

First supervisor: Irmgard Maassen

Second Supervisor: Dr. Karin Esders

Date of submission: 15 September 2020

AM Module

Bachelor's Thesis in English-Speaking Cultures (Major)

A Media Frame Analysis of Xeno-Racism after Brexit

Ella Rebecca Fruchtman

Student number: 4325946

‘One of every two’

Four hours

One of every two.

I step onto the bus more warily today. I keep my head down. I feel my heart beating double-time in my chest.

One of every two, one of every two.

I look for an unoccupied pair of seats. Sitting next to someone today seems risky, somehow. I feel exposed, vulnerable. My scarf feels like a too-bold thing, today.

One of every two, one of every two.

I catch myself doing it over and over. If I do not stop, I will go mad. I will not be able to leave the house. I will fold up and inwards and never straighten out. Always counting, counting.

One of two, one of two.

Despite myself, I look at faces and try to work it out. I hear snippets of conversations and my body springs tight in anticipation. I am still counting.

One of two, one of two.

I try a hesitant smile at someone. If they smile back, or if they do not, then I will know. They do not smile back. But I do not know. Today is not a day for smiles.

One of two, one of two.

All day I go about in this kind of paranoid, nightmarish stupor. The victorious side seems to leer with triumph on television, the defeated seem shell-shocked and scared for what the future holds. And everywhere I go in Southampton today, a city that voted 54% for Leave, I keep grouping people into lots of two, trying to work out which of them voted that way.

One of every two. (Nazneen Ahmed qtd. in Gill and Ahmed 49)

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Racism and Xeno-Racism Theory.....	4
2.1 Hate Crime, ‘Bad Apples’ and Islamophobia.....	4
2.2 Racism and Xeno-Racism	5
2.3 Interim Conclusion	8
3. The Influence of Media and Frame Analysis	8
3.1 Importance of Media	8
3.2 Frame Analysis	9
3.3 Interim Conclusion	11
4. Methodology	11
4.1 Corpus.....	11
4.2 Media Frames: Frame Analysis	12
4.3 Interim Conclusion	13
5. Analysis	13
5.1 Themes.....	14
5.2 Heuristic Analysis.....	15
5.3 Fine Analysis: Guardian	16
5.3.1 Primary Frame	16
5.3.2 Secondary Frame: Structural Xeno-Racism Frame	17
5.3.3 Secondary Frame: Press Responsibility Frame.....	19
5.4 Fine Analysis: Telegraph.....	19
5.4.1 Primary Frame	19
5.4.2 Secondary Frame	21
5.5 Interim Conclusion	22
6. Discussion	23
7. Academic Contextualization of Frames	25
7.1 Academic Context to the <i>Brexit</i> and the <i>Press Responsibility Frame</i>	26
7.2 Academic Context to the <i>Structural Xeno-Racism Frame</i> and the <i>Bad Apple Frame</i> ...	27
8. Concluding Remarks and Outlook	30
9. Bibliography	31

1. Introduction

“Police log fivefold rise in race-hate complaints since Brexit result” (Parveen and Sherwood) – headlines like this one taken from the Guardian could be found in almost every newspaper after the Brexit referendum. On 23 June 2016 the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union by 52 per cent (Edgington). Afterwards, there was a clear increase in violence against people who were perceived as ‘the other’. For an initial overview, this paper will rely on official data given in the report on hate crimes published by the Home Office and reports by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. In the years 2015 and 16, the UK saw a 19 per cent increase in hate crimes, of which 79 per cent were motivated by ‘race’¹ (Corcoran and Smith 1). Between June 16 and 30, 2016, the police reported a 42 per cent increase in hate crimes compared to the same period in previous year. The numbers peaked on June 25 and slowly began to decrease after. On June 25, 289 offences were reported (“Hate crime undermines“). Such offences are called *xeno-racist* in this paper. The term describes discrimination that resembles racism in that it seeks to segregate and expel people in order to preserve “‘our people’, our way of life, our standard of living, our ‘race’”, yet it is not colour-coded (Sivanandan 2). In this paper, all xeno-racist incidents are understood as violent acts, whether they caused physical harm or not. *Violence* therefore refers to physical as well as psychological violence.

This paper asks: How is the increase of xeno-racist violence following the Brexit referendum framed? How is it made sense of in newspapers? And: Are there differences in the framing of xeno-racist violence in the examined newspapers? What are the consequences of employing different frames? The aim of this paper, in answering the research questions, is to examine how xeno-racism is portrayed and made sense of in public discourse. The increase of violence after the referendum can be seen as a historic ‘event’. Framings of this ‘event’ came from the media, as well as politicians, high police officials, regular people, activists and researchers. Put simply, people tried to understand make sense of what happened. And they did so in rather different ways. As it would exceed the scope of this paper to analyse the framing of violence by all different channels mentioned above, this analysis will focus on news outlets and research on the topic. This appears fruitful and important as mass media help

¹ This paper mostly refrains from using the term ‘race’. If the term is used, it refers to political and social categories, made real through racism and xeno-racism (Leach 432). Alina Rzepnikowska argues that ‘race’ is not inherent in the victim, rather that it is the racialisation of groups of people that builds the basis for discrimination (64).

us to “interpret and make sense of information” (Happer and Philo 322). In order to answer the research questions, eight articles from two ideologically different papers, the Guardian and the Telegraph, are examined through the lens of frame analysis. This paper’s thesis is that in their framing of xeno-racist violence, the analysed newspapers fail to fully contextualise the violence within structural xeno-racism.

Based on the Institute of Race Relation’s (IRR) database of post Brexit xeno-racist incidents, Jon Burnett offers an overview of 134 cases between 24 June and 23 July, 2016 (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 21). According to this data, victims were primarily Muslims and Eastern Europeans (4). Another report by the IRR lists people of non European Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic backgrounds as the largest group targeted, making up 31 per cent of reported incidents.² The author convincingly summarises, “it is clear that post-referendum racism and xenophobia was aimed at anyone who was perceived to be ‘foreign’/ ‘other’” (Komaromi 5). Burnett’s data also includes information about the form of violence, which ranged from xeno-racist vandalism, including graffiti, to arson and physical abuse, including stabbings (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 22). One widely discussed example are the laminated cards reading “No more Polish Vermin”, posted through letterboxes (Rzepnikowska 61). According to Burnett’s analysis, the perpetrators were mostly “of a white British background” (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 23).

Regarding the primary texts in the field of xeno-racism and violence, the abovementioned paper by Burnett is one of the principal sources for this paper. Aside from offering a thorough analysis of xeno-racist incidents after the referendum, Burnett places them in the structural context of state racism and the media. He provides evidence linking the violence to government policy slogans and criticises politicians and the media in their reactions to and portrayal of racist violence (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 8). The Institute of Race Relations, which published the study, is an important institution for anti-racism in the UK. Xeno-racism is a crucial piece of theoretical infrastructure for this paper. The term was coined by A. Sivanandan, former director of the IRR. This paper further relies on Liz Fekete, now director of the IRR, who elaborated on this term. The metaphor of the ‘bad apple’ gave name to the *Bad Apple Frame* analysed in this paper. Understanding racists as ‘bad apples’ entails the “individualisation of wrongdoing”, as David Theo Goldberg puts it (1715). Goldberg is essential, as he offers a definition of racism in the context of the denial of structural oppression (1713). Maya Goodfellow, a British author and academic, refers to

² The percentages vary depending on how victims were grouped, for example according to religion or their country of origin.

Goldberg and calls the usage of the ‘bad apple’ metaphor a major problem. Goodfellow also offers a contextualization regarding the violence after the referendum and elaborates on the current state of racism in the UK (“Race and Racism in the UK” 151). The frame analysis applied in this paper is based on Jenny Kitzinger, Tim Kuypers and Robert Entman. Both Kuypers and Kitzinger refer to the effective definitions of Entman in their works, especially to his elaborations on the four functions of frames (Kitzinger 136; Kuypers 191). Kitzinger is essential for this paper, as she focuses on frame analysis applied in media studies and presents useful instructions for its application to news articles (134). Kuypers also offers practical advice on how to apply comparative frame analysis, arguing that “[o]ften the best way to detect [frames] is to examine more than a single news story” (185).

This paper begins by presenting the necessary theoretical background, firstly of racism and xeno-racism theory, then of the concept of frame analysis. Racism and xeno-racism are defined with a focus on structural dimensions and terms such as ‘hate crime’ later inform the analysis. Frame analysis is considered from a theoretical perspective and a justification for this paper’s focus on media texts is given. Chapter 3, Methodology, contains a presentation of this paper’s corpus, disclosing how data was collected and explaining how frame analysis is implemented in the analysis. The analysis follows in chapter 5. After presenting the themes found in the eight articles, a first heuristic analysis provides the four frames that are further defined in the following fine analysis: *The Brexit Frame*, the *Bad Apple Frame*, the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Press Responsibility Frame*. The detailed definition in the fine analysis includes each frame’s cues – keywords pointing to the usage of a particular frame – as well as the structure. The discussion in chapter 6 summarises and interprets the findings from the analysis. Lastly, those findings, namely the frames and their employment, are contextualised as well as criticised through an academic lens in chapter 7.

Xeno-racist violence is a problem that neither began before nor ended after time span discussed in this paper. To highlight the intense impact this moment had, Nazneen Ahmed’s poem, which reflects “on the current state of uncertainty” was chosen to preface this paper (Gill and Ahmed 48). How newspapers frame xeno-racist violence has an impact on how it is understood and discussed in society. How xeno-racism in general and violent incidents specifically are spoken about and what solutions are discussed can have an influence on the lives of People of Colour in the UK. To understand and evaluate how this framing is done in the Guardian and the Telegraph is the aim of this paper.

2. Racism and Xeno-Racism Theory

This chapter is the basis for the analysis of frames in chapter 5 as it provides the necessary substantial categories. The field of racism theory is an enormous one. As described in detail in the introduction, various groups of people were targeted after the referendum. What these different groups of people have in common is the perpetrator's perception that they 'do not belong'. Many sources speak of 'racism', others of 'xenophobia' or xeno-racism. This chapter focuses on offering definitions of the necessary terms. It should be mentioned that this paper refrains from using the term *xenophobia*, briefly defined by the IRR as "a fear or hatred of foreigners" („Definitions"). Fekete importantly adds that xenophobia is sometimes understood as a "*natural*' fear of strangers" (Fekete 23; emphasis added).

2.1 Hate Crime, 'Bad Apples' and Islamophobia

The IRR defines a *hate crime* as "any criminal offence committed against a person or property that is motivated by hostility towards someone based on any aspect of their identity" ("Racial Violence Statistics"). 'Race', ethnicity and nationality form one of the strands of hate crimes monitored by the UK ("Racial Violence Statistics"). A. Sivanandan argues that the focus on the criminal act itself leads to a reduction of "racial violence, a socially-based issue, to individualised 'hate crime'" (qtd. in Burnett, "Racial Violence and the Brexit State" 2). The term *hate crime* is closely linked to the individualisation of xeno-racism, focussing the debate on "individual attitudes" rather than on structural discrimination (Khan and Shaheen 6). Burnett explains that whenever racial violence is understood as a "manifestation of 'hate crime'" the causes are found "within the individual pathology of offenders" ("Racial Violence: Facing Reality" 6). As this is contradictory to the understanding of xeno-racism in this paper, the term *hate crime* will not be used. The usage of the term is understood as a cue, signalling an understanding of xeno-racism as a problem of individuals.

According to Goldberg, the metaphor of the 'bad apple' critically refers to the "individualisation of wrongdoing" (1715). Discussing the metaphor in the UK context, Goodfellow explains "racism is [...] understood as the act of an individual person" ("Race and Racism in the UK" 151). There are similarities to the discussion on the term *hate crime*. Consequences of this understanding of xeno-racism are grave – Goldberg argues that it "erases institutional racisms as a conceptual possibility" (1715) and Goodfellow categorises this understanding as "one of the main problems with how 'race' and racism are understood in

the UK” (“Race and Racism in the UK” 151). Interestingly, when this metaphor is applied, the person seen as the ‘bad apple’ is marginalised as well (Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 17). They are often presented as “isolated, ill-adapted individuals motivated by personal prejudice and hate” (Burnett, “Racial Violence: Facing Reality” 2). In her study, Rzepnikowska further elaborates on this marginalisation through interviews. She explains “[t]he discourses about the British white working class and immigration often homogenise this group and contribute to the assumption that white working class people are inherently racist” (66). Rzepnikowska finds that the participants described ‘the racists’ as poor and uneducated (70), drawing on a social type which defines them as a “council estate dwelling, single-parenting, low-achieving, rottweiler-owning cultural minority, whose poverty, it is hinted, might be the result of their own poor choices” (Bottero qt. in Rzepnikowska 69). A paper published by the Runnymede Trust on reframing racism in the UK mirrors this depiction and states that “[r]acism has been framed as something marginal to British society, and linked only to illiberal or violent views. On this popular account the people that hold racist views are ignorant, from far right parties and working class” (Runnymede 4). While the metaphor cannot be used as a literal cue – its rarely being used word-for-word – the fine analysis in chapter 5.4.2 examines the referral to and employment of the ‘bad apple’ metaphor through the *Bad Apple Frame*.

In a paper on islamophobia published by the Runnymede Trust, anti-Muslim racism and islamophobia are defined as follows: “[A]ny distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (Elahi and Khan 1). This paper will not use the terms islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism, as neither can incorporate the entire group of victims of violence after the 2016 referendum. However, two thirds of this violence were motivated by anti-Muslim racism (Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 8). It is therefore necessary to explicitly name this form of discrimination as a reminder that while not referring to the entirety of cases, it does refer to a large part of them.

2.2 Racism and Xeno-Racism

The IRR defines racism to be “the belief or ideology that ‘races’ have distinctive characteristics which gives some superiority over others. [Racism] also refers to discriminatory and abusive behaviour based on such a belief or ideology” (“Definitions”).

Goldberg defines it “as modes of racially driven subjection and exclusion, debilitation and humiliation, preference satisfaction and privilege expansion” (1713). There are, however, further important aspects for the definition of racism and xeno-racism – both for this paper and in a more general sense.

There have been many efforts to define racism, one of the shortest does not even require a full sentence: Racism = racialising prejudice + structural power (Sow 85). These few words include what cannot be excluded: That racism is not merely a problem of the individual, but relies on a global system of inequality and power. Philomena Essed amplifies the importance of such a global system, arguing that “[t]he term individual racism is a contradiction in itself because racism is by definition the expression or activation of group power” (Essed 37). The terms *systemic*, *structural* and *institutional* racism are often used interchangeably. Systemic and structural racism refer to a global system, “in which public policies, institutional practices, cultural representations, and other norms work in various, often reinforcing ways to perpetuate racial group inequity” (“Racial Equity”). Institutional racism, then, can be understood as a part of this system, applicable to specific institutions, which “intentionally or not, produce outcomes that chronically favor, or put a racial group at a disadvantage” (“Racial Equity”). This for example includes the criminal justice system or the system of higher education. The term *institutional racism* was coined in the United States of America by Charles Hamilton and Kwame Ture and initially defined as “acts by the total white community against the black community” (Ture and Hamilton 2). Structural aspects of racism are often less acknowledged or even denied, as Sian adds in her study on racism in Universities in the UK (Sian 5). Goldberg explains: “The individualization of wrongdoing, its localization as a personal and so private expression of preferences, erases institutional racisms as a conceptual possibility” (Goldberg 1715). In regard to structural and institutional racism in the UK (and its denial), it seems important to mention the Macpherson Report. After the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence and the apparently corrupted police investigation of the case, Sir William Macpherson lead a study on institutional racism in the UK (Booth). The conclusion of his study, that the investigation was institutionally corrupt, “appeared to mark an unprecedented moment in British race history where racism was named not merely as an act related to individual prejudice but as something that was linked to the structuration of the state” (Kapoor 1033). Yet the report is criticised for shaping this reality as merely a failure, almost accidental (Kapoor 1033). It lacked recognition of the activeness it took and takes to continually create such a system of privilege and oppression (Goodfellow, “‘Race’ and Racism in the UK” 152). This aspect of actively created structural racism is important for any

definition of racism. Violence such as was inflicted after the referendum cannot be understood without the context of structural and institutional racism, as highlighted by Benson and Lewis in regard to their study on the experience of everyday racism by British People of Colour living elsewhere in Europe (2223).

There is some agreement among researchers from different parts of the world that racism changed in the second half of the last century, in that racist expression came to rely more on alleged cultural characteristics than alleged biological differences (Leach 440). Etienne Balibar speaks of a “racism without race”, which centres unchangeable cultural differences (28). These differences lead to struggles when cultures ‘mix’ – within this ideology such struggles are a ‘natural’ result and the differences are used to justify racist behaviour and structures (30). While this form of racism might have become more prevailing, many authors point out that the idea of ‘cultural differences’ itself is not new and has always been part of racist ideology (Balibar 32; Leach 434). Adding the important aspect of language, Goldberg argues that racism without ‘race’ to some extent makes ethnoracial language unnecessary, as new signs are found to signal the same exclusion (1713).

Making sense of racism within the system of global capitalism, Sivanandan coined the term xeno-racism in regard to British and European migration policy:

[T]he other side of the coin of ‘the fear of strangers’ is the defence and preservation of ‘our people’, our way of life, our standard of living, our ‘race’. If it is xenophobia, it is – in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them – a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism, except that it is not colour-coded. [...] It is racism in substance and xeno in form [...]. It is xeno-racism. (Sivanandan 2)

In “The Emergence of Xeno-Racism”, Fekete builds on Sivanandan’s argument of poverty being the new common denominator for this form of discrimination (23). Regarding the emergence of xeno-racism, Fekete also points to state level actions by the UK and Europe, including separating migrants and refugees into categories such as ‘useful’ or not – criminalising the latter and blocking legal routes into the country (24). For an effective definition of xeno-racism, it is important to include the aspect of structural discrimination. Most must be adopted from the extensive work done regarding structural racism, as summarised above, some specific aspects, like the classification of migrants according to their alleged ‘usefulness’, can be added. The relatively new term of *xeno-racism* is highly fitting when describing the post-ref violence, as the common denominator is the perpetrator’s perception of his*her victims being ‘foreign’. In addition, a large part of the verbal abuse expresses the wish to “expel” people, to get them out of the country (Burnett, “Racial

Violence and the Brexit State” 7). In Rzepnikowska’s study on discrimination experienced by Polish people in the UK before and after the referendum, the author refers to the term *xeno-racism* (63). Rzepnikowska argues that simply using the term *xenophobia* would neglect the racialisation experienced by Polish migrants in the UK and imply their whiteness. Convincingly, Rzepnikowska argues that race is not inherent in the victim, rather that it is the racialisation of groups of people that builds the basis for discrimination. She then adopts Sivanandan’s definition of *xeno-racism* (64). It is also important that xeno-racism – in contrast to racism – is not necessarily colour-coded. As discussed before, victims might have been racialised by their perpetrators, but not all victims can be described as Black.

2.3 Interim Conclusion

The previous chapter offered an introduction to this paper’s understanding of racism, xeno-racism and the associated terminology, which will enable the analysis and discussion. Essential terms were not only defined, but analysed in regard to their implications. The terms *hate crime*, as well as *racism* are, for example, used as a cue in the analysis in chapter 5. The relied upon definitions of racism and xeno-racism decidedly do not view discrimination as a problem of morally corrupt individuals but instead highlight the importance of structural and institutional aspects of discrimination. This provides the basis for an evaluation of the framing and therefore contextualization of violence by newspapers in the discussion in chapter 6. Chapter 3 offers a justification for this paper’s use of online news articles as well as a theoretical basis for frame analysis.

3. The Influence of Media and Frame Analysis

The focus of this paper on online news articles as its primary source is based on the presumption that their framing is highly influential in shaping public opinion. The first subchapter elaborates on this influence of the media and online news, while the second offers an introduction to the theoretical foundation of frame analysis.

3.1 Importance of Media

As discussed before, an ‘event’ like the outbreak of xeno-racist violence after the 2016 referendum will prompt reactions from a variety of channels, for example politicians or governments, newspapers and civilians. Chapter 5 includes an analysis of how the violence is

framed specifically in online news articles by two different newspapers, whose framing can be presumed to influence public opinion and discourse. First, it should be noted that the purpose of mass media in general is “to interpret and make sense of information for the public” (Happer and Philo 322). Given the mass media’s influence on what is (or is not) discussed by the public, the analysis of media content is “a prime concern” (322). In their introduction to critical media studies, the authors Brian Ott and Robert L. Mack frame mass media as the storyteller of our world and consider their storytelling a fruitful field of study because it has become “the very basis of our cultural environment.” They even compare mass media to the church regarding its influence on cultural values (11). In a less general way, Sean Carey and Jonathan Burton specifically examine the effects of messages by the media regarding public opinion of the European Union in the UK (623). While proving such an effect, they also state that other influences, like identification with a political party, have an even greater impact. Still, media messages are pronounced to be significantly influential (624).

This paper cannot analyse ‘the media’. Its much more narrow focus will be on news reports from two papers, the Guardian and the Telegraph. In her study on gendered discourses Lia Litosseliti argues newspapers to be “a prime public site [...] for constructing values and ideologies” and therefore suitable for analysis (136). Online news are an ever expanding and highly influential segment of the media. According to a 2019 study by Ofcom, news are increasingly consumed online, while the consumption of printed newspapers is decreasing. In 2019, two thirds of the adult population in the UK used the Internet as their main platform for news consumption, a number only surpassed by television news (Ofcom 13). Elizabeth Jenkins and Glen Stamp argue “understanding public opinion through the vantage point of the media, specifically online news sources, carries merit [...]” (2). Their work aims at understanding the influence of online news on the perception of teenage sexting. While this paper does not look at public opinion directly, it does, however, base its justification for using online news on this medium’s importance in shaping public opinion. One way in which media texts can have an influence on their readers, is through framing.

3.2 Frame Analysis

The fifth chapter contains a frame analysis as Entman, Kitzinger and Kuypers define it. Erving Goffman is credited with popularising *frames* as a cognitive concept in 1974. In his definition, frames “allow us to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’ the diverse phenomena we encounter through the course of our lives” (Kitzinger 135). Explaining frames, Kuypers

begins with a simple metaphor: “If you have ever had a picture framed, you know that the frame you chose emphasized some elements of the picture at the expense of others. Similarly, if you were to reframe the picture, you would notice that the very elements previously emphasized [...] would subsequently be de-emphasized by the new frame. Instead, a different combination of elements would be highlighted” (Kuypers 181). Regarding cultural studies frames are considered to have a cognitive effect, guiding the way a topic is understood (Kitzinger 135). Frames are therefore lenses through which themes can be viewed and, more importantly, portrayed – for example by journalists. Entman adds that frames “are defined by what they omit as well as include” (54). According to Kitzinger, “framing refers to the process whereby we organize reality – categorizing events in particular ways, paying attention to some aspects rather than others, deciding what an experience or event means or how it came about” (134).

Frames, as can be found in speech and text, have four functions, through which they can be defined. The first is to define the problem. Secondly, frames give the causes creating a problem and they can, thirdly, offer moral judgements on the subject. Lastly, connected to the first three functions, they suggest or imply remedies for the problem (Entman 52; Kitzinger 139; Kuypers 190). These functions are not always equally apparent (Kitzinger 134). Importantly, Kitzinger adds “the whole frame does not have to be spelt out in every detail in order to invite readers/viewers to recognize and place the issue within that frame” (141). The cognitive process of activating a frame works through cues. Cues can be various aspects of a text that point to a particular frame (140). Kitzinger gives many examples of potential cues, including labels used in a text, similes and metaphors and the use of emotional language (141). Who is cited in an article can also hint at a frame and therefore be a cue (142). Regarding framing by newspapers, Kitzinger explains that “a newspaper report cannot tell the reader everything. Journalists frame a story by selecting the ‘relevant’ facts and placing an event in what they consider to be the appropriate context” (134). In order to detect frames, frame analysis can be employed. Kitzinger calls the concept “an extremely useful way of approaching critical analysis of the media” (135). To employ frame analysis is “to unpick the process through which a frame is presented” (Kitzinger 134). Researchers attempt to detect and define frames in texts through their cues and functions. Entman summarises: “Analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as speech, utterance, news report or novel – to that consciousness” (51). Frame analysis is therefore always, at least in part, audience focussed. Kitzinger concludes that “frame analysis assumes

that frames carry some meaning, or have some impact, or engagement with, the schemata in people's heads or the ideas which circulate within our social networks" (152).

3.3 Interim Conclusion

The first subchapter established the relevance of analysing media texts, specifically newspaper articles through their influence on public opinion. The second subchapter summarised the theoretical foundation of frame analysis. This included a definition of frames as lenses through which themes can be understood, which have a cognitive effect on, for example, the reader of a journalistic article. Frames are also defined regarding their four functions; they define a problem, offer a causal explanation and moral judgements as well as solutions. All this is the theory informing the analysis in chapter 5. A clarification of the exact application of frame analysis can be found in the methodological part of this paper, specifically in chapter 4.2.

4. Methodology

This chapter serves firstly to disclose how data was collected for this paper and to justify the decisions made in the process. Secondly, building on the theoretical basis of frame analysis from the previous chapter, the second subchapter applies this information to offer an overview of the implementation of this method.

4.1 Corpus

Before collecting the data it had to be decided what newspapers to take articles from. The Guardian and the Telegraph were chosen because both are serious and influential newspapers, in print as well as online and because they present different points of view. The Guardian is the most widely read digital newspaper, the Telegraph is within the top five (Ofcom 37). Both papers are popular online – they rank within the top ten news websites in the UK (59). Happer and Philo state that their approach “is based on the assumption that in any controversial area there will be competing ways of explaining events and their history” (322). Examining these different ways of explaining the world, of sensemaking, is the aim of this paper. It is therefore deemed fruitful to investigate and then contrast politically different newspapers: During the campaign, the newspapers presented different positions in regard to Brexit. Analysing 2,378 articles from different newspapers, the Reuters Institute found that the Telegraph published more pro-Leave articles, while the Guardian published more pro-

Remain articles (Levy 16). The readers of the Guardian overwhelmingly voted Remain, almost eighty per cent. Over sixty per cent of the Telegraph readers voted Leave. This means that “[p]apers’ positions [are] broadly in line with readers’ votes” (35).

For the actual data collection for this paper Factiva was used. Factiva is a database offering access to, among other things, newspaper articles. The following criteria were entered into the interface: Respectively, the Telegraph or the Guardian were selected as source and the timeframe was set to include articles published between 23 Jun 2016 and 30 Sep 2016. Furthermore, keywords were used. Articles had to include the word *Brexit* and then either *violence* or *hate crime* or *racist* or *racial* or *racism*. The two searches produced 411 and 443 results for the Telegraph and the Guardian respectively. The results were scanned according to the necessary qualifications for this paper. Firstly, they needed to actually be on the topic of xeno-racial violence. The articles had to employ some sort of framing. It can be argued that everything is framed. Whether a victim, police officials, politicians or bystanders are quoted highlights a certain perspective on the issue. However, short reports under one page that only stated facts were excluded. Finally, the corpus for this paper consists of eight articles, including some marked as opinion pieces, four from each paper.

4.2 Media Frames: Frame Analysis

Kitzinger and Kuypers offer instructions on how to apply the concept of frame analysis. The first step for the researcher is to immerse themselves in the material (Kitzinger 140). Secondly, before attempting to identify the frames used, Kuypers proposes to look at the themes discussed in every article, briefly summarising them. Only then Kuypers examines how these themes are framed (187). The analysis following this chapter begins by listing the themes. This is followed by a heuristic analysis and a broad presentation of the frames found in all eight articles. As Kuypers suggests, the articles from the Guardian and the Telegraph are analysed chronologically (187). After broadly identifying a set of frames, these frames need to be further defined through a detailed identification of their features. Frames can occur in different intensity – there are varying amounts of cues and direct referrals to different frames. The most prominent frame in the newspaper is labelled *primary frame* and frames that are not as present are named *secondary frames*. The fine analysis of these primary and secondary frames includes the basic argumentative structure of the frame, its four functions, as well as the presence or absence of certain keywords or types of language (Entman 52; Kitzinger 141). In the fine analysis, the text is combed through in search of terms that are loaded with meaning. This includes terms that carry theoretical meaning such as *racism* or *hate crime*, as

well as words that can only be read as negative, such as *poison*. Another focus is placed on words that carry emotional meaning. For those articles not classified as opinion pieces, the question of who is cited is of high importance. It should be noted that photographs used in the articles are not analysed. All findings of this fine analysis are presented in tables, which can be found in the first part of the appendix. There are two tables for each frame, one for every paper. Each table contains three columns: The first one gives the number of the article where the cues were found. In the second column keywords and emotional language are collected. The third column contains quotes that point to frames through their argumentative structure. This is the case when it is not single words or terms that carry meaning, but complete sentences. There are then four rows, one for each article. This method for presenting findings is derived from Kitzinger's example analyses (145).

4.3 Interim Conclusion

This chapter firstly illustrated how the eight articles analysed in this paper were selected. Two papers that differ in their stance on Brexit were chosen for the analysis: The Guardian and the Telegraph. Factiva proved to be an effective database for the collection of the material. Secondly, the theoretical elaborations on frame analysis from chapter 3.2 were adapted to serve the purpose of this paper. This will enable the analysis following in the next chapter to identify frames explicitly and implicitly employed in the texts.

5. Analysis

This chapter employs a frame analysis as outlined in chapter 4.2, analysing newspaper articles from two ideologically different papers, the Guardian and the Telegraph. First, a heuristic analysis broadly characterises four frames. In the following fine analysis, the newspapers are treated separately, in subchapters. In each subchapter, then, the primary *Brexit Frame* is analysed first, followed by the secondary frames. These differ between the newspapers. The Guardian employs two secondary frames: The *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Press Responsibility Frame*. The authors publishing in the Telegraph make use of the *Bad Apple Frame* as a secondary frame. The frames are informed by different backgrounds: The *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Bad Apple Frame* rely on the discussions of racism and xeno-racism in the theoretical background in chapter 2. The *Press Responsibility Frame* is informed by the importance of news media, namely their influence on their audience, as portrayed in the second part of the theoretical background.

The *Brexit Frame*, however, requires some further background in regard to the Leave campaign, as some articles argue that the campaign was the dominant reason for the eruption of violence. The two most important campaigns promoting for the UK to leave the EU were Vote Leave and Leave.EU, with Vote Leave being chosen as the official campaign. While Vote Leave highlighted alleged economic gains for the UK, Leave.EU concentrated on the issue of migration and spread more rightwing messages (Savage). Virdee and McGeever argue that one Vote Leave strategy was to evoke feelings in regard to the ‘greatness’ of the former Great Britain, naturally not linking this ‘greatness’ to slavery and colonialism (1805). They describe the nationalism presented by the Leave.EU campaign as more “insular”, constructing migrants as a threat – both economic and otherwise (1806). In a very general sense, it can be argued that migration was a central theme in both campaigns and that much of the arguments made had a racialising effect (Rzepnikowska 65). Sarah Looney argues that politicians in the campaigning period (and beyond) used the “[...] powerful narratives of blame, fear and scapegoating [and] place the very ideas of human dignity and equality under vigorous and relentless assault” (7). She points to a poster by Leave.EU as an example, since it symbolised “a crystallising moment: covert xenophobia and racism were now firmly at the forefront of the debate” (7). The poster shows a queue of non-white refugees and reads: “Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all.” This large poster was to incite fear and hatred and exploited the Syrian refugees for this purpose (8). It should also be noted here that a large part of the xeno-racist violence referred to slogans used in the Leave campaigns (Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 7). This included statements such as “Go Home!”, “Leave!” and “We voted you out!” (Virdee and McGeever 1808). This is important for understanding the employment of the *Brexit Frame* by authors from both the Telegraph and the Guardian.

5.1 Themes

This subchapter answers the question of what the articles from the Guardian and the Telegraph are about. They all deal with the outbreak of xeno-racist violence after the Brexit referendum, as this was a criterion in their selection. In the Guardian, most articles deal with the violence firstly on a specific level, naming certain incidents. This includes the laminated cards saying “No more Polish Vermin”, an incident that is mentioned in article 1 and 3. The first three articles explicitly describe incidents in the first paragraphs as examples. A central theme is the critique of the Leave campaign. This includes evaluating this campaign as in part racist and accusing the politicians associated with Leave of having made false claims, for example in regard to Turkey allegedly joining the EU. Two articles end with an outlook on

the future of the UK. Article 2 paints a dystopian future with a worsening situation for people perceived as foreign and article 4 expresses hope for a clearer understanding of racism after the eruption of violence. Lastly, articles 1, 2 and 4 mention the media as an institution. They highlight the power of media and connect it to the eruption of xeno-racism. The subthemes in the Telegraph are in part similar to those found in the Guardian. Articles 1 and 2 describe specific incidents in order to explain the violence, the former also referring to the laminated cards. As in the Guardian, the authors use these incidents to open their articles. The Leave campaign, including associated politicians, is discussed in all articles. The second and third article, however, list “progressive causes” that the Leave campaign was campaigning for. As is be evident in the analysis, the fourth article differs strongly in its focus. The author discusses the implications of Brexit for the Jewish community in the UK, arguing that she had hoped to increase security for this part of the population by voting Leave.

5.2 Heuristic Analysis

According to the methodology given in the previous chapter, after presenting the themes found in the eight articles, a first heuristic analysis provides the frames used in order to make sense of the xeno-racist violence after the 2016 referendum. This analysis produces four frames, in both the Guardian and the Telegraph. Cues for all frames can be found in both papers, yet not in all articles. The identified frames are referred to in this paper as: *Brexit Frame*, *Bad Apple Frame*, *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and *Press Responsibility Frame*. In this first, heuristic, analysis, the frames differ most prominently in the causes they identify for the xeno-racist violence. The *Brexit Frame* links the referendum and sometimes the Leave campaign to the outbreak of violence. This is the primary frame employed in both papers. In the Guardian, this frame is connected with the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*. Depending on the degree in which this frame is used, authors either simply hint at xeno-racism being a problem that might have existed before Brexit or elaborate on deeper causes for xeno-racist incidents. The articles from the Guardian employ two secondary frames: In addition to the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, authors use the *Press Responsibility Frame*. The latter highlights the influence of the press and its role in the outbreak of violence. The heuristic analysis could only find one secondary frame in the articles published in the Telegraph: The *Bad Apple Frame*, which portrays individuals to be the cause for xeno-racist violence.

5.3 Fine Analysis: Guardian

The preceding thematic and heuristic analysis show what the articles are about, as well as the frames employed by the authors. The Brexit Frame is the primary frame employed in the Guardian, while the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Press Responsibility Frame* are secondary frames. In the following, these frames are examined regarding their structure, namely their four functions, and their cues. All quotes can be found in the table in the appendix (Appendix 1). For no particular reason, the articles published in the Guardian are analysed before those from the Telegraph.

5.3.1 Primary Frame

The first and most prominent frame in the Guardian is the *Brexit Frame*. All quotes referred to in this subchapter can be found in the table in Appendix 1.1.1. This frame is referred to (if not employed) in every article. Articles 1, 2 and 3 refer to it in their titles or opening sentences – this points to the importance of the *Brexit Frame*. The third article uses the term “Brexit Racism” in its title. All articles from the Guardian define the xeno-racist violence as a problem. Some of the examined articles somewhat unexpectedly frame the violence as a (natural) disaster. Article 2 metaphorically describes it as “fire”, being “fuelled” by politicians and the media. In the third article, the author writes “Brexit was a political *earthquake*, but its *shocks* were felt on our streets even before the polls closed” (emphasis added). In the same article, the term “fallout” is used – a word that can also refer to particles from a nuclear explosion (“Fallout”). This can be understood as framing the violence not only as the problem, but as a severe one.

Examples for the causal explanation in this frame include statements like this subtitle from article 1: “The leave campaign has opened up a Pandora’s box of resentment and suspicion” or this explanation given in article 2: “The EU referendum result has perhaps emboldened racists by leading them to believe that the majority agree with their views on immigration and legitimising such public expressions of hatred.” The cause for the problem of xeno-racist violence is found in the Leave campaign’s focus on immigration and the use of racism to further their campaign. This can also be seen in two terms that are used in article 3: *Brexit racism* and *celebratory racism*. ‘Celebratory’ in this case refers to Leave winning the referendum and is connected to the above mentioned argument of people feeling empowered through the outcome of the vote. The argument of people being “emboldened” by the referendum is explicitly put forward by articles 1, 2 and 3. Politicians associated with the

Leave campaign are understood to have been irresponsible and dishonest. This is emphasised, when, in article 1, the author writes: “In order to further their campaign and their careers, these *professional politicians* added bigotry to their armoury of political weapons” (emphasis added). Aside from the substantive accusation, the author seemingly unnecessarily adds the word *professional*, implying that the politicians might not act according to standards of this term. Article 2 mirrors this accusation of unprofessional behaviour when calling out false claims made by specific politicians during the campaign and calling them “irresponsible.” This includes the aforementioned claim that Turkey would join the EU. The behaviour of Leave politicians is seen as causally linked to the violence, as can be seen in this sentence from article 2: “Politicians and the media are fuelling this fire.”

Moral judgement is shown through the use of emotional language: “Her case is *unfortunately* not unique” or “most *worryingly*” (article 2, emphasis added). The fact that blame is put on the Leave campaign is in itself a harsh judgement. In regard to false claims made by the Leave campaign the author furthermore states that “such messages must either be the work of duplicitous demagogues or incompetent and irresponsible migration scaremongers.”

In regard to presenting solutions to the problem, the author of article 2 states: “To prevent the continued and unchecked growth of such bigotry, politicians and media organisations must cease fuelling religious, racial and ethnic tensions to further their petty agendas.” This can be understood as a passive solution – politicians must refrain from using racism. The same article, however, vaguely calls for “collective action” in order to change the situation. In the third article, the presumption is that the violence will cease with time, but still needs to be challenged. Apart from asking politicians to stop inciting hatred, the presented solutions can be described as vague. Article 4 does not employ the *Brexit Frame*. As will be discussed in the following subchapter, this article employs the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*. It refers to and openly rejects the *Brexit Frame*, stating that “[r]acism is not a side-effect of the referendum” (Table Appendix 1.2.1) and argues instead that racism influenced the result of the referendum – and therefore is part of the reason the UK will be leaving the EU.

5.3.2 Secondary Frame: Structural Xeno-Racism Frame

In the Guardian, the *Brexit Frame* is connected to the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*. All quotes referred to in this subchapter can be found in the table in Appendix 1.2.1. Cues for this frame could be found in all four articles. In the first three articles, authors argue that the

Brexit Frame cannot sufficiently explain the outbreak of xeno-racist violence: “Unfortunately, these episodes are only the tip of this hateful iceberg. To claim these reports are solely due to last week’s referendum would be overly simplistic. Concerns about immigration, and in particular Muslim immigrants have been simmering beneath the surface for some time” (Article 2). The third article supports this causal explanation through statistics from 2015, the year before the referendum, which show an extreme rise in anti-Muslim hatred reports. While those three articles hint at underlying problems, structural xeno-racism or racism are not openly referred to. In the fourth article, however, the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* dominates over the *Brexit Frame*. It presents a very clear understanding of structural racism: “[H]ow did Brexit get us here?[...] We are here because we have always been here. Antipathy towards migrants has been simmering away in the background of tolerant Britain, unrecognised by a complacent establishment. It was only a matter of time before one big event gave the undercurrent of racism sanction.” This article situates the violence in an actively racist system and states that this is unacknowledged by large parts of the country. In terms of cues, all four articles use words to emphasise that the underlying problem is not new. This includes the words “always” (in three out of four articles) and “for some time” or “all along” to describe the longevity of the problem. It is also noteworthy that all four articles from the Guardian use the term *racism* in their title. The use of this term can, as discussed in chapter 2.2, point to a structural understanding of the events following the referendum. This is in contrast to terms such as *hate crime*, which point to an individualised understanding of hatred (chapter 2.1). The term *hate crime* is only used once in the articles published in the Guardian. While these are all important cues, the aspect of framing the violence as a (natural) disaster, as discussed in the previous subchapter, can be seen as opposing a structural understanding. Describing the violence as an earthquake (article 2) or a fire (article 1) might mark it as horrible, but also coincidental and potentially unavoidable.

While hinting at the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, the first three articles offer solutions only in regard to the *Brexit Frame*, as are discussed above. Very different in its focus, the fourth article does discuss solutions according to the frame most dominantly employed in this article, the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*. Firstly, structural xeno-racism needs to be acknowledged, as implied in this statement: “The referendum result will force liberal Britain to address an issue it has long chosen to ignore.” Secondly, the article examines the state of integration in the UK, arguing that integration must be part of any solution: “Integration isn’t the ability to take a picture on the tube and see people of every colour. Integration is to look into your workplace, your government, your media and your social

circle, and on finding it inexplicably white, understanding that it is not because of class, or education, or economic circumstances, but race.” In accordance with this understanding of the problem, the solution must be “positive action.” While this is not elaborated any further, it can be understood to point to the need for affirmative action.

5.3.3 Secondary Frame: Press Responsibility Frame

The other secondary frame in the Guardian is the *Press Responsibility Frame*. All quotes referred to in this subchapter can be found in the table in Appendix 1.4.1. This frame can be found in articles 1, 2 and 4. It is not as prominent as the other frames. As might be apparent from the name, authors employing the *Press Responsibility Frame* find a causal relation between the outbreak of xeno-racist violence and media coverage of minorities. This can be observed in the following quote from the subtitle of article 2: “Politicians and the media are fuelling this fire.” Article 1 names tabloid front pages “markers of residual prejudice towards Muslims and arrivals from eastern Europe.” A marker that is, according to the author, sometimes overlooked. Article 4 cites “a sharpened political and media tone on immigration” as one of several causes for racism in the UK. The most explicit usage of the *Press Responsibility Frame* can be found in article 2, which also refers to this frame in its subtitle: “The free hand of the print and online media to distort facts and blame entire groups of people for the troubles of our country, with almost no recourse, plays an equally important role in this spread of hatred. Let’s be clear – they are complicit in the rise of bigotry and the consequences of discrimination.” In the articles analysed for this paper, no solutions or explicit moral judgements could be found. The articles in the Telegraph neither employ nor refer to this frame.

5.4 Fine Analysis: Telegraph

As in the Guardian, the heuristic analysis found that the most prominently used frame in the articles from the Telegraph is the *Brexit Frame*. The authors use a secondary frame; the *Bad Apple Frame*. The name of this frame is derived from the metaphor of the ‘bad apple’, as explained in chapter 2.1. The following two subchapters offer a detailed analysis of these two frames in regard to their four functions and clues.

5.4.1 Primary Frame

Articles 1, 2 and 4 employ the *Brexit Frame*, article 3 refers to it. All quotes referred to in this subchapter can be found in the table in Appendix 1.1.2. The subtitle of the first

article reads: “The vote for Brexit has been blamed for a spate of racist attacks over the weekend.” The three articles employing this frame clearly understand the violence as the main problem. Article 2, for example, describes the vandalism of the Polish Cultural Centre in London in a personal way, hinting at the severity of the problem: “The thought that anyone could have been ‘inspired’ by the referendum result to vandalise the Polish Cultural Centre fills me with *disgust*” (emphasis added). The metaphor of the (natural) disaster could only be found in article 4, where the author uses the aforementioned term *fallout*.

Article 1, employing the *Brexit Frame*, portrays a clear causal connection between “divisive and xenophobic” language and the xeno-racist violence that followed. The second article, much more conflicted in its portrayal, asks: “Has the Vote Leave campaign been hijacked by racists in the aftermath of the referendum?” And “reluctantly” arrives at the conclusion that “there may be some truth in it.” The author does, however, also state that he “still [doesn’t] think the Vote Leave campaign was guilty of racism or xenophobia.” The fourth article differs from the others in this corpus, as it employs a specific perspective: It centralises the safety of Jews in the United Kingdom within or outside the European Union. The author describes how she had initially argued that the UK exiting the EU would protect Jews from rising anti-Semitism in the EU, but reconsidered this in light of the outbreak of violence. The author does, however, apply the *Brexit Frame*: “But even so, I never imagined that a Brexit vote would trigger so much naked hatred on the street.” The articles from the Telegraph have a greater variety in their employment of the *Brexit Frame* than those published in the Guardian.

While there is some argument as to Brexit being viewed as the cause of violence, the moral judgement in the second article clearly differs to the articles published in the Guardian. The perpetrators are judged, they are said to bring “*shame* on [the Brexiteer’s] cause” (emphasis added). Yet, the Leave campaign, its messages and the political actors are praised rather than made responsible: “The leaders of the campaign were always anxious to stress that they embraced Britain’s diverse, multi-ethnic character and, far from wanting to pull up the drawbridge, expressed the hope that it might become easier for skilled migrants from outside the EU to obtain work in Britain once we’ve left the EU.” The fourth article, aside from judging the violence itself, also judges the potential cause, calling out “Nigel Farage’s *morally bankrupt* and *highly inflammatory* ‘breaking point’ posters” (emphasis added).

The third article openly rejects the *Brexit Frame*. Instead, as will be discussed in the following subchapter, it employs the *Bad Apple Frame*. It is interesting, however, that in contrast to the other articles, this article defines a different problem, that of Remainers

claiming that Leavers are racists: “Since the vote, Remainers have been lashing out like frustrated toddlers. If you voted Leave, you’re a bigot, a hooligan, a thug”(Appendix 1.3.2). This article perceives no causal relationship between the referendum, the Leave campaign and the following eruption of violence. The language in refusing accusations made against Leavers is intense: “*Seriously?* Those of us who argued for a global Britain, looking further than one declining trade bloc, are responsible for hatred?” (emphasis added). This paragraph alone uses three rhetorical questions. The author of this article is explicitly rejecting the *Brexit Frame*.

5.4.2 Secondary Frame

Article 4 is the only article from the Telegraph not employing the frame that is analysed in this subchapter: *The Bad Apple Frame*. All quotes referred to in this subchapter can be found in the table in Appendix 1.3.2. The expression ‘bad apple’ refers to the individualisation of wrongdoing and is in itself a denial of a structural problem (chapter 2.1). This frame is most obvious in the following statement from article 3: “I replied that there were a few racist idiots in every society.” Authors using this frame argue that the xeno-racist violence is not indicative of a structural problem, but is instead a problem of the few. This frame is connected to the *Brexit Frame* through the question discussed above: “Has the Vote Leave campaign been *hijacked* by racists in the aftermath of the referendum?” (emphasis added). While the author acknowledges that there might be some connection to the Leave campaign and the referendum, he denies the existence of a structural xeno-racist problem in the campaign as well as in the country – instead the Leave campaign was “hijacked.” This term implies a hostile takeover, such as that of a plane by terrorists. This metaphor portrays Leavers and their campaign as the victims of a few bad individuals. This can also be seen in the last paragraph of the second article: “This is not the Britain we know and love and the Britain we fought for throughout the campaign. [...] We are better than that.” This frame, as can be seen in this last statement, is defined also through the denial of structural xeno-racism. Furthermore the metaphor of the ‘bad apple’ often includes classist characterisations of the perpetrators, as discussed in chapter 2.1. While this connotation is not strongly represented in the articles, the author of article 3 does call the perpetrators “racist *idiots*” (emphasis added). While this is clearly meant as an insult, it describes a person not only as bad but also as stupid. Cause for the violence are ‘bad apples’, glitches in the system, not the system itself. In this context it seems interesting that the first three articles from the Telegraph all use the term *hate crime*, while only one article from the Guardian uses this term to describe the violence.

As explained in chapter 2.1 the use of this term can point to an understanding of xeno-racism as a problem of the few.

Solutions are offered from a combination of both frames. The first solution, as stated in article 2, is to condemn the violence: “[...] anyone who did back Leave [...] now has an obligation to condemn this behaviour.” The focus is mostly on politicians and campaigners from the Leave camp. Article 1 refers to this solution by citing officials, both those that condemn the violence and those who call for others to do so. This solution seems connected to the belief that xeno-racism is not a structural problem, but rather a problem of the few and the majority must simply condemn it. Accordingly, the ‘bad apple’ needs to be reprimanded, as they are in article 2: “Anyone using our victory last Thursday as a pretext to insult Eastern European migrants or any other ethnic minority brings *shame* on our cause and diminishes our achievement” (emphasis added). Article 3 differs in its referral to this solution. The focus is on Remainers allegedly not accepting their defeat and no solutions are offered regarding the problem of xeno-racism. The author does, however, condemn the violence himself, while rejecting any allegation that he or other Leavers should be obligated to do so. This can be seen as the rejection of condemnation as a solution. Hinting at another solution, article 1 includes a noticeable amount of quotes from police officials. The author for example quotes Detective Superintendent Martin Brunning, who explains the legal implications of producing and distributing laminated “No more Polish Vermin” cards. Importantly, this includes highlighting that such a crime “carries a maximum sentence of seven years in prison.” Referring to the police and more importantly giving the sentence can be understood to point to the solution of *Law and Order*, as discussed in chapter 7.

5.5 Interim Conclusion

After the heuristic analysis produced the *Brexit Frame*, the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, the *Press Responsibility Frame* and the *Bad Apple Frame*, the fine analysis further defined these frames. The *Brexit Frame* is employed as the primary frame in both papers (yet not all articles) with authors arguing in favour of a causal relation between the referendum and the violence. The analysis found differences in the employment of this frame between the Guardian and the Telegraph, most apparent regarding their stance towards the Leave campaign. The *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, employed by authors in the Guardian, is, for the most part, hinted at. Another secondary frame from the Guardian was analysed: The *Press Responsibility Frame*. The authors in the Telegraph only employ one secondary frame, the

Bad Apple Frame. In the following discussion these findings are interpreted and evaluations are drawn from them.

6. Discussion

The aim of this paper is to examine how eight articles from the Guardian and the Telegraph framed and therefore made sense of the xeno-racist violence occurring after the referendum in 2016. The analysis, maybe unsurprisingly, found that all articles refer to the *Brexit Frame*. Six articles regard the referendum and the preceding campaign as causal to the eruption of violence, employing the *Brexit Frame* as their primary frame. There are, however, differences in framing between the Guardian and the Telegraph. It seems that the main secondary frame influences the employment of the primary frame, they do not simply exist alongside each other. The Brexit frame, as employed in the Guardian, highlights the role of the Leave campaign, arguing that its racism might have brought to light an underlying pre-existing racism. In the Telegraph, however, the Leave campaign is mostly defended – it is argued that bad individuals “hijacked” the referendum. In combination, the primary and secondary frames therefore produce new meaning, like a new colour mixed from two colours as can be seen in the visualisation in the third part of the appendix (Appendix 3). Three articles from the Guardian dominantly employ the *Brexit Frame*, connecting it to the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, the fourth article predominantly uses the latter frame. It is telling that all four articles by the Guardian use the term *racism* in their titles to refer to the xeno-racist violence, while only one Telegraph article does this.³ Three articles from the Telegraph employ the *Brexit Frame*, two in connection with the *Bad Apple Frame*, article 3 uses only the *Bad Apple Frame*. This shows that in the Telegraph xeno-racist violence is, for the most part, understood as a problem of the few and not as a structural problem. Another aspect of the ‘bad apple’ metaphor is visible in the employment of the *Bad Apple Frame* – the portrayal of ‘the racist’ as uneducated or stupid. While the authors in the Guardian refrain from using this frame, most articles lack a full contextualization of the violence, even though the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* is hinted at. Three articles from the Guardian employ another secondary frame, the *Press Responsibility Frame*. While this is not as prominent as

³ Actually, a second article includes the word *racism* in its title: “We Leavers are not racists, bigots, or hooligans – no matter what the bitter broadcasters say” (Article three). This is not counted because the term is not used to describe the violence, but instead to deflect responsibility.

the two other frames used in the Guardian, it is interesting that there is no mention of or referral to this frame in the Telegraph.

The employment of different secondary frames leads to different moral judgements and suggested solutions. Authors writing for the Guardian stress the importance of political responsibility and the fourth article hints at systemic solutions. In the Telegraph, the main appeal is for officials to condemn the violence. In general most of the articles from both papers do not explicitly elaborate on solutions. Solutions are, however, hinted at. One example of such an implicit solution is what can be interpreted as a call for fixing the problem of xeno-racism with *Law and Order*. As will be discussed further in the following chapter, the call for *Law and Order* as a solution to xeno-racism is typical for the *Bad Apple Frame*. Cues for this solution include the extensive citing of police officials and the referral to the legal consequences in article 2. Interestingly, not one reference to the police or to the legal consequences of the xeno-racist crimes could be found in the articles from the Guardian. This might be due to the fact that the authors writing for the Guardian do not employ the *Bad Apple Frame*.

The most important result of this paper's analysis, then, is the dichotomy of the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Bad Apple Frame*. While articles from the Guardian argue that resentments against people perceived as 'not belonging' existed before the referendum and therefore before the eruption of violence, only article 4 from the Guardian extensively criticises the structures underlying this violence and therefore contextualises xeno-racist violence within these structures. This is mostly missing from the other articles from the Guardian and completely neglected by the articles in the Telegraph. As can be seen in the table there are almost no cues found relating to this frame in the latter newspaper (Appendix 1.2.2). In general, structural xeno-racism is not understood to be essential in contextualising xeno-racist violence in the newspapers. This paper's thesis is validated by these findings. The framing employed in the analysed articles is not sufficient in its contextualization of xeno-racist violence. The context of structural xeno-racism, as a global system of discrimination and privilege, is necessary to make sense of and correctly contextualise single acts of violence.

What are the consequences? An interesting issue is that of privilege and responsibility. It might be quite obvious that pointing at 'bad individuals' and arguing that they are the problem relieves citizens and politicians using this frame of any responsibility. When the problem are a "few racist idiots", as argued in article 3 from the Telegraph, why should implementing different migration policies be even up for consideration? If the existence of

those “few racist idiots” is understood as almost natural, unavoidable, as they exist in every society, why should politicians change the way they frame migration and speak about, for example, Polish migrants? But the *Bad Apple Frame* is not the only frame that can be argued to have this function: When looking at the numbers of Guardian readers that voted Remain – almost 80 per cent (chapter 4.1) – the employment of the *Brexit Frame* can be seen in a similar light. In contrast to the Telegraph employing the *Brexit Frame*, then, most Guardian readers are theoretically able to not feel responsible, as they had voted to remain. If the Brexiteers and their campaign caused the problem, why should Remainers feel responsible to act? This argument can also be applied to the Press Responsibility Frame. One author from the Guardian pointed to “tabloid front pages” (article 1), which would exclude the Guardian. Speaking about the responsibility of print and online media, the author from the second article clearly blames other journalists: “Let’s be clear – *they* are complicit in the rise of bigotry and the consequences of discrimination” (emphasis added). A thorough employment of the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* would not offer the possibility for authors to distance themselves and (indirectly) their readers from the issue. As discussed in the theoretical background, structural xeno-racism is actively produced and all white people in one way or another profit from it through privilege. It can be argued that this alone creates some responsibility for (white) authors and readers – if not for the xeno-racist violence, then for not actively changing the system.

7. Academic Contextualization of Frames

This chapter offers academic context for the frames found and described above. There is some research to be found commenting on the *Brexit Frame* and the *Press Responsibility Frame*, and, more importantly, quite a bit on the dichotomy of the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Bad Apple Frame*. The general significance of understanding individual acts of xeno-racism in their appropriate context has been discussed in chapter 2.2. As can be seen in this paper’s analysis this contextualisation does, however, usually not take place. The academic critique and commentary in regard to each frame are presented in the following two subchapters, with a focus on the dichotomy between the *Bad Apple Frame* and the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*. This includes the consequences of employing a certain frame, most importantly the solutions a frame can or cannot lead to.

7.1 Academic Context to the *Brexit* and the *Press Responsibility Frame*

In the *Brexit Frame*, authors from both papers argue that the Leave campaign and the referendum were causal to the eruption of the violence. Some background in regard to the Leave campaign preceded the analysis in chapter 5. Zubaida Haque writes “Brexit has normalised hatred towards immigrants” (Haque). Reem Ahmed mirrors this argument, drawing a causal relation specifically between the language used by the Leave campaign and the verbal attacks after the referendum. Like the authors of the analysed articles, Ahmed argues that the result might have emboldened people (118). Burnett, analysing 134 incidents after the referendum, finds that 51 of those “included references either explicitly to the EU referendum and its outcome, or the messages that it conveyed” (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 7). He states “[t]here is a parallel, of course, between the ‘leave’ campaign’s unofficial slogan of ‘taking the country back’ and the racist abuse that urges the same” (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 8). While Burnett later highlights other causes, the connection between the referendum and the outbreak of xeno-racist violence is acknowledged. In contrast to the articles, the investigated research also stresses the ordinariness of xeno-racism and even violence. Benson and Lewis write: “Racism for [the People of Colour] is not a Brexit story, but a life story” (2219). Aisha Gill explains “Brexit was not extraordinary; rather, it was a distillation, perhaps a culmination, of specific kinds of unspoken, intangible, yet physically felt experiences of hostility, unwelcome attitudes and xenophobia” (47). The violence must not be understood as a ‘simple’ spike, portraying xeno-racism “as some kind of aberration in an otherwise tolerant country” (Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 17). This stands in opposition to the statement from article two from the Telegraph: “This is not the Britain we know and love [...]. We are better than that.”

It might be considered problematic to investigate an understanding of xeno-racism that includes press responsibility by looking at articles in the press. The *Press Responsibility Frame* did, however, come up in the heuristic analysis even though initially it was not a focus of this paper. Three articles from the Guardian reference this frame: Only one, however, employs it in a truly prominent way. In the articles published in the Telegraph, no author points to the role or responsibility of the media. The argument put forward in articles 2 and 4 from the Guardian is that the media are “complicit in the rise of bigotry” (article 2) through racist coverage on minorities and especially migrants. Researchers also examine the relation between the media and the eruption of violence. Ahmed explains that news press in the UK reports more aggressively on migration than outlets in other European countries, arguing that

rightwing newspapers bear responsibility in rising resentments (114). The importance of media representation is a focus of Rzepnikowska's study on xeno-racism as experienced by Polish immigrants before and after Brexit. The author traces the media representation from Polish immigrants as 'desirable' migrants to an economic threat (66). She concludes "the widespread negative media discourses on migration further contribute to tensions" (70).

7.2 Academic Context to the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* and the *Bad Apple Frame*

In the analysis, cues for the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* were found in all articles from the Guardian. However, only the fourth Guardian article spells this out in a more complete form. The articles from the Telegraph lack significant references to structural xeno-racism. In general terms, researchers object to the *Bad Apple Frame* and highlight the importance of understanding xeno-racism through a structural lens like the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*. Goodfellow writes that racism is more often than not understood as the act of an individual person, usually seen as a 'bad apple'" and categorises this tendency as highly problematic ("Race and Racism in the UK" 151). To "restore much needed context to the 'hate crime' debate" is Burnett's aim in "Racial Violence and the Brexit State" (4). Apart from those general statements, some researchers directly counter arguments and point to problems resulting from this frame.

If it is not individuals, "a few racist idiots" that are expected to exist in every society, as insinuated in article 3 from the Telegraph, what is causal in prompting xeno-racist violence? Attempting to explain xeno-racism and racism in society, researchers such as Burnett and Goodfellow bring up two main arguments: That policies and politics actively create a xeno-racist system and that Britain's colonial past cannot be excluded from explaining modern xeno-racism. Both set these arguments in explicit opposition to the *Bad Apple Frame*. Burnett argues that policies can promote racism in society and asks: "To put it simply, if a hostile environment is embedded politically, why should we be surprised when it takes root culturally?" ("Racial Violence and the Brexit State" 4). He later states that "[the violence] is the literal manifestation of the political climate which sustains it" ("Racial Violence and the Brexit State" 8). The study shows correlations between the language used by the government, including the hostile environment policy⁴, and in the verbal attacks after the referendum. Webber, in a background paper for the IRR, explains the main implications of the hostile environment policy. Firstly, the most basic "necessities of life" are linked to a person's

⁴ It should be noted that the name of the policy was later changed; yet most of its regulations are still in place (Goodfellow, *Hostile Environment* 5).

immigration status, such as access to social housing, state benefits and education. Secondly, the policy includes requiring people who do not work in border control or immigration like landlords and universities to check a person's immigration status (Webber 4). Lastly, the policy includes aggressive policing (5). The aim is quite literally to create a hostile environment for migrants. That this is causally linked to structural racism and xeno-racism is an argument made repeatedly by researchers (Goodfellow, *Hostile Environment* 9; Haque; Rzepnikowska 66). This is one example of how policies can actively produce xeno-racism. This activeness is seen as a vital part of understanding and framing xeno-racism (Goodfellow, "Race and Racism in the UK" 152; Kapoor 1033). It is also contrary to the notion of the *Bad Apple Frame* that portrays acts of violence as almost random acts by bad individuals. Furthermore, Goodfellow highlights the importance of understanding xeno-racism in relation to Britain's past. Colonialism and Imperialism have "played a significant role in solidifying racial categories and hierarchies and embedding racism in the UK" ("Race and Racism in the UK" 152). In addition to being actively created, xeno-racism and racism are "a product of this country's past" (152). Article 4 from the Guardian, employing the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, points to the activeness with which xeno-racism is created. The three other articles containing cues for the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* do not mention the abovementioned activeness or relate to Britain's past.

Goodfellow argues that policy makers in the UK consistently disregard these aspects of activeness and history. She hereby makes the transition from criticising the identified causes in framing xeno-racism to assessing the implied solutions ("Race and Racism in the UK" 152). The first part of any solution must be the acknowledgement of those aspects, aimed at promoting "long-term attitudinal change, as well as implementing more immediate measures to support people systematically discriminated against" (157). It seems necessary to contextualise the solutions that are implied in the Telegraph as well as the Guardian, even though they are noticeably vague. The most interesting finding in this regard is the implied solution of Law and Order. Burnett, analysing the media's understanding of xeno-racist violence, argues "racial violence is [mainly] understood as threatening the social order. It becomes a matter for crime-reporting not for social analysis. The police are depicted as a 'thin blue line' defending the nation against chaos, and the solution, therefore, resides in more powers and more resources for the criminal justice system" ("Racial Violence and the Brexit State" 16). This solution directly connects with the *Bad Apple Frame*, as it reduces the problem to one of individuals, who need to be caught and punished (2). Simply put, an increased number of police officers will not be able to critically review and then change xeno-

racist policies. Kapoor mirrors this argument and critically describes such approaches as counterproductive and even actively strengthening racist structures (1040). While it would exceed the scope of this paper to fully analyse the consequences of increased policing especially for People of Colour, it can be said that this is a highly problematic approach, potentially exacerbating the problem. Support for this solution is visible in article 1 from the Telegraph (chapter 5.4.2).

One solution examined in the analysis is the call for politicians to condemn the violence. This is most prominent in article 2 from the Telegraph, but also hinted at in other articles from this newspaper. To condemn is “to declare to be reprehensible, wrong, or evil” or “to pronounce guilty” (“Condemn”). While any form of xeno-racist violence naturally is reprehensible and wrong, there is some connection to be found between condemnation in this context and the *Bad Apple Frame*. Burnett links this behaviour, the call to condemn violence, to the idea that individual perpetrators are the cause of the problem: “Too many people in power [...] condemn racism because they pass it off as the actions of an insecure, badly-educated and thuggish minority” (“Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 4). This implies that incidents of xeno-racist violence are often loudly condemned because they are understood without their structural context. Condemning xeno-racist acts by individuals, neglecting the structural foundation of racism and xeno-racism and calling for Law and Order to solve the problem of xeno-racism are part of the same narrative (Burnett, “Racial Violence and the Brexit State” 19). This is supported by the fact that in no article from the Guardian a call for this ‘solution’ could be found. Furthermore, a problem with condemning violence is that it can only happen after the fact. Taking a practical approach of critique, Burnett argues that this rarely helps the actual victims (“Racial Violence: Facing Reality” 5).

The employment of the *Bad Apple Frame* influences the timing of discussions on xeno-racism, as Goodfellow points out (“Race and Racism in the UK” 151). If xeno-racism is understood as a problem of the few and of their single actions, it makes sense to only write or talk about it when a person has committed a crime or some other xeno-racist act. This is contrasted by a view through the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame*, where, as discussed above, discrimination is a constant experience, a “life story”. The phenomenon of timing cannot be discussed to its full extent in this paper, as the material analysed also is restricted by a time frame.

8. Concluding Remarks and Outlook

This paper set out to examine how xeno-racist violence after the Brexit referendum in 2016 is framed in two newspapers, the Guardian and the Telegraph. Based on the frame analysis of eight articles, this paper has shown that the Telegraph articles, employing the *Bad Apple Frame*, explain the violence mostly through individual failings, while articles from the Guardian using the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* mostly hinted at a structural understanding and framing of xeno-racism. Article 4 from the Guardian is the only one the corpus explicitly employing this frame throughout the text. This paper's thesis – that newspapers fail to consequently contextualise xeno-racist violence within structural oppression – could largely be confirmed.

The theoretical background provided a basis both for this paper's approach to xeno-racism, as well as frame analysis. Frame analysis, as applied in this paper, proved to be an effective approach to the research questions, as it is well suited for the analysis of journalistic texts and specifically their comparison. A focus of this paper is the contextualization of the four frames in chapter 7. This academic contextualization is deemed highly important in order to establish the relevance of this paper's results: Partly, this relevance emanates from the solutions that are connected with a certain frame. This paper showed that the way xeno-racism is spoken about and what frame is used in the portrayal of it suggests some solutions as appropriate and excludes others. This paper also showed how frames are used to deflect responsibility for changing the status quo. Understanding xeno-racist incidents through the framework of an actively xeno-racist system also means understanding that everyone is responsible for changing that system – especially those that benefit from it.

This paper was not fully able to analyse the aspect of timing – the question of *when* xeno-racism is discussed. Based on this paper's findings, different frames of xeno-racist violence might be connected to different ideas of when it is an 'issue of acute interest'. It might be presumed that articles employing the *Bad Apple Frame* predominantly discuss xeno-racism after individual attacks have occurred, while articles fully employing the *Structural Xeno-Racism Frame* might appear outside of these timeframes – for example when policies in regard to migration are discussed. Such a study could further the understanding of the problematic framing of xeno-racism in newspapers.

9. Bibliography

- Ahmed, Reem. "Brexit: die Enttabuisierung des rechtspopulistischen Diskurses." *Jahrbuch zur Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE)*, vol. 1, 2018, pp. 105-120. *Nomos eLibrary*, DOI: 10.5771/9783845288840-105. Accessed 10 Aug. 2020.
- "Assault Icon." *Free Icons Library*, www.icon-library.com/icon/assault-icon-19.html. Accessed 25 Aug. 2020.
- Baliba, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein. *Rasse, Klasse, Nation: Ambivalente Identitäten*. Hamburg, Argument Verlag, 1998.
- Benson, Michaela and Chantelle Lewis. "Brexit, British People of Colour in the EU-27 and everyday racism in Britain and Europe." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* vol. 42, no. 13, 2019, pp. 2211-2228. *Taylor and Francis Online*, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2019.1599134. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.
- Burnett, Jon. "Racial Violence and the Brexit State." *Institute of Race Relations*, 2017, www.irr.org.uk/publications/issues/racial-violence-and-the-brexit-state/. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.
- Burnett, Jon. "Racial Violence: Facing Reality." *Institute of Race Relations*, 2013, www.irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2013/02/Racial-violence-facing-reality.pdf. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.
- Booth, Robert. "'Institutional racism': 20 years since Stephen Lawrence inquiry." *The Guardian*, 22. Feb 2019, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/feb/22/institutional-racism-britain-stephen-lawrence-inquiry-20-years. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.
- Carey, Sean and Jonathan Burton. "The Influence of the Press in Shaping Public Opinion towards the European Union in Britain." *Political Studies Association* vol. 52, 2004, pp. 623-640. *Sage Publication Journals*, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00499.x. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.
- "Condemn." Merriam Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/condemn. Accessed 10 Aug. 20.
- Corcoran, Hannah and Kevin Smith. "Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/16." Gov.uk, 13 Oct. 2016, www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/559319/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf. Accessed 22 Aug. 2020.
- "Definitions." *Institute of Race Relations*, www.irr.org.uk/research/statistics/definitions/. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Edgington, Tom. "Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU." *BBC*, 13 Jul. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Elahi, Farah and Omar Khan. "Islamophobia: Still a challenge for us all." *Runnymede Trust*, 2017, www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Entman, Robert M. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication* vol. 43, no. 4, 1993, pp. 51-58. *Wiley Online Library*, DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x. Accessed 28 Jul. 2020.

Essed, Philomena. *Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory*. Sage Publications, Inc., 1991. *eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost)*, www.web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=9881a754-7858-4173-b010-8edaf182fee5%40sdc-v-sessmgr03&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=477951&db=nlebk. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020

"Fallout." Merriam Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fallout. Accessed 10 Aug. 20.

Fekete, Liz. "The Emergence of Xeno-Racism." *Race and Class* vol. 43, no. 2, 2001, pp. 23-40.

Gill, Aisha K. and Nazneen Ahmed. "A New World Order?" *Gender and Queer Perspectives on Brexit*, edited by Moira Dustin, Nuno Ferreira, Susan Millns, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, pp. 45-61.

Goldberg, David Theo. "Racisms without Race." *Modern Language Association* vol. 123, no. 5, pp. 1712-1716. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/25501975. Accessed 03 Mar. 2020.

Goodfellow, Maya. *Hostile Environment: How Immigrants became Scapegoats*. London, Verso Books, 2019.

Goodfellow, Maya. "'Race' and Racism in the UK." *New Thinking for the British Economy*, edited by Laurie Macfarlane, Open Democracy, 2018, pp. 150-160. www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/new-thinking-for-the-british-economy/. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Happer, Catherine and Greg Philo. "The role of the media in the construction of public belief and social change." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* vol. 1 no. 1, 2013, pp. 321-336. *University of Glasgow Publications*, DOI: 10.5964/jspp.v1i1.96. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Haque, Zubaida. "Racism and inequality: The truth about Brexit." Runnymede, www.runnymedetrust.org/blog/immigration-racism-and-inequality. Accessed 14 Aug. 2020.

Jenkins, Elizabeth and Glen Stamp. "Sexting in the public domain: competing discourses in online news article comments in the USA and the UK involving teenage sexting." *Journal of Children and Media*, 2018, pp. 1-17. *Taylor and Francis Online*, DOI: 10.1080/17482798.2018.1431556. Accessed 17 Jul. 2020.

"Hate crime undermines the diversity and tolerance we should instead be celebrating." *National Police Chiefs' Council*, 08 Jul 2016, www.news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-tolerance-we-should-instead-be-celebrating-1. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Khan, Omar and Faiza Shaheen. "Minority Report: Race and Class in post-Brexit Britain." *Runnymede Trust*, 2017, www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/Race%20and%20Class%20Post-Brexit%20Perspectives%20report%20v5.pdf. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Kitzinger, Jenny. "Framing and Frame Analysis." *Key Issues and Debates: Media Studies*, edited by Eoin Devereux, Los Angeles, Sage Publications, 2007, 134-162.

Komaromi, Priska. "Post-referendum racism and xenophobia: The role of social media activism in challenging the normalisation of xeno-racist narratives." *Institute of Race Relations*, 2016, www.irr.org.uk/news/post-referendum-racism-and-the-importance-of-social-activism/. Accessed 14 Jul. 2020.

Kuypers, Jim A. "Framing Analysis." *Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action*, edited by Jim A. Kuypers, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2009, 165-181.

Leach, Colin Wayne. "Against the notion of a 'new racism'." *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* vol. 15 no. 6, 2005, pp. 432-445. *Wiley Online Library*, DOI: 10.1002/casp.841. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Levy, David A.L, et al. "UK Press Coverage of the EU Referendum." *Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism*, Sep. 2016, www.reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-11/UK_Press_Coverage_of_the_%20EU_Referendum.pdf. Accessed 10 Aug. 2020.

Litosseliti, Lia. "'Head to head': Gendered repertoires in newspaper arguments." *Gender Identity and Discourse Analysis*, edited by Lia Litosseliti and Jane Sunderland, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002, pp. 129-148.

Looney, Sarah. "Breaking Point? An Examination of the Politics of Othering in Brexit Britain." *TLI Think! Paper* vol. 69. Social Science Research Network (SSRN), DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3014638. Accessed 14 Jul. 2020.

Ofcom. "News Consumption in the UK: 2019." *Jigsaw Research*, 24 Jul. 2019, www.ofcom.org.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0027/157914/uk-news-consumption-2019-report.pdf. Accessed 16 Jul. 2020.

Ott, Brian L. and Robert L. Mack. *Critical Media Studies – An Introduction*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Parveen, Nazia and Harriet Sherwood. "Police log fivefold rise in race-hate complaints since Brexit result." *The Guardian*, 30 Jun. 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/police-report-fivefold-increase-race-hate-crimes-since-brexit-result. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

"Racial Equity: 11 Terms You Should Know to Better Understand Structural Racism." *The Aspen Institute*, www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/structural-racism-definition/. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

"Racial Violence Statistics". *Institute of Race Relations*, www.irr.org.uk/research/statistics/racial-violence/. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Runnymede Trust. "Reframing Racism - Explaining ethnic inequalities in the UK labour market." Runnymede Trust, Sep. 2017, www.runnymedetrust.org/projects-and-publications/employment-3/reframing-racism-labour-market-briefing.html. Accessed 23 Aug. 2020.

Rzepnikowska, Alina. "Racism and xenophobia experienced by Polish migrants in the UK before and after Brexit vote." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* vol. 45, no 1., 2018, pp. 61-77. *Taylor and Francis Online*, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1451308. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Savage, Micheal. "Keep your enemies close: the splits and infighting behind the Leave campaigns." *The Guardian*, 24 Mar. 2018, www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/24/brexit-splits-leave-vote-beleave-funds. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Sian, Katy. "Being Black in a White World: Understanding Racism in British Universities." *Papeles del Ceic International Journal on Collective Identity Research* vol. 2017, no. 2, 2017, www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/papelesCEIC/article/view/17625. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. "Poverty is the new black – an Introduction." *Race and Class* vol. 43, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-7.

Sow, Noah. *Deutschland Schwarz Weiß*. Books on Demand, 2018.

Ture, Kwame and Charles V. Hamilton. *Black Power - Politics of Liberation in America*. New York, Random House Inc., 1992.

Virdee, Satnam and Vrendan McGeever. "Racism, Crisis, Brexit." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* vol. 41, no. 10, 2016, pp. 1802-1819. *Taylor and Francis Online*, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1361544. Accessed 15 Jul. 2020.

Webber, Frances. "The embedding of State Hostility: A background paper on the Windrush Scandal." *Institute of Race Relations*, 2018, s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/wpmedia.outlandish.com/irr/2018/11/19150132/Embedding-State-hostility-v4.pdf. Accessed 13 Jul. 2020.

Appendix

Table of Contents

- 1. Tables with Results from Analysis.....II
 - 1.1 The Brexit Frame.....II
 - 1.1.1 The Guardian.....II
 - 1.1.2 The Telegraph.....IV
 - 1.2 The Structural Xeno-Racism Frame.....V
 - 1.2.1 The Guardian.....VI
 - 1.2.2 The Telegraph.....VI
 - 1.3 The Bad Apple Frame.....VII
 - 1.3.1 The Guardian.....VII
 - 1.3.2 The Telegraph.....VII
 - 1.4 The Press Responsibility Frame.....VIII
 - 1.4.1 The Guardian.....VIII
 - 1.4.2 The Telegraph.....IX
- 2. Newspaper Articles.....X
- 3. Visualization of the Combination of Frames.....XI

1. Tables with Results from Analysis

1.1 The Brexit Frame

1.1.1 The Guardian

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments
Article 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pandora's box - Racist poison - Trumpism - professional politicians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - After a campaign scarred by bigotry, it's become OK to be racist in Britain*⁵ - The leave campaign has opened up a Pandora's box of resentment and suspicion.* - None of this is coincidental. It's what happens when cabinet ministers, party leaders and prime-ministerial wannabes sprinkle arguments with racist poison. When intolerance is not only tolerated, but indulged and encouraged. For months leading up to last week's vote, politicians poured a British blend of Donald Trumpism into Westminster china. - In order to further their campaign and their careers, these professional politicians added bigotry to their armoury of political weapons. - But over the past few months, the men who are now shaping Britain's future outside the EU effectively ditched public decency, and decided it was OK to be racist. - Tell Mama (...) recounted how the "chatter" from small violent far-right extremist groups had risen and risen during the campaign. When Johnson talked about Turkey, they circulated pictures of a church with a minaret photoshopped on top. When Farage talked about sexual-assaulting Syrians, they began talking about "rape-fugees".
Article 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - giving voice to racism - Pandora's box - emboldening racists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brexit has given voice to racism* - Politicians and the media are fuelling this fire* - The result seems to have unleashed a Pandora's box of bigotry - [This Pandora's box of bigotry] will require strong collective action to close.

⁵ The asterisk* indicates that a quote was taken from the title or subtitle of an article. This position is understood to signal high importance of a statement.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fuelling - fire - irresponsible (Leave politicians) emotional language: - Her case is unfortunately not unique - worryingly - unfortunately 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The EU referendum result has perhaps emboldened racists by leading them to believe that the majority agree with their views on immigration and legitimising such public expressions of hatred. For this, the political elite must take responsibility, after stoking a divisive referendum campaign that demonised immigrants by spreading fictitious scare stories, all the while pandering to the lowest common denominator. - “This kind of nudge-nudge, wink-wink xenophobic racist campaign may be politically savvy or useful in the short term but it causes long-term damage to communities” – a prediction that is unfortunately being proved correct. - Despite Boris Johnson once saying he was pro-immigration, his campaign focused its message on immigration, creating unrealistic and unachievable expectations of what migration figures could be. Not only did it falsely claim that Turkey was about to join the EU but it also claimed that Turks were in some way a threat to our national security, highlighting its proximity to Iraq and Syria on a poster. - There are no two ways about it: such messages must either be the work of duplicitous demagogues or incompetent and irresponsible migration scaremongers. - To prevent the continued and unchecked growth of such bigotry, politicians and media organisations must cease fuelling religious, racial and ethnic tensions to further their petty agendas. Silence is no longer an option.
<p>Article 3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brexit racism* - celebratory racism* - earthquake, shocks - explosion (of violence) - (violence as) fallout - (people feel) legitimised - war footing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brexit was a political earthquake, but its shocks were felt on our streets even before the polls closed. - Why this sudden explosion? Paul Bagguley, a sociologist based at the University of Leeds points to the gleeful tone of the racism: “There is a kind of celebration going on; it’s a celebratory racism.” With immigration cited in polls as the second most common reason in voting for Brexit, “people are expressing a sense of power and success, that they have won,” he says. - (...) the Brexit campaign’s relentless rhetoric about “controlling our borders” has led people who might previously have kept their intolerant views to themselves to feel legitimised. - “The Brexiters, with their jingoistic rhetoric, have put the country on a war footing. By framing the debate as ‘we want our country back’, they have made immigrants the enemy and occupiers who need to be expelled.” - Bagguley is confident that after a spike in incidents, things will calm down. Yet he also warns that if these attacks go unchallenged, the damage to our social fabric could be lasting, making attacks more frequent in the future. “It is the residue that is the problem. If people get away with [racist attacks], then the next time there is a reason to have a go, they will.”

Article 4		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The referendum result will force liberal Britain to address an issue it has long chosen to ignore* - True, the campaign appealed to the basest of anti-immigration fears, a drumbeat of hostility that culminated in Thursday's vote effectively being a plebiscite on all immigration. 	
-----------	--	--	--

1.1.2 The Telegraph

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments	
Article 1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The vote for Brexit has been blamed for a spate of racist attacks over the weekend.* - Baroness Warsi suggested that the "divisive and xenophobic" Leave campaign bore responsibility for the "problems on our street" - Warsi, who switched from backing Leave to Remain citing the Brexit camp's "lies and hate", called on leaders of the Leave campaign to "come out and say that the campaigning was divisive and was xenophobic and give a commitment that future campaigning and the way that they intend to run this country will be united, will make people from all backgrounds feel like they belong". 	
Article 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - genie of nationalism out of the bottle - hijacked emotional language: - disgust - shame 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has the Vote Leave campaign been hijacked by racists in the aftermath of the referendum? That's certainly the impression you get from reading about the volume of racist incidents since last Friday. - Yet, reluctantly, I've come to accept that there may be some truth in it (Leave campaign letting "the genie of nationalism out of the bottle"). - I still don't think the Vote Leave campaign was guilty of racism or xenophobia. - The thought that anyone could have been "inspired" by the referendum result to vandalise the Polish Cultural Centre fills me with disgust. - The leaders of the campaign were always anxious to stress that they embraced Britain's diverse, multi-ethnic character and, far from wanting to pull up the drawbridge, expressed the hope that it might become easier for skilled migrants from outside the EU to obtain work in Britain once we've left the EU. - Anyone using our victory last Thursday as a pretext to insult Eastern European migrants or any other ethnic minority brings 	

		shame on our cause and diminishes our achievement.	
Article 3			
Article 4	- (violence as) Fallout	- But even so, I never imagined that a Brexit vote would trigger so much naked hatred on the street. Even in the light of Nigel Farage's morally bankrupt and highly inflammatory "breaking point" posters or of the horrific murder of MP Jo Cox - (never thought that brexit) would trigger something far more toxic than any Brussels time directive on the shape of bananas could deliver.	

1.2 The Structural Xeno-Racism Frame

1.2.1 The Guardian

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments	
Article 1	- racism* - always (harboured resentments)	- Maybe those people had always harboured such resentments, but now felt they could express them publicly without caring who heard.	
Article 2	- racism* - for some time emotional language: unfortunately	- Unfortunately, these episodes are only the tip of this hateful iceberg. To claim these reports are solely due to last week's referendum would be overly simplistic. Concerns about immigration, and in particular Muslim immigrants have been simmering beneath the surface for some time.	
Article 3	- racism* - always	- Campaigners and victims are reporting a rise in racist abuse since the referendum. Has it always been there under the surface – and will this 'celebratory racism' cause lasting damage? - "People haven't changed. I would argue the country splits into two-thirds to three-quarters of people being tolerant and a quarter to a third being intolerant. And a section of that third have become emboldened. At other times, people are polite and rub along." - Woolley is clear, as is Tell Mama, that hate crimes have never gone away. Tell Mama's annual report, released on Wednesday, states that anti-Muslim hatred reported to them rose by a	

		<p>staggering 326% in 2015. Women, especially those who wear hijabs or niqabs, bear the brunt of this. Hope Not Hate points out that it has been arguing for some time that far-right extremism is not getting the attention it deserves.</p>
Article 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - racism* - all along - always - undercurrent of racism - (racism is not a) side-effect - race-related incidents - positive action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The referendum result will force liberal Britain to address an issue it has long chosen to ignore* - The speed with which it happened was the first clue that it was there all along, lying in wait. We went to sleep last Thursday and awoke in a country where racist graffiti, racial slurs and race-related violence is a daily occurrence. The fact that it happened figuratively overnight should not fool us into thinking it literally happened overnight. - (...) how did Brexit get us here? (...) We are here because we have always been here. Antipathy towards migrants has been simmering away in the background of tolerant Britain, unrecognised by a complacent establishment. It was only a matter of time before one big event gave the undercurrent of racism sanction. Racism is not a side-effect of the referendum, it is the reason why the referendum, on the face of it a rather technical question on governance and subsidies and economics, gained such critical traction. It gave outline and shape to xenophobia, which the result animated. - (...) there is profound unacknowledged racism in this country; the result of a lack of attention to issues of race on the one hand and a sharpened political and media tone on immigration on the other. - Integration isn't the ability to take a picture on the tube and see people of every colour. Integration is to look into your workplace, your government, your media and your social circle, and on finding it inexplicably white, understanding that it is not because of class, or education, or economic circumstances, but race. - In assuming (...) that the system was not actively racist in any way, we did so little in the way of positive action while simultaneously not challenging the vilification of migrants in our press and politics.

1.2.2 The Telegraph

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments	
Article 1	- racism		
Article 2	- racism		
Article 3			
Article 4	- racism	- I can't believe how I badly I mistook the temperature when it comes to racial tolerance in this country.	

1.3 The Bad Apple Frame

1.3.1 The Guardian

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments	
Article 1			
Article 2			
Article 3	- hate crime		
Article 4			

1.3.2 The Telegraph

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments	

Article 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - hate crime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cambridgeshire Constabulary were investigating reports - Detective Superintendent Martin Brunning said (...) adding that it carries a maximum sentence of seven years in prison. - The Metropolitan police said they were called to the cultural centre on Sunday morning
Article 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - hijacked - hate crime <p>emotional language:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - love - shame 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has the Vote Leave campaign been hijacked by racists in the aftermath of the referendum? - This is not the Britain we know and love and the Britain we fought for throughout the campaign. Anyone using our victory last Thursday as a pretext to insult Eastern European migrants or any other ethnic minority brings shame on our cause and diminishes our achievement. We are better than that.
Article 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - hate crime - racist idiots 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Since the vote, Remainers have been lashing out like frustrated toddlers. If you voted Leave, you're a bigot, a hooligan, a thug. - When I replied that there were a few racist idiots in every society (...) - I still thought it absurd to suggest that there was some kind of continuum linking racists to the 52 per cent of Britons who had opted for democratic self-government. - Seriously? Those of us who argued for a global Britain, looking further than one declining trade bloc, are responsible for hatred? - Are we all racists?
Article 4		

1.4 The Press Responsibility Frame

1.4.1 The Guardian

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments

Article 1		- (I) overlooked some of the awkward markers of residual prejudice towards Muslims and arrivals from eastern Europe, the tabloid front pages, (...)	
Article 2		- Politicians and the media are fuelling this fire* - The free hand of the print and online media to distort facts and blame entire groups of people for the troubles of our country, with almost no recourse, plays an equally important role in this spread of hatred. Let's be clear – they are complicit in the rise of bigotry and the consequences of discrimination.	
Article 3			
Article 4		- (...) there is profound unacknowledged racism in this country; the result of (...) a sharpened political and media tone on immigration on the other.	

1.4.2 The Telegraph

	Cues/Emotional Language	Substantial Arguments	
Article 1			
Article 2			
Article 3			
Article 4			

2. Newspaper Articles

2.1 Guardian

2.1.1 Article 1: Chakraborty, Aditya. “After a campaign scarred by bigotry, it’s become OK to be racist in Britain.” *The Guardian*, 28. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.1.2 Article 2: Versi, Miqdaad. „Brexit has given voice to racism – and too many are complicit.“ *The Guardian*, 28. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.1.3 Article 3: Khaleeli, Homa. “‘A frenzy of hatred’: how to understand Brexit racism.” *The Guardian*, 29. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.1.4 Article 4: Malik, Nesrine. “Racism is not only the preserve of the dispossessed.” *The Guardian*, 30. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.2 Telegraph

2.2.1 Article 1: Turner, Camilla. “Spate of racist attacks blamed on Brexit vote.” *The Telegraph*, 27. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.2.2 Article 2: Young, Toby. “A vote to leave the European Union wasn’t a vote to repatriate immigrants.” *The Telegraph*, 28. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.2.3 Article 3: Hannan, Daniel. “We leavers are not racists, bigots, or hooligans – no matter what the bitter broadcasters say.” *The Telegraph*, 28. Jun 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

2.2.4 Article 4: Epstein, Angela. “I thought voting Brexit would protect Jewish people. How wrong could I have been?” *The Telegraph*, 13. Jul 2016. Accessed via Factiva 17. Jul 2020.

3. Visualization of the Combination of Frames

