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Autor*innen/Author(s): Melina Altamirano, Sarah Berens, and Sandra Ley

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Corresponding Author
Melina Altamirano, El Colegio de México, Mexico City.
Email: maltamirano@colmex.mx

The Welfare State amid Crime
How victimization and perceptions of insecurity affect social policy preferences in Latin America and the Caribbean

Melina Altamirano
El Colegio de México

Sarah Berens
University of Innsbruck

Sandra Ley
CIDE

Abstract

Criminal violence is one of the most pressing problems in Latin America and the Caribbean, with profound political consequences. Its impact on social policy preferences, however, remains largely unexplored. To understand such effect, we argue that it is crucial to analyze victimization experiences and perceptions of insecurity as two separate phenomena, with distinct attitudinal consequences. We associate heightened perceptions of insecurity with a reduced demand for public welfare provision, as such perceptions reflect a sense of the state's failure to provide public security. But acknowledging the mounting costs and needs that direct experiences with crime entail, we expect victimization to increase support for social policies, particularly for health services. Based on survey data from for 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the 2008-2012 period, we show that perceptions of insecurity indeed reduce support for the state's role in welfare provision, whereas crime victimization strongly increases such preferences.

Keywords
crime, social policy preferences, victimization, insecurity perceptions, Latin America

Corresponding Author
Melina Altamirano, *El Colegio de México,* Mexico City.
Email: maltamirano@colmex.mx

One of the most important changes in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) context in the last decade has been the dramatic increase of criminal violence. According to the 2014 survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, one third of Latin Americans identified crime as their country's main problem. Such violent reality has already had important attitudinal and behavioral consequences across the region, from diminished support for democracy and trust in democratic institutions[1] to increased support for iron fist policies[2] and varying effects on political participation.[3]

Prevailing evidence therefore suggests that crime-related violence shapes citizens' views on politics and, subsequently, their support for the different state policies and their engagement with democratic institutions. When analyzing the effect of crime on citizens' policy perceptions, the literature has mainly focused on security issues. However, it is likely that crime also shapes citizens' views on state policies beyond those related to security.[4]

In this paper, we examine how criminal violence affects citizens' perceptions of the role of the state regarding welfare policies. Exploring this issue is crucial given that attitudes toward redistribution are relevant for understanding patterns of welfare provision and influential in the policymaking process.[5] Furthermore, as exposure to certain contextual conditions can either critically enhance or depress support for social policy provision among certain segments of the population,[6] understanding the impact of crime is imperative. We argue, however, that in order to unravel the impact of crime on welfare preferences, we need a disaggregated approach that distinguishes insecurity perception from actual experiences with crime.

We contend that the nature and logic of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean have implications for citizens' perceptions about the state, and, in consequence, shape preferences about welfare provision. Criminal activity —particularly that which is conducted by organized crime,

the main perpetrator of violence in the Latin American region— expands the public's distrust in the role of the state in the provision of public security. High crime rates, thus, serve as an indicator of the state's willingness to protect its citizens' wellbeing.[7] Crucially, a diminishing belief in the state's capabilities to handle major tasks and functions can also destroy fiscal contracts.[8]

We argue that, in this context, those with a heightened perception of insecurity are less likely to support the state having a larger role in the provision of welfare and public goods. We suggest that, in the face of severe crime, citizens feeling more exposed to violence may become more likely to reject interactions with the government, out of distrust or skepticism. Turning to the experience of crime victimization, we must acknowledge, however, its consequences in terms of new objective economic and health needs, from the restoration of damaged property and productivity costs to medical and healthcare services. Grievances derived from personal experiences with crime should, in contrast, positively alter demand for social policy provision, even if victims are skeptical of public institutions. Actual victimization turns diffuse fears into actual costs and needs. We therefore expect that, despite the states' failure to provide public security, victims are more likely to demand government action as a way of coping with such new needs and costs.

Our study advocates for the disaggregation and correct identification of crime on social policy preferences, separating perceptions of insecurity from victimization experiences. We theorize and provide evidence on the varying dynamics linking crime exposure to policy attitudes. This paper therefore contributes to the growing literature that seeks to examine the different behavioral and attitudinal consequences of crime exposure,[9] albeit with a more disaggregated account. Ultimately, we contend that the spread of negative perceptions of insecurity as a result of growing criminal violence limits the possible expansion of the Latin American and Caribbean

welfare state, despite the growing needs that victims of crime face as a result of their direct exposure to violence. Perceptions of insecurity tend to be more widespread than victimization.[10] A negative effect of heightened perceptions of insecurity on social policy support, therefore, poses a severe threat to the expansion of the welfare state, contributing to the ongoing debate on the challenges of welfare state development in developing countries.[11]

To understand how a violent context transforms citizens' perceptions about welfare policies, first, we briefly review previous works on the determinants of social policy preferences and then explore the extant studies on the connection between welfare state policies and crime. Second, focusing on criminal violence, we propose two contrasting hypotheses on how crime might shape preferences for welfare provision in LAC, via perceptions of insecurity and victimization experiences, but through very distinct processes. Third, we present our research design, data, and methods used. Fourth, we discuss the statistical tests and the robustness checks. Finally, in the conclusion, we provide an assessment of the political implications of growing organized crime activity for the development of the welfare state in LAC.

Welfare state policies and crime

A vast political economy literature has explored the different social and economic determinants of preferences for redistribution and welfare policies. At the micro-level, the most influential insight has been that individual positions in the income distribution strongly affect preferences, with individuals below the mean preferring higher levels of redistribution.[12]

In the Latin American context, scholars have found a diluted effect of relative income on preferences for redistribution[13] and have provided evidence of the effect of other individual characteristics, such as occupation and place of residence,[14] revealing potential limitations of the

classical income models to account for preferences beyond advanced democracies. Moreover, low expectations among the poor critically diminish their demand for welfare policies.[15]

Exposure to certain contextual conditions can also lead individuals to support or oppose public social spending. Racial inequalities seem to have a depressing effect on mass support for redistributive policies.[16] Similarly, a growing informal sector might reduce support for welfare spending.[17] In line with this second strand of studies, our work explores the effect of individual exposure to criminal violence, a highly salient contextual characteristic in Latin America.

Previous research addressing the nexus between crime and welfare has shown that social and penal policies intersect and exhibit crucial interdependencies.[18] For the specific study of the relationship between crime and attitudes towards the welfare state, extant works have mainly focused on the European context, analyzing the role of fear of crime. Evidence suggests that individuals in developed democracies can be supportive of redistribution in unequal contexts as a response to a heightened fear of crime.[19] As Rueda and Stegmueller show, fear of crime increases with higher levels of inequality. In order to address this negative externality of inequality, citizens —especially the rich— express greater demand for redistribution in order to reduce crime through welfare policies, which are considered a suitable response in Western Europe. In developed democracies, welfare measures seem to help individuals protect themselves from social and economic risks and reduce feelings of insecurity.[20]

As noted, these works have been exclusively limited to advanced democracies, where there is an effective level of state intervention and social welfare efforts (as well as criminal activity) have a very different nature and profile when compared to LAC. When we think outside of the European context and place ourselves in the Latin American and Caribbean region, we must consider that —despite improvements in the provision of non-contributory benefits and the

expansion of universal social policies[21]— welfare systems tend to be truncated, with slowly growing coverage rates and stagnating poverty alleviation outcomes.[22]

While citizens in high-income countries turn toward the state in demand for protection, such an effect is less evident in developing countries, where state capacity is an issue of debate and the state is colluded with special interests and criminal groups.[23] Although economic inequality in Latin America affects the distribution of crime,[24] crime itself might play a different role compared to the effect argued by Rueda and Stegmueller in advanced industrial democracies. Increased levels of crime might weaken mass support for state efforts. Previous works have shown that trust, expectations, and willingness to contribute to the tax effort are essential components for sustaining public support for the welfare state.[25] If citizens have low expectations about the potential of social policies to reduce inequality (and therefore crime) because of corruption, interest group capture and/or lack of capacity of government officials, then state efforts will not be perceived as the best strategy to cope with crime. It can be more efficient to simply invest in private protection if one is able to afford it, instead of trying to enforce a public solution via redistribution. Recent findings from Flores-Macías and Sánchez-Talanquer for the case of Mexico corroborate this thought, showing that a decline in public safety reduces individuals' willingness to sustain the fiscal contract.[26]

Although the literature linking the welfare state and crime is still fairly limited, extant studies do suggest the importance of getting a better understanding of this relationship. It is also important to note that, while the works that explicitly link crime and social policy preferences refer to a positive relationship between these variables,[27] these studies largely fail to consider the role of victimization experiences, to differentiate them from perceptions of insecurity, and to distinguish their potentially distinct consequences for the welfare providing role of the state. In

this paper, we argue that such distinction is relevant for several reasons. Perceptions of insecurity do not closely reflect the local crime rate or individual victimization rates.[28] At the same time, perceptions of insecurity are socially constructed,[29] while victimization experiences become embedded in an individual's identity[30] and imply a continuous interactive process between the individual and the surrounding actors, constantly shaping the victim's needs and attitudes.[31] Therefore, as will be discussed further, to understand citizens' perceptions about welfare policies, perceptions of insecurity must be distinguished from victimization experiences. When crime is partly a result of corrupt state practices, as in LAC, and the consequences of victimization are taken into account on their own, attitudes toward public goods provision can be profoundly affected through diverging mechanisms.

Preferences for welfare provision amid crime in Latin America and the Caribbean

In order to comprehend how crime shapes social policy preferences in LAC, we must first understand the logic and nature of such criminal activity, contextualize it, and consequently derive its implications for individual attitudes towards the role of the state in the provision of public goods, distinguishing the different roles and consequences of crime violence for victims and non-victims. Among victims, we must account for the mounting problems, costs, and needs that criminal violence entails for them and which most likely affect their attitudes towards welfare provision in a different way from those who have not experienced crime directly. Non-victims may, nonetheless, perceive insecurity in their surroundings, but with fundamentally distinct consequences for their needs and attitudes towards the state. To understand this distinction, we explore the different logics and implications behind perceptions of insecurity and victimization

experiences. Based on this research, we derive distinct attitudinal consequences in relation to the welfare state.

Criminal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

Growing violence in LAC over the past decade is largely the result of growing criminal activity, mainly led by organized crime,[32] which depends greatly on the protection rackets that it is able to establish with different state actors.[33] It is only through their collusion with government authorities —exerting corruption, bribery, intimidation, or violence— that organized crime groups (OCGs) are able to flourish, protect their territories, and buy impunity for their crimes. This close relationship between OCGs and state authorities largely enables organized criminal activity. Therefore, organized crime violence not only reflects the vulnerability of state institutions, but also shows the political control that criminal groups can exert on them.[34]

Beyond organized crime activity —which may include homicides, kidnappings, disappearances, and extortion, among other criminal acts— ordinary street crime in LAC, like robbery, has also expanded considerably, with a majority of such events involving violence.[35] Still, we must not ignore that assault, robbery, and coercion are tools also used by organized criminal groups, through local gangs, to guarantee profits and local compliance.[36] As we note in the following sections, such violent encounters with crime entail new economic challenges for victims.

Corruption and the weakness of Latin American judicial institutions have resulted in a regional failure to stop even ordinary crime. Latin America is ranked by the 2017 Global Impunity Index as the region with the worst global impunity scores.[37] In Mexico, reporting a robbery to the prosecutor's office can take more than three hours, which discourages many from denouncing crimes. In fact, only six percent of crimes in Mexico are reported and, on average, less than one

percent of those crimes are actually resolved. [38] Likewise, in Guatemala, organized crime has deeply infiltrated the judicial system, resulting in a limited number of arrests and investigations, along with quick releases "because of a prosecutor's 'weak' case."[39] These situations are prevalent throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region. Ultimately, prevailing impunity implies further violence and lack of justice, which then magnify perceptions of insecurity and of the state's (in)ability to effectively provide public security.[40]

It is in this context of organized criminal violence in the Latin American and Caribbean region that we seek to understand its consequences for welfare policy. We argue that this requires acknowledging how citizens perceive said insecurity and distinguishing these perceptions from actual experiences with crime, which greatly transform an individual's needs beyond any subjective notion of the general situation of violence.

Perception of insecurity vs. victimization experiences

Research from diverse disciplines points to the importance of differentiating perceptions of insecurity and victimization experiences. Copious literature in sociology, criminology, and political science has explored the role and logic of perceptions of insecurity.[41] As argued by Skogan, perceptions of insecurity involve cognitive and evaluative components of an individual's notions regarding crime.[42] Insecurity perception is based on a mixture of objective information, cognitive processing (which can differ across individuals) and socially constructed belief and learning.[43] Numerous works have consistently shown that perceived risk is unrelated to personal experiences with crime and is in fact largely disproportional to actual victimization rates. People perceive a much higher risk than the actual risk of criminal victimization.[44] In her study of violence in Latin America, Reguillo also finds that perceptions of insecurity are socially constructed and

then become culturally shared.[45] The works that have delved into the individual characteristics that are associated with increased perceptions of insecurity habitually point to the socialization process of perceptions of risk through which the elderly and women express a heightened sense of insecurity, mainly as a result of a socialized vulnerability and not due to higher victimization rates.[46]

Recent works on victimization experiences have further revealed how these imply a fundamentally different process from perceptions of insecurity. Becoming a victim of crime involves a transformation of an individual's identity. Direct experiences with crime redefine how a person regards him or herself, as well as how a person is regarded by others.[47] The foundational work on the politics of victimization by Moncada has shown how becoming a victim is not only about experiencing a one-time criminal act, but a continuous interactive process between victims, criminals, the state, and society overall.[48]

Given that perceptions of insecurity are socially constructed, we must understand how such socialization may also imply a reconfiguration of how individuals perceive the broader issues that surround crime and insecurity, such as the role of the state. At the same time, given that victimization implies a transformation of how an individual perceives him or herself and relates with his or her surroundings, we must focus on how a direct experience with crime also transforms an individual's reality and position regarding the state —not through socially constructed perceptions, but through actual encounters that translate into specific needs and demands.

Perception of insecurity and the welfare state

From a political economy perspective, an increase in perceived risk or uncertainty should be met with an increasing demand for redistribution to buffer such insecurity,[49] as the welfare state's

function is to hedge risks. However, the perceived uncertainty that emanates from crime and violence is fundamentally different from worries about economic risks. Some Latin American regions may in fact be controlled by criminal groups. Across Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico, organized crime has been able to exert economic and political controls, de facto collecting taxes through extortion quotas, influencing electoral processes, and capturing and redirecting resources devoted to social programs.[50] Under such circumstances, not only does distrust in the state expand, but state welfare provision is largely ineffective.

When crime and violence are largely sustained by the collusion of state authorities with organized crime, as well as the weakness and corruption of many of the police and judicial institutions —as in the case of LAC— citizens may be likely to not only perceive higher physical insecurity, but also to reject further interactions with the state. According to Carreras,[51] high perceptions of violence make individuals less respectful and proud of national political institutions. Lack of support for the state's institutions as a result of growing violence and feelings of insecurity can have profound consequences in the way in which citizens interact with the state. Consistently, Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi[52] show that, when institutions are weak, citizens do not engage with the state through official institutional mechanisms. And, as further noted by Merolla, Mezini and Zechmeister,[53] during crises—possibly related to security— citizens are less likely to support democratic forms of governance.

In this regard, we must consider that demanding a higher level of welfare provision not only entails an individual preference for the state having a larger role, as noted before, but also engaging in further interactions with the state, from paying taxes to following the required procedures to use public services. Social policy provision relies on an effective fiscal contract, but citizens may be less willing to pay taxes if they perceive that the government is not delivering

adequate services or that it is corrupt, incompetent and/or captured by special interests and criminal groups.[54] In other words, it is not simply incapacity due to lack of resources that repels citizens but the state's unwillingness. Thus, if reciprocity breaks down, individuals will be less supportive of redistribution.[55] In addition, citizens form their social policy preferences based on their expectations about the quality and fairness of public services.[56] Indeed, research suggests that perceptions about the quality of government are crucial for understanding levels of public support for welfare policies.[57] In the case of Latin America, previous analyses have shown that historic levels of exclusion in access to welfare provision have led to diminished citizen expectations about the redistributive role of the state. Holland[58] notes that flat/regressive transfers and informal access barriers reinforce skepticism of the benefits of social policy provision. This effect is present *even* among poor voters, who, in developed economies, are generally supportive of welfare efforts.[59] Low public expectations in Latin America have led to a process of "coalition hollowing" from below, as low-income voters do not expect social policies to fundamentally change their wellbeing and therefore weaken their demand for redistribution.[60]

As criminal violence in LAC erodes both citizens' political trust and controls over state institutions, expectations about what the state can achieve regarding welfare provision are likely to decline. Therefore, we expect that individuals who feel more insecure—and who are consequently likely to have a more askant view of state institutions—will be less supportive of an extensive public welfare provision. In this regard, we must recall that the character of crime insecurity implies that the usual risk-insurance rationale is decoupled and individuals are likely to turn instead toward private means for protection as a response to heightened insecurity perceptions. The mechanism might run through several channels such as decreasing trust, disappointment in the state institutions or heightened skepticism of state capacity or an increased perception of state

corruption, induced through the perception that public safety is not sufficiently provided. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

H1. Individuals with high perceptions of insecurity are less likely to demand public welfare provision than those perceiving their environment as more secure.

Victims of crime and the welfare state

Although crime may be associated with greater skepticism about the state and its capacity to provide public goods, we must also take into account that, despite these doubts, violence inevitably implies a profound change in the victims' social and economic reality. This is part of the transformational process to which recent works on victimization have referred.[61] Studies have shown that violent crime has important consequences for employment and health outcomes. These two areas are at the core of welfare policies, and citizens who personally experience trauma and loss may acknowledge the role of the state in helping them address the economic and health consequences of crime victimization.

Robles, Calderón and Magaloni[62] demonstrate that criminal violence diminishes consumption and labor participation. In particular, crime violence has impacted the self-employed the most.[63] This has subsequently resulted in fewer years of educational attainment for their children, as parents have been unable to keep their kids in school and have had to incorporate them into the labor market.[64] Violent crime has also impacted health outcomes. Criminal violence results in low birth weight[65] and prematurity.[66] In addition, a rise in violent crime is associated with an increase in blood pressure and hypertension rates.[67] And, of course, crime victimization and

exposure to violence have important psychological effects that may require professional attention.[68]

Victims in particular face these new mounting costs, needs, and problems, including: a) out-of-pocket costs, such as legal services and stolen or damaged property; b) medical care, ranging from rehabilitation and prescriptions to premature funeral expenses; c) mental healthcare by psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers; and d) productivity costs, such as lost wages and work days by victims and their families, in addition to long term productivity losses, in case of injury or lost body parts.[69] This is true for both violent and non-violent crime. Even in the case of non-violent crime, such as being a victim of a robbery or extortion, victimization implies losing part of one's income, as well as recovering damaged or stolen property. Being a victim of a kidnapping can also mean surrendering a part of the family wealth to pay for a ransom. Victimization of family members has significant costs for relatives. The rising number of disappearances across Latin America implies a major loss of family income —either as a result of losing the income of the household's main financial provider or the new expenses invested in looking for the missing person— on top of the new mental health needs that the victim's relatives will most likely face.

Overall, crime experiences entail numerous economic, health, and emotional costs that render individuals unable to then meet *other* basic needs. Furthermore, they involve a high degree of stress that can even affect one's ability to work. Individuals who have been directly affected by crime may be especially motivated to demand government intervention and provision of social policies to help them cope with the multiple costs of crime. Although the state may have failed victims and let them down by not protecting them from crime, public goods provision could be one of the "most tangible manifestations of the efforts by the state to remedy the harms they have

suffered."[70] Some victims —as in the case of disappearances— may even require welfare provisions in order to continue their quest for truth and justice; without such help they would be unable to provide for their families, while at the same time paying for legal services or traveling to search for their missing loved ones.[71]

Mexico —where violence has risen considerably over the past decade— is an interesting example that illustrates the impact of crime on victims' needs.[72] Crime victims and their relatives can submit petitions to the Executive Commission of Attention to Victims (CEAV, for its acronym in Spanish) for the specific assistance and support they require.[73] The type of requests that the Commission considers is revealing, as it shows the kind of needs that victims and their relatives face. Out of 15 possible services that the Commission can help assist or cover, 13 are related to medical and mental health care, including: surgeries and medical interventions, facial trauma and reconstructive surgery, prosthetic and orthotic devices, counseling and psychological services, as well as obstetric and pediatric services. This example points to a simple political economy rationale: an increase in costs needs to be met with an increasing demand for social protection through the state.

The discussion above therefore suggests that victims may consider that, despite the failure of the state regarding security—or precisely because of such failure—it is still the state's responsibility—more than ever—to provide other basic public goods and help fulfill other basic needs. Moreover, there is simply no alternative to public social protection when victims are economically strained. Therefore, even if victims are deeply skeptical of state institutions, they may have increased demands for social policy provision, mainly as a consequence of their grievances, their new reality, and transformed individual identity and relationship with their surroundings. We argue that facing the burden of these unexpected costs, victims might be

particularly supportive of an active role of the state to effectively provide social services that they require to cover their most basic needs. We then propose the following hypothesis:

H2. Victims of crime are more likely to demand public welfare provision than non-victims.

Overall, our two proposed hypotheses present a puzzle that we seek to address in this paper. While perceptions of insecurity may diminish trust in state institutions and thus depress the demand for an active role of the state in the provision of welfare, victims' mounting costs and needs increase their demands for social protection. Therefore, untangling the effects of victimization experiences and perceptions of insecurity on citizen support for social policy can help us develop a more objective and comprehensive assessment of the political and social consequences of crime in LAC.

Research Design

We focus on the micro level, as perceptions of crime differ from objective levels of criminal violence, emphasizing the need to study insecurity perceptions and crime victimization experiences independently from objective statistics. We test our hypotheses with survey data from three waves of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) conducted in 2008, 2010, and 2012, which contain the items needed to operationalize support for public welfare provision.[74] The data covers countries in Latin America and the Caribbean so that a total of 24 countries are included.[75] We pool the survey waves and control for survey year and country-fixed effects. Since levels of violence and crime vary at the very local level, we employ clustered standard errors at the municipality level.

Dependent Variable: Social policy demand

Building on the considerable scholarship that studies preferences for social policies, we employ the standard items used in cross-country surveys to operationalize support for public social policies.[76] LAPOP asks respondents how much they support the statement that the "government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people" (ROS2). The item reflects demand for public welfare, independent of how public goods are financed, deliberately leaving aside fairness and responsibility considerations that are more salient when asked about redistributive preferences. Respondents can answer on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot).[77]

Levels of support for welfare policies are generally high across LAC countries, with the majority of responses concentrating on favorable scores regarding government provision of social policies. We therefore follow previous analyses and focus on studying the determinants of markedly positive attitudes.[78] We assign a value of 1 for strongly positive attitudes towards welfare provision (6-7), and a 0 for less favorable responses (1-5). Given the dichotomous nature of this dependent variable, we use logistic regression analysis.[79]

In order to move beyond general support for welfare provision, we also test how far crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity influence preferences in a particular social policy field: healthcare. As we have already noted, crime victimization usually leads to a series of immediate health needs due to the violent nature of crime in most cases in LAC. Furthermore, violent crime has long-lasting negative effects on health outcomes for victims and their families.[80] Healthcare needs not only concern restoring physical wellbeing but also psychological support to cope with trauma.[81]

Our second dependent variable therefore focuses on a specific welfare policy: support for public healthcare (ROS6). The statement reads: "The (Country) government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing healthcare services" with the same range of response options, that we recode into a dichotomous variable focusing on strong support at the extreme.

Both survey items used here for the operationalization of our dependent variable refer to a trade-off between market and state as the responsible entity for the provision of welfare in general or healthcare in particular.[82] Support for public healthcare was only asked in 2010 and 2012, while the general public welfare preference was asked in 2008 as well.

Independent Variables: Perceptions of Insecurity and Victimization

To measure subjective perceptions of insecurity we employ an item asking respondents whether they feel safe in their neighborhoods. Insecurity perception ranges from 1 (safe) to 4 (very unsafe). The measure of insecurity perception available through LAPOP allows us to capture the individual's risk perception. This personal assessment about insecurity is particularly useful for three reasons: (1) it addresses the neighborhood level,[83] which is the most immediate political and social milieu that shapes the way citizens view politics;[84] (2) it is fundamentally different from a direct victimization experience; and (3) it is also different from fear of crime, which, as noted by Ferraro,[85] is more emotive in nature, while risk entails a cognitive judgment and involves people's assessments of crime rates and the probability of victimization.

We capture victimization using a survey item asking respondents whether they have been a victim of a crime in the past 12 months. While social desirability bias cannot be fully ruled out when using surveys to study sensitive issues, criminologists largely use this technique due to its

overall reliability.[86] The total non-response rate on this question is only 0.43% (LAPOP 2008-2014). Moreover, the question is sufficiently broad so that the hurdle to answer sincerely is less significant compared to questions asking about victimization of specific types of crime. Additionally, this question allows us to address and acknowledge the emotional and material costs that even regular crime such as a robbery entails: from stress, anxiety, and trauma to direct economic losses.[87] LAPOP also inquires whether a family member has fallen victim to a crime, which can be categorized as a further form of victimization. We study both the direct question on personal victimization and a variable for victimization that conflates individual and family victimization as another operationalization of the victimization experience (see Supplementary Material, Table S1).

Individual victimization experience through crime and the perception of living in an insecure neighborhood are only weakly positively correlated $\rho_1 = 0.19$ (at the 0.1% level of significance). This is consistent with previously cited works[88] that have persistently shown how perceptions of insecurity are not related to victimization experiences. As noted, several works find that perceptions of insecurity are in fact more widespread than actual victimization rates.[89]

Of course, victimization is not a randomized event and we need to consider possible selection effects, which might make victimization endogenous to social policy preferences, and the same holds true for insecurity perception. In order to address these concerns, we report cross-tables of insecurity perception and crime victimization with a set of standard socio-economic covariates in the Supplementary Material (Tables B and C). While victims of crime tend to be young males, with some level of education and living in urban areas, they do not differ significantly from non-victims regarding other sociodemographic characteristics that might be consequential for preferences for redistribution. In particular, correlates on education and urbanization, which

can serve as a good proxy for demand for public welfare support, do not indicate that victims are particularly more likely to require state-provided welfare and therefore support tax-funded services. In addition, as noted before, we have no reasons to think that the poor are particularly supportive of welfare expansion in the region.[90]

Also, perceptions of insecurity do not seem to cluster in specific neighborhoods but are more widespread and often independent of the level of respondent's reported experiences with crime (see Supplementary Material, Table C). As we would expect, respondents also perceive more risk when they live in urban areas. Women and young respondents tend to perceive a somewhat higher risk, but there are barely any differences for other covariates. While some degree of sorting might take place (the rich select into safer neighborhoods), the spread of insecurity perception across the board demonstrates the deeply individual character of such perception. Again, this broad distribution of perceptions of insecurity indicates that there is not a particular group which opts into a given characteristic that could also be affecting preferences for redistribution and social policy.



Figure 1. Aggregated insecurity perception (range 1-4) and aggregated victimization (in %) (LAPOP 2008-2012).
Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from LAPOP 2008-2012.

When we aggregate the information on crime victimization and insecurity perception from LAPOP to the country level, the correlation between these variables is only moderately positive (see Figure 1). Moreover, insecurity perception is weakly correlated with objective levels of violence. Using the homicide rate (homicides per 100.000 individuals) from the World Bank reveals that reported levels of violence even negatively correlate with insecurity perception at the individual level, with a correlation coefficient of $\rho_2 = -0.04$. This shows again that risk perception is a local measure that varies and therefore does not overlap with national figures of violence. The discrepancy between objective and subjective levels of crime and violence further strengthens the need for understanding perceptions of insecurity independently from actual experience as well as independently from official statistics that need to rely on reported crime information.[91]

Controls

Given that we expect trust in public institutions to be one of the key channels through which the effect of insecurity perception influences demand for public welfare, our models include a control for individual trust in political institutions. Using principal component analysis, we generate an index which summarizes individual trust toward the national legislature, the justice system, the supreme electoral tribunal, the armed forces, the national police, political parties, the president, and the supreme court. We add the institutional trust index as a control in a step-wise procedure.

Drawing upon the previously discussed literature, we employ a set of standard sociodemographic characteristics. We factor in the individual's gender (female), age, age squared (to consider non-linearities such as older respondents being more supportive of welfare provision due to reliance on pensions), living in either urban or rural areas (rural is the reference category), and the individual's level of education (measured as years of education).[92] In our analysis we also take into consideration the individual's employment status by introducing dummy variables for being either a public employee, unemployed, retired or responsible for housekeeping (employed in the private sector serves as reference category). Furthermore, we add a variable for household status (married), since recent research has revealed the important effects on welfare support following from intra-household redistribution or inequalities.[93]

Prioritizing a parsimonious model, we focus on socio-demographic characteristics as controls.[94] The country and year-fixed effects control for between country variation so that cross-country variation in income inequality, welfare provision and crimes rates is accounted for.[95]

Results

Results for the influence of crime experience and insecurity perception on the demand for public welfare provision, the dependent variable we discuss first, are reported in Table 1. Perceiving one's neighborhood as insecure reduces the likelihood to express welfare demand at the 1% level of significance. The results from M1 corroborate our first hypothesis. In contrast, the personal experience of crime increases support for public welfare policies, as shown in M2, and thereby lends support to our second hypothesis. We report logistic coefficients in Table 1 and describe substantive effects next.[96]

Becoming a victim of crime is positively associated with an increase in the incidence rate of individual consent to public welfare; the coefficient is highly significant at the 0.1% level of significance in M2 and M3. We report predicted probabilities for our two main independent variables in Figure 2, holding all other variables in the model at modes. Crime victimization increases the likelihood of supporting public welfare by roughly 2.3%. In contrast, the likelihood of demanding public welfare decreases by 1.9% when an individual goes from feeling safe to unsafe, which is a small but still substantive change, given that it refers to the average change. Effect sizes may differ (with smaller or larger magnitude) for subgroups in our sample. Figure 2 shows a discernible effect for insecurity perception at the extremes of the scale —safe and unsafe— while 95% confidence intervals overlap largely for the middle categories. The graph reveals the uncertainty around the model estimates for the middle categories of this variable, and therefore the result for perceived insecurity should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, a change from feeling safe to unsafe can occur rapidly as perceived risk increases, and the point estimates in Table 1 suggest that such a change has a significant impact. Compared to the average marginal effects for education —where one additional year increases the probability of support by 0.2%— or wealth

—which reduces support by -2.4% when estimating the change from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean[97]— the magnitude of the effects for crime exposure is substantial.[98]

Both variables seem to affect welfare state support independently; the effects remain significant in M3 when both variables are added jointly. In contrast to the portrayed positive effect of fear of crime on welfare support for the advanced industrial democracy context,[99] perceptions of insecurity seem to reduce social policy demand in LAC, which is in line with findings for Mexico.[100] Latin Americans instead are more likely to opt for private welfare solutions when facing security failure of the state.

Insights on economic and social consequences of victimization can explain the increased support for public welfare. Since crime experience leads to adverse economic effects —particularly in the LAC region, where crime entails some form of violence— such as unemployment, income shortage, private debt or increased expenses for healthcare, greater demand for public welfare is a logical step. Direct crime victimization then stands for a simultaneous increase in economic risk.[101]

Table 1. Logistic Regression: Support for Public Welfare

DV: public welfare	(M 1)	(M 2)	(M 3)	(M 4)	(M 5)	(M 6)
Insecurity perception	-0.028**		-0.037***	-0.052***	-0.023*	
	(0.011)		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	
Victimization		0.103***	0.117***	-0.062		0.111***
		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.060)		(0.021)
Victimization × insecurity perception				0.071**		
				(0.022)		
Institutional trust					0.019***	0.022***
					(0.005)	(0.005)
Controls						
Female	-0.071***	-0.072***	-0.068***	-0.069***	-0.070***	-0.071***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Age	0.009**	0.009**	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age^2	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wealth index	-0.050***	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.051***	-0.049***	-0.050***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Years of education	0.007**	0.007*	0.007*	0.007*	0.008**	0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employment status						
Public employee	0.078*	0.083*	0.082*	0.082*	0.071*	0.076*
(Ref. cat: private employee)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Unemployed	0.053	0.052	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.054
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Non-employed	-0.010	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.013	-0.008
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Retired	-0.056	-0.052	-0.052	-0.052	-0.061	-0.058
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Urban	0.008	-0.006	0.003	0.004	0.012	-0.001
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Married	0.014	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.013	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
2010 (Ref. cat.: 2008)	0.157***	0.154***	0.155***	0.154***	0.152***	0.148***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
2012	0.131***	0.132***	0.129***	0.129***	0.125***	0.125***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Constant	0.180+	0.109	0.185+	0.216*	0.147	0.084
	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.103)
Observations	77321	77321	77321	77321	77321	77321
Log-likelihood	-49404.3	-49395.8	-49386.8	-49381	-49392.1	-49379.4
Chi^2	1070.43	1075.9	1104.31	1119.63	1070.98	1083.8
BIC	99202.5	99185.5	99178.9	99178.5	99189.4	99163.9

$+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Note: We use a logistic regression with country and year fixed-effects and clustered standard errors at the municipality level. Country-fixed effects are not displayed.

Source: Author's elaboration based on LAPOP 2008-2012.



Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for crime victimization and insecurity perception on welfare support (Table 1 M1 and M2).
Source: Authors' elaboration.

The effects are similar for preferences on the more specific social policy, that is, public healthcare. Average support for increased public healthcare provision is higher than the more general welfare question with a mean of 0.75 (standard deviation is 0.43). Table 2 reports our estimation results for the impact of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity on healthcare support. Again, personal experience of crime goes together with higher demand for public healthcare, while the perception of insecurity in one's neighborhood reduces the likelihood of said support. The predicted probabilities in Figure 3 corroborate this result. The probability of supporting healthcare provision increases by 2.3% for victims, which is consistent with our argument. However, the coefficient for insecurity perception is only significant at the 10% level

of significance in M7. Figure 3 shows overlapping confidence intervals across the categories of this variable. The effect of insecurity perception with a change in predicted probabilities of 1.4% is, hence, less robust for healthcare support when compared to general welfare.

The effect for insecurity perception is reduced in significance and magnitude for both dependent variables when we add a control for institutional trust in Table 1 M5 and Table 2 M11, while the effect for victimization (M6 and M12) only becomes stronger in magnitude. The BIC value in the analysis of public welfare is slightly smaller in the model specifications which include institutional trust, indicating an improvement of the model fit. The reduced effect for insecurity perception on welfare preferences when institutional trust is held constant supports the assumption that the effect of insecurity perception works to some extent through the mechanism of trust in public institutions. The effect for victimization seems to be independent from institutional trust, aligning with our argument that is suggesting a role of grievances derived from experiences with crime.

As perception and actual crime experience indicated opposing dynamics regarding welfare preferences, we need to analyze which impact dominates in cases where both are present. Therefore, we build an interaction term of crime experience and insecurity perception. Estimation results are reported in M4 for public welfare demand and in M10 for healthcare support. We see that when both victimization and heightened perceptions of insecurity overlap, the positive impact of victimization is reinforced even further.[102]

Table 2. Logistic Regression: Support for Public Healthcare

DV: healthcare	(M 7)	(M 8)	(M 9)	(M 10)	(M 11)	(M 12)
Insecurity perception	-0.027+		-0.038**	-0.051**	-0.024+	
	(0.015)		(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	
Victimization		0.135***	0.149***	-0.001		0.140***
		(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.083)		(0.030)
Victimization × insecurity perception				0.060*		
				(0.030)		
Institutional trust					0.010	0.013*
					(0.007)	(0.007)
Controls						
Female	-0.045*	-0.046*	-0.042+	-0.042*	-0.044*	-0.045*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age	0.008*	0.008*	0.009*	0.009*	0.008*	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wealth index	-0.025	-0.027	-0.027	-0.027	-0.025	-0.026
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Years of education	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Employment status						
Public employee	0.042	0.048	0.047	0.047	0.039	0.044
(Ref. cat: private employee)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Unemployed	0.098*	0.098*	0.099*	0.100*	0.098*	0.098*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Non-employed	0.001	0.007	0.006	0.006	-0.001	0.005
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Retired	-0.062	-0.056	-0.058	-0.058	-0.065	-0.060
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Urban	-0.039	-0.056	-0.047	-0.046	-0.038	-0.053
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Married	0.036	0.037	0.038	0.038	0.035	0.036
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
2012 (Ref. cat.: 2010)	-0.118**	-0.114**	-0.117**	-0.117**	-0.118**	-0.114**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Fixed effects	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*	*yes*
Constant	0.987***	0.907***	0.987***	1.013***	0.968***	0.889***
	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.138)
Observations	57051	57051	57051	57051	57051	57051
Log-likelihood	-30052.59	-30041.58	-30036.26	-30033.98	-30050.78	-30038.23
Chi^2	807.38	811.88	820.8	825.013	804.036	808.39
BIC	60477.5	60455.5	60455.8	60462.2	60484.9	60459.8

$+p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001$

Note: We use logistic regression with country and year fixed-effects and clustered standard errors at the municipality level. Country-fixed effects are not displayed.

Source: Author's elaboration based on LAPOP 2010-2012.



Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for crime victimization and insecurity perception on healthcare support (Table 2 M7 and M8).
Source: Authors' elaboration.

To better interpret the interaction term, we plot the average marginal effect of victimization at different levels of insecurity perception in Figure 4. We find that victims who perceive their neighborhood as safe are not discernible in their welfare preferences from those who did not experience any type of crime in the past 12 months. Victims and non-victims who feel safe overlap in their probability to support public welfare with an incidence rate of 64%. However, as their perceptions of insecurity increase, victims continue to demand public welfare and healthcare, while rising perceptions of insecurity among non-victims result in significant diminished support for public welfare, falling to roughly 60%. The effect is similar for healthcare preferences as shown in the panel on the right in Figure 4. Overall, for differences in risk perception among non-victims

we see a clear renunciation of the state. But the victimization experience undermines the negative effect of insecurity perception on welfare preferences: Victims who also feel unsafe remain as likely to demand public goods as victims who feel safe. Experiencing crime turns *diffuse* insecurity into *real* insecurity.

Before we further explore the mechanism behind our findings for crime victimization in the subsequent section, some findings for the control variables deserve further elaboration. As already indicated above, the more affluent respondents are, the less supportive of generous public goods provision they are (assuming a redistributive character), which is in line with findings of previous research which uses asset information to determine the respondent's wealth status. Age significantly affects both general welfare support and preferences for healthcare with an average change in probabilities of 0.1%. Welfare demand increases with age. Finally, the unemployed are significantly more likely to support public healthcare compared to private employees and public employees, which corroborates previous research.



Figure 4. Average marginal effect for crime victimization at different levels of insecurity perception on DV 1 (public welfare) from Table 1 M4 and DV 2 (healthcare) from Table 2 M10. ***Source:*** Authors' elaboration.

Underlying mechanisms

In order to shed light on the mechanism that underlies support for welfare policies among victims of crime, we add further tests. While the cross-national character of the data limits the means to test for the mechanism, we can explore correlations between victimization and further factors which reflect economic need. Family victimization equally exerts a positive effect on both support for public welfare and healthcare, which suggests that experiences with crime have a general negative impact on a household's wellbeing, generating specific needs and subsequent demands (see Table S1 in the Supplementary Material). Moreover, the severity of the experience of crime

should make a difference when economic needs drive support. While non-violent crime can be equally traumatizing as the experience of violence, we can infer an increase in concrete needs among victims of *violent* crime with greater certainty. We therefore distinguish types of crime experience into violent (unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats, armed robbery, assault but not robbery, rape or sexual assault, kidnapping) and nonviolent (unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threat, vandalism, home burglary, and extortion) crime victimization.[103] Victims of violent crime should have a stronger demand for public welfare, especially regarding healthcare compared to non-victims. We report the predicted probabilities for our findings in Figure 5. Indeed, for public welfare we do not find discernible differences regarding the intensity of crime experience; both victims of violent and non-violent crime are more supportive of public welfare (see panel (a) in Figure 5). But, when it comes to healthcare, victims who suffered particularly violent encounters are significantly more likely to demand support compared to non-victims (see panel (b)). In contrast, victims of non-violent crime are not significantly different from non-victims. The findings on severity of crime, thus, correspond with our theoretical expectations regarding specific needs that (certain) victimization experiences create, particularly when related to the violent organized crime activity that permeates in LAC.[104]



Figure 5. Predicted probabilities for crime experience (violent, nonviolent, non-victims) and DV1 and DV2 (LAPOP 2010, 2012).
Source: Authors' elaboration.

In addition, interviews with Mexican public officials at CEAV help us deepen our understanding of the type of benefits and services that victims demand when they turn to the state.[105] As noted, consistent with the above results, health is the most prominent and frequent social service provided by the Commission to all victims. Beyond health, these interviews revealed further needs that victims and their families face. First, since many services require traveling to Mexico City to follow up and review their cases at the national prosecutor's office, many victims and their relatives demand economic support for transportation, lodging and food during such trips. Also, depending on the type of victimization and subsequent needs, direct and indirect victims may receive financial support for housing —such is the case of victims of forced displacement, for

example. For the specific case of disappearances, indirect victims inevitably have a permanent need until their missing relative is found and therefore receive a permanent economic support for room and board, in addition to scholarships for their children. While these services do little to effectively repair the damage that the crime has caused, as noted by one of CEAV's officials, in the face of prevalent impunity, "given the lack of legal justice, there should at least be social justice."[106] Hence, although the state may have failed victims by not guaranteeing their safety and victims may consequently be skeptical of the state's capacity, they are vocal in demanding welfare services that will at least help them continue their search for justice, which becomes their main priority. While this evidence is limited and is not intended to be conclusive, it does help substantiate our argument regarding the needs that victims face and which translate into demands for the welfare state.

Discussion

The analysis of individual preferences on social policy reveals that criminal violence leaves its mark. Our evidence, however, points to two different directions. Individuals who become victims of crime are supportive of the welfare state and public healthcare in particular. In the face of rising risks, victimization increases the state's mandate among individuals to improve welfare policies. In contrast, perceptions of insecurity reduce such demand for public policies, particularly among those with significantly contrasting views regarding their neighborhood's (un)safety. Several mechanisms may be at work: increasing disapproval of the state's performance in the provision of security, rising skepticism of the government's capacity to control crime, or decreasing trust in the capabilities of the state to govern effectively. Looking at the joint effect of victimization and

insecurity perception, experiences with crime seem to cancel out the negative effect of 'mere' perception.

The empirical support for the victimization hypothesis potentially speaks of a mechanism in which policy support is generated through personal needs based on a change of circumstances. Our findings thereby contribute to the literature that has identified the personal experience of economic risk as a strong driver for redistributive preferences.[107] When experiencing job loss and a period of unemployment, individuals tend to support public welfare policies at a higher rate.[108] The experience of crime might be similar to other egotropic perceptions. In contrast, perception of insecurity speaks to a less personalized evaluation of circumstances. Feeling insecure might spur dissatisfaction with the performance of the state, as perceiving a virtual risk of crime and violence exposes the failure of the state to provide public security. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data and the obvious limitations regarding randomization of crime, we cannot test the mechanism that drives the two different responses to crime.

It is also important to note that our argument and findings speak to the specific characteristics of LAC, where violence has been characterized by the rising violent activity of organized crime and the implications that it carries for perceptions regarding the state. This is likely to contrast with the settings in which other works, both in Europe and other developing countries, have studied the relationship between demand for redistribution and crime. Experiences with crime and violence diverge from one region to another in terms of nature, actors involved, as well as the state's capacity to address such phenomena. Such diverging characteristics are also likely to have different implications for the welfare state in other regions.

Conclusion

In addressing the phenomenon of growing rates of violence and crime in LAC, scholarly work has revealed how a violent context can have deep attitudinal effects. Building on these insights, our study examines how crime and violence influence individual preferences on public policies. This question is relevant because investing in social policies, such as improved school enrollment rates that reduce the risk of unemployment or public healthcare that grants access to these services for all, has the potential to reduce violence and crime in the long run. Also, tackling the problem of crime through the means of the welfare state is therefore an alternative to iron fist policies, which are favorably promoted by political candidates who campaign on the crime issue.

Our theoretical contribution is twofold: we move beyond the prevalent analysis between the effects of crime on citizen demand for iron fist security policies and incorporate a dimension of policy that can be as important for preventing and addressing crime, that is, welfare provision. Second, we show that a limited focus on perceptions of insecurity or victimization does not take us far enough to fully understand the impact of violence on citizens' attitudes. While crime victimization increases support for public welfare and healthcare, insecurity perception reduces the likelihood to be favorable toward the welfare state. When both factors overlap and victims also perceive surrounding insecurity, support for welfare policies remains stable, pointing to a qualitative difference between actual experience and diffuse risk perception.

Our findings on victims also contribute to the incipient political science literature on the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of crime victimization. Victims can become more socially engaged[109] while also withdrawing from electoral politics[110] and political institutions.[111] Such departure from the political sphere in response to diminishing institutional trust is reasonable, but when it comes to social policy preferences, withdrawal is less likely. As shown here, crime victimization creates real costs and needs for which private options may be limited or insufficient.

Since insecurity perception is, however, more widespread than actual victimization, our findings suggest that increasing crime rates might put welfare state development at stake in the long run. When evaluations of public safety are flawed, respondents have a lower likelihood to

demand public welfare provision. If such evaluations influence vote choice, insecurity perceptions can boost economically conservative candidates into office so that a retrenchment of the already limited welfare programs is ushered in. Perceptions are, thereby, likely to be an important suppressing factor that hinders much needed public goods provision. Of course, one could question how much preferences matter for welfare state development, but scholars have shown that preferences can be very decisive in shaping vote choices and policies.[112]

Finally, this paper helps us point to potentially fruitful strands of future research. We elaborate on different mechanisms that link crime and social policy preferences. We propose that what drives victims of crime to the mandate of social policies is the increase of economic and health hardships due to the experience with crime. However, further research is needed to substantiate this mechanism and explore other intervening variables that may mediate the relationship between the victimization experience and views on the state, such as income or type of crime. The negative effect of insecurity perception on social policy preferences seems most likely to result from a simultaneous decrease of trust in public institutions and in governmental capabilities to carry out public policies given a perceived security policy failure. Testing the mechanism behind such negative impact should therefore also be at the core of future research on the crime-welfare state nexus. In addition, these findings should also push us to explore the role and distribution of welfare alternatives that citizens living amid criminal violence and victims, in particular, rely on within their private spheres of interaction, when facing the negative economic and social consequences of crime.

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Notes

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[73] Application forms are available at https://www.gob.mx/ceav

[74] Descriptive statistics of our sample can be found in Table A in the Supplementary Material. The subsequent 2014 and 2016 LAPOP surveys do not include the main items we use as our dependent variables (ROS2 and ROS6).

[75] Our sample includes: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and Suriname. Each national sample has approximately 1,500 individuals. Since the LAPOP increased the set of countries year after year, only the final wave contains all 24 countries while previous waves have a minimum of 18.

[76] Carnes and Mares, "Explaining the "Return of the State" in Middle Income Countries: Employment Vulnerability, Income, and Preferences for Social Protection in Latin America."

[77] As robustness test we also run the same model on the item ROS4 which is used by Dion and Birchfield, as well as by Morgan and Kelly, to operationalize support for redistribution. The estimation results corroborate our findings and are reported in Table S2 and Figure S1 in the Supplementary Material. See: Dion and Birchfield, "Economic development, income inequality, and preferences for redistribution"; Morgan and Kelly, "Social Patterns of Inequality, Partisan Competition, and Latin American Support for Redistribution."

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[79] Since the distance between the categories might vary, we also test an ordered probit model and our results are robust to this model specification (see Table S5 in the Supplementary Material). See: J. Scott. Long, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997).

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[82] As Brooks and Ulriksen emphasize, the items represent "easy" instead of "hard" questions on social policy preferences, as they do not remind the respondent about the potential costs involved with expanding social benefits. But when expressing high consent with the item while no explicit costs are mentioned, we would expect this to lower our chances of finding any significant effect. On the contrary, even in this scenario of "free" redistribution, perceptions of insecurity are driving down demand and we find a clear contrasting effect in the case of victimization as discussed below. Sarah Brooks and Marianne Ulriksen. "Can Support for Redistribution Be Maintained in High-Crime Societies?" (Working Paper, Ohio State University, 2019).

[83] A country level evaluation of insecurity is, unfortunately, not inquired in LAPOP. To capture such a dimension, we factor in the homicide rate in Table S6 in the Supplementary Material.

[84] Michael Mackuen and Courtney Brown, "Political Context and Attitude Change," *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 2 (1987): 471–490. 2.

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[86] Josine Junger-Tas and Ineke Haen Marshall, "The self-report methodology in crime research," *Crime and Justice* 25 (1999): 291–367.

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[88] Skogan, "The Fear of Crime and Its Behavioural Implications"; Hicks and Brown, "Perceptions of Risk: A Review of the Effects of Individual and Community-Level Variables on Perceptions of Risk."

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[90] Holland and Schneider, "Easy and Hard Redistribution: The Political Economy of Welfare States in Latin America"; Holland, "Diminished Expectations: Redistributive Preferences in Truncated Welfare States."

[91] We also study the effect of objective levels of violence at the national level by using the homicide rate with a hierarchical model (see Table S6 in the Supplementary Material) but do not find an effect.

[92] Dion and Birchfield, "Economic development, income inequality, and preferences for redistribution"; Morgan and Kelly, "Social Patterns of Inequality, Partisan Competition, and Latin American Support for Redistribution."

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[94] Nevertheless, as previous work has emphasized the importance of social trust (see: Scholz, "Trust, taxes, and compliance") and group homogeneity (see: Morgan and Kelly, "Social Patterns of Inequality, Partisan Competition, and Latin American Support for Redistribution") we add controls for individual trust and ethnicity in additional robustness tests. Moreover, drawing upon the insights on the impact of religiosity on redistributive preferences we factor in religion. This variable is relevant for the Latin American case, where the church has played an important role for victims of crime and violence (see: Sandra Ley, "Participation in High-Risk

Activism: Protesting Amid Violence" (Paper presented at the 2016 "Latin American Studies Association Conference," New York, NY, May 25-29)). The intervening role of churches after experiencing violence, as first providers of welfare, is important to consider as the action of the church might decrease needs-based welfare preferences that are otherwise directed toward the state. Therefore, we include church attendance to measure this dimension (ranging from 1-respondent never attends church to 4-attends more than once a week). Our main findings remain substantively unchanged by these specifications (see Table E in the Supplementary Material).

[95] Table S6 in the Supplementary Material illustrates a hierarchical three-level model replication of our main model specification, adding macro level variables for income inequality, homicide rate, and the size of the informal sector. Our main findings for victimization and insecurity perception remain substantially unchanged.

[96] The findings are also robust to a linear specification of the estimation, see Table S3 and S4 below and in the Supplementary Material.

[97] See Morgan and Kelly, "Social Patterns of Inequality, Partisan Competition, and Latin American Support for Redistribution."

[98] The magnitude of the effects we estimate is also comparable to the size of the effects in other recent works analyzing welfare preferences using survey data (e. g. Rueda and Stegmueller, "The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe."; Morgan and Kelly, "Social Patterns of Inequality, Partisan Competition, and Latin American Support for Redistribution"; Holland, "Diminished Expectations: Redistributive Preferences in Truncated Welfare States.").

[99] Rueda and Stegmueller, "The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe."

[100] Flores-Macías and Sánchez-Talanquer, "Building the Modern State in Developing Countries: Understanding the Relationship between Security and Taxes with Evidence from Mexico."

[101] An argument that could be made against our findings and logic is that those who demand more from the state amid violence are more likely to become victimized. This could occur, for example, through victims' participation in protests (Sarah M. Brooks, "Insecure Democracy: Risk and Political Participation in Brazil." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 4 (2014): 972–985), where citizens go to the streets to express demand for better social protection and through such exposure have a higher propensity to become victimized. However, LAPOP survey data reveals that *only* 13.05% of victims participate in protests. In addition, articulating demands does not automatically translate into risks in all cases, but may depend on the density of networks that surround the individual (Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Enrique D. Arias, "Faith in our Neighbors: Networks and Social Order in three Brazilian Favelas." *Latin American Politics and Society* 46, no. 1 (2004): 1–38; Ley, "Participation in High-Risk Activism: Protesting Amid Violence."). Therefore, it is unlikely that social demands could be driving victimization. Other types of actions for collective demands, such as community meetings, would be even less likely to have such reverse effect as they are less visible and would entail lower risks.

[102] Although victims are more likely to perceive their neighborhood as insecure, only 19.3% of all crime victims chose the category 'unsafe' when responding to the insecurity question. Victims of crime either feel somewhat safe (35.2%) or somewhat unsafe (33.9%). For a cross-table see Table D in the Supplementary Material).

[103] See: Berens and Dallendörfer, "Apathy or Anger? How Crime Experience Affects Individual Vote Intention in Latin America and the Caribbean."
[104] The estimation table is reported in the Supplementary Material in Table S7.
[105] As part of a larger research project, we are currently in the process of collecting data of the types of requests CEAV receives and services it is able to provide.
[106] Anonymous interview with CEAV official on August 16, 2018 in Mexico City.
[107] Yotam Margalit, "Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (2013): 80–103.
[108] See also Carnes and Mares, "Explaining the "Return of the State" in Middle Income Countries: Employment Vulnerability, Income, and Preferences for Social Protection in Latin America."
[109] Bateson, "Crime Victimization and Political Participation."
[110] Ley, "To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral Participation."
[111] Carreras, "The Impact of Criminal Violence on Regime Legitimacy in Latin America."
[112] Brooks and Manza, *Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies*; Rehm, "Social Policy by Popular Demand"; Rueda and Stegmueller, "The Externalities of Inequality: Fear of Crime and Preferences for Redistribution in Western Europe."

Author Biographies

Melina Altamirano (maltamirano@colmex.mx) is an Assistant Professor at the Center for International Studies at El Colegio de México (Colmex) in Mexico City. Her research focuses on the political implications of economic vulnerability and the sources of public support for social policy in Latin America. Her most recent work was published in *Latin American Politics and Society.*

Sarah Berens (sarah.berens@uibk.ac.at) is an Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Innsbruck. Her research focuses on the micro foundation of labor informality, social policy, taxation and the behavioral impacts of crime experience in low- and middle-income countries. Her latest work has been published in *Socio-Economic Review*, *Political Behavior*, and *Political Studies*.

Sandra Ley (sandra.ley@cide.edu) is an Assistant Professor at the Political Studies Division at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City. Her research

addresses the political and behavioral consequences of criminal violence and has appeared in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and *Latin American Politics and Society*.