Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft 08

State classes, opposition, democratization: On the outcomes and prospects of cross-class mobilization in (former) bureaucratic development societies

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Gutachter

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Abstract

This dissertation asks what outcomes cross-class coalitions in Africa in the last and current decade have produced so far. Cross-class coalitions formulate broad and substantive demands for social change. The thesis therefore also asks under what conditions these coalitions can actually realize the broad and substantive demands that they formulate. To formulate an answer to these two key questions, the thesis qualitatively studies such cross-class coalitions in-depth in Uganda, compares the trajectories of cross-class coalitions in Burkina Faso and Taiwan, and looks at economic programs in Tanzania. Building on earlier literature but going beyond those works, I argue that pushing through broad demands and ultimately replacing the remnants of the state class (democratization in the real sense) requires durable cross-class coalitions. The durability of such coalitions rests to a significant degree on the empowerment of the lower classes. Empowerment of the lower classes is a result of successful economic development programs that foster mass incomes and consequently mass demand. I hypothesize that there are basically two ways of how this empowerment can be brought about. First, the remnants of state classes in such former bureaucratic development societies have the option to pursue economic programs that empower the lower classes. The pursuit of such a program disempowers the remnants of the state classes but allows them to potentially survive in the form of a polticial party and participate in the democratic game. Second, cross-class coalitions can try to pursue such a program themselves but are in a far weaker position to do so. Apart from contributing to reestablishing a class-analytical approach in Africanist political science and further developing the state class theory, there are real practical implications of this research for development cooperation. The empowerment of the lower classes and hence supporting cross-class coalitions in their quest to fundamentally change the status quo requires a holistic macro approach focusing on increasing mass incomes. The thesis uses ethnographic data, interviews, and newspaper articles gathered during two field trips to Uganda in 2020 and 2022 as well as other primary and secondary literature on Burkina Faso, Taiwan, and Tanzania to illustrate this argument.

Meinen Eltern

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Figures and Tables

Eigenständigkeitserklärung [Statement of Authorship]

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unerlaubte Hilfe selbstständig angefertigt und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen- und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Die den benutzen Werken wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen habe ich als solche kenntlich gemacht. Einer Überprüfung der Dissertation mit qualifizierter Software im Rahmen der Untersuchung von Plagiatsvorwürfen stimme ich zu.

Bremen, den 4. Oktober 2022

Ort und Datum Unterschrift

Angaben über Mitverfasser [Statement of own contribution to co-authored article]

Die kumulative Dissertation enthält den Artikel 4 “The prospects of cross-class alliances in former bureaucratic development societies: comparing Taiwan and Burkina Faso”, der in Zusammenarbeit mit Jannis Saalfeld, wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden in Duisburg und Promotionsstudent an der Universität Duisburg-Essen, entstanden ist.

Der Artikel hat eine Gesamtlänge von ca. 8.500 Wörtern. Die theoretischen und methodischen Abschnitte des Beitrags wurden gemeinsam konzipiert und formuliert. Insgesamt hat der Zweitautor Jannis Saalfeld im Umfang von 15 Prozent – bezogen auf die Wortzahl des Manuskripts – zu diesem Artikel beigetragen.

Bremen, den 4. Oktober 2022

Ort und Datum Unterschrift

Erklärung des Betreuers:

Hiermit bestätige ich die o.g. Angaben des Doktoranden.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Prof. Dr. Klaus Schlichte

List of articles

Articles 1 and 4 have been published in *Africa Spectrum* and *Third World Quarterly* respectively. Preprints of articles 2, 3 and 5 are currently under review with journals (3 and 5) or have recently been submitted for peer review (2).

1. Friesinger, Julian. 2021. "Patronage, Repression, and Co-Optation: Bobi Wine and the Political Economy of Activist Musicians in Uganda." *Africa Spectrum* 56(2): 127-150. DOI: 10.1177/00020397211025986.

2. Friesinger, Julian. 2021. "Repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc: a politico-economic and sociological perspective on authoritarian durability in Uganda." Preprint, submitted to *International Political Sociology*).

3. Friesinger, Julian. 2021. "The state class and the politics of oil in Uganda." Preprint (currently under review for an edited volume by Hannes Warnecke-Berger and Jan Ickler).

4. Friesinger, Julian and Jannis Saalfeld. 2022. "The prospects of cross-class alliances in former bureaucratic development societies: comparing Taiwan and Burkina Faso." *Third World Quarterly* 43(1): 187-205. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2021.1999225.

5. Friesinger, Julian. 2022. "Are power centralization and inequality necessary for development? A critique of Mushtaq Khan's political settlements framework with special reference to Tanzania." Preprint (currently under review with *Journal of Agrarian Change*, submitted 22 February 2022).

Part 1:

State classes, opposition, democratization: the prospects of cross-class mobilization in (former) bureaucratic development societies in Uganda, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Taiwan

1. Introduction

1.1. The divergence of vision and reality in Uganda's People Power movement

"We know that we have nothing to lose apart from a useless life. We know that we are millions and millions of young professionals, doctors, lawyers, teachers who can't make sense out of life." This was Bobi Wine's response to the question as to how he planned to turn the claimed desire for change in Uganda into real political change. This had been a challenge, as the journalist pointed out, since the current President Yoweri Museveni didn't seem to be willing to leave power (Aljazeera 2019, minutes 9.28–10.02). Bobi Wine, the Ugandan musician-cum-politician and leader of the People Power movement quickly became one of Yoweri Museveni's most outspoken critics and most serious oppositional challengers since his by-election to parliament as an independent candidate in 2017. During the interview, Wine went on to outline how he intended to mobilize other parts of the population for his movement apart from such traditional middle-class-professionals to foster change. "We know that we are together with groups, hundreds of thousands of elders, who are continuously embarrassed by the way things are going, you know. We know that even the young people in the armed forces, young people in the police and civil service, all desire change." (ibid.). Wine claimed to speak for the oppressed and to lead the uprising against – in his words – the oppressor, Museveni (ibid.).

After his election to parliament, Wine, whose legal name is Robert Kyagulanyi, had organized protests against the lifting of presidential term-limits. Despite these protests, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, and his party the National Resistance Movement (NRM) pushed through the lifting of the constitutional term-limits. This allowed Museveni to seek re-election in the 2021 presidential elections. Wine eventually decided to run against Museveni in the presidential elections in 2021. However, running against the incumbent Museveni, a former rebel leader with a repressive apparatus at his disposal, also meant potential challenges to mobilization. Wine however seemed adamant. "Much as our president has the guns, much as they have the ferocious forces, we have the dreams that we hold together and nothing can stop us from achieving what we wanna achieve," responded Wine (Aljazeera 2019, minutes 7.29-7.41).

Already in this interview, one key structural constraint of Wine's movement is mentioned, namely repression. However, this is not the only constraint. Co-optation and patronage are two further obstacles that movements face during mobilization. Consider the following perspective. Lewis Rubongoya, the Executive Secretary of Wine's People Power movement and later the General Secretary of the National Unity Platform pointed to the co-optation problem during our interview in 2020.[1]

> But if you've been noticing right now, some of our coordinators have been bribed, given money, by the state and that kind of thing. So that's why we work […] with known coordinators and coordinators that are not known. So, we work with a covert structure and an overt structure. So, where you go, you'll find Boda Boda riders or charcoal sellers who are coordinators in the different places, but then you also have official coordinators who are politicians. [2]

He further reflected on the possibility of turning the movement into a political party to challenge Yoweri Museveni in the general elections in 2020.

> [T]he other reason of why we did not become a political party is because Museveni, he knows how to deal with organized groups. He's used to deal with organized groups of people and one of the things… at some point we appointed coordinators and the day we appointed coordinators, he started reaching out to them immediately.[3]

However, the former Executive Secretary also reflected on what could eventually happen if the government seeks to continuously use the conflict diffusion tools of co-optation, patronage, and repression to undermine its oppositional challengers.

> Look at Sudan, look at Burkina Faso, all these places where dictators insist on keeping power. I mean, we are at a tipping point in this country. If Museveni does not hand over power peacefully, you can be sure that there will be violence at some point, because you cannot rule over people forever.[4]

Did Bobi Wine, his movement and later party achieve what they wanted to achieve? Despite the constraints of patronage, co-optation, and repression mentioned in the extracts, Wine's movement was later converted into a political party, the National Unity Platform (NUP). The party participated in the 2021 general elections. NUP became the largest opposition party in Uganda's 12th parliament.

[1] I leave aside here what role international actors play. I return to this later in the theoretical section.
[2] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, Executive Secretary of People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala, 27 January 2020.
Explanatory notes: Boda Boda rider is a term commonly used for motorcycle taxi drivers which are ubiquitous in Kampala.
[3] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, Executive Secretary of People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala, 27 January 2020.
[4] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, Executive Secretary of People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala, 27 January 2020.

However, Wine came in only second in the presidential elections (Friesinger 2021, S. 128). Essentially, Wine fell short of replacing long-term ruler Yoweri Museveni to bring about social change, but transformed his movement into a party with respectable electoral gains.

This dissertation takes the case of Uganda as a point of departure to investigate what movements or better cross-class coalitions[5] pushing for change in the current phase of mobilization in Africa actually achieve. On a general level, this question has so far not been adequately addressed in the existing literature on movements and cross class coalitions in Africa.[6] The key question of this dissertation is: what are the outcomes of such cross-class coalitions? Related to this main question are further questions. Under what conditions can such movements enforce the social change that they are interested in? What are the ideal conditions under which cross class conditions can do so? What happens to such coalitions under sub-optimal conditions? If these ideal conditions do exist, how can they be brought about?

What do I mean by outcomes? In this dissertation, I am not interested in movements pursuing small and limited policy changes. [7] Instead, I focus on settings where cross-class coalitions mobilize to overturn stalled political and economic progress. As will become more evident later on, the protagonists of this mobilization are cross-class coalitions. The quotes above illustrate that current class coalitions set out broad goals that essentially seek social change, even if these goals might appear diffuse in heightened protest activity. Social change essentially means replacing current powerholders and finding solutions to the economic plight of the countries in which these movements try to mobilize. The possible outcomes of the mobilizational efforts vary from replacing the state class[8] with the interest bodies of

[5] I explain in the following sub-section why I use cross-class coalition instead of movement.
[6] This will be shown in Chapter 2 on the state oft he art of the literature.
[7] I am therefore not interested in an approach grounded on the micro-level, proposed for example by Amenta et al. (2019) and Amenta et al. (2010) who look at the outcomes of movements in the USA and what reforms these movements were able to enforce. Arguably, these movements have a different character in the sense that they try to achieve fundamentally different goals.
[8] The term state class and the state class theory will be introduced in detail in the theoretical section of this dissertation.

the cross-class coalitions to a prolonged rule of the remnants of the state class and the further existence of the status quo.

Before I turn to the central lacunae, the approach and argument of this dissertation, it is also important to explain why I prefer the term class coalition instead of movement. In the extract above, Wine partly alluded to the class character of the movement when he spoke of the middle-class-professionals he seeks to mobilize. Also, the recent literature on protests in Africa, especially Mueller (2018) but also Branch und Mampilly (2015), re-establishes a class approach. Although the field of movement studies actually had an built-in class focus by looking at old movements, that is labor movements and subsequently at the new mainly post-materialist middle-class movements, in many current studies this perspective is absent (Haunss und Zajak 2019; Rucht 2017). For analytical purposes, in this thesis I speak of class coalitions and alliances of individuals within one class instead of movements and actors. Although I will elaborate on this matter more extensively later, I choose the class concept since it shows more clearly what groups of society mobilize and around which interests – analytical dimensions that movements (emphasizing the network character) and actors do not offer. I also argue that it is meaningful to grasp those coalitions as oppositional challengers already before they turn into organized and formalized parties. Coalitions lobbying for change become part of the political arena once they oppose a government. On the one hand these cross-class coalitions might quickly fray (non-durable coalitions), on the other hand they could alternatively also turn into formalized interest bodies, such as parties, and as opposition even become viable challengers to the state class (durable coalitions).[9] There are several trajectories of transformations of those coalitions, from fraying and choosing to support existing political parties, turning into parties but losing the mobilizational steam, or turning into parties and replacing the state class.

[9] Certainly, cross-class coalitions can also produce less tangible outcomes such as making citizens more confident to oppose, in their view, illegitimate governments. While research programs that look at these aspects have some merit, I believe that given the tangible and real problems in much of the societies in which these coalitions emerge serious attention should be paid to the question of why such coalitions fail. Not least, participants of such coalitions would like to see their demands met otherwise there would not be any mobilization.

1.2. Significance of the research question, approach of the thesis, and argument

Why is the question of outcomes an important question? First, attention to movements and alliances in Africa has in general been very limited. There is a dearth of literature on movements and coalitions in Africa compared to other continents, as scholars such as Brandes und Engels (2011) or Andreas Eckert (2017) assert. The merit of these works is to bring back the question of the goals, organizational setup, and outcomes of movements.

Second, the merit of existing approaches is that they have shown that movements and more specifically cross-class coalitions do exist and mobilize for change, as recently published and important works by Lisa Mueller (2018) and Branch and Mampilly (2015) exemplify. Another further crucial merit of this literature is that it has also shown that these coalitions use frames, depend on resources, and make use of political opportune moments to push for change, as Engels and Müller (2019) showed. Others, such as Branch und Mampilly (2015) study the "evolving political imaginations forged by the divergent forces involved in African protests." (Branch und Mampilly 2015, S. 22) and focus more on the cultural-psychological effects of such protests on the movements themselves. This approach is commendable as it has shown that mobilization can potentially have powerful effects on protesters' immagination highlighting that real change could be possible. However, this literature, rooted in the classical approaches of Social Movement Theory (SMT), did not show the actual effect of the mobilization of these coalitions. The question as to what effects this mobilization produces is relevant because, as in previous waves or phases of social movements or cross-class coalitions, broad goals with the declared aim of social and later political change were set. Current cross-class coalitions also formulate these broad goals by interweaving key political and economic demands for transformation, not only in Uganda (Friesinger 2021), Burkina Faso (Friesinger und Saalfeld 2022), and Senegal (Mueller 2018, S. 113), but also for example in Sudan (Friesinger und Schwarz 2020). Generally, following the classification of phases of movements (Larmer 2015) or protest waves (Mueller 2018; Branch und Mampilly 2015), the current third protest wave can be grasped as a dissatisfaction with the reforms of liberalization in the 1990s. This economic and political liberalization did not bring about a transformation of one-party states into democratic systems in the

real sense of the word. By this, I mean political alternance through strong and self-confident interest bodies that are not part of patronage networks because the working class is empowered and the middle class has a viable partner to challenge the status quo. Liberalization also did not bring a transformation of rent-based economies towards capitalism. While previous protest waves or earlier phases of movements ushered in independence movements in the 1960s and later led to the (re-)introduction of multipartyism in the 1990s, the question as to where the current protest wave is headed and what the outcomes of this heightened activity are is pertinent.

Third, besides the relevance for social science there is a real policy implication of the research question. Development cooperation could make a powerful argument to support such coalitions if they are able to push for social change. For example, Lisa Mueller's (2018) book studies the recent heightened protest activity in Africa and seeks to explain the timing and coalitional character of these protests. Although Mueller does not touch explicitly on the question of outcomes, the book nevertheless generally grasps protests as a potential transformative force. This view is not only expressed in her call for more support by the donor community for these protest coalitions (2018, S. 198–201). In other words, should practitioners work with the given settings in which movements operate and mainly expand the resource base of those movements, as Mueller's research implies? In order to know whether they are a transformative force, the outcomes of these coalitions and the conditions under which they are acting as a transformative force have to be studied. If they are indeed transformative, then bringing about the ideal conditions that make movements an important transformative force could also be supported in other settings by development cooperation.

The argument of this dissertation is as follows. I advance a political economy perspective on cross-class coalitions in sub-Saharan Africa. Different constellations of cross-class coalitions do exist. There are durable and non-durable cross-class coalitions. These coalitions are subject to patronage, co-optation, and repression and are prone to fray in contexts where rent is still the dominant surplus as co-optation and patronage are itself a systemic feature of such (former) bureaucratic development societies. Nevertheless, these coalitions can prepare for mobilization

pushing for social change, but have to make a concrete program, a master plan, out of their broad demands in case heightened mobilization leads to a moment where governments are toppled. However, given these structural constraints – patronage, co-optation, and repression – and the issues with preparing such a master plan, it is more likely that the remnants of the state class implement a program. This program would ideally lead to an empowerment of the working class making the subsequent replacement of the state class with interest bodies of such coalitions possible. This however requires learning and developing insights, for example in the case of Uganda, or re-orientation in cases, e.g., Tanzania, where the state class because of their socialist past, have historically been more open to approaches that foster mass income policies. While the developmental success stories of such states as Japan or smaller states as Taiwan and South Korea may seem like ancient and distant history to my generation (but not to the remnants of the state classes), at least the case of China, however incomplete its transition to a fully capitalist system and even less so democratic system, is instructive and cannot be brushed aside.

This cumulative PhD thesis qualitatively studies cross-class coalitions and contributes to a better understanding of the impacts of cross-class coalitions in the current third protest phase. The empirical focus is sub-Saharan Africa. I do so by focusing mainly on the case of Uganda. Highlighting the effects of these movements and showing their limitations is the key task of the three articles on Uganda. I select Uganda for an in-depth case study to analyze the structural constraints and the effects these have on movements in a more detailed and empirical way. The thesis uses data sampled with ethnographic methods during two fieldtrips to Uganda in 2020 and 2022. It also makes use of interviews and newspaper articles as further primary sources. Further, I also select Burkina Faso and Taiwan for a diverse case comparison to highlight divergent trajectories of movements. Therefore, in article four on Burkina Faso and Taiwan, together with my co-author Jannis Saalfeld, I draw conclusions from class-coalitional trajectories in these two countries and also touch very briefly on Senegal and South Korea. Finally, in article five I select Tanzania as a further in-depth case study to show what the implications of the findings from the class-coalitional trajectories in the above-mentioned countries are for current developmental regimes.

I combine approaches from area studies, comparative politics, and political economy but also addressing the question of the international dimension of these coalitions. My theoretical approach draws on a macro approach called state class theory and bureaucratic development societies, originally developed by Hartmut Elsenhans (1981). The thesis tries to better empirically illuminate the question of the outcomes of such coalitions under certain structural constraints. Hence, I contextualize those coalitions and study their role within the bureaucratic development societies and their relation to the state class. I aim to innovate on the question of the feasibility of achieving those all-encompassing goals of class coalitions, touching on the trajectory of post-colonial African states, the key role the state class plays herein, and the admittedly somewhat weaker role of movement, and of course the general course of development.

This introductory chapter to the cumulative dissertation is divided into six sections. In the subsequent section, I review the key works on movements in Africa to which this thesis speaks and highlight the research gap in the existing literature. In section three, I turn to the theoretical part of this thesis. Here, I first introduce the state class theory and how this relates to the opposition and democratization and then develop my argument in detail. In section four, I present the logic for the case selection, methods, data sampling, collection, and analysis. The last section provides an overview of the articles and shows how these are related. Part 2 contains all the articles referred to and listed above.

2. Protests, movements, and class coalitions: the neglected question of outcomes

In this chapter, I discuss key works on movements and cross-class coalitions in Africa. The central lacunae of the existing works are that they are unclear about the concrete effects the protests staged by such coalitions actually have. Some authors clearly state that the outcomes are very limited but could nevertheless have psycholigical effects by showing protesters that protests are possible and hence real change is also potentially possible. Other scholars see such protests in a more positive light and emphasize the potential gradual effects protests can have on introducing political

reforms. However, the general question as to what outcomes these cross-class coalitions actually produce remains a very important questin. A sub-question that emerges from this literature is what influence structural constraints actually have on cross-class coalitions. The existence of patronage and co-optation points to the relevance of economic factors. There are competing literatures. One stream of the literature acknowledges the significance of economic resources. Another sees these as less important than immaterial resources. In this section, I delve into the main question about the outcomes of such coalitions. Before that, in the upcoming sub-section, I first review key works on the movement periods and protest waves.

2.1. Movement periods and protest waves

One central question in the literature on cross-class coalitions is as to what coalitions existed in different periods of time. Connected to this characterization of coalitions is the question as to what goals these coalitions sought to achieve. This periodization seems important and is commendable to understand the shifting character of such coalitions and the historic context in which they emerged. A further merit of this literature is that it re-establishes a class-analytical approach in the study of African politics. First, I discuss crucial works in the literature on cross-class coalitions in Africa and then towards the end of this sub-section turn to a still existing lacuna of this research program.

In the introduction to a special issue on movements in Africa, Brandes und Engels (2011, S. 1) assert that "the study of African social movements so far is a neglected field of research in African Studies and Social Sciences." Similarly, Simin Fadaee (2017, S. 3) argues that "social movements in Africa have not received enough scholarly attention and have largely remained underrepresented." Andreas Eckert (2017, S. 211) equally finds that the subject "does not – and never did – rank high among those issues that historians of Africa would consider crucial." Underlining that social movements such as trade unions have a long history in Africa, Eckert (2017, S. 222), a historian himself, calls for cross-area comparisons and more studies to "historicize recent developments in the realm of politics and the notions of political and social protest and integrate them into longer histories." Contributions in various

special issues of area studies journals have recently tried to address this gap. Take for example, the special issue on social movement struggles in Africa in *Review of African Political Economy* in 2010, on social movements in Africa in *Stichproben – Vienna Journal of African Studies* in 2011, or the issue on social movements and political change in *Journal of Contemporay African Studies* in 2013. Therein, scholars have mainly focused on single case studies, but nevertheless embedded movements in a longer timeline of mobilization.

While the study of social movements or coalitions in Africa could certainly be given more attention within the general social movement community and provide more historically informed analyses, in recent years scholars have made inroads in historicizing "movements" (Larmer 2010, S. 254–257; Brandes und Engels 2011, S. 5–6), "social activism" (Larmer 2015), and "protests" (Branch und Mampilly 2015; Mueller 2018). Larmer (2015) distinguishes between four historical phases: mobilization in times of nationalism and liberation in the 1950s and 1960s, integration of movements into corporatist structures in the early post-colonial phase from 1960-1975, returning mobilization against economic crises from 1975-1989, and movements' push for democracy from 1990-2010. Brandes und Engels (2011, S. 6) diverge only slightly on this periodization and emphasize the fact that the democracy movements or civil society were grasped as positive factors and later co-opted by international donors such as the World Bank. Branch und Mampilly (2015), Mueller (2018), and Sanches (2022) instead speak of protest waves which mainly overlap with the phases outlined by Larmer (2010). Compared to the works just mentioned which propose a more comparative perspective and macro approach, the articles by Larmer (2010), Brandes und Engels (2011), and Larmer (2015) focus on the movements themselves and try to better understand the framing and mobilization strategies, global-local interlinkages of movements, or crucial movements in shaping national politics (Brandes und Engels 2011, S. 2) or studying movements from below (Larmer 2010, S. 251). Especially the works by Branch und Mampilly (2015) and Mueller (2018) and also the volume edited by Sanches (2022) note a particular spike of protests in the past decade in Africa and try to explain what they see as a third protest wave. The works by Branch und Mampilly (2015), Mueller (2018), and partly also Sanches

(2022) therefore adopt a comparative macro-perspective and emphasize the class component more clearly than the other works cited above.

In their book *Africa Uprising. Political Protest and Political Change*, Branch und Mampilly (2015) first focus on the historical origins of protest and its class dimension, focusing in particular on what the authors term "underclass" (ibid., 20). Rooted in colonial urban policy separating rural and urban space and socially dividing the urban space itself, the city was socially fragmented, an elite and working-class living alongside or opposed by an underclass (ibid., 20). The underclass is constituted by the "unemployed, the underemployed, informal workers, and even parts of the petty bourgeoisie." (ibid., 33). This underclass was not always ignored by the state but was also repressed by the colonial authorities that tried to enforce their idea of an orderly urban space. The central argument of the book is then that because of its neglect or repression urban uprisings by the underclass mainly target political rights as opposed to economic issues (ibid., 32). In turn, the authors refer to the underclass as a political society and establish a distinction between a political and civil society (ibid., 35). In contrast to a political society, which aims to establish a new political order, "[c]ivil society political visions are basically reformist, oriented towards securing political freedoms, civil rights, and economic and social guarantees for citizens from the state." (ibid., 221). The civil society confirms to the middle class. The authors explain the third wave of protests first as a "vehement rejection of the neoliberal economy by Africa's poor" (Branch and Mampilly 2015, 83), which despite impressive GDP growth rates did not provide the poor with better livelihoods. The second factor that makes a political society rise up are democracies that do not provide any real choices (ibid., 88). In this third wave, civil society and political society also interact, but, as the two authors write (2015, 220), the latter "is thus the concept that resonates most strongly with today's protest wave."

In her book *Political Protest in Contemporary Africa*, Mueller (2018) also historicizes protests and shows that they are not a new phenomenon. However, according to her, the coalitions of classes vary in the various waves. She therefore diverges in an important point from Branch und Mampilly's (2015) pure focus on the urban underclass emphasizing more clearly the class-coalitional character of the third wave of protests. Whereas during the first wave, that is the pre-colonial period,

protests included the urban and rural population and combined elite and popular demands simultaneously, the second wave, while geographically inclusive, diverged mostly in the limited inclusion of popular demands. Mueller (2018, S. 21) argues that the "general eagerness of protest leaders to recruit from lower classes distinguishes the third wave of African protests from earlier waves." In Mueller's (2018, S. 7) words: "Middle-class people serve as strategic leaders of political opposition movement (what I call 'the generals of the revolution') and poorer people serve as strategic joiners ('the foot soldiers of the revolution')." However, coalitions between the middle and lower classes reach out to the rural parts to a limited degree. Political and economic liberalization did not have the intended effects, leading to a "economically marginalized lower class and a politically marginalized middle class." (Mueller 2018, S. 54). While economic liberalization has produced a middle class that is independent of the state class and not afraid of criticizing the government, this has not led to an eradication of poverty and inequality. Equally, the reintroduction of multiparty politics has not led to effective control on governments and the eradication of the abuse of power (Mueller 2018, 56-61, 71–72).

While this literature, especially the works by Branch and Mampilly (2015) and Mueller (2018) do a good job at highlighting what can be gained once a class-analytical approach is employed, it is still unclear in this literature as to what outcomes the current coalitions actually are. Despite the question of the outcomes, another question also remains unclear. A sub-question that emerges from this literature is what influence structural constraints actually have on cross-class coalitions. The existence of patronage and co-optation points to the relevance of economic factors. In the next sub-section, I look at a stream of literature that dedicates attention to these factors and tries to understand as to how these influence cross-class coalitions.

2.2. Southern movements are different from their Northern counterparts: resource dependency – a politico-economic factor that hints at the reasons why coalitions are not durable

The question as to what importance such structural factors as patronage and co-optation have on cross-class coalitions is pertinent as it is also related to the question of outcomes. While the question as to whether movements in Africa use frames (see Benford und Snow 2000) or depend on political opportune moments (see Tarrow 2008) is not controversial, resources and hence the dependency on resource appropriation is a more contentious issue in the literature on movements and cross-class coalitions in Africa. There are competing literatures. One stream of the literature acknowledges the significance of economic resources. Another sees these as less important than immaterial resources. Reviewing these key works is necessary as it can be assumed that structural constraints can have important effects on the mobilization of cross-class coalitions and what outcomes they can achieve.

Recent contributions by Engels und Müller (2019), Larmer (2010) and Ellis und van Kessel (2009) focused on the way social movements in Afica function and whether they are significantly different from Northern movements concerning the framing, political opportunities, and the way the movements mobilize resources. This literature has excellently shown that mobilizational strategies such as frames or political opportunities play an important role for cross-class coalitions in Africa just as they were significant in Northern contexts. Analyzing social movements in the Global South, Simin Fadaee (2017, S. 1) asserts that “much of their uniqueness and complexity has been overlooked.” Regarding how movements mobilize resources, Ellis und van Kessel (2009) as well as Larmer (2010, 2015) pointed to the fact that movements depend on resources from foreign donors and note the preponderance of NGOs in the field. Highlighting the relevance of extraversion (that is the cultivation of unequal international relationships to the benefit of elites) in the analysis of African movements, Larmer (2010, S. 256) further points to the fact that in some cases donors even “regard limited forms of social movement mobilisation or protest as a way to undermine particularly ‘intransigent’ governments that have failed to successfully implement programmes of liberal reform.”

Applying traditional social movement theory to the African context and more specifically Burkina Faso, Engels und Müller (2019) do not find any significant differences between movements in Africa and their Western counterparts in terms of how they are constituted, mobilize, and operate. According to the authors, the assertion that social movements depend to a large degree on foreign financial resources stems from an inadequate conceptualization of civil society organizations, NGOs included, as social movements. While not clearly distinguishing between NGOs and civil society, they nevertheless acknowledge that civil society is heavily dependent on donor money. In general critical of the resource mobilization theory, Engels und Müller (2019, S. 79) posit that "social movements can compensate for the lack of material resources by using other resources" such as time, music as a cultural resource, or a shared identity. However, Waal und Ibreck (2013) underline that movements are especially prone to co-optation and collapse, something Engels und Müller (2019) overlook. Using the neopatrimonialism approach, the authors situate movements in the wider political and economic context of Africa. Movements as collective networks may even morph into patronage networks, write Waal und Ibreck (2013, S. 309), with the leaders of collective action crossing over to party politics seeking "power for themselves or align themselves with patrons seeking power."

As becomes evident from this brief review, resources, whether understood broadly or narrowly, play a significant role in mobilization. However, in a setting where co-optation and patronage are omnipresent, it becomes difficult to sustain, as Engels und Müller (2019) do, that economic resources could easily be replaced by immaterial resources over a longer period. In a setting where unemployment and underemployment are widespread, the opportunity costs of strike or protest action can be significantly high, just like the opporunity costs of not accepting inclusion in partonage networks or being co-opted. It is important to highlight this crucial structural difference as patronage and co-optation can possibly weaken these coalitions and also break their shared identity. As the key question of this dissertation is about the outcomes, these constraints should be kept in mind, especially concerning what role financial resources play for movements.

2.3. Waves until forever? The concrete outcomes of coalitions are extremely limited once measured against their goals

While previous protest waves or earlier phases of movements have ushered in independence movements and later led to the (re-)introduction of multipartyism, the outcomes of this current wave seem extremely limited. The question as to where the current protest wave is headed and what the outcomes of this heightened activity is is indeed pertinent. As in previous waves or phases, broad goals with the declared aim of social and later political change were set. For example, Branch und Mampilly (2015, S. 14) write that in the third wave "protesters are seeking to fundamentally transform Africa's political and economic inequities." Branch und Mampilly (2015) and Larmer (2015) agree that the third protest wave (Branch und Mampilly) or movement activism (Larmer) witnessed limited results. The authors diverge mostly in what they deduce in terms of theoretical and methodological approaches for the study of protests and movements from this assertion. However, the question of outcomes deserves more nuance and comparison as I argue. In this sub-section, I review key works speaking to this issue and highlight their merit before I underline the central lacuna of this research program.

In their book, Adam Branch und Mampilly (2015, S. 18) assert that "[i]t is indisputable that, again and again, protests across Africa seem unable to effect substantive reforms in national politics despite their success in bringing tens of thousands of people into the streets." While the second wave of protests ended single-party rule and brought back multipartyism, it changed the lives of ordinary citizens only to a marginal degree (ibid., 17). In contrast to the second wave, the results of the third wave are even more disappointing, write the two authors; the current events did not even further political rights at a formal level (ibid.). The authors subsequently criticize the dominant framework of social movement studies and protests. According to them, the dominant approach "tends to focus only on the failures of protest movements, especially the disparity between their lofty promise and their modest achievements in bringing about political change." (2015, S. 17). Instead, the authors analyze what ideas of democracy and development are developed during and after such protests. This conceptualization of protesters is understood as a kind of empowerment, or in their words "'self-realization'" (ibid.,

19), although only on an ideational level. Hence, the two authors focus not on "lamenting the failure of protest to effect formal political change." Instead, they highlight "the often dramatic developments that accompany protest in popular organization, political consciousness, and political imagination." (Branch und Mampilly 2015, S. 19). Both assert the positive effect on ideational political innovations (ibid., 229). However, the authors also note that states, for example Uganda, quickly moved to contain these protests via repression and militarization. In response to repression rendering protests powerless, violence might therefore well become again a strategy of contestation (ibid., 230). The authors identify thus a dilemma. Protests trigger the state to contain such events and thereby limit its impact leaving protesters with the option "to build alternatives outside the state even though doing so absolves the state of political and social accountability and may leave broader structures of exploitation and violence still unaddressed" (ibid., 231).

Already earlier, Alex de Waal und Ibreck (2013, S. 305) pointed to the limited impact of protests and movements in Africa. According to the authors, "[i]n Africa it seems that while protests are frequent, broad-based popular movements are weak and especially vulnerable to co-option and collapse." However, Waal und Ibreck (2013) situate protests and movements in the larger politico-economic context by building on the neopatrimonialism literature. Although they also emphasize the state's repressive capacities as Branch und Mampilly do, the authors see movements embedded in patronage networks running the danger of being co-opted or even becoming patronage systems themselves (2013, S. 309). Nevertheless, Waal und Ibreck (2013, S. 310) also envision that mobilization through movements can lead to autocrats being voted out of office.[10] However, the latter is difficult to achieve since "non-violent civic mobilisers face the hypothetical challenge of not only overthrowing a ruler but establishing a new institutionalised political order, and making it hegemonic throughout society" (Waal und Ibreck 2013, S. 319) . Although the authors rather stress structural constraints that inhibit movements to establish a new political order in neopatrimonial regimes, they nevertheless acknowledge the significance of agency arguing that "with a leadership capable of analysing the opportunities and

[10] Their essay provides a synthesis of the contributions of the special issue and therefore does not focus on the empirical question of the outcomes directly.

limitations, much can be achieved." (ibid., 319). They are optimistic that once movement leaders have a realistic view of what can be achieved in neopatrimonial systems, that is, protests against repression, political competition, and using the patronage system to their advantage to create jobs for their movement constituency, outcomes are more likely to be reached (ibid., 320).

In contrast to Branch und Mampilly's focus on political consciousness, Lisa Mueller's (2018) book studies the recent heightened protest activity in Africa and seeks to explain the timing and coalitional character of these protests. Naturally, outcomes do not play a role in her framework. The key explanatory task of her work is to make sense of why so many protests emerged in the third wave and not what the impact of the third wave actually is. Consequently, she charts several future avenues for research, among them the study of the outcomes of such protests. Especially, according to her, further research should examine the causal processes and the variables that cause outcome variation (Mueller 2018, S. 191–192). Although Mueller does not touch explicitly on the question of outcomes, they however indirectly play a role. Her work generally grasps protests as a potential transformative force. This view is not least expressed in her call for more support by the donor community for these protest coalitions (2018, S. 198–201).

In her edited volume, Edalina Rodriguez Sanches (2022, S. 3) observes that the impact of protests within the respective societies is unclear. This assesment prompts her to ask how transformative protests actually are, whether and how they matter, and how divergent outcomes can be explained. Transformation or change is framed as a spectrum from no change to significant change, the latter apparently being understood as the movement's realization of the envisioned goals. In the ideal case where movements set out with broad goals, this equals to establishing a new political order (Sanches 2022, 7–8, 221). However, even if protests do not achieve significant change, they might still impact on the self-confidence of movements and their ability to envision alternatives to the status quo, argues Sanches. She thereby includes also less tangible and immaterial impacts in her analysis. Although directly exploring the question of outcomes, Sanches (2022, 8, her emphasis) chooses to inductively study the impacts of protests by shedding light on "the concrete meanings of change in Africa rather than thinking of change and transformation in an *a priori* and fixed

manner, or generalising from definitions derived from the western societies." She builds on the idea of the potential positive effect of protests on political consciousness put forward by Branch und Mampilly (2015). In her recap of the eleven cases studies, Sanches (2022, S. 222) finds that although in the majority of the cases under study protests had a crucial effect on politics, "the results are at best mixed." Taking a closer look at the outcomes of those cases, at least in six out of eleven (Uganda, DRC, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Angola, and Eswatini) in which broad demands were voiced no change of the political order could actually be enforced. In countries where movements were not able to enforce significant change, "new perceptions, such as transposing the fear of protest, forging new solidarities, and gaining a new sense of collective action" in form of non-material change was nevertheless visible (Sanches 2022, S. 228).

While some authors, such as Branch und Mampilly (2015) explicitly decide not to study outcomes of those cross-class coalitions, others such as Sanches (2022) envision outcomes of coalitions also as spectrum. This spectrum runs from class coalitions breaking into two or various parts, limited political reforms, political alternation, or even the establishment of a new political order. While I do not preclude the possibility that those coalitions can contribute positively to foster politically conscious citizens it is equally possibly that they altogether withdraw from the state which might feed into violence. Branch und Mampilly (2015) and also the extract of Lewis Rubongoya in the introduction of this thesis pointed to the possibility of this second trajectory. It is interesting that cross-class coalitions emerge in various contexts, but break down at different stages during their mobilization. The thesis also aims to understand the trajectories of such coalitions better. This thesis pays attention to the concrete outcomes of these coalitions and therefore asks:

> *What are the immediate, mid- to long-term outcomes of such cross-class coalitions?*

Related to this main question are further questions:

> *Under what conditions can such movements enforce the social change that they are interested in? What are the ideal conditions under which cross class*

conditions can do so? What happens to such coalitions under sub-optimal conditions? If these ideal conditions do exist, how can these be brought about?

One key finding of this dissertation is that coalitions are extremely fragile and reach only very limited goals in the context of a rent economy. Hence, in a second and logical step of this dissertation and linked to this question, I ask what routes could be pursued to make such cross-class coalitions more durable. The question of durability of such coalitions forged between the middle and lower classes is inevitably linked to another question: what position do these classes have in society and how powerful are they? With regards to the lower classes this necessitates to ask about the empowerment of the lower classes. Since empowerment of labor is essentially a question of economic policy, I will turn to issues of development theory in the second part of this dissertation after closely studying the dynamics of such cross-class coalitions.

The next section of this introductory chapter introduces the state class theory and explains why I choose this approach.

3. Theory

This work revolves around the concept of rent. In the theoretical section, I will first discuss rent and profit and then briefly summarize Hartmut Elsenhans (1981) theory which explains why rents allowed state classes to emerge in the Global South. Hereafter, I theorize about the role cross-class coalitions that turn into formalized opposition play in this arrangement. In the last step, I will focus on the dilemma of reaching democratization, meaning replacing former state classes with strong and self-confident interest bodies that have their basis in an already empowered labor force and can therefore rupture with patronage systems. Yet before I outline the theoretical foundation of my work, I first briefly explain why I choose to study cross-class coalitions and their role in the political system by means of the concept of rent and the state class theory.

Over the past three decades, neo-patrimonialism (NPM) has served as the prime paradigm in Africanist political science to study the performance of post-

colonial political regimes.[11] Rooted in the works of Weber on rule and domination, proponents of NPM argue that African countries suffer under a hybrid state in which personalized politics with strong presidents co-exist alongside the established bureaucratic form of domination, e. g. institutions. While some Africanist scholars described African states as possessing "a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized political relations" (Chabal und Daloz 1999, S. 16), it is more appropriate to attest that African states experience a simple blurring between the private and public domain, as per Erdmann und Engel (2007, S. 105). Although formally established, the legal-rational form of domination is circumvented and sometimes subverted by rulers using personalized means. In NPM regimes, resources are used for private elite consumption or invested in clientelist or patronage networks in order to produce legitimacy for the ruling elite. According to Erdmann und Engel, this particularistic logic then thwarts efforts to achieve universal public welfare goals (2007, S. 105). Authors interested more specifically in the nexus between regime type and socio-economic performance, such as Kohli (2004), even identified NPM as inhibitive for development. According to Kohli, newly industrialized countries depended on the intervention of the state to drive the emergence of an industrial sector in these countries. State authority, that is "how the politics of the state are organized and how state power is used," writes Kohli (2004, S. 2), shape the economic sphere and ultimately investment decisions (ibid.). In NPM states, where state authority is weak, resources are more likely to find their way into pockets of elites, being spent for private consumption instead of being used for economic transformation (Kohli 2004, 21f). In brief, NPM draws a connection between the deficient bureaucratic apparatus and Africa's lagging behind in socio-economic development. In essence, in my view, NPM posits that if resources were not siphoned off but instead were used for development projects, Africa would be on the course towards being industrialized countries. The central problem with this approach is that it neglects the analysis of economic policy and consequently macroeconomic variables. As Flassbeck und Spieker (2022) have recently pointed out, the reduction of corruption and the establishment of strong institutions, itself certainly a noble

11 NPM is featured in Africanist undergraduate textbooks (see for example Tetzlaff und Jakobeit 2005; Englebert und Dunn 2013) and any political science student from comparative politics or international relations working on Africa will have to engage with this literature.

goal, is ineffective at triggering transformation without pursuing a coherent macroeconomic policy. On the contrary, countries with weak institutional settings (or neopatrimonal states to refer to the literature above) can "be economically successful if they manage to set the other parameters, namely the macro-economic parameters, in such a way that the weak institutional conditions are overridden." (Flassbeck und Spieker 2022).

A decade ago, literature emerged that did take this idea seriously – at least to the extent that a weak institutional setting is not a hindering factor per se. In the 1990s, developmental-minded governments came to power in Rwanda and Ethiopia and could point to considerable successes already in the early 2000s (in Botswana since independence). Thus, opposition to the NPM approach grew. Scholars who analyzed these positive outcomes, such as Pitcher et al. (2009), Mkandawire (2001), Mkandawire (2015) and Khan (2010) who all pursued a more comparative research agenda with Asian states, highlighted the fact that African governments partly had clear visions of how to develop their countries and that economic transformation was generally feasible despite neo-patrimonial structures. Kelsall (2011), Dawson und Kelsall (2012), and Booth und Golooba-Mutebi (2012) built on these insights and developed the concept of developmental patrimonialism, while Khan proposed the framework of political settlements. Essentially, both frameworks see the centralization of rents and power and the existence of a political will to use these rents for long-term goals as necessary conditions to achieve capitalist growth. These works are more strongly based in political economy than the standard NPM approach and are hence a welcome innovation. They acknowledge the relevance of a specific surplus predominant in the Global South and also agree that this surplus can be used to fast-track development.

Nevertheless, they[12] are all unclear as to how to set the macroeconomic parameters right.[13] The NPM approach does not offer any viable solution to

[12] Here I explicitly exclude Flassbeck und Spieker (2022), as they emphasize the relevance of offering low interest rates and determining a favorable exchange rate.

[13] They are also unclear about how countries would eventually overcome their dependency on rents and transition to capitalist systems. The theories are not specific about how entrepreneurs who benefit from rent allocation would eventually bring along entrepreneurs from sectors that did not receive rents.

overcome forms of underdevelopment, besides advocating to introduce better checks and controls and make the bureaucracy more efficient so that fewer resources are squandered. This view is contradicted by more heterodox works, such as the political settlements literature, which showed that development is feasible despite a dysfunctional bureaucratic system. However, the political settlements literature is also too vague as to how to concretely chart a route to transform an economy from one that is growth-based on rent to growth-based on profit. In a particularly important case, specifically South Korea, rent was centralized and channeled into certain sectors, such as the big conglomerates, but factors such as mass incomes were neglected, leading to tensions within the state class but also within society. Taiwan is the contrasting example. Rent was not as extensively centralized. Mass incomes and development by means of decentralized small and medium-sized enterprises played a much more important role than in South Korea (Friesinger and Saalfeld 2022, Friesinger 2022). This already shows that the centralization and channeling of rent cannot be the deciding factor. Apparently, there are also other factors at play or altogether different factors that determine the transition to growth by means of profit. However, the theories lack a (sound) macroeconomic component. Nevertheless, the macroeconomic perspective is crucial to pursue macroeconomic policy, which is essentially part of any development theory.

After this discussion, I first start by highlighting the importance of rent before I move on to the state class concept and bureaucratic development societies. The section also touches on the question of how to use rent intelligently to overcome underdevelopment, a key problem that, in my view, is not given adequate attention or any attention at all in the above cited works.

3.1. Rent and profit: state classes and how to use rent to eliminate rent and transition to profit

Countries of the Global South are characterized by a labor excess population. There is a large “labor reserve army” willing to work for a subsistence wage. In societies with a large agrarian excess population, entrepreneurs will refrain from making large-scale investments and enlarging their production since markets are not big enough

to absorb the goods entrepreneurs anticipate producing (there is no considerable mass demand since labor is working for subsistence wages). Without entering into the details of Elsenhans' (1980) marginality-cum-rent-theorem, I only highlight that the excess population is not hired to work the land, since surplus from the production declines after a certain point when more laborers are employed. It is therefore economic to hire workers only to a certain point. What remains relevant is that this specific employment equilibrium does not absorb the labor excess. Thus, the surplus can not be appropriated by the market (Elsenhans 1997). In such an economy the surplus of rent is dominant, which is appropriated by political means and not by the market.

I choose the state class theory as framework for my thesis as it provides me with the necessary macroeconomic component. The theory uses the concept of rent to study post-colonial societies, but more importantly also shows a way to transform the economy so that rent is no longer the determining surplus form but profit. Hence, in line with Harmut Elsenhans (2012b), I distinguish two specific forms of surplus: rent and profit.[14] I use them as an analytical category, not to measure the income as such. Rent is a specific form of surplus income that exists due to a lack of competition, e.g., monopoly or oligopoly. Let us take the example of a natural resource rent, such as oil. Producers determine the price of oil by regulating supply to allow less competitive producers to also sell their oil. Producers that have better conditions to exploit oil can thereby earn more compared to the producers with higher costs (such as Uganda, since its oil is waxy and first has to be transported through a heated pipeline to the Indian ocean). Producers with better natural conditions therefore receive a differential rent (Elsenhans 1997, S. 439; Schmid 1997). Although the literature distinguishes between different rents, such as consumer or producer rents, differential rents, ground rents, remittances, etc. (Elsenhans 2004, S. 99), what is important here is that rents are not subject to the logic of reinvestment and can either be squandered or used productively to eliminate the dominance of rents.

[14] This distinction is important, as the dominance of either surplus income determines the constellation of societal groups and their autonomy of the state, as I will explain in more detail in the subsequent section.

Conversely, profit is the outcome of competition and is determined by investment expenditure. This type of surplus is entirely appropriated by the market. Kalecki (1942, S. 259) showed that profits in a market economy are determined by investments and not vice versa. Hence, capitalists earn what they spend.[15] In order to understand what profit is, we first consider a closed economy with a balanced state budget. Further, it is best to think of the economy as being split into two economic sectors, the capital goods and the consumption goods sector (Elsenhans 2012b). Consider a consumption good, for example a tablet or a smartphone for reading papers, watching movies, etc. The price of a product is determined by its costs for labor and capital but also all preliminary products produced by other producers. In order to sell the products at a price above their costs, there have to be workers who earn their incomes outside the wage goods sector, that is the capital goods sector who designs and produces the machinery for the consumption goods sector. Workers' incomes in the capital goods sector rise faster if the demand for capital goods exceeds the depreciation of fixed assets. Why do capital goods producers make profits? Companies who produce machinery are knowledgeable about the production process in the wage goods sector. Otherwise, they would not be able to produce machinery that is innovative and tailored to the demand of the wage goods producers. Capital goods producers earn a profit because wage goods producers are ready to pay a premium, otherwise the capital goods producers would start producing tablets and smartphones themselves (Elsenhans 2012b).

Why do wage goods' companies invest in the first place? The basic condition for investment in new technologies beyond depreciation is the positive outlook of a capitalist that consumers will buy the output, which means mass incomes have to rise in order for demand to go up. Rising mass incomes and a relatively egalitarian society are the necessary precondition for the extension of production facilities. Otherwise, these goods cannot be absorbed (Elsenhans 2019). In a perfectly competitive market economy, capitalists constantly have to invest in new technologies in order to retain

[15] Only the variable of investment is subject to the capitalists' decision, not profit. Consumption by capitalists is part of Kalecki's profit equation, which I cease considering here following Elsenhans' (2012) simplified equation of Kalecki. I agree with Elsenhans (2012) that it is fair to assume that capitalists are frugal and spend little on consumption.

their market position in relation to competitors.[16] In capitalist countries, labour is able to claim its share in productivity through increases in the real wage which then impacts positively on investments (Elsenhans 1983). With capitalists seeking to make profits and workers pressing for higher wages, the two groups selfishly try to assert their interests and thus make capitalism self-sustaining (Elsenhans 2004, S. 89).

While profit is earned in a decentralized manner on anonymous markets, rent is appropriated by political means. Since the post-colonial phase rent is increasingly appropriated by a centralized bureaucracy, hence the term bureaucratic development societies. Following the post-colonial period, rents were increasingly appropriated by so-called state classes and used to gain the support of other social groups (Elsenhans 1981). State classes operate relatively independent from the rest of society as they dispose of rent. Elsenhans (1981, 166-167) speaks of a distinct state class that has access to rents and/or decides how to use them. Therefore, in relation to the average labourer, this class stands a better chance to participate within society due to its capacity to determine for what aims rents are essentially used but also because its members receive higher incomes and have more prestige than others. The state class is therefore distinct from other state employees. Teachers, bureaucrats, and other public sector staff can be considered the organic clientele, or what would today be called a part of the middle class, although middle income group would be more appropriate, as I point out in the subsequent section. They depend on the state class, foremost on the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus, and are therefore organic and function as a clientele of the state class because the state class seeks to build coalitions to pursue certain developmental projects, or appropriate more rents, or simply illustrate their power by showing their following (Elsenhans 1981, 122). In those societies that heavily liberalized their economic and political sphere in the 1990s, a process of oligarchization was set in motion. State classes had to assert themselves against increasingly powerful rentiers or to use more neutral term entrepreneurs. Therefore, I think it is more fitting to speak of the remnants of the state class which in many ways nevertheless managed to assert its stand alongside increasingly powerful entrepreneurs.

[16] Kalecki assumed that incomes are fully spent on wage goods and that the government budget as well as the balance of trade are balanced.

As mentioned above, rent is distributed through patronage networks to form coalitions between the state class and further classes. This in turn hinders the emergence of an autonomous civil society. Labour is not scarce and can not enforce control of the ruling class. Nevertheless, state classes are subject to rivalry and thus internal fragmentation. Depending on the levels of rent, the state classes form stable coalitions in times of rent abundance and fight each other in times of scarcity. Thus state classes are acting in a constricting environment between the tendency to self-privilege and the necessity to legitimize themselves (Elsenhans 1981, S. 23). During times of low levels of rent income, the state class disintegrates into different factions. Some factions become more susceptible to economic policy trying to overcome rent. Focusing on the wavering behavior of Algeria's state class from 1962-2000 by drawing on Bourdieu's concept of capital, Rachid Ouaissa (2005) has distinguished these phases more clearly and calls them segmentation phase and consolidation phase. In my view, Ouaissa's work especially shows how competition based on programmes works, regardless of whether the state class is in flux or consolidated. If rents are low and can no longer be used to co-opt the middle class or subalterns, these groups turn to alternative political associations, such as faith-based associations (Ouiassa 2005, 209).

A key question now is how to transition from a rent-based to a profit-based economy. One way of catching-up with technologically advanced countries despite the dominance of rents is described in Elsenhans' (2004) convoy model of globalization. It aims at reaching full-employment through a careful land redistribution scheme, which in turn raises mass incomes combined with an export-strategy that makes use of a devalued currency to gain competitiveness. South Korea and Taiwan, but also China to some extent, provide recent empirical examples for this strategy. However, it is important to stress that a development strategy purely based on the growth of domestic demand is just as possible as export-led industrialization. It is also easier to accomplish a transformation solely based on domestic demand, since the economy is not dependent on foreign demand and the impulse to first achieve labour scarcity in the export sector and then the other domestic sectors.

Generally, the production of simple durable as well as non-durable consumer goods becomes feasible with a more egalitarian consumption profile. These commodities can usually be supplied by the informal sector. Once this stage is reached, a more complex industrial goods sector has to be established in order to diversify the economy.

As long as food supplies are abundant, devaluation has no limits. A devalued currency enables countries to compete internationally as a single country always possesses a comparative advantage in some sector, which will then be transformed into an absolute advantage. The result is that they become cost competitive (Elsenhans 2004, 99f). The further course of catching-up depends on the policy mix adopted by the state: educating workers through specific education policies, subsidies to infant industries, channelling rent to technologically backward sectors. Once full employment is reached, revaluation becomes unavoidable and the country is bound to the profit dynamic as described above (Elsenhans 2004, S. 101).

Apart from educating workers, it is equally paramount to put in place a monetary policy that accompanies the expansion of small and medium sized enterprises. Developing countries usually have high interest rates. High interest rates however can attract financial capital. Investors are making profits out of differentials between the real interest rates between different countries. As the developing country experiences a net inflow of foreign currency, its own currency appreciates until financial capital seeks alternative investment opportunities elsewhere and the currency devaluates again. This can have severe consequences for the export strategy, as exported goods would become more expensive. The central bank has to ward off these carry trades accordingly in order to keep the export industries competitive (Flassbeck and Steinhardt 2018, 211–14).

Now the crucial question is why should state classes pursue economic policies that aim to overcome rents and transition to a profit-based economy. They would dig their own grave by implementing these reforms, wouldn't they? In fact, there seems to be a contradictory relationship between the state class and the achievement of profit-based systems. State classes implement reforms which – if implemented correctly – empower subalterns and lead to the emergence of a self-confident labor

movement. The empowerment of labor will ultimately lead to a replacement of the state class with labor's own interest body. Hence, the state class would make itself obsolete by pursuing those economic policies summarized above. However, state classes can then simply transform into formalized political players and participate in the democratic game, as Taiwan's former ruling party KMT exemplifies. In addition, the South Korean case shows that former state classes can still be a part of the political landscape. Once full employment is reached, it is not unlikely that the Chinese communist party will also be relegated to a simple actor in the democratic game. Although political leaders probably did not have this master plan at hand to eliminate rents such programs can still be conceptualized and implemented as a master plan today.

3.2. Cross-class coalition durability and the possibility to replace the remnants of the state class hinges on the empowerment of labor

The transition to multipartyism in the 1990s and the liberalization of the economy did not lead to a democratic breakthrough in the real sense of the word. Branch and Mampilly (2015) pointed to the unmet expectations of a large part of the population. The current protest wave can be read as a forceful expression of this dissatisfaction. Certainly, previously one-party states introduced democratic elements and the public space was less constricted. Nevertheless, state classes have not been replaced with autonomous and strong interest bodies of the lower classes. In many ways, the latest wave of protests precisely did not change the political order. As Mueller (2018) has shown, current class coalitions combine middle class demands for more democracy and lower class demands for more economic rights.

Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) have highlighted the importance of the lower classes in pushing through democracy. They also find that coalitions between the middle classes and lower classes were significant to democratization. The ability of labour to push for democracy, however, rests on their bargaining position, that is the empowerment of workers through jobs. Otherwise, these social groups can easily be integrated into the state class patronage networks and hence lose their clout. Since labour usually has limited amounts of people from which to recruit intellectual and

leading personnel, the symbiosis with the middle class is self-evident. It is important however is to stress that since the middle classes are themselves embedded into rent economies and are a product of structural heterogeneity[17], they are not per se democratic but prone to a re-inclusion into the patronage networks. In the previous section I touched on the state class and its organic clientele, a part of the middle class. Here, I will further reflect on the middle class, before I turn to the lower classes and the question of what makes those cross-class coalitions actually powerful.

It was only in the period of industrialization that the term middle class emerged, that is in the outgoing 18th and early 19th century of industrializing England. Due to a dynamic economy, the bourgeoisie soon moved up the social ladder and even absorbed the aristocracy; the classes merged, so to say, and then represented the upper class. Leading technical personnel as well as academic professions became increasingly important with the expansion of large private firms. The growth of capitalist enterprises also necessitated the employment of a substantial number of managers and administrative staff. The evolvement of the public sector then also coincided with the growth of the private sector (Hobsbawn 1988, 95–102). In brief, middle-class emergence is closely tied to the taking-off phase of capitalist development. The large African bureaucracies that were built in the aftermath of decolonization have indeed facilitated the rise of a middle class through public sector employment, or in Elsenhans' words, the organic clientele. Although there was a private sector expansion in African countries after the liberalization phase in the 1990s, Africa is not experiencing a dynamic private sector expansion. Therefore, contributions on the middle class in Africa agree that this segment is small and scholars are cautious as to whether to actually term it a middle class (Fichtmüller 2019).

The middle class has no democratic attitude per se, as Geiger (1930) has shown in the case of Germany in the late 1920s, where in the face of economic decline the middle class even supported an authoritarian regime. In a number of developing countries the middle class has also at times backed authoritarian rule, e.g.

[17] In economies characterized by structural heterogeneity, highly productive sectors coexist with sectors which have a low productivity and wages do not yet rise in accordance with average productivity gains.

in Chile, Venezuela and Argentina (Therborn 2012, 18). South Korea's middle class even supported the authoritarian regime in the 1970s (Li 2006, 77). Therborn (2012, 18) calls the middle class "'situationally' (opportunistically) democratic – or anti-democratic". Although the middle class has played a key role in the Arab spring (Ouaissa 2013), a closer look at its situational behaviour illustrates that during an economic slump the upper echelons of the middle class favour authoritarian rule. By contrast, the core segment prefers democratic rule and the lower strata of the middle class advocates a religious state based on Sharia law (Gertel and Ouaissa 2017, 212f). China is a particularly interesting case. Industrialization has mainly been facilitated by state-led export-orientation. The middle class therefore largely owes its existence to the political regime that introduced economic reforms. A study from 2006 showed that criticism of the regime and claims for democratic reform were generally scarce among the middle class, except for very few intellectuals (Li 2006, 73). The support for democratic change among the middle class seemed to be significantly less pronounced than in the lower classes (Chen and Lu 2011, 711, 715). A study on middle class behaviour in Ningbo, China demonstrated that survey participants ascribed the leading role in initiating democratic reform to the communist party or the government (Miao 2016, 173). The middle class in Ningbo even thought of itself as "stabilisers of society, rather than agents of change" (Miao 2016, 178).

Irrespective of the democratic orientation of the middle classes, the lower classes play a key role in democratization. Coalitional success in terms of durability then hinges on the negotiating power of labour. As pointed out above in the section on the state class, if labour is not empowered, subalterns can easily be co-opted and conflict diffusion tools can be employed to thwart any mobilizational efforts. The crucial question now is how such coalitional success could become possible if the state class itself does not pursue a developmental project that seeks to make labor scarce. Focusing on the Arab revolutions in the early 2010s, Elsenhans (2012a) posits that democratic revolutions can be sustained only by proposing mid- to long-term proposals about how to reach such an empowerment of labour through detailed and applicable economic programs. Basically, the task of the middle class is to come up with such a program. He further writes that "they [youth and middle classes, *or* simply class coalitions] will only be able to maintain their social cohesion and ideological

coherence if they launch an economic and social project capable of creating and crystallising a debate on long-term perspectives." (Elsenhans 2012a). In this regard, there are two dimensions in this transition. The first dimension is the economic one, that is using rent in an intelligent and coherent way to eliminate rents. The second dimension is political, which means that coalitions also have to make this project hegemonial (Elsenhans 1999, S. 261). The ideational framework for such a project has existed at least since the time when state classes existed in Africa. Moreover, memories remain of the immediate post-colonial phase in which mass demands were pursued to a much higher degree than by the current remnants of the state classes. Lower classes have the strongest interest in such a project but often lack intellectuals to lead them in this struggle. Nevertheless, this does not mean that middle classes cannot be convinced by the lower classes to pursue such a project.

I theorize that three broad types of the middle-class component in cross-class coalitions exist. The middle-class part of such coalitions can consist of former regime insiders who have, for example, broken away from the core segment of the state class. It is equally possible that they were always part of a rivalling segment that was not considered for positions within the state class and therefore broke away and then formed their own movement or party. A third possibility is that they consist of state class outsiders belonging to the middle class. In any case, they are a product of the structural heterogeneity that persisted after the liberalization period and are not democratic per se.

Further, I theorize that all class coalitions, if they formulate broad-based goals, have to decide whether to transform into a political party or ally to a party, that is whether or not they accept the rules of the democratic system.[18] In the former case, cross-class coalitions then become part of the system and transform into a party. However, also in the latter case, allying with a political party still makes them an actor in the oppositional space. They are therefore no longer an outsider but become part of the system.

[18] The alternative would be to reject the entire democratic process and question the political legitimacy of the ruler via violent means and, for example, to transform into a guerilla group.

A final word on the international dimension of cross-class coalitions is in order here. In the review of the literature on cross-class coalitions, Larmer (2010) pointed to the dependency of civil society at large on Western aid. This dependency is not relegated to civil society actors, but a general feature of politics in Africa. As Klaus Schlichte (2018, S. 49) has argued, societies of the Global South are subject to a highly internationalized political field. The author basically charts two trajectories for current non-industrialized states: either they adopt a developmental model or they become internationalized states, in which donors have a major say (ibid.). Basically, Schlichte argues (2018, 57) that in those latter states domination becomes internationalized, meaning that donors shape public debate and in some cases even "rule indirectly" (p. 57) through such tools as budgetary support. In essence, many smaller post-colonial states in Africa that do not possess a major rent that guarantees the state class autonomy are highly dependent on Western support. The implication of this dependency, as I suggest, is that dependent remnants of the state class will try to retain a sort of international legitimacy by pursuing Western-formulated goals if outside support from China or Russia cannot replace the Western support.

If we bring the two perspectives together – dependency of the remnants of the state class and civil society on Western aid – we see that both depend to a significant degree on outside financial resources. From this combination follows, as I theorize, a tradeoff between the remnants of the state class and the coalitions. Coalitions might try to either portray the remnants of the state class in a less favorable manner in order to reduce the financial flows to the state class or to seek to increase their own financial base by mobilizing the diaspora or by gaining support from civil society actors outside their country. Conversely, the remnants of the state class will seek to prevent the coalitions from using civil society actors to leverage their mobilization or inhibit financial flows to the oppositional challengers.

3.3. The argument

I depart from the understanding that following the liberalization period in the 1990s, the remnants of the state classes largely abandoned projects to transition to capitalism, however ill-guided they eventually were. The remnants of the state

classes survived the liberalization period and have managed to cling to power. Cross-class coalitions essentially criticize the remnants of those state classes for their squandering behavior and the repression that ensued to subdue any criticism for this squandering behavior. Cross-class coalitions are especially appealing, as I argue, because they often propose an anti-corruption stance and the critique of the repressive system, which is mostly credible because of the constellation of those coalitions itself.

The constellation of middle- and lower-class demands can take different forms. I distinguish three different constellations concerning the middle class. Cross-class coalitions can attract former state class patrons who might want to use the movement to campaign against the system and replace the ruling government. Alternatively, they can also attract other members of the organic clientele who fell out with the state class or see better chances to move up the ladder by joining the new challenger. Lastly, the middle-class can also be mainly constituted by outsiders, who are nevertheless a product of the structural heterogeneity found in post-colonial states.

I build on Rueschemeyer and colleagues' (1992) core argument that democratization is facilitated by a cross-class alliance in which labor plays the crucial role. Following Elsenhans' (2012b) post-Keynesian framework, I argue that those coalitions are not durable if labor is not empowered and hence are likely to fray. Elsenhans (2012a) argues that if coalitions come up with a coherent program on how to transition from rent to profit and make labor scarce, their chances to survive after enforcing political alternation are significantly higher. It is evident that in order to implement such a program, cross-class coalitions have to be in possession of state power. This requires coalitions to ally with parties, which makes them prone to former state class patrons who might propose their own program, which in turn goes against the coalitions' interests. Alternatively, coalitions can transform into a party. Allying with existing parties, mostly former patrons of the state class, makes class coalitions more vulnerable to their own agenda, such as pursuing a long-term coherent program. Establishing their own party provides better opportunities to determine the course of their agenda. Ultimately, if coalitions accept the democratic game, they have to win power to implement such a program. Yet, in contrast to

Elsenhans, I am much more skeptical that coalitions can actually pursue such a path. They are structurally in a weaker position, as the remnants of the state class are in possession of the coercive apparatus or are in a better position to dominate the arena of party politics.

Let us now turn back to the composition of the coalitions. Since they are composed of former state class insiders who broke away from the core segment or outsiders that nevertheless thrived under the status quo, I further argue that it is unlikely that they will propose such a coherent program themselves. The critique that these coalitions offer is neither grounded in a developmental discourse nor in a Keynesian perspective of fostering mass incomes. In addition to the intellectual dearth of economic policy, let us also reconsider the structural constraints of those coalitions. The remnants of the state classes are generally in a favorable position to thwart such coalitions from taking power irrespective of their program. Repression is used as a brute tool to divide such coalitions alongside the more subtle tool of co-optation and patronage, as for example Branch and Mampilly (2015) or Kagoro (2016) have illustrated, which makes coalitions fray. Equally, foreign support to coalitions can easily be subverted by repression (closing foreign NGOs that channel money towards oppositional challengers). In any case, since the remnants of the state classes depend on a form of internationalized rule, as referred to above by Schlichte (2018), these will seek to maintain the flow of donor money and expertise.

Taken together, I lastly argue that the remnants of the state class are in the strategically better position to implement such programs themselves. Once the empowerment of the lower classes is achieved and cross-class coalitions can force through democratization, the remnants of the state class can nevertheless transform into a simple player in the new democratic setting by means of competing in elections through a political party. However, I do not say that it is impossible for coalitions to turn into viable challengers that pursue a long-term and coherent agenda. I am only claiming that this is – given the constraints – extremely demanding. In my view, the remnants of the state class are in a better position to implement such a program.

4. Design, methods, and data

The design of a study reflects on the fundamental questions as to how and where to study the key question (case selection and representativeness), how to reach the stage of formulating an answer to the question (method), and how to choose material or collect material to answer the question (data sampling and collection/techniques).

For the sake of transparency and contrary to many end products of research, such as published articles where the process of gaining insights is mostly conspicuously absent (and hence any potential failures), I admit that while the design of the study did not change, the way in which insights were generated included some detours. Some roads proved to be dead-ends, while at the same time or at a later stage new avenues for sourcing information opened up.

This means that along the way several parts of this dissertation had to be revised, adapted, and extended.[19] I give an example of how dynamic the research process was at times. In the initial design, I wanted to study the relationship between the urban and rural contexts, look at the size of the People Power movement, and its results. However, early during the first stage of research in 2020 it was clear that although a formalized structure of the movement existed, it was difficult to assess how popular the movement actually was. While I had also developed a questionnaire which aimed to uncover the support for Bobi Wine as well as the reasons for this support and selected a representative sample for conducting the survey, actually conducting the survey was not possible due to administrative hurdles. During my stay in 2020, I also quickly got the sense that the movement was actually preparing for entry into formalized politics and for elections in 2021. An analysis of the formalized structure of PP highlighted that 17 out of the 22 coordinators were sitting MPs. After writing the first research report for the project team and receiving initial feedback from a friend and colleague, I realized that the more interesting dynamic at play was how the top leadership and its alliance were subject to the standard governmental

[19] Except article 4, all manuscripts of this dissertation were presented in the weekly BIGSSS/InIIS (later International Politics colloquium) at InIIS. Further, articles 1 and 4 were submitted early on for publication; the reviews received helped to sharpen and refine my arguments. The revision process also helped me to strengthen and expand my empirical parts and present the material supporting my argument in a more convincing manner.

techniques of conflict management in Uganda, that is patronage and co-optation as conflict diffusion and repression as a way of conflict postponement.

Already before I left for field research in Uganda, a draft of article 4 had been written and presented. In many ways, this article is the foundational text of this dissertation since it not only analyzes the trajectory of cross-class coalitions but also identifies the politico-economic success factors of such coalitions for democratization.

Below I describe the design of the study, my strategy to generate the insights in this dissertation, how I sampled and collected data, and what my data corpus consists of.

4.1. Single case studies paired with a cross-case comparison

In general, I chose a qualitative approach in this dissertation. The design I use in this dissertation is primarily a single case study, an approach widely used in the political science sub-fields of international relations as well as comparative politics, but also in area studies. Uganda (articles 1, 2, and 3) is chosen as the typical case. In contrast to that, Tanzania (article 5) is selected following the most-likely crucial case logic. I explain further below why Uganda is typical of the wider universe of cases and what the study population consists of. The role of Tanzania as a most-likely crucial case is to criticize a theoretical framework; hence, questions of representativeness are not due here. However, the thesis also contains a comparative element. Burkina Faso and Taiwan (article 4) are chosen as diverse cases. I first describe the motivation behind the choice of a single case study and then explain the comparative approach.

Aiming for high internal validity and representativeness – the typical case of Uganda

As noted above, the initial research gap that I identified was the question about the immediate and mid-term outcomes of protest coalitions. Conducting a case study, as John Gerring (2007, S. 13) argues, also necessitates the researcher to reflect on what the case chosen for analysis is actually a case of. This is especially true for a typical

case that is taken as a case representative of a larger set of cases. As the thesis focuses on cross-class coalitions and their outcomes, these coalitions have to be present in my cases and also have to be regarded as a protest actor. The movements also have to have been in existence for some time in order to assess their outcomes. Further, the theoretical choice limits the universe of cases to former bureaucratic development societies in which remnants of the state class persist until today. Conversely, all countries from the Global North are excluded from this group of cases as the structural conditions are different.

Table 1 below gives an overview of bureaucratic development societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Table 1. Bureaucratic development societies

Africa	**Asia**	**Latin America**
Algeria	Abu Dhabi[3]	Argentina
Burkina Faso[1]	Afghanistan	Bolivia
DRC/(Zaire)	China	Brazil
Egypt	India	Chile
Gabon	Indonesia	Mexico
Ghana	Iran	Peru
Cote d'Ivoire	Kuwait	
Kenya	Malaysia	
Liberia	Pakistan	
Libya	Philippines	
Madagascar	South Korea	
Mali	Syria	
Mauritania	Taiwan	
Morocco	Thailand	
Mozambique	Turkey	
Nigeria		
Senegal[1]		
Sudan		
Tanzania		
Togo		
Tunisia		
Uganda[2]		
Zambia		

Source: Author's compilation of countries classified by Elsenhans (1981, 13–20, 256-261) as bureaucratic development societies. Three further countries were added (see notes).

Notes:

[1]Here, I add Burkina Faso and Senegal and explain in the sub-section on the cross-case comparison why I also group these countries under bureaucratic development societies.

[2] Although Uganda is not part of the cross-case comparison (see below), Uganda can equally be grouped here (Gershenberg 1972, S. 89–92).

[3] In Table 3 (see Appendix, page 70) and

Figure 1 (see below page 54), I use data on the United Arab Emirates instead of Abu Dhabi due to data availability.

To understand the short-term results of cross-class coalitions, I choose Uganda as a single case study and analyze the People Power and later National Unity Platform in-depth. Uganda fulfils the requirements laid out here in so far that it has had social movements that staged protests and the existence of People Power since 2017 allows me to assess at least the immediate to mid-term outcomes of this movement (article 1). Selecting Uganda also allowed me to study the relationship between movements or oppositional challengers and the state class more broadly. This choice allowed me to study a case *in vivo* and not only rely on historical or secondary data. Single case studies usually possess a high validity (Gerring 2007, S. 43). A variety of information is usually collected and cross-referenced via triangulation. However, the choice of Uganda was also made due to pragmatic reasons. The project "Figurations of Internationalized Rule in Africa" received funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [German Research Foundation] for a cross-case comparison of Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Seeking high external validity – the diverse cases of Burkina Faso and Taiwan

The interest in article 5 was to theorize and then empirically illustrate the success factors of middle-class-led mobilization of the lower class to replace the remnants of state class with their own party. In line with the theoretical considerations laid out above, Jannis Saalfeld and I hypothesize that this crucially depends on structural factors such as an early unleashing of the productive forces of a country and the empowerment of labor in order to build durable coalitions. We do so by using a diverse case selection that generally serves to test hypotheses. The cases we select can be taken as representative cases in so far that they depict the maximum diversity of the study population (Gerring 2007, S. 89), that is the extremes on the spectrum of bureaucratic development societies. The advantage of such a cross-case comparison is its high external validity compared to a single case study (Gerring 2007, S. 43).

One pole represents a successful economic development and empowerment of labor and the opposite pole is a failed attempt at economic development. We establish these poles by looking at the economic performance of (former) bureaucratic development societies.

Figure 1 below depicts Gross National Income per capita for selected (former) bureaucratic development societies – divided roughly into high-, middle-, and low-income countries – and regards this as a crude measure for evaluating the transition to capitalist growth or stagnation. The full list of countries (the study population includes all former bureaucratic development societies) is provided in the Appendix (Table 5, 74). Returning to our study design, we conceptualize the first case as an early development of productive forces that leads to an empowerment of labor. Durable coalitions between the middle class and the lower class could emerge in order to replace the state class. In the second case, protest coalitions emerge after neoliberal restructuring but are not durable and powerful enough to replace the state class, which is due to the weakness of labor as a cause of a failed attempt to develop the productive forces. Here, remnants of the state class further dominate national politics with their clientelist networks.

Figure 1. The divergent poles of former bureaucratic development societies



Source: Author's conceptualization; data are from World Bank (n. d.) and on Taiwan from the Republic of China (Taiwan) (n. d.); see Table 3, page 70 in Appendix for the entire list of (former) bureaucratic development societies.

While the top income group includes industrializing latecomers such as Taiwan and South Korea (Kuwait and UAE both possess large oil and gas reserves and are hence excluded from the sample), the bottom income group is much larger. Note that although not depicted in the figure, Uganda and Tanzania also belong to this group. Based on the literature, we further classify Burkina Faso and Senegal in which the remnants of the state class still play a significant role (Speirs 1991; Boone 1992) and add them to the list. Relevant indicators for bureaucratic development societies are a high state involvement in capital formation, employment, and the size of the secondary sector. Note that the design focuses on middle-class-led mobilizational efforts in former bureaucratic development societies. Thus, cross-class coalitions have to emerge at some point in order to be part of the sample. To this end, we further narrow down the sample. Two conditions have to be met: first, divergent performance of (former) bureaucratic development societies, and second, protests by cross-class coalitions. I matched the list provided in Branch und Mampilly (2015, S. 81–82), reproduced in a slightly adapted form in the Appendix (p. 72) with the list of bureaucratic development societies to see which of the cases represent the representative case. I combine the two variables (see the three tables in the

appendix). First, GNI per capita (constant 2021 US Dollar) is taken as an indicator for divergent development of (former) bureaucratic development societies. Second, a varying number of protests and cross-class coalitions is depicted in the table on protests. Third, both variables are combined to select those countries in which protests appear and which qualify as (former) bureaucratic development societies. With two protests during the period 2005-2014 (the mean value without the outliers Egypt and Togo is 2,53), Burkina Faso approximates the representative case (see Appendix p. 74). I select Taiwan and Burkina Faso as two extreme cases and strengthen our case comparison by including Senegal and South Korea, two cases that are similar to the core cases.

Theory examination with a most-likely crucial case – Tanzania

This dissertation takes a theoretical interest in how to eliminate the structural constraints, an almost stagnating development of a country's productive forces and societal integration through clientelism (two sides of the same coin). The political settlements framework represents a theory that offers practical steps in overcoming these structural constraints and has hence gained currency among area studies scholars interested in development issues. In article 5, I subject the political settlements framework by Mushtaq Khan (2018) to a rigorous examination. The theoretical examination has already unearthed several discrepancies. Since any theory also holds predictive value, the idea was to test the theory with a most-likely crucial case. In a most-likely crucial case, the theory's predictions should hold (Gerring 2007, S. 115). Since the theory predicts economic transformation, that is kickstarting a transition to capitalist growth once certain conditions are met, such as power and rent centralization, the chosen case should clearly show evidence that the transformation is under way. Although the general aim of the most-likely crucial case, as John Gerring (2007, S. 120–122) argues, is to critique a theory and provoke an update or reformulation of a theory, in any case such a design questions the validity of a theory. In addition to the theoretical examination and the testing, I also sought to present an alternative existing theory by Hartmut Elsenhans (2019) that might

better explain why the most-likely case for the political settlements framework is after all a disconfirming case.

4.2. Data corpus

Since this dissertation uses a qualitative approach, my data is largely non-numerical and almost exclusively consists of verbal information. The backbone of the dissertation consists of ethnographic data and interview material which I gathered during a total of 13 weeks of research during two phases: January-March 2020 and January-February 2022. Additional material was also gathered during a short stay in Berlin in June 2021, where I met with Bobi Wine, Lewis Rubongoya, and Nubian Lee.

For the single case study on Uganda, I mostly rely on interviews, ethnographic data, and newspaper articles. The total number of interviews consists of ten interviews conducted in English ranging between 13 minutes and one and a half hours.[20] These interviews were tape-recorded with the consent of the interviewees. My interviewees included the top leadership of People Power (which later transformed into NUP), the rank and file of the movement, scholars, diplomatic staff, NGO staff, policemen, musicians, DJs, and producers. While this might seem like a very small number of interviews, the backbone of the thesis is the ethnographic data gathered during two field trips to Uganda. Central to any ethnographic approach are conversations as to what I would term "quasi-interviews" conducted in an informal setting, not recorded but implicitly guided by the researcher's study interest. The field diary consists of 45 entries which vary in length from one to seven pages with a word number of 500 to 7000 words. Part of the field dairy are many conversations that I conducted in an open interview-like manner but which I nevertheless did not tape-record. Access to certain premises such as embassies was only permitted once portable devices, such as smartphones, were left at the entry gate. Diary entries were

[20] Certainly, a crucial limitation of this research is that all three articles on Uganda relied on information available in English, German, and French. I have neither sampled data nor analyzed already available data in Luganda or Luo, languages spoken at the sites where research was undertaken. Although Luganda is a Bantu language and its lexis overlaps to a certain extent with Kiswahili, I can only have a very simple and short conversation in Luganda. My knowledge of Luganda is basic, and I do not speak any Luo. In very few cases, some respondents dropped out because their English proficiency was not sufficient to have a conversation.

written immediately after important conversation took place or in the evening. In preparation for my first field trip, a list of articles on People Power and Bobi Wine was compiled from *The East African*, a weekly newspaper with a regional focus on East Africa, in order to write a rich and detailed narrative of the movement. This list was later used for article 1 to contextualize the movement. During my fieldwork in Uganda, but also during the time spent in Bremen, I collected relevant newspaper articles from two nationwide-distributed daily newspapers, *Daily Monitor* and *New Vision*.

It is important to stress that the material mentioned above was mainly used to write article 1, while articles 2 and 3 on Uganda more generally rest on insights gained into the conduct of politics in Uganda, but do not cite from the material as extensively as does article 1. In 2020 when I wrote article 1, relatively few studies provided a descriptive account of People Power and Bobi Wine. Article 2 and 3 rely more on newspaper articles as primary material and the rich secondary literature. Articles 4 and 5 equally mainly rely on newspaper articles as primary data as well as the rich secondary literature.[21] However, article 5 has especially benefitted from insights into Tanzanian politics gained during two longer stays in Tanzania in 2012 and 2013 during my undergraduate studies and short visits in 2016 and 2020. Although I have not conducted any research during these stays, the interaction with former classmates and friends has greatly helped me to understand the dynamics in Tanzania.

Research in autocratic settings poses several issues to the researcher. I briefly reflect on this in article 1 and will hence not reproduce the arguments for the special treatment of my data. Due to warranted safety concerns, the field diary was written in a way to ensure that respondents could not easily be identified. Further, my interview sources have been anonymized wherever this was justified and possible.

[21] For the article on Burkina Faso and Taiwan, we relied mostly on literature available in English, German, and French. For the Tanzanian case data in Kiswahili was sampled and analyzed.

4.3. Data sampling, collection, and analysis

Before leaving for Uganda, a former classmate connected me to an international journalist working in Kampala, Uganda. Upon arrival in Kampala, this journalist introduced me to a People Power activist, who later facilitated many of the interviews that I conducted with movement members. Additionally, I adopted a snowball sampling method for identifying further interviewees. After a conversation or an interview, interviewees provided me with the contact details of further relevant people. I sought to interview the top leadership of PP, which apart from Bobi Wine, Lewis Rubongoya, and Joel Ssenyonyi also included members with organizational functions. I equally sampled people from non-elite PP groups for interviews. Although for most interviews a timeframe was agreed upon before the interview, it was not unusual that respondents answered phone calls during the interview or that the interview had to end earlier than initially planned.

I collected data mainly by using ethnographic methods[22]. The key goal of an ethnography is to describe a group from the insider's view and hence include extensive fieldwork in order to collect data through the techniques of participant observation and formal and informal interviews (Fetterman 2008, 288, 290-291). Both observations and informal interviews or conversations were summarized by means of notes in a field diary. The writing of field notes and an interim report of the research served as important data analysis steps. Triangulation, that is the referencing of material with other sources, was further used as a quality control to ensure the validity of the collected information. Newspaper articles and social media posts were an important further source of primary material, but also used to cross check the collected data. In addition to these informal interviews, I also conducted semi-structured interviews and tape-recorded these with the leadership of PP. Changing perspective, that is from the insider's view (emic) to the outsider's view (etic), is key to position and contextualize the group's experience in society

[22] Given that the total number of weeks spent for fieldwork was rather short to meet the standards of an ethnography, I only speak of ethnographic methods. However, it should be mentioned that I remained in touch with the majority of participants of this study for the entire period of this dissertation.

(Fetterman 2008, S. 289). This was mainly done by reviewing the relevant secondary literature on this topic.

During the data collection phase, I encountered several logistical problems. Yonathan Morse (2019) has highlighted that a key advantage of doing research in African countries is that participants, especially elites, are easily approachable even through cold calling,[23] mostly eager to participate, and quite open to share information. However, as Morse also points out, although people might be much more approachable in African contexts and access to respondents depends less on gatekeepers, there is also a considerable disadvantage of this easy access to respondents. Agreeing on a date and time for an appointment and actually conducting the interview or conversation can be quite challenging. My experiences of data collection largely concur with Morse's description of his research experience. I found it easy to access the top leadership of People Power and later NUP. On the second day of my fieldtrip, I walked into the office of what was still a movement and with the help of a gatekeeper introduced myself to Lewis Rubongoya, who would later become the Secretary General of NUP. Meeting other influential people in the movement was equally straightforward. I met Joel Ssenyonyi at the compound of People Power and approached him to ask him for an interview and exchange numbers. Meeting Bobi Wine for the first time was almost coincidental. I passed by the Firebase studio and saw Lewis and Joel sitting at a table at a restaurant. I joined them and later Bobi Wine came by and I was introduced to him by Lewis. However, actually meeting respondents for an interview was considerably more difficult. Appointments were often rescheduled numerous times until the interview actually took place. In one case, an expert whom I had wanted to interview for over two weeks and whom I had contacted several times called me only a few minutes before I had to sit down for another scheduled interview asking me whether I could go to his office at that very moment. The interview never took place. In another case, a top-level expert with whom I had scheduled an interview neither showed up at the agreed location at the agreed time nor did the person answer my phone calls or text

[23] The current list of MPs of Uganda's eleventh parliament even provides mobile phone numbers for all MPs Parliament of Uganda 2021.

messages as I tried to find out how long I should wait for my interviewee to eventually arrive at the location. This interview also never took place.

An important difference to Morse in my case was that I was constantly under pressure to "contribute" some money. While interviewees who possessed a more secure material position usually did not ask me for something in return for giving an interview, less privileged people usually approached me and asked for a "contribution" to cover hospital bills or educational projects. While in one extreme case the requested contribution converted to a four-figure sum in Euro, the standard requested contribution ranged from 1.000 to 20.000 UGX.

The data collected was exclusively analyzed by triangulation, meaning the cross-checking and referencing of collected material with other forms of information including secondary material.

5. Overview of the articles in the dissertation

My research question focuses on the immediate, mid- and long-term effects of these movements. The second question that I attempt to provide an answer to is what possible routes could be taken to empower the lower classes to make them a partner for durable coalitions. I try to answer these questions by studying a single case – Uganda – but also by drawing on three further cases – Burkina Faso, Taiwan, and Tanzania.

In article 1 "Patronage, Repression, and Co-Optation: Bobi Wine and the Political Economy of Activist Musicians in Uganda", I study the efforts of a movement to form a coalition not tainted by their former inclusion into the state class in order to mobilize lower classes in a cross-class alliance. Here, I first focus on the Ugandan People Power movement (later transformed into National Unity Platform party) of well-known singer Bobi Wine and his goal to challenge long-time President Yoweri Museveni at the polls in 2021. Bobi Wine represents a younger generation of politicians who are more attuned to the grievances of the younger population. He tried to form an alliance with further musicians. As middle-class mobilizers, musicians are an interesting socio-professional category; they have access to the masses and

can potentially use concerts attended by thousands of peoplefor political purposes, as a campaign platform against the regime. Focusing on the relationship between this alliance and movement and the NRM government, I argue that the government can easily cut off musicians from their main income source, which is concert performances. In line with the theoretical approach outlined above, I highlight that musicians in the Ugandan context engage in mobilization for political change as long as this does not affect their economic survival. Alliances between musicians fray if the government can demonstrate through repression that political activism threatens the economic status of artists. This strategy is used alongside co-optation and patronage. This work is important to contextualize the theoretical propositions from movement studies and better understand them in authoritarian systems. Uganda can be qualified as such a regime (Kagoro 2016), where co-optation and patronage are widespread and serve as tools to diffuse conflict and in turn stabilize the ruling class (Zinecker 2009). Although Engels and Müller (2019) do not find significant differences of movements in the Global South compared to Western movements, I point to the structural differences of movements in rent economies, where the ruling government can easily manage these oppositional challengers by employing patronage, repression, and co-optation. Therefore, the first article focuses on key constraints such coalitions expierence and the short-term outcomes of these cross-class coalitions.

The middle-class driven coalitions are not unique to Uganda, but can also be found in several other countries. However, the fact that these musicians engage in political matters makes them an interesting object of analysis for political science. Bobi Wine later transformed his movement into a political party. His National Unity Platform party became the most significant opposition party in the 2021-elected parliament. In article 2 “Repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc: a polit-economic and sociological perspective on authoritarian durability in Uganda”, I take a closer look at the dynamics of opposition within this authoritarian polity. My interest here is mainly of theoretical nature. First, I review important works from comparative politics and international relations concerning democratization. In the second step, I develop my own theoretical model by combining sociological and polit-economic concepts. Uganda is a formally liberalized polity, in which multiparty

elections take place every five years and where opposition parties garner a significant number of votes at presidential elections, sometimes even as high as 37 percent (Kizza Besigye in the 2006 presidential elections). However, President Museveni, who took power by means of an armed struggle in 1986 and has not left power ever since, has recurrently stressed that there won't be a transition of power from his former guerrilla organization to an oppositional challenger. I suggest that today's Uganda can best be understood as an authoritarian system in which the hegemon employs strategies of "repressive tolerance" (Marcuse 1965) and cuts the opposition off from access to the rural population in order to stabilize the historical bloc.

In article 3 "Uganda's state class and the politics of oil", I take a closer look at the constitution of the remnants of the state class in Uganda and analyze how the recent resource finds have impacted the remnants of the state class. As in Tanzania and Mozambique, large resource deposits have been recently found in Uganda. Hypothetically, this would put the still existing state class in a comfortable position to use these extra-income sources for a developmental strategy. This makes Uganda not only an interesting case study from a political economy perspective to observe the conflicts these newly found resources give rise to, but also to closer scrutinize what the remnants of the state class intend to do with these rents. The oil finds and the shift in developmental discourse are analyzed in light of further important strategies to legitimize the continued rule of the NRM: bringing peace to Uganda after overthrowing Idi Amin, increasing political participation and including marginalized segments of society, and implementing radical neoliberal policies which made Uganda a donor darling. Museveni's government has focused on developing its infrastructure and fostering better market integration. The existing government has financed infrastructure projects with anticipated rents by means of loans. This put the government under pressure since the exploitation of oil had to be postponed several times and has forced the government to engage with its lenders. The resource finds have also led to bitter infighting within the state class. Members of parliament, as part of the organic clientele or rather the middle class, have sought to use those fights to be included in the state classes. Oil finds have the potential to facilitate an enlargement of the state class.

Articles 1 to 3 illustrated the structural constraints in which these coalitions operate by using the case study of Uganda. If we take these constraints seriously, the question to ask is then under what circumstances these protest coalitions can actually have a significant impact. These class alliances interweave political and economic demands and call for democratization. The question remains as to what exactly allows them to act as a force of change in democratization. The purpose of article 4 "The prospects of cross-class coalitions in (former) bureaucratic development societies: comparing Burkina Faso and Taiwan" is to understand why in some countries these coalitions can introduce democratization while they break down and fray in other polities. In this co-authored article (*second author Jannis Saalfeld, Universität Duisburg-Essen*), I build on the works of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Mueller (2018), and Elsenhans (1992) and postulate that where labor is strong, it can enter durable coalitions with middle classes. In contrast, these alliances break down where labor is weak and not empowered. Labor is empowered by an early development of a country's productive potential. We select Taiwan (early development of the country's economy resulting in empowerment and durable coalitions) and Burkina Faso (failed development and dis-empowerment of labor and non-durable coalitions) and chart the trajectories of labor's position in society. We illustrate that in the case of a strong labor movement, as was the case in Taiwan, democratization was introduced, while in Burkina Faso the remnants of the state class dominate today's political landscape. We further reflect on the cases of South Korea and Senegal – two cases similar to the extremes of Taiwan and Burkina Faso regarding economic development and labor empowerment. This argument is relevant to a wider set of cases in which movements have succeeded in overthrowing a head of state but in which the old elite remains in government after a political revolution. Here, I look at the mid- to long-term effects of these movements and class coalitions.

If meaningful transformation requires the existence of strong labor to assert democratization, it follows that any agenda that seeks to foster political and economic rights has to engage more closely with how to achieve increasing the bargaining power of labor in society. Such an agenda could be pursued by foreign governments and their NGOs, movements or African governments. In article 5 "Are

power centralization and inequality necessary for development? A critique of Mushtaq Khan's political settlements framework with special reference to Tanzania", I highlight the relevance of Elsenhans' (2019) argument that capitalist growth necessitates rising mass incomes. First, I critque the heterodox framework of political settlements, which gains traction in Africa-focused social sciences and posits to offer a viable route for governments in the Global South to embark on such a development path. The framework suggests that development hinges on the security of a regime and its capacity to centralize rents and oversee their efficient use. In my critique, I identify crucial ambiguities that point to underlying contradictions of the theory. The most significant ambiguity is that it ignores crucial evidence on the importance of smallholders in the transformation to capitalism. Based on the Marxist paradigm of primitive accumulation, the framework stipulates that large-scale agriculture is superior to smallholders and that evictions would be a necessary evil of overcoming underdevelopment. I select Tanzania as a crucial case, since the previous government under President Magufuli seemed to have followed these theoretical propositions and centralized power as well as rent. However, I show that despite these important developmental efforts, Magufuli's government continued to neglect agriculture and accepted rising inequality. While this program might slowly elevate Tanzania further up in the middle-income groups of nations, it is far from triggering capitalist growth and moving quickly towards the upper ranks of middle-income countries or even high-income nations. The authoritarian turn that started during Magufuli's first term is less pronounced under his successor Samia Suluhu Hassan, but there is no indication yet that she is radically reversing the chosen path. In order to achieve a stronger position of labor within society, raising mass incomes has to be a central priority. These findings are also relevant to Uganda. It shows that a mass-oriented approach is generally better suited to create legitimacy and suggests a viable route to do so – also in the case of Uganda.

6. Conclusion

In this conclusion, I provide a brief recap of the argument and outline to which strands of the literature I aimed to contribute. Lastly, I discuss one question that merits further research.

The key question of this dissertation was the following: what outcomes have cross-class coalitions in Africa in the last and current decade so far produced? Cross-class coalitions formulate broad and substantive demands for social change. Relatedly, the thesis also asked under what conditions these coalitions can actually realize the broad and substantive demands that they formulate. The thesis qualitatively studied such cross-class coalitions in-depth in Uganda, compared the trajectories of cross-class coalitions in Burkina Faso and Taiwan, and looked at economic programs in Tanzania to formulate an answer to these two key questions. Building on earlier literature but going beyond those works, I argued that pushing through broad demands and ultimately replacing the remnants of the state class (democratization in the real sense) requires durable cross-class coalitions. The durability of such coalitions rests to a significant degree on the empowerment of the lower classes. Empowerment of the lower classes is a result of successful economic development programs that foster mass incomes and consequently mass demand. I hypothesized that there are basically two ways of how this empowerment can be brought about. First, the remnants of state classes in such former bureaucratic development societies have the option to pursue economic programs that empower the lower classes. The pursuit of such a program disempowers the remnants of the state classes but allow those remnants to potentially survive in the form of a polticial party and participate in the democratic game. Second, cross-class coalitions can try to pursue such a program themselves but are in a far weaker position to do so. Apart from contributing to reestablishing a class-analytical approach in Africanist political science and further developing the state class theory, there are real practical implications of this research for development cooperation. The empowerment of the lower classes requires a holistic macro approach focusing on increasing mass incomes. The thesis used ethnographic data, interviews, newspaper articles gathered during two field trips to Uganda in 2020 and 2020 as well as other primary and

secondary literature on Burkina Faso, Taiwan and Tanzania to illustrate this argument.

The thesis largely rests on a detailed single-case study of Uganda. In article 1, I sought to make a contribution to the study of cross-class coalitions, protests, and middle classes, as well as the role of musicians as oppositional challengers in Africa. The article zoomed in on alliances among middle-class members in Uganda and highlighted the fragility of such alliances. An authoritarian regime can easily cut off musicians as oppositional challengers from their main income source and force them to go back to the fold. The article also showed that – what I would term the trinity of authoritarian regimes – co-optation, repression, and patronage can demobilize cross-class coalitions to a significant degree. My contribution to social movement studies is to highlight these key constraints of mobilization and underline how they weaken cross-class coalitions, a perspective that is for example absent in works such as by Engels and Müller (2019).

In article 2 and 3, I tried to contribute to the study of authoritarian regimes in the Global South. Advancing an approach grounded in political sociology and political economy, the key contribution, in my view, is that both articles showed that the study of authoritarian regimes gains from a more holistic and conceptually demanding view. Authoritarian regimes are ambiguous, as Levitsky and Way's (2010) term "competitive authoritarianism" already suggests. States that pursue repression while at the same time proposing liberal state practices seem paradoxical while they are not. The two articles make sense of the varying behavior of the remnants of the state class in Uganda and also highlight the rationale behind the state pursuing liberal and repressive behavior at the same time. By highlighting the different strategies which the government pursues to legitimize its rule and the classes it seeks to co-opt, the articles also contribute to a more class relational view of the study of regimes, something that is not very prominent to date (see for example the approaches of Tripp 2010, Tapscott 2021 or Levitsky and Way 2010).

In article 4, together with my co-author, I highlight the processes that enable cross-class coalitions to become a powerful actor to force through democratization, meaning replacing the remnants of state classes with coalitions' own interest bodies.

Contributing to the study of cross-class coalitions and democratization, the main merit of this research is to advance a variable that goes beyond those that authors such as Rueschemeyer and colleagues (1992) or Mueller (2018) have proposed. Rueschemeyer and colleagues were mainly interested in democracy and operationalized this variable in a minimal sense. Mueller is only interested in protests. The key interest of this article is the question as to when cross-class coalitions actually become powerful actors to replace the remnants of the state class and substantially change the political order.

In article 5, I lastly tried to contribute to a better theoretical understanding of how states can be re-oriented towards a developmental path that is sustainable and confers legitimacy upon the remnants of the state class. Contra a heterodox but popular approach in Africanist political science and development studies, I highlight that the transition to capitalist growth necessitates a re-orientation of the economy towards increasing mass incomes. The main contribution of this article is to re-emphasize that the transition to capitalist growth necessistates a disempowerment of rentiers and an empowerment of peasants and the informal sector. This framework stands in contrast to works influenced by the political settlments approach, originally developed by Mushtaq Khan (2010). I also provide a critical analysis of Magufuli's growth strategy, a strategy that was often praised as a return to earlier developmental efforts pursued under Julius Nyerere.

Lastly, I briefly discuss one question that merits more attention. Future research should dedicate more attention to alternative forms of mobilization. The francophone countries of West Africa have witnessed a surge of Islamist mobilization contra the state in recent times. Key examples here include Mali and Burkina Faso but also Niger. East Africa is not exempt from this phenomenon. Uganda, Kenya and also Mozambique have seen such mobilization, although in Uganda Islamist mobilization by the Allied Democratic Forces has not been very successful. However, a key question that merits further research in the future is, in my view, the following: How is the failed attempt of the remnants of state classes to develop the economy and limited results from cross-class coalitions feeding into alternative (potentially more violent) forms of mobilization?

7. Appendix

7.1. List of Interviews

Table 2. Interviews

#	Name	Role	Location	Date
1	David Lewis Rubongoya	Eexecutive Secretary, People Power	Kamwokya, Kampala	27 January 2020
2	-	Musician	Kampala	30 January 2020
3	Fred Nyanzi Ssentamu	Local Councilor 1	Kampala	2 February 2020
4	Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi)	Head, People Power	Kamwokya, Kampala	5 February 2020
5	Joel Ssenyonyi	Spokesperson, People Power	Kamwokya, Kampala	6 February 2020
6	-	Key advisor, People Power	Kampala	11 February 2020
7	-	Music producer	Kampala	14 February 2020
8	-	DJ and music producer	Kampala	21 February 2020
9	-	Scholar	Kampala	5 February 2022
10	Andrew Mwenda	Journalist	Kampala	10 February 2022

7.2. GNI per capita in (former) bureaucratic development societies, 1965-2020 (current USD, 2021)

Table 3. GNI per capita in (former) bureaucratic development societies 1965-2020

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Africa												
Algeria	250	330	910	1990	2400	2370	1550	1590	2710	4470	4850	3570
Burkina Faso	80	90	160	300	210	330	250	270	460	650	700	770
Congo, Dem. Rep.							150	130	200	320	460	550
Cote d'Ivoire	210	300	600	1160	640	780	700	650	930	1230	2050	2280
Egypt, Arab Rep.		220	330	490	680	760	920	1420	1220	2370	3340	3000
Gabon	360	570	2870	4590	3860	4820	3910	3100	5520	7850	7970	7030
Ghana	230	250	300	420	350	400	370	340	460	1240	1940	2340
Kenya	100	130	250	450	310	370	270	410	510	920	1300	1840
Liberia									250	460	650	570
Libya									6860	12380	5690	4960
Madagascar	140	180	310	500	400	310	280	290	340	470	490	470
Mali		60	120	250	180	290	270	280	460	700	800	830
Mauritania	260	290	510	710	580	730	900	730	940	1500	1640	1670
Morocco		250	540	980	680	1160	1300	1390	2070	2930	3020	3020
Mozambique							190	320	400	520	640	460
Nigeria	110	170	400	760	970	560	310	470	1030	2150	2820	2000
Senegal		320	560	840	560	920	740	670	990	1330	1320	1430
South Sudan											1090	
Sudan	140	170	380	480	390	530	400	340	760	1260	1220	530
Tanzania						200	170	410	500	720	980	1080
Togo	110	130	260	420	230	400	300	310	400	560	640	920
Tunisia		270	760	1360	1150	1410	1790	2270	3160	4210	4190	3300
Uganda					200	320	230	270	310	680	830	800
Zambia	270	450	590	610	340	430	380	330	560	1340	1580	1160
Asia												
(Abu Dhabi)/UAE								31400	37500	33400	42870	39410
Afghanistan										510	590	500
China	100	120	200	220	290	330	540	940	1760	4340	7890	10550
India	110	120	190	270	290	380	370	440	710	1220	1600	1920
Indonesia		80	220	470	500	560	990	580	1220	2530	3430	3870
Iran, Islamic Rep.	250	390	1460	2050	3420	2540	1290	1760	2960	6250	5370	2960
Kuwait							20520	17980	35220	42490	41820	
Malaysia	300	370	860	1790	1920	2400	4050	3460	5270	8260	10680	10570
Pakistan	110	170	160	320	340	400	470	480	740	970	1260	1270
Philippines	210	250	430	790	590	830	1160	1180	1380	2370	3380	3430
Korea, Rep.	130	280	660	1870	2480	6450	11820	11030	18520	22290	28720	32960
Syrian Arab Republic								4070	6400	10800	950	
Taiwan	229	396	980	2385	3376	8420	13315	15105	16846	19765	23367	29202
Thailand	140	210	380	710	790	1490	2740	1980	2790	4580	5710	7040

Turkey		560	1110	1860	1310	2310	2850	4320	6820	10490	12030	9050
Latin America												
Argentina	1230	1320	2720	2910	2700	3190	7360	7470	4260	9270	12590	9070
Bolivia				820	840	720	850	980	1020	1780	2960	3180
Brazil		450	1180	2180	1550	2350	3430	3930	4000	9650	10190	7850
Chile	670	880	1150	2300	1430	2350	4420	5060	6210	10750	14130	13470
Mexico	480	680	1460	2560	2270	2790	4790	6210	8050	9040	10160	8480
Peru	380	500	1080	1020	840	840	1950	1970	2540	4410	6340	6030

Source: World Bank (n. d.); data for Taiwan are from Republic of China (Taiwan) (n. d.)

7.3. African protests, 2005-2014

Table 4. African protests 2005-2014

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	#
Algeria							2011	2012	2013	2014	4
Angola							2011		2013	2014	3
Benin							2011			2014	2
Botswana							2011				1
Burkina Faso							2011			2014	2
Burundi										2014	1
Cameroon				2008				2012			2
Central African Republic		2006							2013	2014	3
Chad						2010				2014	2
Côte d'Ivoire						2010	2011				2
DRC/(Zaire)							2011		2013		2
Djibouti	2005						2011			2014	3
Egypt				2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	7
Ethiopia	2005	2006							2013	2014	4
Gabon					2009		2011	2012		2014	4
Guinea			2007		2009				2013	2014	4
Kenya				2008		2010			2013		3
Lesotho							2011				1
Liberia							2011				1
Libya							2011		2013		2
Madagascar					2009	2010			2013		3
Malawi							2011				1
Mali								2012	2013		2
Mauritania							2011	2012	2013		3
Mauritius							2011				1
Morocco							2011	2012	2013		3
Mozambique						2010		2012	2013		3
Niger					2009				2013	2014	3
Nigeria								2012			1
Senegal							2011	2012			2
Somalia						2010				2014	2
South Africa					2009	2010	2011			2014	4
Sudan							2011	2012	2013		3
Swaziland							2011	2012	2013		3
Tanzania							2011	2012	2013		3
Togo	2005					2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	6
Tunisia							2011	2012	2013	2014	4
Uganda							2011				1
Western Sahara							2011				1
Zimbabwe	2005		2007	2008							3
										Total	105

Source: Reproduced in a slightly adapted version from Branch und Mampilly (2015, S. 81–82). The authors looked at protests from 2005 to 2014 and counted protests that focused on broad goals with participation from political society. Hence, small scale protests directed at specific goals were excluded.

Note: The calculated mean of protests per country in the given period is 2,625.

7.4. Sample cross-case comparison: bureaucratic development societies and protests

Table 5. Combination of two variables: Bureaucratic development societies and protests

Country	**Bureaucratic development societies (yes, then listed as country / no, left out with -)**	**Bureacratic development societies AND number of protests[24]**
Algeria	Algeria	4
Angola	-	-
Benin	-	-
Botswana	-	-
Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	2
Burundi	-	-
Cameroon	-	-
Central African Republic	-	-
Chad	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	2
DRC/(Zaire)	DRC/(Zaire)	2
Djibouti	-	-
Egypt	Egypt	7
Ethiopia	-	-
Gabon	Gabon	4
-	Ghana	-
Guinea	-	-
Kenya	Kenya	3
Lesotho	-	-
Liberia	Liberia	1
Libya	Libya	2
Madagascar	Madagascar	3
Malawi	-	-
Mali	Mali	2
Mauritania	Mauritania	3
Mauritius	-	-
Morocco	Morocco	3
Mozambique	Mozambique	3
Niger	-	-
Nigeria	Nigeria	1
Senegal	Senegal	2
Somalia	-	-
South Africa	-	-

[24] Countries that only fulfil one criteria (protests or bureaucratic dev. society) are excluded. Hence, Niger even though it experiences protests (see previous table) is excluded from the sample.

Sudan	Sudan	3
Swaziland	-	-
Tanzania	Tanzania	3
Togo	Togo	6
Tunisia	Tunisia	4
Uganda	Uganda	1
Western Sahara	-	-
-	Zambia	-
Zimbabwe		-
	Total	61

Source: Author's own compilation based on lists in 7.2. and 7.3.

Note: The mean is 2,9, but excluding outlier Egypt 2,7, and more importantly excluding both outliers Egypt and Togo 2,53.

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Part 2:

Articles

1. Patronage, Repression, and Co-Optation: Bobi Wine and the Political Economy of Activist Musicians in Uganda (*Africa Spectrum*)

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Abstract

In recent decades, musicians have figured prominently on Africa’s political stage. Popular Ugandan musician Bobi Wine moved beyond protest singer and ventured into politics by entering parliament in 2017 and challenging long-term President Yoweri Museveni at the presidential polls in 2021. To push for social change, Wine created the People Power movement and built an alliance with fellow musicians. This article studies Wine’s movement and his alliance with musicians by taking a political economy approach. I posit that the political activism of musicians reaches its limits when a sitting government can easily threaten the economic base of its oppositional challengers. Alliances become fragile once the government can demonstrate that challenging a ruling elite has severe consequences for one’s livelihood whereas aligning with the government ensures eco- nomic prosperity. The article uses ethnographic data, interviews, and newspaper arti- cles to demonstrate this argument.

Keywords

Uganda, Bobi Wine, activist musicians, co-optation and repression, fragility of alliances

Introduction

This article examines the efforts of popular musician-turned-politician Bobi Wine[25] to challenge President Yoweri Museveni's long-term rule in Uganda and to lobby for social change in the East African state. The study analyses Wine's endeavour to mount a credible challenge to Museveni by focusing on an important period between 2017 and 2020, when Wine sought to build an alliance with other activist musicians to push for transformative policies. In 2017, Wine won a parliamentary seat in a by-election, then built a coalition with like-minded activist musicians, and established his People Power movement in 2018 to mobilise for social change. In mid-2020, the movement was transformed into the National Unity Platform (NUP) to challenge Museveni at the general elections on 14 January 2021. Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) used patronage, repression, and co-optation to contain Wine's endeavour to form an alliance with other activist musicians and build a movement once it became clear that the young politician would appeal to a large part of the electorate. Closer to the election in 2021, the NRM intensified the use of one of these tactics, namely repression. In fact, a range of political commentators agree that patronage and repression played a key role in maintaining the NRM's dominance in the presidential and parliamentary elections in January 2021 (Byaruhanga, 2021; Kiyonga, 2021; Mufumba, 2021; Onyango-Obbo, 2021).

Uganda's 2021 elections were marred by irregularities and violence. After Bobi Wine was arrested in November 2020 for allegedly violating COVID-19 regulations during his campaign, NUP supporters took to the streets. Police and security forces responded with lethal force, leading to at least fifty deaths (Bagala, 2021). Closer towards the polls, journalists also became subject to repression, while Uganda's security services arrested and abducted opposition supporters (Bagala, 2021; Wandera, 2021). On election day, government authorities ordered an internet shutdown, which lasted for at least several days after the poll had taken place (Bwire, 2021). According to the official results provided by the Electoral Commission, incumbent Yoweri Museveni won a sixth term in office with 58.4 per cent of the vote,

[25] Wine's legal name is Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu. I henceforth use his stage name throughout the article.

while Wine gathered 35.1 per cent (Electoral Commission, 2021b). Wine subsequently claimed that the poll was rigged[26] and was placed under house arrest. Although he initially challenged the official election results at the Supreme Court, he later withdrew his petition over concerns that the court was biased. Instead, he called for peaceful protests against the sham election and demanded the release of missing opposition supporters.

As becomes evident, the tactics of patronage, repression, and co-optation play an important role in maintaining the NRM's dominance in Uganda. The present article focuses on the early stage of Wine's efforts to mount a credible challenge to Museveni by building a coalition with like-minded activist musicians to lobby for transformative politics, and closely studies the dynamics at play. Alliances with other groups and individuals lend credence to forces pushing for social change (Mueller, 2018), but activist musicians also face restrictions in lobbying for transformative politics and building alliances. The literature on music and politics described co-optation and repression as factors that limit musicians' activism (see for instance Olukotun, 2002; Schumann, 2013). Furthermore, recent studies on protests and movements in Uganda have illustrated that the NRM contains these oppositional activities through patronage, repression, and/or co-optation (Branch and Mampilly, 2015; Philipps and Kagoro, 2016). Here, I explore how the sitting government, Museveni's NRM, has reacted to the challenges of Wine and his coalition and how in turn the NRM's response to these challenges has impacted Wine's alliance. The article highlights the variety of tactics of such regimes to contain its challengers but also studies the reactions of such activist musicians to these tactics.

Musicians played a vital role in the politics of colonial and post-colonial Africa (Fosu-Mensah et al., 1987; Tracey, 1954). They continue to do so in contemporary

[26] Election observers deployed from the East African Community declared the poll on 14 January 2021 free and fair (Atukunda, 2021). However, neither the United States nor the European Union had sent election observers, citing Uganda's unwillingness to allow their missions into the country (Biryabarema, 2020; U.S. Embassy in Uganda, 2021). In late February 2021, the US government called for independent and impartial investigations into alleged irregularities and human rights abuses (Butagira, 2021). However, Uganda's Electoral Commission (EC) rejected the proposal of an audit "because there is no supporting law under which it can be carried out" (Ahimbisibwe, 2021). The EC chairman, Justice Simon Byabakama, instead pointed to the judiciary's ability to evaluate the elections (Ahimbisibwe, 2021).

Africa. Gunner (2019) identified different usages and roles of political music. It can be used as "a resource that knowledgeable citizens draw on at times of pressure or celebration, or even of mourning," as a frame for identification, or as a "veritable arsenal of energy for those struggling for a better order" (Gunner, 2019: 2). In her study on hip-hop in Africa, Clark (2018: 72) noted that the continent's artists have not only provided this arsenal of lyrical power to criticise societal grievances but have also taken a more direct role in opposing non-democratic regimes, for instance by creating movements and staging protests.[27] Regarding the cases of Burkina Faso and Senegal, Touré (2017) has offered a decidedly optimistic account of these musicians and their alliances with fellow artists and civil society groups, and posited that these can serve as a crucial corrective compensating for a weak opposition.

Musicians who move from careers as protest singers into the political sphere to organise opposition against a regime make themselves a subject of the study of opposition politics. Oppositional challengers rely on resources to mobilise and push for social change as well as to avert co-optation. Arriola (2012, 2018) has identified the significance of financial resources for the mobilisational and electoral success of opposition parties and coalitions. Using a political economy framework, he argues that African countries that adopted the sweeping economic liberalisation policies of financial institutions in the 1990s depoliticised access to credit and thereby allowed entrepreneurs to more readily support opposition parties and their party- and coalition-building efforts. Paget (2019) has recently employed this framework to analyse the rise and success of Tanzania's main oppositional party Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) and has related this to the existence of such powerful financiers.

My argument uses the main thrust of these theoretical propositions to make sense of the dynamics of Wine's movement and his alliance with other activist musicians. I argue that the political activism of musicians reaches its limits when a sitting government can easily threaten the economic base of its oppositional

[27] Clark (2018: 72, 107–115) points to other recent cases in which musicians have taken on a more active role in the politics of sub-Saharan (Burkina Faso and Senegal) and North Africa (Egypt and Tunisia).

challengers – that is, when the livelihood and status of musicians are at stake. Alliances become fragile once the government can demonstrate that challenging a ruling elite has severe consequences for one's livelihood, whereas aligning oneself with the government ensures economic prosperity.

By focusing on Wine's alliance and the effects of patronage, repression, and co-optation on his coalition, I aim to provide some tentative answers as to whether the optimism concerning musicians' alliances (Touré, 2017) is also justified for Uganda. I further try to contribute to the politico-economic approach to the study of opposition politics by analysing the ways in which governments can re-politicise accumulation and thereby constrain the scope of opposition. The article further complements Osiebe's Osiebe (2020) more introductory paper on Wine by taking a closer look at People Power and Wine's alliance with fellow musicians.

The article is divided into four sections. In the next section, I develop the argument in more detail and provide a note on methods and data. The empirical section of this article first introduces Bobi Wine and gives some context on his movement, the alliance, and ideological standpoints. I then shed light on the government's response to Wine's challenge before closely studying the dynamics of what I call "activist musicians' alliance." The conclusion relates the NRM's efforts to undermine the power of its oppositional actors to the recent results from the general election on 14 January 2021.

Music, Protests, and Oppositional Politics: A Political Economy Perspective

Musicians build alliances with fellow artists in order to push for social change; artists and their alliances can then be considered to be part of the oppositional forces (Touré, 2017). To understand the dynamics in this oppositional field, I draw inspiration from political economy literature that has identified financial and organisational resources as a central determinant of successful group engagement in social conflict (see Dahl, 1971: 48–61; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1216). Arriola (2012, 2018) presents a theory that looks at the politico-economic conditions of opposition

politics and coalition-building in Africa. He argues that in those countries where leaders maintained a tight grip on the financial sector following economic liberalisation in the 1990s, business is "induced into remaining politically aligned to the regime without having to be explicitly told to be loyal; their economic self-interest silently guides their political behaviour" (Arriola, 2018: 94). However, where states pursued a more radical agenda of economic liberalisation, a diverse banking sector emerged and entrepreneurs had access to depoliticised credit. Businessmen were thus more willing to support oppositional challengers. Building on this framework, Paget (2019) showed in the case of Tanzania's main opposition party Chadema that financiers who had benefitted from such liberalisation reforms supported the building of its nationwide party structures. It was in part this organisational infrastructure that made the past electoral successes of Chadema possible (Paget, 2019: 698, 705–706).

Although I draw inspiration from this political economy framework, I shift the focus to those entrepreneurs who move beyond the role of solely acting as financiers of oppositional activities and venture directly into the political sphere. I understand activist musicians as those entrepreneurs who take on a more active role in politics, while I consider musicians largely to be entrepreneurs. Generally, musicians have benefitted from the political and economic liberalisation in the 1990s, as these reforms opened up new channels to distribute and promote music through newly created TV and radio stations. Also, consumer demand for cultural products has increased considerably (Schneidermann, 2014a: 12–13). However, musicians as entrepreneurs probably depend less on access to credit and more on the uninterrupted potential to generate income by selling their music. This is different from classical entrepreneurs, who depend more heavily on loans to finance new production facilities, for instance.

While this framework establishes the larger politico-economic conditions of successful group engagement in social conflict, I connect the approach to studies from area studies and comparative politics that have examined the political role of musicians in society as well as the dynamics of oppositional actors within authoritarian or hybrid regimes. It is important to relate these research strands, as,

in the case of Uganda, oppositional actors such as activist musicians and their alliances operate within authoritarian contexts. Hence, they are also subject to government strategies that are generally employed to stifle criticism of the regime.

As Gunner (2019), Englert (2008a), Allen (2004), and Fosu-Mensah et al. (1987) all have noted, apart from fulfilling other important functions,[28] political music can be used as a form of protest but can equally be manipulated by a regime to produce or renew its legitimacy. In a case study on musicians' activism during military rule in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s, Olukotun (2002) analysed the crucial role musicians played in voicing and amplifying civil society's dissatisfaction with military rule. The regime sought to silence critical artists by prohibiting them from playing their music or forcing artists underground. At the same time, Nigeria's military ruler tried to gain the upper hand in this field of contention by organising a two-million-person march, a public mega-event that also deployed "artistic resources by the state in the search for hegemony" (Olukotun, 2002: 209). Other scholars have pointed to similar dynamics in countries such as Nigeria in the 1970s (Labinjoh, 1982; Langley, 2010; Sithole, 2012), Zimbabwe (Eyre, 2001), Tanzania (Englert, 2008b; Reuster-Jahn, 2008), Ivory Coast (Schumann, 2013, Schumann, 2015), Angola (Moorman, 2014), Kenya (Mutonya, 2004), Cameroon (Nyamnjoh and Fokwang, 2005), and Uganda (Schneidermann, 2014a; Schneidermann and Diallo, 2016). Schumann (2013) has illustrated that a government's strategy towards musicians can also shift from co-optation to repression once musicians are no longer considered a necessary tool with which to legitimise its rule.

The literature on protests and movements in Uganda has shown that the strategies of patronage, repression, and co-optation are also employed to contain other oppositional activities. Branch and Mampilly (2015: 115) have emphasised the NRM's key strategy of "a blend of co-optation and force" to manage the political landscape in Uganda. The authors described this as one of the dilemmas of Ugandan politics that restricts the scope of the opposition. Concerning the repressive component of this strategy, they point to the "Walk to Work" protests in 2011, during

[28] I refer here to the works of Gunner (2019), Englert (2008a), and Allen (2004), who all review important strands of the general literature on music and politics.

which the security forces cracked down on demonstrators, thereby thwarting efforts to mobilise continuously. The authors also observe that the movement failed to mobilise other parts of society, most notably the rural population, as it lacked an agenda that went beyond simply criticising corruption and the NRM. Kagoro (2015) has further analysed the strong coercive capacity of the Ugandan state, in which the military, the ruling party, and the presidency are fused, something Branch and Mampilly (2015: 138) term "militarised rule." As Kagoro (2016) argues, this fusion helps to keep the NRM in power despite the formally liberalised political field in Uganda. In their study of protest dynamics in one of Kampala's markets, Philipps and Kagoro (2016) illustrate how both the NRM and the police also heavily relied on co-optation and patronage to undercut oppositional momentum. Key figures that could turn locally perceived or real grievances into protests were simply included in patronage networks and co-opted.

Based on these studies, I argue that the political activism of musicians reaches its limits when a sitting government can easily threaten the economic base of its oppositional challengers – that is, where the livelihood and status of musicians are at stake. Alliances then become fragile once the government can demonstrate that challenging a ruling elite has severe consequences for one's livelihood whereas aligning with the government ensures economic prosperity.

Although I use diverse evidence to illustrate these dynamics, the article mainly draws on data from ethnographic fieldwork conducted from January–March 2020 in Kampala, Uganda. The empirical part of this article is based on a field diary kept during my fieldwork. I combine these data with semi-structured interviews that were conducted with key participants of the movement. Respondents later provided me with further contacts that shared useful insights into the movement and the alliance. I also interviewed journalists, NGO staff, personnel from the diplomatic field, and the police. Together with other primary sources such as newspaper articles, I triangulated the available data in a reiterative-interpretative process.

Since research in non-democratic regimes can be a delicate endeavour, especially research that concerns issues of regime stability,[29] I decided to anonymise the majority of my sources due to concerns for the safety of my research participants.[30] Research on oppositional actors falls into the category of a regime's stability and therefore, in my view, justifies the anonymisation of a large number of my sources.

Bobi Wine and People Power: Navigating Between Revolutionary Symbols, African Political Thought, and the Old Policies of President Museveni

After graduating from Makerere University in 2003 with a diploma in Music, Dance, and Drama, Wine could not find a job in the formal sector and instead turned to making music. Produced by his elder brother Eddy Yawe, Wine's career in Uganda's music scene soon took off. Wine is now one of the most famous Ugandan artists, blending reggae and afrobeat. He shifted from music to politics in 2017 when he ran as an independent candidate in a parliamentary by-election in Kyadondo County East, a constituency in Wakiso district, which borders the district of Kampala, and also won.

Wine grew up in Kamwokya, one of Kampala's more impoverished neighbourhoods. His family is closely connected to politics; his father was a district councillor for the Democratic Party – to date one of the main opposition parties – in Uganda's central region during the 1980–1986 bush war (Pilling, 2019; Schneidermann and Diallo, 2016: 115). The family lost its status over a conflict with the NRM at the end of the bush war. Bobi Wine's brother Nyanzi Fred Ssentamu was a local councillor 1 for Kamwokya until 2021. Eddy Yawe, Wine's elder brother and

[29] See Koch's (2013) introduction to the special issue in Area (Volume 45, Issue 4) on research in "closed contexts" as well as Ahram and Goode's (2016) introductory paper to the special issue of Social Science Quarterly (Volume 97, Issue 4) on "autocracies." The dilemmas and tensions of conducting research in different autocratic regimes regarding confidentiality and the security of research participants and researchers are addressed in both issues.

[30] Glasius et al. (2018: 100–103) categorise research participants as "ordinary people," "expert informants," and "spokespersons" in order to make an informed decision whether or not to anonymise a source. I have cited the full name of my respondents where my interviewee was a top-level public figure of the movement and represented the official spokesperson view of the movement ("spokesperson" group). All other interviews have been anonymised ("ordinary people" as well as "expert informants"). I give an indication of the professional occupation of my interlocutor wherever possible.

also a successful musician and music producer, tried to venture into politics in 2011 and 2016, when he ran for parliament in Kampala's urban region. However, he lost in both elections (Schneidermann and Diallo, 2016: 117). Mikie Wine, one of Bobi Wine's younger brothers, himself a professional musician, also planned to venture into politics in 2021.

After taking power in 1986, rebel-leader-turned-president Yoweri Museveni introduced a "no-party democracy" and effectively banned all political parties with the declared aim of curbing sectarianism and ensuring peace and stability (Kasfir, 1998). Uganda's "no-party democracy," in which non-partisan candidates ran in presidential and parliamentary elections, remained in place until the first multi-party elections in 2006 (Carbone, 2008). Despite this political liberalisation, Museveni's NRM has continued to dominate Uganda's political arena and consistently won a majority in parliament and the presidency.[31]

After his election to parliament, Wine formed a movement called People Power in mid-2018. David L. Rubongoya, the Executive Secretary of People Power, described the movement as "a non-violent […], political movement in Uganda which aims at ending the Museveni dictatorship of 34 years […] and of course establishing a government of the people for the people that works basically for their interests."[32] At this point, the movement did not issue any membership cards or collect any fees.[33] However, a formalised coordination structure for mobilisation in Uganda and abroad existed. Wine's fellow artists such as Nubian Li, Ronald Mayinja, Dr. Hildermann, and actor and TV presenter Mary Flavia Namulindwa, had official coordinating functions,[34] while further popular musicians with whom Wine allied, such as Jose

[31] Yoweri Museveni has won all multi-party elections since 2006 (59.3 per cent of the vote in 2006, 68.4 per cent in 2011, and 60.6 per cent in 2016) against Kizza Besigye, his main challenger from the hitherto largest opposition party Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) (37.4 per cent in 2006, 26 per cent in 2011, and 35.6 per cent in 2016). The ruling party NRM has maintained a majority of close to or slightly above 70 per cent in previous parliamentary elections (elected seats only): 191 out of 284 seats in 2006 (67 per cent), 250 out of 350 seats in 2011 (71 per cent), and 283 out of 401 (71 per cent) seats in 2016 (African Elections Database, 2011; Electoral Commission Uganda, n.d.).

[32] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, Executive Secretary (ES) People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala, 27 January 2020.

[33] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, ES People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala,27 January 2020.

[34] People Power Calendar 2020, depicting People Power national co-ordinators and sub-coordinators; photo depicted in field note 14, 30 January 2020.

Chameleone and Eddy Kenzo, did not have any official role within the movement. In mid-2020, the People Power movement was then transformed into a political party, the NUP.

What does this movement and now political party stand for? A visit to the headquarters in Kamwokya, Kampala, gives a first impression of the ideological references that Wine makes. The grey walls of the compound were covered with six-foot portraits of world-renowned African intellectuals and politicians. Nelson Mandela's likeness depicted in a map of the African continent was at the centre of the assembly of these intellectuals. Next to the portrait of an optimistic-looking Mandela was a motto written in Rastafari colours: "A winner is a dreamer who never gives up – Nelson Mandela." The likenesses of Malcolm X, Bob Marley, Marcus Garvey, Haile Selassie, Muammar al-Ghadaffi, and Che Guevara also adorned the walls. After some additional office space had been constructed on the compound in mid-February 2020, the likenesses of former Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah, Martin Luther King, and Thomas Sankara joined the wall. Opposite Sankara and Nkrumah, there was now a mural of Bobi Wine with a raised fist, wearing a white t-shirt, red jacket, and red beret.

In 2019, Bobi Wine had given a concert in Johannesburg and later met with South African opposition politicians; among them was Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The partly revolutionary borrowings described above, most evidently the red beret but also the central reference to Mandela, evoke comparisons with Malema's EFF. Asked whether Wine would support Malema's leftist policies and also had plans to redistribute wealth and income to tackle poverty, for instance through land expropriation as the EFF advocated, he responded:

> My brother Julius Malema and his people have their own challenges. They are not grappling with dictatorship. For us, we are fighting with lawlessness, dictatorship, corruption. […] Here, people are poor, because some of them are [pauses] obscenely rich. People are unemployed because jobs are kept for people even when they are in their nappies. The injustice, the inequitable distribution of opportunities here. You know, you cannot get opportunities because you come from the wrong tribe, or from the wrong family. The corruption that is here [pauses]. We live in an immensely rich country. But the policies and the decisions that are in place do not provide for a solution.[35]

[35] Interview 4, Bobi Wine, Kamwokya, Kampala, 5 February 2020.

So far, the main thrust of the campaign of Wine's movement and his party has been to denounce Museveni as a dictator. He has criticised President Museveni mainly for the lack of political freedoms, public goods, and the persistence of corruption. However, Wine also praised Museveni and the NRM for its "Ten-Point Programme," formulated in 1986 shortly before taking power. Museveni outlined his central policies in this programme, identifying ten key aspects that would facilitate a broad-based and inclusive post-war government. It emphasised "that the immediate problem of Uganda is not economic, but political" (National Resistance Movement, 1986). Re-establishing peace and security, a broad-based and inclusive government based on democratic principles, and rooting out corruption to provide public goods were the cornerstones of the Ten-Point Programme. The economic component of the manifesto stipulated state industrialisation of certain key industries (iron and steel, chemical products, construction and engineering) but demanded to "let private enterprise deal with the rest" (National Resistance Movement, 1986). However, the advocated mixed-economy approach did not address the question of how other sectors of the economy would eventually industrialise.

Wine had indicated that his movement's policies would not differ substantially from the 1986 NRM Ten-Point Programme, as he mainly identified the lack of implementation of these policies as the key reason for Uganda's current socio-economic issues (France 24, 2019). This point was reiterated by his executive secretary.

> [T]here is nothing bad in that "Ten-Point Programme". The first one [goal] was restoration of democracy, ending corruption, ending the misuse of power, ending the misuse of the gun, all those were very good points. And, I think, if all those were implemented, Uganda would be fine. So, the problem of Uganda has not been the question of policy. It's just been the failure of, [pauses] you know, [pauses] governance. It's a question of governance, governance, governance.[36]

NUP's manifesto starkly resembles the NRM's Ten-Point Programme and places a strong emphasis on eliminating corruption, downsizing the government and its institutions to finance an expansion of education and health services (National Unity Platform, 2020).

[36] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, ES People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala, 27 January 2020.

Containing Oppositional Challengers by Threatening Their Economic Base

Building on his familial background in politics and his network in the music industry, Bobi Wine initially assembled an extensive array of internationally successful but also locally based musicians that subscribed to his movement. However, this alliance proved to be short-lived. While the next section will discuss the dynamics of this alliance more closely, this section first analyses the government's approach to the leader of this alliance, namely Bobi Wine. As a presidential challenger with his movement and now party, Wine remains the central figure of this alliance and has received most of the government's attention.

Wine has produced several songs that are critical of the NRM and the status quo in Uganda. However, the NRM has mainly taken issue with his critical stance towards the ruling elite since he entered parliament in 2017 and challenged the regime by staging protests in 2018 and 2019. The government's main approach to Wine has been to ban his live concerts and other mass political events. Since the primary source of income for established musicians in the Ugandan music industry is live shows,[37] the prohibition of concerts has thus had a severe impact on Wine, as I will now elaborate. More importantly, this approach has ramifications for artists that are aligned to Wine, as their economic base also becomes threatened.

As only artists signed to international labels gain a significant portion of their income from royalties – Ugandan music is readily available from street shops – every major Ugandan artist has a substantial number of live shows each year. Apart from the main act, several other famous musicians give guest performances during these events. Usually, these major shows attract a large number of fans, which makes them highly lucrative.

Wine's concerts have traditionally taken place at his property, the One Love Beach, in Busabala by Lake Victoria. Police have blocked these shows since Wine turned from a musician into a politician. Up to October 2019, more than 125 shows of Bobi Wine were reportedly blocked (The East African, 2019). Only on rare

[37] Interview 5, music producer, Kampala, 6 February 2020; Interview 8, DJ and music producer, Kampala, 21 February 2020; see also Schneidermann (2014b).

occasions has he performed. The police usually argued that Wine's concerts did not meet the necessary safety requirements (Abdallah and Abdallah, 2018). Organisers of such events must provide a detailed plan of crowd and traffic control to show that adequate security measures are being taken to protect the public. These requirements are mainly stipulated in the Public Order Management Act (Republic of Uganda, 2013). Passed in 2013, the law leaves room for interpretation due to its vague nature. The police can easily invoke a security narrative that associates these live performances but also other mass events of oppositional forces with criminality and violence, which then gives them legitimate reasons to block these events.[38] Although it cannot be ruled out that crowds might turn violent, or that some of the fans might engage in violent or criminal behaviour, it is noteworthy that the law transfers vast powers to the police to monitor and block public meetings or events.

The law has been used to curb other oppositional events. In one extreme case, the organisers of the Ugandan Fees Must Fall protests had requested permission for a demonstration at Makerere University in October 2019. However, the police decided to ignore the request for this event. When protesters nevertheless went ahead and staged a protest without having acquired the permission of the police, the demonstration was immediately stopped (NTV Uganda, 2019).

Although live performances no longer take place at Wine's property, the site at Lake Victoria, comprising a restaurant, bar, and football field, is still open to the public. Today, this business can hardly sustain itself due to the absence of live shows.[39] Blocking these concerts impacts Wine's income[40]; his sources of income have thus shifted. His parliamentary salary, interviews on international news cables,[41] and the rent he collects from his properties have become more critical.[42]

Although Wine was not allowed to give live performances on his property, his music was still being played across Ugandan TV and radio stations at the time this

[38] Conversation with journalist 2, Kamwokya, Kampala, 30 January 2020; summarised in field note 13.
[39] Conversation with manager, 26 January 2020; summarised in field note 10.
[40] Conversation with N, Kampala, 20 January 2020; summarised in field note 2.
[41] Conversation with interlocutor N and journalist 1, Kampala, 19 January 2020; summarised in field note 1.
[42] Conversation with interlocutor N, Kampala, 20 January 2020; summarised in field note 2.

research took place. Wine's song "Kyarenga" ("It is too much / It is unbearable") a critique of socio-economic conditions in Uganda, was even being played on government-owned TV stations.[43] Moreover, Wine was a regular guest on radio programmes.

Artists who have aligned themselves with People Power and Wine have faced the same government strategy of repression. Since fellow musicians cannot fall back on a parliamentary salary or lucrative contracts for interviews, depriving these artists of the opportunity to give live performances has severe implications, as the following examples illustrate.

Lucky Bosmic Otim, a musician from Northern Uganda, served as People Power's youth co-ordinator in the Acholi sub-region. He was not only a vocal critic of President Museveni but also attacked musicians who were aligned with the NRM. The government then blocked his national concerts and prevented him from travelling abroad to perform. Also, the security forces reportedly put pressure on him. Otim resolved his precarious situation by meeting President Museveni and shifting his allegiance to the ruling party (Lucima and Wandera, 2020: 14, 34). Otim explained his decision to a journalist:

> Unless I sing, my family will not eat; will not have an education, so I decided to become free again since People Power is not catering for my family's welfare. Anybody who cannot support you in your most difficult hour, that is not your person (friend). (Owiny, 2020: 12)

Shortly after having crossed over to the NRM camp, a significant performance by Otim at a show in Northern Uganda was then cleared by the security forces (Kwo, 2020).

Other artists who openly campaigned for Bobi Wine and praised him as the next president of Uganda have faced a similar situation as Otim. A young popular artist described that he had once sung for President Museveni at a government-funded show several years previously but had seen a sharp decline in bookings for

[43] Personal observation at TV studios, New Vision Group, Kampala, 4 February 2020; summarised in field note 17.

concerts since openly supporting and campaigning for Bobi Wine as a presidential challenger.[44]

The examples are representative of the strategies and decisions of musicians weighing up whether to engage in politics or not, as a person who is close to Bobi Wine and NRM musicians alike explained:

> As long as you don't speak about politics, you can still make a lot of money. This is why the other [popular] artists do not want to come out and support Bobi [Wine] publicly, even if they support him privately.[45]

This statement, but also the examples of Wine, Otim, and another young popular musician described in the previous paragraphs, show that the NRM government regulates musicians' political activism by threatening their economic base. Blocking these concerts deprives Wine and other activist musicians not only of income but also of a crucial channel for addressing larger audiences on issues that the NRM government might deem politically sensitive. It furthermore precludes other artists aligned to Wine from using their shows for political mobilisation. Apart from repression, the NRM also relies heavily on patronage and co-optation to control activist musicians.

The Crumbling Alliance: Patronage, Repression, and Co-Optation Lead to Disintegration

Bobi Wine initially succeeded in bringing together various artists supporting his thrust for social change. This alliance comprised several significant artists from the Ugandan music scene but also included less well-known musicians. They all shared discontent with the socio-economic conditions in Uganda and subscribed to the ideas of People Power.

Bobi Wine, Eddy Kenzo, Jose Chameleone, and Bebe Cool all play key roles in Uganda's music scene. All four of them possess their own recording studios and music labels with which several other popular but less successful artists are under contract.

[44] Interview 2, musician, Kampala, 30 January 2020.
[45] Conversation with N, Kampala, 5 February; summarised in field note 20.

Despite the fact that these four leading artists are politically aligned to either the government or the opposition, they have frequently collaborated on a number of songs.

While Bebe Cool supports the NRM, Bobi Wine represents the opposition. Wine initially succeeded in building an alliance with Jose Chameleone and Eddy Kenzo, who openly supported Wine's presidential ambitions and subscribed to his movement. However, Chameleone's and Kenzo's allegiances have proven to be fluid.

In 2015, Jose Chameleone had joined Bebe Cool in praising the government in the 2016 presidential elections. Both artists were the lead musicians of the song "Tubonga Nawe" ("We are with you") showcasing their support for the ruling party NRM. The song also featured various artists signed to their respective labels. As a gesture to thank these musicians for their support, President Museveni allocated them 400 million Ugandan shillings (UGX). Although the money donated in return for the song was meant to support the entire music industry in Uganda, it was nevertheless explicitly given to those musicians who praised President Museveni and therefore caused conflicts in the music industry over the question of fair distribution (Kigambo, 2015; see also Schneidermann and Diallo, 2016: 99).

However, in 2019, Jose Chameleone turned away from the NRM. Bobi Wine had persuaded Chameleone to support his People Power movement openly (Nakayo, 2019). Eddy Kenzo also joined Bobi Wine and his People Power movement after Wine was attacked and imprisoned in 2018 during a campaign event in Northern Ugandan that turned violent. Eddy Kenzo then released several songs in which he criticised the government over the status quo. With Chameleone and Kenzo, Wine's alliance had become rather significant in 2019. However, Kenzo jumped ship shortly after he had pledged his support to Wine. After a meeting with President Museveni in late 2019, Eddy Kenzo said that he no longer supported Wine and People Power and would stay away from politics. President Museveni not only promised to support Kenzo's projects in the music scene financially but also acknowledged Kenzo's talent and hardworking character (Museveni, 2019; Okello, 2019). Chameleone also distanced himself from the People Power movement (and later the NUP), having initially joined

the Democratic Party to run for mayor of Kampala in 2021 but eventually standing as an independent candidate.[46]

In general, artists who have chosen to cross over to the NRM cite "fear, risks to their lives, poverty and need for survival of their families" (Lucima and Wandera, 2020: 34) as their reasons for changing sides. Musicians who had criticised President Museveni were later approached by the NRM and promised financial rewards if they shifted their allegiance. Ronald Mayinja, one of the sub-coordinators for musicians in Uganda, had criticised the government at a show at which President Museveni himself was present; "his life has been threatened a couple of times with some people approaching him to meet the President" (Lucima and Wandera, 2020: 34). Mayinja is a particularly interesting case to illustrate the tactic of repression and co-optation. Wine had appointed Mayinja as one of his People Power sub-coordinators managing the alliance with fellow musicians. After receiving personal threats, Mayinja stopped supporting Bobi Wine and created his own movement called Peace for All. Since he had been interested in running for a seat in parliament in his home constituency in Gomba, he then announced his plans to build a party ahead of the general elections 2021 (Lule, 2020). However, only months later he once again pledged his support to Wine and even became a member of his party, the NUP (Wamala, 2020). This was not the end of the story. He again distanced himself from the NUP after being offered the opportunity to record a song praising President Museveni. In "Muzeyi Akalulu" ("Museveni, the vote is yours"), Mayinja "heaps praise on Museveni as the best president he has ever seen in Uganda" (Kazibwe, 2020), claiming that Museveni is God's gift to Ugandans and announcing that he would be prepared to mobilise for the NRM. Mayinja justified this changeover: "I got a client from NRM who asked me to do an advert for them and that is what I did" (Kazibwe, 2020).

Bobi Wine has also found it challenging to convince other artists to stay within his movement and later his party, as activist musicians who had criticised the NRM were later approached by the government and promised financial rewards if they

[46] However, in the 2021 mayoral race, incumbent mayor Erias Lukwago was re-elected for a third term in office.

shifted their allegiance to the NRM. Hassan Ndugga, also a formerly staunch People Power supporter and musician, explained to journalists that money was his main motivation for coming home to the NRM.

> I have joined NRM because I want to become rich. Those criticizing me have never given me even a single penny, not even Bobi Wine, apart from praising me. I don't want to die poor. (Lucima and Wandera, 2020: 34)

Just like Hassan Ndugga, further famous musicians such as Big Eye and Pastor Wilson Mugembe have also stopped supporting People Power in favour of the NRM.

However, there are also artists and producers who have resisted those offers. For example, a music producer has chosen to keep up his support for Bobi Wine despite the negative effects it has had on his economic situation.

> There is a certain guy who gave me an idea. [He said:] "Now, you know, you know a lot about Bobi Wine. Now, when I take you to Museveni you become [exclaims] rich immediately – when you just sing Museveni and talk everything about Bobi Wine, you'll become rich." I told him: "You go, you go! Bobi Wine has brought me from far. You go." Even though I don't have, I will get money one day. That money is not good. They give me because of talking about Bobi Wine. I don't want that. I told him to leave me.[47]

An artist who was close to Bobi Wine reported a similar incident in which financial rewards were offered in return for keeping a distance from People Power.

> [My manager] again came to me and was like: "There is a deal happening and hey, you can be paid, man." I ask him: "For what? Yes, I can be paid, I want the money, but for what!" He was like: "Hey, but you just leave those Bobi Wine things and don't talk about them and just do your thing." I was like: "Now, do you think is that okay, for you?" He was like: "Hey, we need money, you know. We need to do expensive videos. We need to do… You don't want to draw your thing, you don't want to make your thing go. You need a beautiful house!"[48]

This "deal" included not only money but also a car, as he went on to explain. Another artist described how after releasing a song that openly questioned whether President Museveni was at all aware of the issues of the more impoverished neighbourhoods of Kampala, he was subsequently offered an opportunity to sing for the president which meant being paid a significant amount of money.[49] Wine himself has also been approached several times to cross over to the NRM. Almost all critical figures around

[47] Interview 5, music producer, Kampala, 6 February 2020.
[48] Interview 2, musician, Kampala, 30 January 2020.
[49] Conversation with musician, Kampala, 4 February 2020; summarised in field note 17.

Bobi Wine have been approached by Museveni or his aides and asked to shift their allegiance to the NRM.[50]

In efforts to further divide the alliance, the NRM has also directly co-opted some of Wine's former fellow musicians into the ruling elite. Bobi Wine had publicly branded himself as bringing the "Ghetto" – a signifier for the impoverished urban settlements in Kampala – to parliament. In Kamwokya, where Wine grew up, people call him the "Ghetto President." To push back Wine's popularity among the youth, Museveni established two NRM empowerment offices for the youth in Kibuye and Katwe. These offices are headed by two former close allies of Wine – Buchaman and Full Figure – who have both been co-opted by the ruling elite to ensure the NRM's presence in the "Ghetto" and also to give inhabitants a direct link to the president. In addition to Buchaman and Full Figure, Catherine Kusasira, another famous musician, also serves as a presidential envoy to mobilise the youth for the NRM. By appointing presidential envoys, President Museveni has tried to portray himself as relating to the issues of the more impoverished neighbourhoods. A graffito on one of the walls of the recently established Kibuye empowerment office reads: "M7 man of ghetto [sic!]" (Shaban, 2019).

Buchaman belonged to a core team of musicians performing at Wine's concerts, the two having collaborated on several songs. He also served as the former vice-president of Wine's recording label Firebase Records. However, after Buchaman and Wine had fallen out with each other, Buchaman was later appointed as the NRM's presidential advisor on "Ghetto Affairs" for Kibuye. According to a DJ and music producer who is close to both musicians, switching allegiance has improved Buchaman's economic situation as well as his reputation. Inhabitants now address him too as "Ghetto President." However, as the DJ and music producer goes on to explain, the appointment of Buchaman as presidential advisor created controversy over who is the real "Ghetto President."

> [W]hen you hear Bobi Wine [pauses] still claims to be the "Ghetto President". Buchaman is also the "Ghetto President". That is separation among ourselves, 'cause we all come from the

[50] Conversation with interlocutor C, Kampala, 8 February 2020, summarised in field note 21; Interview 5, music producer, Kampala, 6 February 2020; Conversation with N, Kampala, 5 February 2020, summarised in field note 20.

> ghetto and all these systems are divide and rule. If you divide them, you can rule them. If we are separated [pauses], united you stand strong. Divided you fall. At the end of the day, we as the ghetto youths are the ones who are going to lose. And most of the times, they've [referring to the NRM] been keeping us behind. It's only in these times when they need our votes, is when they are trying to put us on the front line.[51]

The second NRM empowerment office in Katwe is headed by Full Figure. Full Figure was one of the most outspoken critics of Museveni before she crossed over to the NRM and even hailed Bobi Wine as the next president of Uganda. However, after she too had fallen out with Bobi Wine, Museveni appointed her as the presidential advisor on youth affairs. The resources she then received were intended to mobilise support among the youth for the NRM.[52]

The appointments of Full Figure, Buchaman, and Kusasira are far from symbolic, as these leaders in their respective communities offer residents of the individual neighbourhoods a direct channel to the government through which to voice their grievances and seek help.[53]

The combination of the strategies of repressing key musicians, enticing artists to change their allegiance by including them in patronage networks, and co-opting former allies of Wine directly into the ruling elite eventually led to the disintegration of Wine's alliance.

Conclusion

This article has focused on musicians as forces for social change. By concentrating on Ugandan artist Bobi Wine and his alliance, this article has illustrated musicians' agency in mobilising for social change and the NRM's strategy for containing these efforts. My argument has drawn inspiration from Arriola's (2012, 2018) political economy framework for the study of opposition politics and combined these propositions with further literature on protests and movements in Uganda (Branch and Mampilly, 2015; Philipps and Kagoro, 2016) and music and politics (see especially

[51] Interview 8, DJ and music producer, Kampala, 21 February 2020.
[52] Conversation with interlocutor N, Kampala, 20 January 2020; summarised in field note 2.
[53] Interview 8, DJ and music producer, Kampala, 21 February 2020; Conversation with interlocutor N, Kampala, 20 January 2020, summarised in field note 2.

Olukotun, 2002; Schumann, 2013). I have argued that the political activism of musicians reaches its limits when a sitting government can easily threaten the economic base of its oppositional challengers – that is, when the livelihood and status of musicians are at stake. Alliances become fragile once the government can demonstrate that challenging a ruling elite has severe consequences for one's livelihood, whereas aligning with the government ensures economic prosperity.

Although Wine succeeded in allying with fellow musicians, the resulting activist musicians' alliance proved to be short-lived. Oppositional challengers require financial resources to effectively engage in social conflict. As I have shown in this case study, the NRM has deprived Bobi Wine and the other activist musicians of a crucial income-generating activity, namely live performances. Foremost, Wine himself has been affected by this strategy. However, fellow artists who openly embraced Bobi Wine and his People Power movement have also been targets of this repression. Several of Wine's supporters have shifted their allegiance or abstained from politics, as this ensures a continuous flow of income from concerts. Fellow artists could not easily fall back on other income sources that could compensate for the loss of shows. The cases of Lucky Bosmic Otim, Ronald Mayinja, and Hassan Ndugga are indicative of this strategy of repression and patronage. Depriving Bobi Wine of crucial resources by banning his concerts has also made it difficult for him to keep activist musicians within his movement, key collaborators having been enticed by the NRM to change sides. Wine has lacked the resources to keep these artists within People Power. The NRM has further destabilised Wine's alliance by co-opting two of his former key allies – Buchaman and Full Figure – into the ruling elite. Although some individuals have continued to keep up their support for Wine despite the negative impact on their economic situation, it is evident that Wine's alliance has disintegrated.

Wine later transformed his People Power movement into the NUP party to challenge Museveni at the ballot box on 14 January 2021. In important respects, 2021's presidential election resembles previous polls under multi-party politics in 2006, 2011, and 2016 – not only in terms of the tactics that were used to contain the opposition but also regarding the election outcomes. Bobi Wine's election result of 35.1 per cent in this year's presidential poll resembles the election outcomes of 2016

and 2006, in which the main contender, the FDC's Kizza Besigye, gained 35.6 and 37.4 per cent, respectively. Although NUP has won fifty-seven seats in Uganda's 11th parliament (Electoral Commission, 2021a) – a significant number and unprecedented for an opposition party – Wine's and NUP's support base presently seem to lie overwhelmingly in only one region, Uganda's Central region. Notwithstanding the fact that, overall, the opposition did make inroads into the electorate (the other opposition parties more or less retained their number of seats in the parliament compared to the previous legislative period[54]), the ruling party holds 316 out of 499 elected seats and therefore still has a comfortable majority in parliament. Compared to the previous parliament, the NRM's majority has decreased from 71 per cent in 2016 to 63 per cent today (Electoral Commission, 2021a). The NRM also held a majority of less than 70 per cent in parliament, whereas it represented 67 per cent of the delegates in Uganda's 8th parliament (2006–2011).

Especially since the election in January 2021, Wine has dedicated his time mainly to his political involvement and focused less on music – partly because of the demanding political schedule, but also because, at the time of writing, his long-time collaborator Nubian Li and one of his producers, Dan Magic, still remain in prison.[55] How and to what extent NUP can capitalise and mobilise on a constant basis beyond its strongholds remains to be seen. In general, seemingly competitive elections with a significant share of the vote going to the main oppositional contender are characteristic of all previous elections in Uganda, but should not distract from the fact that the NRM has consistently stressed that as a former rebel movement it will not cede power to the opposition.

In general, observers concur that repression, patronage, and co-optation have played a decisive role in staving off the oppositional challenge from Bobi Wine. The relevance of the political economy argument that I have illustrated here also becomes clear when one considers the ultimate pre-election period and the

[54] Forum for Democratic Change (FDC): 32; Democratic Party (DP): 9; Uganda People's Congress: 9; Jeema: 1; People's Progressive Party: 1; Independents: 73 (Electoral Commission, 2021a).

[55] Nubian Li, Dan Magic, and Eddy Mutwe, Bobi Wine's personal bodyguard, as well as further supporters of Wine were arrested on 30 December 2020, accused of illegal possession of ammunition, inciting violence, and violating COVID-19 rules (Jjingo, 2021; Rubongoya, 2021).

difficulties Wine's party encountered in terms of funding. Shortly after its foundation, the NUP vetted candidates for parliamentary posts and initially endorsed 427 flagbearers. Technically, the party could have fielded candidates in almost every electoral constituency. However, slightly more than half of these endorsed candidates were actually nominated for the parliamentary elections. Wine cited the nomination fees of three million UGX as a factor hindering the nomination of all endorsed candidates (Mufumba, 2020). As a new party with no representatives in parliament, the NUP party was not eligible to benefit from public funds for political parties. Instead, it relied heavily on foreign sources. According to a recent report by the Alliance for Finance Monitoring (2020: 26), 60 per cent of the NUP's funding came from the diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom. The resources from the diaspora played an essential role in the establishment of the party and its campaigning.

Touré (2017: 74) has described similar alliances and movements in Burkina Faso and Senegal as transformative forces. The NRM reacted to Wine's efforts to push for social change by employing strategies it has also used to keep other oppositional challengers in check: patronage, repression, and co-optation. It remains to be seen what the trajectory of Wine's NUP party will be in the mid to long term. Notably, Wine lacks an alternative programme that goes beyond a general critique of the NRM, corruption, and the shortage of public goods. Although earlier protests and movements had successfully mobilised Ugandans in urban settings, such as the "Walk to Work" protests in 2011, repression was not the only reason they broke down; mobilisers also failed to come up with a programme that could have ensured continuous mobilisation of people by including widespread grievances in a popular political programme that could relate to urban and rural settings alike (Branch and Mampilly, 2015: 140–145). The similarities of Wine's People Power programme or the NUP manifesto and the NRM's policies could be taken as an indication that despite the will to act as a force for social change, Wine's movement might also run into difficulties when it comes to mobilising people continuously, as it is yet to develop a popular programme.

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Patronage, Repression und Kooptation: Bobi Wine und die politische Ökonomie aktivistischer Musikerinnen und Musiker in Uganda

Zusammenfassung

Auf den politischen Bühnen Afrikas haben Musikerinnen und Musiker während der ver- gangenen Dekaden eine bedeutende Rolle gespielt. Der populäre ugandische Musiker Bobi Wine beschränkte sich nicht auf eine Rolle als Protestsänger, sondern wurde politisch aktiv, indem er im Jahr 2017 ins Parlament einzog und Langzeitpräsident Yoweri Museveni bei der Präsidentschaftswahl im Jahr 2021 herausforderte. Um so- zialen Wandel zu forcieren, kreierte Wine die Bewegung People Power und schuf eine Allianz mit weiteren Musikerinnen und Musikern. Dieser Artikel untersucht Wines Bewegung und seine Allianz mit Musikerinnen und Musikern unter Zuhilfenahme eines polit-ökonomischen Ansatzes. Zentrale These des Artikels ist, dass der politische Aktivismus von Musikerinnen und Musikern dort auf seine Grenzen stößt, wo eine am- tierende Regierung die ökonomische Basis seiner oppositionellen Widersacher leicht bedrohen kann. Allianzen werden fragil, wenn das Herausfordern der herrschenden Elite ernste Auswirkungen auf die Lebensgrundlage der Opponenten hat, wohinge- gen eine Unterstützung der Regierung ökonomische Prosperität sichert. Der Artikel greift auf ethnografische Daten, Interviews sowie Zeitungsartikel zurück, um dieses Argument zu illustrieren.

Schlagwörter

Uganda, Bobi Wine, aktivistische Musikerinnen und Musiker, Kooptation und Repression, Fragilität von Allianzen

2. Repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc: a politico-economic and sociological perspective on authoritarian durability in Uganda (Preprint, submitted to *International Political Sociology*)

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Abstract

This article develops an alternative to dominant approaches of comparative politics and area studies which explain authoritarian durability. The frameworks of "competitive authoritarianism" (Levistky and Way), "hybrid regime" (Tripp), and "modern authoritarianism" (Tapscott) overemphasize traditional conflict diffusion tools, foremost repression to explain why authoritarianism is durable. In contrast to these approaches, this article uses the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and historical bloc and combines it with Marcuse's repressive tolerance to advance a framework grounded in political economy and sociology. In line with Gramsci, I argue that hegemony has to be actively re-produced and a regime has to thwart counter-hegemonic projects that could potentially reorganize a historical bloc, meaning the classes grouped together around the ruling class. Hence, it is therefore paramount for a government to restrict the oppositions' access to peasants to avoid a potential fraying of the historical bloc. Further, repressive tolerance creates the semblance of contestation but essentially contains oppositional challengers. The article uses Uganda as a case study. It draws on ethnographic data and interviews collected during fieldwork in Kampala in 2020 and 2022 and on newspaper articles to illustrate the relevance of my framework.

Keywords

Repressive tolerance, hegemony, historical bloc, authoritarian durability, Uganda

Introduction

In an interview in April 2017, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was faced with unusually frank questions. The interview took place just before constitutional age limits in Uganda were lifted. The lifting of these term limits allowed President Museveni to rule indefinitely. Asked by the journalist whether Museveni would soon retire, Museveni who by then was 72 and in power already for 31 years, responded that he would retire once his mission – reducing sectarianism, political and economic integration of East Africa, and infrastructure development – was achieved. However, the journalist pointed out that his mission has remained very much the same since coming to power. So, how to make sure that Museveni wouldn't be remembered as a dictator, asked the journalist. Museveni's somewhat ironic response was the following: "A dictator who is elected five times that must be a wonderful dictator, that must be a special one, elected five times with always a big majority, that must be a wonderful dictator?!" (Al Jazeera 2017, minutes 45.56-51.44). This statement stands in sharp contrast to the view proposed by opposition parties in Uganda. Opposition parties in Uganda have lamented the many restrictions on their work and the unequal opportunities to campaign. Subsequently, they have tried to paint Museveni's government as a military dictatorship (Simon 2019). Given that Museveni's current term as president ends in 2026, the ruling party is apparently preparing the Museveni's succession with his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba.[56] Military dictatorship or not, the key thesis of this article is that it is very likely that the current regime which is essentially authoritarian will endure even if the mission of Museveni would be achieved. This article thus deals with the question why authoritarian regimes are so durable.

Students of democratization offer various explanations for authoritarian durability. The objective of this article is to show their shortcomings and then develop an approach rooted in political economy and political sociology that better explains authoritarian durability than these standard accounts. I believe that Uganda is an excellent case to study this, as the country first established a "no-party democracy," but then returned to multiparty elections in 2006. As the paragraph above showed

[56] Museveni's son has recently undertaken a range of diplomatic visits, including to Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan.

and the literature on this topic illustrates (I discuss these approaches later on in detail), the discussion of how to best describe this regime is still ongoing. This is the case even although consensus exist that it is non-democratic. In this article, I try to combine concepts from political sociology and political economy to develop an alternative framework to explain authoritarian durability. Let me be clear that I do not seek to engage in the conceptual debate of how to qualify regimes in the Global South and contribute just another label to the literature and coin my own term. I am of the view that many of the liberalized states in the 1990s introduced a mere façade, which, as a variety of today's examples show, take for example Tanzania, can quickly be disassembled or reassembled.

The more interesting question, in my view, is why authoritarian regimes are actually so durable. In order to develop my own framework, I need to show the limitations of existing approaches. Hence, in a first step I examine the validity of these approaches concerning the durability of authoritarian regimes. I focus on three frameworks. In brief, these works explain durability by highlighting structural issues such as patronage, co-optation, and repression that make authoritarian polities sustainable. Although these approaches explain durability in different ways, they have one thing in common. The explanations they offer are unsatisfying, although each to a different degree. While a very popular approach in international relations and comparative politics, the book *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* by Levitsky and Way (2010) and a more area studies influenced theory by Aili M. Tripp's (2010), published as *Museveni's Uganda. Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime* try to conceptualize countries as a type in-between autocracy and democracy, Rebecca Tapscott's (2021) publication *Arbitrary States. Social Control and Modern Authoritarianism in Museveni's Uganda* departs from these former approaches. I choose the approach by Levitsky and Way since it remains one of the most influential works in the field of the study of democratization. In contrast, Tripp's work, likely because it treats mainly one case, has never had the same impact in the field as did the work by the two former authors. However, the approach is of particular significance in area studies focusing on Uganda. Lastly, Tapscott's work is chosen as it seeks to innovate in the study of authoritarian durability by departing from these more popular approaches.

It would be foolish to claim that patronage, repression, and co-optation do not play an important role in authoritarian regimes in the Global South. Not least, one of my previous works has precisely shown how these conflict diffusion tools helped Uganda's government to contain its oppositional challengers in the past years (Friesinger 2021). Yet, by reviewing and pointing to shortcomings of those standard approaches, I highlight the relevance of politico-economic and sociological concepts that, as I posit, complement and in sum can better explain the durability of authoritarian regimes. The goal of the article is to show that the concepts of repressive tolerance (Marcuse 1970), hegemony, and historical bloc (Gramsci et al. 2007) enrich existing approaches.

The argument is as follows. In line with Gramsci, I argue that hegemony, meaning the moral and intellectual leadership, has to be actively re-produced and that counter-hegemonic projects have to be thwarted that aim to reorganize the historical bloc in which the social classes are grouped around the ruling class to a largely firm entity. Oppositions' access to peasants, which could be a key partner of counter-hegemonic projects for a reorganization of the historical bloc, is therefore restricted. The granting of liberal practices in key sectors of the society, such as the media or academia considerable freedom, creates a semblance of an open and liberalized political field, but this repressive tolerance essentially helps to contain oppositional challengers and re-produces hegemony. Intellectuals stabilize this bloc ensuring through their intellectual production that the discursive space does not give space to alternative conceptions of power and the structure of the economy. In the absence of any economic programs or a so-called master plan to capture this group (itself cause of the intellectual space), counter-hegemonic forces are unlikely to mount a real challenge to the hegemon. The authoritarian nature is therefore unlikely to change any time soon, even if leadership longevity has its natural limits, when a President dies.

The article proceeds as follows. In the following section, I first review the key works of Levitsky and Way, Tripp, and Tapscott. I point to shortcomings in their explanations of authoritarian durability. Then in section hereafter, I introduce the concepts of repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc and show their significance in the case of Uganda. I draw on secondary and primary data, such as

newspaper articles, interviews, and ethnographic data collected during two fieldtrips in 2020 and 2022 during 13 weeks to illustrate the significance of these concepts.

Repression or the fear of prosecution of repression does not exclusively explain authoritarian durability: a review of dominant approaches

In fact, the entire discussion in comparative politics and international relations is still grappling with how to conceptualize regimes in the Global South. Since the 1990s, the study of regimes – a core subject of comparative politics and international relations – has seen the rise and fall of different concepts. In the 1990s when many states (re)introduced multiparty politics, scholars spoke of a third wave of democratization. However, already in the early 2000s scholars began to question if countries really democratized. In light of the mismatch between democratic ideals and practice, students of democratization now advanced a more pessimistic perspective. Some scholars characterized those liberalized regimes as "elections without democracy" (*Journal of Democracy*, Volume 13, No 2), while others spoke of "illiberal" or "pseudo-democracy" (van Walle and Butler 1999). Further nuanced concepts were developed such as "competitive authoritarian" (Levitsky and Way 2002), "electoral authoritarian" (Schedler 2002) or "hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002). However, in the past decade we once again saw some conceptual change. Scholars now spoke of a "third wave of autocratization" (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019) triggering again a conceptual debate of how to understand regimes in the Global South. Another recent example is Anne Meng's (2020) book *Constraining Dictatorship*. She rejects the perspective of the early 1990s which equated the introduction of democratic institutions with democracies. Instead, she demands that "we need to stop trying to understand these regimes as problematic democracies, and analyze them instead as institutionalized autocracies." (Meng 2020, S. 29). I first start by reviewing Levitsky and Way (2010).

Analyzing the trajectories of 35 countries from 1990-2008, Levitsky and Way (2010, S. 4) seek to explain why after 1990 some countries democratized whereas others did not. The authors first establish that in the 1990s authoritarian systems introduced multiparty elections and hence became competitive authoritarian

(Levitsky and Way 2010, 3, 13). Competitive authoritarian regimes are defined as systems with multiparty elections which are however manipulated in favor of the sitting government. Nevertheless, this electoral competition is characterized by a higher level of uncertainty about its outcome than in outright authoritarian systems (Levitsky and Way 2010, S. 3). In Levitsky and Way's (2010, S. 23) framework, there are three key variables that influence the trajectory of such competitive authoritarian regimes after 1990: "linkage to the West," "leverage" and "organizational power."[57] In brief, in states with strong ties to the West (linkage) competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. Prominent cases include Croatia, Taiwan, Mexico but also Mali. All of the examined competitive authoritarian regimes which democratized also experienced turnover (21f). In states with weak ties to the West (linkage), much of Africa and what is today the post-Soviet area, the trajectory depended on how strong the ruling party and its institutions were (organizational power) and whether the West could exert pressure on adamant regimes (leverage) (Levitsky and Way 2010, S. 23). There are then two trajectories for countries where linkage plays no significant role. Competitive authoritarian regimes morphed into "stable authoritarian," if ruling parties possessed high organizational power, take for example Russia, Tanzania, or Mozambique. Where ruling parties were not organizationally strong and Western leverage was high, as was the case in Kenya, Zambia or Madagascar "unstable authoritarian" regimes ensued (Levitsky and Way 2010, 20-23, 72). In an article from 2012, Levitsky and Way further theorized that competitive authoritarian regimes are most durable if ruling parties not only depend on material sources such as patronage but also use a strong common identity, rooted for example in a liberation war. This creates extraordinary levels of legitimacy for its leaders, polarizes the party system,

[57] Linkage describes the ties of a country to the West in terms of its economy, society, and politics. Leverage can best be described as the West's power to force through democratization. The West possesses more leverage in states which are vulnerable to economic sanctions, cuts in aid budget, or military intervention, e.g. much of African aid-dependent countries, whereas Russia or China could whither those measures Levitsky and Way (2010, 41). Western leverage can also be circumvented if countries, such as Russia and China, help competitive authoritarian states to circumvent Western pressure to democratize or is not applied or only in a equivocal way in geopolitical relevant states such as Saudi Arabia (Levitsky und Way 2010, 41). In states which are closely linked to the West (linkage) and where the West has considerable sway (leverage) via aid, sanctions, or its military, democratization is likely to be pushed through. International actors together with domestic actors such as voters, NGOs and businessowners can exert pressure on autocrats (Levitsky and Way 2010, 50–54). The third variable "organizational power" boils down to the ruling party's cohesion and its ability to employ patronage, co-optation, and repression to divide its oppositional challenger (Levitsky and Way 2010, 54–70).

and increases repressive capacities (Levitsky and Way 2012, S. 871–872).[58] In an "update" to their theory, Levitsky and Way (2020, S. 52) write that "[t]he persistence of competitive authoritarianism is somewhat surprising" but explain its durability simply with the end of Western hegemony (linkage and leverage) and the rise of China and Russia (Levitsky and Way 2020, 52–54). Why do competitive authoritarian regimes not simply eliminate any form of competition for power if there is now even less external pressure to follow the democratic model, one is tempted to ask. This is due to the weak organizational power, as the authors argue. Ruling parties, according to Levitsky and Way (2020, S. 57–59), do not possess strong enough institutions, the repressive capacity and strong parties to subdue oppositional challengers completely.

Although competitive authoritarianism, meaning real but unfair competition, is a contradiction in terms – on markets, anti-competitive behavior (unfair competition) equates to monopolies or at least oligopolies (hence non-existing or unreal competition) – this should not bother us here any further. My critique focuses on two key issues: the author's undervaluation of the role of opposition in democratization and overemphasis on the organizational power variable. I choose Taiwan and Mali to show the key deficiencies of the framework. Discussing counter-arguments to their theory, Levitsky and Way (2010, S. 54–56) claim that the variable of opposition is of limited value to explain transitions, but that would make more sense to explain transitions through the weakness of incumbents. However, they have to admit that in Taiwan's case the opposition played a role. While they cite Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) work on the relevance of empowered labor in bringing about democratization, they fit the Taiwanese case in their framework. However, by referencing the modernization argument of development begets democracy they subsume this under linkage to the West, while Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) work is essentially a polit-economic framework that explains democratization not by closeness to the Western world, but by the lower and middle classes ability to replace the ruling class. In contrast to Taiwan, Mali's transition to democracy is explained by

[58] Lachapelle et al. (2020) reecho this argument and apply it to a broader sample of parties coming to power after social revolutions. Facing counterrevolutionary threats, parties with revolutionary origins in turn establish especially cohesive parties which make defection unlikely, fuse politics and military, and lastly develop highly powerful repressive tools (Lachapelle et al. 2020, S. 567–574).

strong linkage. While linkage might even explain why Mali "democratized," the more serious issues rests with the question what kind of democratization Mali has experienced and how the quality of democracy differs from, let's say, Taiwan. In the last ten years there have been three coup d'états in Mali which makes one question what kind of democracy Mali was before the first coup in 2012. Taiwan's opposition prior to 1990 was already so self-confident and powerful based on the empowerment of labor to register an opposition party while the martial law was still in place and prohibited this. Taiwan's KMT was organizationally strong (militarized) and possessed legitimacy not only because of the amelioration of economic conditions but also because of redistributive efforts shortly after taking power.

In contrast to the global structuralist approach of Levitsky and Way (2010), Aili M. Tripp explains leadership longevity and authoritarian durability with domestic factors. Tripp (2010, 1, 4, 184-195) sees Museveni trapped in a catch-22 situation which according to her explains his overstaying in power. What started as a popular, broad-based government in the late 1980s became increasingly a narrow elite rule by the Western region of Uganda. As Tripp (2010, S. 1) argues, the usage of patronage, repression, and co-optation to remain at the helm of government after coming to power in 1986 created this catch-22 situation, "[b]ecause leaders have sought power through violence and patronage, they cannot leave power; the personal consequences would be too great." Tripp (2010, S. 1) further postulates that "[b]ecause there is no easy exit, they must continue using violence and patronage to remain in power." Hence, it follows that the only option is to remain in office and prolong one's rule. "Leaving office will surely mean exile, repression, imprisonment, or death. It might even mean a trip to The Hague to be tried in the International Criminal Court," argues Tripp (2010, 4) further.

While Tripp's argument seems straightforward and convincing at the first glimpse, there is simply no such catch-22 situation. The argument implies that a hostile actor, an opposition party or a rival faction, would come to power willing to break with the old system. A look to neighboring Kenya shows that outgoing Presidents who deployed large-scale violence or embezzled funds to remain in power can negotiate an elite consensus with the incoming heads of state precisely not to prosecute past crimes. The example of Kenya in 2002 with outgoing president Daniel

arap Moi and incoming Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga is instructive in this case. The two dissidents Kibaki and Odinga were part of the old elite, the former served as Vice-President under arap Moi in the 1980s, the latter was a former manager in the bureaucracy during Moi's time. Moi assured that the transition to his successors would be peaceful. Although the US administration under Bush did mediate the transition from Moi to Kibaki and Odinga, these elites offered – probably in return for Moi's conciliatory position – to possibly exempt Moi from any prosecution of past events of electoral violence or the disappearance of state resources during Moi's rule from the early 1990s to 2002 (Peters 2002, 342). Let us turn back to Uganda. Museveni has been challenged at the presidential polls mainly by his former ally Kizza Besigye, Museveni's physician in the liberation war and current husband to Museveni's former girlfriend Winnie Bwanyima (Oluka 2017). It is equally not unlikely that an agreement be reached not to look into any or some past human rights abuses. The essential point is that there is no deterministic relationship between alternation and prosecution; since most challengers hail from the former state class it is rather a matter of negotiation.

Again focusing on Uganda but departing from a micro-perspective on vigilante groups in Uganda, Rebecca Tapscott's (2021) work seemingly breaks with Tripp and Levitsky and Way. Tapscott's book instead grasps Uganda as a modern authoritarian system. Tapscott's framework, just like Tripp's, focuses purely on domestic factors. What makes Uganda's autocracy particularly a modern one, according to Tapscott (2021, S. 2), is "that it governs by law, rather than unrestrained violence and executive decrees." However, this form of governance is arbitrary focusing rather on "fragmenting alternatives to state power than on exercising ironfisted control." (Tapscott 2021, S. 12). Basically, she argues that despite the existence of institutions, these are used arbitrarily and to the benefit of the ruler, hence the term institutionalized arbitrariness. Governments create a multitude of competing authorities, for example in the security sector. Although "arbitrary states allow for pockets of civic organization and pathways for citizens to make claims on the state; […] they make these spaces fragile by intervening in them violently and unpredictably." (Tapscott 2021, S. 3). It therefore divides civil society, because of the unpredictability and the fear of an arbitrary intervention, and enforces, what

Tapscott (2021, S. 4) calls “self-policing,” because it also leaves public space ungoverned, hence the need for vigilante groups. The government can intervene at any time in the public space. It has the choice to, for example, use the police force to intervene in the public space or in another instance make use of security services. It therefore projects power even if it is not permanently present.

The question of why authoritarian systems are durable is not Tapscott's prime interest. However, her account implies that civic space is controlled through arbitrariness and ultimately fear where the government can crush any serious challengers already at an early stage. Authoritarian power is hence projected to the lowest level and the regime stabilized because the multitude and arbitrariness of authorities atomizes a government’s challengers. “[T]hese rulers are progressively developing resilient systems of rule to dominate society and project control across territory,” writes Tapscott (2021, S. 199), and therefore eliminate two of the main ways to challenge its rule: elections and insurgencies (2021, S. 199). As is evident from this brief summary, Tapscott's approach is in fact much closer to Levitsky and Way's or Tripp's work, even if the core interest of this work is not to explain authoritarian durability. The division of challengers through what is essentially a repressive behavior even though it might seem arbitrary is also the prime explanatory variable of the two other theories.

Although Tapscott (2021) specifically seeks to depart from Levitsky and Way (2010) and Tripp (2010), she is in fact much closer to the first approach than she believes. Insecurity and repression prolong a leader’s stay in power, shielding it from any challengers. In Levitsky and Way's (2010) work, opposition plays conceptually a marginal role, rendering any questions how authoritarian systems transitioned to democracy and the discussion about what regimes meaningfully qualify as democratic de facto irrelevant. Tripp (2010) conceptualizes a dilemma situation in which rulers cannot leave power because they fear prosecution. Although prosecution is possible after a leader leaves power, this is by no means deterministic, as shown by the Kenyan case where an elite consensus was struck between outgoing and incoming elites.

After this critique, I propose three concepts, namely repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc, grounded in political sociology and political economy that conplement and hence better explain authoritarian durability.

Authoritarian durability depends on more than classical conflict diffusion tools: the significance of repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc

The key concepts of my argument are repressive tolerance, hegemony, and historical bloc. Before I develop the argument, let me briefly restate it already at the beginning. The argument is that no regime can maintain power by solely dividing its opponents through patronage and co-optation or repressing its dissidents, but needs to foster what Antonio Gramsci called hegemony. Hegemony, after all, is the creation of a kind of belief that there is no alternative to the current status quo. Repressive tolerance, that is granting key sectors of the society such as the media considerable freedom, is a key component of fostering hegemony, as I shall show, as this also stabilizes the historical bloc. Regimes that want to become hegemonial and seek to remain so have to group social classes around it. The concept of historical bloc embodies the coalition between different social groups that is, in the Italian case against which it was developed by Gramsci, large landholders, bourgeoisie, and the king of Piedmont. According to Gramsci, any group that seeks to ascent to power needs to be hegemonial before coming to power and therefore has to develop a counter-hegemony against a sitting government. Intellectuals stabilize this bloc ensuring through their intellectual production that the discursive space does not give space to alternative conceptions of power and the structure of the economy. Dissidents in fact try to build a counter-hegemony through their own intellectual production. The counter-hegemony becomes a threat to the government when dissidents can successfully organize a bloc that is more powerful than the existing historical bloc or connect with existing forces of the existing historical bloc and thereby destabilize the regime. Since Uganda, just as other sub-Saharan countries of Africa, is characterized by the existence of subsistence farmers, the access to these smallholders for counter-hegemonic forces is restricted. In the absence of any economic programs or a so-called master plan to capture this group, counter-hegemonic forces are unlikely to

mount a real challenge to the hegemon. The absence of this master plan is itself a cause of the intellectual space in Uganda. On a general level it is also the failure to acknowledge historical examples that have successfully transitioned to capitalist systems and which in the aftermath to developing a strong labor movement also democratized. The authoritarian nature is therefore unlikely to change any time soon, even if leadership longevity has its natural limits, when a President dies.

Now, I will turn to the concepts and show their relevance for the analysis of authoritarian durability.

The NRM hegemony: a closed-off intellectual world and the dearth of a counter-hegemonic project

Gramsci departs from a conceptualization that society can be divided into a civil society, meaning the private realm, and a political society or the state, that is the public realm (Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith 2007, 12). The dominant social group or ruling class cannot restrict itself to simply occupy the political society and dominate through exercising orders via the state, but also has to foster consent for its position within society. Gramsci highlights that "the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'." (Gramsci et al. 2007, S. 57). Consent is either "spontaneous," fostered through the ruling class and their intellectuals via their prestigious position in society, or "legally enforced" by means of a repressive apparatus (ibid. 12). Gramsci postulates that any social group that seeks to come to power and assume government, must lead or be hegemonic already before coming to power. In any case, any group in power also has to ensure that it retains the position of intellectual and moral leadership (ibid. 57-58). Key in fostering hegemony are intellectuals. Gramsci attaches particular significance to "organic" intellectuals, who emerge from a certain social class which they structure ideologically, different from "traditional" intellectuals, where this class affiliation is less obvious (ibid. 3-4). Organizationally, the place of these "organic" intellectuals which emerge out from the classes themselves is the political party. Making ideas hegemonic is a task that not only includes the organization of "organic" intellectuals in the political party linking them

to the working class, but also to absorb the more progressive intellectuals from the bourgeoisie (ibid. 4). In essence, any group has to develop a counter-hegemonic project before replacing the ruling class.

Naturally, opposition parties in the era of multiparty democracy are the prime vehicle for developing such a counter-hegemonic project. They include the intellectuals in their ranks or are in close contact with such intellectuals. Focusing on the current main opposition party in Uganda, the National Unity Platform, recent work by Friesinger (2021) has shown that the two key axses of critique of this opposition party are essentially corruption and the excessive use of repressive means to control society. The NRM's key policies date back to the "Ten-Point Programme" formulated by Museveni before coming to power in 1986. The perspective of opposition parties on this "Ten-Point Programme" is instructive in how opposition parties seek to depart from the ruling party. Consider for example the perspective of Lewis Rubongoya, the General Secretary of Uganda's most important opposition party:

> [T]here is nothing bad in that "Ten-Point Programme". The first one [goal] was restoration of democracy, ending corruption, ending the misuse of power, ending the misuse of the gun, all those were very good points. And, I think, if all those were implemented, Uganda would be fine. So, the problem of Uganda has not been the question of policy. It's just been the failure of, [pauses] you know, [pauses] governance. It's a question of governance, governance, governance.[59]

This campaign strategy resembles earlier approaches of the Forum for Democratic Change, founded by the former regime insider Kizza Besigye, who in the early 2000s campaigned a critque of the squandering behavior of the ruling elite (Tripp 2010). The general thrust of the NRM to debase such campaigns is to campaign itself on those issues. In 2019, President Museveni organized an anti-corruption march through the capital city Kampala "calling corrupt people parasites who steal public wealth." (Athumani 2019). Museveni's walk was shortly followed by his 6-day march through Luwero triangle, campaigning and mobilizing for the NRM in this historic region of Uganda (BBC 2020). Before taking power from Milton Obote in 1986, Museveni's National Resistance Army had its important base in this region. While this march focused not so much on addressing the key issue of corruption it nevertheless

[59] Interview 1, David L. Rubongoya, ES People Power, Kamwokya, Kampala, 27 January 2020.

brought back memories of the liberation struggle, a very violent period in Uganda, and how the ruling party NRM ended this violent period.

For the ruling NRM it is easy to counter any attempts of opposition parties and their intellectuals to mount a challenge to the hegemony of the NRM by simply campaigning on the same issues that opposition parties campaign on.

Political liberalization to better contain oppositional challengers: repressive tolerance

As noted already in the section 2, Uganda stands out in terms of the liberalized but still unbalanced political and public space (Levitsky and Way) and the division of oppositional challengers through a multitude of authorities and repressive organs (Tapscott).

The idea of repressive tolerance, in my view, captures better the interests behind political liberalization than existing frameworks. Herbert Marcuse (1970), writing in the context of the American invasion in Vietnam, postulated that the rules of the game of political contestation, for example protests, are set by the ruling elite. Hence, even progressive forces have to follow these rules, accepting and strengthening the ruling elite and status quo. Oppositional and divergent approaches are tolerated by the government, in so far as they do not call for a revolution, or in its claim to transform society do not threaten to become a position accepted by the majority. Implicit in this concept is the idea that tolerance meaning opening up of public space does not threaten the status quo. Simply put, the conservative majority creates legitimacy by allowing these critical voices a limited space for expressing their concerns, but does not have to feel very threatened by allowing dissenting voice. Granting only limited space to these alternative approaches thus even has a cathartic effect. Coming back to Uganda, the government can easily rebuff claims that it is authoritarian, since the political and public space is formally liberalized. Where critical voices point to the overly repressive behavior of the police or other security agencies towards oppositional politicians or movements, the government can easily reject this critique. Tapscott's work is precisely relevant here, because it shows how Uganda's government also switches between the use of different security agencies to contain its challengers but also in its use of informal and formal procedures.

There are two specific fields in which I highlight the relevance of the concept: political (government-opposition relations) and public space (media). The media landscape in Uganda is recurrently described as one of the most liberal in Africa. This not only refers to the existence of numerous radio and TV stations in the country, which burgeoned after the liberalization of the media landscape, but describes the overall political climate in the country including the two important *newspapers Daily Monitor* and *New Vision*. As a state-owned newspaper, New Vision was and is the mouthpiece of the government in terms of its editorial guidelines regarding human rights violations. Yet, even the government-owned newspaper features critiques of the government.[60] While the newspaper was given considerable freedom of what issues to cover by going "beyond simple political propaganda to be a readable and highly popular media outlet" (Stremlau 2019, S. 113), the foundation of the *Daily Monitor* was actually actively supported by the government-aligned newspaper. A newspaper more critical of the government would ensure that the state-owned newspaper would get less attention from the government and take a more center-position (Stremlau 2019, S. 120).

The privately owned newspaper *Daily Monitor*, but also the *The East African*, both backed by the Aga Khan Foundation, frequently run op-ed pieces from political commentators that lash out at corruption, looting of state resources or repression.[61] The liberalization of the media was important as Nicole Stremlau's (2019) work *Media, Conflict, and the State in Africa* highlights clearly. She traces the ideal of having an open and unrestrained debate in Uganda's media landscape to the early days of the NRM when it encouraged soldiers to openly question their commanding officers in a guided and structured way. Stremlau (2019, S. 135) cites the former editor of the *Daily Monitor* Charles Onyango-Obbo: "Whatever one says, there is a fundamental difference between the NRM government's attitudes toward the press and that of other governments." A free press was important to maintain the image

[60] The government-owned New Vision group and the opposition-friendly *Daily Monitor* also have significant interests in the radio and television market. Although the radio plays a more significant role in Uganda than the newspaper, the news are often just read from the two newspapers, as Stremlau (2019, S. 127) writes. The main publishing houses thereby broaden "their reach and ability to set the political agenda beyond the literate and their typical print media distribution networks." (Stremlau 2019, S. 127).

[61] Fieldnote 10, Kampala, 5 February 2020.

of a democratized country. Onyango-Obbo sums up this strategy in the following remark:

> They [NRM] used the existence of it [The Monitor] - they would say, look at the paper like The Monitor. There are very few markers of a democracy and they would point to Tanzania and Kenya, which have newspapers which are critical, so then they say look you cannot therefore deny the fact that we have something special and unique happening here. So in many ways we also became a pawn of the regime. (Stremlau 2019, S. 131)

But not only the media landscape is important. Also, academics at the prestigious Makerere University are not per se barred from providing critical studies of the Ugandan regime.[62]

The strategy of repressive tolerance is in fact most visible when scrutinizing the relationship between the government and opposition. Analyzing the NRM's strategy to contain defected elites from mounting a credible alternative to Yoweri Museveni, Moses Khisa (2016, S. 742) summarizes the approach as follows: "Museveni's semi-authoritarian regime needs a minimum semblance of political contestation, but it has at the same time worked to promote a discourse that debases an alternative to his three-decade rule." While I will touch on the discourse that makes any other challenger look like a non-alternative in the section on hegemony, I touch on the necessity of democratic semblance and highlight that political liberalization was a strategy to manage discontent within the NRM and ultimately strengthen the NRM and to better control the opposition. From 1986 to 2006, the political system, termed as a no-party democracy, was characterized by the absence of political party competition. It allowed political candidates to compete only on an individual merit basis.[63] The idea of a democracy without parties began to lose support beginning in the late 1990s when elite cracks within the NRM became first visible. The decision to liberalize was much more driven by inter-factional struggles than external pressure (Makara et al. 2009). Although the results of a referendum on

[62] I can only provide very selective examples here. Take for instance Sabiti Makara's (2010) article on Uganda's skewed multiparty elections or a recent article on (youth) unemployment in neoliberal Uganda by Godfrey Asiimwe (2022). The edited volume on Uganda during neoliberal times by Wiegratz et al. (2018) is another instructive example. It contains many chapters by Ugandan scholars critically assessing the three decades of Museveni's rule in Uganda, was presented at Makrere University, and even received a positive review by the state-owned newspaper *New Vision* (see Achan n.d.).

[63] Although political parties were banned, parties that had played a significant role in the pre-1986 politics, but were then in the opposition, tried to covertly organize and keep alive a rudimentary party structure (Carbone 2008).

the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 2000 indicated that a majority was against allowing parties to re-enter the political scene, Museveni later traded political liberalization and further reforms of the judiciary, local government, and land sector against the removal of presidential term limits (Carbone 2008, S. 192). Key political elites who were critical of Museveni's long-term rule, such as Eriya Kategaya, then first Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Internal Affairs, and Jaberi Bidandi-Ssali, Minister for Local Government from 1989-2004, or Kizza Besigye, former State Minister in the State House and Political Commissar, were first sidelined and then ultimately contained by either forcing them out of the NRM or by bringing them back to the fold.[64] Bidandi-Ssali later broke away and founded the People's Progressive Party, while Besigye founded the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), the most important opposition party from 2006 to 2021. While Kategaya was involved in the foundation of the FDC, he was later again co-opted by Museveni (Carbone 2008, S. 191–194). In a party-based system, challengers become easily identifiable and approachable (necessity to appoint coordinators, establish structures including offices). But the liberalization also binds the challengers to the rules set by the NRM in which they have to operate.

The second generation of discontented elites that defected from the NRM, such as Amama Mbabazi and Gilbert Bukenya, or new challengers such as Robert Kyagulanyi as a non-insider were also integrated into this field and thereby contained.

Peasants as most important group of the historical bloc: oppositions' restricted access to rural areas to prevent any potential reorganization of the bloc

What is a bloc and why is it historical? In Gramsci's words "[s]tructures and superstructures form an 'historical bloc'. That is to say that the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the ensemble of the social relations of production." (Gramsci et al. 2007, S. 366; emphasis in original). Specific constellations of classes emerge out of the productive potential of a country.

[64] In any case, the discussion on political liberalization focused more on the succession of Museveni, as Tripp (2010, 59) highlighted by asserting: "[m]any within the NRM simply wanted the possibility for change in leadership institutionalized and did not have broader democratic aspirations."

This class constellation is embodied in the superstructure, the ideological sphere of society which is mediated by the intellectuals. This constellation or unity of classes is relatively stable and reproduces the social order exactly via its superstructure, therefore also bloc. The historical bloc crumbles and is in flux once a new arrangement of classes is sought. This becomes particularly dangerous for the ruling classes as challengers, as I claim, might try to re-organize the bloc by advancing programs that question the credibility of the cultural hegemony of the ruling classes.

A key feature of Museveni's NRM during the bush war was the replacement of chiefs with so-called resistance councils practicing public debate. In post-1986 Uganda, the resistance councils were transformed into local councils. While the name changed, their function remained the same. Not only did these councils serve as institution for practicing democracy on the village level, but they also served to install a security architecture with intelligence operatives working even on the village level. While this helped certainly to contain insurgents at a very early stage, as Janet Lewis (2020) has highlighted, this counter-insurgency strategy can equally be used to monitor oppositional activities in the periphery.

Opposition parties in Uganda are heavily restrained to the urban middle class context. Already during Uganda's "no-party democracy" phase, parties supported by international donors, such as the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, were restrained from reaching out to the countryside (Carbone 2008). This approach of restricting opposition parties especially during the run-up to presidential elections to urban contexts has remained a central feature of Ugandan politics ever since 1986. But also recent oppositional challengers such as former NRM insider Amama Mbabazi were restricted from reaching out beyond the urban settlements (Khisa 2016, S. 738). Robert Kyagulanyi and his party National Unity Platform were equally hindered from accessing the rural areas (Taylor 2020).

It seems like a contradiction that oppositional challengers are restricted to the urban domain although the state disposes of such a wide informational network and could sense any slight change in the ideological field at a very short time. The unrestricted access to the middle class, which resides mainly in the urban centers, is small, and disconnected from the rural parts, is not surprising. As one seasoned

interview partner argued, the NRM tries to avoid to give opposition parties any opportunity to mobilize peasant grievances even if opposition parties do not take up any such popular demands in their programs[65] and instead focus rather on middle class demands.

Reflecting on the relationship between non-industrial cities and the countryside in Italy at the end of 19th and beginning of the 20th century, Gramsci, probably recurring to Marx, ascertained that Italian peasants were dispersed and isolated and were therefore difficult to organize (Gramsci et al. 2007, S. 75). Karl Marx ([1852]/2007) singled out this dispersed, isolated, and amorphous mass as a key supporter of the coup d'état of Louis Bonaparte in 1851. Although the peasantry could even objectively be considered as a class, Marx highlighted that peasants were not connected on the national level and did not possess a political organization with which to voice their demands (hence potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes). Thus follows for Marx ([1852]/2007) that peasants could not represent themselves but had to be represented, in this case, by the executive power which protected it against other classes. In contrast, the social classes in the urban centers were united in a common ideological front against the peasants characterized by animosity (Gramsci et al. 2007, S. 91). Eric Hobsbawm (1973, S. 5–6) argued that this animosity of the urban classes inscribed itself into peasants' consciousness, expressing itself as distrust against non-peasants and in the case of Italy even translated into self-contempt. But more importantly, Hobsbawm (1973, S. 19) ascertained that the peasantry and class interests were usually not represented in the party system by means of its own party, unlike the party of the working class. In his words, "peasants tend to be election fodder, except when they demand or inhibit certain specialized political measures." (Hobsbawm 1973, S. 19).

Since Uganda's economy is essentially dominated by the primary sector where the large majority of people are employed, any access to this disorganized (in the sense of political self-organization) mass by oppositional challengers could be a threat that potentially destabilizes the historical bloc. It is more comprehensible now, as I believe, why the NRM restricts the access to the rural areas so heavily.

[65] Interview Andrew Mwenda, Kampala, 10 February 2022.

Conclusion

The key interest of this article was to explain why authoritarian regimes are so durable. I departed from the unsatisfactory approaches from comparative politics and international relations and area studies that essentially explain the durability of authoritarianism by means of the repressive capacity of the regime or the fear of prosecution for their repressive behavior. As I have shown, each of these approaches has significant shortcomings. While classical conflict diffusion tools are certainly an important part of authoritarianism, these might be a sufficient but by no means necessary condition. The concepts of hegemony and historical bloc which I have interwoven with repressive tolerance represent a more encompassing theorization of the durability of authoritarian regimes.

Any counter-hegemonic project, if it wants to become credible, essentially has to rethink how to become a partner of the peasants. This necessitates an intellectual reorientation towards economic policies that seek to increase agricultural productivity and get rid of the excess labor, very much like Taiwan or South Korea did in the past half century. While this might seem like a monumental task which counter-hegemonic projects could not see through themselves, since they are cut off from the rural contexts (because of the government's fear of the potential mobilization of the peasants), it might lead to a re-orientation of the ruling government, if the NRM comes to believe that the historical bloc could crumble.

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3. The state class and the politics of oil in Uganda (Preprint, currently under review for an edited volume by Hannes Warnecke-Berger and Jan Ickler)

Title

Uganda's State Class and the Politics of Oil

Status

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Abstract

This chapter studies the ideational shift of Uganda's state class and the conflicts between the state class, middle class, and subalterns which unfolded in the aftermath of oil discovery in 2006. Drawing on Hartmut Elsenhans's state class theory and Ouaissa's extension of it, the chapter argues that, as past legitimization strategies begin to lose its luster, the discovery of oil and hence the anticipation of revenues allows Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni to propose a new developmental project. This project focuses mainly on infrastructure developments, which are largely debt-financed. It partly honors pledges made with regards to socio-economic transformation. The discovery of crude not only allowed for the pursuit of this new developmental project, but also gave rise to significant conflicts over the use and distribution of the anticipated rent. Fights unraveled between the different segments of the state classes. Legislators as part of the middle class, a product of the rent structures and a regime stabilizer, aligned themselves within these fights over the centralization and distribution of the new-found rent, trying to capture a share of future rent. Since the exploitation of oil necessitates the construction of crucial oil-related infrastructure, the discovery has also led to conflicts on the local level over land, in-migration and jobs. The chapter uses grey and secondary literature and is also based on insights gained during two field trips to Uganda in 2020 and 2022.

Keywords

Uganda, state class, middle class, legitimization strategies, rent

Introduction

In 2006, when large oil deposits alongside some smaller gas fields were discovered in Uganda, the resource finds were considered a blessing and expectations ran high that the discovery of oil and gas would improve the lives of Ugandans. Some thought that the cost for transportation would decrease as Uganda could now potentially use its crude to produce fuel and other petroleum products. Others instead harbored hope that the government would be able to fulfil its promises on development and use the oil revenues to improve the country's health care system, e.g., by building more government clinics. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, fueled even bigger expectations. After organizing a national prayer ceremony to thank God for the discovery, Museveni immediately announced that the oil discoveries would fast-track Uganda's plan to reach middle-income status and make it more autonomous in financing infrastructure developments and other public investments in the country (Kavuma 2009). This discursive shift comes after two decades of neoliberal restructuring of the country.

Approximately 2.5 billion barrels of oil have been discovered so far in the Albertine Graben in Uganda's Western region. While the Ugandan government estimates the total deposits in the entire country to be around 6.5 billion barrels (Musoke 2014), so far circa 2 billion barrels seem to be exploitable (Patey 2015, 9). Uganda's oil finds are mainly onshore (Kinyera 2019, 111). However, the exploitation seems to be complex, which partly helps to explain why the prospected date of production has been delayed several times since the discovery. The transport of the crude to the nearest port on the Indian ocean necessitates the construction of a pipeline. Uganda's oil is waxy and thus requires the pipeline to be heated (van Alstine 2014; Vokes 2012). The ca. 1,500 km long pipeline will run from Hoima, Uganda, to Tanga in Tanzania but is prospected to operate only in 2025 (BBC Swahili 2021). In order to serve the local market with refined fuel products, Uganda has signed an agreement over the construction and operation of a refinery producing 60,000 barrel per day (Biryabarema 2018), which should be fully operational in 2023 (The East African 2019). The Ugandan crude was originally discovered by wildcatters Heritage Oil and Hardman Resources. Yet, the resource will now be exploited by the French company TotalEnergies and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).

Uganda's deposits are much smaller than those of other African countries such as Libya (46 billion barrel), Nigeria (37 billion), Algeria (12 billion) and Angola (9.5 billion), but are nevertheless bigger than South Sudan's (3.5 billion) (Oil in Uganda 2012d; US Energy Information Administration 2021; Patey 2020). The estimated production capacity of Uganda's oil fields would make it the fifth largest petroleum producer in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, as it is projected that other mid-level producers' production capacities are likely to decrease, Uganda's role as oil producer on the African continent may become even more important (Patey 2020, 1184).

Once oil exploitation eventually begins, revenues from oil will likely be significant.[66] This is not only shown by Museveni's discursive shift, but also by the fact that resource discoveries in Uganda have given rise to debates about how to use the revenues from oil rent, sparking significant conflicts between the state class, legislators as part of the middle class and former kingdoms (Vokes 2012). The construction of infrastructure to exploit oil has also provoked conflicts between subalterns and the state.

Existing studies on the recent oil discovery in the East African state have focused on issues related to the governance of oil in Uganda, looking at the country's steering capacity of the oil sector or what is called "pockets of effectiveness," the regulation of the sector and delays (Hickey and Izama 2017, 2020; Schritt and Witte 2018; van Alstine et al. 2014; Polus and Tycholiz 2016, 2017; Byaruhanga and Langer 2020; Langer, Ukiwo, and Mbabazi 2019; Doro and Kufakurinani 2018). Further research has examined the discursive shift of the sitting government turning from a neoliberal to a more developmental discourse (Hickey 2013; Rubongoya 2018). Other

[66] How significant the impact of crude on Uganda's society will be, depends most crucially on the price of oil. Wolf and Potluri (2018) proposed different scenarios concerning oil revenues. Their reference scenario estimates that revenues will be on average 2.1 billion US Dollar (USD) per annum over a 33-year period with peak oil in 2031/32 at 4.5 bn USD (ibid., 11f). In a more conservative scenario, the authors project peak oil already at 1.1 billion USD, or approximately at a quarter of the revenues of the reference scenario (ibid., 13). The more optimistic scenario projects peak oil at 12 billion USD. Uganda's budget for the financial year 2021/22 was an estimated 12.6 billion USD, as Bloomberg (2021) reported, out of which ca. 3.6 billion USD were external grants and loans from project and budget support (Lugolobi 2021, Annex 1). The revenues, as estimated in the reference and even more so in the optimistic scenario, would therefore represent a significant contribution to Uganda's budget. However, besides the price of oil, these projections are also dependent on the production sharing agreements that the government has signed with TotalEnergies and CNOOC. To date, these contracts have not been made public.

scholars have looked at the local expectations of people (Mawejje 2019; Witte 2018) and the significance of resource finds for the local population and their livelihood (Kinyera 2019; Kinyera and Doevenspeck 2019; Kinyera 2020; Bybee and Johannes 2014; Byakagaba et al. 2019; also Witte 2018). In this chapter, I try to add to the literature on the politics of oil in Uganda by bringing together the research strands on discursive shifts, Uganda's centralization efforts of the rent and expectations. It situates these issues in the broader politico-economic and historical context of Uganda's state class and renders ideational shifts and the conflicts around rents more intelligible.

I analyze two related dynamics: the change of strategy and the nexus between rent and conflicts over its appropriation and distribution among different groups. Uganda represents an ideal case to study the societal dynamics through which the anticipation of rent produces a lock-in effect and starts to shape the course of development even before the exploitation of this resource begins. In order to understand these dynamics, I choose a theoretical approach rooted in political economy. Such a theory allows me to analyze the constellation of different classes and hence, the behavior of actors and their strategies in relation to rent. One seminal work in which the concept of "rent" and the constellation of classes play a crucial role is the state class theory originally developed by Hartmut Elsenhans (1996; see also 2021, 125-131). State classes in post-colonial states emerged and expanded due to the fact that low agricultural productivity and a significant labor surplus generated rents, then appropriated by the bureaucratic apparatus. Since the appropriation of rents is not bound to an imperative of reinvestment, state classes oscillate between the pressure to legitimize their rule and the freedom to squander this surplus. Although there were state classes in sub-Saharan Africa which tried to transition from rent-based to capitalist growth, these post-colonial governments ultimately failed to overcome the status of a rent economy. Uganda represents a case where the state class initially partly pursued plans to transition to capitalist growth during Obote 1 (1962-71), but then abandoned this project, transitioning to neoliberal restructuring, only to return to pursuing capitalist growth after finding new rents. Tanzania provides a further case in point of a wavering state class. Uganda's state class has been oscillating between those two extremes. Past legitimization strategies of President

Museveni, in power since 1986, begin to lose their luster. In line with the state class theory, I argue that the discovery of crude allows Museveni to pursue a new developmental discourse focusing on infrastructural developments.[67] This project helps to further legitimize his decades-long rule, as the more active developmental approach partly allows him to honor his pledges to transform the country.

Using the state class theory as foundation, I then combine Elsenhans' approach with the works of Rachid Ouaissa, to analyze the bargaining between the state and middle class. As Ouiassa (2018) has stated, the middle class plays a crucial role in the continued rule of the state class and the maintenance of the status quo. As middle classes in former bureaucratic development societies depend on rents, they have a self-interest to ensure that the state class distributes part of this rent to them. While this renders intelligible the conflicts between state class and legislators, who count among the most outspoken actors in the centralization of the rent and, as part of the middle class, engaged in fights with the state class, the discovery of oil has caused further conflicts. Here, the overwhelming focus on infrastructural development gave rise to clashes between the subalterns in the oil region and the state that centered around land, in-migration and jobs.

I trace the recent dynamics within the state class, between state class and middle classes, and the state class and subalterns by using newspaper articles, secondary and grey literature. The chapter also benefits from insights gained during two field trips to Uganda in 2020 and 2022, during which I conducted research on Uganda's state class, social movements and opposition politics. As part of my PhD research, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a wide variety of actors, such as journalists, scholars, politicians, activists, police officers, NGO staff and personnel from the diplomatic field, further complemented with participant observation.

This chapter is divided into six sections. In the next section, I provide the theoretical foundation needed to develop the argument in more detail. Section three

[67] By developmental approach I understand a strategy aiming at socio-economic transformation that empowers subalterns by making them scarce on the labor market via developing the productive forces of an economy and eventually transitioning from rent-based to profit-based growth. Although the approach of focusing mainly on better market integration pales against meaningful approaches of development, Museveni's strategy nevertheless signifies a more active approach in development than the hitherto fully neoliberal approach.

examines the legitimization strategies of President Museveni, while section four describes the recent infrastructural developments and their financing. The dynamics of the conflicts between the state class and middle class rivaling for the rent are analyzed in section five. Thereafter, in section six, I turn to the conflicts in the region where crude will be extracted.

State Class Theory

Following independence, African states saw the emergence of bureaucratic development societies with a new ruling class, the so-called state class, which in many cases sought to fast-track development (Elsenhans 1996). The basis of their existence is a surplus income called rent, which in essence results from imperfect market competition and is appropriated through political means. Such rent is characterized by its ambivalence: it can be used for economic transformation or simply squandered (Elsenhans 1997). One good example for a resource rent is seen in oil.

Since rents are in essence ambivalent, state classes also play an ambivalent role in overcoming underdevelopment. On the one hand, state classes have to legitimize their rule, for example, with development projects. On the other hand, since rents are a specific surplus earned on non-competitive markets and therefore do not have to reinvested to remain competitive, rents can also be squandered when elites prefer to pursue self-privileging. In times of rent abundance, the state class experiences stability and is able to co-opt important social groups, whereas low levels of rent entail instability of the state class and lead to its fragmentation (Ouaissa 2005).

Basically, Elsenhans defines the state class as those public sector employees who receive higher wages, have more prestige and increased possibilities to participate within the state than the average laborer, and are involved in the appropriation as well as the distribution of rents (Elsenhans 1996, 177). Other personnel employed by the state are considered “organic clientele.” The organic clientele possesses privileges in the form of formalized jobs and depend on the growth of the state class. Despite the liberalization of the economy and politics in the

1990s, state classes persist to date, even though today it is often more apt to speak of the remnants of the state class.

During the past six decades, state classes have oscillated between state-driven development policies and market-driven policies. Following the liberalization period in the 1990s, African states largely lacked developmental strategies. Remnants of the state class survived as their leaders smoothly transitioned from leftist positions to neoliberal stances and adapted to the new multiparty context. However, countries such as Tanzania and Uganda have recently pursued a more state-driven form of development (see Paget 2020; Rubongoya 2018; Hickey 2013; Hickey and Izama 2017). In the case of Uganda, in the mid-1980s, Yoweri Museveni advocated for a leftist agenda, then implemented neoliberal reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s and now partly picks up the earlier discourse again.

Although the state class can be regarded as the central actor in the (former) bureaucratic development societies, it is equally important to consider the relations of the state class to other strata of society – the organic clientele, or what can be better understood as the middle class, and subalterns – and the bargaining over rents. A useful extension of the state class theory was provided by Ouaissa (2018), who highlighted that the middle class is a crucial actor in rent economies. In (former) bureaucratic development societies, the middle class, including the organic clientele along with professionals of the private sector, which expanded after the liberalization in the 1990s, is interested in maintaining the status quo of those rent economies (ibid.). Middle classes in rent economies are historically the outcome of the growth of the state class and still depend on the status of structural heterogeneity and are not the product of the development of the productive forces leading to capitalism. Middle classes are therefore, as Ouaissa argues (2018, 125, 127), mainly interested in the easy capture of rents and a guaranty of continued rent income. The capture of rent necessarily leads to conflicts between the state class and the middle class. It is important to add that the organic clientele of the state class, as part of the middle class, also seeks to gain access to the state class through a process of intra-elite bargaining. This bargaining additionally demonstrates that the boundaries between these groups can be fluid (Elsenhans 1996, 177). In her study on legislatures in Tanzania and Uganda, Collord (2019) singles out the parliament as one important

arena of conflict for such bargaining over rents between the state and the legislators as part of the middle class.

Whether rents are used for economic transformation depends on the constitution of the state class and the existence of economic programs that address the question of economic transformation. Important, however, is that these programs ultimately focus on raising mass incomes. In Elsenhans's state class theory, which offers a crucial post-Keynesian macro-economic perspective, the practical way to eliminate the large labor surplus, itself a result of the low agricultural productivity, is to reduce rents and instead trigger mass income growth to transition to profit-based growth. According to this theory, productivity increases in the agricultural sector have to be combined with income redistribution towards an egalitarian income profile and rising mass incomes.

In the parts that follow, I use the state class theory developed by Elsenhans (1996) to analyze the politics of oil in Uganda. Building further on the works of Ouiassa (2005, 2018), I posit that the discovery of crude allows Museveni to pursue a new developmental discourse, which helps to legitimize his continued rule. Using the insights of Ouiassa (2005, 2018) and Collord (2019), I further argue that middle classes as regime stabilizers have a self-interest to ensure that the state class distributes part of the anticipated rent to the middle class or get included in the state class to provide them greater access to rent. However, as I show in the empirical sections, these fights play out along the lines of the struggles dividing different segments of the state class. As Collord (2019) has shown, parliament is one crucial arena in which such fights are waged for rents. While the aim to shift to a middle-income country by using rents for infrastructural projects partly honors pledges made to socio-economic transformation, infrastructural developments, as will be briefly shown later, cater to a large part to middle class demands. Subalterns currently benefit less from these infrastructural developments or are even negatively affected by conflicts caused by oil developments, such as intensified land struggles, exacerbated competition for a livelihood and in-migration.

Museveni's Varying Legitimization Strategies

Museveni has used several strategies to legitimize his continued rule since 1986. Bringing peace to Uganda following Idi Amin's despotic rule (1971-79) and the Bush War of 1986 was and is a key strategy to legitimize the National Resistance Movement (NRM) rule. The broad-based and inclusive government, the expansion of the state sector and the re-instatement of Uganda's kingdoms, although solely relegated to cultural functions, have all been further important strategies. The embracing of neoliberal reforms has made Uganda a posterchild for World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies, while Uganda's swift deployment for peacekeeping missions, such as in Somalia under the mandate of AMISOM, conferred to it increased international legitimacy.

Although Museveni initially proposed a leftist discourse during his studies at the University of Dar es Salaam and before coming to power, Museveni and his party, the NRM, swiftly changed course after having won the Bush War in 1986. Museveni then argued in favor of a lean state and the privatization of the country's assets. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF needed positive examples for their reform policies and found such a "test laboratory" in Uganda while it was dependent on financial support from these institutions. Focusing on the liberalization period in Uganda, Mwenda and Tangri (2005), Tangri and Mwenda (2001), and Himbara and Sultan (1995) have highlighted the stark dependence on donors, but also the divestment process of parastatal enterprises to some of the members of his inner circle[68] as well as the cushioning of state retrenchment by creating employment opportunities through special statutory bodies for former public officers.

Museveni retained not only a sort of international legitimacy by becoming a showcase country for neoliberal reform, but also by engaging in peace-keeping missions in conflict-affected neighboring states (on the latter see Fisher 2012). Domestic strategies were equally important. He cushioned the effects of liberalization policies for his organic clientele, introducing a "broad-based

[68] The core is constituted around Museveni's inner family circle which, among others, currently include the first lady who serves at the same time as Education Minister, his brother Salim Saleh, his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Commander of the Land Forces of the Uganda People's Defence Forces, and Sam Kutesa, the former Foreign Minister and an in-law to Museveni.

government" which sought to include opposition politicians into the government and make it more representative of Uganda's different regions (Lindemann 2011; Golooba-Mutebi and Sjögren 2017). The re-introduction of multiparty politics in 2005 created important administrative and parliamentary positions. The size of Parliament, the number of districts, and hence the roles for various regional posts due to the decentralized government structure, has grown ever since 1986. The number of districts has increased from 33 in 1986 to 135 in 2020, and Parliament has grown from 270 in 1989 to 530 seats in 2021 (Carbone 2008, 66; Election Guide 2021; Tangri and Mwenda 2005, 458-460). Additionally, Museveni aimed at shoring up support from former kingdoms abolished by Uganda's first president, Milton Obote, in the late 1960s. Museveni's Bush War was mostly fought within close proximity to the capital city of Kampala, a Bugandan stronghold, and relied on crucial support from the Baganda. In the 1990s, the NRM welcomed the exiled Baganda monarch, still a very popular figure, back to Uganda and allowed the kingdom to be re-instated in 1993, although only as a cultural institution (Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013, 9-12), and further handed back the property expropriated during the Amin era (Kasfir 2019, 530).

However, despite these strategies, bitter fights about the succession of Museveni unraveled between different segments of the state class already in the 1990s. The threat to a split of the NRM emerged when a more frugality-oriented segment campaigned against the self-privileging tendencies of Museveni and his inner circle. In 1999, Kizza Besigye, Museveni's former physician in the Bush War, then later Minister for Internal Affairs and Political Commissar of the NRM, heavily criticized Museveni's inertia to stop his relatives and close allies from privileging themselves (Booth et al. 2014, 67). Besigye's decision to run against Museveni in the 2001 presidential polls affronted the NRM. Later, Besigye together with further former key figures from the NRM founded the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) (Carbone 2008, 191-194), the most important opposition party from the re-introduction of multipartyism in 2006 to 2021. A second serious challenger emerged when NRM stalwart Amama Mbabazi, Secretary General since 2005 who also held various positions such as Defense and Security Minister and later Prime Minister, broke away from Museveni's key segment and challenged Museveni at the

presidential polls in 2016. I will focus on the conflicts between the key segments of the state class over the centralization and distribution of rent, in which Mbabazi has played a crucial role, after outlining for what infrastructure projects the anticipated rent revenues were used.

Catering for Middle Class Demands: Infrastructural Development and Prestige Projects

Museveni's past legitimization strategies start to lose their luster as the "liberation argument" (having brought peace to Uganda after protracted periods of war and insecurity) seems to be less convincing to the youth who have not experienced the civil war but only the very limited progress under the NRM (Reuss and Titeca 2017). The discursive shift to a new developmental vision therefore comes at a time when domestic dissatisfaction with the continued NRM rule becomes more evident.

In 2007, following the discovery of oil, Museveni outlined his *Vision 2040* for Uganda, which essentially aimed at transitioning to a middle-income country by 2040. The plan, among other things, also envisioned large-scale infrastructural developments, such as the construction of dams, roads, but also included reviving the national air carrier, the construction of a bullet train network, new international airports and highways, to create jobs and integrate the country better (National Planning Authority 2007).

In anticipation of future revenues for oil, several of these large-scale infrastructure programs have been commissioned and financed with loans (Wolf and Potluri 2018, 7).[69] Part of this infrastructure is a ca. 50 km highway from Entebbe, where Uganda's State House and only international airport are located, to Kampala, Uganda's capital. Furthermore, two hydroelectric dams in Karuma and Isimba, which together are expected to generate almost 800 Megawatts, fall in this category of debt-financed-infrastructure (Ogwang and Vanclay 2021). A range of further road and dam projects, the upgrading of Entebbe international airport and the construction of

[69] Anticipated revenues from rent are used to finance not only infrastructural development but also defense projects. Back in 2011, Museveni bought at least eight Russian fighter jets for 740 million USD using foreign reserves of the Central Bank of Uganda. He argued that the amount would be paid back by future revenues from oil (Daily Monitor 2011a, 2011b).

the second international airport in Kabaale, the re-establishment of Uganda Air and the construction of industrial parks have also been financed by loans (Wolf and Potluri 2018, 7). Further, Uganda is part of a larger railway corridor development aiming to link Tanzania and Kenya to the Eastern part of the Congo and South Sudan. Uganda's plans for the construction of a standard gauge rail from Kenya's border to Kampala have, however, not yet received financing, but the construction of the railway is prospected for 2022-23 (Wakabi 2020). Moreover, the critical oil infrastructure, namely the oil refinery as well as the pipeline, have not yet received any funding.

This debt-financed infrastructure in anticipation of rent revenues has led to a significant increase of the national debt level. From 2011-2021, the debt to GDP ratio increased from 20 to 50 percent (Draku and Ladu 2021). Initially, the Ugandan planning authorities had "presumed that the first repayments [for these projects] would not be due until after oil revenues had commenced" (Ogwang and Vanclay 2021, 7). The Ugandan government initially prospected to start oil production already in 2013, but had to delay the extraction of the resource several times (Lakuma 2020). In 2021, given the significant delay to oil exploitation and the negative economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on tax revenues, Uganda had to consider negotiating a debt moratorium with its creditors. According to a news report, China demanded that oil revenues be used directly to repay one of the loans which Uganda was seeking to renegotiate (Biryabarema 2021).

The upgrading of Entebbe Airport, the expressway from Entebbe to Kampala and the re-establishment of Uganda Air are excellent examples of prestige projects that are extremely expensive and accessible to only a select few. The cumulative costs for these three projects in the period 2012-2021 were ca. 1,38 billion USD (Wolf and Potluri 2018, 7). Conversely, the agricultural sector suffers from a general lack of attention and inadequate allocation of funding towards agricultural support services (Asiimwe 2022, 2018).

Fights Between the State Class and the Middle Class over the Use and Distribution of the Anticipated Rent

After oil was discovered in 2006, Museveni first tried to define oil as a strategic resource, bringing it under the control of the Presidency and the military (Hickey and Izama 2017, 173) and then moved to centralize power over the resource. Since Uganda's legislation on natural resources dated back to 1985, from 2011 to 2015 the NRM sought to pass a number of new bills regulating the oil sector. Subsequently, Parliament became the arena in which power struggles between segments of the state class played out. The conflict over centralization and distribution of rent unraveled along two segments of the state class and legislators, who are part of the middle class aligned to these segments. Specifically, these revolved around Museveni's key segment, which included the former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, and an opposing faction aligned with the former Justice Minister Kahinda Otafiire and former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya. The legislators who initially opposed Museveni's centralization efforts of the rent in 2012 comprised a set of young, outspoken and ambitious backbench Members of Parliament (MPs) from the ruling party, either opposing Mbabazi or directly aligned with the Otafiire segment.

Already in 2010, Henry Banyenzaki, a so-called "rebel MP" from the ruling party who previously clashed with the party leadership over his defiant behavior (Gyezaho 2007), was one of the young backbenchers opposing Museveni's government on the basis of oil policy (Edwards 2010). He pressured the NRM government to publish the Production Sharing Agreements between the Ugandan government and oil companies, but was co-opted in 2011 as State Minister for Industry (Edwards 2010; Matsiko 2013). In 2011, before key legislation on oil was presented in the legislature, allegations emerged which accused the Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa and the Energy Minister Hilary Onek of accepting bribes from Tullow Oil, the company that later sold its stake in the oil projects to TotalEnergies and CNOOC. MPs passed a vote to stop any negotiations on new oil projects (BBC 2011). After it emerged that the documents showing alleged corrupt behavior of these figures were fabricated, the Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister were cleared. However, the Energy Minister had already been replaced. It was believed that the documents were launched by the Justice Minister, Kahinda Otafiire (Collord 2019, 246).

Otafiire and Mbabazi, who both share a long history with Museveni since the Bush War and belong to a number of NRM "untouchables" (Daily Monitor 2010) who are not prosecuted for any corrupt behavior, clashed already a number of times since 2005. In 2005 and again in 2010, both competed for the position of Secretary General of the NRM, which Mbabazi won both times (NTV Uganda 2016). Spats ensued between Mbabazi and Otafiire, as well as between Mbabazi and Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, over corruption issues and mismanagement of the party. Bukenya and Otafiire accused Mbabazi of being behind a mafia group that wanted to sideline them from government positions (Obore 2008). Bukenya and Otafiire subsequently tried to retaliate against Mbabazi, seeking to remove him from his powerful position as Secretary General and Minister over a corruption scandal in 2008 (Gyezaho and Wanambwa 2008; Matsiko 2008). A second important figure who had interests in discrediting Mbabazi was the Speaker of Parliament Rebecca Kadaga. Already during the corruption scandal in 2008, Kadaga, who was then still Deputy Speaker of Parliament, sided with the Otafiire faction in seeking to remove Mbabazi (Gyezaho and Wanambwa 2008). When Parliament discussed and then passed legislation on the oil sector, she opposed the party leadership, siding instead with legislators who criticized the ruling party over the centralization of the resource (I will return to this issue later).

The conflict over the centralization of the rent ensued over the draft of the Exploration, Development and Production Bill. The draft stipulated that the Energy Minister, among other authorities, could not only engage in any negotiations with oil companies over the exploitation of the resource, but also grant, revoke and renew these licenses (Oil in Uganda 2012c; Oloka-Onyango 2019, 56). This legislation would have allowed Museveni to gain control over the licensing and negotiation, and supported plans to appoint the Board of Governors of the National Oil Company (NOC) (Oloka-Onyango 2019, 59). The counter proposal of the "rebel" backbench legislators stipulated that the Petroleum Authority (PA) instead of the Minister would grant licenses (Mukasa and Odyek 2012) to the oil companies. The MPs proposal further suggested that MPs endorse candidates selected for the PA and for NOC as well as administer the budget of the NOC (ibid.). The defiant MPs additionally demanded to have a say in the management of the Petroleum Fund to which all

revenues from oil – royalties and profit oil – are transferred (Kakaire 2012). If the draft bills of the MPs had been passed, the legislation would have created a powerful PA and an independent body, solely accountable to Parliament, administering the Petroleum Fund. This would have created power centers outside the ambit of the President.

Given the opposition of the legislators, the Energy Minister initially proposed to share the responsibility of awarding production licenses with the PA. However, Museveni urged MPs to return to party discipline and pass the original draft. He then called the MPs individually and eventually pushed through his agenda to centralize the control of oil. Over 100 MPs abstained and four legislators voted against the law (Oil in Uganda 2012d; Collord 2019, 247-249). Although, as stipulated in the Exploration bill, Parliament approves the Board of Directors of the NOC and the PA, the granting of licenses is solely the responsibility of the Energy Minister.

After the crucial act was passed, the core segment sought to punish the unruly MPs. The NRM pushed to suspend the membership of the defiant MPs who voted against party discipline and expel them from Parliament (Daily Monitor 2013), which, however, was thwarted by the Speaker Kadaga. All of those defiant MPs previously had engaged in fights with either Mbabazi or a further figure from this core segement such as Kuteesa (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2021; Sserunjogi 2011; Mutaizibwa and Kakaire 2011). Kadaga was a crucial figure in the fights between the two segments, as she allowed the debate in Parliament about the corruption scandal in 2011 to drag on and exposed the core segment. Later, she also sided with the unruly MPs and opposed plans to have them expelled (New Vision 2013).

As stipulated in the Public Finance Management Act, the revenues from the exploitation of oil – royalties as well as profit oil – accrue to the NOC, which transfers the revenues to the Petroleum Fund at the Central Bank of Uganda (Kazi 2019, 183). Although to date no oil has been extracted and only money from a tax dispute over capital gains with oil companies has been transferred to the account, the government has recurrently withdrawn money from the Petroleum Fund, transferring revenues to its Consolidated Fund without following procedures as laid out in the Public Finance Management Act (Ssekika 2020). Further, the withdrawn sums by the

government since mid-2010 increased considerably with every budgetary cycle between 2017-2019 (ibid.). Although the executive claimed that the money withdrawn would be used for infrastructure projects, the Auditor General asserted that these claims could not be verified as information on infrastructure developments was not disclosed by the government (Kasemiire 2020; Ssekika 2019).

The oil discoveries have also given rise to conflicts between the state class with the re-instated cultural kingdoms. However, these fights appeared to be aligned to the fights between the different segments. The resource finds are located in the Western region of Uganda in districts that previously belonged to the kingdom of Bunyoro. Hence, the Bunyoro King demanded that the central government share at least 10 percent of the oil revenues with the cultural institution. When the series of oil-related bills were discussed in Parliament in 2012, the Bunyoro king demanded 12.5 percent of the oil revenues be allocated to his kingdom (Oil in Uganda 2020). Claiming that this was standard practice around the world, the Bunyoro King tried to lobby MPs and demanded this share in order to foster development in the Western region (Sekanjako 2012). The King's position was supported by MPs who came from the oil region who also partly belonged to the unruly MPs engaging in the fights with the core segment (Kakaire 2012; Sekanjako 2012). However, the Public Finance and Accountability Act, passed in 2015, stipulated that the central government receives 94 percent of the revenue from oil, while the rest goes to local governments of the oil producing districts. Cultural kingdoms such as Bunyoro receive just one percent of the royalties.

Conflicts in the Region between Subalterns and the State Class

Conflicts between the state and subalterns also unfolded in the region affected by the oil projects. Expectations of the local population over the benefits of the oil discovery were well pronounced, as were the fears that the discovery would negatively impact the lives of residents living in districts with oil wells (Mawejje 2019). These were all connected to the development of the production facilities and the oil infrastructure, which are part of Museveni's larger developmental project to develop Uganda's infrastructure. The construction of an export pipeline, a pipeline

for refined products towards Kampala, two oil production sites, the refinery and an industrial park comprising the construction of Kabaale airport, Uganda's second international airport, would require 115,000 hectares of land (Ogwang and Vanclay 2019, 12).

In particular, residents expected the oil discovery to lead to increased business opportunities, better infrastructure (roads, electricity, and water), better healthcare and education and job opportunities (Mawejje 2019, 131f). While the oil sector provided little direct employment opportunities (ibid.) from which mostly qualified people have benefitted (Ogwang and Vanclay 2019), the expected negative repercussions were tied to issues of land, in particular, the loss of access to land due to resettlement, in-migration and, thus, increased competition for land and jobs (Mawejje 2019, 132). According to Ogwang, Vanclay, and van den Assem (2019: 5-6), residents spoke of a "local resource curse", since the oil discovery and the impacts it had on the local population caused the above-mentioned conflicts. The development of the oil infrastructure and the production sites required the acquisition of land. In fact, after the discovery of oil, a frequently voiced complaint by residents was that politicians had allegedly acquired land in the area under exploitation for speculative purposes and evicted residents (Bybee and Johannes 2014, 140; see also Ogwang, Vanclay, and van den Assem 2019, 5). A report by the Resettlement Advisory Committee (2016, 22) outlining a land acquisition and resettlement framework asserted that the increased speculative behavior has led to "a sharp increase in land disputes." The price of land rose dramatically due to the oil discovery (Bybee and Johannes 2014, 140). Hence, compensation paid for land could therefore not buy the same plots due to speculation. Apart from issues with delays in resettlement payments and allocation of land not equivalent to the prior farmland, pastoralists and farmers also clashed over the access to land as infrastructure development partly led to increased rivalry over land (Ogwang, Vanclay, and van den Assem 2019, 8; Kinyera and Doevenspeck 2019, 396). According to Ogwang and Vanclay (2019, 11) rising population figures in the districts have already led to "tensions over job opportunities between local youth (meaning those who are born in the region) and 'foreign people' (Ugandans and others from outside the project areas)." In-migration was not the only threat worrying residents. Access to fishing at the lake has also been restricted

(Ogwang, Vanclay, and van den Assem 2019), undermining the possibilities of fishermen to earn a living.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the discursive shift regarding development and the various conflicts that unfolded between different segments of the state class, the middle class and subalterns in the aftermath of discovery of oil in Uganda in 2006. Although Uganda's oil deposits are much smaller than those of other oil-rich states, such as Nigeria, Algeria or Angola, the currently exploitable resources are still significant. The production of oil has been delayed since the initially prospected date in 2013 and is now set for 2023-2025.

The crude discovery has fueled enormous expectations of development. The pursuit of infrastructure projects allows Museveni to partly honor pledges to socio-economic transformation made during his earlier rule. The debt-financed development of Uganda's generally much needed road and electricity infrastructure cannot hide the fact that the state class pursues several prestige projects which are not directed at the long-term improvement of the masses. In general, the financing of infrastructure with debts in anticipation of oil revenues bears the risk of increasing dependency on foreign creditors and donors if revenues materialize at a later stage than initially expected and do not meet the projected income. The infrastructural developments are not complemented with a strategy to direct rents into not yet productive sectors. One of the most important sectors clearly would be agriculture, which today still suffers from a lack of serious attention.

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4. The prospects of cross-class alliances in former bureaucratic development societies: comparing Taiwan and Burkina Faso (co-author Jannis Saalfeld, *Third World Quarterly*)

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Abstract

This article examines cross-class alliances in former ‘bureaucratic development societies’. We look at middle-class mobilisational efforts aimed at the lower classes in Taiwan and Burkina Faso. In particular, we analyse their capacity for challenging the socio-political dominance of the remnants of post-colonial state classes and hypothesise that the transformative potential of such class alliances depends on the development of the productive forces. Specifically, we argue that the formation of competitive middle-class-led political parties with a mass base independent of the clientelist networks of post-colonial state classes hinges on an early empowerment of labour. We test the validity of our argument using a ‘diverse selection’ comparison of Taiwan and Burkina Faso.

Keywords

Burkina Faso, Taiwan, cross-class coalition, middle class, state class, empowerment of labor

Introduction

The aim of this article is to shed light on the political prospects of middle-class-led cross-class alliances in the Global South. Class coalitions and their transformative potential have been studied by different authors. For instance, in their seminal monograph Capitalist Development and Democracy, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1992) identify alliances between organised labour and middle-class representatives, ie urban professionals in the public and private sector, as key enablers of democratisation. While, according to Rueschemeyer et al., in Europe the push for political liberalisation tended to be spearheaded by the working class, in Latin America the middle classes initially acted as the leading force against authoritarianism.

In a recently published book, Lisa Mueller (2018) investigates contemporary political developments in sub-Saharan Africa through a comparable class-focussed lens. Challenging the notion of ''classless Africa" (Mueller 2018, 8), she finds that urban coalitions between middle-class activists and lower-class citizens are a characteristic feature of a 'third wave of protests' that unfolded in the region in the early 2010s.

Building on the work of Mueller and Rueschemeyer et al., we probe middle-class efforts to mobilise the lower classes. Specifically, we study divergent constellations of mid- dle-class-led class coalitions in former 'bureaucratic development societies'. The concept of the bureaucratic development society has been developed by Elsenhans (1996; see also 2021, 125–131). Rooted in Keynesian macro-economics, it revolves around the hypothesis that in the post-colonial societies of the Global South, the emergence of dynamic prof- it-based economies has historically been blocked by structural deficits. These deficits, Elsenhans argues, paved the way for the rise and expansion of bureaucratic state classes appropriating the economic surplus via the state apparatus.

Drawing on Elsenhans' theoretical and conceptual propositions, we probe the potential for a middle-class-led class coalition to turn into a viable political alternative to the remnants of state classes and their organic clientele. We do so with the help of a comparative case study of Taiwan and Burkina Faso, two former bureaucratic

development societies. Our selec- tion of these two cases follows the logic of a diverse selection design (see Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300). In line with this logic, we focus on highly contrasting paths of the eco- nomic transformation of bureaucratic development societies and explore their impact on coalitional class politics.

While Taiwan's state class managed to bring about a comprehensive development of the productive forces, its Burkinabé counterpart did not even come close to inducing the emer- gence of a fully fledged capitalist market economy. Instead, Burkina Faso's bureaucratic development society transitioned towards neoliberal structural adjustment. Echoing Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens' propositions on the political implications of capitalist development, we contend that this divergence crucially shaped the political pros- pects of middle-class-led alliances emerging in the two countries at different points in time. In particular, we argue that the capacity of such alliances for challenging the socio-political dominance of the state class depends on the make-up of the subaltern classes. In Taiwan, the lower classes have been dominated by a strong and assertive working class emerging prior to the onset of multi-party politics. Under such circumstances, class coalitions are able to assert themselves as independent and competitive political forces seeking to take power, pushing through what we designate as 'political liberation'. By contrast, where – as in Burkina Faso – an empowerment of labour has not taken place, middle-class-led alliances tend to form after the emergence of multi-party politics. State class patrons and their clientelist networks continue to dominate the liberalised political sphere. Under these conditions, middle-class activists may successfully mobilise lower classes to push for political reform. However, given the weakness of labour, the resilience of clientelism and the bad reputation of conventional party politics, these activists are inclined to refrain from trying to transform cross-class alliances into organised and viable alternatives to state-class dominated parties.

The article is divided into four parts. In the next section, we review the work of Mueller (2018) and Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992), and present our argument. In the third section, we then proceed to the comparison of Taiwan and Burkina Faso. We make use of primary sources and the comparatively

rich secondary literature on the political and economic history of Taiwan and Burkina Faso to identify the mechanisms underlying class coalitions' dynamics. The purpose of the fourth section is to discuss the different tra- jectories of these two former bureaucratic development societies and to reflect on two further cases similar to Taiwan and Burkina Faso.

Class coalitions and political change

Over the past four decades, cross-class alliances have been identified as key drivers of political change by various authors (see Dix 1984; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Goldstone 2011; Beissinger 2013; Durac 2015). One of the most seminal theoretical frameworks revolving around such alliances has been developed by Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992). Focussed on historical developments in Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, they study the relationship between capitalist development and democracy. At the heart of their macro-historical theory lies the assumption that 'it is power relations that most importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize, and then maintain itself even in the face of adverse conditions' (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 5). In the light of this premise, they present the balance of power among different classes and class alliances as 'a factor of overwhelming importance' (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 5).

Emphasising that class interests are socially constructed, rather than pre-given, Rueschemeyer et al. investigate divergent configurations of inter-class relations involving labour movements, middle classes, the industrial bourgeoisie and landed elites. Their main argument is that capitalist development is conducive to democracy. Specifically, they posit that capitalist development 'weakens the landed upper class and strengthens the working class as well as other subordinate classes' (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 271). However, while they identify labour as the most reliable pro-democratic force, they also detect that 'in all regions […] pressure from the organized working class alone was insufficient to bring about the introduction of democracy; the working class needed allies' (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 270).

Indeed, regarding Latin America, Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 155–226) find that cross-class pro-democratic pressure was largely spearheaded by mem- bers of the middle class, including state employees, private-sector professionals and intel- lectuals. This regional specific outcome, they argue, can be attributed to the deficiencies of dependent import-substituting industrialisation limiting working-class power. Furthermore, pointing to the causal relevance of divergent industrial structures, they also find that in Latin America, '[w]ithin the industrial sector, the predominance of small enterprises with paternalistic labor relations hampered labor organization'(Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 180).

Inspired inter alia by Rueschemeyer et al., Lisa Mueller (2018) provides a pioneering analysis of the class dynamics underlying political change in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Exposing the notion of ''classless Africa" as a myth (Mueller 2018, 8), she stresses that the region's post-colonial leaders have historically headed corrupt ruling classes using the state apparatus 'to accumulate wealth and oppress the poor'(Mueller 2018, 65). She further contends that on the basis of their clientelist state-centric economic policies, these state classes blocked the emergence of an autonomous middle class, ie a 'stratum of Africans who meet their basic material needs with income from sources outside the state' (Mueller 2018, 9, emphasis in original).

According to Mueller, such a middle class eventually emerged in the late twentieth century following the economic crises of the 1970s and the 1980s and the neoliberal structural adjustment policies subsequently enacted. On the one hand, Mueller (2018, 67) states that 'economic liberalization was initially painful for a middle class built on patronage and urban bias'. On the other hand, she finds that as private capital accumulation was becoming pos- sible, 'in the long term, the middle class flourished' (Mueller 2018, 67).

The intellectuals, business owners and salaried professionals constituting this middle class, Mueller argues, have acted as driving forces behind political opposition movements. Most crucially, according to Mueller, their mobilisational efforts have

decisively contributed to the emergence of the 'third wave of protests in sub-Saharan Africa' (Mueller 2018, 67) beginning in the early 2010s.[70]

Mueller identifies middle-class representatives as the main organisers and spokespersons of protests. yet she also finds that the rank-and-file of protest movements in Africa is primarily made up of 'an economically marginalized lower class' rooted in 'the uneven distribution of rising incomes' (Mueller 2018, 54). Thus, according to Mueller, middle-class-led cross-class coalitions are a key feature of contemporary African politics.

While Mueller embraces the concept of the 'state class', she does not refer to the state class theory of Elsenhans (1996). In line with other authors, such as Sklar (1979), Diamond (1987) or Boone (1998), Elsenhans discusses the genesis and evolution of bureaucratic post-colonial ruling classes appropriating economic surplus via the state apparatus. However, in contrast to these authors, Elsenhans' framework possesses a crucial macro-economic component. Central to this component is the distinction between two types of economic surplus: profit and rent. While, according to Elsenhans, profit is the outcome of apolitical market competition, rents are appropriated via political means.

Building on the classical Keynesian assumption that the total volume of profits in a given period depends on the size of investment spending (and not vice versa), Elsenhans proposes a model wherein the development of the productive forces follows from rising mass incomes. Guided by this assumption, Elsenhans contends that in the post-colonial societies of the Global South, the predominance of rents has been rooted in a structural deficit: low agricul- tural productivity implies huge labour surpluses, which inhibit real wage increases, as there is a large reserve army of labour willing to work for subsistence wages. As a result, demand for machine-produced consumer goods is low so that private entrepreneurs are kept from appropriating the existing economic surplus as profit via investment spending. Under these conditions, Elsenhans (1996) argues, economic surplus has to be primarily appropriated politically, ie in the form of rents. Against this background, Elsenhans diagnoses the

[70] According to Mueller (2018, 31–47), the first two waves of protest unfolded in the decolonisa tion period and the early 1990s, respectively.

post- colonial genesis of bureaucratic development societies dominated by state classes. He states that '[t]he state class includes all those employed in the state sector (administrative set-ups and state-owned enterprises) who, as compared to the average worker, enjoy higher incomes, greater opportunities for participation and greater prestige' (Elsenhans 1996, 177). More precisely, the state class comprises those parts of the bureaucracy that oversee the appro- priation and/or distribution of rents or are involved in decision-making on the executive level in the bureaucracy, enterprises owned by the state and organisations tied to the state (Elsenhans 1996, 177). Further personnel employed by the state are considered the organic clientele of the state class. It is labelled 'organic' since it depends on the growth of the state class and 'clientele' as it enjoys privileges – job security and high incomes – of which the large part of the population is deprived (Elsenhans 1996, 177f). Trade unions that aggregate interests of the personnel employed by the state class in such bureaucratic development societies can be considered the organic clientele.

In Elsenhans' Keynesian framework, state classes face the challenge of re-orienting bureaucratic development societies towards capitalism by implementing specific economic policies. In particular, he attaches great importance to agrarian reforms, coupling productivity growth with an egalitarian income distribution and rising mass incomes. At the same time, he highlights the self-privileging tendencies of state classes resulting from their clientelist grip over the masses and their use of economic surplus free from market pressures. Thus, Elsenhans generally attributes state classes an ambivalent role when it comes to overcoming economic underdevelopment.

Drawing on Elsenhans' theoretical and conceptual propositions, we define two opposing poles of a spectrum of former bureaucratic development societies. At one end of the spec- trum are societies where a state class successfully brought about a comprehensive transition to capitalism. At the other end are countries where the state class' economic interventionism – as well as the subsequent neoliberal structural adjustment – did not even come close to achieving this transition. On the basis of this conceptualisation, we now investigate the potential of middle-class mobilisation of the lower classes to challenge the socio-political dominance of the remnants of the state class and its organic clientele. This implies going beyond the

study of democratisation as political openings may 'merely' lead to competitive electoral politics between political parties dominated by state class patrons and their clien- telist networks. Thus, our dependent variable differs from those of both Mueller (protest) and Rueschemeyer et al. (democracy).

We hypothesise that in former bureaucratic development societies where state classes bring about a comprehensive development of the productive forces, the empowerment of labour provides a mass base for the formation of middle-class-led competitive political par- ties. Such parties possess a mass base independent of the clientelist networks of the state class. Under these conditions, cross-class coalitions operate as competitive challengers to the socio-political dominance of the remnants of the state class.

By contrast, we contend that in former bureaucratic development societies where the transition to capitalism has drastically failed, the sphere of multi-party politics tends to be dominated by state class patrons and their clientelist networks. As shown by Mueller (2018), in these societies middle-class efforts to mobilise the lower classes for political change nor- mally only arise in the aftermath of the onset of multi-party politics. Building on this finding, we argue that while middle-class protest organisers may successfully push for political reforms, cross-class alliances tend to fray quickly. The weakness of labour, the resilience of clientelism and the bad reputation of conventional party politics incentivise middle-class leaders to refrain from trying to transform alliances into organised and viable alternatives to state-class dominated parties.

The divergent paths of cross-class coalitions in Taiwan and Burkina Faso

In line with our focus on the opposite poles of a developmental spectrum of bureaucratic development societies, we compare Taiwan and Burkina Faso according to a diverse selec- tion logic. Taiwan's state class managed to bring about a comprehensive development of the productive forces. It pursued a strategy of import substitution combined with an export-led growth strategy via small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to facilitate technology learning. Rising mass incomes with an egalitarian and productive agricultural sector allowed Taiwan not only to subsidise

industrialisation but also to reach self- sufficiency of foodstuffs and the undervaluation of its currency to make products more competitive. In Burkina Faso, in order to transform the economic structure, factions of the Burkinabé state class sought to implement similar policies that aimed to increase mass incomes but failed for various reasons. As a result, Burkina Faso transitioned towards neo- liberal structural adjustment.

Echoing Rueschemeyer et al.'s propositions on the political implications of capitalist devel- opment, we contend that the contrasting developmental trajectories of Taiwan and Burkina Faso crucially shaped the political prospects of middle-class-led alliances that emerged in the two countries at different points in time.

Rapid economic development in Taiwan

Taiwan's state class introduced economic policies that changed the structure of the economy fundamentally in a short time span, making labour scarce within only two decades.

The Kuomintang (KMT) had lost the Chinese civil war and took refuge in nearby Taiwan. They established authoritarian rule in 1949, banning labour strikes and the formation of political parties. Furthermore, independent media outlets were forbidden (Chu 1996, 496). However, these measures were complemented by policies to create legitimacy such as an egalitarian land reform (Gold 1986, 8, 123f; Wong 2003, 242). The land reform served to cut off the landed elite from its power base and assuage peasants (Chu 1996, 496; Wong 2003, 243). By nationalising large-scale industries, the KMT also gained control of the industrial economy located in urban Taiwan (Chu 1996, 496; Ranis 1995, 511). Against the backdrop of communist advances in Southeast Asia, Taiwan received considerable economic support from the US, just as its neighbour South Korea did. However, Taiwan was much less depen-dent on this outside intervention by the US than nearby South Korea (Yi 1988, 131–36).

Although Taiwan had relatively good preconditions for the development of its productive forces, the country still had a labour surplus in the 1950s (Ranis 1995,

511). Nevertheless, excess labourers were soon to be absorbed by the market due to the burgeoning agricultural and industrial sectors. Taiwan significantly increased its agricultural productivity after the land reform process. It witnessed remarkable growth rates from the 1950s onwards, and also in non-agricultural output once it had shifted from an import-substitution policy to an export-oriented strategy. Overall, economic transformation on the island was institutionally assisted by the Taiwanese state, relying on various sector-specific support services and pol- icies (Brautigam 1994). One prominent example of this transformation from the primary sector to industrial manufacturing took place in the food processing sector, which repre- sented the fastest growing sector in Taiwan in the early 1960s outside agriculture (Ranis 1995, 511f, 518).

Three features of Taiwan's economic transformation merit more attention here: first her egalitarian income structure due to the land redistribution and the rising mass incomes, second the reliance on SMEs and third the burgeoning export sector. First, incomes were very evenly distributed due to the land redistribution. The Gini coefficient for rural incomes declined from approximately 0.50 in 1950 to 0.31 in 1970 (Ranis 1995, 515), meaning that Taiwan's farmers saw their real incomes more than double in roughly the same time frame (Ho 1979, 91). Higher incomes meant more purchasing power for consumer goods. The rural industrial sector could supply these goods, especially those that were income elastic, such as furniture (Ho 1979, 94; Ranis 1995, 515).

Second, the remarkable aspect about Taiwan's economic transformation was its highly decentralised industrialisation. SMEs mostly located in the countryside were at the forefront of industrial development. The heavy reliance on SMEs facilitated rapid technological learn- ing, as imported technology had to be adapted to the smaller local market and its specific needs (Yi 1988). Taiwan's reliance on SMEs in industrialisation also guaranteed the rural population the ability to earn a livelihood in the countryside. From 1956 to 1966, 46% of the new workforce in manufacturing was hired in rural SMEs as rural-based industries were highly labour intensive (Ho 1979, 83, 86). The overwhelmingly rural distribution of the SMEs ensured that labour did not have to migrate to the urban centres in pursuit of a better live- lihood (Ho 1979, 78, 93). The reliance on small- and medium-sized businesses

impacted the method of workforce organisation, a matter to which we will turn in the sub-section hereafter. According to Minns and Tierney (2003, 109), in 1971, almost 70% of all enterprises had fewer than 20 employees. In the 1980s, 90% of the companies had a workforce of fewer than 30 employees. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, 98% of the total number of firms were SMEs – about 700,000 firms – employing 70% of the workforce (Minns and Tierney 2003, 109).

Third, the shift from an import-substitution policy towards an export-oriented strategy based on SMEs and the economic boom based on this export strategy saw a‘new commercial sector [emerge that was] relatively independent of the party-state’ (Yang 2007, 509f). From 1952 to 1980, the non-agricultural output always saw double-digit percentage growth, with an all-time high of 18.5% from 1960 to 1970 (Ranis 1995, 512). The export-oriented strategy, which was accompanied by a devaluation policy, radically transformed the economy. In 1952, Taiwan’s exports consisted of almost 92% of agricultural products, but in 1988, almost 95% of the exports were industrial goods (Ranis 1995, 522). The transformation was reflected in the occupational transition of the workforce. Employment outside agriculture rose from 29% in 1956 to 67% in 1980 (Ranis 1995, 514). The above-mentioned dynamic firms were mainly controlled by native Taiwanese (Yang 2007, 510). The relevance of this factor will become more evident when we turn to the convergence of middle-class and working-class interests.

Due to the export-oriented strategy that focussed on rising mass incomes, first through the land reform and later through its decentralised industrialisation, Taiwan experienced labour scarcity only two decades after it had embarked on a process of industrialisation (Ranis 1995, 512–522). The economic transformation had changed the social structure of Taiwan extensively. These changes later allowed for democratisation. As Wong (2003, 244) highlighted, ‘equitable growth under authoritarianism meant that economic inclusion in Taiwan was realized before the extension of political citizenship’. Economic inclusion, in turn, facilitated a stable and sustainable class coalition between scarce labour and the middle classes, as we illustrate in the next section.

Labour empowerment and the emergence of a sustainable class coalition in Taiwan

Only a decade after Taiwan experienced labour scarcity in the 1970s, civil society's increased self-confidence led to the founding of several organisations that established close ties with oppositional forces. These organisations were led by the middle class and brought human rights, feminist, environmental and labour issues to the fore. As Ho (2010, 6) observed, '[m]edical doctors, journalists, college professors and lawyers were instrumental in establishing pioneer social movement organizations'. More importantly, however, was the emergence of oppositional candidates first in local and then later in national politics. In addition to these movements and new oppositional forces, government-critical media outlets increasingly demanded political reforms from the KMT government. However, the KMT government sought to undermine these move- ments in the 1980s, and repressed or/and co-opted some of its leaders into the state class (Ho 2010, 6–8; Jacobs 1981, 37). Nevertheless, the oppositional movement asserted itself against the state class, since the cross-class alliance between the working class and the middle class was durable.

Oppositional politicians already participated in national and local elections in the late 1960s. The organisation of oppositional forces, however, only began to gain momentum in the 1970s, which correlated with the achievement of labour scarcity. The main oppositional challengers, the so-called Tangwai (people outside the KMT), had won several seats in the 1977 local county and township executive elections (Lee 1980, 49–52). Already, support for the Tangwai mainly came from the popular classes (Yang 2007, 520f, 524f).

Early on, the KMT had opted for a corporatist labour regime, which tied the working class under a KMT-controlled labour union to the state class (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003, 224; see also Minns and Tierney 2003, 111). In 1986, almost one-fourth of the workforce was unionised in these labour unions (Chu 1998, 191). Discontent with this arrangement was evident, however, as 'a 1980 university survey of union members found that less than 10 percent expressed satisfaction with union cadres and nearly 90 percent believed that unions were not capable of representing their opinions'(Yang 2007, 524). Workers' waning support for this regime was reflected not

least by increased strike activity. Using data on strike activity in Taiwan from 1984 to 1998, Buchanan and Nicholls (2003, 227) showed that there was a consistent upward trend of stoppages, increasing from 907 strikes in 1984 to 4138 stoppages in 1998. The strikes mobilised only 9000 workers in 1984, but this number increased to 104,000 employees in 1998 (although the average number of workers participating in these strikes in the years between 1985 and 1997 was usually much lower than during 1998) (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003, 227). However, it is important to note that stoppages in Taiwan were of a briefer nature, included fewer workers and hence meant fewer lost work hours than in South Korea. Also unlike in South Korea, they were also more locally bound and limited to certain firms (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003, 233).

The mostly urban-based social movements recruited heavily from the middle class. 'While the numbers pale in comparison with the great 'people power' movements of the Philippines and South Korea, their very emergence in normally placid Taiwan shocked the regime to the core' (Yang 2007, 522). Together with the increased self-confidence of labour, the increasingly self-confident politicians fed into the foundation of organised oppositional parties (Chu 1996, 496). Despite the prohibition of oppositional political parties, the first formalised oppo- sitional party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was founded in 1986. The martial law introduced in 1949 was abandoned in 1987, a year after the foundation of the DPP (Ho 2010, 8; Chu 1996, 496).

The relationship forged between the popular classes and the middle classes was rein- forced during the abolition of the martial law. 'Especially in the heady days just before and after the lifting of martial law, workers mobbed the offices of DPP officials and flocked to legal seminars organized by opposition labour groups such as the Taiwan Labor Legal Assistance League' (Yang 2007, 525). The labour movement established a close connection with the political party DPP, lobbying for political transformation through these party organs (Jung 2011, 398). Minns and Tierney (2003, 116) illustrated this clearly when citing an activist who reflected on the relationship between labour organisations and the DPP: 'They have tied their support organisations to the electoral ambitions of the Democratic Progressive Party'. Although the labour movement tried to form its own interest association with the

foundation of a Labour Party in 1987, this political entity broke in two and was no longer a significant actor on the political stage (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003, 229). Labour's interests were thus closely bound to the DPP.

Following student protests and subsequent reforms of the electoral system, the DPP eventually entered parliament in 1992 and even won the presidency in 2000[71] (Ho 2010, 9–13; Arrigo 1993, 35; Yu 2005, 111). The class-coalitional project that led to the formation of the DPP achieved this 'political liberation' approximately half a century after the KMT had devised and implemented policies seeking legitimacy but ultimately giving rise to the workers' strong bargaining power.

It is noteworthy, as Yang (2007, 525) writes, that the DPP's programme on socioeconomic matters 'was virtually indistinguishable' from the state class. The DPP had shifted its cam- paign from a leftist agenda to promoting an explicitly Taiwanese ethnic identity calling for the independence of Taiwan. Yang (2007, 528f) showed that class issues were in fact expressed in ethnic terms, as especially the working class was an ardent supporter of the Taiwanese national identity.

The presence of a nationalist discourse and the increasing absence of a distinct leftist discourse to mobilise the electorate becomes comprehensible once we reconsider the peculiarity of Taiwan's path to industrialisation. Due to the unique industrialisation strategy via SMEs, a considerable part of the country's workforce was employed by mostly small, family-run firms. The company structures and the dynamic growth of these companies meant that becoming a company manager or owner of one of these firms seemed feasible (Chu 1996, 496f). Furthermore, until 1986 trade unions remained under the close control of the KMT government. When labour strikes rose, the KMT intervened immediately to resolve labour issues (Chu 1998, 191–195). Chu (1998, 195–197) highlighted that workers experienced the state as pro-business and hostile to their demands. Therefore, he writes, they drew a connection between their subjugation as workers and their political exclusion through the authoritarian regime. The mobilisation along nationalist lines and the DDP elite's awareness of the ability of such a discourse to mobilise a large part of the electorate, which Yang (2007, 533) but also Minns and Tierney (2003) pointed out,

[71] In 2001, the DPP also came to represent the largest party in Taiwan's parliament.

now becomes intel- ligible. The two groups that benefitted immensely from the KMT's outward-looking pro- duction strategy were the workers and capitalists in the export sectors, who were mainly native Taiwanese.

Burkina Faso: economic stagnation

Burkina Faso's labour surplus has remained significant since independence mainly due to the fact that attempts to transform the economic structure through redistributive and mass income-oriented economic policies failed. In the late 1950s, 96% of the population was employed in the agricultural sector. The primary sector contributed close to two-thirds of the gross domestic product (GDP), while the industrial sector's share of GDP was only 3.5% (Ebong 1967, 9; Samo 1967). The predominance of the agricultural structure and low pro- ductivity levels persist to date (Speirs 1991, 94f). In 2018, manufacturing still only contributed about 5% of the country's GDP (World Bank 2019). Labour statistics from 2001 show the overwhelming importance of the informal sector, which employs 74.3% of the total workforce (Institut national de la statistique et de la démographie 2018, 64). The primary export com- modities – primarily cotton and gold – have remained largely unchanged since indepen- dence (Samo 1967, 50; Lange 2018).

With the ascension of Thomas Sankara in the 1980s, Burkina Faso saw its first attempt to transform the country's economic structure. The Sankarist government wanted to reach self-sufficiency in the production of staple foods and standardised industrial goods through a redistributive policy called Réorganisation agraire et foncière. The aim was not only to increase production but also to include the peasantry in state–society relations by increasing agricultural output and nationalising and reorganising land allocation while subordinating middle- and upper-class consumption desires by reducing imports (Reza 2016, 97–101; Otayek, Sawadogo, and Guingané 1996, 10). Besides import controls and the attempt to harmonise demand, the core of Sankarist policies aimed to increase farmers' incomes through price increases and better commercialisation of agricultural products (Tallet 1996, 121). Agricultural support services such as sinking wells and planting trees to stop desertification were further important cornerstones of this policy (Reza 2016,

98). However, these policies failed not only due to the inefficiencies of para-statal marketing boards but also because of political resistance from powerful groups. Efforts to restructure the primary sector and attempts to create value chains in the various industries in the 1980s were mainly in vain.

Sankara had introduced wage freezes for civil servants and tight budgetary controls to finance agricultural development (Speirs 1991, 104), to narrow income gaps and orient the incomes towards mass consumption. Trade unions disapproved of these policies as wage freezes and cracking down on corrupt officials affected a large share of its members, the formal workforce. Sankara, in turn, brought the dissenting labour unions under his control. Nevertheless, resistance to redistributive policies also came from such powerful elites as the chefs de terre. The establishment of the Comités de défense de la révolution aimed at restruc- turing the system of land allocations and empowering farmers through redistributive land policies. The committees ultimately failed to sideline the influential chefs de terre, who have played a vital role in controlling access to land (Gausset 2008, 60; Tallet 1996, 123; Kuba 2004, 66f).

The growing resistance of the elites and discontent with the leftist policies fed a coup d'état and the assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987. Blaise Compaoré, a long-time ally of Sankara who is believed to have orchestrated the overthrow, changed the government's course immediately. His government re-integrated the alienated clientele of the state class as it raised wages, abandoned import controls and cut prices (Speirs 1991, 101–105). Further, Compaoré rehabilitated the chiefs as they provided vital support to mobilise the rural pop- ulation (Reza 2016, 100–102).

As early as 1991, Compaoré reached a loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and committed himself to the liberalisation policies of the IMF. The country wit- nessed cuts to its welfare budget, while previously nationalised state companies were again privatised. Burkina Faso then became one of the top target countries for development aid in Africa and was one of the first countries to become part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Western donors lauded Burkina Faso for its privatisation and deregulation policies. Despite the impressive GDP growth rates in the first two decades after the liberal- isation policies were

implemented, the liberalised Burkinabé economy is still dominated by Compaoré and his inner circle (Reza 2016, 102f).

Burkina Faso experienced periodic food shortages (Speirs 1991, 89) and staple foods still constitute a sizeable part of the country's imports. While under the prevailing circumstances self-sufficiency of staple foods could theoretically be achieved despite Burkina Faso's seem- ingly unfavourable conditions (Herrera and Ilboudo 2012, 88), the goal of autonomy in food production was no longer a priority of Compaoré's, in contrast to Sankara's governments. The high but volatile export-earnings of cotton and gold – in which the Compaoré family holds a significant stake – currently preclude a transformation of the agricultural sector in favour of the production of staple foods (Herrera and Ilboudo 2012, 87–90; Speirs 1991, 97; Reza 2016, 103).

The lack of structural transformation and the persistently high labour surplus had severe implications for the constitution of a class coalition. The weak bargaining power of labour in Burkina Faso only allowed the formation of a fragile middle-class-led alliance, which quickly frayed rather than transforming into a viable political alternative.

Failed empowerment of labour and limited impact of middle-class mobilisation

Protests and mass mobilisation are a constitutive element of Burkina Faso's post-colonial political history (Harsch 2017; Engels 2019). The most important actors driving these upris- ings in the post-colonial era were labour unions representing a small and privileged for- malised workforce eager to be co-opted by the state class.

As Burkina Faso's economy went into stagnation in 1966 shortly after independence, the government reacted with austerity measures and cut civil servants' wages. Labour unions mobilised against this policy and called for the military to oust the then president (Reuke 1979, 19–21). The organised workforce represented in these labour unions would once again become pivotal in exerting pressure on the regime, leading to another coup d'état, when Sankara's efforts to industrialise the country and to mobilise the peasantry were met with resistance by

the trade unions. The opposition to these policies was triggered by the fact that they lowered the living standards of the unions' members. More importantly, the Comités de défense de la révolution, which aimed to absorb trade unions and traditional institutions (Loada 1999, 138), even threatened to render the unions irrelevant. The coup d'état against Sankara in 1987, which was likely led by Compaoré, his former deputy and minister of state at the presidency, marked the end of the attempts to restructure the class composition of Burkinabé society.

Demonstrators also took to the streets in 1998, 2006, and 2008, protesting against cor- ruption, repression and persistently high poverty. Trade unions representing the tiny and privileged formalised workforce always played a pivotal role in these protests (Engels 2019, 2013; Loada 2019). When president Compaoré tried to lift the constitutional presidential term limits in 2014 to extend his 27-year rule beyond 2015, protests erupted again. However, this time a cross-class coalition between the middle class and the lower classes, ie the urban poor, lobbied for change. In 2014, the movement mobilised large crowds against Compaoré's plans to lift the constitutional term limits and extend his rule beyond 2015.

Apart from trade unions and political parties that had already mobilised against Compaoré in the previous years and hence also played a crucial role, a central actor in this class coalition of 2014 was Le Balai Citoyen. According to Frère and Englebert (2015, 303) this movement 'made the fall of the regime possible'. Founded by two popular musicians Smockey and Sams K'le Jah, Le Balai Citoyen, especially popular with the young population, interwove political and economic issues. This enabled a broad coalition of forces interested primarily in the removal of Compaoré (Harsch 2017, 193, 198; Touré 2017; Gorovei 2016; Citoyen 2014). Not only its leadership but also its organisational structure was overwhelmingly urban-based (Commeillas 2015). Also, other organisations such as the Collectif anti-référendum and the Mouvement 21 avril mobilised against Compaoré's plan to prolong his stay in power (Carayol 2018).

The foundation of Le Balai Citoyen has to be situated in the changed political context of Burkina Faso, as Frère and Englebert (2015, 301) highlight, when they write:

> The birth of Balai Citoyen was an important development as it provided a hitherto largely alien- ated and disconnected youth with a means of political mobilization at the same time as it illustrated the relative impotence of regular political parties to genuinely represent the aspira- tions of the youth and, in general, to aggregate the demands of citizens beyond the small cliques of their members.

In mid-2000, Compaoré had already planned for his brother François Compaoré to succeed him as president after his last constitutional term officially ended in 2015. However, Compaoré's party, Congrès pour la democratié et le progrès (CDP), opposed his plan. Compaoré subsequently founded the Fédération Associative pour la Paix et le Progrès avec Blaise Compaoré (FEDAP-BC) in order to support François Compaoré as presidential candidate for the 2015 elections. After FEDAP-BC figures took over the CDP to push through Compaoré's brother as his successor, key politicians from Compaoré's inner circle – such as Roch Marc Kaboré – were pushed aside and subsequently defected. In 2014, they founded the party Mouvement du people pour le progress (MPP) (Frère and Englebert 2015, 300). Kaboré had served as prime minister in the 1990s and later as president of the parliament. In 2010, the CDP had already suffered a high-level defection by Zépherin Diabré, former minister for commerce, industry and mines under Compaoré in the 1990s. After his defection, Diabré founded the party Union pour le progrès et le changement (UPC) (Jeune Afrique 2020). Following the 2012 elections for the legislature and municipalities, the UPC took over the role of the main opposition party from the Union pour la Renaissance/Parti Sankariste (Harsch 2017, 194f).

In the period directly before the ousting of Compaoré, these newly founded opposition parties also mobilised against the long-standing president. Recently founded opposition parties such as the UPC and the MPP, as well as trade unions, which had initially opposed the early mobilisational efforts of Balai Citoyen, joined the movement against Compaoré which then culminated in the latter's ouster in October 2014 (Carayol 2018; Frère and Englebert 2015, 296).

In 2015, after a short period with a transitional government,[72] the two former key figures from Compaoré's inner circle, Roch Marc Kaboré and Zéphirin Diabré, ran

[72] Protesters' success in overturning the regime hinged on the acquiescence of the armed forces. The military signalled that they would not shoot protesters or intervene when angry crowds gathered in front of the parliament and other institutions or properties associated with Blaise Compaoré. The decision to let Compaoré flee to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire further indicates a negotiated transition

against each other in the presidential elections, which Kaboré won (Roger 2015). Le Balai Citoyen's co-founder Smockey had explicitly decided against transforming the momen- tum of the movement into a political party: 'We are a political movement, but we don't want to come to power or access any political office. We intend to represent a civic strength that can pressure the authorities to get them to work towards the people's interests' (Saddier 2014).

Later, Smockey explained that since Burkina Faso already had several parties, he preferred to remain independent so as to be able to control the government. However, he considered supporting a party standing for real change a possibility (Gänsler 2019; Bationo 2019). In fact, Le Balai Citoyen had called for the youth to cast their ballot in the 2015 elections and overcome their disillusionment with party politics (Harsch 2017, 223). Voter registration in the 2015 elections increased by 70% compared to registered voters in the 2010 elections (Harsch 2017, 223).

The ousting of Compaoré did not lead to a replacement of the state class with autonomous interest bodies of the lower classes. Even the return of the former long-time ruler is currently under discussion. After his re-election in 2020, Kaboré co-opted the former main opposition leader Zépherin Diabré[73] into his government and appointed him as minister for reconciliation (Roger and Duhem 2021). Amid the heavily deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Diabré is reaching out to the exiled Blaise Compaoré to discuss his return to the country as the ruling elite envisages him negotiating with insurgent groups.[74]

Discussion

within segments of the state class (Frère and Englebert 2015, 297). Le Balai Citoyen welcomed the military takeover while acknowledging that without the military's approval, political change would not have been possible (Gorovei 2016, 531f; Frère and Englebert 2015, 297–301).

[73] In the 2020 presidential elections, Diabré again ran for president, but this time came third after Eddie Komboïgo (CDP) (Toulemonde 2020).

[74] Blaise Compaoré's party, CDP, the largest opposition party after 2020, had called for talks with jihadist groups and lobbied for a return of Compaoré to lead these talks (Wilkins 2021). Before the elections in 2020, Kaboré precluded the possibility of any deals with such groups (Gänsler 2020). Compaoré's return seems to hinge on the question of whether and how the former president will be held accountable for past human rights violations (Diallo 2021).

Shortly after independence, state classes in Taiwan and Burkina Faso implemented economic programmes that aimed at catching up with industrialised nations and in the case of Taiwan eventually succeeded in orienting the economy towards a profit-based system.

Taiwan encountered labour scarcity only about two decades after it had embarked on its industrialisation strategy. The country's land reform and the various agricultural services raised mass incomes and subsidised the industrial sector. The chosen path of industrialisa- tion via SMEs to better serve the demands of the local markets facilitated technological learning through adaptation. Furthermore, self-sufficiency in foodstuffs allowed the deval- uation of the country's currency to increase the competitiveness of exports. The industri- alisation strategy impacted on the class composition of the country. Workers already had a strong bargaining position in the 1980s. The middle class and its various movements also became more self-confident in the 1980s, staging protests and strikes actively criticising the KMT government, but more importantly, they channelled these forces into founding the opposition party DPP while martial law still prohibited any free political association. The state class initially tried to repress and co-opt the movement, but could not impede these movements to achieve 'political liberation'. The middle-class-led coalition first enforced the liberalisation of the polity and then replaced the remnants of the state class in 2000 by winning the presidential elections.

While Burkina Faso's government under Thomas Sankara also tried to implement policies to raise mass incomes of the rural sector, the country has had a considerable labour surplus since independence. As the organic clientele of the state class, Burkina's labour unions represented only the privileged and narrow interests of a small fraction of a formal workforce in the public and private sectors. Attempts to restructure and empower the lower classes were actively opposed by this labour aristocracy. The failed attempts at restructuring the Burkinabé economy made the state class dependent on donors and forced it to liberalise its polity and economy in the 1990s. While economic liberalisation gave rise to a middle class independent of the state class, the political liberalisation did not lead to competitive party politics with political forces independent from the state-class patrons. Given the tarnished image of party politics, the leading middle-class activists refrained from trying to

transform cross-class alliances into organised and viable alternatives to state-class-dom- inated parties.

We selected Taiwan and Burkina Faso as two diverse cases of former bureaucratic development societies. We regard these cases as representative of a larger sample of the two distinct trajectories of bureaucratic development societies. Here, we briefly reflect on two other countries on the spectrum of the divergent trajectories of former bureaucratic devel- opment societies.

In other newly industrialised countries, such as South Korea, the state class pursued an equally successful strategy of industrialisation as Taiwan's ruling class. However, Korea's industrialisation process via conglomerates and not via SMEs meant that the workforce was more concentrated geographically and in fewer firms and had fewer prospects of becoming entrepreneurs themselves. Although the middle class initially mobilised to push for political reforms,'the main driving force for democracy was transferred from the student movement and the Chaeya groups to the labor movement' (Jung 2011, 397, emphasis in original). The labour movement that was 'known for its militancy' (Jung 2011, 392) organised a hitherto unknown number of stoppages over several months in 1987, the year regarded as the break-through on the way to 'political liberation' from Korea's state class. The Korean case points to the fact that the impetus to replace the state class can also come from the labour move- ment. The interests of the middle class and the lower class can also converge more consis- tently at a later stage to vote the state class out of office via its own political force (as was the case in Taiwan).

Senegal's socio-economic and political conditions starkly resemble those of Burkina Faso and also gave rise to a middle-class-led class alliance disenchanted with the stalled economic and political developments in the country and disillusioned with party politics (Touré 2017, 64, 67). The class alliance mobilised against President Abdoulaye Wade's (2000– 2012) efforts to remove the constitutional presidential term limits in 2011. Demarest (2016, 70) showed that the class coalition itself was heavily dependent on financial contributions from former state-class patrons. These patrons broke away from the ruling party and then founded their own political parties as a vehicle to compete in presidential elections. The class alliance initially threatened

to abstain from the elections if Wade's candidacy was not withdrawn – the Constitutional Court later confirmed Wade's candidacy for a third term as constitutional. However, the coalition soon faltered when former state-class patrons – among them Macky Sall, who then was elected president in 2012 – withdrew its support for the alliance and seized the opportunity to run in the presidential elections (Demarest 2016, 72). Notwithstanding the differences between Burkina Faso's and Senegal's political context, the dynamics of the cross-class alliance in the two countries are similar. The momen- tum of the cross-class coalition could not be transformed into a viable political alternative to the remnants of the state class, which allowed former state-class patrons to further dominate politics in Senegal.

Conclusion

Where labour is empowered prior to the onset of multi-party politics, as was the case in Taiwan, it can enter into a durable middle-class-led coalition capable of effectively challeng- ing the remnants of bureaucratic state classes. It only took Taiwan two decades to reach labour scarcity and for a self-confident civil society to emerge, which in turn achieved a 'political liberation' from the state class. This fact underlines the relevance of Elsenhans' emphasis on the importance of egalitarian income policies coupling productivity increases with rising mass incomes.

In the absence of the successful implementation of such policies, in Burkina Faso multi- party politics has historically been dominated by former key members of the state class. Middle-class representatives have eventually resorted to mobilising the lower classes to push for political change. However, faced with workers' weak bargaining power and a political process characterised by the resilience of clientelism and patronage politics, they have been reluctant to work towards the establishment of a viable political alternative.

We have also shed light on the dynamics of South Korea's (successful development of productive forces and empowerment of labour) and Senegal's (very limited economic trans- formation and significant labour surplus) cross-class alliances as two further cases on the spectrum of bureaucratic development societies. South Korea's cross-class coalition equally pushed through a 'political liberation' of the

former state class, although here the central impetus came from the lower class, and it was only at a later stage that middle-class interests converged with the working-class demands. The cross-class coalition in Senegal which emerged in the early 2010s did not transform into a viable political entity and lead to a replacement of the remnants of the state class. Former state class patrons further dominate the country's political landscape.

Indeed, as observed by Mueller (2018, 190), politically assertive middle-class activists in the former bureaucratic development societies of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa often 'are disillusioned with party politics as a way of effecting political change'. This disenchant- ment manifests a fundamental dilemma because, as inadvertently demonstrated by Taiwan's and South Korea's state class, any political project aiming to sustainably empower the masses ultimately needs to be based on state power.

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5. Are power centralization and inequality necessary for development? A critique of Mushtaq Khan's political settlements framework with special reference to Tanzania (Preprint, under review with *Journal for Agrarian Change*)

Title

Are power centralisation and inequality necessary for development? A general critique of Mushtaq Khan's political settlements theory illustrated with special reference to Tanzania

Status

Preprint

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Abstract

This manuscript offers a critique of political settlements (PS) theory which identifies power centralization as a condition for the emergence of a developmental state in the Global South. The theory postulates an authoritarian advantage of regimes in achieving economic transformation. Although the approach enjoys increasing popularity, this paper points to significant contradictions within the framework. Contrary to the theory's core claims of an authoritarian advantage and the necessity of primitive accumulation, I point to the significance of (1) rising mass incomes for capitalist growth and the relevance of empowering smallholders and (2) the nexus of considering mass interests and the creation of legitimacy. By analyzing the crucial case of Tanzania, I lastly seek to understand why, despite PS theory's prediction, capitalist growth does not trigger. I point to two factors: (1) rising inequality and (2) the continuous neglect of the agricultural sector. The critique is of broader relevance to other countries in the Global South.

Keywords
Tanzania, political settlement, primitive accumulation, smallholder empowerment, authoritarianism, rising mass incomes

Introduction

Heterodox approaches within development studies have gained currency due to good governance's inability to offer countries of the Global South a viable route to economic transformation similar to that of recently industrialised nations. Taking South Korea as an empirical departure point, the heterodox political settlements (PS) approach, developed by Mushtaq Khan, offers a grand theory that allocates the state a central role in intervening in markets to drive productivity increases, growth, and a catching-up process.

In short, Khan's PS theory postulates that a transition from poverty to capitalist growth largely hinges on political factors, namely the constitution and cohesion of a ruling coalition in a given country. Crucial to this theory are rents and the management thereof. The more power is centralised within the ruling elite, the more likely it is that the government can efficiently appropriate and distribute rents and ensure rent-receivers' performance (Khan 2000). Derived from a comparison of developmental efforts of Bangladesh and South Korea from 1960 to the 1980s (Khan 1989), power and rent centralisation – which includes authoritarian measures to bring dissenting voices into line with the elite's proposed developmental vision – are identified as the central conditions to enter into economic transformation, namely constructing a developmental state that fosters industrialisation. This argument resembles those of earlier works from Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004) which built on central insights of the government's role in industrialisation as analysed in Wade (1990). However, Khan's framework differs from these approaches most starkly in its understanding of economic transformation as being embodied in the Marxist paradigm of primitive accumulation (Khan 2010).

An increasing number of scholars working within a comparative political economy and area studies tradition have used this framework to analyse African development efforts.i Despite the increasing number of scholars working with this theory, the approach has been subject to criticism. In a recent article, Tim Kelsall (2018b) finds that Khan's theory holds explanatory power only regarding certain developmental outcomes, e.g. natural resource management and oil sector as well as social protection while being less useful to explain processes in other areas, e.g. the health sector or public sector reform. He partly attributes this to the inherent

elite bias of the theory and calls attention to the importance of the configuration of a settlement, that is the relationship between elites and certain social groups with "disruptive potential" (2018b: 665). While Kelsall focuses more on methodological issues and seeks to refine PS theory, Nicolas van de Walle (2016) argues in a more sweeping critique of the theory that proponents of this approach echo the arguments of the early modernisation school of the 1950s, which postulated an authoritarian advantage over democracies to pursue economic transformation. The author then points to the examples of Botswana and Mauritius and highlights the "striking correlation […] between the degree of openness of political institutions and development." (2016, 174). Van de Walle sees the success stories of these two countries in terms of economic development as cases that contradict PS theory's central tenet of power centralisation.

Given that the PS framework enjoys increasing popularity, this article also seeks to engage critically with the theory. This seems to be timely as scholars working at the intersection of comparative politics, development studies, and area studies are increasingly re-focusing their attention on the nexus between regime stability and economic transformation. In current Africa-centred scholarship on development, the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia are used to illustrate the superiority of a tight grip of the ruling elite over a country's society. However, these countries are not producing the expected beneficial results, at least not in terms of economic transformation.ii As authoritarian tendencies are also increasing in Africa, it appears to be all the more important to re-consider the debate on the relationship between the two variables of regime stability and economic development. PS theory implicitly states that the authoritarian advantage lies in the fact that a power centralization outweighs the costs for a shrinking space for civil society, the opposition as well as within in the ruling party to voice dissent, as the country can then faster catch-up with Western states and achieve the Western ideal of democracy and diversified economies with a strong industrial base as would otherwise be the case without a centralised power base. Whether the ultimate goal of catching-up with the industrialised countries justifies authoritarian measures at all is an important question, but equally if not even more important seems to be the question about what kind of economic transformation this power centralisation would even trigger.

As stated above, scholars have already voiced concerns over the theory's ability to guide economic transformation. I take Kelsall's (2018b) and van de Walle's (2016) assessments as starting points to scrutinise the central tenets of PS theory, but intend to do so in a more rigorous way than the two aforementioned authors. Reconsidering the conceptual building blocks of the theory seems to be warranted, as ambiguities about the explanatory power of the theory exist, as Kelsall (2018b) ascertains. The vagueness of the theory might very well result from the initial choice of conceptual building blocks. Therefore, in section one, I briefly summarise the theory. In section two, I carve out important contradictions that emerge from the original framework and the works of the students of this approach. Here, I highlight that the specific theoretical proposition of primitive accumulation is not in line with the empirical importance of smallholders for industrialisation. Van de Walle (2016) raises important questions about the nexus of legitimacy, regime type, and the chosen economic programmes. There is historical evidence that the regime stability of South Korea from 1960-80 – exactly the historical period from which the theory originally abstracted – seems to question the emphasis placed on regime stability by PS theory. For this reason, in section three, I highlight the phases of political turbulence that Korea's ruling class faced from within elite circles, but also from social movements and the difficulties it encountered to discipline highly influential entrepreneurs. If it is true that smallholders played a more important role and that the political history of authoritarian South Korea was more mixed than PS theory states, one would have to reconsider evidence of the significance of smallholders and the production of legitimacy through economic programmes. I intend to do so in section four, where I revisit the post-Keynesian insight of rising mass incomes as a condition of capitalist growth and the significance of the agricultural sector. In the final section, I seek to explain why the case of Tanzanian economic transformation is not kick-starting despite the prediction that it would.

A considerable part of the manuscript is devoted to the discussion of PS theory. After all the theory's underlying motive is to offer countries of the Global South a viable route to economic transformation and has already gained traction among developmental policy circles. Given that scholars have pointed to the ambiguities of the theory and in light of its increasing popularity, a rigorous and thus

detailed examination of the theoretical propositions seems necessary. If one of the key problems of the theory as I seek to illustrate is indeed the focus on fostering inequality and the closure of possibilities for political participation and if an alternative approach that focuses on mass interests and creating legitimacy holds more explanatory power, it is a warranted endeavour to specifically look solely for these main determinants – incomes and associated with that the sectoral performances of the economy and legitimacy – in the empirical section and specifically focus on the macro level. I select one specific case where PS theory predicts economic transformation such as in the case of Tanzania but where there is no robust indication for such transformative dynamics. The country is chosen as the crucial case which means that if the theory cannot explain this specific case, the raised concerns over a mismatch between theory and real events are further underscored. Tanzania's governing party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) under John Magufuli has largely acted in line with this theory. After Magufuli's sudden death in March 2021, his former vice-president Samia Suluhu Hassan has been appointed to succeed him. Whether or not the authoritarian shift which began during Magufuli's first term from 2015-2020 is likely to be continued under the new president remains unclear.[iii] However, the transfer of power to Hassan who's term will end in 2025 also provides a point to evaluate Magufuli's efforts from 2015-2020.

The theoretical sections marshal qualitative evidence on the economic transformation of South Korea and Taiwan. Here, I build on the comparatively rich secondary literature on economic transformation with reference to the two countries. I use a grey literature, primary sources, and statistical data in the section on Tanzania.

Political settlements theory: regime stability guides economic transformation through primitive accumulation

PS theory tries to understand differing performances of developmental efforts in the Global South. It establishes the dominance of patron-client networks in these countries and assumes that powerful groups, such as entrepreneurs, generally seek to protect their privileges, namely rents. Economic policy can endanger the dominance and privileges of entrepreneurs if policies are not in their favour. This makes it likely for business owners to thwart the introduction of far-reaching policy

changes if these negatively impact entrepreneurs' benefits, namely rents (Khan 1995). Rents are understood as "incomes which are higher than would otherwise have been earned" on competitive markets (Khan and Jomo 2000, 5).

PS theory analytically focuses on the distribution of power in society to identify the powerful groups and understand how and whether they might organise resistance against proposed policy interventions (Khan 1995). This focus is embodied in the term political settlement. A political settlement "*is an interdependent combination of a structure of power and institutions at the level of a society that is mutually ‚compatible' and also ‚sustainable' in terms of economic and political viability.*" (Khan 2010, 20; his emphasis).[iv] The distribution of power in society includes not only the ruling coalition – which controls political authority and state power (ibid., 8) – but also entrepreneurs, opposition parties, trade unions, and other power groups. A political settlement is relatively stable, as "both the institutions and the distribution of power become supportive of each other." (ibid., 5).

The individual strength of these different groups is captured in the term ‘holding power’. Holding power describes one's capability to engage in conflicts over the distribution of rents. It is not restricted to material resources but includes non-material goods like legitimacy and political abilities to mobilize people (ibid., 6, 20). Conflicts likely emerge when the institutional set-up is changed and impacts the allocation and distribution of rents, via new policies (ibid., 5).

Due to the theory's focus on administrative and bureaucratic power as its explanatory variable, PS theory differentiates between several distinct settlements. It offers the following four ideal types: potential developmental coalition, (vulnerable) authoritarian coalition, (weak) dominant party, and competitive clientelism (ibid., 49).[v] These types are each linked to different paths of economic transformation (Khan 2003, 2). That raises the question as to what accounts for the main differences between these types. In answer to that, there are two dimensions: horizontal and vertical power relations. The first looks at the degree of the exclusion of rival factions, e. g. opposition. If the ruling coalition faces weak opposition, this points to a weak horizontal power distribution and vice versa. Vertical power relations analyse the degree of the exclusion of lower-level factions in the ruling

coalition. Weak lower-level factions indicate a weak vertical power distribution and vice versa.

Particularly beneficial to economic transformation is the type called ‘potential developmental coalition’. It is characterised by weak opposing factions on the ruling coalition's lower and horizontal levels, hence disposing of strong implementation capabilities. While these are necessary conditions, the emergence of a developmental state "of course requires other conditions, including the emergence of an appropriate developmental leadership, as well as minimal technological capabilities within the country." (Khan 2010, 66). A business sector with little political influence, but high technological-entrepreneurial capabilities is further identified as being beneficial for a capitalist transformation (ibid., 66, 71f)[vi], as politically weak entrepreneurs cannot easily disrupt the introduced institutional changes that affect their rents.

What happens when the potential for a developmental coalition is reached? Once power and rent are centralised, ruling coalitions can then steer a process of capitalist transformation effectively. Khan's idea of economic transformation is guided by the Marxist paradigm of primitive accumulation, which he defines as "politically driven accumulation in a context of social and economic transition." (2003, 2). The separation of the producers of the means of production is seen as necessary, as "the growth of capitalism depends first on the concentration of assets in the hands of new classes and secondly on the presence of incentives and disciplining structures that ensure that the new accumulators become or remain productive." (ibid., 16).

What is crucial to PS theory, therefore, is the appropriation and transfer of rent to entrepreneurs and the disciplining of businesses to use these rents efficiently. Gray and Khan (2010) refer to this as a rent management strategy. The authors claim that in dynamically developing countries, "assets were systematically transferred to productive investors while in less dynamic developers, assets remained in the hands of unproductive expropriators." (343). In another central work of Khan, the significance of this argument becomes more explicit regarding the agricultural sector. Khan (2004, 104) argues in favour of the re-allocation of land and other resources to large farmers, as small and medium farmers are fragmented, generating few

surpluses and disposing of low levels of technology to achieve high productivity. To ensure fair land acquisition and compensation for land users, Khan suggests certain control and oversight measures of those firms that land has been allocated to (Khan 2009, 28).

Furthermore, Gray and Khan (2010, 343) argue that in low-income countries, productive assets such as land are held by "low productivity traditional sectors and as a result of their low productivity, their owners do not have the resources to pay for the definition and protection of clear property rights." These insufficient property rights result in high transaction costs for firms that seek to invest. The transfer of these resources by allocation, which amounts to expropriation, is thought to be necessary to enable businesses to start setting up production facilities (Khan 2009, 39).

In brief, developmental success in Khan's model is primarily attributed to the power architecture of regimes, which then impacts the allocation and enforcement of the productive use of these rents. However, several contradictions emerge from the framework.

Emerging contradictions concerning the theoretical cornerstones of the theory: the relevance of smallholder in East Asian economic transformation

PS theory initially emerged from Khan's (1989) comparison of Bangladesh and South Korea. In Khan's later work, South Korea and Taiwan are then introduced as success stories and hence ideal cases of catching-up with the Western world (Khan and Blankenburg 2009). However, the authors define South Korea and Taiwan as exceptional and unique because of the high degree of autonomy from society that the ruling coalition in these two societies enjoyed. They argue that currently the power architectures in countries of the Global South are not favourable to the kind of economic transformation that was achieved by Korea or Taiwan. Khan and Blankenburg mainly make the omnipresence of patron-client networks and their ability to avert changes that threaten the privileges of these networks responsible for this administrative deficit. Development success then seems possible only in specific sectors of the economy where the state can introduce incentives and disciplinary measures compatible with the domestic power distribution (Khan and Blankenburg 2009, 338f).

Whitfield et al. (2015), who were students of PS theory, share this view, but make economic aspects of the global economy responsible for the low chances of a replication of the Korean or Taiwanese success story. In light of the "dispersion of productive capabilities across a wide range of developing countries and the resultant increased competition in all areas of production that has driven down prices of manufactured goods" (Whitfield et al. 2015, 3), the authors conclude that it would be more difficult to create value and wealth in this global economy than in the previous century. Therefore, they propose integration into the global economy by sector-specific industrial policies, such as entering value chains in the food processing industry. So, while Khan and Blankenburg (2009) identify the low administrative potential of states as a hindrance to economic transformation, Whitfield et al. (2015) see the economic environment as the main problem for catching-up in the whole economy. However, Whitfield et al. (2015, 306) have to admit that the limited success these policies produce in specific sectors is insufficient to lead to economic transformation, especially since they fail to create jobs and address poverty. Whitfield et al. (2015, 306) propose a solution to the limited benefits of sector-specific industrial policies by fostering labour-intensive agribusiness and manufacturing through Foreign Direct Investment and nurturing domestic capitalists. In countries of the Global South, where close to three quarters of the population are working in the agricultural sector, this means focusing on smallholders, as this type of production is labour-intensive, and stands in contrast to the capital-intensive large-scale farming that Khan (2004) proposed.

While this raises the question as to why foreign and domestic investors would enter into manufacturing when the global economy has made manufacturing unattractive, as claimed by the same authors earlier, the more serious issue rests with the process of economic transformation. According to Khan and Blankenburg (2009), in the cases where all conditions have been met to unlock the potential of a coalition to become developmental, economic transformation can indeed take off, whereas Whitfield et al. (2015) implicitly preclude this option given the changed global economic setting. In any case, PS theory understands economic transformation as in Marx's primitive accumulation, where entrepreneurs are allocated resources to accumulate in the economy, which translates to the empowerment of the wealthy to

the detriment of the poor. However, the derived conclusion by Whitfield et al. (2015) to tackle poverty via labour-intensive agribusiness and manufacturing then stands in contradiction to Marx' paradigm, a concept that the same authors make use of.

Kelsall (2013, 10f, 47), who equally adopts primitive accumulation, nevertheless notices that empirical evidence on the Southeast Asian countries suggests that productivity gains, especially in smallholder agriculture, were the basis for industrial development in this region. Kelsall infers that the stalled developmental efforts in several African cases result from this neglect of smallholders. This, however, contradicts Khan's (2004, 104) perspective of the relevance of large-scale farming in industrialisation and consequently the insignificance of smallholders. Khan's argument favors large-scale farmers over small farmers, as the latter are fragmented and are characterised by "low surplus-generating capacities and low technology of even medium farms". While Khan's theoretical proposition is to expropriate and distribute land to large-scale farmers, and in general, allocate rents to the wealthy, the empirical evidence quoted by Kelsall but also the conclusion drawn by Whitfield et al. (2015) contradict the Marxist paradigm.

As empirical realities contradict the theoretical proposition (Kelsall 2013) or the identified solutions to overcome poverty demand labour-intensive jobs and are at odds with empowering entrepreneurs to the detriment of the masses (Whitfield et al. 2015), some students of the PS approach have decided to drop the Marxist paradigm or use it in an atheoretical manner. Although Gray (2015: 399f) grasped corruption on the elite level as primitive accumulation which "can potentially feed back into forms of investment and hence influence the overall pace and character of economic transformation.",[vii] her later work only uses the term accumulation (Gray 2019). Kelsall (2018a, 2018b) dropped the concept of primitive accumulation and, in recent works, has only focused on rents.

Some of Khan's students are convinced that the PS approach should not be understood as a theory. While some students of this approach explicitly use the term theory (Whitfield et al. 2015), others, like Behuria, Buur, and Gray (2017, 524), claim that "the real value of Khan's ideal types is not the ability to predict, but that the approach, as a set of theorised mid-range contentions, is a good basis for construing informed hypotheses." However, the essence of political settlements is to explain

why economic transformation succeeds or fails due to the existence or lack of administrative and bureaucratic capabilities. It thereby identifies mechanisms and proposes solutions to achieve developmental success. Hence, the theory cannot be reduced to only four ideal-types. Any set of interrelated contentions that seeks to explain empirical realities and which identifies mechanisms and laws is, in principle, a theoretical endeavour and, therefore, also holds predictive value.

These contradictions are, in fact, the result of deeper underlying problems, as I shall demonstrate. A closer look at the political history of South Korea indicates that the ruling class faced considerable challenges by social movements questioning the legitimacy of the pursued growth model and leading to overall crises of legitimacy.

South Korea's political turbulence and influential entrepreneurs

Although Korea's elite had a long term horizon and adopted central development planning, the pursued growth model created significant social tensions and led to political turbulence. While initially implementing land reform and prioritising mass interests over big business immediately after World War II, from the 1960s to the 1980s, Korea's ruling elite gave priority to rapid economic growth via an accumulation strategy that favoured the development of large, export-oriented conglomerates. The so-called Chaebols formed the backbone of this industrialisation strategy. Focusing on rapidly creating economies of scale, economic growth depended mainly on exports and had over-capacities due to low domestic demand. In times of crises, such as external demand shocks, the conglomerates had to fall back on state support that further strangled domestic demand, as it introduced wage freezes and imposed cuts to agricultural support services. The increasing debt burden of the Korean state from footing the bill of inefficient entrepreneurs resulted from the stark dependence on Chaebols and the neglect of domestic demand in this period (Yi 1988). A report in the German magazine Der Spiegel (1987) on Daewoo's business activities, by then one of the biggest Chaebols involved in heavy industries, notes that in case purchasers of Daewoo's ships failed to pay, the government would readily step in to compensate entrepreneurs.

Focusing on the second half of the 1970s, Rhee's study (1994) on heavy and chemical industrial policy showed that once the state tried to rein in the over-

capacities and attenuate its heavy reliance on exports to balance the developmental model, entrepreneurs easily thwarted and resisted any disciplinary measures of the state to shift the focus of accumulation. Park's (1961-79) successor Chun (1980-88) faced the same difficulties. While the Korean government was successful in convincing business owners to enter into heavy and chemical industries, that is increasing the rent appropriation strategies for entrepreneurs, it had difficulties to discipline the entrepreneurs to become more efficient and limit their privileges and reduce their rents at a later stage. Rhee therefore points to an important limitation in the ability of the Korean authoritarian state to discipline rent receivers: once it had empowered the Chaebols, the government found it difficult to ensure their performance while facing a lock-in effect of the chosen path. However, this would indicate that the Chaebols were much more in the driver's seat than Khan (2000, 135) suggests.

Furthermore, Korea's ruling elite faced increased difficulties to legitimise its developmental model. This became even more apparent when the regime had to introduce more repressive measures to quell voices that challenged this growth model of neglecting domestic demand and favouring big business (Yi 1986). Therefore, the ruling elite introduced emergency laws in 1971 to suppress radical social movements that channelled growing discontent with the ruling elite's vision. Apart from coup d'états in the 1960s and 70s, intense power struggles over the right policy directions within the ruling elite were the outcome of the crisis of legitimacy, which even led to the assassination of its head of state in 1979 (Yi 1986).

The one-sided growth model did not only produce inefficiencies and over-capacities in its early stage, but also led to the empowerment of entrepreneurs instead of the masses and created resistance to limit entrepreneurs' potential rent appropriation. The effects of this developmental strategy also become more apparent when compared to Taiwan. At the start of the 1980s, Korea was technologically behind its far more successful neighbour Taiwan, which had opted for technology adaptation via small and medium-sized businesses and acquired knowledge through transforming and adapting machinery for local demands, while Korea mainly imported capital goods and their inputs (Yi 1988).

The divergent paths of industrialisation in South Korea and Taiwan appear to be able to explain the different democratisation experiences in both countries. Chu (1998) attributes the fact that the Korean oppositional movement drew overwhelming support from the labour movement and questioned the ruling elite's *entire* societal project, including the chosen industrialisation path. He points out that the Taiwanese middle-class-driven counterpart focused its critique mainly on the suppression of political freedoms under the KMT regime, but less so on the economic dimension. While the Korean democratisation movement seems to have drawn a direct connection between its political subjugation and the economic status quo, its Taiwanese counterpart had a different focus. The prospect of becoming an owner of a small and medium-sized company was a real possibility of social mobility in Taiwan (Chu 1998). The equality-focused approach of the KMT government furthermore presented fewer reasons to question the economic policy of the ruling elite than in Korea. Taiwan experienced labour shortages already two decades after it had embarked on an industrialisation programme in the 1950s (Ranis 1995) while South Korea followed suit only a decade and a half after Taiwan (Bai 1985).

If it is true that smallholders, that is mass interests, played a central role in economic transformation as even some proponents of PS theory have to acknowledge, and if this approach created a level of legitimacy that did not lead to considerable periods of political and social turbulence, since it considered the interests of masses, one would have to consider an approach that focuses on this determinant of empowering the masses in contrast to empowering the already wealthy.

The problems with primitive accumulation and the significance of rising mass incomes as a condition for capitalist growth

In his analysis of Britain's transition to capitalism, Marx glossed over a central contradiction in his chapter on primitive accumulation. Although land concentration indeed increased, as Marx rightly observed, this was related to a later period than he initially focused on and only to regions that were not the dynamic centres of capitalist development. Most importantly, real incomes even *increased significantly* in this period of growth (Elsenhans 1980). Marx implicitly acknowledged this empowerment of labour when he wrote that the English working class had achieved a bargaining

power hitherto unknown and even succeeded in organising its interests against capitalists in the 19th century ([1867]/1981, 769). Although there was a significant portion of the population living off of subsistence wages, as Marx noted, these were 'subsidised' by a specific rent management strategy to guarantee their subsistence. In 17th century England, the poor laws served to 'subsidise' marginals by appropriating rents from the landed elites by taxing these above-average incomes (Elsenhans 1980). Therefore, rent was taken to overcome the dominance of a rent economy by decreasing the rents and dominance of rentiers in society and instead increasing incomes and driving the demand of the masses. Following Marx' own contradictory statements, and as I pointed out above, it is therefore much more plausible that the transformation from a rent economy to capitalist growth hinges on rising mass incomes and that this mechanism is a condition of *all* economic transformations (Elsenhans 2019).

The importance of the post-Keynesian perspective of rising mass incomes lies in the fact that they allow for the productive potential to expand and nurture the capital goods sector. Rising mass incomes enable an expansion of the domestic market, which facilitates investments into mass goods production, since entrepreneurs can accumulate profits by satisfying these demands through increased production. Kalecki (1942) has shown that in capitalist economies, the total profit of capitalists results from the aggregate investments in an economy; entrepreneurs get (profit) what they spend (investments). In an economy with fiat money, investments do not necessitate prior savings to facilitate investments, as both neoclassic and Marxist scholars believe,[viii] but require an expanding mass market. Any investment in production capacity that is not replacing depreciated capital but instead increases output needs to be met with increased demand. Therefore, it necessitates rising mass incomes that can absorb the additional products produced. Countries in the Global South are all facing substantial labour surpluses and are burdened by marginality, meaning that workers produce less than what they need for the subsistence of their families. Therefore, they do not represent a stimulus large enough to expand the domestic market. Hence, the central challenge to overcome the rent economy is to eliminate marginality and empower the masses (Elsenhans 2004).

While the first industrialisers had relatively beneficial internal social structures to trigger off this mechanism, or as pointed out above, where rent was taxed away and labour subsidised as in Britain, small countries in the second industrialisation phase such as Taiwan and also initially South Korea have opted for a combination of a strategy of integration in the global economy. This triggered rising income in the export sector, but there was also a restructuring of the internal demand by raising rural incomes to orient the economy towards mass demand (Elsenhans 2019).

Agrarian reforms adopted by the latecomers of industrialisation have served precisely this function of raising mass incomes, as several scholars have pointed out (Bräutigam 1994; Putzel 2000; Chang 2009). The argument's practical relevance lies in the fact that an agrarian reform that harmonises acreage absorbs the labour surplus and increases rural incomes by employing marginal labour. A necessarily reduced surplus – in case the previous land distribution was used exclusively for foodstuff production – initially means higher prices for produce and narrowing income gaps between the rural and urban sector, while at the same time providing incentives to farmers through higher prices to increase the agrarian output through investments in higher productivity. The masses' rising incomes then enable production and consumption of mass goods, instead of durable or luxury consumption goods, and increasing investments in production, which increases productivity (Elsenhans 1980). These agrarian reforms created demand for consumption goods and triggered investments in the agricultural sector and subsidised an emerging industrial sector, as family members of farmers could work in the modern sectors at a below-average wages, which were still above average in the primary sector.

Agriculture in Southeast Asia played a role as the backbone to industrialisation, as Kelsall (2013) also observes, because it empowered marginals and expanded the mass market. The Taiwanese KMT followed this approach by implementing agrarian reforms to raise mass incomes, support these reforms through various sector-specific services, and link them to the emerging industrialising sectors (Bräutigam 1994). Chang's (2009) comparative survey exemplifies the significance of smallholders in industrialisation via land reform and the importance

of various agricultural support services to drive productivity and mass incomes. South Korea initially used similar strategies to empower the masses, but later neglected to nurture the agricultural sector and instead favoured big business. Later on, the Korean state consistently failed to reach planned investments in this sector, as financial resources had been redirected to the Chaebols. The widening income disparities during the Park era in the 1970s reflect this policy choice favouring big business (Yi 1986, 177; Yi 1988, 53f, 131f). In contrast to Korea, Taiwan attributed the agricultural sector a pivotal role in development early on, stressing the importance of forward and backward linkages, making small and medium-sized enterprises and technology adaptation the core of its industrialisation (Bräutigam 1994). From 1960 to 1990, Taiwan had a much more egalitarian income distribution than South Korea (Ranis 1995, 515f).

The purpose of the next section is to shed light on the crucial case of Tanzania, in which the conditions for capitalist growth according to PS theory have been met. Still, economic transformation has not taken off due to the continued neglect of raising mass incomes.

Magufuli's Tanzania: little indication of triggering capitalist growth due to the neglect of agriculture

With the election of John Magufuli in 2015 who campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, scholars of PS theory saw an increased likelihood that Tanzania would transform into a developmental state (Andreoni 2017; Wangwe 2018; Kelsall 2018a). In a blog post on 1 July 2020, the Worldbank announced that Tanzania would hitherto be classified as a middle-income country, which was promptly presented by the CCM government as an important tangible result of Magufuli's presidency (Mwananchi Digital 2020). Indeed, from 2015-2020 Magufuli focused on integrating Tanzania's domestic market better via large-scale infrastructure developments. Furthermore, he also succeeded in re-centralising rents – not only via increased tax collection efforts but also by attempts to skim off rents in the still economically important mineral sector (Jacob and Pedersen 2018). Under Magufuli, Tanzania witnessed a continuation of impressive Gross Domestic Product growth rates during the past

decades. However, a closer look at the GDP's sectoral performances shows that high industrial and manufacturing growth rates strongly reflect a construction boom.

In contrast to construction, the agricultural sector continues to perform weakly. Agricultural production deficits also continue to exist, making food imports still necessary, although not to a large scale. Poverty under Magufuli persisted, while currently available data suggest that inequality may even have risen. The positive effects from this construction boom will likely dissipate, as Magufuli's policies were not embedded in a strategy that tried to overcome the considerable labour surplus by eliminating marginality through agrarian reform.

The recent efforts in re-centralising power, or better the authoritarian turn of Magufuli's administration (Paget 2017; Hirschler and Hofmeier 2019, 243-252), have their origins in domestic dissatisfaction with the liberalisation policies of his predecessors Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015) (Hirschler and Hofmeier 2019, 3-5), and Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005), and the performances of these governments. Magufuli's authoritarian turn, with its strong focus on efficient and fast results, aimed at re-establishing the legitimacy of the ruling party. It is likely that this policy will reach its limits once the underlying problems of lacking mass demand remain unaddressed.

The continued neglect of agriculture since the departure of Nyerere

Against the backdrop of a relatively egalitarian society and considerable foodstuff production, Tanzania's development path under Julius Nyerere (1961-85) aimed at mobilising the peasantry to reach full self-sufficiency in food production by increasing agricultural productivity, while at the same time building state-owned primary industries for consumption goods via import-substitution. Nyerere's policy skimmed off surplus from the export-based agricultural production of cash crops such as coffee and tea (Lofchie 1994, 140) to earn foreign reserves to buy machinery for its infant industries. Tanzania's economic policy also sought to increase agricultural productivity through easier land access via relocation of the peasantry in so-called ujamaa villages, specific cooperative arrangements, and supportive agrarian services. Hence, the consumption goods sector witnessed rapid growth throughout the 1970s, due to which the import of consumption goods declined. Still, foreign reserves had

to be spent on high-quality inputs and machinery. The parastatal companies faced several problems, among them the lacking experience of managerial staff. However, the excess capacity in these companies was due to lacking infrastructure, but more importantly, lacking demand. Several parastatal companies were facing these problems (Coulson [1982]/2013, 232-253). Due to an agricultural crisis in the mid-1970s caused by droughts and issues with implementing the ujamaa (collectivisation) strategy, Tanzania's growing balance of trade deficits eventually resulted in a higher debt burden and dependence on Western countries (Lofchie 1978).

Magufuli's ascension to the presidency in 2015 represented a partial departure from the liberalisation strategies pursued by Mwinyi (1985-95), Mkapa (1995-2005), and Kikwete (2005-15) allocating the state a more critical role in the economy. Magufuli's focus on infrastructure projects aimed at a better integration of the market and bringing down transaction costs and has seen considerable successes providing public goods, such as infrastructure, health care, and education (Ofisi ya Takwimu ya Taifa 2020; Mpangala 2020). However, some infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a standard gauge railway that plans to connect Dar es Salaam with Kigali, Kampala, and even the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the revival of the national air carrier Air Tanzania, bind precious resources that are lacking in other sectors, such as the primary sector.

Besides his achievements in limiting the squandering of government resources, Magufuli also put a halt on large-scale agricultural projects (Sulle 2020). His new agrarian policy, stipulated in the Agricultural Sectoral Development Programme II, mostly aimed at improving market integration through better storage facilities, increased use of inputs, more irrigation, and further agricultural services (United Republic of Tanzania 2017). However, it did not touch on the sensitive question of land deficit for smallholders. During preceding governments, vast tracts of village land had been allocated to agribusiness, producing even non-food products (Beyene 2015, 175-177). By then, already a considerable part of smallholder farmers suffered from the small acreage of their plots (Skarstein 2015, 102).

As Coulson (2015: 45-50) argues, the prime argument for fostering smallholder agriculture consists not only in their general ability to compete with large-scale farming in terms of their productivity. The significance of smallholders is

found in their pivotal role to trigger rising mass incomes that are the basis for capitalist growth and the backbone of industrialisation, as described above. Smallholder agriculture serves to absorb the considerable labour surplus and increases income when the acreage is sufficiently large enough to ensure a family's subsistence. However, the labour surplus in Tanzania remains significantly high. In addition to that, the current government's efforts to formalise its informal sector workers, which absorbs a vast number of rural migrants,ix increased the total of registered firms, but cannot be taken as an indicator for a dynamic economy as the previous government depicted (Ofisi ya Takwimu ya Taifa 2020; Mpangala 2020).

Rising inequality, growing urban-rural income polarisation, and stark sectoral GDP growth differences with underperforming agricultural sector

While the Tanzanian government has made little progress in alleviating poverty (National Bureau of Statistics 2019a), a closer look at the structure of incomes shows that inequality, as measured in the Gini coefficient for Tanzania Mainland, increased from 0.34 in 2011/2 to 0.38 in 2017/8. The gap between rural areas in Tanzania and its major city, Dar es Salaam widened considerably (National Bureau of Statistics 2019a, 15).x Concerning earlier data on inequality in Tanzania, Osberg and Bandara (2012, 7-9) underscore that due to validity issues with the Gini indicator, inequality might well be higher than this figure depicts. Therefore, I consider two further data sources that offer an indication of equality levels. While Tanzania has been a relatively egalitarian society from its independence compared to neighbouring Kenya, deregulation from the 1990s has had a considerable impact on income distribution. If the Forbes Africa's billionaire list is anything to go by – Tanzania currently hosts the only billionaire, Mohammed Dewji, in the whole of East Africa (Forbes 2020) –, income differentials in the previously egalitarian state have widened considerably.

Survey data from 2018 further highlight these income disparities. While the survey participants' assessment of the country's economic performance and their living conditions increased slightly, and the outlook to see living conditions increase was more positive than in previous periods, an increasing number of Tanzanians reported having lacked access to basic necessities, such as food, cash income, medical

care, water, and cooking fuel. Furthermore, respondents in rural contexts were more likely to have a negative assessment of personal living conditions and the country's economic conditions than those in urban areas (Mwombela, Olan'g, and Mboghoina 2018).

The divergent income paths have their origin in the different performances of the economic sectors. Although Tanzania has since 1998 achieved above-average annual GDP growth rates for Sub-Sahara Africa (World Bank n.d.) and has been among the top economic performers in SSA from 2009 to 2016 (Masenya et al. 2018, 6-8), the economic sectors show stark differences between the growth rates for the agricultural, industrial, and service sector. Figures from 2013-2019 provide a general picture of the dynamics in the different sectors and indicate that the annual growth rates of agriculture hovered around 5 percent, while the industrial sector reached about 10 percent per annum and services growth was at roughly 6 percent (National Bureau of Statistics 2020, 11f).

Gross fixed capital formation increased by over 60 percent from 2015 to 2019. However, this is mainly attributed to a rise in the total statistical value for buildings and structures equalling 81 percent, while the value of machinery and equipment has only marginally increased by 2 percent (National Bureau of Statistics 2020, 34, 45).[xi] A possible explanation for the increased debt burden under Magufuli, which has already been a matter of national debate (Kweka 2020), might very well be the construction boom which the previous government fuelled. The development described here seems to continue a trend from 2012, in which construction overwhelmingly contributed to high growth rates in the industrial sector, the sector under which construction is classified (National Bureau of Statistics 2019c, 27). This dynamic is reflected in the statistical data on the output of manufactured goods. The growth rates of manufactured products – although data do not exist for all manufactured products– demonstrate that construction-related goods witnessed significantly higher growth rates than other consumption goods (National Bureau of Statistics 2019a, 61).

The widening gap of rural-urban incomes may well have its origins in the divergent performances of Tanzania's different economic sectors. Personnel in infrastructure projects and especially highly qualified personnel in high-technology

sectors such as an air carrier or a railway construction firm, but more general staff in the industrial sector, realise high incomes. They have different consumption profiles and prioritise durable consumption and luxury goods over mass products. The renewed interest in construction projects has led to a high growth rate of the modern sector, while agriculture consistently lags behind the other sectors.

The construction boom will likely absorb some of the labour surplus in Tanzania. Since the issue of raising mass incomes remains unaddressed by the government and is not likely to play a role in Hassan's government (2020-25), it is likely that the already widened income gaps and increased inequality, which concern a vast majority of people, will lead to more discontent with the economic strategy, but also the authoritarian nature of the current Tanzania government.

Conclusion

Abstracting from the Korean developmental experience from the 1960-1980, Khan's PS theory puts emphasis on regime security and posits that once power is centralised, the ruling elite can start with a rent management strategy which allows for technological learning and catching-up. The management of rents – above-average incomes earned in non-competitive settings – signifies allocating rents to rentiers while at the same time ensuring the productive use of these rents. According to the framework, this ultimately helps to overcome poverty and reach capitalist growth. PS theory understands the process of economic transformation in the Marxist sense of primitive accumulation, that is the prior allocation of resources to entrepreneurs before a process of accumulation via the market can start.

As I tried to show, several contradictions emerge from the theory which cast doubt over the general explanatory power of the framework. The contradictions of PS theory can be summarized as follows: firstly, it overemphasises the variable of regime stability, and secondly, the use of the Marxist paradigm of primitive accumulation is problematic, as Khan's interpretation of the paradigm calls for the redistribution of assets from the poor to the wealthy. The article has reconsidered historical evidence of the South Korean regime from 1960-80 and showed that the empowerment of big business and the neglect of mass interests led to considerable conflicts in society and within the state class. The development path chosen by

Taiwan differed starkly from the South Korean. While both countries followed an export-oriented industrialisation path and eventually industrialised in the 1990s, Taiwan never experienced the same societal conflicts about the chosen industrialisation path as did South Korea. The Taiwanese government empowered smallholders and ensured rising mass incomes. The consideration of mass interests enabled the KMT to create higher levels of legitimacy than the military regime in Korea. This relates to the second contradiction in Khan's framework. Contrary to the Marxist paradigm of primitive accumulation, empirical evidence of economic transformation in South-East Asia, highlights the importance of smallholders in absorbing labour surplus and acting as backbone for industrialisation. The post-Keynesian insight of rising mass incomes as a condition for capitalist growth is in line with the historical evidence of the significance of smallholders for industrialisation and can better explain the transformation to capitalist growth than the Marxist paradigm of primitive accumulation.

Discussing the Tanzanian recent developmental efforts under Magufuli, I have sought to illustrate that there is growth within the modern sector, but argued that realising its dream of economic transformation remains unlikely, as long as the essential condition of harmonisation of demand and raising mass incomes is not addressed. The positive effects of infrastructure developments for market integration and the impact on absorbing part of the enormous labour surplus are likely insufficient to lead to any substantial steps towards economic transformation. If infrastructural development is not embedded into a more substantive vision of raising mass incomes through agrarian reform, the labour surplus of countries such as Tanzania will still be significant after implementing those projects. I have considered statistical evidence of income distribution and sectoral growth performances to shed light on the effects of the policies implemented by John Magufuli's government from 2015-2020. The available data on income gaps between the rural and urban spheres showed that income increases in Tanzanian cities were considerable but not in the rural parts of Tanzania. Therefore, the rural-urban income gaps widened significantly. Furthermore, inequality seems to have increased while poverty persists. Agricultural growth remained low, and addressing land inequalities did not seem to be a priority of the previous Magufuli government. It neither appears

to be on the agenda of the current government of Samia Suluhu Hassan, Magufuli's successor. If these concerns remain unaddressed by the current government of Samia Suluhu Hassan, dissatisfaction with the foreclosure of the oppositional arena and discontent with the widening income disparities and inequality will likely increase

In his critique of PS theory, van de Walle (2016) highlighted that there is no positive relationship between authoritarianism and development. It is essential to add here that a strategy which aims to achieve capitalist growth via fostering rising mass incomes is perfectly compatible with partly hybrid regimes in Africa. However, what is relevant is that a significant group – government, opposition, or movements – has to make this programmatic offer to the population and implement it.

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Notes

i This is reflected by the recent dedication of a virtual and special issue to PS theory by the journal of *African Affairs* (Virtual Issue: Political Settlements Research in Africa) and the *Journal of International Development* (Volume 29, Issue 5) respectively.
ii See the recent debate between Cheeseman (2020) and Adesina et al. (2021).
iii Shortly after the general election in October 2020, several opposition leaders were arrested and the ruling party CCM attempted to quell concerns over election irregularities. Opposition leaders then fled the country (BBC Swahili 2020). However,

after the transfer of power to Hassan, some of these exiled politicians have however stated that they would reconsider returning to Tanzania (BBC Swahili 2021).

iv Khan's later definition differs from the earlier one, grouping influential groups in society as organizations. Nevertheless, this does not change the fundamental meaning of a political settlement (Khan 2017, 640-43).

v The aforementioned ideal-types are themselves sub-types to the entity of a clientelist political settlement. Khan proposes three other entities: capitalist, pre-capitalist and settlements in crisis.

vi Khan also envisions a possibility for accumulation if entrepreneurs are politically weak and dispose of moderate to low technological capabilities. However, the "outcomes depend on [the] ruling coalition" (2010, 71) and whether it has a long-term developmental vision.

vii Gray (2015, 401) claims that this was mainly due to the fact that the political settlement in Tanzania was not potential developmental and lacked measures "to channel resources generated through corruption into more productive investments."

viii Gray (2015), Gray and Khan (2010), and Khan (2010) all share this belief as became evident by the assumption that entrepreneurs have to be allocated financial resources and then disciplined to be able to expand and produce. Gray's (2015) conception of the positive effects of corruption, namely that corrupt officials would later be able to invest if the mechanisms to channel these resources into production exist, is a nice illustration of this notion (see endnote 7 for the quote).

ix This policy was already put forward under Mkapas' governments (1995-2005). Mkapa had been pursued by Hernando de Soto's recommendations that formalisation would help spur entrepreneurial activity and reduce poverty (Mkapa 2019). Magufuli rose in the ranks under Mkapa's governments in the 1990s and then later under Kikwete.

x The Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics calculates the Gini coefficient based on consumption data and treats this as equivalent to income.

xi Measured in current market prices. Data for 2019 are provisional.

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