Titel/Title: Apathy or Anger? How Crime Experience Affects Individual Vote Intention in Latin America and the Caribbean

Autor*innen/Author(s): Berens, Sarah, & Dallendörfer, Mirko

Veröffentlichungsversion/Published version: Postprint

Publikationsform/Type of publication: Artikel/Aufsatz

Zusätzliche Informationen/Additional information:

CONTACT:
Sarah Berens, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany. Email: sarah.berens@uni-koeln.de

Apathy or Anger?

How Crime Experience Affects Individual Vote Intention in Latin America and the
Caribbean

XXX

XXX

Abstract

Does the experience of crime lead to individual disenchantment from politics or can it even
stir political activism? We study how crime victimization affects the intention to vote with
survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean. Research on non-electoral political
behavior reveals that crime victims become politically more engaged. In contrast, findings
from psychological research suggest that victimization increases apathy due to loss of self-
esteem and social cohesion. Building a cognitive foundation of political activism we propose
that it is the level of distress which increases – in the case of non-violent crime –, or decreases
– in the case of violent crime experience – the likelihood of voting. The results support the
hypothesis on victims of non-violent crime. The probability of turnout does, however, not
change for victims of criminal violence. We subsequently test for a possible anti-right-wing
incumbent effect, to explain the mobilization of victims of non-violent crime, but only find
evidence for an anti-center incumbent tendency.

Keywords: crime victimization · vote intention · violence · voting behavior · Latin America
and the Caribbean

Introduction

Falling victim to crime is a constant hazard for many citizens in the developing word. Partic-
ularly for those living in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC hereafter) with an average
homicide rate of 24.5 compared to the global average of 8.4 (World Bank 2015), the likelihood of
becoming victimized is high and mounting. Robbery, the most common crime in Latin America,

affects for instance between 10.8% of the society in Chile and 25.2% in Ecuador (UNDP 2013, 59). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) saw the urgent need to address the scope of crime and violence in Latin America and devoted the 2013/2014 development report to this topic (UNDP 2013). The report documents a rise in criminal violence, particularly in the form of robbery and violence against women and youths, in contrast to other world regions and concludes that Latin America experienced an "epidemic of violence" in the last decade (UNDP 2013). Against this background we study how crime[1] affects democratic stability in the form of electoral participation in low- and middle-income countries. More concretely we ask: how does crime experience influence the individual's intention to cast a vote on election day?

Findings in the political science literature on war related violence reveal that victims are more likely to participate in electoral (Blattman 2009) and non-electoral forms of political activities (Bellows & Miguel 2009) and are more altruistic and risk seeking than non-victims (Voors et al. 2012). However, this strand of research cannot disentangle the effect of the individual victimization experience from the collective experience of war. Embarking from this strand of research, scholars have started to show that it is not only the collective experience of war, which usually entails massive violence and brutality, that can have tremendous effects on political participation but that also individual victimization through crime, as experienced in every day life by a large share of the world population, can alter individuals' political behavior. The recent contribution of Bateson (2012) suggests that crime victims become politically more active and engaged when it comes to non-electoral forms of activity. Victims are more likely to participate in demonstrations, protests and community meetings than non-victims. Focusing on the effect of crime on democratic attitudes and trust in democratic institutions, Pérez (2003), Fernandez & Kuenzi (2010), Carreras (2013) and Blanco (2013) emphasize that the experience of crime reduces support for democracy and trust in institutions and it also raises individual demand for the state to take rigorous action (see Bateson 2012, Trelles & Carreras 2012).

Compared to these insights, psychological and sociological research has illustrated that traumatic experiences can lead to individual withdrawal from social bonds (Lejeune & Alex 1973, Alesina & La Ferrara 2002, Brehm & Rahn 1997). Employing a habitual model of voting (Gerber et al. 2003) we argue that it is the level of distress induced through crime experience that

---

[1]Crime can broadly be defined as any act or omission that breaches the law. As such, it includes acts as tax evasion or pollution as well as robbery or homicide. We are mainly concerned with personal crimes, that is, criminal acts whose adverse affects are suffered by individuals as opposed to the state as a collective.

either increases – in the case of non-violent crime –, or decreases – in the case of violent crime –, the individual's likelihood to vote in elections. Falling victim to violent crime reduces the individual's self-esteem and trust in others (see Skogan 1992), so that the individual rather withdraws from collective actions such as voting. On the contrary, we propose that experiencing non-violent crime leads to anger about the breach of civic and social rules and increases preferences for policy change so that the act of voting becomes more likely.

Our goal is to improve our understanding of the cognitive foundation of political activism. We examine the impact of crime on the most basic and most common act of democratic participation: the act of voting. The literature on voter turnout is abundant, explaining turnout with the decisiveness of the elections (Downs 1957, Cox & Munger 1989), institutional variables such as compulsory voting (Fornos et al. 2004), the feeling of 'civic duty' (Riker & Ordeshook 1968, Fiorina 1976), socio-economic characteristics (Feddersen & Pesendorfer 1999), and, more recently, habit (see Gerber et al. 2003, Coppock & Green 2016). But already Rosenstone advocates taking into account "life circumstances that [...] place demands on the citizen" (1982: 42) in his study on turnout in the U.S., emphasizing the relevance of psychologically stressful events for voting behavior. According to findings from the American political science literature, emotions play a role for political activity. Especially anger has proven to increase electoral mobilization (see Valentino et al. 2011).

Against this background, we study the link between crime victimization and turnout from a comparative cross-country perspective. We conduct the analysis for Latin American countries and the Caribbean (LAC) as there is a lot of variation in crime rates (UNDP 2013) and all countries in our sample have experience with democratic electoral competition.[2] In order to study the influence of criminal violence on electoral participation we make use of the standardized survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The survey includes information about vote intention in presidential elections, crime victimization experience, and allows differentiating between different types of crime that the respondent may have faced. The information is available for LAPOP 2010, 2012, and 2014. We pool the data and use a logistic regression model with country and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the municipality unit to study the impact of victimization on vote intention.

---

[2]Compulsory voting is present in many LAC countries, but enforcement varies massively (see Fornos et al. 2004), leaving sufficient variation in turnout to study vote intention.

The empirical findings show that crime victims in LAC are more likely to vote, but as expected, the electoral mobilization occurs through the experience of non-violent crime. Victims of violent intrusion and aggression do, however, not fall into apathy; their propensity of voting is not affected by victimization. Subsequently, we approach the mechanism of anger by analyzing how far electoral mobilization is driven by the wish to hold the government accountable through supporting or punishing the incumbent. Comparing left-wing, center and right-wing incumbent support, we find that crime victims in general, and victims of non-violent crime in particular, punish center incumbents.

This article contributes to our understanding of political activism in two ways. First, we make a case for voting behavior and the central phenomenon of individual victimization through crime, moving beyond the war victimization literature and capturing a potentially traumatic event which is much more frequent and widespread. Second, we advance our current understanding of the impact of crime victimization with a discussion on the mobilizing effect of non-violent crime experience through electoral accountability. While crime experience is an adverse event, we emphasize that voters in low state-capacity contexts respond to such political failures with the use of electoral means. Importantly, we find no evidence of withdrawal among victims of violent crime, which refutes part of our theoretical expectations. We reflect on the implications of this null-finding for victims of violent crime in the discussion.

The subsequent section discusses the effect of crime victimization on individual behavior. Building on the conflicting findings from the current academic debate we present our argument on the level of distress for voting behavior. We then introduce our empirical strategy, data and the estimation model. We explore the implications of our findings on turnout before we approach the mechanism that links crime victimization and turnout and end with a discussion of the paper's contribution and limitations.

The Argument: How Crime Victimization Influences Turnout

We argue that the level of distress due to crime experience influences the likelihood to vote in two different ways. Recent research on voting behavior promotes that voting is an act of habit (Gerber et al. 2003, Coppock & Green 2016) and social pressure. Individuals who have voted once are much more likely to turn out to vote again compared to individuals who have never

taken part in elections. Classical rational choice theory (see Downs 1957), which has dominated the discourse for long periods, fails to explain the act of voting (Green et al. 1994). The expected utility from voting, is almost never expected to outweigh the costs (Aldrich 1993, 256), as the likelihood of one's vote being pivotal is extremely small. Explaining turnout therefore requires a cognitive explanation that moves beyond rational utility. We propose that the crime experience can either increase or decrease the willingness to vote, depending on the level of distress that the experience of crime entailed.

The Cognitive Consequences of Crime

The psychological literature focuses on the effect of victimization on perceptions of personal efficacy. If crime reduces efficacy (also collective efficacy, see Sampson et al. (1997)), then we would expect that it should lead to lower turnout. A common expectation is that individuals withdraw themselves from public life after experiencing criminal violence. Psychological research has shown that the experience of crime can lead to loss of self-esteem, passivity (see Peterson & Seligman 1983, Macmillan 2001), and learned helplessness, and has negative long-term consequences when experienced in adolescence (Macmillan & Hagan 2004). Victimization shatters the individual's prior belief in "personal invulnerability" (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze 1983). Janoff-Bulman & Frieze (1983) argue that people usually hold basic assumptions about the world which allow them to master their every-day lives and these assumptions are severely challenged by victimization experiences. This includes the 'illusion of invulnerability' and the belief that the world is understandable and things generally happen for a reason. Victims adopt the feeling that there must be something different about them that made them a victim of crime while others were not (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze 1983, 6). These violations of the victim's inner model of the world cause psychological distress. While Janoff-Bulman & Frieze (1983) do not focus on crime victims in particular, other research on criminal victimization has also documented these distressing effects of crime. Crime-victimization as well as other forms of victimization have been associated with a variety of symptoms known as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (see e. g. Janoff-Bulman & Frieze 1983, Lurigio 1987, Macmillan 2001). Lurigio (1987) examines victims of burglary, robbery and assault, and reveals that victims perceive themselves more vulnerable to future crime, are more fearful of the possibility of future attacks, and show less

trust in themselves being able to avoid future attacks by means of careful behavior.

As the findings from psychological theories suggest, becoming a crime victim hurts an individual's sense of self-efficacy, that is the belief in the meaningfulness of their own actions as a result of their experience, which represents a loss of control (Peterson & Seligman 1983). If crime victims suddenly find themselves in a world that does not make sense anymore (habits are shaken), and which is perceived as harmful due to a crime experience, they might perceive politics as secondary and far away from their problems. Apart from habit, Edlin et al. (2007) argue that individuals link the act of voting to social benefits, which can be increased through voting. If individuals become alienated from society or the group they previously felt to belong to, following crime victimization, this motivating factor of social benefit diminishes. Thus, there is reason to assume that crime victimization destroys habitual acts and reduces the attributed social utility of the act of voting.

The Attitudinal and Behavioral Consequences of Crime

In contrast, findings in political science imply that people exposed to crime should be politically more active and vote more conservatively. In recent empirical studies using micro-level survey data, crime has shown to have a negative influence on democratic attitudes and trust in democratic institutions (do Rio Caldeira 2000, Pérez 2003, Fernandez & Kuenzi 2010, Malone 2013, Blanco 2013, Carreras 2013). The theoretical argument is clear: Crime suffered by individuals presents an infringement on their basic rights and freedoms that democratic states seek to guarantee. Property crimes, such as theft and robbery, infringe on the individual's property rights and violent crimes, such as assault, rape or homicide violate the right to physical integrity. Protecting these rights, that is, providing public security, is a crucial function of a state (Tilly 1985). Individuals attribute continuous failure to provide public security not only to the political system as a whole (see Carreras 2013) but also to other democratic institutions, especially those directly dealing with crime (Blanco 2013) or even to democracy as such. If one of the most basic public goods, public security, cannot be provided under a democratic government, democratic legitimacy is endangered and citizens are more likely to support unconstitutional, repressive measures (Pérez 2003) and harsh undemocratic policies called "mano dura" or government of the iron fist (see Bateson 2012, Malone 2013). Apart from being a crime victim this

also holds for the perception of insecurity (see Blanco 2013, Malone 2013). The more violent the surroundings, the more the voter is not just affected in her attitudes but also in behavioral terms. The effect goes, however, into the opposite direction. Insecurity and threat deters voters from voting in governmental elections (see Trelles & Carreras 2012, Ley 2017).

Addressing the relationship between crime victimization and behavioral change for a large set of developed and developing countries, Bateson (2012) emphasizes the positive influence of victimization on non-electoral political activism. Apart from Bateson (2012), seminal studies that investigate the impact of violence on political behavior focus on individual war experience and political mobilization, and report the same trend. In a field experiment in post-conflict Uganda Blattman (2009) finds that victims are more likely to be politically active than individuals who were unrelated to war. In a similar vein Bellows & Miguel (2009) report that war victims in Sierra Leone become "community activists" after experiencing violence and Voors et al. (2012) find positive effects of war related violence experience on social behavior in a field study on Burundi. Violence victims are found to be more altruistic and to act more pro-socially than non-victims. Clearly, war related violence is different from victimization through criminal deeds, as war is a collective experience as opposed to crime victimization which is mostly individual in nature, but we might still identify similarities in the coping strategies of individuals for both forms of victimization.[3]

Level of Distress

The both logically possible competing directions of the victimization effect on turnout emphasize the need for greater disaggregation. To solve the theoretical juxtaposition, we argue that it is the type of crime experience which leads – in the case of violence – to abstention or in the case of a non-violent crime – to turnout. What drives the different behavioral outcomes are the two different emotional responses to crime: apathy or anger. Expecting a linear effect of victimization misses the psychologically diverse responses to crime victimization. The more severe the crime experience, that is, the higher the level of what we call distress, the lower the likelihood to vote should be. While it is difficult to study the different emotional responses to

---

[3]We focus on personal victimization, leaving the witnessing of criminal acts or victimization of family members aside. Experiencing victimization of a family member might be equally traumatic as a personal experience. To show that our results are independent of family members' crime experiences we add family member victimization to our estimation model as a robustness test. A victim in the family increases the likelihood of voting (see supplementary material Table S1). The effect of victims of non-violent crime on turnout remains robust.

crime, differences in behavioral responses after experiencing different types of crime or different levels of violence have been corroborated. Blattman (2009) identifies "witnessing" of violence as strongest predictor for political engagement among abductees in contrast to having received acts of violence, executed violence or having family members who experienced violent attacks. Behavioral differences following different types of crime experience have also been identified in psychological studies on victimization (e. g. Lurigio 1987, Norris & Kaniasty 1991, Kilpatrick & Acierno 2003). According to Norris & Kaniasty (1991), the psychological response to crime is stronger regarding violent in contrast to non-violent victimization experiences (see also Brehm & Rahn 1997).[4]

We assume that falling victim to a non-violent crime leads to an emotional response of anger. In contrast, experiencing violence is expected to be more traumatizing so that the individual's emotional response is withdrawal or even a lack of immediate emotions, referred to as apathy. Anger refers to "the body's response to a frustrating situation in which we possess a sense of control and believe our future actions will lead to success in dealing with the problem at hand" (Valentino et al. 2009, 311). Experiencing unlawful behavior of others and harm through no fault of one's own should fuel the feeling of injustice and demand for compensation (see Fehr & Gächter 2000, on negative reciprocity). A functioning state depends on citizens' respect for the rule of law. If someone defects from the rules of the game, it is not unlikely to increase opposition and outrage to this act of defection and to give rise to a demand for 'restorative justice' (Schroeder et al. 2003) through the ballot box. In contrast, according to Kilpatrick & Acierno (2003), victims of violent crime have a higher likelihood to develop PTSD, especially after experiencing physical assault and injury (2003, 129). Davis and Friedman (1985, 104) find first empirical support for the assumption that a violent crime experience reduces pro-social behavior in contrast to victims of property crime in a study of New York neighborhoods from 1980. Also Green & Diaz (2007) detect different emotional responses of violent versus non-violent crime experience. Experiencing violence nourishes a more self-centered perspective to cope with the experience so that issues such as politics become secondary during the healing process.[5] This supports the assumption that a traumatic crime experience rather leads to

---

[4]A further strand of research that has been labeled as post-traumatic growth theory in psychology, emphasizes that traumatic experiences can also have a motivating effect on individual behavior (Tedeschi & Calhoun 2004), but such an effect becomes more plausible after a longer time period that allowed the individual to process the traumatic event and should depend on the severity of the intrusion.

[5]One could argue that trauma should lead to activism, as Albertson & Gadarian (2015) reveal among voters

8

apathy and withdrawal in the aftermath of the event. Such different emotional responses are then likely to induce different behavioral outcomes.

The political psychology literature provides crucial evidence on the impact of emotions on political behavior (e. g. Marcus & MacKuen 1993, Albertson & Gadarian 2015). Valentino et al. (2011) have shown for the U.S. case how the feeling of anger increases electoral participation in national elections. Using survey experiments, Albertson & Gadarian (2015) reveal how fear of e. g. immigration or terror attacks influence how individuals gather information and how fear directs partisan appeal (see also Merolla & Zechmeister 2009). Anxiety about immigration increased trust in Republicans among U.S. American voters. In contrast, anger about immigration policy reduced support for the Democrats (Albertson & Gadarian 2015, 94). Following Lerner & Keltner (2001), fearful individuals differ in risk perception compared to angry individuals. Emotions, thus, play an important role in how voters process information and different emotions lead to sizable differences in behavior (Marcus & MacKuen 1993).

Experiencing non-violent crime such as a stolen car might, therefore, have less severe psychological consequences than being physically attacked and harmed, which is a much stronger intrusion to physical integrity than a burglary. While the former should stir anger about the government's inability to provide security and to enforce rule of law, and induce the wish to hold the government accountable, the latter is more likely to induce apathy and withdrawal, as psychological distress is much higher. We visualize the argument in Figure 1. Hence, the type of the crime (violent or non-violent) should play a role for electoral mobilization or demobilization, once an experience with crime has taken place. Compared to non-victims, victims of non-violent crime should be more likely to vote, while victims of violent crime should be less likely to do so in comparison to individuals who have not been victimized. We therefore propose the following two hypotheses:

H 1 *Victims of non-violent crime are more likely to turn out to vote than non-victims.*

H 2 *Victims of violent crime are less likely to vote than non-victims.*

While we cannot directly test the change of emotions following from different types of crimes, we can expect that anger materializes in an observable behavioral response as indicated through

---

in the U.S. for the emotion of anxiety, but in our case we consider a state of apathy that comes from a concrete experience in contrast to a fear that something might happen in the future.

Figure 1: Theoretical argument

the dotted line in Figure 1. A mobilization effect of victimization through anger might reflect the increased demand of policy change due to non-violent crime experience. Voters can use their vote to signal demand for security policy changes, such as public investment in crime-prevention (e. g. improvement of the education or health care system) or stricter punishments (see Bateson 2012). Parties strategically appeal to security policy issues to increase electoral returns since it is an important phenomenon in many countries in LAC (see Holland 2013, Romero et al. 2016) and it is a salient issue across socio-economic groups (Wiesehomeier & Doyle 2014). Holland (2013) illustrated how the right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador, a country that is experiencing extreme rates of violence, successfully managed to win office through 'issue ownership' of mano dura politics in the election campaign. "Angry" victims might become motivated to vote for those candidates that they perceive will fight the crime problem by promoting mano dura. It is also possible that crime victims are motivated to vote to change or support the candidate in office (see Pérez 2015). The recent study of Romero et al. (2016) shows for the Mexican case that crime victimization reduces support for the incumbent, attributing the finding to an accountability mechanism. An accountability mechanism based on incumbent ideology seems a plausible explanation for mobilization of victims of crime, whose experience rather spurred anger and outrage than apathy and withdrawal. The dotted line in Figure 1 therefore illustrates how we expect the effect of non-violent crime to go through anger and reflected by an accountability effect, toward a higher likelihood of turnout.

10

Empirical Strategy

To study the impact of victimization experience on individual vote intention we make use of survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for 25 Latin American and Caribbean countries that are considered electoral democracies.[6] LAPOP conducts standardized cross-country surveys every two years in the Americas. The item we use to operationalize our dependent variable, vote intention, was included in LAPOP from 2010 onwards so that our time frame covers three survey rounds from 2010 to 2014.[7] We pool the data and make use of a logistic regression with country and time fixed effects and robust clustered standard errors at the municipality level (see Bateson 2012).[8] We study first how far victimization influences vote intention before we disaggregate victimization into violent and non-violent crime experience to test our hypotheses. As LAPOP does not include appropriate questions to measure emotions and, furthermore, is a cross-sectional survey, we cannot directly test the change in emotions after crime victimization took place. We therefore study if the mobilization effect on turnout becomes visible through an accountability-mechanism, holding the incumbent accountable for security-policy failure.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the individual's vote intention in a hypothetical presidential election.[9] The question reads: "If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do?" with the options "wouldn't vote", "would vote for the incumbent candidate or party", "would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration" and "would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote" (LAPOP item vb20). We dichotomize the variable taking the value of zero for those who answered they would not vote and one for those who would cast a vote for the incumbent, the opposition or a null

---

[6]The analysis includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, Surinam, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas. Only the latest survey from 2014 includes all 25 countries.

[7]The 2008 LAPOP also includes an item on vote intention and crime victimization but the structure of the crime item differs from the 2010 item. We analyze type of crime experience for LAPOP 2008 separately. Findings are provided as supplementary material (Table S7).

[8]Estimations of a baseline model with bivariate regressions for each survey year are displayed in the supplementary material (Table S2).

[9]We acknowledge that the item does not measure actual behavior but information on victimization covers the individual's past 12 months and actual voting happened in many cases then prior to crime experience.

vote. On average 20.64% chose the answer category not to vote with a standard deviation of 0.41.[10]

The responses might be noisy due to social desirability. Respondents are inclined to over-report the intention to vote. A social desirability bias could be problematic if it is systematic. However, if victims misreport their voting behavior because they desire to be viewed positively by the interviewer, they may also misreport that they have not been a victim of crime for the same reasons so that victims who did not vote may report as non-victims who voted.[11] In this case we underestimate the effect of victimization. Social desirability bias may, thus, be problematic for an exact estimation but is unlikely to be a serious threat to inference. Nevertheless, to address the concern we compare reported vote intention levels from LAPOP to actual turnout rates (IDEA 2018). Our average vote intention of 78.8% corresponds to the regional turnout average of 68.6% for the time period 2010-2014.[12] The correlation between turnout rates in presidential elections and average vote intention from the preceding LAPOP round is $\rho = 0.51$.

Independent Variables

Crime victimization is measured by the question: "have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?" with the answer categories yes/no (LAPOP 2012). Victimization is coded as a dummy variable with the value one representing victims. On average 18.4% of those who answered the question did report to be a victim in the last year with a small nonresponse rate of just 0.3%.

Subsequently, we differentiate violent and non-violent crime victimization (LAPOP vic2). Respondents are asked to indicate the type of crime they last experienced from a list of items. We code the crime types "unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats", "armed robbery", "assault but not robbery", "rape or sexual assault", "kidnapping" as *violent* crime experience as

---

[10]Excluding the null vote leaves our findings substantially unchanged.

[11]Although self-reporting on victimization might suffer from a downward bias, the data from self-reported victimization surveys is well acknowledged as an important data source in the literature (e. g. see Junger-Tas & Marshall 1999).

[12]Calculated as a simple average for elections between 2010 and 2014 (IDEA 2018). Haiti and Colombia can be identified as outliers, with the difference of reported vote intention and actual turnout rates of more than 30 percentage points. Furthermore, after abolishing compulsory voting in Chile in 2012, turnout strongly declined in the 2013 presidential election. Findings for a test, which excludes these outliers, remain robust and are reported in Table S9.

Figure 2: Violent and non-violent crime victimization by country (2010-2014)

these involve physical harm or severe threat to physical integrity and are generally considered to be traumatic (e. g. see Kilpatrick & Acierno 2003). "Unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threat", "vandalism", "burglary of your home", and "extortion" are coded as *non-violent*, as these types are directed toward objects and property.[13] We drop the category "other" as missing. Out of those who answered the question on type of crime 8.7% reported to be victim of a non-violent- and 8.8% a victim of a violent type of crime. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of non-victims, victims of non-violent crime and victims of violent crime across countries as average of 2010-2014. In the estimation model we use dummy variables for violent and non-violent crime experience (non-victim serves as reference category).

Factors which characterize crime victims are gender, income, age, level of education and town size. Young males living in urban areas are most likely crime victims in LAC (Gaviria et al. 1999, Bateson 2012). However, while crime cuts across socio-economic groups (see Holland 2013) the type of experienced crime is not fully random so that we need to take into account confounding factors which might affect both the likelihood of crime experience and turnout. The socio-economic status might not equally influence crime exposure, especially regarding violent

---

[13]We also study the effect for each type of crime separately and report the results in Table S4 in the supplementary material. The separate regressions support the general pattern that we find for the indicators violent and non-violent crime below.

and non-violent crime, and voting behavior. The descriptive statistics reveal, however, that victimization occurs at all income levels.[14] More male than female respondents are afflicted by victimization and more often they fall victim to violent crime. Among the wealth quintiles the more wealthy respondents are more often crime victims compared to the lower quintiles, but the better-off respondents are less frequently victims of violent crime. We therefore need to hold these factors constant in the estimation model on vote intention and crime victimization.

Control Variables

The following control variables are added to the estimation model: Age in years, age squared (due to diminishing returns of age), a dummy for gender (male), employment status (public employee, unemployed, retired, non-employed such as housekeeping and students; employed serves as reference category) and education, measured as years of schooling completed. Individuals with higher income are more likely to cast a vote since they have clear-cut preferences on redistributive issues (see Rosenstone 1982). Instead of using income brackets which are not comparable in LAPOP over time, we employ asset information to create a wealth indicator with the use of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (see Filmer & Pritchett 2001).[15] The resulting wealth indicator captures long term wealth of the respondent (Filmer & Pritchett 2001). Furthermore, we also take into account the respondent's town size since voting follows a different dynamic in small rural areas compared to big cities. Individuals live more atomized in urban areas so that the norm of voting as 'civic duty' weighs less heavily on urbanites.[16] Moreover, we control for previous voting behavior (1=voted), as voting is considered as "habit-forming", so that individuals who have voted once have a higher likelihood to vote again (Gerber et al. 2003).

It is important to take into account country level characteristics such as competitiveness of the elections (Cox & Munger 1989, Aldrich 1993), the electoral system or compulsory voting (see Fornos et al. 2004). The effect of compulsory voting has found substantial support (Lijphart 1997) and it exists in many Latin America countries. It varies in the level of enforcement so that de jure compulsory voting does not always translate into de facto turnout levels so that there is sufficient variation in individual vote intention. Also general crime rates are impor-

---

[14]See Table S3 in the supplementary material.
[15]We calculate wealth indicators separately for each year.
[16]Town size was coded from 1= rural to 5= capital city.

tant context factors. High homicide rates are associated with lower turnout levels. Moreover, when violence is driven by a political rationale research has found negative effects on electoral participation. Electoral violence reduces candidates' incentives to run and thereby candidate variety and quality (Trelles & Carreras 2012) and it influences the voter through intimidation (Ley 2017). Based on expert survey data, Mexico, Honduras, Colombia and Venezuela are most strongly afflicted by electoral violence in LAC (Norris et al. 2015).[17] While we cannot distinguish fear of general versus political violence, LAPOP surveys information on the respondent's perception of living in an insecure neighborhood (1=secure to 4=not secure). The variable is only added stepwise in order to avoid biasing our results through possible multicollinearity (the correlation between victimization and perceived insecurity is, however, only $\rho= 0.186$) or post-treatment effects. The country specific effects are captured in the regression analysis through country fixed effects.[18]

The Model

Because of the binary nature of our dependent variable vote intention we employ a logistic regression model. We make use of country (J=25) and year (T= 3) fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level, as differences in crime exposure likely varies at the municipality level. *X* reflects a vector of micro level control variables. *Country* and *year* represent a vector of respective dummy variables. We specify the estimation model for i=1...N individuals as follows:

$$\Pr(y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{victim type}_i + \gamma * X_i + \delta * \text{country}_i + \eta * \text{year}_i + \epsilon_i)$$

Results: Victimization, Vote Intention and Type of Crime

Table 1 presents logistic regression coefficients for the dependent variable vote intention. Starting with the interpretation of the most basic models, in M1 and M2 we study the general victimization effect. In M2 we add a control for insecurity perception and level of information.

---

[17]Estimating the model without these country cases leads to similar conclusions.

[18]While a logistic regression is the statistically more conservative estimation model, we report findings from a multilevel logistic regression that takes into account particular country-level variables such as compulsory voting in the supplementary material Table S5.

In M3 and M4 we distinguish violent and non-violent crime victimization experience. In the general specification in M1 and M2 crime victimization shows a positive impact on the intention to vote. The average marginal effect of crime victimization on the likelihood of turnout is 0.006 (M1), so that the likelihood of voting changes by 0.6% when voters have fallen victim to crime, though barely at the 10% level of significance in M1 with a p-value of 0.101. In M2 the coefficient of victimization is significant at the five percent level and the model shows a better model fit considering the BIC values.

Differentiating type of crime experience, M3 reveals that a violent crime experience has a different effect on victims' electoral participation than a non-violent crime experience. While the positive coefficient of non-violent crime approximately doubled compared to the general effect of victimization, the effect becomes insignificant for victims of violent crime. The average marginal effect for victims of non-violent crime is 0.015 meaning that the propensity of voting changes by 1.5% for victims of non-violent crime. We illustrate the predicted probabilities for the willingness to vote in Figure 3 with 95% confidence intervals.[19] Non-violent crime victimization, thus, stirs the individual's likelihood to turn out on election day. The magnitude of the effect is not massive, but given that voting is compulsory in many countries and, thus, turnout is overall quite high, it is also not negligible in size. Moreover, when elections are close, also a small change in voting behavior can have a decisive impact. Furthermore, an additional year of education has an average marginal effect of 0.2% on vote intention and being male increases the chance of voting by 1.9%. The strongest average marginal effect follows from past voting (23.5%). The findings, thus, support hypothesis 1. The experience of a violent criminal event does, however, not affect the individual's vote intention. Despite the experience of a traumatic event, victims of violent crime are not demobilized; they are not significantly different from non-victims in their willingness to vote. Hypothesis 2 cannot be supported. The null finding for victims of violent crime is puzzling, since there are clear expectations of withdrawal and trauma after experiencing violence in the psychological literature. Two countervailing effects might be at play: Victims of violent crime might also feel angry about the experienced harm and feel the need for change, but at the same time carry the weight of trauma which inhibits the transformation of anger and disappointment into political action. A further possibility is that the effect of violent crime varies across individuals. Some individuals might be able to cope

---

[19]Predictive margins are calculated for males who voted. All other variables are as observed.

Table 1: Vote Intention, Crime Victimization and Type of Crime

DV: *vote intention*	(M 1)	(M 2)	(M 3)	(M 4)
Victimization	0.041	0.057*		
(ref: no victim)	(0.025)	(0.026)		
Victimization				
Victim: non-violent crime			0.111**	0.124***
(ref: no victim)			(0.035)	(0.035)
Victim: violent crime			-0.014	-0.002
			(0.032)	(0.032)
Male	0.136***	0.123***	0.136***	0.124***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age in years	-0.019***	-0.021***	-0.019***	-0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wealth indicator	0.023+	0.007	0.022+	0.006
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Years of education	0.017***	0.015***	0.017***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employment situation				
Public employee	0.118**	0.118**	0.120**	0.117**
(ref: employed)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Unemployed	-0.014	-0.010	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Non-employed	0.048*	0.047+	0.045+	0.047+
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Retired	0.033	0.023	0.033	0.023
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Town size	-0.046***	-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.042***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Past voting	1.716***	1.703***	1.714***	1.703***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Perceived insecurity		-0.042***		-0.042***
		(0.012)		(0.012)
Informed		0.101***		0.101***
		(0.010)		(0.010)
2012	0.001	0.018	0.003	0.019
(ref: 2010)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
2014	0.198***	0.224***	0.199***	0.225***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Constant	0.863***	0.677***	0.855***	0.678***
	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.121)
Observations	95176	93617	93617	93617
ll	-41057.14	-40304.73	-40378.33	-40300.86
Chi^2	8323.32	8438.61	8260.67	8434.92
BIC	82561.4	81078.8	81214.5	81082.5

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: LAPOP 2010-2014. Note: We include country fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the municipality level. For presentation purposes country effects are not displayed.

with their experience more effectively and political activism may even be a way of helping them to deal with the experience (see Bateson 2012), while others despair and fall into apathy. The support structure that individuals can (or cannot) access plays an important moderating role here, but such information is not covered in the survey.


Figure 3: Predictive margins for non-victims, victims of non-violent crime and victims of violent crime on vote intention based on M4 in Table 1.

Before we proceed with the nature of the effect, some of the control variables deserve further notice. The effects of the basic control variables work in the expected directions. The perception of living in an insecure environment shows a negative effect, which goes in line with the results of Trelles & Carreras (2012) and Ley (2017). Interestingly, findings for the U.S. context on the impact of anxiety point toward the opposite direction, with an increase in political demands and engagement among voters (Albertson & Gadarian 2015). Future research needs to study more closely, why victimization and fear have such opposing effects in LAC and also why the effect of fear in LAC differs from findings for high-income countries.[20] It might be the case that our negative effect of withdrawal of Hypothesis 2 is to some extent captured in this indicator, but as we reported above, both variables do not strongly overlap. The coefficient for age is highly significant and indicates that older people are more likely to vote. Also more wealthy and more informed voters have both a higher propensity to vote in Model 1 and Model 2. The

---

[20]A possible reason might be lack of trust in institutions that is suddenly confronted with actual needs, once victimization occurs, but we can only speculate on this.

with their experience more effectively and political activism may even be a way of helping them to deal with the experience (see Bateson 2012), while others despair and fall into apathy. The support structure that individuals can (or cannot) access plays an important moderating role here, but such information is not covered in the survey.

Figure 3: Predictive margins for non-victims, victims of non-violent crime and victims of violent crime on vote intention based on M4 in Table 1.

Before we proceed with the nature of the effect, some of the control variables deserve further notice. The effects of the basic control variables work in the expected directions. The perception of living in an insecure environment shows a negative effect, which goes in line with the results of Trelles & Carreras (2012) and Ley (2017). Interestingly, findings for the U.S. context on the impact of anxiety point toward the opposite direction, with an increase in political demands and engagement among voters (Albertson & Gadarian 2015). Future research needs to study more closely, why victimization and fear have such opposing effects in LAC and also why the effect of fear in LAC differs from findings for high-income countries.[20] It might be the case that our negative effect of withdrawal of Hypothesis 2 is to some extent captured in this indicator, but as we reported above, both variables do not strongly overlap. The coefficient for age is highly significant and indicates that older people are more likely to vote. Also more wealthy and more informed voters have both a higher propensity to vote in Model 1 and Model 2. The

---

[20]A possible reason might be lack of trust in institutions that is suddenly confronted with actual needs, once victimization occurs, but we can only speculate on this.

negative coefficient for town size is highly significant with an average marginal effect of 0.6%.

Approaching the Mechanism: Crime Experience and Incumbent Support

In order to shed light on the mechanism which links crime experience and turnout we investigate incumbent vs. opposition choice. We analyze the effect of crime victimization on left-wing, center and right-wing incumbent support, expecting anger to become apparent through an accountability mechanism.[21] We employ political-position data from Baker & Greene (2011) for the respective country and year. The dataset is an extension of the expert survey data from Wiesehomeier & Benoit (2009) on ideological positions, which is limited to Latin American countries.[22] Governments are ranked on a scale from 1-left to 20-right. We recode 1-8 as left, 9-12 as center, and 13-20 as right.[23] We employ the same item vb20 as used in the first part of the analysis as DV, which asks if the individual would vote for the incumbent (=1) or the opposition (=0). We exclude non-voters and voters who leave the ballot blank. We cannot identify the ideological position of the opposition; it is usually a mix of left, center and right-wing parties. We therefore focus on support for the incumbent versus opposition. Subsequently, we split the sample into a left-, center- and a right-incumbent sample and run the estimation model on each sample.[24]

Crime is often a very salient policy issue in many presidential elections such as in Guatemala in 2011 or in the 2013 elections in Honduras (see Pérez 2015). We therefore look for a possible accountability effect that visualizes increased anger and outrage among victims of non-violent crime. In an analogy to the economic voting literature, right-wing parties, who are currently in office, could be held particularly accountable for security policy failure. For the dichotomous DV *incumbent support* we use again a logistic regression model with robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level. We add a control for the respondent's perception

---

[21]Studying how far the electoral mobilization among victims of non-violent crime might be stirred by a general anti-incumbent effect does not reveal any significant differences of victims of non-violent- compared to victims of violent crime (see Table S10). Both are equally less likely to support an incumbent.

[22]Baker & Greene (2011) extend the data for further years by assigning each presidential candidate the value from Wiesehomeier & Benoit (2009) if available and otherwise of his or her party if available.

[23]Categorizing 1-7 as left, 8-13 as center and 14-20 as right shows the same pattern, see Table S12 in the Supplement. Employing a smaller range of 9-10 leaves no observations. As further robustness test, we also use the left-center-right categorization of the executive's ideological position measured with the Dataset of Political Institutions (DPI) of Beck et al. (2001) which also covers Caribbean countries, see Table S11. The findings corroborate the results displayed in Table 2. In addition, we calculate 2008 separately (see Table S6 and S7) as the operationalization of type of crime differs.

[24]Table B shows which governments are coded as either left, center, or right.

of the country's economic development to control for economic motives which can affect the respondent's incumbent support (Gélineau & Singer 2015).

The results show that victimization decreases the individual's likelihood to vote for a center incumbent compared to voting for the opposition (Table 2 M7) with an average marginal effect of 3.3%, holding economic evaluations constant. It has a weaker impact on voting for a left incumbent (Table 2 M9; the average marginal effect is 0.9%) and no significant effect on right-wing incumbents. Again, differentiating victimization by the degree of violence experience, we find that non-violent crime victimization significantly decreases expressing a vote intention for a center incumbent (M8) by 4.7% (average marginal effect). In contrast, victims of violent crime are not significantly affected in voting for either center (M8) or right-wing (M6) incumbents compared to voting for the opposition. Victims of violent crime are, however, less likely to support a left-wing incumbent (M10). We visualize the effect in Figure 4 with predictive margins for the likelihood to vote for a right- (a), center (b), and left-wing (c) incumbent. Against our expectations, it is not right-wing incumbents that are punished, but center incumbents. In such cases, victims of non-violent crime are more likely to vote for the opposition.

Figure 4: Predictive margins for non-victims, victims of non-violent crime and victims of violent crime on vote for right-wing (panel a), center (panel b) and left-wing (panel c) incumbent based on M6 and M8 in Table 2.

That victims of non-violent crime punish center incumbents might speak for an increased demand for a hard-on-crime candidate, who takes a clearer stance than the center. It might very

Table 2: Logistic Regression with Country and Year Fixed Effects: Vote for Incumbent in Countries with Left-wing, Center and Right-wing Executive

	Right-wing		Center		Left-wing	
	(M 5)	(M 6)	(M 7)	(M 8)	(M 9)	(M 10)
DV: vote for incumbent						
Victimization	-0.009		-0.171**		-0.075+	
(ref: no victim)	(0.047)		(0.062)		(0.039)	
Victim: non-violent crime		-0.027		-0.233**		-0.036
(ref: no victim)		(0.064)		(0.083)		(0.051)
Victim: violent crime		0.027		-0.107		-0.116*
		(0.068)		(0.088)		(0.055)
Male	-0.247***	-0.252***	-0.169**	-0.181**	-0.075*	-0.075*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Age in years	0.006	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.020**	0.019**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age^2	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wealth indicator	-0.029	-0.029	-0.279***	-0.275***	-0.226***	-0.227***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Years of education	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.056***	-0.055***	-0.047***	-0.047***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Employment situation						
Public employee	0.101	0.110	0.506***	0.509***	0.249***	0.243***
(ref: employed)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Unemployed	-0.063	-0.070	0.094	0.085	-0.033	-0.048
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.071)	(0.072)
Non-employed	-0.057	-0.057	0.060	0.051	-0.048	-0.058
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Retired	0.001	0.015	0.404***	0.406***	-0.106	-0.119
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Town size	-0.011	-0.010	0.058*	0.057*	0.015	0.016
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Past voting	0.219***	0.216***	0.134+	0.151+	0.136**	0.131**
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Perc. eco. development	-0.598***	-0.599***	-0.748***	-0.750***	-0.971***	-0.968***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Perceived insecurity	-0.064**	-0.067**	-0.057+	-0.060+	-0.105***	-0.105***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.022)
2012	-0.308***	-0.311***	1.243***	1.269***	-0.176*	-0.177*
(ref: 2010)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.082)
2014	-0.811***	-0.811***	0.968***	0.984***	-0.055	-0.048
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Constant	1.453***	1.448***	2.468***	2.480***	4.041***	4.067***
	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.298)	(0.301)	(0.202)	(0.203)
Observations	16228	16030	9907	9709	22103	21783
ll	-10313.20	-10190.62	-5440.53	-5318.89	-13148.35	-12966.10
Chi^2	890.15	890.39	1414.03	1400.59	1819.65	1829.45
BIC	20868.8	20633.0	11083.5	10848.9	26546.8	26191.9

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: LAPOP 2010-2014; Baker & Greene (2011). We include country fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the municipality level. For presentation purposes country effects are not displayed.

well be the case that victims of non-violent crime are motivated to vote to support a right-wing *opposition* candidate in these cases. Given the limitations of data, further research needs to address the actual vote choice of crime-victimized voters (e. g. see Visconti (2017) for the case of Brazil), ideally regarding real electoral behavior and not in a hypothetical scenario as applied here, to unpack this potential mechanism that links victimization and turnout. Our findings hint at a possible dissatisfaction with a center position that mobilizes victims of non-violent crime to be more eager to vote. But this is only a first step toward a better understanding of the political consequences of different types of crime experience.

Conclusion

Crime and violence are central phenomena in many developing countries and they bear the hazard to affect democratic quality by suppressing electoral participation. In this paper we have analyzed the effects of crime on vote intention, drawing on the vast turnout debate and different strands of political, sociological, and psychological literature that are concerned with the effects of victimization. We propose a micro foundation that considers the individual's cognitive base for electoral mobilization in contexts of uncertainty and distress. The voting literature agrees that the act of voting can hardly be explained in rational choice terms unless it has some intrinsic value for individuals such as expressing support for democracy. Habit, the feeling of civic duty and pro-social values are strong predictors for turnout. Experiencing an intrusion to one's physical integrity and the breach of human rights through crime victimization shatters such values. But the effect of crime victimization on the decision to vote is theoretically ambiguous, turning both, withdrawal and activism into plausible outcomes.

We propose that it is the level of distress which makes a difference once victimization has occurred: when crime victimization involves violence, we expect withdrawal while a non-violent crime experience should fuel anger and electoral engagement. The analysis reveals a significant positive effect of crime victimization on voter turnout, supporting the latter view that crime victims are motivated to participate electorally by their experience with crime. But while there is no significant effect for victims of violent crimes, victims of non-violent crime are significantly more likely to vote than non-victims. First results suggest that the crime-induced mobilization mechanism is electoral in nature. Victims of non-violent crime might be driven by the wish to

punish the incumbent for security policy failure and this holds for center incumbents in particular. That victims of violent crime do not significantly respond with altered voting behavior is a positive finding. Even when experiencing massive intrusion to physical integrity, what could be considered an exogenous 'shock' of habits (see Coppock & Green 2016), voters do not fully withdraw themselves from the political arena. A negative effect of crime experience on electoral participation would endanger democratic quality in the long run and present an easy gateway to undermine the state from within. But despite of the "epidemic of violence", voters seemingly hold on to democratic means. Given the frequency and spread of crime experience in many developing countries, it is important to note that even extremely distressing experiences do not lead to political apathy. However, in order to fully dismiss our withdrawal-hypothesis, we need further research on the experience of violence, since such experiences more likely remain underreported. Emotional and behavioral responses to the experience of violence are particularly difficult to study as fear, feelings of shame and avoidance to remember the event aggravate the identification of a possible effect, which could be a reason for the null-finding for victims of violent crime, next to possible moderating effects of differing support structures that help victims to cope with trauma.

Further data limitations confine our conclusions. Because we lack repeated observations, we cannot control for factors such as loss of self-esteem due to crime experience, since we cannot identify the causal order of the events in LAPOP. Also, we can only assume different emotional responses after experiencing different types of crime based on findings in psychology and political psychology, as LAPOP does not regularly survey emotions. It is a key task of future research to measure and test how far this assumption holds in a developing country context and how emotions then affect political behavior. Adding survey questions on emotions to public opinion surveys would be a step forward to understand patterns of emotions among victims of crime. But studying crime experience requires a sophisticated research design since a random assignment to treatment clearly violates ethical standards (e. g. also vignette experiments, as in Albertson & Gadarian (2015) regarding the analysis of fear, or interviews are problematic since victims might be re-traumatized when revoking the event). Ideally, panel data covering repeated observations of vote choice, the occurrence of criminal victimization as well as appropriate questions on emotions can be used to identify alterations of emotions as well as behavioral changes following

crime victimization. So far, the collection of panel data is still very limited in low- and middle income countries due to the high costs.

Moreover, we cannot take into account how far the police, as local, first-contact representation of the 'state', was able to reinstall or, in contrast, shatter trust in public institutions after the crime experience. In cases where the police captured the offender, the affected sense of legitimacy might be corrected. Part of the crime problem in LAC, however, is that these cases are rare, and most criminal incidents are not even reported to authorities.[25] The same holds for lack of comparable data on how governments deal with criminals, that is, the implementation of security policy. This is considered in our analysis by country fixed effects, but further research could productively address the impact of the security structure on the relationship between the voter and public institutions. In addition, future research needs to investigate the influence of repeated victimization which is so far limited with LAPOP data.[26] Repeated non-violent crime victimization combined with lack of revenge through an effective police (lack of restorative justice) might destroy the belief in the political system as such so that the individual withdraws from the public sphere and invests in private security means. Finally, besides differentiating victims by type of crime, we consider the effect of victimization on turnout to be constant across victims. It is possible that the electoral motivation effect varies across socio-economic characteristics, which deserves further scrutiny.

Acknowledgements

---

[25]LAPOP inquires in 2008 and 2012 (aoj1) if the victim reported the crime to public officials and approximately 58% indicate that they did not. The response rate is, however, rather low.

[26]The frequency of crime victimization was surveyed in LAPOP 2010 onwards. The effect for repeated victimization is not significant for the likelihood to vote, see Table S8 in the supplementary material.

Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.

References

Albertson, B. & Gadarian, S. K., (2015), *Anxious politics: Democratic citizenship in a threatening world*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Aldrich, J. H. (1993), 'Rational choice and turnout', *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 246–278.

Alesina, A. & La Ferrara, E. (2002), 'Who trusts others?', *Journal of Public Economics* **85**(2), 207–234.

Baker, Andy & Kenneth F Greene. 2011. "The Latin American left's mandate: free-market policies and issue voting in new democracies." *World Politics* 63(1):43–77.

Bateson, R. (2012), 'Crime victimization and political participation', *American Political Science Review* **106**(3), 570–587.

Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. & Walsh, P. (2001), 'New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions', *The World Bank Economic Review* **15**(1), 165–176.

Bellows, J. & Miguel, E. (2009), 'War and local collective action in Sierra Leone', *Journal of Public Economics* **93**(11), 1144–1157.

Blanco, L. R. (2013), 'The impact of crime on trust in institutions in Mexico', *European Journal of Political Economy* **32**, 38–55.

Blattman, C. (2009), 'From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda', *American Political Science Review* **103**(02), 231–247.

Brehm, J. & Rahn, W. (1997), 'Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital', *American Journal of Political Science* **41**(3), 999–1023.

Carreras, M. (2013), 'The impact of criminal violence on regime legitimacy in Latin America', *Latin American Research Review* **48**(3), 85–107.

Coppock, A. & Green, D. P. (2016), 'Is voting habit forming? New evidence from experiments and regression discontinuities', *American Journal of Political Science* **60**(4), 1044–1062.

Cox, G. W. & Munger, M. C. (1989), 'Closeness, expenditures, and turnout in the 1982 US house elections.', *American Political Science Review* **83**(01), 217–231.

Cruz, J. M. (2000), 'Violencia, democracia y cultura política', *Nueva Sociedad* **167**, 132–146.

Davis, R. C. & Friedman, L. N. (1985), 'The emotional aftermath of crime and violence', *Trauma and its wake: The study and treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder* pp. 90–112.

do Rio Caldeira, T. P. (2000), *City of walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo*, University of California Press.

Downs, A. (1957), *An economic theory of democracy*, Harper & Brothers, New York.

Edlin, A., Gelman, A. & Kaplan, N. (2007), 'Voting as a rational choice why and how people vote to improve the well-being of others', *Rationality and Society* **19**(3), 293–314.

Fehr, E. & Gächter, S (2000), 'Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* **14**(3), 159–181.

Feddersen, T. J. & Pesendorfer, W. (1999), 'Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences', *American Political Science Review* **93**(02), 381–398.

Fernandez, K. E. & Kuenzi, M. (2010), 'Crime and support for democracy in Africa and Latin America', *Political Studies* **58**(3), 450–471.

Filmer, D. & Pritchett, L. H. (2001), 'Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data—or tears: An application to educational enrollments in states of India*', *Demography* **38**(1), 115–132.

Fiorina, M. P. (1976), 'The voting decision: Instrumental and expressive aspects', *The Journal of Politics* **38**(02), 390–413.

Fornos, C. A., Power, T. J. & Garand, J. C. (2004), 'Explaining voter turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000', *Comparative Political Studies* **37**(8), 909–940.

Gaviria, A. et al. (1999), 'Patterns of crime victimization in Latin America', *Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper* (408).

Gélineau, F. & Singer, M. M. (2015), The economy and incumbent support in Latin America, *in* R. E. Carlin, M. M. Singer & E. Zechmeister, eds, 'The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts', University of Michigan Press, pp. 281–299.

Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P. & Shachar, R. (2003), 'Voting may be habit-forming: Evidence from a randomized field experiment', *American Journal of Political Science* **47**(3), 540–550.

Green, D. P., Shapiro, I. & Shapiro, I. (1994), *Pathologies of rational choice theory: A critique of applications in political science*, Cambridge University Press Press, Cambridge.

Green, D. L. & N. Diaz. 2007. "Predictors of emotional stress in crime victims: Implications for treatment." *Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention* 7(3):194.

Holland, A. (2013), 'Right on crime? Conservative party politics and mano dura policy in El Salvador', *Latin American Research Review* **48**(1), 44–67.

Janoff-Bulman, R. & Frieze, I. H. (1983), 'A theoretical perspective for understanding reactions to victimization', *Journal of Social Issues* **39**(2), 1–17.

Junger-Tas, J. & Marshall, I. H. (1999), 'The self-report methodology in crime research', *Crime and Justice* pp. 291–367.

Kilpatrick, D. G. & Acierno, R. (2003), 'Mental health needs of crime victims: Epidemiology and outcomes', *Journal of Traumatic Stress* **16**(2), 119–132.

Lejeune, R. & Alex, N. (1973), 'On being mugged: "The event and its aftermath"', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* **2**(3), 259.

Lerner, Jennifer S & Dacher Keltner. 2001. "Fear, anger, and risk." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81(1):146.

Ley, S. (2017), 'To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral Participation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (online first).

Lijphart, A. (1997), 'Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma. Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1996', *American Political Science Review* **91**(01), 1–14.

Lurigio, A. J. (1987), 'Are all victims alike? The adverse, generalized, and differential impact of crime', *Crime & Delinquency* **33**(4), 452–467.

Macmillan, R. (2001), 'Violence and the life course: The consequences of victimization for personal and social development', *Annual Review of Sociology* pp. 1–22.

Macmillan, R. & Hagan, J. (2004), 'Violence in the transition to adulthood: Adolescent victimization, education, and socioeconomic attainment in later life', *Journal of Research on Adolescence* **14**(2), 127–158.

Malone, M. F. T. (2013), 'Does crime undermine public support for democracy? Findings from the case of Mexico', *The Latin Americanist* **57**(2), 17–44.

Marcus, G. E. & MacKuen, M. B. (1993), 'Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential campaigns', *American Political Science Review*, **87**(3) 672–685.

Merolla, J. L. & Zechmeister, E. J. (2009), *Democracy at risk: How terrorist threats affect the public*, University of Chicago Press.

Norris, F. H. & Kaniasty, K. (1991), 'The psychological experience of crime: A test of the mediating role of beliefs in explaining the distress of victims', *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* **10**(3), 239–261.

Norris, P., Martínez i Coma, F., Nai, A. & Groemping, M. (2015), The expert survey of perceptions of electoral integrity, pei3.5, www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

Pérez, O. J. (2003), 'Democratic legitimacy and public insecurity: Crime and democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala', *Political Science Quarterly* **118**(4), 627–644.

Pérez, O. J. (2015), The Impact of Crime on Voter Choice in Latin America, *in* R. E. Carlin, M. M. Singer & E. Zechmeister, eds, 'The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts', University of Michigan Press, pp. 324–345.

28

Peterson, C. & Seligman, M. E. (1983), 'Learned helplessness and victimization', *Journal of Social Issues* **39**(2), 103–116.

Riker, W. H. & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968), 'A theory of the calculus of voting', *American Political Science Review* **62**(01), 25–42.

Romero, V., Magaloni, B. & Díaz-Cayeros, A. (2016), 'Presidential approval and public security in mexico's war on crime', *Latin American Politics and Society* **58**(2), 100–123.

Rosenstone, S. J. (1982), 'Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout', *American Journal of Political Science* **26**, 25–46.

Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W. & Earls, F. (1997), 'Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy', *Science* **277**(5328), 918–924.

Schroeder, D. A., Steel, J. E., Woodell, A. J. & Bembenek, A. F. (2003), 'Justice within social dilemmas', *Personality and Social Psychology Review* **7**(4), 374–387.

Skogan, W. G. (1992), *Disorder and decline: Crime and the spiral of decay in American neighborhoods*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Tedeschi, R. G. & Calhoun, L. G. (2004), 'Posttraumatic growth: Conceptual foundations and empirical evidence', *Psychological Inquiry* **15**(1), 1–18.

Tilly, C. (1985), Bringing the state back in, Cambridge University Press, chapter War making and state making as organized crime, pp. 169–187.

Trelles, A. & Carreras, M. (2012), 'Bullets and votes: Violence and electoral participation in Mexico', *Journal of Politics in Latin America* **4**(2), 89–123.

UNDP (2013), Executive summary: Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014. Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America, Technical report, United Nations Development Programme.

Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K. & Hutchings, V. L. (2011), 'Election night's alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation', *The Journal of Politics* **73**(01), 156–170.

Valentino, N. A., Gregorowicz, K. & Groenendyk, E. W. (2009), 'Efficacy, emotions and the habit of participation', *Political Behavior* **31**(3), 307–330.

Visconti, G. (2017), 'Crime Victimization and Policy Preferences: Evidence from Brazil', *Presented at the Latin American Studies Conference 2017, Lima, Peru.*

Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R. & Van Soest, D. P. (2012), 'Violent conflict and behavior: A field experiment in Burundi', *The American Economic Review* **102**(2), 941–964.

Wiesehomeier, N. & Benoit, K. (2009), 'Presidents, parties, and policy competition', *The Journal of Politics* **71**(04), 1435–1447.

Wiesehomeier, N. & Doyle, D. (2014), Profiling the electorate: Ideology and attitudes of right-wing voters, *in* J. P. Luna & C. R. Kaltwasser, eds, 'Bringing the Right Back In: The Politics of Conservative Strength amidst Latin America's Turn to the Left'.

World Bank (2015), World Development Indicators (WDI), www.data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed march 2015)., Technical report.

Appendix

Table A: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DV					
Vote intention	100571	0.788	0.409	0	1
Incumbent support	70718	0.501	0.500	0	1
Independent Variables					
Victimization	100282	0.183	0.387	0	1
Victim: non-violent crime	99174	0.087	0.281	0	1
Victim: violent crime	99174	0.088	0.283	0	1
Control variables					
Male	100571	0.499	0.500	0	1
Age	100044	39.464	15.716	16	101
Age^2	100044	1804.38	1426.291	256	10201
Wealth indicator	100525	5.504	1.134	.003	7.433
Years of education	99938	9.474	4.277	0	18
Employment situation					
Public employee	99694	0.090	0.287	0	1
Unemployed	99694	0.073	0.261	0	1
Non-employed	99694	0.300	0.458	0	1
Retired	99694	0.066	0.249	0	1
Town size	100571	2.903	1.592	1	5
Past voting	98747	0.749	0.433	0	1
Perceived insecurity	100571	2.249	0.910	1	4
Informed	99990	4.376	1.019	1	5
Perc. eco. development	98600	2.215	0.733	1	3
2010	100571	0.295	0.456	0	1
2012	100571	0.320	0.467	0	1
2014	100571	0.385	0.487	0	1

Source: LAPOP 2010-2014.

Table B: Left-Center-Right Presidents in LA

Country	Year		
	2010	2012	2014
Mexico	right	right	center
Guatemala	center	right	right
El Salvador	left	left	left
Honduras	center	center	center
Costa Rica	right	right	right
Panama	right	right	right
Colombia		right	right
Ecuador	left	left	left
Bolivia	left	left	left
Peru	right	left	left
Paraguay	left	left	right
Chile		right	left
Uruguay	left	left	left
Brazil	center	left	left
Venezuela	left	left	left
Argentina	center	center	center
Dominican Republic	right	right	right

Source: Baker & Greene (2011) based on Wiese-homeier & Benoit (2009). Note: We use the left-right ideology score (1-20), factoring in when LAPOP went into field. The data only covers Latin America. Matched with LAPOP data, 41.6% of our respondents live under a left-wing president, 19.9% under a center incumbent and 38.5% under a right-wing president.

of the country's economic development to control for economic motives which can affect the respondent's incumbent support (Gélineau & Singer 2015).

The results show that victimization decreases the individual's likelihood to vote for a center incumbent compared to voting for the opposition (Table 2 M7) with an average marginal effect of 3.3%, holding economic evaluations constant. It has a weaker impact on voting for a left incumbent (Table 2 M9; the average marginal effect is 0.9%) and no significant effect on right-wing incumbents. Again, differentiating victimization by the degree of violence experience, we find that non-violent crime victimization significantly decreases expressing a vote intention for a center incumbent (M8) by 4.7% (average marginal effect). In contrast, victims of violent crime are not significantly affected in voting for either center (M8) or right-wing (M6) incumbents compared to voting for the opposition. Victims of violent crime are, however, less likely to support a left-wing incumbent (M10). We visualize the effect in Figure 4 with predictive margins for the likelihood to vote for a right- (a), center (b), and left-wing (c) incumbent. Against our expectations, it is not right-wing incumbents that are punished, but center incumbents. In such cases, victims of non-violent crime are more likely to vote for the opposition.

Figure 4: Predictive margins for non-victims, victims of non-violent crime and victims of violent crime on vote for right-wing (panel a), center (panel b) and left-wing (panel c) incumbent based on M6 and M8 in Table 2.

That victims of non-violent crime punish center incumbents might speak for an increased demand for a hard-on-crime candidate, who takes a clearer stance than the center. It might very