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Access to general social protection for immigrants in advanced democracies

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Abstract

Immigration has become a central socio-political issue in most advanced democracies. While research mainly focuses on immigrant-specific policies in the area of immigration, integration and citizenship, we still know very little about the incorporation of immigrants into mainstream social policies. By analyzing cross-national differences in the inclusion of immigrants into general social protection across 27 rich democracies on the basis of comparative indicators from the MIPEX dataset we seek to address this gap in a quantitative study. A cross-national comparison of these indicators shows a particularly large variation in the inclusiveness of the access to social protection for immigrants across countries. By drawing on the welfare state and integration regime literature, we assess the power of two contrasting perspectives, namely the post-national welfare state and the welfare chauvinism models, in explaining this large cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social security and social housing. Our overall findings suggest that both the welfare chauvinist and the post-national welfare state models comprise two theoretical perspectives that turn out to be fruitful to interpret cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social protection. According to the welfare chauvinism model, we find robust evidence that left-wing cabinets are particularly reluctant to open general social protection schemes to immigrants. By contrast and in line with expectations derived from the post-national welfare state model, countries with an overall generous welfare state and countries facing large immigration flows tend to provide immigrants with more generous access to social protection.

1. Introduction

Immigration has become a central socio-political issue in most advanced democracies as a result of the increasing international mobility in the last decade. In line with this societal development, immigration (← p. 44) has also gained in importance in the political science debate. The proliferation of comparative indices measuring citizenship and integration regimes demonstrates that this is a rapidly growing area in the political sciences (Goodman, 2015). While this boom mainly focuses on immigrant-specific policies in the area of immigration, integration and citizenship, we still know very little about the incorporation of immigrants into mainstream social policies. Understanding the varying national regulations on the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream policies such as social security or social housing policies is nevertheless an essential research avenue if we want to move beyond the burgeoning empirical literature on immigrant-specific policies. Indeed, the study of immigrant-specific policies provides only a partial picture of the national regulations facilitating or restricting immigrants' integration. In order to obtain a comprehensive picture, the empirical debate needs to consider national regulations on immigrants' access to mainstream programmes as well. With this article, we aim at filling this gap by presenting one of the first quantitative analyses of immigrants' inclusion into general social protection (but see also Römer 2017). The overall social protection granted to immigrants depends not only on a country's social protection generosity but also on the extent to which immigrants benefit from equal access to social protection. Thus, immigrants' access to general social protection comprises one of the two dimensions determining the overall social protection benefits granted to immigrants. For this purpose, we analyze indicators for access to social security and social housing for immigrants with different types of legal status from the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015) across 27 rich democracies. A cross-national comparison of these indicators shows a particularly large variation in the inclusiveness of the access to social protection for immigrants across countries. By drawing on the welfare state and integration regime literature, we assess the power of two contrasting perspectives, namely the post-national welfare state and the welfare chauvinism models, in explaining this large cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social security and social housing. Our overall findings suggest that both the welfare chauvinist and the post-national welfare state models comprise two theoretical perspectives that turn out to be fruitful to interpret cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social protection. According to the welfare chauvinism model, we find robust evidence that left-wing cabinets are particularly reluctant to open general social protection schemes to

immigrants. By contrast and in line with expectations derived from the post-national welfare state model, countries with an overall generous welfare state and countries facing large immigration flows tend to provide immigrants with more generous access to social protection. A last noteworthy finding of this article concerns the non-significant interaction between welfare state generosity and inclusiveness of the integration regime for explaining cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social protection.

2. Contemporary variation of immigrants' access to general social policies

To capture the immigrants' integration into mainstream social policies we use a set of indicators provided by the MIPEX project for the year 2014 (Huddleston et al., 2015). The MIPEX project is aimed at providing comparative measures of policies to integrate migrants. It comprises 167 policy indicators that cover eight integration dimensions (labour market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination). The indicators have been collected annually since 2010 in 34 countries. Unfortunately, the time span between the first and the most recent data collection is too short to be able to measure the evolution of access to social protection over time. Therefore, we use the latest available year to describe the contemporary patterns of immigrants' integration into national mainstream social protection. Four out of the 167 MIPEX policy indicators measure the access to social security and housing of third-country nationals¹ with different legal status categories and are used to form our dependent variable on the access to social protection schemes. These four indicators can have a score of 100 (referring to the most inclusive access), of 50 (for countries with access restricted to (← p. 45) immigrants with specific legal statuses or with some conditions on this access) and of 0 (for countries where only permanent residents or none of the immigrant legal statuses are afforded access).² It should be noted that the three values of these indicators measure the eligibility for social security and social housing for different types of immigrant legal statuses. A distinction is made between long-term residents and other immigrant legal statuses, such as family reunion or temporary work permits. This implies a hierarchical conceptualization of immigrant legal statuses and the assumption that long-term residents benefit from the most

¹ These indicators of the inclusiveness of the access to social protection for the EU member states sampled measure the access to social protection of third-country nationals. The case of intra-European immigrants is therefore not taken into account.

² Details on the indicators and their categories used in this contribution are presented in detail in Table A01 in the online appendix.

inclusive access to social security and social housing. Immigrant entry categories do indeed entail different types of access to social protection and thus lead to a hierarchical differentiation of immigrant legal statuses according to their eligibility for social protection (Carmel & Cerami, 2011, p. 6; Sainsbury, 2006).

We ran a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to assess the dimensionality of these four MIPEX indicators (cf. Corrigan 2014). They can be reduced into a single dimension, as the first dimension of the MCA explains 72.35% of their total variance. Furthermore, Cronbach’s alpha statistic for these four indicators is 0.815, suggesting a high degree of internal consistency. Therefore, we computed a scale for our dependent variable by adding these four indicators together and dividing the total score by 4. Our dependent variable thus measures the access to social housing and social security of different immigrant legal statuses and ranges from 0 (most restrictive access) to 100 (most inclusive access). This index does not capture the generosity of the social policies enacted which might differ across nations. As mentioned earlier, the focus of our paper is on the access of immigrants to general social security schemes, and not on explaining the generosity of social policies, which would be an interesting but different research question.

Figure 1 shows the integration of immigrants into general social policies across 27 rich democracies (see also Table A02 in the online appendix).

Figure 1: Integration of immigrants into general social policies




Figure 1 illustrates that the integration score varies greatly across the 27 countries. Some countries such as Germany, Sweden, Canada and Estonia are highly inclusive in terms of integrating immigrants into general social policies. In contrast, Norway, the United Kingdom and Hungary are comparatively restrictive against incorporating migrants into social security (← p. 46) and housing policies. Interestingly, the restrictive (on the right-hand side of Figure 1) as well as the inclusive country clusters (on the left-hand side of Figure 1) contain countries from very different types of welfare regime. For example, the cluster including countries with the most inclusive access to social protection for immigrants contains Scandinavian, liberal and corporatist welfare states as well as countries from Eastern Europe. At a first glance, general welfare state institutions and the integration of immigrants into public social protection seem not to be interrelated. In Section 5, we will test whether this descriptive finding also holds within a quantitative statistical framework.

3. Theory and hypotheses

Cross-national differences in immigrants' access to general social protection can be best explained by considering two strands of research. Indeed, as Sainsbury (2012) convincingly argues, combining the literature on welfare state and on integration regimes enables us to better understand variation in immigrants' access to social protection across countries. This combination brings us to two contrasting models from which opposing hypotheses can be derived: the post-national welfare state and the welfare chauvinist model.³

The post-national welfare state model which emerged in the early 1990s is best illustrated in Soysal's (1994) book "Limits of citizenship": as a result of the growing authority of supranational institutions and the global existence of the human rights framework, residence status (has) replaced citizenship as the primary requirement for access to social rights. The main dividing line in access to social services within this perspective is not between citizens and non-citizens, but between permanent residents and immigrants with other legal statuses (Brubaker, 1989, p. 156). Within the post-national welfare state model, citizenship does not play any significant exclusionary role with respect to the inclusiveness of social policies. Therefore, the cross-national variation in immigrants' access to general social protection is expected to follow a similar pattern to the cross-national variation in the overall generosity in

³ The few studies dealing with the historical development of immigrants' social rights distinguish between three periods of welfare inclusion and connect them to three models, the citizenship model, the post-national welfare state model and the welfare chauvinist model) (e.g. Koning & Banting, 2013).

respect of social policies (see also Römer, 2017, who empirically confirmed this positive association). According to Banting (2000, p. 25), “*countries that established a strong social regime, whether of social-democratic or corporatist complexion, have been more successful in incorporating new immigrants without eroding mass support for the welfare state.*” Furthermore, in comprehensive welfare states the level of generalized trust and social solidarity should be higher than in less generous ones. If citizens do not believe that non-needy immigrants abuse the welfare state system, they should be more willing to integrate immigrants into general social protection (Boräng, 2015, p. 216). Thus, according to the post-national welfare state perspective, immigrants’ access to general social protection is expected to be more inclusive in countries with a corporatist or social-democratic welfare state regime than in countries with a liberal welfare state regime (H1a). Moreover, within the post-national welfare state view and as is the case with the politicization of general social policy issues, inclusive vs. restrictive social policies toward immigrants should be traced back to a left-right policy divide: according to Sainsbury (2012), left-wing governments tend to implement more inclusive policies on immigrants’ social rights than right-wing governments. Indeed, as Sainsbury (2012) showed in her qualitative comparison of the inclusion of immigrants in the social policies of six countries, political parties in their capacity as office holders and policy makers turn out to represent key actors in drawing up and implementing measures for the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in social programmesprogrammes. This leads us to formulate a second hypothesis within the post-national welfare state perspective: immigrants’ access to social protection is expected to be more inclusive in countries where left-wing governments have dominated (H2a).

A further factor that might affect the integration of immigrants into general social policy is the size of immigration flows. According to the post-national welfare state perspective, we would expect countries with large immigration flows to provide immigrants with more inclusive access to social protection (H3a). Countries facing larger immigration flows are more likely to have already implemented this global human (← p. 47) rights framework into their national policies as they were under more pressure than other countries with lower immigration flows to adapt their social policies to their growing immigrant population.

In contrast to the post-national welfare state model, the welfare chauvinist model is characterized by a general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism. This general backlash should encompass the implementation of restrictive policies for immigrants’ access to social protection. Within this perspective, it can be expected that access to social rights for

immigrants is more restricted in countries with generous welfare systems since politicians restrict generous social benefits to citizens in order not to lose the support of the non-immigrant majority (H1b). This form of welfare chauvinism or so-called internal exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state clearly separates citizens as insiders from immigrants outside the boundaries of the welfare state (Boräng, 2015, p. 217). With regard to political parties, we would also expect the opposite relationship between left-wing governments and immigrants' access to social protection within the welfare chauvinist perspective. Indeed, the traditional left-wing parties' electorate is composed of the blue-collar and lower classes. Members of these classes are much more likely than members of higher classes to perceive immigrants as competitors for scarce economic resources and as a threat to their cultural identity: individuals belonging to the blue-collar and lower classes endorse anti-immigrant stances to a much larger extent than individuals from higher classes (Kriesi et al., 2008). The widespread immigrant resentments among the traditional left-wing electorate put left-wing parties in a dilemma: on the one hand, a growing segment of the population – including the traditional left-wing electorate – supports restrictive policies toward immigrants. On the other hand, left-wing parties have been the traditional defenders of immigrants' rights and are thus expected to pursue inclusive policies regarding immigrant rights within their own ranks (Freeman, 1986). Thus, in order to respond to the demands of their electorate, left-wing parties with office holders might be tempted to implement more restrictive policies in respect of immigrants' access to social protection (H2b).

Lastly, within the welfare chauvinism model we can also expect the reverse association between immigrants' access to social protection and immigration flows: countries facing large immigration flows are likely to restrict access to general social protection for immigrants (H3b) (see also Baldi & Goodman, 2013). Indeed, the costs of guaranteeing immigrants' access to generous social protection depend directly on the size of the target population that would benefit from this access. According to the welfare chauvinism perspective, the inclusiveness of social protection in respect of immigrants in a country is likely to decrease according to the level of immigration flow faced by this country.

We test both competing perspectives empirically for a broad sample of countries and expect the overall welfare generosity, the influence of left-wing parties and the immigration flow to exhibit a positive (post-national welfare state perspective; H1a, 2a and 3b) or negative (welfare chauvinism perspective; H1b, 2b and 3b) relationship with immigrants' access to general social protection.

Besides these hypotheses contrasting the post-national welfare state perspective with the welfare chauvinism perspective, we test two sets of interaction effects. Firstly, we want to test the groundbreaking conclusion that Sainsbury (2012) drew from her qualitative comparison of immigrants' access to social protection in France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. She convincingly points to the fact that welfare state regimes alone cannot explain why Denmark and Sweden differ to such a great extent in the incorporation of immigrants into their welfare states. Indeed, these two Scandinavian countries belong to the same welfare state regime, but have implemented contrasting policies on immigrants' access to the welfare state. According to Sainsbury, Denmark, in contrast to Sweden, affords immigrants more restrictive access to social protection. She argues that these differences could be related to the different integration regimes in Denmark and Sweden: the Danish integration regime is characterized by an explicit rejection of the positive accommodation of immigrants (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013), while Sweden opted for inclusive immigrant rights policies. Sainsbury (2012) thus comes to the conclusion (**← p. 48**) that understanding cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social protection requires that the combination of both welfare state and integration regimes be considered. So far, this finding has been observed solely in qualitative studies comparing a small number of countries. In this article, we are able to assess the generalizability of this result to a large sample of countries. If we translate Sainsbury's finding into quantitative terms, we would expect immigrants' access to social protection to be the most inclusive in countries with a generous welfare state and with an inclusive integration regime. By contrast, social protection access for immigrants is expected to be the most restrictive in less generous welfare states with a restrictive integration regime. We therefore hypothesize a positive interaction effect between welfare state generosity and the inclusiveness of integration policies on immigrants' access to general social protection (H4).

Since research on post-communist welfare states (e.g., Fenger, 2007; Hacker, 2009; Haggard & Kaufman, 2009) has shown that there are clear differences between traditional Western welfare states and post-communist welfare states due to the very different political and social trajectories on the two sides of the Iron Curtain, we additionally test whether the impact of left-wing governments and immigration flows on immigrants' access to social protection differs between post-communist and Western countries.

4. Method and Data

As mentioned above, our dependent variable is composed of four indicators, i.e. the access of immigrants and their families to social security and housing (see above for details). We use the MIPEX indicators for the most recent year available, which is 2014. Our country sample includes 27 rich democracies⁴. Since we want to explain variation in the level of immigrants' access to social security across countries, we run cross-sectional analyses. In addition and in order to assess the robustness of our findings, we run all models for the classical 21 OECD countries without the post-communist countries, because research has shown that social policies in post-communist countries have a different welfare state tradition than in Western European countries, as mentioned above.

To test our first hypothesis (i.e. H1a and H1b), we include the overall welfare state generosity in our analysis. The overall welfare state generosity is measured by the average replacement rates across three different programmes (unemployment, sickness and pension) (Scruggs, Jahn, & Kuitto, 2014). This indicator is only available for the 21 OECD countries. When analyzing the broader country sample of 27 countries, we include a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a country belongs to the Scandinavian type of social democratic welfare regime and 0 otherwise, assuming that Scandinavian welfare states are the most generous welfare states in our sample.

Our second hypothesis (i.e. H2a and H2b) refers to the relationship between left-wing governments and immigrants' access to general social programmes. To measure the strength of left-wing parties we include the cabinet share of leftist parties in our analysis (see Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel, Weisstanner, & Engler, 2016).

We computed the average rate of immigration flow (i.e. inflow of foreign population divided by the country's overall population) for the years 2003 to 2013, which enables our third hypothesis to be tested (i.e. H3a and H3b). The statistics for immigration flows and for the overall population have been retrieved from the OECD database (International Migration Database, "Inflows of foreign population" and Population Statistics Database).⁵ Additionally,

⁴ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, United Kingdom.

⁵ The OECD statistics do not provide immigration flow statistics for the following countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Croatia.

we use migration data provided by Eurostat to distinguish between immigration flows originating from EU and non-EU countries for the EU countries of our sample. Owing to the high number of missing values, our country sample size decreases considerably when using these Eurostat immigration flow statistics. We therefore present the results of the models using immigration flows from non-EU countries for the EU countries of our sample in the online appendix solely to show the robustness of our results (see Tables A04 and A05).

To test our fourth hypothesis, we operationalize countries' integration policies by using the Multicultural Policy Index for immigrants (MCP) developed by Banting and Kymlicka (Multiculturalism Policy Index, 2016). The (← p. 49) MCP index measures policies designed to recognize, accommodate and support immigrants' cultural differences and goes beyond purely capturing anti-discrimination policies (see for details Banting & Kymlicka, 2013, p. 583). Among the available comparative indices measuring integration regimes, the MCP index encompasses the largest range of countries (N=21 Western democracies). The MCP index is nevertheless highly correlated with other available comparative indices measuring integration regimes (Helbling, 2013). We use the immigrant MCP index scores for the year 2010. The index ranges from 0 (total rejection of positive recognition, accommodation and support of immigrants) to 8 (most inclusive recognition, accommodation and support policies for immigrants). Descriptive statistics for the main independent variables can be found in Table A02 in the online appendix.

We will test the aforementioned hypotheses by controlling for a standard set of variables that are assumed to influence the overall welfare state generosity, such as GDP per capita, the level of public debt, the dependency ratio measuring the share of the elderly as a percentage of the total working age population, the extent of globalization captured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of the GDP, and a dummy variable capturing EU membership. All independent and control variables are computed as averages across the period ranging from 2003 until 2013.⁶ Furthermore, we control for federalism, as it has been shown to affect immigrants' access to social protection (with federal countries providing more restrictive access to social protection for immigrants, Sainsbury, 2012). Including these variables does not change our main results. The detailed results can be found in the online appendix (Tables A04 and A05).

⁶ To ensure the robustness of our results, we have also taken averages from 1993 until 2013. The results remain the same and are available upon request.

5. Empirical Results

Table 1 presents our estimated results for the broader sample of countries including the post-communist countries. Model 1 is the baseline model and tests our first three hypotheses in respect of the effect of welfare state generosity (H1a and b), left-wing governments (H2a and b) and the level of immigration flows (H3a and b) on immigrants' access to general social protection. Moreover, in Model 1 we controlled for GDP and included a dichotomous variable to control for post-communist countries. In Models 2 and 3, we added interaction variables to analyze the extent to which the impact of our central independent variables differs between Western welfare states and post-communist countries.

Table 1: Access to general social programmes (incl. post-communist countries)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
GDP per capita	-0.00171** (0.000616)	-0.00168** (0.000613)	-0.00171*** (0.000553)
Scandinavian welfare state	35.90** (12.90)	35.24** (13.11)	36.57*** (12.73)
Immigration flow	3,697* (1,911)	3,661* (1,932)	4,628** (1,856)
Left-wing government	-1.000*** (0.304)	-0.960*** (0.293)	-0.927*** (0.310)
Post communist countries	-25.72 (21.32)	-20.34 (33.33)	0.923 (22.69)
Left-wing government * poco		-0.139 (0.528)	
Immigration flow * poco			-6,074* (3,015)
Observations	27	27	27
R-squared	0.390	0.391	0.483

Notes: poco = post-communist countries; standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of Model 1 clearly support the hypothesis that Scandinavian countries, which traditionally have a generous welfare state, also include immigrants in general social security to a greater extent than all other welfare regime types. The coefficient for “Scandinavian

welfare states” is positive and (\leftarrow p. 50) statistically significant at the 5 % level. The inclusion score measuring immigrants’ access to social protection is estimated to be more than 30 points higher than in alternative welfare regimes *ceteris paribus*. This result is consistent with our hypothesis 1a derived from the post-national welfare state perspective and not in line with the welfare chauvinism model (H1b): we find that welfare states with generous social regimes are more able and willing to include immigrants in general welfare state settings.

The results for our variable capturing the strength of left-wing parties in government lead us to reject H2a and confirm H2b. Consistent across all models, the share of left-wing parties in government in the last decade seems to have a negative impact on the inclusion of immigrants in general social protection. The coefficient in Model 1 is statistically significant at the 1% level and substantive in magnitude. What we could not observe with respect to the overall welfare state generosity in terms of welfare chauvinism, seems to hold when it comes to the governmental influence of left-wing parties: even though left-wing governments are traditionally in favour of more social spending and extending welfare state generosity, they tend to opt for strategies that save scarce resources for their core constituency. Left-wing governments seem to protect welfare states from outsiders, restricting immigrants’ right to claim general social protection benefits. The score in respect of immigrants’ inclusion in social security is estimated to be around 10 percent lower in countries where the representation of left-wing parties in government has been 10 percentage points higher over the last ten years.⁷

The estimations also reveal interesting results regarding the association between the size of immigration flows and the inclusion of immigrants in social protection. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that countries facing high levels of immigration flows provide immigrants with more inclusive access to general social protection (which confirms our H3a derived from the post-national perspective). The problematic issue of the pressure arising from high immigration flows seems to push governments to find policy solutions which might, in consequence, blur the citizenship boundary in the design of social policies and lead to more inclusive access for immigrants to social protection.⁸

⁷ This result does not imply that right-wing governments favour policies directed towards greater integration of immigrants into general social protection since the group of parties which is not coded as left-wing includes very different party families such as the greens, conservatives, Christian and center parties as well as right-populist parties.

⁸ It should be noted that even though our dependent variable measures immigrants’ access to social protection in 2014 and data for immigration flows refer to the average in the ten years before, the design of our empirical analyses (i.e. a cross-sectional analyses) does not enable us to fully determine the causality behind the two

In a last step, we test whether the effect of left-wing governments and immigration flows on immigrants' inclusion in social security differs between post-communist countries and those without a communist history (see Models 2 and 3). First, the interaction between post-communist countries and the share of left-wing parties in government in Model 2 is not significant. This means that the statistically significant and negative relationship between left-wing governments and the level of immigrants' inclusion into social protection is similar for both post-communist countries and Western countries. In Model 3, we added an interaction term between post-communist countries and immigration flows, which turns out to be significant and negative⁹. Accordingly, there is a significant relationship between high immigration flows and more inclusive access to social protection for immigrants solely in Western welfare states. In post-communist countries, the positive relationship between immigration flows and the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security disappears¹⁰.

Table 2 presents the results of our estimations that are limited to the 21 OECD countries. In Model 1 we again test our baseline model. In contrast to Table 1, Model 1 of Table 2 is composed of a more differentiated measurement of welfare state generosity that is only available for a smaller sample of countries (see Section 4 for more details). In Model 2, we additionally include the Multicultural Policy Index as the main effect and test in Model 3 whether the overall welfare state generosity is associated with more inclusive access to social protection for immigrants in countries characterized by inclusive integration policies (by including an interaction term between welfare state generosity and the Multicultural Policy Index).

Before turning to the relationships between the Multicultural Policy Index and our dependent variable, Model 1 of Table 3 enables us to test the robustness of the relationships between welfare state generosity, immigration flow and left-wing government, and the level of immigrants' access to social protection, as seen in Table 2, by restricting the analysis to a smaller sample of 21 countries (excluding the post-communist countries). First, we find a positive relationship between the overall welfare state generosity and immigrants' access to

variables. The relationship detected might also be interpreted with the welfare magnet thesis: countries providing more inclusive welfare schemes to immigrants might attract a larger number of immigrants.

⁹ All these results remain stable when using data on non-EU immigration flows. Unfortunately, this data is only available for a limited number of countries (see Tables A04 and A05 in the online appendix).

¹⁰ This result does not seem to be due to the large differences in the level of immigration flows in Western countries and post-communist countries as the statistically insignificant squared term for immigration flows indicates to us (model not reported due to limitations on space).

the welfare state in line with (← p. 51) the results of Table 1. However, the coefficient only reaches statistical significance in Model 1. In the smaller sample of 21 countries, the welfare state generosity is not as closely related to the social protection policies as it is in the larger country sample, which includes the post-communist countries. Second, the influence of left-wing governments remains the same in magnitude and statistical significance as in the large country sample of Table 2. Left-wing governments in Western welfare states as well as in post-communist countries seem to restrict immigrants' access to social security and social housing to protect scarce resources for their core clientele among the working class, who might feel threatened by outsiders' claims for social benefits.

Lastly, the results for immigration flows are also in line with the results of Table 1. Countries challenged by high levels of immigration flows tend to provide more inclusive access to social protection for immigrants.

In the second model of Table 2, we included the Multicultural Policy Index. Surprisingly, we do not observe a statistically significant substantive association between multicultural policies and the level of immigrants' inclusion in general social protection.¹¹ Countries scoring highly in terms of inclusive multicultural policies do not necessarily grant equal access for immigrants to mainstream social programmes. For the sake of comprehensiveness, we included an interaction term between the multicultural policy index and the variable measuring overall welfare generosity in Model 3. The main and interaction effects remain insignificant, which leads us to reject our last hypothesis (H4). Furthermore, this indicates that the findings obtained by Sainsbury (2012) for a limited number of countries cannot be generalized to a larger country sample.

¹¹ This result supports the bivariate pattern; the correlation coefficient of the two variables equals -.18 (Pearson's r)

Table 2: Immigrants' access to social protection - 21 OECD countries

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
GDP per capita	-0.00132** (0.000476)	-0.00132** (0.000492)	-0.00132** (0.000519)
Welfare state generosity	1.481* (0.815)	1.505 (0.894)	1.410 (2.196)
Left-wing government	-0.947*** (0.304)	-0.955** (0.340)	-0.953** (0.351)
Immigration flow	3,541* (1,825)	3,535* (1,876)	3,555 (2,094)
Non-EU immigration flow			
Multicultural policies		0.213 (2.134)	-0.405 (11.67)
Multicultural policies * welfare state generosity			0.0200 (0.405)
Observations	21	21	21
R-squared parentheses	0.422	0.423	0.423

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6. Conclusion

This article has provided one of the first quantitative studies investigating cross-national differences in the inclusion of immigrants into general social protection (see also Römer 2017). Based on comparative indicators from the MIPEX dataset measuring the access afforded different immigrant statuses to social housing and social protection, we were able to analyze the level of immigrants' inclusion into social protection across 27 rich democracies. In contrast to previous studies based on a qualitative approach focusing on a few countries, we assessed the extent to which a large number of industrialized democracies differ in the level of access to social security they grant to immigrants. Our results show very large variation in the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security and social housing across countries. Investigating the integration of immigrants into social policies across countries is therefore a highly relevant research question. Moreover, this variation does not seem to follow

a pattern that (← p. 52) could be interpreted solely in terms of welfare state or integration regimes. Rather, we point to the theoretical relevance of contrasting the post-national welfare state and welfare chauvinism models for understanding this cross-national variation. First, two main findings correspond to the expectations that can be derived from the post-national welfare state model, which states that citizenship is no longer a salient exclusionary boundary: generous welfare states and countries facing larger immigration flows tend to provide immigrants with more inclusive access to their general social protection schemes.

Interestingly, the relationship between immigration flows and the level of immigrants' inclusion in social protection does not hold in post-communist countries. We nevertheless also find evidence supporting the welfare chauvinism model which states that there is a general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism: left-wing cabinets are particularly reluctant to open general social protection schemes to immigrants as one type of outsider. Our results actually suggest that left-wing governmental actors tend to seek to protect their core constituency rooted in the working class by limiting inclusive social protection for immigrants.

Furthermore, our quantitative analysis enables us to evaluate the generalizability of findings highlighted in previous qualitative case studies to a large number of rich democracies. Indeed, our results relativize the conclusion drawn by Sainsbury (2012) regarding the important role played by integration regimes in explaining cross-national differences in the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security. According to our analysis based on Banting & Kymlicka (2013)'s Multicultural Policy Index for immigrants, multicultural policies are neither directly associated with the level of immigrants' access to social protection nor do they condition the relationship between the overall welfare state generosity and the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security. In other words, generous welfare states do not tend to have social protection schemes for immigrants which are significantly more inclusive when their policy constellation is characterized by inclusive multicultural policies.

This study suffers from some limitations, of course. First, the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security was measured by four indicators for immigrants' access to social security and housing that had been collated by national experts as part of the MIPEX project (Huddleston et al., 2015). These indicators should be considered as rough estimates of the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security and housing: such quantitative indicators are not intended to provide a nuanced measure of the complexity of such social policy fields. Furthermore, the indicators we used in this study provide a measure of the legislative

regulation surrounding the access of immigrants with different legal statuses to social security and social housing. The analysis of such indicators does not say anything about the effective implementation of regulations. Moreover, some social protection programmes might be accessible to immigrants with different statuses but nevertheless require a qualifying period of social insurance contributions or residence. Thus, some immigrants might have formal access to such programmes but at the same time be de facto implicitly disentitled. Further research is required to assess the outcome of such policies and the extent to which immigrants holding different types of legal status effectively access social security and housing. In addition and as mentioned earlier, our dependent variable measured immigrants' access to social security and housing without taking into account the overall level of generosity for social security and housing. Further studies are required to enhance our understanding on the complex relationship between these two dimensions across countries. However, even though data on the legal access of immigrants to social security do not capture aspects such as the effective coverage or benefit generosity, they allow us to shed light on the factors that shape the policies of central governments which are taking over responsibility for these affairs. In addition, this study focuses on access to social security and housing for immigrants who entered the destination countries legally. Our analysis cannot capture the exclusion mechanisms used by the destination countries through residency requirements. Keeping these limitations in mind, this study should therefore be understood as a first step toward a new research avenue that is aimed at assessing the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream policies from a comparative perspective. (← p. 53)

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Online Appendix:

Table A01: Policy Indicator for Access to General Social Protection of Immigrants

Indicator number	Description of indicator	Score of 100	Score of 50	Score of 0
1	Which categories of third-country nationals have equal access to social security? (unemployment benefits, old age pension, invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance)	Long-term residents, residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) and residents on family reunion permits	Long-term residents and residents on family reunion permits or long-term residents and certain categories of residents on temporary work permits	Only long-term residents or none
2	Do family members have the same access to social security as their sponsor (unemployment benefits, old age pension, invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance)?	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	No access
3	What categories of third-country nationals have equal access to housing benefits? (e.g., public/social housing, participation in housing financing schemes)	Long-term residents, residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) and residents on family reunion permits	Long-term residents and residents on family reunion permits or long-term residents and certain categories of residents on temporary work permits	Only long-term residents or none

4	Do family members have the same access to social housing as their sponsor? (e.g., public/social housing, participation in housing financing schemes)	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	No access
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Source: The 2014 Migrant Integration Policy Index; available from <http://www.mipex.eu>

Table A02: Integration of immigrants into general social policies – Descriptives

Country	Social Security	Housing	Overall
Estonia	100	100	100
Germany	100	100	100
Sweden	100	100	100
Canada	100	100	100
Romania	100	100	100
France	100	100	100
New Zealand	100	100	100
Poland	100	100	100
Slovakia	100	75	87.5
Switzerland	100	75	87.5
Italy	100	75	87.5
Denmark	75	100	87.5
Belgium	50	100	75
Spain	100	50	75
Austria	75	75	75
Finland	75	75	75
Japan	75	75	75
Bulgaria	50	50	50
Netherlands	50	50	50
Ireland	50	50	50
Portugal	50	50	50
USA	25	75	50
Greece	75	25	50
Czech Republic	25	25	25
Hungary	50	0	25
Australia	25	25	25

Norway	25	25	25
Slovenia	25	25	25
United Kingdom	0	0	0

Table A03: Descriptive statistics for the main independent variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
GDP per capita	27	33334.8	14792.8	9464.5	66960.6
Welfare state generosity	21	32.1	6.4	21.0	42.9
Immigration flow	27	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Left-wing government	27	32.4	22.0	0.0	76.0
Multicultural policies	21	3.6	2.4	0	8
Scandinavian welfare state	27	0.1	0.4	0.0	1.0
Post-communist countries	27	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0

Table A04: Robustness checks – Large country sample

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
GDP per capita	-0.0015** (0.000695)	-0.00171** (0.000620)	-0.00171** (0.000674)	-0.00163** (0.000635)	-0.00172** (0.000625)
Scandinavian welfare state	23.08* (12.55)	35.90** (13.37)	35.80** (13.90)	34.89** (12.68)	33.96** (16.21)
Left-wing government	-0.792** (0.301)	-1.001*** (0.322)	-1.002*** (0.316)	-1.004*** (0.309)	-1.004*** (0.312)
Immigration flow		3,700* (2,055)	3,705* (1,969)	3,837* (2,050)	3,498 (2,157)
Non-EU immigration flow	5,233 (4,479)				
Post-communist countries	-28.74 (23.54)	-25.63 (25.11)	-25.36 (22.98)	-21.46 (21.83)	-28.70 (22.49)
Trade openness		-0.00108 (0.149)			
EU membership			0.585 (11.47)		
Elderly				1.188 (2.204)	
Debt					-0.0505 (0.127)
Observations	21	27	27	27	27
R-squared	0.37	0.390	0.390	0.398	0.392

Notes: poco = post-communist countries; standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A05: Robustness checks – Small country sample

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP per capita	-0.0018** (0.00067)	-0.00153** (0.000541)	-0.00168* (0.000810)	-0.00156*** (0.000464)	-0.00158** (0.000561)	-0.00129** (0.000513)
Welfare state generosity	2.73 (2.04)	3.105*** (0.929)	2.290* (1.309)	1.133 (0.999)	1.678* (0.923)	1.535 (0.944)
Immigration flow		5,320*** (1,673)	3,253* (1,740)	4,015* (1,985)	3,227* (1,775)	3,084 (2,358)
Non-EU immigration flow	8,987** (3,759)					
Left-wing government	-0.773** (0.338)	-1.230*** (0.225)	-0.937*** (0.260)	-0.992*** (0.304)	-1.073*** (0.341)	-0.915*** (0.307)
Trade openness		-0.408** (0.169)				
EU membership			-15.08 (19.79)			
Elderly				0.385 (0.314)		
Debt					-0.174 (0.169)	
Federalism						4.377 (7.355)
Observations	15	21	21	21	21	21
R-squared	0.445	0.538	0.448	0.474	0.452	0.439

Notes: standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1