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DISCUSSION PAPERS

**Overview of the Sudan Uprising – Before, During and After the  
Revolution**

By

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Diskussionsbeiträge

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Bremen, June 2020



# Sudan and South Sudan



## Sudan Economy Research Group

University of Bremen

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Khartoum/Oxford/Bremen, June 2020

I am currently a Visiting Professor of Economics and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Department of Economics, University of Oxford, United Kingdom (UK), an Affiliated Researcher at the UNU-MERIT, University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands, and Full Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, Khartoum University, Khartoum, Sudan. E-mail: [samiasatti@yahoo.com](mailto:samiasatti@yahoo.com). Professor Karl Wohlmuth from the Institute for World Economics and International Management (IWIM) and the Sudan Economy Research Group (SERG) approached me to write a short version of the original paper, incorporating also new developments in Sudan. We had a good scientific cooperation as editors and contributors during the researches on volumes 20 and 21 of the African Development Perspectives Yearbook for the years 2018 and 2019; both volumes were released by LIT Publishers. Both volumes deal with Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) Policies for Inclusive Growth in Africa. I have contributed various essays and reviews to these publications. This paper is on the more recent developments in Sudan, and fits perfectly the format of the SERG Discussion Papers.

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

CNN	Cable News Network
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index (of Transparency International)
CSAE	Centre for the Study of African Economies (Department of Economics, University of Oxford, United Kingdom)
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GII	Global Innovation Index (Report)
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	human development index
HDRO	Human Development Report Office
HI	Happiness index
ICT	Information and Communications Technology

ILO	International Labour Office
ILOSTAT	ILO Statistics (database)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LMIES	lower middle-income economies
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
NCP	National Congress Party
PI	Prosperity index
PPP	purchasing power parity (income)
R&D	research and development
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
RSF	Reporters Sans Frontières
RWB	Reporters Without Borders (RSF/Reporters Sans Frontières)
SDG	Sudanese pound
SPA	Sudanese Professionals Association
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa (countries)
STI	Science, Technology, and Innovation (Policies)
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UKTSI	University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP-HDI	United Nations Development Programme-Human Development Index
UNSDSN	United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network
UNU-MERIT	United Nations University-Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands)
US \$	US Dollar
WHR	World Happiness Report

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## **Abstract**

This paper provides an overview of the Sudan Uprising and discusses the major causes and factors that contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising; the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising are discussed. We improve the understanding, fill the gaps in the literature, and provide a valuable contribution to the literature by presenting a new and more comprehensive analysis; we also investigate the factors that caused and those that contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising; we assess also the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. A novel element in our analysis is that we investigate the various causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom. All that has caused the Sudan Uprising, and we examine the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Associations, and of the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative) and the external factors (especially the role of the Diaspora), that both have contributed to supporting the Sudan Uprising. We also explain the potential opportunities and the major challenges following the Sudan Uprising.

From a policy perspective, the relevance of our analysis is that we explain the causes of the Sudan Uprising, the internal and external factors that supported the Sudan Uprising, and the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. Our findings support the first hypothesis that a combination of mixed factors and causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom in Sudan have caused the Sudan Uprising. Our results corroborate the second hypothesis that the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professional Associations, and the University of

Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative) and external factors (especially the role of the Diaspora) contributed to support the Sudan Uprising, and the potential transformation in Sudan. Our results support the third hypothesis concerning the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. One major policy implication from our findings is that the lack of peace, freedom, and justice have motivated the mass street demonstrations and the Sudan Uprising as all that called for the achievement of peace, freedom, and justice for all people in Sudan. Another major policy implication from our findings is that it is important for policymakers in Sudan to adopt sound and coherent policies to consider potential opportunities and challenges to achieve comprehensive economic, social, political and institutional reform, to achieve the potential transformation, to fulfil the objectives of the Sudan Uprising (peace, freedom, and justice), and to achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development in Sudan.

**Keywords:** Economic development, social and human development, sustainable development, youth, ICT, crisis of development in Sudan.

**JEL classification:** O1, O10, O11, O15, O43, O55, I3, P16

# **Overview of the Sudan Uprising – Before, During and After the Revolution**

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## **Introduction**

This paper aims to provide an overview of the Sudan Uprising and discuss the major causes, factors contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising and potential opportunities and major challenges following of the Sudan Uprising. It is composed of six Sections and the References. As for the structure, the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the framework for the research on Sudan Uprising. Section 2 shows the general political context and the socio-economic characteristics of Sudan. Section 3 investigates the major causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom that all have caused the Sudan Uprising. Section 4 discusses the internal and external factors that contributed to the uprising in Sudan (including the role of youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Associations, the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative, and the Diaspora as an important external factor). Section 5 explains the potential opportunities and major challenges confronting the transition period following the Sudan Uprising. Finally, Section 6 provides the Conclusions.

## **1. The relevance, importance, objectives, hypotheses, and the structure of the research**

The issues discussed in this paper are both timely and relevant in view of the increasing interest to improve the understanding about the Sudan Uprising at the international level. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by providing a new contribution to the literature and presenting a more comprehensive analysis of the factors that caused and those that contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising, and it presents the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. We improve the understanding, fill the gaps in the literature, and provide a contribution to the literature by presenting a new and more comprehensive analysis and investigation of the factors that caused and those that contributed to the success of Sudan Uprising, and have led to the potential opportunities and major

challenges following Sudan Uprising. A novel element in our analysis is that we investigate the various causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom; all these factors have caused the Sudan Uprising. We examine the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative) and external factors (like the role of the Diaspora) that both have contributed to supporting Sudan Uprising.

We also explain potential opportunities and major challenges following Sudan Uprising. From policy perspectives, the relevance of our analysis is that we explain the causes of Sudan Uprising, the internal and external factors that supported Sudan Uprising, and the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. Our findings support the *first hypothesis* that a combination of mixed factors and causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom have led to the Sudan Uprising. Our results corroborate the *second hypothesis* that the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative) and the external factors (mainly the role of the Diaspora) has contributed to support Sudan Uprising and the potential transformation in Sudan. Our results support also the *third hypothesis* concerning the potential opportunities and the major challenges following the Sudan Uprising.

We are aware that the lack of analysis of the consequences and impacts of Sudan Uprising may constitute a limitation of our analysis in this paper. However, in this paper we did not focus on the consequences and impacts of Sudan Uprising only because of lack of adequate and reliable data covering the short period following the Sudan Uprising. We believe that given the short time since the success of Sudan Uprising, it is probably too early to assess the impacts, since full assessment of the consequences and impacts would be more relevant and practical only after a reasonable time period. Therefore, we plan to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the consequences and impacts of Sudan Uprising in our future studies when adequate and reliable data are available what may be the case after a reasonable time span. Regarding the research method this paper uses new secondary data and uses both the descriptive and comparative approaches to provide an overview of the Sudan Uprising.

## **2. General political context and socio-economic characteristics of Sudan**

Before assessing the factors that caused and those that contributed to the success of Sudan Uprising, it is useful to start by explaining the general political context and the socio-economic characteristics of Sudan.

Sudan was the largest country in Africa and the Arab world until 2011, when South Sudan separated as an independent country, following an independence referendum. Sudan is now the third-largest country in Africa (after Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and it is also the third largest country in the Arab world (after Algeria and Saudi Arabia).<sup>1</sup> The political context in Sudan is characterised by a long history of political instabilities and a context of continuous complex conflicts.<sup>2</sup> Even after the independence of Southern Sudan in 2011, Sudan still endured political instability, a lack of good governance, a lack of sound and systematic functioning institutions, and a lack of a commitment to implementing long-term sustainable and balanced economic development plans and strategies. This implies that the interaction between these political, economic, and institutional factors together have unfortunately continued to contribute to a low standard of economic development in Sudan as explained below.<sup>3</sup>

Concerning the context of the general socio-economic characteristics and economic development in Sudan, Nour (2020) illustrates the substantial gap between Sudan and the world regions in the standards of economic development, as measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and the human development index (HDI). In general, Sudan is characterized by low standards of economic development together with high population growth. For instance, Nour (2020) shows that the low GNI per capita income in Sudan, being higher only in relation to the least developing countries, and the low human development level, also being higher in relation to the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, but having lower values than all other world regions. According to the World Bank classification of economies, Sudan is classified among the lower medium-income economies (LMIEs). According to the classification of the UNDP-HDI, the human development index (HDI) for

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<sup>1</sup> In Sudan, the available natural resources include agricultural resources, water, and rivers, and in addition the mineral resources include petroleum and crude oil, natural gas, gold, silver, asbestos, manganese, gypsum, mica, zinc, iron, lead, uranium, copper, kaolin, cobalt, granite, nickel, tin, chrome, and aluminum.

<sup>2</sup> As for the political context since independence in 1956 and over the past five decades, Sudan was ruled by three civilian governments (1956-58, 1964-69, and 1985-89) and four military governments (1958-64, 1969-85; 1989-2019, and April 2019-August 2019).

<sup>3</sup> See Nour (2013, 2015)

Sudan is classified among the world's low-income and low- human development index group, having on average lower values than the average for world countries.<sup>4</sup> According to UNDP-HDR (2019), Sudan is still classified amongst the low human development countries and at the bottom of developing countries in terms of HDI (0.507), as it ranked 168 out of 189 countries.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, average life expectancy, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, literacy rates, and gross enrolment ratios in primary, secondary and tertiary education for Sudan fall behind the standard rate of the world regions and the North Africa region (see Nour, 2020).

### **3. The Causes of the Sudan Uprising**

This section discusses the several major causes of the Sudan Uprising. It discusses the *first hypothesis* that a combination of mixed factors and causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedoms have caused the Sudan Uprising.

#### **3.1. Economic causes (economic mismanagement, low levels of development indicators, deterioration of economic indicators) in Sudan**

From an economic perspective, the economic causes including, for instance, the intensification of the economic crisis, the prevailing economic structure, the economic mismanagement, and the deterioration of all economic indicators (including for instance, the major currency devaluation; the high inflation rate; the rising costs of basic goods; the implementation of austerity measures to end subsidies to wheat and fuel; the bank transactions' limitation on money withdrawals; the shortage of hard currencies; the deficiency of labour markets; the deficiencies of fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, etc.) and other economic issues have contributed as the major economic causes of Sudan Uprising.

The structure of the Sudanese economy contributed to the prevailing economic crisis, as for instance data from the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2019) publication about the structure of Sudan's economy indicate the dominance of services (59.8%, 57%, 58.2%) and agricultural sectors (22.6%, 24%, 21.8%),

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<sup>4</sup> The World Bank in its reports and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Human Development Reports classify world countries differently according to the income level, we use the World Bank classification of economies that puts Sudan in the lower middle-income category or group.

<sup>5</sup> The human development index (HDI) provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level), and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income). See on the HDI: UNDP-HDR (2019), pp. 300-303.



and low shares of the industrial sector (17.7%, 19%, 20%) in GDP in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively (see Nour, 2020).<sup>6</sup> The structure of Sudan's economy implies that the Sudan economy can be considered as a rent-seeking economy and as a primary exports economy that suffers from uncertainty and high fluctuation in economic growth and from macroeconomic instability. Sudan's economy is characterised by a low GDP per capita income, the presence of high rates of poverty and unemployment, and inequalities in resources sharing. The independence of the South in 2011 has had immediate negative fiscal and balance of payments implications for (North) Sudan [because of the loss of the bulk of the oil production and export revenues, as about 75 per cent of Sudan's oil revenues are generated from southern oil production].<sup>7,8</sup> Thus, the prevailing economic structure in Sudan contributes to the prevailing economic crisis that hinders the allocation of sufficient resources to achieve inclusive and sustainable development in Sudan.<sup>9</sup>

The Sudanese economy suffers from both economic mismanagement and economic volatility that result from the longstanding failure to implement sound and coherent policies to stabilize the economy and to sustain economic growth. According to the World Bank's classification, Sudan's economy was listed amongst the least developed poor and highly indebted economies but following the exploitation of oil and the improvement of its economic performance during the period 2000-2010 the situation has changed. Sudan's economy has turned from a low-income economy into a lower medium income economy according to the World Bank classification. However, the improvement of Sudan's rank in the World Bank classification system should not hide the serious economic mismanagement problem. For instance, one example of economic mismanagement is proven by the failure of previous governments to make optimal utilisation during the short period of oil exports and the resulting wealth from oil exports (2000-2011), and to contribute to reforms of the economic structure and to a genuine long run stabilization of Sudan's economy. The failure to utilise the wealth from oil exports (2000-2011) appears from the expansion of the rent-seeking economy and from rent-seeking activities including a sharply rising services sector and growing commercial activities instead of the promotion of agricultural and industrial activities. This has led to a continuous deterioration of the economy and has turned to be the major cause of the economic crisis in Sudan. In addition, economic mismanagement also appears from the lack of rationality to

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<sup>6</sup> See Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2019, p. 47.

<sup>7</sup> See International Monetary Fund IMF (2013) "Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper" IMF Country Report No. 13/318, October 2013: See: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13318.pdf>, accessed on September 04, 2014, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> See Nour (2018).

<sup>9</sup> See Nour (2011, 2013, 2015)

utilise the wealth from oil revenues for the promotion of the provision of health and education services instead of increasing military expenditures. After the independence of South Sudan, the decline in oil revenues caused a major adjustment to the Sudan's fiscal situation and was prompting financial austerity measures. After the secession of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan's economy suffered from a shortage of financial resources, as Sudan government revenues declined by about 75%. The decline in revenues from oil and the worsening economic conditions led to a continuous deterioration of economic indicators, including a deterioration of GDP, of the GDP annual growth rate, of fiscal revenues, and of gross capital formation over the period 2010-2018 (see Nour, 2020). The misallocation of the short-lived wealth from oil resources (in the period 2000-2010) and the deterioration of the economic conditions after the loss of oil revenues have caused an intensification of vulnerabilities and have limited progress in social indicators in Sudan, which is apparent from the massive scale of inequality (gender, rural-urban, and regional inequalities, and inequalities in resources sharing) and from high poverty rates, as for instance about 65 per cent of the population in Sudan are living below the poverty line and 52.3 per cent of population in Sudan are living in multidimensional poverty. The intensification of the massive scale of inequality and the immense level of poverty imply economic mismanagement and a failure of previous governments.

Another recent example of economic mismanagement appears from the failure of Sudan's previous governments in implementation of economic reform and economic stability and economic growth in 2018. Particularly, to confront the economic crisis, in October 2018 the Sudan government implemented a major devaluation of the Sudanese pound (SDG) in relation to the US dollar, which was the third documented devaluation since January 2018. The devaluation implies that the exchange rate (Sudanese pound SDG per US Dollar) devaluated from 6.7 SDG in December 2017 to 18.6 SDG per US dollar in January 2018 and then again to 47.5 SDG in October 2018 per US dollar. The economic mismanagement is demonstrated not only from the very large and most serious devaluation of the Sudanese pound, but also from the large and rising discrepancies between the official exchange rate and the parallel market exchange rate. The large devaluation of the Sudanese pound, the large and rising discrepancies between the official exchange rate and the parallel market exchange rate, and the shortage of hard currencies led to a serious deterioration in the imports of inputs, and for investment and production of both the agricultural and industrial sectors.

As a result of economic mismanagement and a continuous major devaluation the Sudanese economy continued to suffer not only from the impacts of the devaluation of the Sudanese pound, but also from the continuous and rising inflation that increased from 12.5 per cent in December 2015 to 25.2 per cent in December 2017, then to 66.8 per cent in August 2018, and then again to 72.9 per cent in December 2018. Both the continuous devaluation of the Sudanese pound and the rising inflation led to severe increases in the prices of basic goods and so to high and escalating costs of living; all that resulted in the continuous deterioration of the situation for many people what motivated serious mass demonstrations among the people in Sudan. Many factors caused protests, but the major cause of protests that led to the collapse of the previous regime was the increase of prices of bread that increased threefold in December 2018. The demonstrations of Sudanese citizens started in December 2018 and continued until and even after the downfall and overthrow of the previous regime.

During this same period, along with both economic mismanagement and because of the problematic economic structure, the Sudanese economy continued to suffer from a deficiency of the labour market and from vulnerability in work and employment. For instance, the deficiency of the labour market and the vulnerability in work and employment appears from high unemployment rates (13.3%), mainly the youth unemployment rates (40%), a high share of vulnerable employment that constitutes 40 per cent of total employment, widespread existence and predominance of informal employment in non-agricultural sectors that constitute 77.3 per cent of total employment in non-agricultural sectors. It is this fact that the problematic economic structure comes in, with a small share of industry in total employment in Sudan (15%) compared to high shares of agriculture (43.1%) and services (41.9%)<sup>10, 11</sup> This cumulation of impacts and effects had devastating consequences for the living standards in Sudan (see Nour, 2020).

The deficiency of fiscal policies appears from the continuous increase in the budget deficit due to the increase in total expenditures that continued to rise above the total increase in revenues (2017-2018). The deficiency of monetary policies appears from the continuous increase in the money supply and the failure to control inflation and devaluation of the Sudanese Pound (2017-2018). The deficiency of trade policies appears from the continuous

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<sup>10</sup> The share of vulnerable employment (%) is defined by total employed people engaged as unpaid family workers and own account workers as a percentage of total employment. The proportion of informal employment in non-agriculture employment (%) is defined by the proportion of informal employment in non-agriculture employment as a percentage of total employment in non-agriculture. The share of employment in agriculture, services, and industry are defined by the total employment in agriculture, services, and industry as a percentage of total employment (%) respectively. (see ILO (2019). See the ILOSTAT database at: [www.ilo.org/ilostat](http://www.ilo.org/ilostat). (Accessed 17 June 2019).

<sup>11</sup> See Nour (2011, 2013, 2014)

increase in the trade deficit due to the increase in total imports that continued to rise above the increase in total exports (2017-2018) (see Nour, 2020).

Finally, one of the major problems that contributed to the longstanding economic crisis in Sudan is the deterioration in Sudan's global economic links. For instance, data from the World Development Indicators database (The World Bank 2019) shows the deterioration of Sudan's global links during the period (2010-2018) that appears from the deterioration of merchandise trade (% of GDP), total external debt stocks, net migration, personal remittances received, foreign direct investment, net inflows, and the received net official development assistance. (see Nour, 2020) The deterioration of Sudan's global economic links also appears from the continued US economic sanctions since the 1990s that put several serious limitations and major restrictions on inflows of international or foreign capital from other world countries to Sudan. Although in October 2017 the United States indicated that it cancelled the US economic sanctions on Sudan, the Sudanese economy continued to suffer from several serious limitations on inflows of international or foreign capital from other world countries to Sudan.

### **3.2. Social and human causes (weak social and human development, immense scale of poverty, and massive extent of inequality) in Sudan**

Weak social and human development leads to increasing vulnerabilities that appear from several indicators, including widespread poverty and inequality and a weak performance in regard of the Human Development Index (HDI). Sudan continued to suffer from high rates of poverty, as according to the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics Household Survey Report (2009), in 2009 about 46.5 per cent of the people in northern Sudan were estimated to be living below the poverty line of less than US\$ 1 a day, and according to the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2019), in 2019 about 65 per cent of the people in Sudan were estimated to be living below the poverty line of less than US\$ 1 a day. This implies not only high poverty rates but also a substantial increase and intensification of poverty rates from about 46.5 per cent in 2009 to 65 per cent in 2019. Moreover, Sudan suffers from a high proportion of the population in multidimensional poverty that appears documented from the high Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) for

Sudan (52.3%), what implies that more than half of Sudan's population suffer from multidimensional poverty.<sup>12</sup>

The most recent survey data that were publicly made available for Sudan's MPI estimation refer to 2014; the data indicate that in Sudan 52.3 per cent of the population (21,210 thousand people) are multidimensionally poor while an additional 17.7 per cent are classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty (7,158 thousand people). The breadth of deprivation (intensity) in Sudan, which is the average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty, is 53.4 per cent. The MPI, which is the share of the population that is multidimensionally poor, adjusted by the intensity of the deprivation, is 0.279, and it is above the measured level of Yemen that has an MPI of 0.241. Nour (2020) compares multidimensional poverty with income poverty, measured by the percentage of the population living below PPP US\$ 1.90 per day. It shows that income poverty only tells a part of the story. The multidimensional poverty headcount is 37.4 percentage points higher than income poverty. This implies that individuals living above the income poverty line may still suffer deprivations in health, education, and/or standard of living. Nour (2020) also shows the percentage of Sudan's population that lives in severe multidimensional poverty. The contribution of deprivation in each dimension to overall poverty complete a comprehensive picture of people living in multidimensional poverty in Sudan. The most recent data from UNDP show that during the period 2007-2018 the proportion of multidimensional poverty in Sudan (52.3%) is above the proportions in North Africa countries (see Nour, 2020). Particularly, the proportion of population in multidimensional poverty in Sudan (52.3%) is more than ten times above the proportion of population in multidimensional poverty in Egypt (5.2%), although the population in Sudan (41.8 million) is less than half the population in Egypt (98.42 million) in 2018. Therefore, in Sudan 65 per cent of the population live below the poverty line in 2019 and 52.3 per cent of the population live in severe multidimensional poverty in the period 2007-2018 what implies weak progress in social development towards ending poverty.

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<sup>12</sup> The 2010 HDR introduced the MPI, which identifies multiple overlapping deprivations suffered by individuals in three dimensions: health, education, and standard of living. The health and education dimensions are based on two indicators each, while the standard of living is based on six indicators. All the indicators needed to construct the MPI for a country are taken from the same household survey. The indicators are weighted to create a deprivation score, and the deprivation scores are computed for all individuals incorporated in the survey. A deprivation score of 33.3 percent (one-third of the weighted indicators) is used to distinguish between the poor and the non-poor. If the deprivation score is 33.3 percent or greater, the household (and everyone in it) is classified as multidimensionally poor. Individuals with a deprivation score greater than or equal to 20 percent but less than 33.3 percent are classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. Finally, individuals with a deprivation score greater than or equal to 50 percent live in severe multidimensional poverty. The MPI is calculated for 101 developing countries in the 2019 HDR. (See UNDP HDR 2010)

Initially, Sudan suffers not only from high poverty rates but also from widespread and serious inequalities that appear from several inequality measures including for instance, Gini coefficient, Palma ratio, quintile ratio, and the share of national income held by the poorest 40 per cent of the population (see Nour, 2020).<sup>13</sup> For instance, the income inequality in Sudan (2017) appears from the fact that the richest (top income earners) 10 per cent of the population held 42 per cent of the national income, followed by the middle 40 per cent of the population that held 41.4 per cent of the national income, while the poorest (bottom income earners) 50 per cent of the population held only 16.6 per cent of the national income. This implies that the national income held by the richest top 10 per cent of the population and by the middle 40 per cent of the population are more than twice above the national income held by the poorest (bottom) 50 per cent of the population in Sudan in 2017. This also implies that the national income held by both the richest top 10 per cent of the population and the middle 40 per cent of the population together are more five times above the national income held by the poorest bottom 50 per cent of the population in Sudan in 2017. The massive inequality also appears from measures of the rural-urban and the regional multidimensional poverty index, incidence of poverty, average intensity of poverty, vulnerable population, severe poverty population share) (see Nour, 2020). The multidimensional poverty index in Sudan looked at by rural-urban residence areas reveals serious regional inequalities not only in the share of population but also in poverty levels. For instance, although the share of population in rural areas is more than double the population share in urban areas, the extent of rural-urban poverty and inequality appears from the fact that the multidimensional poverty index and the incidence of poverty in rural areas more than twice above the urban areas, while the average intensity of poverty and the proportion of the vulnerable population in rural areas are above the extent in urban areas, and the severe poverty in rural areas is more than four times above the same measure in urban areas. Moreover, the multidimensional poverty index in Sudan viewed by subnational regions reveals serious regional inequalities not only in the share of the population, but also in the multidimensional poverty index, the incidence of

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<sup>13</sup> Income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient measures the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, while a value of 100 shows absolute inequality. Income inequality as measured by the Palma ratio is defined by the ratio of the richest 10 per cent of the population's share of gross national income (GNI) divided by the poorest 40 percent's share. It is based on the work of Palma (2011). Income inequality as measured by the quintile ratio is defined by the ratio of the average income of the richest 20 per cent of the population to the average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population. Income inequality as measured by income share held by poorest 40% is defined by the share of national income held by the poorest 40 per cent of the population. Income inequality as measured by the income share held by richest 10 % is defined by the share of national income held by the richest 10 per cent of the population. See the World Bank (2019): World Development Indicators database. Washington, D.C.; see: <http://data.worldbank.org>. (Accessed 21 June 2019). See also World Bank (2019): World Development Indicators database. Washington, D.C.; see: <http://data.worldbank.org>. (Accessed 15 July 2019), and the HDRO (Human Development Report Office) calculations based on data from World Bank (2019): World Development Indicators database. Washington, D.C.; see: <http://data.worldbank.org>. (Accessed on 15 July 2019).

poverty, the average intensity of poverty, and the proportion of vulnerable population and severe poverty (see Nour, 2020).

The extensive inequality is related to regions, gender, rural-urban residence, etc. The reported inequality extends beyond income inequality and includes human capital inequalities (inequality in HDI, supply of and demand for education and health; see Nour, 2019; 2020) and also regional, gender and rural-urban inequalities in the access to ICT in Sudan (see Nour, 2015; 2020). Since long, the inadequate and inequitable provision of education, training and health services are critical impediments for social and sustainable development in Sudan. The growth in the provision of these services in the past years should not hide the prevailing and still growing inequalities in Sudan. For instance, the regional inequality in the provision of education appears from the supply and demand sides of education. The regional inequalities in the supply of education appear from the great regional disparity and the inequalities in the distribution of infrastructure, financial and human resources. This refers to public and private educational investment and spending on education as a percentage of GDP, the percentage share of public and private education institutions, and the human resources (teaching staff) available in Sudan. The regional inequalities in the demand for education appear from the great regional disparities, the inequalities and the variations across the main regions in public and private enrolment ratios of students in basic, secondary, technical, vocational and tertiary education institutions in Sudan (see Nour, 2020).

The regional inequalities in the provision of health services appear from the inequitable distribution of health facilities as measured by the coverage of health insurance, the number of health centres, clinics, and hospitals ,and the distribution of health manpower and health workers across regions in Sudan (see Nour, 2020).<sup>14</sup> The UNDP Sudan Human Development Report (2012) indicates the regional inequalities in HDI and its components in Sudan. In our view the regional inequalities in the HDI and its components lead to serious implications in Sudan. For instance, Sudan's HDI for 2018 is 0.507. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.332, a loss of 34.6 per cent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices; this implies that the human inequality coefficient for Sudan is equal to 34.3 per cent. The loss of HDI as a result of inequality in Sudan (34.6 per cent) is above the losses due to inequality that is reported in Yemen (31.8 per cent), the

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<sup>14</sup> See Nour (2019, 2013, 2011)

group of low HDI countries (31.1 per cent), and the Arab States (24.5 per cent) (see Nour, 2020).

In addition to the prevailing regional inequality in the demand for education, further evidences on inequality from the demand side appear from the gender differences in educational attainment as measured by the gross enrolment ratio of females for primary, secondary and tertiary education. Further evidence on gender inequality appears from the HDI defined by gender; for instance, the 2018 female HDI value for Sudan is 0.457, in contrast with 0.546 for males, resulting in a Gender Development Index (GDI) value for Sudan of 0.837 (see Nour, 2020). Sudan has a Gender Inequality Index (GII) value of 0.560, ranking it 139 out of 162 countries in the 2018 index. In Sudan, 31.0 per cent of the parliamentary seats are held by women, and 15.3 per cent of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education compared to 19.6 per cent of their male counterparts. Female participation in the labour market is 24.5 per cent compared to 70.3 for men (see Nour, 2020).

Furthermore, the weak performance in the human development index (HDI) appears from the classification of Sudan among the low human development group of countries and also appears from the deterioration of Sudan's ranking in the HDI from 167 to 168 out of 189 world countries which are included in the UNDP-HDI for 2017 and 2018 respectively. The trend of the human development index (HDI) over the period 2000 - 2018 implies that the low human development indicators of Sudan continued to fall below the level of the Arab states and the world average level; for instance, in 2018 Sudan's HDI score (0.507) was below the average of the Arab States (0.703). In 2017-2018, the HDI for Sudan (0.507) shows a stagnating trend and no significant improvement (see Nour, 2020). As a result of the weak economic, social, and human development indicators, it is not surprising that Sudan shows poor performance regarding both the Prosperity index (PI) and the Happiness index (HI). For instance, in 2019, the score of the Prosperity Index for Sudan was 36.68; though the Sudan Prosperity Index score fluctuated substantially in recent years, it tended to decrease through the period 2010–2019, ending at a score of 36.68 in 2019. During the period 2015-2017 the score for Sudan regarding the Happiness Index remained unchanged at a level (4.14) that implies that Sudan shows a stagnating trend and that there was no significant improvement in terms of the Happiness Index over the period 2015-2017 (see Nour, 2020).<sup>15, 16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The Legatum Prosperity Index is the only global index that measures national prosperity based on institutional, economic, and social well-being. It seeks to redefine the concept of national prosperity to include, as a matter of fundamental importance, factors such as democratic governance, entrepreneurial opportunity, and social cohesion. The Legatum Prosperity Index analyses the performance of 167 nations across



### 3.3. Political causes in Sudan

The political context in Sudan is characterised by a long history of political instability. Even after the independence of Southern Sudan, Sudan still endures political instability, a lack of good governance, and a lack of sound, effective and systematically working institutions. The failure of the political system and its institutions appears from the fact that the previous regime through its only party (the National Congress Party/NCP) has banned the presence of a multi-party system and has continued to maintain its full control and predominance over the political field in Sudan for nearly three decades (1989-2019). The failure of the political system and its institutions is demonstrated from the lack of democratic institutions and the predominance of undemocratic institutions in Sudan. The political causes, including the long-standing failure of political institutions, political instability, dominance of a one political party system and autocracy, political repression, and human rights abuses, based on violent government suppression on protesters, led to great frustration among the people in Sudan. The protestors were motivated to insist on a comprehensive change of the political regime as one of the top objectives of the Sudan Uprising. While the Sudan Uprising was motivated initially by economic causes when protests started over the rising costs of bread and fuel in December 2018, the motivation of protests have widened to insist on overthrowing the political regime and bringing down the system of predominance of only one ruling party for nearly three decades since 1989. Data from the Global Innovation Index (GII) Report (2015) profile for Sudan implies serious weaknesses and/or a weak performance in terms of institutions, the political environment, and with regard of political stability.<sup>17</sup> For instance, of the general

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65 policy-focussed elements, measured by almost 300 country-level indicators. See: <https://li.com/reports/2019-legatum-prosperity-index/>, accessed on 24 February 2020. See also: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Prosperity-index>. (Accessed on 16 February 2020).

<sup>16</sup> The World Happiness Report (WHR) is a landmark survey of the state of global happiness that ranks 156 countries by how happy their citizens perceive themselves to be. The report is produced by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UNSDSN) in partnership with the Ernesto Illy Foundation. The report includes data collected from people in over 150 countries. The variables included in the report are the following: real GDP per capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, freedom to make life choices, generosity, and perceptions of corruption. See the WHR under: <https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2018/> (accessed on 24 February 2020). The Happiness Index (HI) is a comprehensive survey instrument that assesses happiness, wellbeing, and aspects of sustainability and resilience. This instrument can be used to measure satisfaction with life and the conditions of life. It can also be used to define income inequality, trust in government, sense of community, and other aspects of well-being within specific demographics of a population. See on the methodology: Musikanski et al. (2017). See also: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Happiness> (Accessed on 16 February 2020). See also: <https://worldhappiness.report/download/> (Accessed on 24 February 2020).

<sup>17</sup> On the GI: The Institutions pillar focusses on nurturing an institutional framework that attracts business and fosters growth by providing good governance, as the correct levels of protection and incentives are essential to innovation. The Institutions pillar captures the institutional framework of an economy. The Political environment sub-pillar includes two indices: the first is the political, legal, operational or security risk index that replaces the political stability and safety indicator, reflecting more on the likelihood and severity of political, legal, operational or security risks impacting business operations; while the second reflects the quality of public and civil services, policy formulation, and implementation. The Regulatory environment sub-pillar draws on two indices aimed at capturing perceptions on the ability of the government to formulate and implement cohesive policies that promote the development of the private sector and at evaluating the extent to which the rule of law prevails (in aspects such as contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts). The third indicator evaluates the cost of redundancy dismissal as the sum, in salary weeks, of the cost of advance notice requirements added to severance payments due when terminating a redundant worker. The Political and Operational Stability Index captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. The Government Effectiveness Index captures perceptions of quality of public and civil services and the degree of their independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's

ranking of the whole sample of 141 economies which were included in the calculation of the GII (2015), Sudan exhibits the fourth weakest position in terms of the institutions pillar (138), especially because of its weak position at the bottom place in terms of political environment (141). Sudan had the third weakest position in terms of political stability (139), a bottom place in terms of government effectiveness (141), and it had also the eleventh weakest position in terms of regulatory environment (130). Especially Sudan's fifth weakest position in terms of rule of law (137), its sixth weakest position in terms of regulatory quality (136), the poor business environment (118), and the weak position in terms of time to start a business (112) ) matter in this context (see Nour, 2020). All this is not only relevant for innovation, but for the overall conduct of the Sudanese economy.

### **3.4. Institutional causes (widespread corruption, financial mismanagement, and lack of political integrity) in Sudan**

The institutional causes including the incidence of high corruption and lack of political integrity imply the failure of previous official efforts to end government corruption, the lack of trust in institutions, and the lack of political integrity that is demonstrated from the fact that Sudan failed to significantly improve its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores since 2017. For instance, according to data obtained from the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index issued by the Transparency International Secretariat (2019)<sup>18</sup>, Sudan is among a vast majority of countries that are stagnating or showing signs of regressing in their anti-corruption efforts and that do not engage the most relevant political, social and business actors in political decision-making. Over the period 2018-2019 Sudan is ranked among the top ten highly corrupted (lowest scoring) countries in the world, namely, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Sudan, respectively. Sudan failed to drop out of the top ten highly corrupted countries on the CPI in the world since 2017. For instance, in 2019 the CPI ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption; in 2019 Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Sudan are at the bottom of the index,

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commitment to such policies. The Regulatory Quality Index captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector development. The Rule of Law Index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The Ease of Starting a Business related to the ranking of economies on the ease of starting a business is determined by sorting their distance to frontier scores for starting a business. These scores are the simple average of the distance to frontier scores for each of the component indicators. See Global Innovation Index (GII) Report (2019), p. 206.

<sup>18</sup> Since its inception in 1995, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International's flagship research product, has become the leading global indicator of public sector corruption. The index offers an annual snapshot of the relative degree of corruption by ranking countries and territories from all over the globe. In 2012, Transparency International revised the methodology used to construct the index to allow for a comparison of scores from one year to the next. The 2019 CPI draws on 13 surveys and on expert assessments to measure public sector corruption in 180 countries and territories, giving each a score from zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean, or highly clean). See: [https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/2019\\_CPI\\_efforts\\_stagnate\\_in\\_G7](https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/2019_CPI_efforts_stagnate_in_G7) (Accessed on 6 February 2020). See also: [https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2018](https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/corruption_perceptions_index_2018) (Accessed on 6 February 2020). See also: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Corruption-perceptions-index> (Accessed on 16 February 2020).

with 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 16 points, respectively. In 2019, out of 180 countries with a score of 16 points only Sudan is ranked in position 173 at the sixth place from the bottom. Over the period 2005-2019, the CPI of Sudan fell gradually from 21 scores in 2005 to 16 scores in 2019. Over the period 2017-2019, with a fixed score of 16, Sudan shows a stagnating trend, implying that Sudan fails to improve its CPI score value (see Nour, 2020).

The failure of previous official efforts to control corruption in Sudan can be explained by the lack of or poor enforcement of comprehensive and systematically designed regulations. The lack of real progress against the profound and the prolonged corruption caused a great frustration, disappointment, dissatisfaction, and deep negative effects on people in Sudan. This happened along with an increasing awareness that the opportunity of ending corruption, restoring trust in politics, improving political integrity, and improving living conditions and welfare for citizens in Sudan is dependent on changing the political regime and just that motivated the Sudan Uprising.

In Sudan the incidence of corruption is also problematic for protecting democracy in view of the fact that the CPI (2018) analysis reveals that corruption is contributing to a global crisis of democracy and that the continued failure of most countries to significantly control corruption is contributing to a crisis of democracy around the world. Corruption damages democracy to produce a vicious cycle, as corruption undermines democratic institutions and, in turn, weak institutions are less able to control corruption.<sup>19</sup>

In Sudan, the low CPI score comes at a time when the Sudan is experiencing deterioration and has registered its lowest score for political rights. These ratings reflect the deterioration of rule of law and of democratic institutions, as well as a rapidly shrinking space for civil society organisations and free and independent media, in Sudan. Kukutschka (2017)<sup>20</sup> provides a general overview of the nature and extent of corruption in Sudan, as well as its presence across different sectors of the economy in Sudan. He indicates that corruption is present in all sectors and across all branches and levels of government in Sudan: public servants are known to demand bribes for services that individuals or companies are legally entitled to;

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<sup>19</sup> Concerning the relationship between corruption and the crisis of democracy across analysis with global democracy data reveals a link between corruption and the health of democracies. Full democracies score an average of 75 on the CPI; flawed democracies score an average of 49; hybrid regimes – which show elements of autocratic tendencies – score 35; autocratic regimes perform worst, with an average score of just 30 on the CPI. CPI research makes a clear link between having a healthy democracy and successfully fighting public sector corruption. “Corruption is much more likely to flourish where democratic foundations are weak and, as we have seen in many countries, where undemocratic and populist politicians can use it to their advantage. (by Delia Ferreira Rubio, Chair of Transparency International, 2019)”. See: <https://www.transparency.org/>.

<sup>20</sup> For all this section see Kukutschka (2017). pp. 2-8.

government officials hold direct and indirect stakes in many enterprises, which distorts the market through patronage and cronyism; and the head of state and government is believed to have embezzled up to US\$9 billion from oil revenues. The human rights situation in the country continues to deteriorate. In 2011, Freedom House ranked Sudan as one of the nine countries judged to have the worst human rights record, with its inhabitants suffering from intense repression (Martini 2012). It indicates that concerning the nature and extent of corruption in Sudan, corruption in Sudan is a systemic issue. The country is perceived as one of the most corrupt in the world: Transparency International's 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for example, gives the country a score of 14, ahead only of North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria (Transparency International 2017). The World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator also places the country among the 10 most corrupt countries on the planet. These results are hardly surprising given that Sudan is also considered a fragile state under "very high alert" by the Fund for Peace (2016), and as noted by Transparency International (2011) "fragile, unstable states ... linger at the bottom of the index ... demonstrate[ing] that countries which are perceived to have the highest levels of public sector corruption are also those plagued by longstanding conflicts which have torn apart their governance infrastructure...". Sudan is a country plagued by conflicts, phenomena of resource curse, inequalities of various types, mismanagement, instability, poverty, and many other forms of fragmentation.

Corruption takes a variety of forms in Sudan, ranging from petty forms of corruption, such as bribery, to grand corruption (e.g. embezzlement and theft of public funds involving high-level officials), and to political corruption, i.e. "the manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth" (Transparency International 2009). It indicates that the main drivers of corruption in Sudan include an absence of checks and balances [to hold the government accountable], systematic violations of human rights [which make it difficult for a strong media landscape and civil society to flourish], lack of political opposition, the absence of rule of law, and the close ties between business and politics, among others. In addition to the excessive administrative burden, for instance, several studies have shown that there is a strong association between bureaucracy and corruption. This is mostly attributed to the fact that excessive regulation increases administrative discretion, thus generating opportunities for corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi/Kukutschka 2013). According to figures provided by the World Bank's Ease of Doing

Business Survey, the administrative burden in Sudan ranks among the worst in the world and has worsened over the years. Starting a business, for example, takes 36 days and 10 procedures, and can cost around 25% of the business owner's income. Paying taxes is another complicated process which requires making 42 payments per year and an investment of 180 hours. While these figures are not uncommon in sub Saharan African countries, they still lag international best practices and provide incentives to pay bribes to "speed up" processes. It illustrates how corruption, in its different forms and shapes, is present across many sectors of the economy and can be considered a normal occurrence.

Concerning corruption by sector, in the extractive industries sector the lack of transparency and accountability generates a very high risk of corruption and political interference (GAN Integrity 2016), and corruption has been reported all along the production chain, including volume, reporting, reserves, entitlements of foreign companies, as well as allocations to producing states and distribution companies (Sudan Democracy First 2016a). In 2009, for example, Global Witness published an analysis of Sudan's oil figures and showed discrepancies between the figures of the Sudanese government and those released by the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (Global Witness 2009). The report said there were discrepancies ranging from 9% to 26% between 2005 and 2007. Even after losing around two-thirds of its known oil reserves and three-quarters of its oil revenues in 2011, following the secession of South Sudan, the allegations of corruption in the sector continues. In 2014, for example, the auditor general accused the Ministry of Finance and the Sudanese Oil Foundation of spending oil revenues to repay a Chinese loan for the Khartoum refinery without keeping accounts. Furthermore, he revealed "a mismatch in the oil accounts in the period 1996-2012, pointing to an amount of US\$ 628 billion that was classified as 'operating expenses'" (Dabanga 2014). There have also been reports stating that more than 60% of the oil companies operating in Sudan engage in tax evasion and that less than a quarter of the total oil revenues get deposited in the public treasury (Dabanga 2014)..... He provides another example of corruption in the health sector and indicates that because of the widespread practice of bribery and other corrupt dealings, the access to the public healthcare system does not live up to the standards of justice, fairness, and equality. Instead nepotism, bribes, and favouritism prevail and access to healthcare is a luxury for those who can afford it. A further example of corruption relates to the land tenure system and the land use and agriculture sector and indicates that Sudan's land holds great agricultural potential, but the accelerated land

acquisition by foreign investors is problematic for local farmers who find their land rights disregarded (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016).

In recent years, corruption in land governance in the country has come under greater scrutiny due to the increased commercial value of agricultural and urban land. There are concerns that corruption plays a role in facilitating large-scale land acquisition by investors. Although allegations of corruption are extremely sensitive and hard to prove, the principal conclusion is that corruption is most evident at the higher level of the investment chain, associated with deal-making in establishing partnerships, joint ventures, land acquisition, and project planning with concession holders and project managers. This is supported by investment finance originating higher up the chain, with a governance system that favours those belonging or connected with the political establishment as a prime enabler of corrupt practices (Sudan Democracy First Group 2016b).

### **3.5. The lack of freedom causes in Sudan**

Over the past years Sudan suffers not only from the deterioration of economic indicators, economic and financial mismanagement, high corruption, and widespread inequalities, but also suffers from the lack of economic, political, and civil freedoms. That is demonstrated from the rankings and the weak performance of Sudan compared to world countries in terms of various indexes of freedom, including the index of economic freedom, the political rights index, the civil liberties index, and the press freedom index as explained below.

### **3.5.1. Lack of economic freedom: A weak Index of Economic freedom<sup>21</sup>**

Regarding the index of economic freedom, over the period 2017-2019 Sudan revealed a deterioration in the index of economic freedom (see Nour, 2020). For instance, in 2019 the Sudan index of economic freedom was at level of 47.7 scores. The Sudan index of economic freedom declined from a 49.4 score in 2018 to a 47.7 score in 2019; this implies a decreasing change of 3.44%. Over the period 1995-2019, with a score less than 50.0 (39.4-47.7), Sudan continued to be among the weakest ranked countries in the index of economic freedom. This implies that the classification of the World countries according to the index of economic freedom puts Sudan among the persistently repressed world countries. In 2019, Sudan shows a weak performance in the four broad categories or pillars of economic freedom, including: rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets, that all are below the world average (see Nour, 2020).

Sudan's economic freedom score is 47.7, making its economy the 166th freest in the 2019 Index. Its overall score has decreased by 1.7 points, with sharply lower scores for fiscal health and trade freedom outweighing an increase in government integrity. Sudan is ranked 41st among 47 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and its overall score is well below the regional and world averages. Years of social conflict and civil war in Sudan have undermined investor confidence. The petroleum sector provides some economic stability, but other sectors face serious structural and institutional deficiencies. Currency risk was heightened in 2018 after repeated devaluations due to persistent hard currency shortages. Coupled with rising inflationary pressures, this further undermined investor sentiment and reduced private consumption and thus growth. Poor governance, weak rule of law, rigid labour markets, and an inefficient regulatory regime have impeded economic diversification and have created a

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<sup>21</sup> The definition of the index of economic freedom is based on the belief that economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labour and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please, with that freedom both protected by the state and unconstrained by the state. In economically free societies, governments allow labour, capital, and goods to move freely, and to refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. Economic freedom brings greater prosperity. The Index of Economic Freedom documents the positive relationship between economic freedom and a variety of positive social and economic goals. The ideals of economic freedom are strongly associated with healthier societies, cleaner environments, greater per capita wealth, human development, democracy, and poverty elimination. The index of economic freedom is based on 12 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, or pillars, of economic freedom: (1) Rule of Law (property rights, government integrity, judicial effectiveness), (2) Government Size (government spending, tax burden, fiscal health), (3) Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labour freedom, monetary freedom), and (4) Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). Each of the twelve economic freedoms within these categories is graded on a scale of 0 to 100. A country's overall score is derived by averaging these twelve economic freedoms, with equal weight being given to each. The Index of Economic Freedom considers every component equally important in achieving the positive benefits of economic freedom. Each freedom is weighted equally in determining country scores. Countries considering economic reforms may find significant opportunities for improving economic performance in those factors in which they score the lowest. These factors may indicate significant binding constraints on economic growth and prosperity. According to the index classification of world countries: free countries (score 80-100), mostly free countries (score 79.9-70), moderately free countries (score 69.9-60), mostly unfree countries (score 59.9-50), and repressed countries (score 49.9-0). See the Heritage Foundation: <https://www.heritage.org/index/about>, accessed on 24 February 2020. The index of economic freedom score 100 represents the maximum freedom. See: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Index-of-economic-freedom>, accessed on 6 February 2020.

large informal economy. Decades of economic mismanagement and corruption precipitated an economic crisis in 2018 that featured inflation, food and water shortages, and street protests. The oil sector has driven much of Sudan's GDP growth, but the secession of South Sudan has cost Sudan two-thirds of its oil revenues. Close to half of the population is at or below the poverty line and reliant on subsistence agriculture.

Sudan's performance regarding the rule of law implies that there is little respect for private property, and that enforcement is uneven. The judiciary is not independent, and years of political conflict have deformed the legal framework. Sudan is one of the world's most corrupt nations. It was ranked 175th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International's 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Power and resources are concentrated in and around Khartoum. Sudan's performance concerning the government size implies that the top personal income tax rate is 10 per cent, and the top corporate tax rate is 35 per cent. The overall tax burden equals 6.7 per cent of total domestic income. Over the past three years, government spending has amounted to 10.6 per cent of the country's output (GDP), and budget deficits have averaged 1.6 per cent of GDP. Public debt is equivalent to 126.0 per cent of GDP. Sudan's performance regarding regulatory efficiency implies that the poor governance and the inefficient regulations impede the development and diversification of the private sector. A large informal economy remains trapped by business regulations that inhibit registration and a rigid labour market that discourages formal hiring. In 2018, the government's decision to remove fuel subsidies and to eliminate wheat subsidies spiked inflation and led to widespread and violent street protests. Sudan's performance concerning open markets implies that the combined value of exports and imports is equal to 21.5 per cent of GDP. The average applied tariff rate is 17.5 per cent, and nontariff barriers impose additional severe impediments on trade flows. Investment remains largely reserved for the hydrocarbon sector. Access to credit remains limited. About 17 per cent of the adult Sudanese have access to an account with a formal banking institution (see Nour, 2020).<sup>22</sup>

The weak performance in economic freedom is related to the state of weak business freedom as proven by weak performance in the ease of doing business index.<sup>23</sup> For instance, in 2019

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<sup>22</sup> For all this section see The Heritage Foundation (2019): '2019 Index of Economic Freedom: Sudan' [heritage.org/Index](https://heritage.org/Index) (2019), pp. 390-391, Accessed February 20, 2020.

<sup>23</sup> Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1–190. A high ease of doing business ranking means that the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and the operation of a local firm. The rankings are determined by sorting the aggregate scores on 10 topics, each consisting of several indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. The rankings for all economies are benchmarked to May 2019. See: <https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings>, accessed on 16 February 2020. See also: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Ease-of-doing-business-index>, accessed on 16 February 2020.



the ease of doing business index for Sudan was at a 48.02 score. Although Sudan's performance in the ease of doing business index has increased from a 45.52 score in 2016 to a 48.02 score in 2019, and so was growing at an average annual rate of 1.86%, but Sudan's performance is below the world average (see Nour, 2020).

### **3.5.2. Lack of political and civil freedoms: weak political rights index<sup>24</sup>, civil liberties index<sup>25</sup>, and press freedom index<sup>26</sup>**

The lack of political rights, political freedom, and civil liberties in Sudan are demonstrated from the Freedom House data related to the political rights index and the civil liberties index. For instance, in 2019 the political rights index for Sudan was at a 7.00 score and the civil liberties index for Sudan was at a 7.00 score. Over the period 2007-2019 the Freedom House data for both indicators for Sudan imply that the Sudan political rights index and the Sudan civil liberties index both showed a constant trend and remained fixed at around a 7.00 score; this also implies that both indexes do not show an improvement in Sudan (see Nour, 2020).

In 2019, out of 190 countries with a political rights index score of 7, Sudan is ranked in the 21st place from the bottom and among the top 30 world countries with weak political rights. Similarly, in 2019, out of 190 countries with a civil liberties index score of 7, Sudan is ranked in the 7th place from the bottom and among the top ten world countries with no civil liberties (see Nour, 2020). Over the past years, Sudan suffered not only from the lack of political rights, political freedom and civil liberties but also has suffered from the lack of press freedom. Mainly, the lack of press freedom appears from the poor performance in the Press Freedom Index. For instance, data from Reporters Without Borders (RSF/Reporters Sans Frontières) indicate that in 2019 the press freedom index for Sudan was at a 72.45 score.

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<sup>24</sup> The Political Rights Index from the Freedom House evaluates three categories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. The index ranges from 1 (strong rights and highest degree of political freedom) to 7 (weak rights and weak political freedom). See: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/political\\_rights/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/political_rights/), accessed on 24 February 2020. See also: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sudan/political\\_rights/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sudan/political_rights/), accessed on 24 February 2020. See: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Political-rights-index>, (Accessed on 16 February 2020).

<sup>25</sup> The Civil Liberties index from the Freedom House evaluates the freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. The index rating ranges from 1 (strong liberties and highest degree of freedom) to 7 (no liberties and no freedom). See: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/civil\\_liberties/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/civil_liberties/), accessed on 24 February 2020. See also: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sudan/civil\\_liberties/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sudan/civil_liberties/), accessed on 24 February 2020. See also: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Civil-liberties-index>, (Accessed on 16 February 2020).

<sup>26</sup> Published annually by Reporters Without Borders (RSF/Reporters Sans Frontières) since 2002, the World Press Freedom Index measures the level of media freedom in 180 countries. It assesses the level of pluralism, media independence, the environment for the media and self-censorship, the legal framework, transparency, and the quality of the infrastructure that supports the production of news and information. It does not evaluate government policy. The global indicator and the regional indicators are calculated based on the scores registered for each country. These country scores are calculated from the answers to a questionnaire that is completed by experts throughout the world, supported by a qualitative analysis. The scores measure constraints and violations; so the higher the score, the worse the situation of press freedom. Because of growing awareness of the Index, it is an extremely useful advocacy tool. See: <https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-press-freedom-index-cycle-fear>, (Accessed on 24 February 2020). See also: <https://knoema.com/atlas/Sudan/Press-freedom-index> (Accessed on 16 February 2020).

Though the Sudan press freedom index fluctuated substantially in recent years, it tended to increase through the period 2004- 2019, ending at a score of 72.45 in 2019; this implies that the constraints violations have increased and that the situation of press freedom in Sudan became worse (see Nour, 2020).

Therefore, our findings in this section support the first hypothesis that a combination of mixed factors and causes including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the lack of freedom causes have inspired the Sudan Uprising. We observe that the lack of peace, freedom, and of justice led to great frustration that motivated the mass street demonstrations and the Sudan Uprising that called for the achievement of peace, freedom, and of justice for all people in Sudan (during the period December 2018 - April 2019), giving political space for negotiations and for building a new government.


#### **4. The interaction between the internal and the external factors - how they have contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising**

This section discusses the interaction between the internal and the external factors (the role of internal factors such as youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association/SPA, the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative/UKTSI, and as an external factor the Diaspora), as all that have supported the Sudan Uprising. We examine in this section the second hypothesis that the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association/SPA, and the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative/UKTSI) and external factors (the Diaspora) have contributed to support the Sudan Uprising.

##### **4.1 The role of youth in Sudan Uprising**

The role of youth for supporting the successful transition in Sudan is important and inspiring for other African countries. The distribution of population by gender and age and the population pyramid for Sudan (2018) indicates that the Sudanese nation is a young nation. The share of the population age 0-14 contributes 41.3 per cent, the share of the population age 0-24 contributes 61.2 per cent, and the share of population age 0-34 contributes 75.5 per cent (see figure 1 below).

**Figure 1:** The distribution of total population by age and the population pyramid for Sudan (2018)



**Sources:** Adapted from (1) Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, and (2) Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Report (2018), p. 139.

We observe that in view of the fact that the demographic structure implies a high share of youth (population age 0-24) that contributes 61.2 per cent of the total population in Sudan; it is not surprising that the youth turn out to be the most effective population group that supports the Sudan Uprising. It is widely recognized that the rationale for the great enthusiasm and motivation for the extensive participation of youth in the Sudan Uprising is most probably related to the increasing interest among the youth to achieve a better future for the youth. Inspired by the Arab Spring of 2011, previous unsuccessful revolution efforts in Sudan in September 2013, and the increasing awareness among the youth, the young generation was becoming more persistent to continue the revolution and the demonstrations to change and to overthrow the previous regime. The significant commitment for participation in the revolution

among the youth is demonstrated from the fact that the greatest share of the documented victims and deaths was among the young generation.

The significant contribution of the youth in the revolution is also demonstrated from the intensive participation of different age groups of the young generation, the high participation of the young generation from different education and occupation backgrounds, and the high level of participation of higher education students from the public and private universities. In the past the higher education students from the public universities have had a longstanding contribution in previous Sudanese revolution, such as in 1964 and 1985. In the recent revolution the significant contribution from the higher education students from private universities is widely recognized to be very important, and these new aspects that significantly indicate the national unity among the young generation in Sudan.

The significant contribution of youth in the revolution is also demonstrated from the youth' proposal for the adoption of a new political, economic and social contract to achieve freedom, peace and equality. For instance, from the youth' perspective the proposal for the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is grounded on social protection for the poor through supporting the poor by adoption of the cooperative social responsibility principle: 'those who have should give, and those who need should take'. The significant contribution of the youth in the revolution is also demonstrated from the persistent gathering of the youth near the Army Headquarters for nearly 57 days. The gathering of the youth near the Army Headquarters was characterised by a unique social and national unity among the youth from different regional, social and economic backgrounds; and that fact implies the potential success of the youth in establishing equality and overcoming the longstanding discrimination being based on regional, social and economic backgrounds. The gathering was also characterised by a high level of coordination that implies the success of the young generation in managing the demonstration activities even under very hard and complex situations in Sudan.

In addition, the young volunteers arranged the various revolutionary activities with great interest, motivation, power, and a high level of coordination; for instance, young volunteer doctors and pharmacists arranged for a pharmacy to provide medication to those who need it; companies and volunteering individuals arranged with young volunteer doctors and pharmacists to facilitate the provision of medicine free of charge, and young volunteering

individuals arranged with young volunteer doctors to facilitate the provision of blood donations to ensure availability of blood for the injured individuals during the protests. In addition to the coordination between young volunteers and volunteering individuals it was realized to ensure the availability and to arrange for the provision of cash, water, and food donations to those who need it for free during the uprising period. The gathering of the young Sudanese ‘revolutionaries’ near the Army Headquarters from April 06, 2019 to June 02, 2019 revived the national unity in Sudan; for instance, the arrival of the Atbara train, together with the arrival of various regional representatives from the northern, central, eastern, and western Sudan implies the increasing awareness about the importance of national unity to support the success of the revolution and the potential peaceful transition.

The young Sudanese ‘revolutionaries’ are praised for overcoming and breaking the wall of fear and for being very brave, peaceful, very cooperative, and for committing to unity and solidarity that deserved the appreciation from both local and international communities. The high organisational and management skills and the ability of the youth was also successful to attract the interest of the international community and also to attract the representative diplomats in Sudan that visited the gathering of the young near the Army Headquarters to support the Sudan Uprising and the Sudanese youth’ revolution. Evidence shows that the young Sudanese ‘revolutionaries’ near the Army Headquarters attracted the interest from the international community. For instance, the European and American journalists following the Sudanese Revolution were assigned the view of the entrance of the train carrying the revolutionaries of Atbara City to the sit-in-area; this was the most impressive and harmonious revolutionary scene of its moment in the world. Moreover, at the end of April 2019, the British newspaper “The Guardian” selected the picture of the night gathering of the young Sudanese ‘revolutionaries’ near the Army Headquarters among the 20 pictures that influenced the week of 22/23 April 2019.

#### **4.2. The significant role of women in the Sudan Uprising**

Since long the role of women has been widely recognized in political, economic, and social development in Sudan. The historical contribution of women has been widely recognized and documented in the Sudanese literature. The role of women in the recent Sudan Uprising has been widely acknowledged and recognized at the national, regional, and international levels. Many women were interested in leading the revolution to support the downfall of the previous regime. The Sudanese women's role in leading the uprising against the previous regime

contributed to the success of the uprising. The spirit of revolution spread among many of the people in Sudan, including men and women. And women's participation reveals a significant contribution to the leadership of the political and social transformation in Sudan. Women are more motivated and interested to support the protest movement because they suffered from the previous regime, mainly from the lack of proper support for women in all aspects of life. The reasons behind the significant contribution of women in Sudan's uprising can be explained by the fact that they suffered from the long-standing gender gap in education and employment and the inadequate participation of Sudanese women in the political, economic, and social activities in Sudan.<sup>27</sup> In addition, also the large number of victims from the side of the youth motivated women to continue their leading role - to support demonstrations to force the collapse of the previous regime. The important role of women is demonstrated from the extensive contribution of women at different ages and occupation levels to support the protest movement since the end of December 2018. For instance, Sudanese women working in medical fields contributed to the provision of medical services for the protestors; similarly, Sudanese women working in different occupations significantly contributed according to their abilities. On the International Women Day (March 08, 2019), the participation of Sudanese women in the celebrations reveals the strong commitment of women to support the Sudan Uprising and a potential transition for a better future for Sudanese women.

#### **4.3. The significant role of ICT in the Sudan Uprising**

We observe that in view of the fast diffusion of ICT and the increasing utilization of ICT, in particular mobile phone and internet in Sudan during the period 1990-2018 (see Nour 2020), it is not surprising that ICT turns out to be an extremely important instrument for supporting the Sudan Uprising and the potential transformation. The Transitional Military Council (TMC)'s shut down of the Internet to limit the influence of the revolution, although it impeded the contact between the revolutionaries, has also motivated the revolutionaries to continue the revolution to fulfil all the objectives of the revolution. The increasing use of ICT facilitates connection and coordination between the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), the youth, the women, and the Diaspora to support the Sudan Uprising. And, ICT facilitates the arrangements of various revolutionary activities, including protesters' movements and shifts. Without the use of ICT, it would have been impossible to arrange for the various activities and to make the protestors' movement successful for the achievement of the revolution objectives. That implies an outstanding and full utilization of ICT to support the

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<sup>27</sup> See also Nour (2014)

uprising and the potential transformation in Sudan. The use of ICT not only facilitates the connection and coordination between the revolutionaries, but also between the revolutionaries and their families, with the revolutionaries inside Sudan, and with the revolutionaries in the Diaspora to increase their involvement in supporting the revolution.

The high share of the youth in the participation in the revolution implies that the use of ICT is of great benefit for the successful achievement of the revolutionary objectives. In particular, the role of youth in using ICT to support the Sudan Uprising is not surprising in view of the extensive use of ICT by the young population as explained in the Sudanese literature on the subject (see Nour, 2015). For instance, Nour (2015) finds a negative relationship between the use of ICT defined by mobile phones, computers and the Internet (the proportion of individual use of computers at home and outside the home, the Internet, and the Mobile Phone) and age. Nour (2015) finds that the proportion of individuals who used computers at home and outside the home, the Internet, and the mobile phone decreases with the increase of age (see Nour, 2020). Nour (2015) finds that the relative distribution of individuals who used mobile phones, computers at home and outside their home, and the Internet defined by age is higher for the very young population age (15-24), followed by the age groups 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and (75+) respectively. (See Nour, 2020)<sup>28,29, 30, 31, 32</sup>

The role of ICT is demonstrated from the contribution to improve the awareness at national and regional level about the Sudan Uprising through the widespread use of social media hashtags to support in this way and through these means the Sudan Uprising, including for instance the following hashtags: [#IAmSudaneseRevolution](#), [#PrayforSudan](#), [#SudanMassacre](#), and [#BlueForSudan](#). For instance, according to Patrick (2019), people on social media are turning their profile pictures blue to stand in solidarity with Sudan and to bring awareness to the uprising that was sweeping the country. This began after Mohamed Hashim Mattar, 26, was allegedly shot dead by the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) during a crackdown on protesters in the country's capital, Khartoum, on June 3, 2019. Mattar's favourite colour, blue, was used on all his social profiles, and his friends and his family put up this colour on their profiles to honour his death. It soon spread among the social media users

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<sup>28</sup> As indicated by 43.5, 29.2, 14.3, 9, 3.4, 0.5 and 0.1 65 respectively for computers at home.

<sup>29</sup> As reported by 45.1, 31.3, 14.6, 6.8, 1.8, 0.3, and 0.1 respectively for outside home use of computers.

<sup>30</sup> As indicated by 45.7, 30.6, 14.6, 6.7, 2, 0.4, and 0.1 respectively for the Internet.

<sup>31</sup> As reported by 33.5, 24.1, 18.1, 12.9, 6.8, and 3.3, respectively for mobile phones.

<sup>32</sup> See also Nour (2015)

who used the colour not only to honour Mattar but also other martyrs of the Sudan Uprising. Hashtags like #BlueForSudan have gained momentum on social media, with [some world] stars putting up the colour and using the hashtag to bring awareness to the global people about the situation in Sudan.<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, according to the Belam (2019), social media users use the #BlueforSudan hashtag to show solidarity for protesters. The #BlueForSudan hashtag has also been used to raise awareness about the protests in the country. People on social media are turning their profile avatars blue and posting blue-themed artwork in memory of the 26-year-old Mohamed Mattar. The hashtag #blueforSudan has been trending internationally on Twitter as people seek to raise broader awareness of the situation in the country. The colour has been chosen because it was the Instagram avatar of Mattar, an engineering graduate. The internet movement started when Mattar's friends turned their profile pictures the same colour as the avatar on his mattar77 account. The mattar77 Instagram account has inspired the #BlueforSudan hashtag. The #blueforSudan hashtag first started appearing in English on Twitter on 11 June 2019, and by the following day had become a rallying point for Sudanese activists on social media to remember Mattar and to make a broader point about the situation. Many of the people using the hashtag have been posting it alongside a series of blue artworks symbolising the protests in Sudan. The hashtag has become a rallying point for Sudanese nationals outside the country, with users encouraged to share statistics of victims of the government's crackdown alongside the images.<sup>34</sup> The case of Mattar on social media highlights the important role of new media for political change, but the new tools could also be used effectively by governments/military and security forces.

#### **4.4. The significant role of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) in Sudan Uprising**

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) was formed in 2016 as an alliance of professional groups which includes staff from the universities; SPA had a lead role in anti-government protests that started on 19 December 2018.<sup>35</sup> The significant contribution of the

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<sup>33</sup> See Patrick, A. (2019), "why social media is going blue for Sudan" CNN, June 13, 2019: <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/13/africa/sudan-social-media-campaign-intl/index.html>, Accessed February 20, 2020.

<sup>34</sup> See Belam, M. (2019), 'BlueforSudan: social media users show solidarity for protester', The Guardian, June 14, 2019: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/14/blueforsudan-social-media-users-show-solidarity-for-protester>. Accessed: February 20, 2020.

<sup>35</sup> The Sudanese Professionals Association traces its roots to October 2016, when an alliance charter was drafted and approved by three of Sudan's largest professional groups. Namely, the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, the Sudanese Journalists Network, and the Democratic Lawyers Association. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) is a continuation of the long history of Sudanese professionals' persistent attempts to form independent trade unions and bodies to defend their rights and seek to improve their working conditions. Several attempts to form such bodies were made in the past; most notably were the attempts to form a professional alliance in



Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) is demonstrated from their increasing efforts and their involvement to provide well planned guidance for demonstrators to increase the widespread series of mass demonstrations that remained active during and after the period (December 2018-April 2019). SPA provided significant guidance for the mass demonstration that initially started in the city of Atbara in December 2018 and continued to spread in other regions, including the capital in Khartoum. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) is an umbrella association of 17 different Sudanese trade unions. In December 2018, the group called for the introduction of a minimum wage and participated in protests in Atbara against the rising cost of living. The SPA took an increasingly prominent role in the 2018–2019 Sudanese protests which were raised against the government of Omar al-Bashir during 2019. After the 19 December 2018 Atbara protests started, the SPA initially decided to coordinate with the protestors, by adding a call for an increased minimum wage. After discussing with the protestors, they decided to support the calls for "regime change".<sup>36</sup> The Sudanese Professionals Association not only provided continuous guidance for the mass demonstrations on the streets but also provided a well-defined vision for a comprehensive reform and the transition for rebuilding the country after the success of the revolution. This appears from the 'Declaration of Freedom and Change', arranged by the Sudanese Professionals Association in Khartoum on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2019. Through the "Declaration of Freedom and Change" the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) confirmed the continued efforts to support the mass demonstrations and the continued peaceful struggles until the totalitarian regime is removed and the achievement of the three following goals is achieved. Included are the following goals: (1) The immediate and unconditional end of General Omar Al Bashir's presidency and the conclusion of his administration; (2) The formation of a National Transitional Government (this transitional government will be formed of qualified people based on merits of competency and good reputation, representing various Sudanese groups and receiving the consensus of the majority; their role is to govern for a term of four years, until a sound democratic structure is established, and elections are held); and (3) Putting an immediate end to all violations against peaceful protesters, repealing of all laws restricting freedom of speech and expression; and bringing the perpetrators of crimes against the

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2012 and 2014. Both failed to achieve their goal because of the regime's opposition which extended to the persecution and arrest of key founding members. The SPA is currently comprised of many bodies united under an agreed upon charter and common goals. These were announced in June 2018. The following groups are backers of or are officially under the umbrella of the SPA: Teachers' Committee, Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, Democratic Lawyers Association, Sudanese Journalists Network, Association of Democratic Veterinarians, University Professors Association, Sudanese Doctors Syndicate (the legitimate), Committee for the Restoration of the Engineers Syndicate, Central Pharmacists Committee, Sudanese Engineers Association, Sudanese Plastic Artists Association, Association of Animal Production Specialists, Health Officers Association, Central Committee of Medical Laboratories, Professional Pharmacists Assembly, Association of Professional Accountants, Association of Agricultural Engineers. See: <https://www.sudaneseprofessionals.org/en/about-us/>. (Accessed February 20, 2020).

<sup>36</sup> See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese\\_Professionals\\_Association](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_Professionals_Association). (Accessed February 20, 2020).

Sudanese people to fair trials in accordance with accepted national and international laws.<sup>37</sup> Following the 3 June 2019 Khartoum massacre, the SPA called for "complete civil disobedience and open political strike" on the grounds that the Transitional Military Council (TMC) was responsible for two days of mass murder, and for the violent repression of workers' strikes. The SPA called for the Sudanese to follow the method of peaceful nonviolent resistance and to support the transition period following the success of the uprising.<sup>38</sup>

#### **4.5. The important role of the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative (UKTSI) in the Sudan Uprising**

The UKTSI is a group of faculty members at the University of Khartoum founded in December 2018; they have expressed their conscience, but to rise up and support the peaceful popular movement that began in December 2018 in fulfilment of the message that the University of Khartoum has been for decades in the service of the society. In this initiative, they pledge to harness all their knowledge and energy to achieve the noble goal to continue working for the benefit and the service of the society in Sudan.<sup>39</sup> The important role of the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative (UKTSI) is proven by the fact that UKTSI provided an inspiring, well planned, and organized road map from the university elites' perspective to support a comprehensive change and to facilitate a peaceful transition during the critical period of mass demonstrations (December 2018-April 2019). Based on the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative (UKTSI) road map, the University of Khartoum teaching staff was increasingly involved in supporting the demonstrators and uprising. The University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative (UKTSI) not only provided continuous support for the mass demonstrations in the streets but also provided the university elites' perspective and vision for a comprehensive reform and the transition for rebuilding the country after the success of the uprising. This appears from the continued efforts and the increasing contribution through the arrangement of series of more specialized workshops with active participation from academic teaching staff to provide more practical and useful policy recommendations to support solving various problems confronting the transition period following Sudan uprising.

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<sup>37</sup> See: <https://www.sudaneseprofessionals.org/en/declaration-of-freedom-and-change/>. Accessed February 20, 2020.

<sup>38</sup> See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese\\_Professionals\\_Association](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_Professionals_Association). Accessed February 20, 2020.

<sup>39</sup> See: <https://sudannextgen.com/members/u-of-k-teaching-staff-initiative-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B0%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%85/>. Accessed February 20, 2020.

#### **4.6. The significant role of the Diaspora in the Sudan Uprising**

We observe that in view of the increasing number of the Sudanese in Diaspora, it is not surprising that the Diaspora turns out to be an extremely important external factor for supporting the Sudan uprising and the potential transformation of the country. The significant contribution of the Sudanese Diaspora for supporting the Sudan uprising and the potential transformation in Sudan is not surprising in view of the fact that since long the received personal remittances sent by the Sudanese Diaspora continued to be significant contributions to economic and social development in Sudan (see Nour, 2020). The increasing number of the Sudanese Diaspora and the increasing use of ICT facilitate the connection and coordination between the Sudanese Professionals Association, the youth, and the Sudanese Diaspora to facilitate the arrangements of various revolutionary activities, including protesters' movements and shifts. During the Internet shutdown the support of the Diaspora significantly contributed to make the protesters' movement successful for the achievement of the revolutionary objectives. The high impact of the Diaspora is demonstrated from the direct financial support to the revolution as well as the direct support in the form of participation in the process of creating increasing awareness at the international level about the importance of supporting the Sudan Uprising. For instance, the Sudanese Diaspora in the United States and the Sudanese Doctors in United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Gulf countries coordinated various initiatives for the collection and provision of direct financial support to encourage the Sudan Uprising. In addition to other initiatives for the provision of indirect and non-monetary support, there were also specific actions taken. For instance, the Sudanese Diaspora in Saudi Arabia coordinated an initiative for facilitating the provision of access to electricity services during the shortage of the supply of electricity services; this was done effectively during the critical time of civil disobedience during the Sudan uprising.

Therefore, our results in this section corroborate the second hypothesis that the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association/SPA, and the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative/UKTSI) and the external factors (the Diaspora) contributed to support the Sudan Uprising and the potential transformation in the Sudan.

## **5. Potential Challenges and Opportunities for the Transition Period following the Sudan Uprising**

This section discusses the major challenges and potential opportunities for the transition period following the Sudan Uprising. We investigate the third hypothesis concerning the potential opportunities and major challenges confronting the transition period in Sudan following the Sudan Uprising.

### **5.1. Major challenges for the transition period following the Sudan Uprising**

From an economic perspective, the major challenge confronting the transitional period in Sudan is the intensification of the economic crisis that was the major cause of the Sudan Uprising as explained in section 3 above. Even after the overthrow of the previous regime the deterioration in economic conditions continued to put increasing pressure on the transitional period. In particular, over the past months the continuous deterioration in economic indicators, including the large devaluation and the rising inflation rates (see Nour, 2020), rising costs of living, and scarcity and shortage of basic goods put increasing pressure on both the people and the transitional government in Sudan. This challenge also includes the rising poverty and vulnerability conditions among the people. The Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2019) proposed the road map and recommended the implementation of several policies to deal with the economic crisis and to reform the Sudan economy. For instance, the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2019) recommended the removal of subsidies, based on the argument that the removal of subsidies is expected to support the economic reform by decreasing the pressure on the government budget. The Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2019) simultaneously also recommended to strengthen social protection policies to support the poor through the provision of direct financial allowances for the poor to help them to overcome the expected negative impacts of increasing prices of basic goods as a result of the removal of subsidies. In our view, while the implementation of the removal of subsidization policies is essential for supporting the economic reform, the implementation of social protection policies most probably will be impeded by the widely predominant informal employment conditions in non-agricultural sectors (that constitutes 77.3% of total employment in non-agricultural sectors).

This implies that the implementation of the planned social protection measures to protect the poor from the negative impacts of the removal of subsidies on basic goods will be impeded by

the difficulty of processing the benefits from the direct financial support for the large majority of poor people who are involved in informal employment in non-agricultural sectors. From an economic perspective, the economic reform policies are also largely impeded by the shortage and limitation of the financial resources for the transitional government to cover the priorities in government spending and to implement the economic reform policies. It will also be difficult to reduce military spending and to increase spending on health, education, science, technology, and innovation. From an economic perspective, the reform of economic structure is also largely impeded by the lack of explicit long run, sound and systematically designed strategies for the transition from the current dominance of the rent-seeking economic structure to a knowledge-based economy.

From political and institutional perspectives, other challenges confronting the transitional period in Sudan are the achievement of comprehensive institutional reforms, ending corruption, establishing political stability, ensuring sound and sustainable democratic civil institutions, and ensuring political and civil freedom to fulfil one of the key objectives of the uprising, to ensure freedom for all people in Sudan. Another challenge confronting the transitional period in Sudan is the achievement of sustainable peace to help ending of the root causes and the negative consequences of previous conflicts and fragile conditions over the past years and also to achieve one of the other key objectives of the uprising to ensure sustainable peace for all people in Sudan. Another challenge confronting the transitional period is ensuring the separation of the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. A further challenge confronting the transitional period is the problem created by the beneficiary groups from the previous regime that not only are rejecting the change but are also using their resources to hinder proposed economic, political, and institutional reforms.

From social, human and sustainable development perspective, other challenges confronting the transitional period in Sudan are the improvements in social indicators such as ending poverty and ending inequality to help achieve the SDGs indicators and to achieve inclusive growth and sustainable, equitable and balanced development. The major challenge facing Sudan's progress towards the SDGs is to end poverty and to end gender, rural-urban, and regional inequalities in various development contexts. Ending inequalities in income distribution and in social and human development will help to achieve one of the major objectives of the uprising to ensure justice and equality for all people in Sudan.

From a social justice perspective, another challenge confronting the transitional period in Sudan is related to ensuring independent judicial authorities to ensure full accountability and to ensure the achievement of justice for all the victims who are affected by violations of human rights during the previous regime (1989-2019), but also for all the victims during the uprising and even after the creation of the transitional period (December 2018 – August 2019). Particularly, the priority for the achievement of justice for the Sudanese martyrs of the massacre at the Army headquarters - 29 Ramadan (June 03, 2019) needs to be restated. That also helps to achieve one of the further key objectives of the uprising - to ensure justice for all people in Sudan.

## **5.2. The major potential opportunities for the transition period following the Sudan Uprising**

From an economic perspective, the transition period provides an opportunity for the implementation of sound, coherent and comprehensive economic reform policies to end the economic crisis that was the major cause of the Sudan uprising as explained in section 3 above. This includes for instance, provision of incentives for enhancing productivity of agricultural and industrial (mainly manufacturing) sectors, and for enhancing agricultural-based industries such as sugar industries and food industries, but also of textile industries and leather industries. Encouraging the utilisation of agricultural resources for enhancing agricultural productivity and ensuring food security in Sudan is a top priority. Measures are needed to counteract devaluation, to fight inflation, to balance the budget deficit (by increasing revenues and by reducing expenditures), to balance the trade deficit (by promoting exports and by reducing imports), to control the money supply, to improve the availability of basic goods for all people in Sudan, and to remove the subsidies along with ensuring increasing social protection for all poor people in Sudan. As all these measures are interdependent, a holistic and long-term approach is needed.

Another potential opportunity is related to reducing government expenditure and enhancing a rational allocation of government spending by reducing military expenditure and by increasing expenditure to improve health and education services and to invest in social development to reduce poverty and vulnerability in Sudan. The transition period provides an opportunity for enhancing the efficiency of the labour market by supporting the creation of employment opportunities to reduce unemployment rates and particularly, of youth unemployment rates, and by enhancing employment in the formal sector and reducing

employment in the informal sector. The transition period provides also for an opportunity to reform the economic structure by supporting explicit long run, sound and systematically designed strategies to ensure managing the transition from the current dominance of the rent-seeking economic structure to a knowledge-based economy. A knowledge-based economy is reliant on factors such as knowledge, science, technology, research and development (R&D), innovation and skills.<sup>40</sup> And, the transition period provides for an opportunity to build a sound and resilient infrastructure and to reform the large public sector schemes, such as the Gezira scheme in the Aljazera state.

From political and institutional perspectives, the transition period provides an opportunity for the achievement of political stability, institutional reform, building sound and sustainable civil democratic institutions, and for ending corruption. Another potential opportunity is the achievement of sustainable peace and ending of the root causes and negative consequences of previous conflicts and fragile conditions which have persisted over the past years in Sudan. From social, human, and sustainable development perspectives, the transition period provides an opportunity for the improvement of social indicators, such as ending poverty and inequality, achieving inclusive growth, equitable, balanced, and sustainable development, and realizing the SDGs in Sudan. In view of the high poverty rate and the massive extent of inequality, the potential opportunity is that ending poverty and ending inequality will support the progress towards the achievement of SDGs and of an inclusive and sustainable development process in Sudan. Moreover, from a gender perspective, the transition period provides an opportunity for women empowerment and for mobilizing a significant support for women in all political, social, and economic spheres.

From a youth perspective, the transition period provides an opportunity for enhancing involvement of the youth to support the transition period in Sudan. In view of the fact that the demographic structure implies a high share of youth (population age group 0-24) that contributes 61.2% of total population in Sudan, and given the effective participation and substantial contribution of the youth in the Sudan Uprising, the involvement of youth will greatly support comprehensive economic, political, social, and institutional changes during the transition period in Sudan. The transition period provides an opportunity for supporting small size entrepreneurship projects and the creation of additional employment opportunities for the youth that will contribute to support an effective utilisation of youth' capacities. Such

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<sup>40</sup> See Nour (2011, 2012, 2013)

measures will reduce unemployment among the youth and will increase the involvement of the youth in building Sudan. This expectation is based on the argument that during the past years young volunteers provided highly significant and well-coordinated contributions to support the voluntary organization ‘Shari Alhawadith’ which was supported by companies and individuals. The young volunteers, including young volunteer doctors and pharmacists, well-coordinated the provision of medicine, of emergency medical needs, and of medication provided for free to those who need it among the marginalized and poor people in Sudan.

From a higher education institutions’ perspective, the transition period provides an opportunity for enhancing the involvement of higher education institutions and of university elites to support the transition process in Sudan. For instance, the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative (UKTSI) was founded in December 2018 and provides a model for the positive contribution of the universities’ teaching staff and of the university elites to support the transition period in Sudan. According to the UKTSI Report (2019), the contribution of UKTSI appears from the arrangement of a series of more specialized workshops with an active participation from the academic teaching staff to reflect the university elites’ perspective and vision to provide more practical and useful policy recommendations to support comprehensive reforms and solutions of the various problems confronting the transition process in Sudan. The activities are including, for instance, workshops on economic reform, infrastructure services, a road map for reforming local governance and the federal state, reforms of the health sector, reforms of the education sector, and reforms of the energy and mining sectors in Sudan.<sup>41</sup>

From the Diaspora perspective, the transition period provides an opportunity for enhancing the involvement of the Diaspora to support the transition period in Sudan. For instance, the Diaspora initiative ‘Dollar Alkaram’ aims to provide significant financial contributions to support the rebuilding of Sudan during the transition period. This significant initiative from the Diaspora is not surprising because since long the personal remittances sent by the Sudanese Diaspora continued with significant contributions to economic and social development projects in Sudan (see Nour 2020). Further evidence of the involvement of the Diaspora appears from the contribution of the Diaspora initiative ‘Sudan Nextgen’, which is composed of Sudanese Diaspora experts, organizations, and communities being ready to

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<sup>41</sup> See University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative (UKTSI) Report (2019), University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative – Department of Planning and Programme Report (August 2019), pp. 1-97, Khartoum, Sudan, 2019.



transform Sudan, by moving Sudan to the next level. The Sudan Nextgen vision is to transform and to leapfrog Sudan in pursuit of being one of the leading countries and economies in Africa, making Sudan a thriving African economy with educated, engaged citizens, and making a positive impact on the world.<sup>42</sup>

During the transitional period Sudan Nextgen will focus on ten priority areas, including: aiming at sustainable peace, stabilizing the economy, fighting corruption, promoting law and justice, increasing women representation, reforming institutions, improving foreign policy, social development, youth employment, and revising the constitution and the system of elections (source: Atlantic Council Meeting, December 05, 2019<sup>43</sup>). To achieve the Sudan Nextgen vision Sudan Nextgen will focus on these overarching objectives during the transitional period, including: fulfilling the covenant of martyrs and for the sacrifices of the Sudanese people, celebrate diversity and pluralism, respect and promote dignity and human rights, reach out for comprehensive participation and shared social responsibility. justice and equality, ensure transparency and financial and managerial accountability, establish and respect the principle of the rule of law, dialogue, solidarity, cooperation and communication, commitment, professionalism and credibility, promote peace and forgiveness, promote national interest, optimism and a positive spirit, and support innovation and creativity.<sup>44</sup>

From the professional perspective, the transition period provides an opportunity for enhancing the involvement of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) to support the transition period. In view of the important contribution of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) to support Sudan Uprising, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) is expected to continue its leading role to enhance the contribution of various professional groups to continue supporting the comprehensive reform during the transition period following the Sudan Uprising.

Finally, from the other perspectives, the transition period provides an opportunity for enhancing the involvement of the civil society to support the transition period. In view of the important contribution of the civil society to support the Sudan Uprising, the civil society is expected to continue its leading role to support the transition period following Sudan

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<sup>42</sup> See: <https://sudannextgen.com/members/u-of-k-teaching-staff-initiative-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B0%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%85/>. Accessed February 20, 2020.

<sup>43</sup> See: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/prime-minister-promises-sudan-will-never-be-the-same-again/>

<sup>44</sup> See Sudan Nextgen Urban Development Projects: Expert and citizen teams advising the government, Accessed February 20, 2020.

Uprising. The transition period also provides an opportunity for enhancing the involvement of the private sector and enhancing public-private sector partnerships to share the responsibilities to rebuild Sudan and to support the transition period following the Sudan Uprising. The transition period provides an opportunity for the involvement of the international community to support the transition period following the Sudan Uprising.

Therefore, our findings in this section support the third hypothesis concerning the potential opportunities and major challenges confronting the transition period in Sudan following the Sudan Uprising.

## **6. Conclusions**

This paper provides an overview of the Sudan Uprising and discusses the major causes and factors that contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising and highlight the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. We improve the understanding, we fill the gaps in the literature, and we provide an extremely valuable contribution to the literature by presenting a new and more comprehensive analysis and investigation of the factors that caused and those that contributed to the success of the Sudan Uprising. We also look at the potential opportunities and the major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. A novel element in our analysis is that we investigate the various causes, including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom that caused the Sudan Uprising. We examine the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative) and the external factors (especially the Diaspora) that contributed to supporting the Sudan Uprising. We also explain the potential opportunities and the major challenges following the Sudan Uprising.

From a policy perspective, the relevance of our analysis is that we explain the causes of the Sudan Uprising, the internal and external factors that supported the Sudan Uprising, and the potential opportunities and major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. Section 1 presents the introduction. Section 2 shows the general political context and the socio-economic characteristics of Sudan. Section 3 investigates the major causes, including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom that caused the Sudan uprising. Our findings in Section 3

support the first hypothesis that a combination of mixed factors and causes, including economic causes, social and human development causes, political causes, institutional causes, and the causes related to the lack of freedom led to the Sudan Uprising. We explain that from an economic perspective, the economic causes, including for instance the intensification of the economic crisis, the prevailing economic structure, the economic mismanagement, and the deterioration of all economic indicators have contributed to the Sudan Uprising. The deterioration of the economic indicators is given evidence by factors such as: major currency devaluations; high inflation rates; rising costs of basic goods; implementation of harsh austerity measures to end subsidies to wheat and fuel; banks' limitation on money withdrawals; shortage of hard currencies; increasing deficiencies of the labour market; deficiencies of fiscal, monetary, and trade policies and regulation, etc. Also, other economic issues have contributed as the major economic causes of the Sudan Uprising.

We find that the social and human development causes include the weak social and human development situation that leads to increasing vulnerabilities; these appear from several indicators, including the widespread poverty and inequality and the weak performance reflected in the Human Development Index (HDI). We find that the political causes include political instability, the lack of democratic institutions, and the predominance of undemocratic institutions in Sudan. We explain that the institutional causes include the widespread corruption, the financial mismanagement, and the lack of political integrity in Sudan. We explain that over the past years Sudan suffered not only from the deterioration of economic indicators, economic and financial mismanagement, high corruption, and widespread inequalities, but also suffered from the lack of economic, political, and civil freedom. For instance, the lack of freedom is demonstrated from the rankings of Sudan and from comparisons showing the weak performance of Sudan in relation to world countries in terms of various indexes of freedom, including the index of economic freedom, the political rights index, the civil liberties index, and the press freedom index. We observe that the lack of peace, freedom, and justice led to great frustration that motivated the mass street demonstrations and the Sudan Uprising that called for the achievement of peace, freedom, and justice for all people in Sudan (December 2018 - April 2019).

Section 4 discusses the internal and external factors that contributed to the uprising in Sudan, including the role of youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association, the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative, and the Diaspora. Our results in Section 4

corroborate the second hypothesis that the dynamic interaction between the internal factors (youth, women, ICT, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and the University of Khartoum Teaching Staff Initiative) and the external factors (the Diaspora) contributed to support the Sudan Uprising and the potential transformation in Sudan. Section 5 explains the potential opportunities and the major challenges confronting the transition period following the Sudan Uprising from various economic, social, human development, political, institutional, and sustainable development perspectives. We explain that from an economic perspective our results in Section 5 support the third hypothesis concerning the potential opportunities and the major challenges following the Sudan Uprising. One major policy implication from our findings is that the lack of peace, freedom, and justice motivated the mass street demonstrations and the Sudan Uprising that called for the achievement of peace, freedom, and justice for all people in Sudan. Another major policy implication from our findings is that it is important for policy-makers in Sudan to adopt sound, effective and coherent policies to consider the potential opportunities and the challenges to achieve the comprehensive economic, social, political, and institutional reforms, to achieve the potential transformation process, to fulfil the objectives of the Sudan Uprising (peace, freedom, and justice), and ultimately to realise inclusive growth and sustainable development in Sudan.

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- Nr. 2 Handwerk im Sudan - Technische und Sozioökonomische Aspekte. (Non-factory Small Industry In Sudan: Technical and Socio-economic Aspects). By: Peter Oesterdiekhoff, University of Bremen. December 1984
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