratic party the ability to disregard significant numbers of constituents which could potentially participate to the detriment of that party's established hierarchy. That is, by promoting punitive policies disproportionately affecting/removing Democratic partisans on the tails of the inter-unit distribution, Republicans may in fact enable the Democratic party to move to the center without worry of ostracizing the most left of their party. The correlate being that the most extreme factions of the Republican party are

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<sup>14</sup>Without further investigation, it is not possible to know how these assumptions from such a limited primary analysis completely match up with empirical reality.

not silenced, on par, and thus are allowed to factionalize intra-party dynamics. Such a proposition is certainly an interesting research topic for later exploration. The question remains whether political actors would seek votes from such voters considering the caustic environment of political campaigns. However, evidence from Parkes (2003) would suggest there is some credence to such prospects.<sup>15</sup> Such a proposition would depend of course on the creation of more competitive districts as opposed to the tendency to establish more secure partisan districts.

A further implication of the work presented herein concerns the non-partisan motivated sorting of Democratic preferences into urban areas. In light of the research on the effect of sorting into high-density partisan areas, Democratic and left preference constituents may possibly be doing more harm than good in choosing to reside in more urban areas, thus leaving large swathes of the remaining districts devoid of competing interests. The desire to live within homogeneous communities may decrease the ability of the left to demand desirable policies simply by reducing the total seats they are able to win. A more strategic scenario would consider promoting migration of left and Democratic supporters away from urban districts and into right and Republican dominated areas. This, of course, seems unrealistic as an actionable strategy; however, advances in technology and infrastructure may in fact enable urban left preferences to out-migrate to such areas and create more competitive precincts and districts both within and outside of their current urban islands.

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<sup>15</sup>According to Parkes (2003):“During the 1998 provincial election campaign, Parti Quebecois candidate Raoul Duguay visited Cowansville Penitentiary, a federal prison which houses many long-term inmates. Under Quebec law which provides that inmates’ votes are counted in their place of domicile, ninety-two inmates had designated the prison as their place of domicile. For Duguay, who was running in that district, those ninety-two votes were significant enough to warrant meeting with inmates to discuss their concerns”.

## Chapter 9

# Conclusion

This work has focused on the issue of democratic representation and the relationship which it shares with that of public policy. While the ramifications of electoral participation have remained a contentious issue in public debates, and especially within the fields of political and welfare state studies, this study points to the intrinsic value which such aggregation of preferences has for public policy. In addition, it has pointed to the reciprocal relationship which public policy has with democratic agency.

The reasoning for this investigation has come about from the persistence (notably in the United States) of the policy of political disenfranchisement of citizens following a felony conviction. While the US is not alone in administering this policy, the extent to which it has come to pervade democratic communities in that country makes its existence a particular concern. Thus, while other nations continue to deny the right to participate in elections based on felony statuses (and other qualifications), it is the extent of that exclusion in the US which makes it a prime case for study.

Felon disenfranchisement viewed through the political-economic lens of the welfare state is a useful approach with which to uncover the intimate relationship presented herein. It is perhaps one of the few contemporary examples of a natural experiment which demobilize so many of the population systematically. Moreover, the investigation presented has sought and reported alternative explanations of this form of political demobilization which lie persistently below the surface of popular challenges to the policy. This is so, I have argued, because so much of the debate in the US has centered on the omnipresent issue of race in American political and social life - not to mention economic life. Because debates on the nature of civil, political, and social rights is so incessantly mired in framings of real or imagined racially

prejudicial behaviors and intentions, much of the debate on the ramifications of political demobilization has succumbed to their conclusions.

Thus, the main theses for this work have stemmed from a central concern spawned by the existence of political disenfranchisement policies, specifically in the United States. That is, if we are willing to support or challenge clear abrogations of democratic participation, it is essential to debate and discern not only the normative logics operating in the background, but also the very real practical ramifications of such stances. To tout normative values of democratic participation is, to some degree, to hold court for the sake of holding court. Too often, both challengers and defenders of political demobilization (not exclusive to *felon* disenfranchisement) have used moralistic argumentations to pursue their ends. While this is true of many movements, such strategies have proven particularly caustic for the struggle for democratic rights. The case for the de-establishment of political demobilization policies runs head-first into this dilemma. While many value the ideal of political equality, the acceptability of *outcast* citizens (presumably voluntary violators of the social compact) remains a distasteful pill to swallow for many. That the war on crime was inflated by the success of the victim's rights movement and attachments thereof is telling of the strength which the framing of issues has had on the political landscape in the United States and elsewhere (Simon 2003, Gottschalk 2006, Fraser 1984, 1989).

The *merit* concept of the right to vote, evidenced by the historical findings in Chapter 4, has helped to enable a situation wherein the political demobilization of the predominantly lower and laboring classes is possible. The demise of social welfare, with the rise of neo-liberal ideology since the mid-20th century, formed part and parcel of the vigorous redefinition of clients of the welfare state (significantly in the lower tiers) as contemptible and undeserving recipients of communal relief. Race prejudice and its central role in social and economic life played no small part in enabling much of the discourse and decisions which dissolved many of the gains made in the previous eras of progressive government. While its existence has been and remains a tenacious issue in social life, both within and outside of the US, the decisions made possible by its exploitation overwhelming impact those who are at risk in the environment of highly marketized living.

This fact is important to keep at the forefront of our thoughts on correctional populations in general, and the disenfranchised members of that population in particular. In simpler terms, while many of the clients of social corrections are (at least in terms of unweighted counts) disproportionately

racial minorities (and particularly African Americans), the vast majority of its clients are the poor and laboring classes of all racial groupings. Such a distinction is central to understanding felon disenfranchisement's place in the realm of the political economic realm of the welfare state. This work has attempted to bring together, to the extent possible, the multitude of considerations needed to approach the political demobilization of felons (and by extension their communities) from a more comprehensive viewpoint. Individually, these issues are worth their own field of study, and as much is clear by the range of academic debate reported in each of the topics presented. Taken together, however, a more fluid picture emerges - one which greatly enhances our understanding of issues of class relations in the democratic demobilization.

## 9.1 Discussion of Findings

The chapters and sections herein have presented a broad depiction of the concerns inherent in dealing with the issue of felon disenfranchisement in particular and the political demobilization of citizens in general. For the reader's convenience I review these here along with their relevant hypotheses and findings.

In chapter 1, I began with an overview of key theoretical issues in welfare state studies. Such an overview informed the context of the arguments and findings which followed in the remainder of the work. This chapter laid out a survey of a selection of the leading theoretical conceptions of the welfare state's development as according to comparative welfare state literature. The chapter proceeded with a survey of the logic of industrialism, followed by the logic of capitalism, and then rounded off with an overview of the Power Resource and the Varieties of Capitalism approaches to the study of welfare systems comparatively.

Following this, a more in depth argument has been given as regards the debate between the firm centered VoC approach and the resource based PRA approach. By shifting the focus of concern from left party and working class mobilization, VoC scholars have reinvigorated the debates concerning welfare state formation and persistence. PRA, however, remains a formidable theoretical construct in the field of study. Having dealt with these theoretical concerns, this chapter then moved onwards to consider the basis for welfare state legitimacy and attendant justification. These areas concerned three

main premises for state intervention into the market. While an insurance approach focuses on the often debated efficiency and technical aspects of welfare state legitimacy, moral and political approaches look at more socio-political aspects of such intervention.

The moral argument concerning state intervention revolves, I argue, around a single axis along a continuum of concepts about the place of state and individual in social, economic, and political life. On the one end of this continuum lies a residualist conception of the state. This *Malthusian* approach, I argue, takes the individual as the sole custodian of her own fortunes. In this perspective, the individual ought only be guaranteed the negative freedoms necessary to pursue her own interests. Survival is a function of individual propensity and ability to succeed. The alternate view places the individual at a more communitarian pole, one which elaborates on the enabling ability of collective protection. This *Kropotkin* variety of social Darwinism places the individual within the social environment as author and product. The state has a responsibility, and interest, in creating policy by which the individual benefits. This section illustrated how these two stances have been evidenced in social and economic policy across time and space - notably in the cases of the *New Poor Law* reforms in Victorian England and the creation of the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996* in the US. Importantly, this section illustrates the consistent controversial nature of state intervention in the social and economic lives of individuals and the manner in which such intervention is couched.

Moving from this, the political variant of justification of the welfare state was put forward - illustrating the current and emergent views by which the welfare state is legitimized and even structured. In this approach, the Marshallian concept of citizenship plays a central role for advocates of the welfare state. The social rights which developed following the extension of civil and political rights are (in contrast to a more static conception of Marshall's framework) symbiotic with the latter. This approach to understanding the welfare state relies on the (de)formative capacity of policy established at the bequest of social rights on citizen political agency. Utilizing the theoretical concept of *Reflexive Democracy* elaborated by Olson (2006), this section merged these insights with the conceptual understanding of political processes of Easton (1957) to illustrate the potential ramifications of political (de)mobilization and welfare state structures.

In as much, the premise of this approach maintains that the welfare state can be argued as legitimate (and the policies and processes within it as just)

in as much as the system actualizes political agency amongst constituents of the welfare system. In a political system built upon the ideal of full democratic participation and universal suffrage, the ability of constituents to realize their rights is dependent on and author to the design of welfare policies. More simply, we get out what we put in. This section provides the core concept of interest in the following chapter. That is, Chapter 2 tests these assumptions more fully.

Chapter 2 empirically tests the assumptions of reflexive democracy by utilizing an original dataset of cross-sectional and longitudinal data of the 50 United States across 16 years. Using a three-stage series of regression analyses with this Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) data, this chapter finds that the relationship of the welfare state and political participation remains a viable avenue of research, even in light of emergent criticisms to the contrary. As with Toikka et. al (2004), I find that allocations towards policies which decommodify the individual are significantly reliant on political participation (H1).

I find that those policies which are significantly associated with political turnout are those which reduce the post-transfer inequality of citizens across the US - i.e., cash benefits and generosity reduce post-transfer inequality (H2). Furthermore, I find that it is likely that it is the experience of inequality itself which mediates the effect of welfare state policies on political turnout. States with higher inequality measured after the effects of transfers have been taken into account exhibit significantly lower rates of turnout on election day. The findings from this chapter add a welcomed degree of support for those who focus on the (de)formative effects of welfare state structuring on the individual's (and by extension their community's) ability to author policy. That is, it illustrates the effect which the welfare state has on political agency, as well as the effect which political agency (materialized) has on the welfare state. Further inquiry is merited and welcomed in exploring this issue further. As such, these findings entail that the demobilization of large swathes of the electorate, and particularly those of the lower and laboring classes, has very real implications for their well-being in subsequent rounds of the policy process.

Chapter 3 provided a developing view of correctional systems (e.g., prisons, jails, youth detention facilities, community supervision) in respect to the welfare state. In this view, correctional systems are separate only as concerns their punitive purposes. All other services provided under their authority (e.g., medical, dental, educative, psychological, employment training,

etc.) are necessarily and rightly to be viewed as extended welfare state services *outside* the field (particularly for the United States) of typically defined welfare state components - i.e., they are for the most part isolated to particular beneficiary populations. To delimit the areas of the welfare state, by which to facilitate a clearer understanding of the placement of such clients in the overall system of welfare, an adapted version of the Titmuss (1965) (and later Abromovitz (2001)) framework is given which firmly situates these clients in terms of overall welfare state processes. Using this framework, it is possible to more easily discern not simply *where* clients of correctional systems fit in with respect to the welfare state (a matter that must be further explored in the general welfare state literature), but also *why* scholars and practitioners ought to be concerned with their fate. This conceptual exploration is supplemented by a practical example of this tier using the state of North Carolina as a case in point. This analysis reveals temporal variation of program uptake and funding in one state. It also provides perhaps one of the first welfare state examinations at this level of disaggregation. Because this framing of correctional systems places their functional value at the center of investigation, it reveals not what the social corrections tier (and consequently the clients it serves) means for social and political discourse, but rather what it *does* for the residents of the political economic landscape. This chapter ended the first part of this work, that which dealt with (largely) the theoretical concerns inherent in pursuing a study of the demobilization of constituents via felon disenfranchisement policy.

The second part of this work explored almost exclusively matters directly related to the disenfranchisement of felony offenders in the United States. It began with an exploration of the modes and methods of general disenfranchisement, then turning specifically to the area of felon disenfranchisement. As a definable population, it is argued that felons represent the single largest and most systematically demobilized group left in the United States. No other group receives so little support from so many peers as does the felony offender. To investigate this, I look at the development of discourses regarding the practice in the United States. I find that while racial prejudicial arguments have formed the core of debates in recent years, their prominence is not without detriment. Particularly, I find using an analysis of the historical literature regarding the subject that a more labor oriented framework of the practice is useful for uncovering which types of persons are most at risk of this policy. That is, I argue that the literature provides sufficient evidence to provide for the argument that felon disenfranchisement (akin to many other forms of political disenfranchisement (Keyssar 2009)) predominately impacts the lower and laboring classes, specifically those disproportionately

at detrimental risk from a commodified labor market system. The fact that minorities are so “disproportionately” impacted by these policies has much less to do with policies aimed specifically at their racial grouping and much more to do with their precarious position in unprotected markets. This is not incidental. A closer examination of the context in which such policies were devised reveals the explicit merit based conception which the right to vote was encoded. This chapter argues that challenges to the practice of felon disenfranchisement, while raising real concerns on the impact of minority communities, would do well not to steer away from the very real political-economic concerns of those most impacted. The results from this chapter inform the impetus behind chapters 6, 7, and 8.

Chapter 5 provided for the rationale and methods used in the bulk of this research. The three main findings chapters reveal the results of quantitative, qualitative, and geographic data taken from primary and secondary sources (in the case of some interviews and the spatial analysis). In order, chapter 6 takes the results from the survey of felons conducted in the state of North Carolina and produces a coherent set of depictions of the preferences of those respondents in terms of issues which are more closely discernible in terms of policy choices. As mentioned in the work, these preferences have been measured at a much more detailed level to provide insight into the actual preference *profiles* of the disenfranchised - as opposed to simply asking respondents their support of a particular candidate or party.

Such detailed item selection is not without its drawbacks, which I will discuss in turn below. However, the information retrieved from respondents indicates, at least for those surveyed, that the disenfranchised are not as liberal as some might speculate, nor as anti-governmental as others might also conjecture. In fact, the results find that respondents are particularly in support of state responsibility and action on a variety of issues, and noticeably variant when it comes to issues of protection from the labor market. Indeed, their exposure to the labor market is perhaps the single most defining feature of the politically disenfranchised. While respondents do indicate a lesser desire to see increased spending on policing services, this is only so as it pertains to a lack of desire to increases in spending.

Respondents do not call for drastic reduction in policing and law enforcement spending by the state. On the contrary, their divergence from the control population is only apparent due to the desire for *increased* spending by the control population. More so, respondents do not try to *soak the rich*, and surprisingly so. From the evidence so far, the disenfranchised felon is

much more likely to support policies which enable a protected labor market at the benefit of those who pursue gainful employment. They do not indicate a desire to see generous benefits extended to all working aged adults regardless of activity. This finding is reflected in the results of the qualitative data. Using responses from the ISSP06 item group, I have constructed a profile of respondents based on their answers to these items in order to produce an answer to a more basic question for many researchers - are respondents Democrats or Republicans. While the bulk of respondents reported themselves as *Independent* with their placement on a political self-identification scale, the analysis of their placement given their responses on the items of interest suggest a heavily Democratic party bias.

While respondents may not be avowedly Democratic, their replies indicate that their preferences would likely be inline with those of the control group who are openly Democratic party supporters. Adding to this, an analysis between predicted Democrats who are disenfranchised and of the control group indicate that respondents are also significantly more liberal politically in terms of government's responsibility and effort towards decommodification of the individual via welfare state effort. Put simply, not only are the disenfranchised (according to this analysis) Democratic supporters, they are the left of the Democratic party in terms of their preferences for state intervention in areas of welfare spending and responsibility for action. This facet is corroborated in the qualitative interviews with both a selection of respondents and secondary analysis using respondents from Manza and Uggen (2006).

The results from the qualitative data in chapter 7 reveal a much richer source of data than was possible in a self-complete survey design. The results from this chapter indicate the degree to which respondents see not only the state's place in their lives, but also the place of political actors and agency. Taken together with the quantitative survey results, a far richer picture emerges of respondents. While the finding of the quantitative results reveal a non-electorate more prone to support greater spending on issues related to employment related topics and to view officials as largely untrustworthy; the results from the qualitative research reveal voices which elaborate on these preferences. In terms of voice, respondents in both the primary and secondary groups saw a need for greater state intervention, but also a need for such help to be properly administered. In terms of their political agency, respondents exhibited opinions which saw the ambivalence of political actors as dissolute and largely lacking in concern for themselves and their communities. Particularly interesting was both the lack of racial

reasoning behind views and the support for social correction services as mean of remedying current and past institutional failures in the social safety system. More so, the mixed methods approach used in this work has greatly enhanced the reliability of the survey instrument, especially given the special circumstances for this and other hard to reach populations of interest. Most importantly, this segment of the work closes the gaps identified by Manza and Uggen (2006) regarding the more detailed profiles of the disenfranchised.

Following the evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative results, a further piece of the political disenfranchisement puzzle was brought to bear in the form of a detailed spatial analysis of those areas especially impacted by the removal of the vote via criminal disenfranchisement (Chapter 8). This final piece closes another gap in the study of political disenfranchisement - the spatial exclusiveness of the affected communities *and* its importance in political systems. Advances in GIS methods and technology enable social scientists to revisit proven techniques of research to deliver further insights in the field of political and economic research. These results holds as well for the welfare state. First, using respondent approximate points of previous residence (i.e., points nearest to their previous location of residence and therefore likely voting district), this work overlaid official records of prison entries for the year 2008 to estimate the approximate areas where the disenfranchised are located. Going beyond the simple descriptive analysis of spatial location, this chapter utilized a rich set of data containing the registration and behavior of millions of North Carolina voters in order to gain insight into the types of political and economic environments from where the disenfranchised originate.

The findings from this chapter are particularly useful in understanding the complex nature of political rights in the context of vote aggregation using geographic boundaries. Interestingly, the removal of more left leaning voters from Democratic (noncompetitive) party strongholds is not detrimental to the party equally. Rather, because of the structure of the political institutional framework in the United States (in particular), removing such voters from the pool of Democratic electors may in fact work in favor of those *within* the party itself to maintain party unity. That is, by reducing the need (real or potential) to court the votes of constituents with preferences farther to the left of the median inter-district preference, felon disenfranchisement may in fact enable party elites to remain unmoved and even move to the center and right over time. Republicans, while sharing some of the effect of political disenfranchisement, have less to fear from criminal disenfranchisement. However, their vulnerability to entrant groups and factionalization

may entail that they are increasingly moved to the right as a party, and face threats by separatist groups as well. This has particularly interesting ramifications as it may be that it is indeed the Republican party centrists and those to the left which lose out, as their party must move to the right to avoid splinter groups from forming; while Democrats are (theoretically) able to capture those disaffected voters in the center. This area of study is only suggestive herein; however, the implications are worth dedicated study. The primary results from this chapter remain the identification of the communities of high disenfranchisement as co-located with areas of high partisanship (Democratic support) and low turnout regardless of election cycle. While the present study does not enable direct comparisons to be made with the non-disenfranchised from the same communities as the respondents, the evidence provides new insight into the importance of political agency in a spatial context.

## 9.2 Limitations

The work presented herein is not without its limitations. For one, the results here cannot be readily assumed to apply to all the millions of politically disenfranchised across the United States. Indeed, it is difficult to say with confidence whether these results hold for the entire population of disenfranchised across the state and or even urban areas. Given the low return rates of the quantitative surveys, it is difficult to apply these findings without due hesitation. The results of the qualitative analysis does go some distance in providing a check against this low turnout rate. This is especially so in consideration of the QSA analysis. That is, taking the responses from those outside this analysis and under different conditions (i.e., under separate sampling and incentive structures) does provide a degree of comfort in interpreting the results from both the quantitative and qualitative findings. That said, future research designs should work with the considerations outlined in the aforementioned section pertaining to research with hard-to-reach populations.

In addition, we might be concerned with the comparability with the control group used in this analysis. As has been previously noted, respondents in the control groups are not specifically drawn from the same population as that of the primary research. Contributor control groups (ANES, ISSP06, ISSP09) were limited to those states considered South according to the US Census Bureau; however, it stands to reason that the opinions of those across

states may also be a source of contention for the results provided herein. While this study implemented, to the greatest extent possible, strategies to ensure respondent participation and comprehension, the nature of self-complete surveys with supervised populations simply hampers any research design of this scale. Future research must incorporate not only greater numbers of respondents (e.g., all crime categories), but also more in depth means of data gathering. In-person, computer assisted survey methods, as well as greater numbers of research staff would deliver immensely more adequate results than those achieved herein.

### 9.3 Final Reflections

This work leaves open still more issues which must be addressed by future scholars. While it builds on the available information about political (de)mobilization and the welfare state, and adds significant information regarding those affected by felony disenfranchisement statutes, it opens the discussion regarding how much we have left out of the debate on both welfare state studies and political agency. This work shows that the verdict on felon disenfranchisement policies (and indeed any type of disenfranchisement) is not set in stone. Whereas much of the literature regarding the practice of felon disenfranchisement, correctional growth, and even welfare state developments has operated under the heading of race relations in the US, this work shows that it need not limit itself to such considerations. While not a central tenant of the work I have endeavoured to provide here, the issues surrounding racism in the United States continues to form a serious obstacle in discerning many political economic phenomenon.

More so, it ought to be noted that the ideas put forward here are in no way intended to “paper over” race and racism in the United States or elsewhere. The poverty and inequality which has so attached itself to those considered African Americans in the United States has been and remains a potent reminder of the myriad of policies and movements to institutionalize racism in the country. Certainly, programmatic choices which disproportionately and intentionally affected African Americans and other minorities across the US cannot be defended on any grounds. What I attempt to provide here is an alternate manner of viewing many of these issues which stem from a more political economic understanding of such developments. Thus, in a manner similar to many scholars of the Marx and Engels school of thought, this work has indeed looked at social corrections as a largely labor regula-

tory institution. However, it has not done so as to benefit those strands of scholarly work. Instead, social corrections act as such institutions *because* of their inescapable functional purpose as components of the social welfare mix - across time and space. As concerns the issue of race cleavages in the US, the exclusion of large swathes of domestic and agricultural workers at the advent of the New Deal era (in an effort to bring on board Southern interests), for example, was undoubtedly aimed at the predominantly African American workforce. Equally so, the redlining of many residential areas to prevent investment in those communities where African Americans were or could be dominant residents continues to impart a vicious reality on the social, economic, and political prospects of the African American community - long after the realization of the Fair Housing Act. However, I argue, these events must also be understood for what they mean in a broader sense for welfare systems and the clientele thereof.

Since the realization of the power of poverty as a unifying force among labor in the early years of the United States (e.g., Bacon's Rebellion - see Breen (1973)), economic and political interests have found the instigation and intensification of racial prejudices to be an effective mechanism in dividing lower classes against common communitarian solutions. This work takes as the focal point of race relations the perverse effect of disproportionately over-commodifying the lives of minorities as a key factor in many past and present disparities.<sup>1</sup> African Americans and other minorities suffered racism, less cannot be said; however, such active and passive prejudicial treatment was compounded by their exclusion from any form of protection from the market - be it labor, financial, housing, or otherwise. "Effectively", notes Coates (2014), "the black family in America [has been] working without a safety net. When financial calamity strikes — a medical emergency, divorce, job loss — the fall is precipitous."

The fact that such market exposures occurred simultaneously with political demobilization was not coincidental. Indeed, the two (as evidenced in this work and others) are co-dependent. The policies enacted in the Jim Crow

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<sup>1</sup>That is, by denying loans to lower and middle income minorities, the Federal Housing Authority unduly subjected citizens based on racial profiling to the deleterious effects of under-protected housing environments. Likewise, reducing the eligibility of African American workers in the ineligible areas of agriculture and domestic work to obtain adequate employment security funds exposed these workers to the savages of unregulated labor market policies, leading many to migrate to areas where labor market opportunities were already limited - note the use of Southern labor to overcome labor union gains and thereby leaving newly arrived laborers to underlying racial and ethnic acrimony.

South share many of the same similarities with those of criminal disenfranchisement and work towards the same end. It is thus not surprising to see the conclusion that skyrocketing prison (and conviction) populations are thus a new form of Jim Crow policy, aimed at African Americans. Such reactions, however, tend to downplay the effect which these events have across race - subsuming market position to racial divisions. The views expressed share many similarities with the Marxian view of false consciousness. However, the view here does not argue for an overhaul of class awareness as a cure for income or political inequality. This work argues merely that we must mind the innate place of class and those policies which mitigate inequality. The work on integrating correctional systems pursues the same ends by differing means. By integrating the correctional system back into mainstream welfare state and political studies, it is possible for the scholar to maintain the place of these issues in coherent study.

The issue of felon disenfranchisement, likewise, is not intended to represent any concrete degree of cure for the many ills which face those communities adversely affected. Remedying this practice is more akin to staving off an ecological cascade effect in political-economic policies which under-gird the welfare state. The blanket removal of political rights from criminal offenders is but one part of a larger puzzle for those interests concerned with the relationship of political agency and human welfare. We may also extend this study to the growing populations of first and second generation migrant populations across Europe, who remain without meaningful political representation. Such consideration is a very real concern at a time when current and future immigrants to the continent are slowly and purposely classified into desirable *expats* and only minorly desirable *immigrants* and *refugees*. I consider also the many aboriginal citizens of Australia, for instance, who because of these same policies are also demobilized and locked out of the polling booth; we may even extend to those traveler populations (e.g., Roma and Sinti) who face analogous barriers to inclusion. The matter is at the heart of the modern welfare state, it is somewhat disturbing to note the dearth of studies dealing with the functional meaning of barriers to democratic governance in terms of those areas most affected by its actualization. With no small number of actors of the opinion that government intervention is akin to promotion of negative values and phenomenon among society, it is important that bridges be built between various fields whose interests overlap with welfare state issues. Thus, commentators in and out of academia support the views of less state intervention without fully considering the ramifications of their calls to action (or rather, inaction). To quote the indulgences of Dr. Krauthammer regarding state intervention:

I mean, what we're going to end up with is a European level of unemployment, chronic unemployment subsidized. And the fact is, if you subsidize apples, you get more apples; if you subsidize unemployment, you get more of it. And that's what the economics study shows. It's not that people are lazy. It shows that if you have unemployment insurance, then you can make choices which would allow you to turn down a job that perhaps isn't exactly what you want. (Miller 2014 )

Such rhetoric on the part of state minimalists fail to take into account the realization that what is being subsidized is the security to make proper and responsible decisions in the midst of economic hardship. As such, they repeat the Malthusian calls to state dissolution on the backs of an ever increasingly commodified and penalized labor force. Because of the political demobilization which occurs throughout the various tiers of the welfare state, and obviously so in the US, in conjunction with the political institutional dynamics also at play - those most adversely affected by policies based on such discourse are ushered out of the policy making process overtly and by their own dissent.

This research has brought many questions in answering others. Does market inequality itself allow access to the poorer electorate by right wing policies that attribute simplistic solutions to complex socio-economic problems? Does chronic poverty or living in a situation of prolonged welfare minimalism build a path dependency of poor decisions? Do more progressive communities reinforce themselves by reducing the stress on the whole of their population, minimizing the personal cognitive barriers to participation by directly decommodifying citizens? Do minimal systems subvert their own purposes by creating incentives, especially for the participants of the research presented herein, to circumvent institutional assistance or seek out the stabilizing environments of correctional environments? Furthermore, does the type of political economic system which promotes political exclusion of vested interests require particular policies to exist in order to endure? Many of these questions are under investigation, and it stands to be seen which conclusions will shed light to those presented herein. The results here find that democratic participation remains important for policy, and particularly for welfare state policy. Also, the inclusion of social corrections into a tier of the welfare state is both functionally justified and (outside the burden of time) particularly unburdensome to undertake. Finally, the resolution of felon disenfranchisement will likely not result in any dramatic changes to the current or near future social safety net; however, this does not make

the matter any the less important for policy makers or academic interests. Indeed, a more pro-active approach to policy making, especially as pertains to re-including disassociated constituents, which actively seeks out the policy preferences of those left out of the decision making process may make changes to policies less reactionary.



# Appendices



## Appendix: Chapter 2

## Political Demobilization and the Welfare State

Table 1: Regression Variables and Sources 1/2

Role(s)	Variable	Description	Source
IV/DV	Assist	Cash contributions and subsidies to persons, not in payments for goods or services or claims against the government.	US Census/Own
IV	Assist Lag	One year Lag of Assistance and Subsidies.	Own
IV/DV	Cash	Cash assistance paid directly to needy persons under the categorical programs.	US Census/Own
IV	Cash Lag	One year Lag of Cash expenditures.	Own
IV	Cash Burden	Percentage of total spending on Cash that is allocated to the central (State) government.	Own
IV	Cash Int.	Multiplicative interaction term for the spending categories.	Own
IV	Citi. Ideology	Measurement of citizen ideology, reported by Berry et.al. 1998 (Citi6008).	Berry et al (1998)
IV/DV	Correctional	State prisons, reformatories, houses of correction, and other - state - institutions for the confinement and correction of convicted persons and juveniles.	US Census/Own
IV	Correctional Burden	Percentage of total spending on Corrections that is allocated to the central (State) government.	Own
IV	Correctional Int.	Multiplicative interaction term for the spending categories.	Own
IV	Correctional Lag	One year lag of Correctional expenditures.	Own
IV	Federal	Percentage of a state's revenue obtained from Federal monies.	US Census/Own
IV	Felon Dis.	5-level variable measuring the severity of disenfranchisement policies.	Own
DV	General	General spending on welfare services per state as share of total state expenditures.	US Census/Own
DV	Generosity	The benefit level of AFDC/TANF for a family of four as a percentage of the federal minimum wage at full-time hours (40 hours per week).	UKCPR/Own
IV	Health	Outpatient health services, other than hospital care general public health activities .	US Census/Own

Table 2: Regression Variables and Sources 2/2

Role(s)	Variable	Description	Source
IV	Hospital	Financing, construction acquisition, maintenance or operation of hospital facilities, provision of hospital care, and support of public or private hospitals.	US Census/Own
IV	House Dem	Share of control of the lower house of state government by Democratic party.	UKCPR
IV	Inst. Ideology	Measurement of institutional/state ideology, reported by Berry et.al. 1998 (Citi6008), with positive values indicating higher degrees of conservatism.	Berry et al (1998)
IV	LDV	Lagged dependent variable otherwise not detailed.	Own
IV/DV	Other	Payments to other governments for welfare purposes, amounts for administration, support of private welfare agencies, and other public welfare services - share of total state expenditures.	US Census/Own
IV	Other Burden	Percentage of total spending on Other that is allocated to the central (State) government.	Own
IV	Other Int.	Multiplicative interaction term for the spending categories.	Own
IV	Per Cap Inc	Per capita income of state.	UKCPR
IV	Perc. Black	Percent of population that is categorized as Black or African American	US Census
IV	Pop Density	Population divided over the total land area per state.	US Census/Own
IV/DV	Post-Trans. Gini	"Best behaved" post-transfer Gini measure incorporating 3 sources.	Voortheis (n/d)
IV	Presidential	Dummy variable for presidential year.	Own
IV	Senate Dem	Share of control of upper house of government by Democratic party.	UKCPR
IV	South	Dummy variable for South region as defined by US Census.	US Census
IV	Supervised	Total supervised population per 100,000 of voting aged population.	McDonald (2013)
IV/DV	Turnout	Turnout rate of voting eligible population.	McDonald (2013)
IV	Unempl. Rate	Share of labor force unemployed/Adjusted for election for Voter turnout models.	UKCPR/US Census
IV	Union	Density of unionization by state and year.	US Census
IV	Vendor Int.	Multiplicative interaction term for the spending categories.	Own
IV/DV	Vendor	Payments made directly to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other commodities and services provided under welfare programs.	US Census/Own
IV	Vendor Burden	Percentage of total spending on Vendor that is allocated to the central (State) government.	Own

## Appendix: Chapter 3

# Political Demobilization and the Welfare State




Figure 1: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates 1992 - 1997

## Political Demobilization and the Welfare State




Figure 2: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates 1998 - 2003

# Political Demobilization and the Welfare State




Figure 3: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates 2004 - 2008

## Appendix: Chapter 5

Table 3: Sampling Counts from DOP Sampling Stages

	Total	Med-Min	Init.	S. Frame	S. Frame	Urban	S. Frame	Urban-2	Random	Sample
Alb. CI	711		658	298		298		298		135
Br.Cr. CI	1,014		932	437		437		437		193
Bun.CC	173		127	59		59		59		32
Cha. CC	249		114	98		98		x		x
Col. CI	644		548	229		229		229		108
Dav. CC	249		170	92		92		92		36
Dur. CC	177		106	74		74		x		x
For.CC	239		168	129		129		129		57
Gas.CC	224		157	97		97		97		44
Har. CI	838		747	312		312		312		125
Nas. CI	934		740	297		297		297		120
N.H. CC	351		253	114		114		114		52
Rob. CC	267		192	74		74		74		37
Wak. CC	352		251	127		127		127		61
Total	6422		5163	2437		2437		2265		1000

Table 4: Sampling Percentages from DOP Stages

	Total	Med-Min	Init.	S. Frame	S. Frame	Urban	S. Frame	Urban-2	Random	Sample
Alb. CI	11.07		12.74		12.23		13.16		13.50	
Br.Cr. CI	15.79		18.05		17.93		19.29		19.30	
Bun.CC	2.69		2.46		2.42		2.60		3.20	
Cha. CC	3.87		2.21		4.02		x		x	
Col. CI	10.02		10.61		9.40		10.11		10.80	
Dav. CC	3.87		3.29		3.78		4.06		3.60	
Dur. CC	2.75		2.05		3.04		x		x	
For.CC	3.72		3.25		5.29		5.70		5.70	
Gas.CC	3.38		3.04		3.98		4.28		4.40	
Har. CI	13.04		14.47		12.80		13.77		12.50	
Nas. CI	14.54		14.33		12.19		13.11		12.00	
N.H. CC	5.46		4.90		4.68		5.03		5.20	
Rob. CC	4.15		3.72		3.04		3.27		3.70	
Wak. CC	5.48		4.86		5.21		5.61		6.10	
Total	100		100		100		100		100	



Bremen International  
Graduate School  
of Social Sciences



The questionnaire in this packet asks **you** about **your** opinions on subjects important in your community. This first of its kind survey is voluntary and anonymous. Your help is greatly appreciated.

To participate:


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Read through the description of the project.




Complete the questions as best you can.



Put the completed questionnaire into the drop box at the location you picked this up from

**OR**



Mail the questionnaire back with the provided return envelopes

Figure 4: Community Supervised Insert



Bremen International  
Graduate School  
of Social Sciences



You have been selected to participate in a survey being conducted by the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Science in conjunction with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The questionnaire in this packet asks **you** about **your** opinions on subjects important in your community. This first of its kind survey is voluntary and anonymous. You have been chosen at random to participate.

To participate:


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Read through the description of the project.



Complete the questions as best you can. (About 30-45 mins max)



Put the completed questionnaire into the drop box at your facility

With additional support from:




Figure 5: Institutional Supervised Insert



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of Social Sciences



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## Political and Economic Choices of Felons: North Carolina

*A study by the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences*

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\* This project is not connected with any political, governmental, or interest group in any way. Answers to these questions will not be shared with anyone outside those involved with the project without your express consent. Thank you for your participation.

1

Figure 6: Example: Institutional text - 1

## Political Demobilization and the Welfare State

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Dear Sir/Madam,

You are being asked to voluntarily participate in a social science research project which looks at the views and opinions of North Carolina felons. This survey is being distributed as part of further research into the opinions of North Carolina felons as part of the research of Daniel Horn [PhD Fellow – Bremen International Graduate School of Social Science] under the supervision of Dr. Olaf Groh-Samberg [University of Bremen], Dr. Klaus Boehnke [ Jacobs University], Dr. Bernhard Kittel [University of Oldenburg], and Dr. Christopher Uggen [University of Minnesota]. This survey investigates the social, economic, and political attitudes of North Carolina citizens who have lost their right to vote through conviction of a felony offence. This project is the first of its kind in the United States and will be part of the development for further research into national attitudes regarding the issues covered. Your participation is very important to this research.

You are being asked to complete a short questionnaire on a variety of social, political and economic issues which will take approximately 30 – 60 minutes to complete. You will be asked to complete the survey on your own and return the booklet to a drop-box which will be available for your completed booklets.

### **What is the purpose of this study?**

By some estimates, more than **5.3 million** U.S. citizens, such as yourself, have lost the right to vote in elections because of a conviction of a felony offence. In 2006, the number of North Carolinians who had lost their right to vote for a felony conviction was roughly **73,330 persons**. The United States is alone in the world for the number of persons who lose their right to vote in elections because of a felony conviction. While many Senators, Representatives and other officials continue to work on this issue, we still do not have much information regarding the impact of this policy.

The research you are being asked to participate in looks at, specifically, U.S. citizens who have had their right to vote removed due to a felony conviction (disenfranchisement). As such, **this research is interested in your views** on a variety of nationally and internationally used surveys that typically under-represent the views of felon populations. Your participation will increase the general knowledge of offender populations for future generations.

### **What are some general things you should know about the research study?**

You are being asked to take part in a research study for which you have been randomly selected. **Your participation in this study is voluntary**. You have the right to be a part of this study, to choose not to participate or to stop participating at any time without penalty. The purpose is to gather *your* views on political issues and economic policies. You are not guaranteed any personal benefits from being in this study. If you do not understand something it is your right to ask the researcher for clarification or more information – an opportunity will be available at the time of collection of materials. Neither your sentence nor your treatment by prison staff will change in any way.

If at any time you have questions about your participation, do not hesitate to contact the researcher named above.

### **What will happen if you take part in the study?**

2

Figure 7: Example: Institutional text - 2

*By completing this survey you are consenting to participate in this research.* You will be asked to answer a variety of questions which have all been used in other surveys of the general populations both in the United States and across the world. The questions are exactly the same as those given to others who have taken part in past surveys. Some questions are much longer than others and will require a little time to read through and answer. Take your time, it is much more important that you feel comfortable with your answers than to rush through.

### **Finished Surveys:**

Once you have completed this booklet, place the completed booklet into the supplied “drop-box” at your institution. Your forms will be collected by the researcher. No Department of Correction Staff will be involved in the collection of materials.

### **Risks**

For the survey you will be asked to fill in, there have been no foreseeable risks found.

### **Benefits**

Your participation in this research will greatly increase the information that future researchers and academics will have regarding persons convicted of felony offences. To the knowledge of this researcher, this is the first in depth survey of persons who have lost their right to vote because of a felony in the United States or elsewhere. You will be part of the first respondents ever in what is hoped to be a much larger project to pay attention to disenfranchised persons’ opinions on policies that may affect their communities.

### **Confidentiality**

The information in the study records will be kept confidential to the full extent allowed by law. The staff of the Department of Correction are not conducting this research project. They will not get a copy of your name or of your answers. The Department will receive a copy of the overall results at the end of the study but will not be able to identify you personally from the copy they receive.

No subjects (i.e. you) will be identified in any report or publication about this study. Although every effort will be made to keep research records private, there may be times when federal or state law requires the disclosure of such records, including personal information. This is very unlikely, but if disclosure is ever required, the Department will take all steps allowable by law to protect the privacy of personal information. All answers that you give will be kept confidential. There are several exceptions to this secrecy: if you tell the researcher that you are thinking about hurting yourself, hurting someone else, or planning an escape, these matters are not a secret. You know that the researcher must pass this information on to the prison staff.

### **Compensation**

For participating in this study you will not receive any compensation in accordance to the rules and regulations set forth by the North Carolina Department of Corrections.

**What if you have questions about this study?**

If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the researcher, [Daniel Horn](#) at [dnhorn@email.unc.edu](mailto:dnhorn@email.unc.edu) or by mail. Additionally, the Principal Researcher will be onsite to collect survey materials, at which time you may meet with the PI to clarify any questions and complete/correct any questions you may have had problems with.

D. Horn  
c/o C.E.S.  
FedEx Global Education Center  
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
Campus Box 3449  
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3449

With additional support from:



Figure 9: Example: Institutional text - 4

Please fill out the information on the following pages as best you can.

**Why do we ask for this information?**

The questions you are answering are taken from 3 nationally representative surveys carried out in the United States and across the world. Because we wish to be able to compare your responses with others, we need to make sure we paint an accurate picture of "who you are" - though obviously no survey can really tell us your entire history.

1. First, I would like to ask if you could tell me where you are from. Please fill in as much information as you remember.

**"Why do you need to know where I am from?"**

→ This information is used to determine your community of origin. This helps to match up your replies to those in your home community. **As with all information, this information will not be given to anyone outside this survey project.**

Your last street address:

City & Zip code:

OR: Voting Precinct :

2. Have you ever registered to vote in North Carolina? [Check One]

YES  NO

3. Please choose one option which best describes your race: [Check one]

<input type="checkbox"/> Native American	<input type="checkbox"/> White	<input type="checkbox"/> Hispanic
<input type="checkbox"/> African American	<input type="checkbox"/> Asian	<input type="checkbox"/> Other

4. Please select your gender: [Check one]

Male

Female

Figure 10: Example: Institutional text - 5

5. What is the highest level of formal education **you** have completed? [Check One]

<input type="checkbox"/> Elementary [Grades 1-5]	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> GED
<input type="checkbox"/> 6 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 8 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 11 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> College/University
<input type="checkbox"/> 5 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 9 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 12 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> None of these

6. What is the highest level of formal education **your mother** has completed? [Check One]

<input type="checkbox"/> Elementary [Grades 1-5]	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> GED
<input type="checkbox"/> 6 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 8 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 11 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> College/University
<input type="checkbox"/> 5 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 9 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 12 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know

7. What is the highest level of formal education **your father** has completed? [Check One]

<input type="checkbox"/> Elementary [Grades 1-5]	<input type="checkbox"/> 7 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> GED
<input type="checkbox"/> 6 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 8 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 11 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> College/University
<input type="checkbox"/> 5 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 9 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> 12 <sup>th</sup> Grade	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know

9. Do you attend religious services? [Check one]

<input type="checkbox"/> Every week	<input type="checkbox"/> Once a month	<input type="checkbox"/> Only on holidays
<input type="checkbox"/> Almost every week	<input type="checkbox"/> A few times a year	<input type="checkbox"/> I don't attend

10. Regardless of whether you attend any religious services do you ever think of yourself as part of a particular church or denomination? [Check one]

NO     YES

10. A. Which denomination below best fits you? [Check one]

<input type="checkbox"/> Methodist	<input type="checkbox"/> Muslim	<input type="checkbox"/> Catholic	<input type="checkbox"/> Mormon
<input type="checkbox"/> Baptist	<input type="checkbox"/> E. Orthodox	<input type="checkbox"/> Jewish	<input type="checkbox"/> Other

Figure 11: Example: Institutional text - 6

( To begin with, let's talk about government... )

11. On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to...

	Definitely Should Be	Probably Should Be	Probably Should Not Be	Definitely Should Not Be	Can't Choose
Provide a job for everyone who wants one	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Keep prices under control	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Provide health care for the sick	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Provide a decent standard of living for the old	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Provide industry with the help it needs to grow	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Reduce income inequalities between the rich and poor	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Give financial help to university students from low-income families	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment	<input type="checkbox"/>				

3

Figure 12: Example: Institutional text - 7

12. Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington is not getting too strong. What is **your feeling**, do you think the government is getting too powerful or do you think the government is not getting too strong? [Check one]

Government is Not Too Strong     Government is Too Strong     Don't know, no interest

13. Generally, how would you describe taxes in America today?  
( Taxes include all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, taxes on goods and services and all the rest. )

	Much Too High	Too High	About Right	Too Low	Much Too Low	Can't Choose
First for those with high incomes, are taxes...	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Next, for those with middle incomes, are taxes...	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Lastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes...	<input type="checkbox"/>					

14. Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

	Spend Much More	Spend More	Spend the Same	Spend Less	Spend Much Less	Can't Choose
The Environment	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Health	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Law Enforcement	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Military/Defense	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Retirement	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Unemployment	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Culture/Arts	<input type="checkbox"/>					

Figure 13: Example: Institutional text - 8



# Appendix: Chapter 7

## North Carolina Topic Guide

### Background Information

1. To start with, I'd like to get some basic information down: Could you tell me a little bit about yourself – your hometown, marital status, age, etc?
2. Since I am looking into issues which directly effect persons who have had run ins with the law, I will ask you a couple of questions about criminal convictions.
  - (a) Have you ever been convicted of a felony?
  - (b) Was this in North Carolina or in another state?
  - (c) What year was the first and last conviction?
3. What is your current legal status? When do you expect to have completed your supervision requirements?

### Situations of Felons

I want to start with some of your views about what you think is going on in America, and more so, the situation of people in America who are convicted every year.

1. Why do you think so many people are being arrested in America?
  - (a) Why do you think so many people are being *convicted*?
  - (b) Why do you think so many people are in prisons now?
  - (c) Is there much of a difference between people in prison and people out of prison?

- (d) Do you think there is much of a difference between the Americans who are serving time and the communities where they come from, or is there not much difference socially and culturally?
2. Can you describe some common traits of people you know who end up in prison or convicted of felonies? (race, income, age, education) Why?
3. If you could think of one common trait among all felons, what would it be, besides being convicted of a felony.
4. Have you had much interaction with other persons convicted of felony offenses?
  - (a) How would you describe their backgrounds? (family background, education, income)

### **Political participation**

1. Have you ever voted in an election? When was that? Could you name some of the candidates you voted for?
2. Did you ever lose the right to vote because of a felony conviction? How did you find out about this? Have you voted since then? Why or why not? What do you understand your voting rights to be?
3. Were you able to vote in the last presidential elections?
  - (a) Do you think you would have voted if you had had the legal right to vote?
    - i. Why or why not?
    - ii. Who would you have voted for?
  - (b) What about the future, do you think you will vote in an election?
4. Was it important to you who won the presidential election?
5. Can you tell me, which issues are important to you in deciding between candidates?
6. If you had to chose, would you generally consider yourself a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?
  - (a) What do these words mean to you?
7. Do you think of yourself as closer to the republicans or democrats?

8. Do you think elections are a good way to make government pay attention to what people think?
  - (a) Do you think people like you have a say about what government does?
9. Do you think the government can be trusted to do what is best for the country? Or, do you think most people in the government cannot be trusted?
10. The word “politics” means different things to different people, what do you think of when you hear the word politics?
11. Some states have laws that let people vote while they are in prison, on parole or probation and others take away voting rights for life. Do you think people should lose the right to vote when they are in prison?
12. How does losing the right to vote affect a person’s ideas about being a part of their communities?
  - (a) About their government?
13. Have you lost other rights because of a criminal conviction? Which ones are most important to you?
14. Do you feel like you are less of a citizen because you have lost these rights?
15. Do you think of voting as a right or a privilege?

### **Social Policy**

I’d like to ask you some questions regarding what the government should have a responsibility to take care of and what people should be required to take care of for themselves.

1. Some people believe that the government has a responsibility to take care of the general welfare of the population. What do you think government has a responsibility towards?
  - (a) Which sorts of programs can you think of?
  - (b) Which ones do you think are most important?

### **Political Disenfranchisement**

Returning to the issue of Felon Disenfranchisement, I wonder if you could give me your views on a few questions:

1. How much do you know about this issue?
2. Have you been involved in politics in the past?
3. Do you think politicians would care if felons voted?
4. What do you think the purpose of taking away the right to vote is?
5. Do you think politicians would pay attention if felons were required to vote?
6. What do you think would change if felons had the right to vote?
  - (a) Do you think politicians would pay attention to them?

## **Manza and Uggen Topic Guide**

The following has been taken with permission from the authors to be used as a guide to those interviews carried out in Minnesota by Manza and Uggen (2006). All analysis is secondary and any errors are my own.

### **Current Status**

1. To state with, I'd like to get some basic information down. Could you tell me a little about yourself - your hometown, age, marital status, etc?
2. Because these laws only apply to people who have been in trouble with the law, I will ask a couple questions about criminal convictions. Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Was this in Minnesota or another state? What year was the first and last conviction?
3. What is your current legal status? When do you expect to be released?

### **Political Involvement and Engagement**

1. Have you ever voted in an election? When was that? Could you name some of the candidates you voter for?\*
2. Did you ever lose your right to vote because of a felony conviction? How did you find out about this? Have you voted since then? Why or why not? What do you understand your voting rights to be?

3. Where you able to vote in the last presidential election? Do you think you would have voted if you had the legal right to vote? Why or why not? What about in the future? Do you think you will ever vote in an election?
4. Who would you have voted for? Which issues are important to you in deciding between candidates?
5. Did you care who won the presidential election? Did you watch stories about the election on TV or read about it in newspapers or magazines?

### **Partisanship, Efficacy, and Trust**

1. If you had to choose would you generally consider yourself a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative? What do these words mean to you? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republicans or to the Democrats?
2. Do you think elections are a good way to make the government pay attention to what people think? Do you think most people like you have a say about what the government does?
3. Do you think the government can be trusted to do what is best for the country? Or, do you think most of the people running the government cannot be trusted?
4. The word politics means different things to different people. What do you think of when you hear the word politics?

### **Community Involvement Generally**

1. Just like "politic," the word community has a lot of different meanings. A lot of people that I've talked to in prison mention the word "community" - saying things like "I want to give back to my community." What do you think of when you hear the word "community"?
2. How can people who have been in trouble with the law help out their communities? Is there anything that you have done to help out your community? [PROBE: volunteering, community center, etc.]?
3. Do you think that former prisoners who out (or get involved) in their communities are less likely to go back to jail or prison? Can you think of any people or examples of how this might work? [PROBE: restorative justice involvement]

### Voting and Registration

1. Some states have laws that let people in prison, or on parole, and probation vote and others have laws that take away voting rights for life. Do you think that people should lose the right to vote when they are in prison? What about when they are on parole? On probation?
2. How does losing the right to vote affect a person's ideas about being a part of their community? About their government?
3. Have you lost other rights because of a criminal conviction? Which ones are most important to you? Do you feel like you are less of a citizens because you have lost these rights?
4. Do you think of voting as a right or privilege?
5. Aside from voting in politics, I'm interested in how people who've been in the criminal justice system eventually move away from crime. Could you describe things in your life that have moved you away from crime - or pulled you into crime? Can you name any turning points in your life?
  - (a) *Work*: Have any jobs or work experiences influenced you? How?
  - (b) *Family*: Have any family members been especially helpful or harmful? Friends?
  - (c) *Community*: Is there anything about your community or neighborhood that has made it tougher or easier to move away from crime?
  - (d) *Time*: How long would you say it has been since you've done any crime? Serious crimes or smaller crimes?
6. To tie this back to politics, do you think that losing the right to vote makes it tougher to stay clean or out of trouble with the law? Or is it really a small factor compared to other issues? How?

### Wrap-up

Table 5: Demographics of Interviewees

Characteristic	Frequency		Percentage	
<b>Race</b>	Manza / Uggen	Horn	Manza &/Uggen	Horn
White	22	1	67%	17%
Black	6	5	18%	83%
Native	5	0	15%	0%
<b>Sex</b>				
Male	23	6	70%	100%
Female	10	0	30%	0%
<b>Age</b>				
Age 20-29	15	2	45%	33%
Age 30-39	11	1	33%	17%
Age 40 and over	7	3	21%	50%

Table 6: General Characteristics of Interviewees

Characteristic	Frequency			Percentage		
	Manza / Uggen	Horn	Manza /Uggen	Horn	Manza /Uggen	Horn
<b>Party</b>						
Democrat	18	4	55%	67%		
Republican	9	2	27%	33%		
Independent	2	0	6%	0%		
Don't know	4	0	12%	0%		
<b>Political Label</b>						
Conservative	9	3	27%	50%		
Liberal	7	2	21%	33%		
Moderate	2	1	6%	17%		
Conservative or moderate liberal	3	0	9%	0%		
"Independent"	1	0	3%	0%		
"Everything"	1	0	3%	0%		
Don't know	10	0	30%	0%		
<b>Correctional Status</b>						
Prison	23	0	70%	0%		
Probation	7	5	21%	83%		
Parole	3	0	9%	0%		
<b>Ever voted?</b>						
Yes	22	6	67%	100%		
No	11	0	33%	0%		
<b>Plan to vote in the future?</b>						
Yes	24	3	73%	50%		
No	1	2	3%	33%		
Unknown	8	1	24%	17%		

Table 7: Primary and Secondary Interview Codes

Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
Background	46	2
Citizenship: Means	16	4
Community: Meaning	30	5
Criminal Policy	6	1
Demoralization	5	3
How prison changes R	14	9
How Society Sees R/Criminal Experience	52	4
Collateral Consequences	45	10
Would felons vote?	6	2
Differences between Felons and NonFelons	2	6
Justice System Unfair	13	1
Dissin: Effects: Negative	22	9
Dissin: Effects: Neutral	6	3
Dissin: Effects: Positive	3	0
Dissin: Felon Voting: Anti	1	0
Dissin: Felon Voting: Any Effect?	7	2
Dissin: Felon Voting: Neutral	1	0
Dissin: Felon Voting: Pro	7	1
Dissin: Reason for	7	7
Dissin: Should Exist: No	40	7
Dissin: Should Exist: Yes	5	3
Informed of Diss: non-official	19	6
Informed of Diss: Official	9	3

Continued on next page

Table 7 – continued from previous page

Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
How would felons vote?	7	1
Does Government have responsibility to help?	3	2
Arrests why?	14	4
Driver: Drugs/Substance Abuse	28	4
Driver: Education	6	5
Driver: Employment	10	10
Driver: Environmental	21	15
Driver: Family	5	2
Driver: Idleness	1	1
Driver: Lack of Social Assistance	9	9
Driver: Materialism	4	5
Driver: Media	0	7
Driver: Poverty/Inequality	5	7
Driver: Security	0	1
Important Policies: Comm Dev	5	1
Important Policies: Vocational	0	1
Important Policy Areas	0	1
	6	2
Important Policy Areas: Crime	4	0
Important Policy Areas: Crime Control	1	1
Important Policy Areas: Defense	10	1
Important Policy Areas: Education	0	7
Important Policy Areas: Environment	7	0
Important Policy Areas: Health Policy	1	8
Continued on next page		

Table 7 – continued from previous page

Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
Important Policy Areas: Housing	7	2
Important Policy Areas: Inequality reduction	1	2
Important Policy Areas: Job Creation	0	1
Important Policy Areas: Labour Market Policy	24	3
Important Policy Areas: Other	1	0
Important Policy Areas: Retirement/ Old-Age	2	2
Important Policy Areas: Unemployment		4
Gov Solution: Civic Education	11	2
Gov Solution: Education	10	4
Gov Solution: Vocational Education	6	4
government limits	0	2
Government Support	0	3
Most important policy area	2	1
What government could/should do	6	4
PRWRA	4	1
Public Assistance: Negative	0	1
Public Assistance: Positive	5	0
Public Childcare: Negative	0	1
Public Childcare: Positive	1	2
Public Education: Negative	0	0
Public Education: Positive	0	3
Public Healthcare: Negative	1	0
Public Healthcare: Positive	0	4
Public Housing Policy	0	1

Continued on next page

Table 7 – continued from previous page

Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
Public Housing: Negative	0	0
Public Housing: Positive	0	1
Public Retirement: Negative	0	1
Public Retirement: Positive	0	0
child support	1	2
Childcare	4	1
Conditions: Mental Health	1	1
Education: Positive	6	0
General Welfare: Negative	0	1
General Welfare: Positive	0	1
AFDC/TANF	6	1
afterschool care	0	1
Benefit Levels: Retirement	0	0
Benefit Levels: Unemployment	0	2
Dental Care	1	1
R Views on prison	28	1
Purpose/Function of Soc Corrections	12	2
Services from Soc Corrections	23	8
R Views on Privacy	13	3
Race matters	9	13
single parenthood	1	3
Unemployment: negative	0	4
Unemployment: positive	1	4
Universal Healthcare	0	6

Continued on next page

Table 7 – continued from previous page

Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
young parenthood	0	1
Sub-national elections matter?	3	2
Tax Poor More	0	0
Tax Rich More	2	3
Tax the Same	0	0
Corruption Experience	2	1
Trust in Government: No	26	17
Trust in Government: Yes	9	2
Trust in Politicians: No	9	10
Trust in Politicians: Yes	2	0
Ideology R Conservative	14	5
Ideology R Liberal	11	3
Ideology R Moderate	7	1
McCain	0	1
Meaning of Conservative v Liberal	4	6
Mexicans	0	1
Nixon	3	1
Obama	0	6
old ways better	1	3
Participate No	19	2
Participate yes	48	6
Participate: Civic Engagement	30	1
Participate: Civic involvement past: no	2	1
Participate: Civic involvement past: yes	22	2

Continued on next page

Table 7 – continued from previous page

Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
Participate: Will vote if allowed to	21	6
Participate: Would have voted Dem	12	4
Participate: Would have voted if allowed: no	1	2
Participate: Would have voted if allowed: Yes	18	6
Participate: Would have voted Ind	0	0
Participate: Would have voted Other	2	0
Participate: Would have voted Rep	5	2
Personal Responsibility	11	1
Pol Participation: State: No	1	1
Pol Participation: State: Yes	7	
Political R Democrat	21	5
Political R Other	4	0
Political R Republican	10	2
Political R Undecided	4	3
Political: People like R have say in Govt: Neutral	0	0
Political: People like R have say in Govt: No	13	3
Political: People like R have say in Govt: Yes	3	0
Politics: Difference Parties: No	3	1
Politics: Difference Parties: Yes	0	1
Political: Difference between Dems and Rep	17	5
Politics: how felon vote would affect	9	3
Politics: Important to Offenders: No	6	2
Politics: Important to Offenders: Yes	4	0
Politics: Interest: No	2	4

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
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Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
Politics: Interest: Yes	21	0
Politics: Meaning	25	8
Politics: Politicians would NOT pay attention to felons	1	1
Politics: Politicians would pay attention to felons	1	5
R Perception Bush	33	4
R Perception Clinton	11	2
R Perception Gore	24	
Gore	36	5
Bush	66	2
Clinton	31	0
Reagan	10	
R Perception of Democrats: Neg	2	0
R Perception of Democrats: Pos	5	3
R Perception of Republicans: Neg	14	3
R Perception of Republicans: Pos	3	0
R Views on Government Priorities	14	1
Candidates voted for	14	1
Voted Democrat	11	3
Voted Independent	4	1
Voted Other	1	0
Voted Republican	4	1
Voting and Economics/Taxation	4	1
Voting doesn't matter	4	7
Voting is a priv	3	1
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
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Codes	Manza/Uggen	Horn
Voting is a right	10	5
Voting Matters	25	6
Where R gets information from: Internet	0	1
Where R gets information from: Print	1	2
Where R gets information from: TV	17	4
Where R gets information from: Word of mouth	6	2
Would vote in 2008 no	0	0
Would vote in 2008 yes	0	2

# Appendix: Chapter 8




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


(b) Rates

Figure 14: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA Respondents and Tract Rates




(a) Respondents




(b) Rates

Figure 15: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA Respondents and Tract Rates




(a) Respondents




(b) Rates

Figure 16: Asheville MSA Respondents and Tract Rates




(a) Respondents




(b) Rates

Figure 17: Fayetteville Respondents and Tract Rates




(a) Respondents




(b) Rates

Figure 18: Wilmington MSA Respondents and Tract Rates




(a) Partisan Registration




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 19: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA Partisan Registration




(a) Partisan Registration




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 20: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA Partisan Registration




(a) Partisan Registration




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 21: Asheville MSA Partisan Registration




(a) Partisan Registration




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 22: Fayetteville MSA Partisan Registration




(a) Partisan Registration




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 23: Wilmington MSA Partisan Registration




(a) Partisanship and Rates




(b) Clusters and Rates

Figure 24: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location




(a) Partisanship and Rates




(b) Clusters and Rates

Figure 25: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location




(a) Partisanship and Rates




(b) Clusters and Rates

Figure 26: Asheville MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location




(a) Partisanship and Rates




(b) Clusters and Rates

Figure 27: Fayetteville MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location




(a) Partisanship and Rates




(b) Clusters and Rates

Figure 28: Wilmington MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 29: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 30: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 31: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 32: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 33: Asheville MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 34: Asheville MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 35: Fayetteville MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 36: Fayetteville MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering




(a) Participation Rates




(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 37: Wilmington MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering



(a) Participation Rates



(b) Significant Clusters

Figure 38: Wilmington MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering

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## Political Demobilization and the Welfare State

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# Declaration

I declare that the work contained herein represents my own efforts; without any unauthorized aid(s); all sources and aids used are referenced; and all exerts, citations, and ideas are indicated.

Daniel Horn  
August 1, 2014