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Contested coasts: The production of space at Aotearoa New Zealand's coastline

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Part I Entering coastal spaces

1 Introduction

Many sailing boats and other pleasure craft are scattered on the Waitemata Harbour close to Auckland's city centre. This is not an unusual picture. However, on this day in March 2015, the people on the boats carry posters and banners, and a crowd joins them on land as well: This is a boat flotilla and a protest march against plans of Ports of Auckland to extend a wharf into the harbour. Four years earlier, in November 2011, there was a protest march by local Maori to a hearing of the Environmental Court in Tauranga. They tried to stop dredging plans of the Port of Tauranga. Furthermore, in Wellington, since 2014 a citizen group fights against the plans of the Airport to reclaim land in Lyall Bay for a runway extension.

All these three cases in major Aotearoa New Zealand cities are interrelated by a common theme: the development plans of ports and airports in coastal and marine areas contested by individuals and groups of people. These are for example residents or recreational users of the coastal areas. Moreover, also cultural issues can lead to conflicts. The opponents are challenging the developments through citizen initiatives as they cooperate with newspapers, they hand in submissions to the local councils, and also do not fear legal confrontation. These conflicts are in contrast to the image the Aotearoa New Zealand coast usually has as dream destination for many tourists and one of the favourite places for New Zealanders as well. Lonely beaches, surfing adventures or a relaxed holiday are associations much more commonly connected to the coast than conflict and protests. However, the coast is subject to changes, as residential and infrastructural developments are increasing. And these developments are not left unchallenged.

New Zealanders are strongly attached to their coast and many cultural imaginaries of Aotearoa New Zealand such as in books or movies are inspired by the beach (Hayward, 2008). The coast is a landscape laden with images, expectations, wishes, and dreams, not to forget about its economic value. New Zealand's coast was the arrival place for both Maori (indigenous people of New Zealand) and European settlers, and is therefore part of both cultures' narratives. The coastline is valued for its "untouched beauty" as well as for nature conservation. Furthermore, the coast is a place of childhood holiday memories (Collins and Kearns, 2010b). Many popular recreational activities and sports are carried out at the coast, on land as well as in and on the water. This prominence in the everyday cultures of Aotearoa New Zealand is also reflected in the political realm: In the main planning statute, the Resource Management Act 1991, the preservation of the natural character of the coast of Aotearoa New Zealand is an issue of national significance. However, this popularity leads to

a growing development pressure on the coast. Approximately three-quarters of New Zealanders live within 10km from the coast (Le Heron et al., 2019: 3). In the last decades, especially residential development at the coast was heavily debated in Aotearoa New Zealand (Brake and Peart, 2013: 152; Freeman and Cheyne, 2008). Generally, coastal development can lead to a loss of coastal wilderness, natural areas or access, and therefore also has an impact on amenity values and the “relaxed character” (Peart, 2009: 152) of the coast. In this multifaceted situation, there is not just one coast. Rather, many coastal spaces exist (Le Heron et al., 2019: 3; Walsh, 2017). These spaces are produced by a variety of actors, with different practices, techniques and aims. Coasts can be framed as spaces for nature conservation, for coastal protection, as cultural landscapes, as spaces for infrastructural or residential development (Brake and Peart, 2013; Freeman and Cheyne, 2008; Hayward, 2008; Peart, 2009; Walsh, 2017). In short, there is a multitude of coastal spaces, both material as well as immaterial (such as meanings or interpretations) and these become especially visible when conflicts occur. Whereas for developers, the coast and the sea are zones for potential development, the same areas do have different meanings for other actors: “Coastlines have multiple values and varying meanings for New Zealanders far beyond the physical and economic assets commonly identified in planning and policy making” (Hayward, 2008: 49). These different constructions of spaces can lead to conflicts.

Following Healey (2015), urban areas are full of these potential conflicts: “These are not just over materialities but over discourses and practices, that is, over ways of thinking and acting” (Healey, 2015: 299). Healey elaborates that there is potential for conflict about values, resource use, ways of life, memories or meanings, arising out of the different people and groups who share the same space. In the case of new developments, these fractures become evident, whereas in everyday life they are usually not visible. In less abstract terms, these conflicts can also develop from different demands towards the coast, such as site for infrastructural or coastal development, and cultural meanings, for example for indigenous people (Ruru et al., 2011b). Conflict around the coast in Aotearoa New Zealand has been researched with different focuses, such as coastal protection (Gesing, 2016), managed retreat (Scheve, 2019), or climate change adaptation (Hayward, 2008). Generally, conflicts in coastal and marine areas in Aotearoa New Zealand are growing (Le Heron et al., 2019: 3). In this dissertation, I will investigate different coastal spaces and their various meanings associated with them by different actors based on the three case studies in three Aotearoa New Zealand cities: Auckland, Tauranga and Wellington.

For this dissertation, I chose cases where conflicts are evident. In Auckland, two citizen initiatives fought against a planned wharf extension of Ports of Auckland and voiced concerns

on issues such as recreational use of the harbour, access to the coastline or visual connections which would be disturbed by the extension. In Wellington, the airport planned land reclamations into Lyall Bay to extend its runway. Here, the main protest came from a citizen initiative as well, with a wide set of arguments. In this case, I focus on the perception and assessment of landscapes, as well as the relationships residents and recreational users have with the coast. In Wellington, the opposition against the dredging of shipping channels was mainly led by local Maori, which gives this case a cultural aspect the other cases do not have in this extent.

Within my research, I use the empirical framework of the production of space (Lefebvre, 1991/1974). Lefebvre, following Marxist geographies, rejected an absolute understanding of space that dominated geographical thought until the 1970s (Hubbard, 2005: 42). Rather, he understood space as being intertwined with social relations, thus socially produced (Hubbard, 2005: 42; Lefebvre, 1991/1974). Actors “produce” different spaces through practices and techniques. These comprise formalised practices as in planning and development, surveying and charting; practices of everyday life by residents and recreational users as well as the spiritual and cultural meaning and significance of the coast. Understanding spaces not as pre-set entities but as produced and dynamic has implications for example on planning or living at the coast. In a container space thinking, social relations do not play a role, and people are living in a setting they cannot change. From a Lefebvrian perspective, people themselves are producing these spaces. This allows to see and analyse power relations, and can empower actors.

The different coastal spaces have different “qualities” and follow different reasonings: they are important for people’s everyday lives, play a role in cultural worldviews and practices, for visual amenity and recreation, or as area for a development, or are framed, mapped and planned in formalised planning and consenting processes. Walsh gives into consideration that “[t]he spatialities underlying these distinct geographies of the coast have, however, received little attention to date” (Walsh, 2017: 1). Within this dissertation, I investigate these different coastal spaces and how they are produced through a variety of practices and techniques.

However, the production processes of space raise many questions: How are nature and landscape defined and perceived? Who has access to the coast and its assets, amenities and resources? What counts as beautiful and what should be protected? Which norms, values or worldviews are the most important? To examine these questions, I follow a political ecology approach in this work as a complementary theoretical foundation to Lefebvres work (a more

detailed introduction to political ecology will be found in chapter 2.1). Next to my theoretical framework, consisting of political ecology and Lefebvres *Production of Space*, I use three concepts to link the abstract theory with my concrete cases. These are landscapes, infrastructures, and planning. I understand coastal spaces as landscapes in this work, which allows me to narrow Lefebvres theory and include both material and immaterial aspects of spatial production. As all my case studies revolve around infrastructural developments, I also detail on this concept. I do not understand infrastructures as solely technical-material, but as relational and constructed, and therefore deeply social. A third conceptual frame is planning as the main formal process that guides the developments. To investigate my research questions, I draw from literature review as well as my own empirical research (for methods see chapters 2.3 and 9).

Building on research that deals with the Aotearoa New Zealand coast from a qualitative social science perspective (Collins and Kearns, 2010b; Freeman and Cheyne, 2008; Gesing, 2016; Kearns and Collins, 2012; Murton, 2006; Peart, 2011; Ryks, 2014; Scheve, 2019), I focus on the production of space at New Zealand's coast. Investigating three case studies on conflicts around infrastructural developments, I want to reveal the multitude of spaces and variety of practices that produce these spaces. My aim is to show this diversity and make more sensitive for it and ultimately show that there is much more to "the coast" than what can be seen at a first glance.

1.1 Aim of dissertation and research questions

My overarching motivation is to investigate the specific human-environment-relations at the Aotearoa New Zealand coast. This dissertation focuses on the production of space at New Zealand's coast in the context of coastal infrastructural developments. I understand space as being "produced" by social processes, following Lefebvre's terminology. I focus specifically on conflicts in three case studies, because here, the different spaces and the social processes that produce them become more explicit and visible. This leads to my main research question:

How do different constructions of coastal space influence development processes for infrastructural projects in New Zealand?

With this question, I aim at a better understanding of how these different constructions of spaces interact and what power they unfold to see if they do influence the development processes. Furthermore, the following questions help to answer my main research question and specify it further:

1. Production of coasts:
 - a) What coastal spaces are produced in the case studies?
 - b) How do different actors produce these spaces?
 - c) Which concepts of space are relevant in what way?

2. Implications:
 - a) What are the aims and interests of the production of coastal spaces with regard to infrastructural development projects?
 - b) What power structures are (re)produced in the processes of coastal production?
 - c) How, if so, do marginalised and subaltern actors and discourses get integrated in planning processes? Where and how are they excluded?

Question 1a) specifically looks into the case studies to see what spaces are produced by the different actors in the conflicts, the “what”. Question 1b) focuses on the production processes and therefore practices that produce space, the “how”. Question 1c) aims more at the overarching concepts that categorise and characterise spaces, such as landscape, place, scale, and will help to find out which of these concepts are helpful to understand the spaces of the Aotearoa New Zealand coast. The second set of questions goes one step further and guides the investigation of the implications these production processes and produced spaces have. Question 2a) examines the aims and interests that are pursued with the production of spaces. Question 2b) has a closer look at the power structures around the production processes. This issue is narrowed down in question 2c), which focuses on the integration and exclusion of marginalised and subaltern actors and their spaces in formal planning and development processes.

1.2 Outline of chapters

In Part I, I introduce the theoretical concepts that are the foundation of my work. Starting with political ecology as my broad research approach (chapter 2.1), I will then detail on the concept of the production of space by Henri Lefebvre (chapter 2.2). Thereafter, I will discuss the methodological implications and my research design (chapter 2.3).

Part II focuses on the conceptual background of my work: landscapes, infrastructures and planning. In chapter 3, I will discuss landscapes as a specific form of space that helps to frame the coast and understand the related production processes. In chapter 4, I outline the

concept of infrastructures. Finally, in chapter 5, planning as an important driver of the production of conceived space will be presented.

Part III then turns to the specific Aotearoa New Zealand situation and perspective. I introduce historical developments and Aotearoa New Zealand specific context that are important to understand the contemporary processes of spatial production (such as the colonial history of New Zealand) and give context information for the case studies (chapter 7). This is followed by an overview over the New Zealand planning framework in chapter 8.

Part IV comprises the three case studies: dredging in Tauranga Harbour, wharf expansion in Auckland and the land reclamation plans of Wellington Airport. After a general introduction to the case studies, I detail on my methodology (chapter 9). Subsequently, I provide a detailed discussion of each case study in chapter 10 (Auckland), 11 (Wellington) and 12 (Tauranga) before concluding this work in chapter 13.

2 Theoretical background

My research builds on two theoretical foundations. First, political ecology guides me in how to approach my research, what questions to ask and in the design of this project. Second, I use Lefebvre's work on the production of space as a heuristical framework for my investigations. This chapter further details on these two. In Part II, I will introduce concrete concepts that serve as an intermediary step between theory and empirical material.

2.1 Political Ecology

Political ecology is one of the few approaches that studies nature-society interactions from a social science respectively interdisciplinary perspective (Neumann, 2011; Robbins, 2012). Drawing from different research traditions and fields, it offers a variety of approaches, methods and theories to investigate the interactions within and between society and the environment. Traditionally, political ecology is interested in the analysis of resource access, use and control. Its aim is to challenge "dominant understandings of how humans interact with their environments" (McCarthy et al., 2015: 620). Political ecology can be used as a "theoretical and political lens through which to understand, challenge, and structure further inquiry into nature-society relationships in the contemporary world" (McCarthy et al., 2015: 621). I understand nature-society interactions as central to my research. In the following, I will outline the development of political ecology and explain its role for my dissertation.

Political ecology emerged as a research approach in different contexts in the 1970s. It developed out of human and cultural ecology and was amongst others influenced by (neo-)Marxism, development and peasant studies, as well as cultural ecology (Robbins, 2012: 83). The (neo-)Marxist influence led to a structural approach, with a focus on the global capitalist system and the corresponding class relations and modes of production (for other exemplary publications of that time see e.g. Hecht, 1985; Watts, 1983). Initially, political ecology focused on environmental degradation in the so-called "third world" countries. Important characteristics of political ecology were (and still are) to understand land management as a social phenomenon. Early political ecology publications (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987b) challenged colonial and conventional explanations of soil erosion by a detailed analysis starting from the household level. They analysed the interplay between economy and the social world and its effect on the environment to test common assumptions and find alternative explanations and interpretations of environmental phenomena. The focus of early political ecology research was on regional and rural case studies, promoting in-depth

analysis and tracing connections over multiple scales, following the typical “chain of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987a; Robbins, 2012; Watts, 2009). Even though the majority of political ecology publications are not strictly Marxist, the investigation of the impact of external structure and the integration of political economy still plays an important role in many political ecology analyses (Watts, 2009). In addition, the normative foundation as well as a focus on justice remains alive in contemporary political ecology research.

In the last decades, a broadening of the research agendas could be observed. On a theoretical level, the inclusion of the role of discourse and related power relations as well as plurality of knowledge introduced a strand with a more poststructuralist thinking into political ecology (Forsyth, 2008) (for other important publications of that strand see e.g. Leach and Mearns, 1996; Peet and Watts, 1996). Furthermore, there was a diversification of research topics (for an overview about recent research topics and foci see both Bryant, 2015 and Perreault et al., 2015). Due to the enlarged research agenda, also first world countries became object of political ecology analysis. McCarthy et al. describe this as a development “from a term for a relatively narrowly focused and arguably counterhegemonic stream of research within certain key Anglophone institutions, to an institutionally sanctioned umbrella term for critical analyses of ‘environment’-related research in multiple disciplines, regions, and languages” (2015: 620). This plurality is also criticised (Walker, 2005, 2007; Watts, 2009: 547).

Today, political ecology offers an approach to study nature-society relationships from a critical and normative perspective. It can be understood as an umbrella for a range of different approaches that investigate nature-society interactions, related by their academic historical development and a core of literature. However, there are several overarching principles I want to introduce in the following, as well as show how they are relevant for my research (based on McCarthy et al., 2015: 626). Political ecology encourages researchers, activists or citizens to challenge and deconstruct common apolitical explanations of environmental issues as well as in other fields of nature-society interaction. Furthermore, also the categories of the human or the society on the one hand and the environment or nature on the other hand are subject to investigation (Gesing et al., 2018). The political ecology approach invites researchers to be sensitive to different explanations, “truths” and forms of knowledge. Global power structures and inequalities are investigated with a political economy perspective that helps to identify logics of capitalism that are producing environmental transformation and degradation. The focus on the global south shifted to an approach that can be helpful in any location of the world, however still often with a focus on marginalized communities. Specifically, the awareness of the interconnectedness of many processes is a strength of political ecology. Even though the traditional “chain of explanation”

is not strictly followed by most political ecology researchers anymore, it informs about and makes aware of the interconnectedness between actors and different scales as well as locations. Therefore, a key element of political ecology research is the social and historical context of a problem (McCarthy et al., 2015). My work adopts several of these issues. First, even though I do not see this work in a strictly Marxist tradition, I understand my position as generally critical of capitalism and its effects on the environment and society. The infrastructural developments in my case studies are all justified by a growth agenda which I will critically discuss in relation towards other norms and values. Furthermore, I see my research as political in the way that the production of space is not a neutral process, but that it reflects the power relations of the societies where it takes places. The spaces are produced for certain reasons that serve the interests of some and confine those of others. Another point is the definition of what nature is and how it relates to culture or society. Here as well, there exist different concepts that either enable or restrict uses. These concepts can be justified by different forms of knowledge, which I will discuss in the following section. Last, I follow the political ecology tradition of case studies, including the social and historical context of the conflicts around coastal infrastructures.

Knowledge

After this general introduction to political ecology, I will focus on the issue of knowledge in this section. In planning, decision-making processes and conflicts around infrastructural developments, there are usually competing positions and explanations, stemming partially from different knowledges. This can be for example scientific knowledge in an expert's evidence, report or planning document, and local or indigenous knowledge, passed on orally by local (indigenous) people. One of the main characteristics of political ecology is that it investigates and challenges "traditional" explanations as well as the production of knowledge in general. Hand in hand with this goes the appreciation of alternative explanations as well as other forms of knowledge. Scientific knowledge often appears as objective or universally true. However, researchers work in specific contexts and have different perspectives. This means that research is always restricted and never universally true: it produces "situated knowledges" (Haraway, 1988). Similarly, the concept of "local knowledge" describes that knowledge is geographically and historically bound, and that the local circumstances as well as contexts have an effect on the knowledges that are produced (Barnes, 2009: 422). The underlying assumption for both approaches is that knowledge is not out there to be discovered, but rather produced by certain persons or groups in certain contexts:

Knowledge does not come from the sky, from heavenly inspiration, but from engaging in particular kinds of social practices that are historically and geographically grounded. [...] Knowledge is irreducibly social, never innocent, always coloured by the context of its production. (Barnes, 2009: 422)

This quote underlines that there is not one truth or one simple answer or solution to a question or problem. Furthermore, also scientific knowledge is just one form of knowledge, one way of explanation, that exists next to other knowledges. Forsyth (2008) discusses that so-called indigenous knowledge is often eclipsed by more dominant forms of explanation, especially through Western science. He points out the differentiation between expert knowledge (ascribed to science or professionals) on the one hand and lay knowledge (ascribed to traditional knowledge, indigenous people, or “normal” citizens) on the other hand. He criticizes that scientific knowledge is often portrayed as “neutral” or “objective”, even though it is a form of local and situated knowledge as well. Agrawal criticizes this dichotomy that is often constructed between Western science and indigenous knowledge. He argues that the situation is much more complex, as all knowledges are anchored in a specific context. It would make more sense and be more fruitful “to talk about multiple domains and types of knowledges” (Agrawal, 1995: 433) than keeping the dichotomy. Furthermore, Agrawal stresses that the way knowledge is classified always serves “the purpose for which it is generated. [...] Specific strategies for protecting, systematizing and disseminating knowledge will differentially benefit different social groups and individuals” (Agrawal, 1995: 433). The issue of knowledges is especially interesting for the analysis of my case studies, as there are tensions between different knowledges (see case studies chapter 10-12).

Summary

Political ecology allows me to first, position my research in a normative and political research tradition. It encourages me to ask questions of power and justice, to uncover marginalization, to find alternative explanations, and to trace political and economic interests. Second, it allows me to employ a specific research agenda that focuses on the question of nature-society interactions. In more detail, this means to investigate what natures are constructed, what natures are ignored and whose interests do they serve. Also, coastal infrastructures are not neutral objects. Their development serves certain interests and favours certain norms and ideologies (such as a growth paradigm), whereas it hinders others (such as spiritual ones). Therefore, the development of coastal infrastructures is tied to specific framings of

nature and culture. Furthermore, when conflicts emerge around these developments, they can hint to these different positions, power structures and the conceptions of nature and society.

This links closely to my empirical research. Focusing on coastal landscapes, issues of environmental impact, effects on visual amenity or recreational use are rated very differently by different stakeholder (opponents and proponents of the development projects). I want to investigate these different understandings of the coastal landscape and how they are linked to the production of distinct coasts in the conflicts around infrastructural developments. The second set of my research questions is therefore especially strongly influenced by a political ecology perspective (What are the aims and interests of the production of coastal spaces with regard to infrastructural development projects? What power structures are (re)produced in the processes of coastal production? How, if so, do marginalised and subaltern actors and discourses get integrated in planning processes? Where and how are they excluded?). To complement my political ecology approach, I draw from Lefebvre's thoughts on the production of space, which I will explain in the following.

2.2 Lefebvre's Production of Space

Whereas political ecology forms the broad approach of my work and my position in the research field of nature-society relations, Lefebvre's work informs my understanding of space. The French (Neo-)Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991) was one of the most influential social theorists of the 20th century. His book "The production of space" ("La production de l'espace") (Lefebvre, 1991/1974) found – and still finds - wide reception amongst city and regional researchers, human geographers and architects. Even though it was originally published already in 1974, its English translation in 1991 provided it with wide attention among non-French scholars (Schmid, 2010). In "The production of space", Lefebvre outlines his theory of space. Lefebvre's theory is not about space *per se*, but about the *production* of space. As he understood social space as a social product, he was not interested in the mere artefacts of spatial production, but in the production process itself. This has three implications. First, spatial arrangements are explicitly framed as produced and constructed. Their societal aspects obvious because they are the outcomes of societal power relations and processes. Second, by putting the focus on the production process, the alterability and the changing nature of spaces becomes highlighted. Third, by looking at the production process, it becomes clear that we have to take the producers into account, the people and

mechanisms that stand behind the production processes and are consciously or unconsciously part of producing space.

Only by investigating how society and social practice work we can determine the role space plays and how a social practice becomes a spatial practice (Belina, 2013: 24). Lefebvre seeks to “demystify capitalist social space by tracing out its inner dynamics and *generative moments*” (Merrifield, 2000: 171). Merrifield states further:

Lefebvre sees fragmentation and conceptual dislocation as serving distinctively ideological purposes. Separation ensures consent, perpetuates misunderstanding, and worse: it reproduces the status quo. By bringing these different modalities of space together within a single theory, therefore, Lefebvre seeks to *expose* and *decode* space [...]. The key concept to contend with, however, is *production*. (Merrifield, 2000: 171, *emph. in original*)

To expose and decode the different modes of production of space, Lefebvre presents a framework of three modalities of space: *espace conçu*, a conceived, intellectual space of planners, *espace vécu*, the lived space of everyday experience, and *espace perçu*, the perceived spaces of material practice. His “complex heuristic device”, as Merrifield calls it (2000: 171), is only sketched out in a preliminary fashion in his book and leaves us to re-write it as part of our research. In that way, it is not a “closed” or very coherent “theory” in the conventional way, but rather a record of his thoughts (Schmid, 2010). This has the disadvantage that many things stay unclear, open or even contradictory and there is no profound theoretical framework to lean on. But this openness is also an advantage. It gives the opportunity to adapt the thoughts to the present times, to use his work as starting point for own research, rather than a theoretical corset the research has to be pressed into. Lefebvre himself raised the point that there cannot be one generic theory for everywhere, but that specific contexts have to be acknowledged: “[...] every society – and hence every mode of production [...] – produces a space, its own space” (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 31). With this understanding of spaces, Lefebvre countered the prevalent understanding of space. During that time, space was seen as a container or absolute space, a notion which has been prevalent in science for centuries (for a discussion see Löw, 2012: 17–34). In the following sections, I will introduce the three modalities of space: *espace conçu*, *espace vécu* and *espace perçu*.

Espace conçu

Espace conçu is the conceived space, a concept about space. It is an intellectual space of planning and science, produced by technocrats and professionals like engineers, architects, and geographers (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 38). This space is produced by thinking about space, by formalised knowledge. This knowledge is not objective, but tied to power and ideology (Schmid, 2010: 218). Formalised knowledge is based on a strategy of reduction, and follows therefore a logic of separation. *Espace conçu* is produced through and manifest in intellectual and verbal signs (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 39). This includes maps and plans as well as language and discourses (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 233). Also images, signs and the built environment can play a role in the production of *espace conçu*. For example, monuments, towers, factories or office blocks speak a specific spatial language and represent specific uses and power relations. This explains why *espace conçu* is also called the “representation of space”: maps, plans, language and discourse are used to represent this space and this specific way of conceptualising and thus producing space. The term “representation” incorporates both ideology and knowledge (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 45): as space is pretended to be objectified, the societal production processes of space are hidden and the production of space seems natural (Deffner, 2010: 53). In that way, the social production of the representation of space has to be analysed in order to uncover and demystify the assumed “naturalness” and “objectivity” of the production of space (ibid.). A map, for example, is deeply political: what does it show, what is left out, and how are things symbolized?

Espace conçu is the dominant space in most capitalist societies (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 39). Merrifield understands this dominance has its root in the circumstance that *espace conçu* is the space of capital, and that the system is a capitalist system (Merrifield, 2000). *Espace vécu* and *perçu* are usually subordinated to *espace conçu*. Merrifield states that „conceptions [...] rule our lives” (Merrifield, 2000: 175). The conceived spaces are treated as “objective”, and the lived experience seems to be of little or no importance. Its representations repress other forms of space and tries to conceptualise them. The reductions of formalised knowledge impose their order on the practice (Schmid, 2010: 218).

Espace vécu

Espace vécu is the lived space, the space of action and everyday life. It is the space of its users and inhabitants and their experiences (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 39), and can also comprise the clandestine or underground side of life (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 33). In that way, *espace vécu* is the opposite to the formalised knowledge and professionals of the *espace conçu*. As it is

more felt than thought (Merrifield, 2000), it is also not manifested in formalised verbal and intellectual form, but rather in lived situations, in action, in symbols. *Espace vécu* manifests itself in stories and history, experiences, values, traditions, and images (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 41; Schmid, 2010). Lefebvre calls it a space of representation, a representational space, which is alive and has an affective kernel (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 42). He refers to several spatial examples like bedroom, square or graveyard; spaces which represent a specific meaning or use (Schmid, 2010: 223). So, *espace vécu* is connected to codes and presents complex symbols. These codes are very varied and reflect the wider diversity of social space (Schmid, 2010: 223ff.). Also conventions can be contained in *espace vécu*, space that “denominates what should be done” (Schmid, 2010: 224). The other way around, these spaces are produced against the background of societal conditions (Deffner, 2010: 163). The codes, symbols and conventions which allow the subjects to access their spaces are specific to every society. Furthermore, *espace vécu* is also closely linked to feelings.

So, if someone belongs to a certain social group, they use the bedroom to sleep and feel comfortable when they think of it, they shudder when one thinks of the square and the violent end of a demonstration, and they become sad when they go to the graveyard to bury and mourn the deceased. This example illustrates the essential production process of the *espace vécu*, the production of meaning: “It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects” (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 39). Also the importance of contextualisation is apparent here. With another societal background, one would maybe make different use of or not know at all a bedroom, a square, and a graveyard. The representational space shows most obviously that space is a product of the history of a society, that its specific meanings were produced in a process (Deffner, 2010: 54). The uncovering of the social codes embedded in the *espace vécu* is only possible by considering its historical context (ibid.).

Espace perçu

Lefebvre did not want to set up a dichotomy, a contradiction between the *espace vécu* and *conçu*. Consequently, he introduced a third mode of space in his heuristic, *espace perçu*. The *espace perçu* deals, as its name suggests, with perceived spaces. It is the physical-material space in which the activities of collective actors are inscribed as reality (Schmid, 2010: 211). Its constituting processes is the spatial practice, which is the material result of human activity and the people’s perception (Deffner, 2010). Schmid elaborates further on the topic:

Spatial practice comprises production and reproduction, specific places and spatial ensembles [...] Lefebvre assumes that everyone knows what

is meant when one talks about a room, a street corner, a place, a market, a cultural or shopping centre, a public space etc. These terms of everyday speech distinguish, without isolating, particular spaces and describe generally a social space. They correspond to a use of this space and therefore to a spatial practice, which expresses them [the uses]. (Schmid, 2010: 211)

Human bodies and collective actors are the producers of that space. *Espace perçu* becomes observable through acts by collective actors in the form of durable objects and realities (Schmid, 2010: 211). This can be understood as the construction of specific places and spatial ensembles, either in material form or figuratively, as shared understandings, like room, market, or place. Words of everyday language distinguish and correspond to specific uses of a space, to a spatial practice which expresses this usage (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 16; Schmid, 2010: 211). Here as well, the historic genesis has to be considered, as a progression of productive acts (Schmid, 2010: 213). Deffner (2010: 52) compares the spatial practice to an unreflected practice of everyday life, which accepts societal relations, and in that way reproduces specific spaces and spatial ensembles.

Not only places play an important role for *espace perçu*, but also networks, routes and patterns of interaction that link different places (Merrifield, 2000). In Lefebvre's words, spatial practice links "daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, 'private' life and leisure)" (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 38). Merrifield sees them as a kind of link between *espace conçu* and *vécu*, still he argues that Lefebvre stays unclear how exactly *espace perçu* mediates between *espace vécu* and *conçu*. Nonetheless, this third space is important to break open the binary between lived and conceived (Merrifield, 2000), and so create the "trialectical" connection of the spaces.

Summary

Even though the three constituting spaces of the spatial triad are presented separately above, they never exist on their own. Lefebvre's heuristical framework can be understood as three glasses we can put on to see space through a specific lens. Still, there is only one space on a general level, we just concentrate on one specific part of it at a time. This is central to Lefebvre's theory. His intention was not to divide and separate space, but to create a single theory of space. So even if three forms of space are outlined above, they are all part of one space, of one spatial theory. They influence each other, flow into one another and include characteristics of each other. They can only be thought, theorized and lived all together.

Nevertheless, for empirical and theoretical reasons, the – interim – division of space helps to understand and identify its different processes of production.

It is also very important to stress that these three spaces are neither in a stable and fixed relation to each other nor do they hold a stable and fixed form. Rather, their characteristics depend very much on the historical and cultural background. Therefore, it is essential to situate and contextualise the spatial triad with “real life relationships and events” (Merrifield, 2000: 175). Especially if we keep in mind that Lefebvre did not define his spatial triad very detailed. Consequently, it should not be interpreted as a model, scheme or systematic (Belina, 2013), but be adapted to the research context. Different studies using Lefebvre’s “Production of Space” in their investigation show how diverse the spatial triad can be interpreted and applied to actual case studies (Deffner, 2010; Stanek, 2008; Young and Keil, 2014).

2.3 Methodological implications and research design

In this work, I combine the approach of political ecology and the heuristic of Lefebvre to investigate the production processes of space at New Zealand’s coast. On the first sight, these two theoretical frameworks seem to be very different. On the one hand, Lefebvre’s thoughts on a theory of space are a rather theoretical, specific and abstract work by one researcher. On the other hand, political ecology is a relatively broad approach or even umbrella under which many researchers or activists from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds mingle. This leads as well to a wide variety in theories, methods and explanations. So what are the advantages of such a combination? Political ecology and Lefebvre’s work on the production also share many aspects, and therefore can be well combined to create a specific perspective on the production of space at New Zealand’s coasts.

Both political ecology approaches and Lefebvre are investigating symbolic meanings and immaterial issues, based on constructivist notions. However, they both do not negate materiality (e.g. of spaces or of natural resources) and consider it an important factor. Both are interested in processes, and specifically the people, groups and mechanisms that shape them. They are both aware that there are several “realities” (such as several spaces, or several “truths” or explanations). This awareness for different perspectives and groups of actors leads to an interest in power relations in both political ecology approaches as well as Lefebvre’s theory on space. On a more general level, they want to look behind what is taken for granted or seen as normal and show the hidden processes that produce these situations

or spaces. And, last but not least, they have similar roots in (neo-)Marxist thinking. Whereas Lefebvre's thoughts stay on a rather abstract level, political ecology approaches offer more research approaches. In the following, I explain what implications the application of these two theories has for my methodology and research design. A political ecology approach allows to explore material and immaterial practices of the production of space in a tension field between different actors such as the State, local governments, planners, experts, Maori, residents, sailors, surfers, and courts. Lefebvre's thoughts on space, used here as a heuristical framework, remind to concentrate on the social processes and not on space as an artefact. My research builds on literature reviews for the chapters in part II and III of this dissertation. Document and policy analysis inform part III and also the case studies in part IV. The case studies build on empirical material I collected through interviews, site visits, newspaper article analysis, policies, laws, court decisions, maps and participants' maps. My methods for collecting the empirical material for the case studies are described in more detail in chapter 9.

My main research question asks how different constructions of coastal space influence development processes of infrastructural projects in New Zealand. More specifically, I want to investigate the production of the coast and the implication this has on societal relations and the planning process. If we look at the research questions in the light of the theory of the previous chapter, it becomes visible that both a political ecology approach as well as Lefebvre's theory on the production of space play a role in formulating and answering the research questions. Regarding the conceptualisation of space, Lefebvre's theory helps to put the focus on the three different aspects of space, *espace vécu*, *perçu* and *conçu*. Political ecology provides a helpful framework to pose certain kinds of questions and put the focus on certain issues. These questions and issues revolve around environmental justice (Who is winning, who is losing?), human nature relationships (What understanding of "nature" or "environment" is hegemonic?), political dimensions and power issues (Who decides? Whose world views and paradigms influence explanations?). These questions were helpful for developing my own research questions, especially when it comes to actors or historical developments. Thus, the questions from 1a-c lean slightly stronger on a Lefebvrian theory, whereas the questions 2a-c are rather related to a political ecology

I chose a qualitative research design to investigate my research questions. I constructed three case studies to collect own empirical material around conflicts about the development of infrastructures in coastal landscapes. This approach leans closely on a "traditional" political ecology research approach, which builds on case studies. Political ecology offers an approach that also includes the context of the cases, i.e. taking historical aspects into account as well,

trace the development of the case, have a look at different involved actors and see who profits and who loses from a certain development. This informed the decisions concerning my research: I chose to include the historical development of the cases as well and see them united by a common context. Here, one of my main interests lies in the power relations corresponding to the production of coastal spaces. I analyse conflicts about the use of the resource “coastal landscape”, looking at competing understanding and representations as well as uses. A political ecology perspective enables to focus on and make visible political and economic power aspects of environmental issues in general, and, in this case, conflicts at the coast in specific. The political ecology lens also helped to keep a certain perspective while analysing my material.

Lefebvre’s approach regarding the production of space offers an entrance into an analysis of the production processes of space. Using his theory as heuristic framework allows to put focus on the societal processes that produce space. Research about the production of space is always about uncovering social relationships and concentrating on the production of space (Lefebvre 1991:90). Even though all three modes of spaces exist everywhere and at the same time, there are some predominant characteristics which allow to explore the production processes of spaces in greater detail. Belina reminds us that “How and in what form the ‘spatial’ in spatial practice is relevant to explain social phenomena [...] has to be determined in each case” (Belina 2013:78). Using Lefebvres ideas as a heuristic framework, it is possible to derive methodical and empirical implications out of this. However, this is not easy: The investigation of the production of space “is a task that necessitates both empirical and theoretical research, and it’s destined to be difficult” (Merrifield 200:173). Lefebvres meta-theory cannot be applied entirely and unmodified to a specific research question, that is an endeavour which is doomed to fail (Deffner 2010:54). Rather, his thoughts should be used as a guiding a direction, they can serve as reference point (Schmid 2010:332).

When we follow Lefebvre’s spatial triad, the production processes can be distinguished into the production of (formalised) knowledge (linked to *espace conçu*), the production of meaning (linked to *espace vécu*) and the material production of space (linked to *espace perçu*). These production processes are linked to material and immaterial artefacts which are produced by different actors. *Espace conçu* is manifest in formalised, intellectual artefacts. These comprise for example plans, maps and discourses. Also the built environment can represent the *espace conçu*, e.g. in official buildings (Merrifield 2000). It is planners, technocrats and scientists who produce these artefacts, all of which inscribe a specific form of formalised knowledge into space and thus produce the *espace conçu*. *Espace vécu* is constituted by the production of meaning. It is the everyday life and its experiences which add

a symbolic dimension to space. This results generally in artefacts such as stories, values, traditions, and experiences. It is the “ordinary” people, the inhabitants and users, who steer this production process. *Espace perçu* is produced by the perception of the physical, sensual and material environment through the human body and its spatial practices. The artefacts can be routes or networks as well as commonly understood terms of places like room, market or street corner.

How can these spaces, their artefacts and processes be approached analytically and methodologically? Although it is “never easy to set back from the object [...] to the activity that produced and/or created it” (Lefebvre 1991:113), this is exactly what has to be done to overcome a fetishisation of space and to discover the underlying societal production processes. The above-mentioned artefacts can serve as a starting point to approach the production processes of space.

However, there is no operationalisation of these concepts in Lefebvre’s work. In this regard, practice theory can help to operationalise Lefebvres theory by putting the focus on practices and investigate how they produce space (Reckwitz, 2014: 19). Practice theory puts the focus on actors and their practices, and wants to investigate how practices construct reality (Elias et al., 2014: 3). In my case, this would be the production of spaces. I follow Schatzki in that I have a broad understanding of practices, including “phenomena such as knowledge, meaning, human activity, science, power, language, social institutions, and historical transformations”, which are all aspects or components or practices (Schatzki, 2001: 9). Practices can be both, either routinized and unreflected, or intentional and explicit (Elias et al., 2014: 4; Everts et al., 2011: 326). Furthermore, practices includes both saying and doing (Everts et al., 2011: 323). Saying relates to the immaterial discursive realm, whereas doing is more focused on material practices. This is one of the advantages that practice theory has: it includes materiality as well, without being essentialist (Everts et al., 2011; Schatzki, 2001). Regarding space and the production of space, spatial analysis following a practice theory approach connects well to Lefebvres work (Reckwitz, 2014: 19). Practice theory approaches after Schatzki do have a “dynamic and activity-oriented understanding of space” (Everts et al., 2011: 327), which I see as linking well to Lefebvres understanding of space. Furthermore, both the production of space as well as practices consider materialities important factors in the construction of realities.

So what does Lefebvre offer us in terms of more concrete hints how spaces are produced? *Espace conçu* is produced through practices of planners, scientists, technocrats, engineers or architects, who are usually informed mainly by Western scientific knowledge. Here, artefacts

such as official documents, maps, and plans of “professionals”, but also discourse and language can be entry points into analysis. Additionally, interviews are illuminating motives and ways of thinking of the actors performing in these production processes. I will therefore include official documents such as resource management legislation, plans and policies as material. Furthermore, I interviewed councillors, planners and other experts during my field stay in Aotearoa New Zealand to understand their ways of conceiving space.

Espace vécu, as a space of everyday life, can be approached through the experiences of its users and residents. As it is not formalised like *espace conçu*, the challenge lies in not blurring the meaning of the experience by the research methods and a corset of formalised thinking (Schmid 2010:224). Interviews with user and residents allowed me to investigate experiences and the lived space. Books, pictures, songs, and oral history can help to approach the production processes of *espace vécu*, as they expose feelings, values and traditions. Here, I used for example a collection of traditional stories of the local Maori of the Tauranga region (Stokes, 1980b). Furthermore, I also interviewed members of the Maori communities and residents that are closely connected to the landscape in their everyday lives.

To study *espace perçu*, the processes of spatial practice and material production have to be taken into focus. The perception of space can be experienced by the researcher herself, through site inspections and observations. However, the material spatial practices of different actors are important in producing *espace perçu*. These can be either physically using the space (commuting, recreational use, ...) or by materially altering it (building infrastructures, ...). Additionally, I asked my interview partners to sketch participant’s maps for me. These helped to capture their interactions with the area.

Participant’s maps or drawings can be a reasonable completion to the methods in all three cases, as they enable interviewers and interviewees to document arrangements which cannot be put into words easily. However, whereas *espace conçu* is usually produced through processes which are detectable relatively easy (official maps, plans, laws, political decisions are usually accessible), practices that are related to *espace vécu* or *espace perçu* are often much harder to reveal. Here, the maps drawn by the research participants allowed deeper insights.

I want to stress again at this point that there can be no clear separation made between the different modalities of space and the processes that produce them. This distinction is made for analytical reasons, to focus on specific aspects of space and somehow organise them so that they can be investigated and discussed.

Part II Conceptual background: landscapes, infrastructures and planning

In the previous part, I introduced my research topic and questions as well as my methodological approach and the outline of chapters. Most importantly, it also included the theoretical foundation for this dissertation, namely political ecology as an approach and Lefebvre's theory on the production of space as a heuristic framework. Political ecology in general offers an approach in the broadest sense (and not a narrow set of theory, concepts or methods). Lefebvre's theory on the production of space offers a theoretical perspective and heuristic framework on space. However, both political ecology as well as Lefebvre's *Production of Space* remain rather on an abstract level. To bridge the gap between the theory on the one side and the empirical case studies on the other side, I will introduce three conceptual backgrounds in this part: landscapes, infrastructures and planning.

Furthermore, I define two main axes that are lying across the concepts. These are informed by a political ecology perspective. First, I understand them as socially constructed, and second, therefore enmeshed into social power relations. As Lefebvre did not want his thoughts on the production of space be understood as a universal theory, one has to fill them with concrete content, depending on the research context. In this regard, the following chapters are the first step into filling Lefebvre's theory with my concrete topics.

First, I will focus on landscapes as a specific form of space which is highly relevant in my research context. I outline the processes that produce specific landscapes and the power that underlie the processes, such as ideologies or labour relations. Chapter 4 then addresses the topic of infrastructures. The development of infrastructures at the coast are the starting points around which I will later develop my case studies. Here as well, issues of power are addressed as well as the construction of infrastructures by society. The third chapter in this part details on planning as a dominant technique or practice to produce space, especially *espace conçu*. Furthermore, as all coastal developments are enmeshed in a planning system, they cannot be understood without some knowledge about it. These chapters are the foundations from which I will afterwards focus specifically on the Aotearoa New Zealand context in Part III and IV.

3 Landscapes

The concept of landscape serves as an intermediate step to investigate the production of space in this work. Whereas space is a broad and abstract concept, landscape is a more specific, concrete way to understand certain aspects of space (cf. D Mitchell, 1996). In my work, I refer specifically to the distinct landscape of the coast. Whereas in this part, I will stay on a general level discussing landscape, in the course of this dissertation the coastal landscape and its production will be discussed and analysed in detail. In the first section of this chapter, I will describe the development of the concept of landscape. I will then discuss how landscapes can be understood as being both material and constructed. Here, I focus on the role of the economic system in the production of landscapes. Because landscapes are also socially constructed, they are influenced by norms and values which are inscribed in the social practices of its production. Alternative readings of the landscape can be a strategy to counter the dominant understandings of landscapes. This point links closely to the second block of my research questions and will be discussed in the case study chapters.

3.1 Definitions and meanings of landscape

Roughly until the 1950s, landscape has been the central research object of geography (Lippuner, 2014). Research interests covered a range from geomorphology over vegetation studies to the interplay between society and environment. Famous in this respect is the work of Carl Sauer, who introduced Geography as an “areal knowledge”, the knowledge of landscape and of lands (1925, in Sauer, 1974). In his opinion, Geography should devote its energy to discover areal connections of phenomena and their order, to understand how both natural and cultural processes influence the form of the landscape. According to Sauer, landscape consists of the sum of its morphological components, both natural features as well as cultural objects like infrastructure or buildings. Sauer underlines that landscapes are both “natural” and “cultural” (D Mitchell, 1996). However, at this time, there was no notion of constructivism, the landscape was seen as a pre-given object. Furthermore, nature and culture were seen as separate, even though they were interacting with each other. “Culture” was understood by Sauer as a factor that only materially altered the “natural” landscape to a “cultural” landscape. Key terms like nature, culture and landscape itself were not theorized respectively problematized (D Mitchell, 1996: 24–25).

In the 1980s, landscape emerged as a key concept in human cultural ecology and consequently also in political ecology. Landscape studies were re-interpreted and re-

theorized by the new cultural geography as an element of the cultural turn (Neumann, 2011; Wylie, 2009). The key terms were now theorized and problematized from a constructivist perspective. After Cosgrove (1984), landscape is a particular way of seeing and representing the world. Landscape is not just the “shape” of the physical environment, but also comprises the social processes that produce it. Before this background, Cosgrove analysed the development of the concept of landscape in Europe. From the 15th to 19th century, in Western Europe, “landscape” was an artistic and literary representation of the visible world, emerging with the emergence of landscape painting. It described a scenery as viewed by a spectator, manifested for example in pictorial representations. Landscapes then were understood as opposite to the city, as a quiet and beautiful ideal (WJT Mitchell, 2002). But its meaning comprises more than just aesthetics: there was a “growing dependency on the faculty of sight as the medium through which truth was to be attained: ‘seeing is believing’” (Cosgrove, 1984: 9). As objectivity was accorded to this “faculty of sight”, the visual perception and representation of “landscapes” (and especially what was defined as a landscape) became a powerful instrument. “The visual”, the “enjoyment of the view for its own sake” remains a basic principle of the landscape (WJT Mitchell, 2002). This constructivist perspective allowed to understand Landscape as more “than merely the visual and functional arrangement of natural and human phenomena which the disciplines can identify, classify, map and analyse” (Cosgrove, 1984: 13). Themes like socio-ecological transformations, contested meanings of nature or colonial narratives of landscapes became core topics of landscape research in political ecology (Neumann, 2011). These themes are also important for my analysis in this work. Furthermore, I position my work in contemporary human geography research, which investigates how landscape is produced through social practices and how representations of landscapes are made (Lippuner, 2014).

Materiality and social constructedness of landscapes

Landscape is both a social construct with symbolical meanings as well as it has an undeniable material component (Lippuner, 2014: 47). Don Mitchell defines landscape “a kind of produced, lived, and represented space constructed out of the struggles, compromises, and temporarily settled relations of competing and cooperating social actors: it is both a thing [...] and a social process” (D Mitchell, 1996: 30). These spaces and the relating struggles and social interplays lay at the heart of my analysis. Furthermore, I understand both material as well as immaterial aspects of the landscape as pivotal for investigation. Don Mitchell (1996) understands that landscape has a material “essence”, consisting of earth, stones, vegetation, water, sky, sound and silence, light and darkness. In this “essence”, cultural values and

meanings are encoded. Even though a researcher with a background in social constructivist human geography might contest this “essentializing” view, Don Mitchell stresses the importance of the materiality of space. In his opinion, especially newer strands in cultural geography since the 1980s risk to move too far away and exclude the material aspects of landscapes and therefore render invisible certain aspects of it. He refers to Lefebvre in that it is impossible to talk about ideologies without investigating the spaces that serve as reference – spaces that also have a material component (D Mitchell, 1996: 5). However, all objects in the landscape are imbued with social and cultural meaning and significance as soon as people start to think, talk or write about it, and the landscape represents a complex system of this multitude of meanings (D Mitchell, 2005; see also Ratter and Döring, 2017). What we see, how we define it, what meaning and value it has is a social process. Döring and Ratter, in their work on “coastsapes”, understand coasts as a “multi-layered” product of social, economic, cultural and aesthetic practices (Döring and Ratter, 2017: 2,3). According to Don Mitchell, the relationship between this material form and the ideological representation should be at the centre of research, culminating in the overarching question “Why does the landscape look like it does (because it has a clear function in its present form), and who *made* it look that way?” (D Mitchell, 1996: 5f.). This implies that the function of the landscapes serves specific interests and promotes particular ideas while it prevents others. Here lies the core of the political substance of landscape and space in general. Gailing and Leibenath state that “landscapes are relational phenomena that emerge when humans engage with their physical environment” (Gailing and Leibenath, 2017: 339).

3.2 Producing landscapes

In this work, I follow Mitchell’s (1996) argumentation and understand landscape as a social product that has a material component. This is important because according to Lefebvre (1991/1974), space is not only produced in mental or abstract ways, but also materially. Don Mitchell draws parallels between the production of landscapes in particular and the production of space on a more general level. They are both “mystified, ideological projects” that hide their production (D Mitchell, 1996). In the following sections, I will have a closer look at how landscapes can be produced. I will focus on the role of the economy, and in contrast/or complementary to that, the role of leisure. Another important aspect regarding my work is the relation between indigenous cultures and landscape, such as stories related to landscape features. However, as I will specifically focus on Maori perspectives on landscape, I will introduce this aspect in chapter 7.1, and further detail on it in chapter 12. Of course, there are even more ways in which landscape can be produced. Two more are

specifically important for this work, namely the emotional connection to landscapes (see especially chapters 7.5 and 11.3) and the professional examination as in landscape assessments or evaluations (chapters 8.3 and 11.2). All themes will be further discussed in part III and IV in the respective contexts where they become relevant.

Landscapes of economy and leisure

In this part, I will focus more closely on economy as one driver of the production of landscape. Following a political ecology approach, the role of capitalism and economy plays an important role in analysing how landscapes are constructed. Landscapes can be understood as sites of production as well as sites of reproduction:

The landscape [...] is both an outcome and the medium of social relations, both the result of and an input to specific relations of production and reproduction. In our world, those relations are capitalist, [...] and the landscape [...] is a commodity. (D Mitchell, 2005: 49)

Mitchell sees two ways in which landscapes are produced (D Mitchell, 1996: 28): First, economy and labour shape the landscape materially (e.g. by installing infrastructure, ch. 4). Second, through the symbolic representation of the products of labour as landscape (e.g. farmland as landscape). The production processes are invisible and hidden, and therefore hard to challenge or even to be seen and understood. Landscape production within capitalism is a moment in the overall process of uneven development, and landscapes can have a stabilizing function on inequality when it inscribes it into the landscape. Also Gailing and Laibenath see a general primacy of economy in the production of landscapes (Gailing and Leibenath, 2017: 345) and link the production of landscape to economic transformations: "Landscapes can be understood as cultural products of economic transformations that establish the hegemony of certain classes, groups or actors and thus performs political functions" (Gailing and Leibenath, 2017: 343). Cosgrove (1984) shows that the idea of landscape as a "way of seeing" was closely linked to the commodification of land within the capitalistic transformation in Europe. In other words, a capitalist system influences how people perceive the land, and what interests they have in it (D Mitchell, 2005: 1).

Whereas labour can be understood as one driver of the production process of landscapes, the construction of a landscape that serves leisure is another way. Here as well, both material as well as immaterial aspects are important. The construction of a landscape as apparent counterpart to economy works because of the strong aesthetic component that is historically ascribed to it. Landscape allows an aesthetic access to the "natural" environment as a

“beautiful” landscape, for example in landscape paintings (Cosgrove, 1984). In this view on the landscape serves as projection screen, as backdrop for specific practices (Lippuner, 2014). One of these practices is travelling. Here it also becomes visible how landscape is commodified through this way of seeing (and therefore not antagonistic to the economy anymore, but rather part of it): it becomes the blueprint for tourist phantasies, and it has to stay “beautiful”. For example, the “wilderness” experienced was sought by the city population at the end of the 19th century as a contrast to city life (Cronon, 1995, see also the following section). Interestingly, not only “untouched” landscapes promoted tourism. Kaika (2008) describes how at the same time, it was popular to travel to large dams as a holiday or leisure activity. In these cases, infrastructures became part of the landscapes or formed a specific landscape type on their own.

3.3 Landscape as ideological concept

As the previous sections showed, neither aesthetics nor the production of landscapes in general is a neutral process. Landscapes do have ideological functions and work so as to “reflect and reproduce the values and norms of socio-economic elites” (Wylie, 2009: 410). Don Mitchell argues that

[w]hile it is possible to define landscape as a morphology, or as an arrangement of things, or as a way of seeing, its *power* and *importance* derive from how each of these, working in combination, become the vehicle for all manner of exclusionary, alienating, expropriating and often racist and patriarchal social practices. (D Mitchell, 2005: 5, *emph. in original*)

The rather neutral “values and norms” from Wylie’s point of view are in Mitchell’s opinion more drastic social practices. Powerful actors might try to represent the landscape as stable, fixed and natural. So developing alternative readings of the landscape can also be a strategy of subaltern actors (D Mitchell, 1996: 30–31). Therefore, conflict and contestation play a constituting role for the landscape – which we will see later in the discussion of the case studies (chapters 10, 11, and 12). Without acknowledging the struggles about the production of landscape, there is a risk to reproduce the existing power relations rather than analyse or challenge them (D Mitchell, 1996). Consequently, landscapes are neither natural nor neutral, but an “ideologically-charged and very complex cultural product” (Cosgrove, 1984: 11). Cosgrove states that

Landscape [...] is an ideological concept. It represents a way in which certain classes of people have signified themselves and their world through their imagined relationship with nature, and through which they have underlined and communicated their own social role and that of others with respect to external nature. (Cosgrove, 1984: 15)

The idea people have about what constitutes a landscape is thus tied to both their own social background as well as the hegemonic understanding of landscape – and also nature – in society. How these different ideas can look like will be illustrated in my case studies later in this dissertation. Dominant framings of landscapes are the expression of a dominant group's values, conventions, customs, and practices (Olwig, 2007: 591). The privilegization of certain values, interests and practices leads to inclusion and exclusion (Gailing and Leibenath, 2017: 338). Some examples of how power can be exerted over the medium of landscape are through cartography, property rights in the land, politics of subsidies and especially in general dominant views and interpretations on and of the landscape (Kost and Schönwald, 2015, see also chapter 7 and case studies). Especially in the last point, the labelling of people as “experts” and “lay persons” can influence if their interpretation, meanings about, readings and assessments of the landscape are rated as legitimate and “correct”.

Even though contemporary understandings of landscape can also comprise urban features, for instance, (“cityscapes”, Landscape Institute and Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment, 2013), initially an important characteristic of landscapes was the presence of “nature” (Cosgrove, 1984). Here, romantic and idealizing ideas about nature, wilderness and landscape overlap into a common archetype: a “natural” area, untouched by humans – and pleasant to look at. This framing of landscape as nature is not apolitical, but serves specific interests as well. Cronon (1995) makes a similar point when he analyses the perception and construction of nature throughout history. With a focus on the US, he describes the development of the idea of protecting nature, originating from romanticizing ideas about wilderness by the wealthy city population. Towards the end of the 19th century, large areas were designated as national parks in the US, where human use was banned. These areas attracted the wealthy city population, who installed lodges and other accommodation for holidays and retreats from the city life. They romanticised and idealised the countryside as a “wilderness experience”, with the image of an untouched nature. However, the same areas were often home to and used by Native Americans for thousands of years. This shows how specific landscapes were “invented” as a place of retreat for recreation and reproduction. In this way, landscapes became a commodity or an asset for tourism and retreat, while, at the

same time, other (traditional) uses were forbidden and marginalised in the same area (WJT Mitchell, 2002; see also Neumann, 1998).

WJT Mitchell explores this “moral, ideological, and political darkness” (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 6) of landscape construction in relation to global imperialism. Aotearoa New Zealand for instance was imagined as a pastoral paradise (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 21), which also made landscape painting famous in New Zealand. However, it represented the colonialists’ view on the country (and the Maori), which has been correctly criticized as “pictorial colonisation” (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 22). This “coding of nature as Eden” (Robbins, 2012: 180) was typically used for the areas perceived as political and economic periphery by Europeans.

3.4 Conclusion

In this sub-chapter, I introduced the concept of landscapes as an intermediate step between the abstract theoretical approaches and the concrete case studies. I understand landscapes as both socially constructed and material. They are influenced by social, political, and economic processes and interests and can thus be understood as ideological concepts. This is an invitation to a detailed analysis and investigation of landscapes. To investigate the production of landscapes, (D Mitchell, 1996: 29) suggests asking a set of questions: Who generalizes? Who is involved? Under what conditions do these people interact (power relations)? At what scales do people and processes operate to create landscapes? These questions are typical questions for political ecology research and reflected in my research questions as well. As Boda (2017) states “The politics of landscape production involve questions about the power to define what landscape *means*, who or what belongs *to* landscape and who or what belongs *in* landscape” (Boda, 2017: 361). Regarding my case studies, this has been an important issue as there are quite different opinions about landscape. Moreover, the materiality of landscapes cannot be neglected. It gets its meaning through the interaction with social processes (D Mitchell, 1996). In my work, both the materiality (such as the concrete construction works or impacts on the environment) as well as the social construction (the meaning the landscape has for different actors such as residents, Maori or landscape architects) of landscapes will be investigated

4 Infrastructures

As a second conceptual background, I introduce infrastructures in this chapter. The development of infrastructures at the coast is the basis on which I will analyse the production of space in my case studies. Infrastructures are, like landscapes, produced by social processes as well as they are also material. In the first section, I trace the development of the term from former uses to newer interpretations in social sciences, as infrastructures can be understood in quite different ways. Here, especially the change from understanding infrastructures as technical objects towards a relational understanding of infrastructure which includes its interplay with society is crucial for a social science perspective on infrastructures. In the following section 4.2, I focus on the social and political dimensions of infrastructures. As they are a product of the society, infrastructures are imbued with power relations. This can lead to contestation over issues of justice, access or ownership. Conflicts around infrastructural developments are the starting point for each of my case studies, where I will discuss these points in more detail. In section 4.3, I will discuss the connection between nature and infrastructure. On the hand, infrastructures serve as a kind of “mediator” to access natural resources (e.g. in the form of water pipes). On the other hand, in the last decade, the understanding of nature as a provider of infrastructural services gained more importance and opened up the concept of infrastructures into a new direction.

4.1 Definitions and meanings of infrastructure

Infrastructures are vital parts of societies. They are commonly defined by their role to supply society with basic needs like water, electricity, transport, communication, culture, and protection. They serve as an underlying structure of services and amenities for economic production and societal functioning (Lee, 2009). Additionally to this relatively narrow concept of infrastructure, there are also broader understandings, which incorporate relational aspects or the interplay between infrastructure and nature. I will discuss this in the following sections.

The term “infrastructure” has been used since the beginning of the 20th century (Gandy, 2011; van Laak, 2008). It initially referred to mainly physical-material structures like railroads, streets and power lines. This type of infrastructure is also called “grey” infrastructure. Later on, this term was expanded to include also cultural and social structures. However, infrastructures were often reduced to their technical dimensions and analysed from an engineering perspective. Furthermore, analytical borders were drawn between technical-

material and social-immaterial infrastructures. However, this distinction is more and more questioned (Müller et al., 2017). First, newer forms of infrastructure like information technology cannot be distinguished as either the one or the other, for example telecommunication. Second, scholars are increasingly aware of the strong interdependence of technical and social aspects of infrastructure. Technical infrastructures are the product of planning and decision making and are therefore also essentially social, as well as social or cultural infrastructures also need a material basis (like a museum building). Thus, infrastructures have inherently political and social aspects, they shape society and are shaped by society (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Monstadt, 2009). This view acknowledges the relational characteristic of infrastructures, in contrast to the conventional focus on technical and economic functions (Müller et al., 2017). Here, the focus is not on a specific class of artefact, but on the process of the relationship-building (Carse, 2012: 556), a reciprocal connection between society and infrastructure. If we understand infrastructures as relational, the interactions and influences of society, economy and nature with and on infrastructures become interesting for analysis. Therefore, also the social and political dimensions of technical infrastructures are taken into the focus of research. Water infrastructure for example can be easily framed as an apolitical issue, which exists to provide people and economy with water. However, as many authors show, water infrastructure is a deeply political and social issue, that reflects social inequalities and power hierarchies (Kaika, 2008; Meehan, 2014; Swyngedouw, 1997). Star pleads for a research that does not overlook these hidden processes: it is “necessary to ‘deconstruct’ the boring, backstage parts of infrastructure, to disembody the narratives it contains and the behind-the-scenes decisions” (Star, 2002: 110). Plus, to analyse them in relation to the political context and power structures.

In the following, I will focus on two aspects. The first is the issue of social and political dimensions of infrastructures. The second is the role of nature and landscape in relation to infrastructure. Following a political ecology agenda, I think it is vital to consider these two aspects and bring them together. Social dimensions become particularly visible when it comes to access, ownership and power structures. Material infrastructures can disturb views, emit noise or toxic substances, are used to transport goods and people, link neighbourhoods or separate them, block routes or open new ones. These circumstances are strongly linked to issues of environmental or social justice (Who breathes the exhausts from the coal power plant? Which suburb is linked to the city centre with a new road?). Therefore, this can lead to contestation of infrastructural planning processes. These conflicts can revolve around the infrastructure per se, but also around spatial and social issues, like access, land use, cultural

values, or environmental justice. Thus, these conflicts reveal not only different opinions about certain infrastructures, but open much bigger themes like decision making and power constellations or conceptions of nature and landscape. This leads to the second point, the role of nature and landscapes. Infrastructures can be understood as “mediators” of natural resources, as they moderate and channel for example water or transform sunlight into energy (Naumann and Moss, 2012). Furthermore, in the last decades, concepts such as “green infrastructure” or “nature as infrastructure” emerged, that put the relation of nature and infrastructure in a new light. In addition, landscapes themselves can be understood as infrastructures. I will detail on these points in the following sections.

Lying across to these areas, there is another aspect: the integration of space and the interplay of space, society and infrastructure. That space, society and infrastructure do interplay and influence one another has been widely acknowledged (see Becker et al., 2016; Moss et al., 2008; Müller et al., 2017; Wissen and Naumann, 2008). Spatial arrangements can be transformed by infrastructural changes. This can be either in a physical way, e.g. as many infrastructures occupy a specific area through their materiality, or in a social and political way, as they can change use habits, daily routes and routines. Decisions on where to develop what kind of infrastructure have an immense effect on regional structures and development. This perspective will not be singled out as a separate section, but is discussed as a crosscutting matter in relation to the other topics and at the end of the dissertation.

4.2 Social and political dimensions of infrastructures

Whereas technical infrastructures are often perceived as “neutral” prerequisites for societal development, power relations as part of infrastructural arrangements become more and more an issue of investigation (Wissen and Naumann, 2008: 20). Especially research from political ecology and urban political ecology see infrastructural development as a highly contested process (see for example Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). Interesting contributions from a (urban) political ecology perspective are for example Swyngedouw’s research on water infrastructure in Ecuador and Spain (Swyngedouw, 1997, 2015), Gandy’s investigation on New York’s hidden water supply (Gandy, 2002), and Carse’s work on the transformation of the Panama Canal watershed from forest and agricultural land to a natural infrastructure serving the canal (Carse, 2012).

The power infrastructures can unfold and the power that is exerted through infrastructures goes often unnoticed, as many infrastructures are invisible (internet, water pipes) or so much taken for granted that people do not see them anymore. The often hidden flows of

materiality and resources and infrastructures then hide themselves the “social relations and power mechanisms that are scripted in and enacted through these flows” (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000: 121). Furthermore, if unnoticed and unquestioned, technical infrastructures also hide market mechanisms (Kaika, 2008: 88). These can be on a micro-level, revolving around issues such as access or provision with services. On a macro-level, this can also reflect global political or economic developments. The political dimensions of infrastructure and space become especially obvious when we look at state power and rule. Power is not only implicitly inscribed in infrastructures, but infrastructures can be used (and were used) by the ruling to exert power and authority (van Laak, 2008), for example by road constructions to access new territories or by restricting internet connections. But this is not only a one-way effect. Infrastructure does not necessarily only constitute and strengthen the state power, but can also disable and weaken it (Bouzarovski et al., 2015; Meehan, 2014). Moreover, power is exerted not only over society, but also nature (van Laak, 2008). The “dominion” over nature becomes visible in large technical structures like dams (Kaika, 2006).

Infrastructural development is socially constructed “by various interest groups through an array of tensions, tactics, and complexities” (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008: 370), often in conflictuous ways (Star, 1999), which I will discuss in the course of this work. McFarlane and Rutherford critique that traditional research has often “relegated infrastructures to an apolitical context [...], as not worthy of attention, to be hidden from views (physically and/or discursively) and/or simply the purview of engineers or technocrats” (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008: 364). This is where social sciences are needed to deconstruct the often neglected power aspects of infrastructures and take into account users and consumers of infrastructures and their services (Obertreis et al., 2016). Müller et al. (2017) stress the importance to more explicitly research on power structures and social inequalities, which are embedded in infrastructural projects. Especially as the social and spatial distribution of infrastructure affects equality, participation and development (Wissen and Naumann, 2008). This can be highly uneven between various groups: “One person’s infrastructure is another’s brick wall” (Star, 2002: 116). These societal power relations like inequality and repression are expressed and reproduced in infrastructure, e.g. by the access to certain services or fees (Müller et al., 2017: 8). The development of traffic infrastructure, for instance, can marginalise or integrate parts of city and also reflect social conditions and contradictions (Young and Keil, 2014). Infrastructures matter, then, discursively as well as materially.

As explained in the previous paragraph, infrastructures are socially constructed and can (re-)produce inequalities. Therefore, infrastructural development does not go always smooth and is often contested (see for example Feindt and Saretzki, 2010). Protests can revolve

around the infrastructure itself, spaces of installation, ownership structures, inequalities, environmental impacts, politics, and modes of governance. If the power relations and ideologies are revealed and deconstructed, infrastructural developments can become the site of active critique and protest. In Berlin for example, citizens organised the remunicipalization of the energy grid, which can be read as a contestation of neo-liberalism (Becker et al., 2015). Pieck (2015) examined the resistance against the modes of highway construction in Peru. And senior citizens became protesters in the conflicts around the reconstruction of the train station in Stuttgart (Butzlaff et al., 2013).

Flitner concludes in his work on green infrastructures that conflicts are not just about the infrastructure as objects, but about broader questions of recognition and societal participation (Flitner, 2017). Carse stresses a similar point: even though conflicts are often around material landforms and land covers (which serve as infrastructure) “they raise questions about which among a multitude of potential environmental services are to be emphasized and delivered and, crucially, *whose* societies and economies those services support” (Carse, 2012: 544). Even though the two authors refer to green infrastructures, their arguments can be adapted to grey infrastructure as well. Carse explains more detailed why these conflicts can develop:

Conflicts often ensue when actors representing different systems of production inhabit the same ecosystem and use the same resource. However, these conflicts become cultural, rather than strictly political-economic, when groups value, conceptualize, and partition that resource in different ways. (Carse, 2012: 556)

Carse sees two explanations for conflicts. First, different economic systems can lead to a conflict over the use of an ecosystem or a resource as infrastructure. Second, cultural differences in how resources are perceived can be a trigger as well. These points are central for my research. As I will show later, the conflicts in my case studies base on the materialities of infrastructure and the environmental effects as well as on social, cultural and political issues such as recognition, participation, values or worldviews. Here, also the connection to landscapes is important for both material as well as immaterial (social, cultural, economic or political) effects and interactions. Infrastructures can for example block view lines and thus disturb amenity values of a landscape or the connection to it (ch. 10.4). Or an underlying growth paradigm of an airport company is criticised by residents with other norms and values (ch. 11).

Especially the issue of participation and recognition is closely linked to the issue ownership. Initially, infrastructural care was established by the state to supply its citizens, and often owned by the state or the regional or local authorities. This task was seen as a basic tasks of the state. However, in the last decades, many services were corporatized and privatised (e.g. in New Zealand, ch. 7.7, and Germany). These processes are in some cases steered by large transnational companies, which overtake and replace actions which were formerly carried out by the nation states. In the course of this development, market mechanisms gain more importance in contrast to state policy and geopolitical relations. Not only privatisation, but also infrastructural development general is also part of capitalist and neoliberal agendas, for example as they enable access to resources or foreign direct investments (Becker et al., 2015; Pieck, 2015). Even when the infrastructural development is still in the hand of the state, economic players can have a big influence on it. As Peck (1996) shows in his work, actors such as large companies can get the infrastructures they want, as infrastructures are an important factor in attracting new investments. Especially in port development, large shipping lines would for example not (be able to) call at a smaller port anymore when it does not offer the facilities they need (ch. 10 and 12). The main arguments for these port or airport developments are usually derived from a growth agenda, which means that there will be bigger ships that need to berth or bigger planes that need to land.

4.3 Nature as infrastructure

As a second aspect I want to discuss the relation between infrastructure and nature in this section. Or, more precisely, how nature can be framed as infrastructure. This perspective also allows to link the concepts of infrastructures and landscapes.

In the last decades, a new understanding of infrastructure emerged, called green infrastructure or nature as infrastructure (Carse, 2012; Flitner, 2017). The concept of green infrastructure or nature as infrastructure describes ecological processes that can be used for human needs, respectively deliver services for the society, e.g. the production of fresh air by plants, bees that pollinate food plants or the filtering of water by the soil (Carse, 2012, more in Benedict and McMahon, 2001). Benedict and McMahon define green infrastructure as an “interconnected network of natural areas and other open spaces that conserves natural ecosystem values and functions [...] and provides a wide array of benefits to people and wildlife” (Benedict and McMahon, 2006: 1). Green infrastructure pursues the goal to provide ecosystem services to society (Benedict and McMahon, 2006). The benefit of green infrastructure is therefore not primarily seen in the sustenance of the natural environment

or biodiversity, but in the benefits and services they provide for the social world (European Commission, 2013, for a critical discussion see Flitner, 2017). Nature as infrastructure is a similar concept. Carse describes that “[...] nature is – or might become – infrastructure, delivering critical services for human communities and economies” (Carse, 2012: 540). In Carse’s example, infrastructural functions such as water storage and regulation are assigned to a forest landscape – the landscape is re-interpreted from an agricultural frontier to a managed watershed.

These concepts broaden the “classical” idea of infrastructures and trace how nature and landscapes become incorporated into the field of infrastructures. Especially for landscape, this conceptualisation is not an easy one, because there is no clear definition for the term landscape. On the one hand, landscape can be perceived as “nature”. On the other hand, buildings or grey infrastructure can be perceived as an “industrial landscape”. This also opens up interesting possibilities and can help to understand conflicts: if there are different interpretations about what landscapes are, then it can become more clear why people get in conflict over it. If landscapes are understood as infrastructure, this would allow to include more aspects as well as roles and functions of a “landscape as infrastructure”, such as visual and aesthetic amenities or emotional and cultural values (building identity). Gandy states that the “combination of landscape with infrastructure necessarily brings questions of aesthetics and cultural representation into our analytical frame” (Gandy, 2011: 63). In this way, understanding landscapes as infrastructures would mean to put a new understanding to an already existing landscape or service. If for example a school is understood as infrastructure, the landscape can also be understood as infrastructure if it is used to teach about cultural traditions such as collecting seafood (ch. 12.4). The same comparison can be made about a sports court and harbour used for recreational sailing (ch. 10). Also, landscape is as much a product of human society as for example technical infrastructure, both in a material sense and by discursive production by ascribing meaning, value and benefit to it. A clear division between nature and technology is illusory (Carse, 2012: 540). According to Carse, “[a]s nature *becomes* infrastructure through work, human politics and values are inscribed on the landscape” (Carse, 2012: 540). This process is similar to what D Mitchell (1996, 2005) described in the previous chapter on landscapes.

Yet another view on how nature and infrastructure can be thought together is described by van Laak. He explains how infrastructures can create a technical landscape which can be experienced like a “natural” one (van Laak, 2008: 107). This material production of landscapes through infrastructure becomes clearer when imagining larger projects like dams,

power lines, or land reclamation. These projects would create new landscapes, e.g. a new lake or a change of the shoreline, or visually alter it in the case of utility poles.

4.4 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to show that infrastructures are much more than technical objects, but closely intertwined with and produced by social processes. Therefore, they are imbued with power and issue to contestation. Furthermore, also nature and landscapes can be understood as infrastructures. To understand infrastructures as relational allows to relate, analyse and understand the conflicts around them in much more complexity. It enables the researcher to investigate power relations and see that also different conceptualisations of infrastructure or nature can be an underlying reason for conflicts around infrastructural developments. This chapter therefore poses a foundation for the entry into my case studies and guides the focus on the processes that create infrastructures.

Furthermore, I want to roughly outline how infrastructures are linked to the production of space. Infrastructures can interact with space on a material basis (then mainly to the production of *espace perçu*). Furthermore, they are also intertwined with the production of *espace conçu*. Especially the material and conceptual construction of grey infrastructure (in my case ports and airports) is connected to economy and planning. However, infrastructures can also get into conflict especially with cultural and social spaces and landscapes (*espace vécu*).

The interactions of coastal infrastructures and space can be manifold. Material infrastructure obviously affects the coastal landscape in its morphology and physically alters space. This happens for example through land reclamation, dredging, construction of dykes or seawalls (for a recent discussion see Herbeck and Flitner, 2019). This can be perceived negatively by local communities, but also positively e.g. if it offers protection against storm surges, provides access to the coastal area or creates jobs. Also, this interaction can happen through the provision of services. Services can be distributed unequally over space, there can be unequal access to infrastructures and their services, or an unequal distribution of negative effects (some get the benefits, others the negative outcomes). So the interaction with space is also immediately a social one as well.

5 Planning

The third conceptual background for my work is planning. In all of my case studies, I investigate conflicts that were tied to the development of infrastructure and therefore to planning processes and decisions. Planning in my understanding for this work does not only mean plan-making, but also the associated practices that steer for what purposes land (and the sea) can be used, whose positions have to be taken into account in decision-making processes, and how decisions on construction projects are made. I understand planning as an overarching practice that affects both landscapes and infrastructures. Landscapes are affected by planning both materially (what happens where?) as well as on a conceptual level (what is defined as “landscape”?). Infrastructures are affected materially (where are they allowed to be developed?), and also conceptually (again: What is defined as infrastructure?). However, when it comes to conflicts around infrastructure, also issues such as the acknowledgement of different knowledges or the understanding of nature can play an important role (as I will discuss in my case studies). Thus, planning can serve as a link between landscapes and infrastructures.

On an abstract level, planning is one of the practices that produce *espace conçu*, usually carried out by state agencies (Rydin, 2004: 3). Furthermore, it is one of the most formalised ones, written down in laws, policies and plans, and fundamentally influencing the built and natural material environment as well as societal relations. Where other practices of spatial production are much more hidden, planning, when it exists, is obviously and openly there. However, its underlying assumptions, paradigms, rationalities and ideologies might be hidden as well. According to Lefebvre, planning is part of the production of an *espace conçu*. *Espace conçu*, the conceived space, is the hegemonic space, a capitalist space (Lefebvre, 1991/1974). To understand how this dominant practice of production of space developed and how it is intertwined with society, I have a closer look at planning in this chapter. In the first section, I trace the historic development of planning. Subsequently, I focus on the perspective planning has on space, and the power as well as conflict potential planning can unfold. Drawing from my background in political ecology, I will discuss in the last section how the power of planning also builds upon a belief in scientific expert knowledge.

5.1 Development of planning

Martin defines urban and regional planning as “[t]he design and institution of specific policies and laws to guide land use” (Martin, 2009: 782). These specific policies started to develop in

the 19th century. The development of spatial planning in the UK (which was the foundation for the New Zealand planning system) can be traced back to the time of the industrial revolution (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). During the Industrial Revolution in Europe, cities started to grow rapidly and without order. This led to poor living conditions for the working class, and to health problems, caused by insufficient infrastructure, e.g. no access to clean water and a lack of sewerage provision (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). These conditions culminated in outbreaks of cholera and a typhoid epidemic in Britain's main cities in 1837 (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 10). After these events, issues of public health and welfare became tasks of planning. The UK introduced its first codes and standards in the 1870s with the aim to improve hygiene and sanitation in the cities (Murdoch, 2006: 96; Rydin, 2004). One of the goals of the first planning laws was the amelioration of living conditions for the working class – so that its ability to provide labour was not diminished, as the reproduction of the working class is a necessary condition for capitalism (Mitchell, 2005).

In the 1920s, zoning (assigning slots of space to different uses) was introduced (Martin, 2009), which consequently became “central to governmental interventions in processes of development” (Murdoch, 2006: 100). Up until the mid of the 20th century, the notion prevailed that planning was mostly preoccupied with physical features and the design of human settlements (Murdoch, 2006). Later on in the 20th century, planning became institutionalized at different scales to manage the growth of cities. Especially the provision of infrastructures was a central issue (Martin, 2009).

In the same period, the self-image of planning was slowly changing. In the 1950s and 60s, an objectifying, Euclidean conception of space was prevalent, where the physical structure was understood as the surface for social and economic activities. In the second half of the 20th century, the active role of planning in social and political relations became more and more a conscious part of planners work, and planning was understood as a social and political process: Planners were no longer seen as “neutral facilitators” (Murdoch, 2006: 103). With this change in the perception of the role of planners, also the methods changed: alternative and qualitative methods such as ethnographies and participant observations were introduced and applied in the field of planning (Murdoch, 2006: 103). These methods allowed much more than technical surveying and mapping to cater for social complexity. Furthermore, this was the time when communicative and collaborative planning practices were increasingly advocated (see for example Healey, 1997), which was seen as a paradigm shift in planning:

The emergence of communicative and collaborative discourses indicates that planning is moving away from a prescriptive and rational ordering of space (using technical models and plans) towards a more social process of decision-making, based on understandings of cultural, political and ethical differences. (Murdoch, 2006: 104)

This framing of planning as social process acknowledges that there are different interest groups with different aims. I am interested in exactly these different viewpoints. I argue that these differences mentioned by Murdoch do lead to the production of different spaces, as I will show in chapters 10, 11, and 12.

5.2 Planning and space

Even though planning has changed and developed, many authors still attest the planning system to be a technocratic regime, imbued with overcome notions of space like container thinking, or the notion of space as an empty arena (Graham and Healey, 1999). Graham and Healey state that planning sticks to a reductionist perception of cities and places, as it considers them to be “single, integrated, unitary, material *objects*” (Graham and Healey, 1999: 624, emphasis in original), as if space could easily be drawn on a piece of paper. These ideas are supported by traditional tools of spatial representation like maps. These are only two-dimensional and do neither allow to depict multiplicity nor change. Also Murdoch criticises that planning has difficulties to represent “the complex and heterogeneous spaces in which it is inevitably immersed” (Murdoch, 2006: 95). The multiplicity of spaces and their constant changing and dynamics are hard to cover with planning laws and policies. This might stem from the roots of planning, which Martin describes as “rooted in the utopian ideals of modernism, and a faith in the capacity for scientific and technical reason to achieve the goals of order, coherence and regulation” (Martin, 2009: 782). Order, coherence and regulation rather promote stability and categories, than embrace multiplicity or change.

Planning does not only formulate ideas about space, but also produces space through techniques such as mapping, with artefacts such as plans and maps. The spatial perceptions communicated through the map became dominant: “Once [planners] held the map, they held the city; and once they held the city, they felt they could mould it in line with dominant governmentalities of spatial organization” (Murdoch, 2006: 98). Murdoch calls this the “taming” of space. Harvey (1996) discusses this production of a dominant cartographic image:

To produce one dominant cartographic image out of all this multiplicity [of cartographies of the world; MO] is a power-laden act of domination. It is to force a singular discursive representational exercise upon multiple cartographies, to suppress difference and to establish a homogeneity of representation. To engage in this is a typical discursive strategy of hegemonic power, that has the intended effect of curbing the imaginary and shaping material practices and social relations as well as institutions to a dominant mode of production [...]. (Harvey, 1996: 284)

Harvey sees the problem that a multitude of spaces that exist in the same area are reduced to one cartographic representation. He understands this as a discursive strategy of hegemonic power to establish practices, social relations and institutions that serve the purposes of a dominant mode of production. This homogenization reduces complex and multi-layered spatial relations to a sheet of paper, in which some things are included and others are not, and thus rendered invisible (Graham and Healey, 1999; Murdoch, 2006). This shows that maps and survey techniques are not neutral techniques, but closely intertwined with the power to dominate the discourse about space. Stephenson states that

[a] fundamental tool of planning practice continues to be the rational representation of space as a map or plan, which assumes that only those things which are physically mapped carry significance. Such representations, perhaps unintentionally, impose a structure-focused version of reality and exclude the memories, dreams and meanings that exist in the “real” world. (Stephenson, 2010: 17)

In this quote, the ideas of Lefebvre reverberate: a space that is produced through memories, dreams and meanings, and not only through planning practice. In her work, Stephenson focuses on landscape as a constructed way of seeing the world that creates and affirms individual as well as community and cultural identity (Stephenson, 2010: 15). This also leads to emotional attachment to an area. Kearns and Collins (2012) state that argumentations on emotional grounds are often not taken serious and marginalized in the process by other actors. Emotions can hardly stand against the technical and legal perspective that is prevailing in public planning processes (Kearns and Collins, 2012). They plead “to take people’s feelings as well as their perceptions [...] and embodies experiences [...] seriously. Emotional discourses may be dismissed by the often ‘rationalist’ orientation of planning, with its emphasis on the technical and quantifiable” (Kearns and Collins, 2012: 951). This issue arose also in my case studies (see for example ch. 10.4 and 11.3)

Power and conflict in planning

The previous section already outlined how planning can fall short of embracing an understanding of space that includes different forms of spaces. However, these different spaces, their uses and interests in them exist. Therefore, conflict in planning processes is often inevitable (Rydin, 2004: 4). These conflicts are enmeshed in the existing power relations and hegemonies in society that produce it. Through its framing as a government task, planning has the power to generate dominant ideas about space, as well as really having a physical impact on material space, social relations and economy. It has “the opportunity to put [...] ideas into practice [...] to bring certain geographies into being” (Murdoch, 2006: 111). These ideas are influenced by the most powerful groups with the ability to articulate their ideas about space: “powerful, corporate economic and social interests are presented as the single alternative available” (Graham and Healey, 1999: 641). Also Stephenson (2010: 17) states that “culturally grounded sensitivity to people/place relationships remains a ‘fringe’ concern” in the planning field. Therefore, planning should rather give voice to those which are suppressed by dominant discourses and practices, Healey (2015) pleads. Planners should be aware of their role, and try to enhance social and environmental justice beyond capitalist space (Leffers, 2015).

However, there are also critical voices that doubt that planning can exceed the power relations that produce it: “[...] any move to construct a planning consensus needs to be taken in the full knowledge that it may simply involve yet another imposition of power relations, culminating in new spaces of domination and subjection” (Murdoch, 2006: 105). This is also the reason why some authors criticise alternative approaches to planning, such as collaborative planning or participation mechanisms, even though often the consultation with the public is seen as positive and progressive. As participation happens within the traditional planning logic, no fundamental criticism is possible regarding the approach as such, and the underlying norms and values (Gunder, 2010). Participation then can become a tool of legitimization of the goals of the private sector and the government within a neoliberal agenda (Gunder, 2010). This makes it even more important to investigate different spaces and their production processes, so that the production processes become visible. Only then an analysis is possible.

5.3 Planning and knowledge

One reason why planning and planners are perceived as so powerful in the production of space is that their work is based on a scientific and technological reasoning (Murdoch, 2006,

for a discussion on knowledge see also ch. 2.1). The legitimacy of (environmental) planning is based on the idea that it follows a rational process (Rydin, 2004: 3; White, 2015: 41–43). Planning discourses are formalised and “scientized” through the reliance on scientific expert knowledge. This becomes visible in procedures such as evidence-based decision-making or cost-benefit analysis (which I could also witness in the case studies). Flyvbjerg characterizes this as technical power, which derives from the technical knowledge planners have (Flyvbjerg, 1998). These science-based planning principles legitimate discourses by “giving them authority and rules in which to operate, and dismiss competing discourses as uninformed and incapable of accessing the truth” (Leffers, 2015: 133). This implies that scientific or planning knowledge knows “the truth” about things. However, also scientific knowledge is not stable, and what was once considered “true” may not be so at another point in time (White, 2015: 36–42). It is just one aspect of a complex issue, or even a “myth” altogether (Forsyth, 2008: 24). Especially in environmental planning, there is often a higher degree of uncertainty than usually communicated. Additionally, there can also be a lack of data, or phenomena are generalised without specifically looking at a case (Forsyth, 2008: 24–25). White makes a similar point:

the integration of science into the practice of environmental planning is far from sooth or unproblematic. [...] the way that science is conducted and compiled can also play a role in enabling or inhibiting its translation into the arena of policy and practice. (White, 2015: 131)

Also, scientific knowledge is only a specific form of knowledge, and also only accessible to a specific group of people. The way the data is collected or interpreted can influence the results that are taken from it. Furthermore, findings from e.g. natural sciences do not necessarily give answers to social, political or economic problems. Additionally, planning is not only informed by science, but is also a system that contributes to formalised knowledge production itself (Leffers, 2015). In the last decades, a loss of faith in “predictive certainty and positivistic science” could be observed, as well as a challenge of the exclusivity of knowledge held by experts in the planning process (Gunder et al., 2018). Here, the inclusion of other types of knowledge such as local or indigenous knowledge could help to have a more diverse knowledge foundation.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined how planning often struggles with acknowledging that there is not one single space, but a multitude of produced spaces. From this circumstance, conflicts can

arise. However, planning stays a powerful instrument that reproduces certain perceptions of space (*espace conçu*), legitimised through scientific and technological knowledge. Other knowledges about space are not taken into account. The strong connection to societal power relations can make planning a powerful process in the production of space. Three relations are important here. First, planning that is congruent with the goals of capitalism (such as growth) profits from the economic hegemony. Second, planning is rationalized and scientized to legitimate its practices and aims. Third, planning is usually carried out on the basis of a legal framework by the state, who has an authority over many fields of life and produces official artefacts such as plans and maps. These three points help to explain why for Lefebvre, *espace conçu* is the dominant form of space. I do not claim that the other forms of space, *espace perçu* and *espace vécu*, are less important than *espace conçu*. Rather, I want to show that the *espace conçu* can have more “power”, because it builds on the three points mentioned above (close connection to hegemonic system, legitimised through rationalisation and science, building on a legal framework and carried out by the state). *Espace vécu* and *espace perçu* do usually not have this “hard” foundation and these strong actors that produce them. However, in the everyday life of people for example, *espace vécu* and *espace perçu* can be as important, or even more important, than *espace conçu*.

While I remained on a rather abstract level in this chapter, I will discuss the concrete Aotearoa New Zealand planning framework in chapter 9. In the subsequent parts of this dissertation, I will investigate along my own empirical research which understandings of space, respectively which spaces, are able to influence the decision-making process, and how different knowledges about space are included in it.

6 Summary of part II

In this part, I introduced central concepts for my research. All three concepts are social ideas, “invented” at a certain point in time and interpreted in many different ways over time and space. Furthermore, they are not “neutral” or descriptive terms, but reflect the ideologies and hegemonies of the society that produced them. In addition, they all also exhibit a materiality that cannot be neglected. Landscapes, infrastructures, and planning are important for my research, both individually as well as in their interrelation. These interrelations are manifold, and their separation artificial. Planning, for example, can define what landscapes or infrastructures are. Landscapes can be understood as infrastructures. Material infrastructures changes the landscape. All concepts are influenced by the understanding of nature and the respective society-environment relations.

The elaboration of the conceptual background in this part brings us one step further from the abstract theory and research questions towards the concrete examples of the case studies. If we link them back to the theory, there are two connections. First, political ecology gives me the perspective on the three topics landscape, infrastructure and planning. Furthermore, landscape is a central concept for political ecology research (Neumann, 2011). Second, my attempt was to fill Lefebvres abstract theory with more concrete concepts that are relevant for my research. As an intermediary step, landscape as a specific form of space links the abstract theory with the concrete example of the coast. Regarding coasts, little research has combined the concept of landscapes with coasts from human geography perspective (see for example Döring and Ratter, 2017; Ryan, 2012). Infrastructures have an immediate effect on the materiality of space, but can also help to link back to how space is conceptualised. And planning as the main driver in the production of *espace conçu* reveals the conception of space. However, also planning has a direct material effect, as it regulates what can be done where.

Going even one step further back, I also want to recapitulate my research questions under the light of the insights of this part. The questions subsumed in the first block revolved mainly around the kind of spaces and the practices that produce them. One sub-question (1c) can already be answered here: I chose to frame coasts as landscapes, which allows me the inclusion of both immaterial aspects as well as material aspects that influence the production of space. This also helps to develop the questions 1a and 1b further: based on an understanding of coast as landscape, I am interested in the understandings what landscapes means, who belongs to it and what belongs in it (Boda, 2017). These and the questions from

the second block need the empirical findings for further analysis. The theories and concepts from part I and II pose a foundation and are applied more concrete on the example of Aotearoa New Zealand in the following parts III and IV.

PART III Setting the scene: Aotearoa New Zealand's Coast

After introducing the conceptual background in the previous part, I will focus on the Aotearoa New Zealand context in this part of the dissertation. This part of the dissertation give insight into the multiple meanings, uses as well as legal and planning concepts of the Aotearoa New Zealand coast. They shall make clear to the reader how different processes, practices and strategies were and are producing the Aotearoa New Zealand coast in the past and present. All the events, processes, practices and strategies lead to specific spaces, many of which are still manifest today. I give an overview over historical and contemporary strategies and practices of space production in Aotearoa New Zealand. Aotearoa New Zealand's history "[...] was always a history of spaces and of the ability of its inhabitants to control space and resources cognitively, socially and physically" (Christensen, 2013: 310). Starting with the first settlement of Aotearoa New Zealand by Maori and the process of colonisation I will show how western techniques such as surveying and mapping as well as practices such as (re-)naming the land were used to appropriate the land. This leads to conflicts around access and ownership of the coast. Proceeding on the timeline, I illustrate the development of a beach culture and the emotional attachment to the coast that many New Zealanders have. Further, I outline how the coastal areas changed in the last decades due to stronger development pressures, and how this conflicts in some cases with other demands to and images of the coast, for example as a provider of wilderness and nature. In the following two sections, I will first detail on the development of infrastructures in Aotearoa New Zealand, with a focus on ports and airports as these are important for my case studies. Second, I outline the neoliberal restructuring of the Aotearoa New Zealand economy in the 1990s, which had strong effects on many parts of life. Several acts were passed that organised the management of the infrastructures and their structure, for example corporisation was advanced both for airports and ports.

In chapter 8, I present the planning and legal framework for coastal developments in New Zealand. Most important here are the Resource Management Act 1991 and the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010. I will also illustrate the process of obtaining permission for a development (resource consenting), which is followed in all the case studies, as well as some of the corresponding procedures such as the Assessment of Environmental Effects.

In New Zealand, we have the specific condition of a country self-identifying as a bi-cultural nation, comprising both Maori as well as Pakeha (New Zealander's of European descendant)

culture. However, there exist tensions over some issues, mainly stemming from the colonial past and its effects. For this work, especially the attribution of different understandings on nature or world-views on the environment are interesting. These appear for example in controversies on regulations, as I will show in the following chapters.

7 Historical and contemporary production of the Aotearoa New Zealand coast

The coast is not a clearly defined area, nor is there a clear boundary between land and water. Rather, it is a fuzzy space with varying extents. Sea level rises and falls on the short term due to tides or storm surges and on the long term due to sea level rise or land uplift. Where does the coast become ocean or land? There exist many ideas of what the coast is and over which area it extends. Formally, in the New Zealand context, the coast is defined by a number of different documents – and in a number of different ways. For example, in the Resource Management Act, the coastal marine area is defined from the seaward limits of the territorial sea (approximately 12 nautical miles from shore) to the landward boundary of mean high water springs. However, the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement recognises “that the extent and characteristics of the coastal environment vary from region to region and locality to locality” (Department of Conservation, 2010: Policy 1(1)), and also comprises parts of the terrestrial area. Notwithstanding these partially contradictory definitions, most people have their own individual as well as collective ideas and opinions about what the coast is and where its boundaries are. Whereas spatial extent and the boundaries of the coast can play an important role, even more important is what the coast actually means: What qualities of the coast are considered important, what role does it play in people’s lives or a national context, how is it perceived, constructed, communicated about by different actors? Different coasts get produced by a variety of practices, both material and symbolical.

For New Zealanders, the coast plays a major role in the construction of their national identity (Kearns and Collins, 2012). Peart describes the strong relation Kiwis have with their coast: it is “dear to the heart of all New Zealanders”, a “source of many of our earliest memories” and “imprinted in our psyche” (Peart, 2009: back-cover). However, next to these positive associations most New Zealanders have to their coast, it is also a space of contestation and conflict because of the different uses of and ideas about the coast. Especially when new developments are planned or take place, these different perspectives on the coast become manifest. Several examples in the literature show the tensions between these different spaces. In New Zealand, issues on the coast are development pressures due to residential or infrastructural development, conflicts about coastal protection, resource use, as well as access to and ownership of coastal areas and parts of the foreshore and seabed, the tension between cadastral mappings and “undisciplined” coastal Māori communities, and the

emotional attachment to the coast (Brake and Peart, 2013; Charters and Erueti, 2007; Collins and Kearns, 2010a; Freeman and Cheyne, 2008; Gesing, 2016; Kearns and Collins, 2012; Ryks, 2014).

In Aotearoa New Zealand this idea of “wilderness” is a strong narrative, where the land is pictured as “wild”, “untouched” nature. This framing started already in early times of colonization, when New Zealand was represented as romantic wilderness, for example in paintings (WJT Mitchell, 2002). This wilderness-discourse is typical for settler societies (Cronon, 1995). In the view of British colonizers, New Zealand was an ideal garden, perfectly suited for implementing the European ideal of the pastoral because of its “sublime ‘Southern Alps’, its picturesque seacoasts, lakes, and river valleys, and its sheep-herding economy” (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 21). This was not only a view focused on landscape features, but also comprised societal issues: in this landscape, “the best elements of British society might grow into an ideal nation” (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 21). This makes clear how interpretations of the landscape are not neutral but instrumentalised for political interests. Mitchell describes how New Zealand developed as a country whose landscape is “virtually synonymous with pristine natural beauty” (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 20). Aotearoa New Zealand uses these circumstances to develop landscape as its principal commodity. The “clean and green” New Zealand slogan emerged in the early to mid-1980s (Tucker, 2017: 278). It was an expression of the nation’s wish to become nuclear-free, building on the environment movement. However, the slogan was then also used as a promotion tool and a brand, for the whole country and therefore also indirectly by companies (Pawson, 1996a: 273). Especially for promoting tourism, it was effective and helped to generate revenue in the tourism sector (Tucker, 2017: 278). Over the decades, this image became a “national place myth” (Pawson, 1996a; Tucker, 2017: 279). This strengthened the close ties of the landscape to the national identity (Byrnes, 2001: 2; WJT Mitchell, 2002). As a myth, it has some truth in it, however there exist also many environmental issues, such as unsustainable agricultural practices (Pawson, 1996a; Tucker, 2017).

In this chapter, I take a closer look at some general practices of space production in Aotearoa New Zealand regarding coastal landscapes. How are different coastal spaces produced through material and symbolical practices? Even though I use the concept of the production of space, I do not follow a strict division of space in Lefebvres three categories. Rather, I organise the chapter according to the respective practices, which lead in many cases to the production of more than one spatial dimension respectively have an effect on more than one category. This is due to the facts that first, Lefebvre did not present a readymade analytical framework which can just be “applied” to research, and second, it depends very much on the

specific cases how and in what form space matters. And this is what still has to be investigated.

I follow loosely a historical development, starting with Maori as the first permanent settlers of Aotearoa New Zealand and their interaction with the coastal environment. With the beginning of colonisation, Europeans introduced new concepts of space, and new practices of measuring, mapping and planning. In the beginning of the 20th century up to today, the coast became a space of recreation and identification for New Zealanders. Then, I will touch upon the issues of coastal infrastructures before discussing the neoliberal reforms in Aotearoa New Zealand in the 1990s.

7.1 Early settlement and Maori environments

Maori are the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand. In their traditional stories, Aotearoa New Zealand was fished out of the sea by the demigod Maui (Royal, 2005). In this myth, the North Island is a fish that turned solid in the sunlight. Hence the name of the North Island is *Te Ika a Maui* (the fish of Maui) in *te reo maori* (the Maori language) (Mein Smith, 2008: 6) (I use Maori terms to the best of my knowledge and give short translations. However, some terms comprise larger concepts, which cannot be explained in full detail here.). In Maori tradition, they arrived from their ancestral homeland of Hawaiki in the thirteenth century (Mein Smith, 2008). Hawaiki is the place of origin in Maori mythology. It cannot be determined whether Hawaiki is a physical island or a mythical place (Royal, 2015). There are also several stories about the first people that arrived in Aotearoa New Zealand (Royal, 2005). In one story, the Polynesian Kupe was chasing an octopus, and in the hunt he sailed from his homeland Hawaiki as far as to Aotearoa New Zealand (Royal, 2005). According to scientific descriptions, Maori are of Polynesian descendant, and came to Aotearoa New Zealand using their voyaging canoes and their sophisticated techniques of navigation (Mein Smith, 2008: 7). Their initial population was about 100-200 persons (Peart, 2009).

When we look at how Maori actually interacted with their environment, we can distinguish two main storylines: one where Maori were culturally closely connected to the environment and “more ecologically minded than Pakeha” (Mein Smith, 2008: 13), and one where Maori exploited nature (Mein Smith, 2008: 13–16). The narrative of the environmentally aware Maori builds on the Maori mythology, where people are seen as part of nature (see also the following section). Furthermore, Maori developed “sophisticated systems” to manage natural resources (Peart, 2009: 36), such as *mauri*, a kind of life force inherent in every animal, plant, and also inanimate things such as water. Mihinui (2002) explains that she sees

the basis of Maori resource tenure in respect towards the land (and the sea). Resource management practices such as going to the fields and work together were always closely connected to kinship values and the organisation of the group (Mihinui, 2002: 22). The story of Maori as exploiters of the ecosystem stems mainly from the time of early Maori settlement. The first Maori settlers relied mainly on coastal birds, marine mammals and fish. However, as their population grew, soon the stocks of the hunted animals such as moa, fur seal and sea lion became depleted (Peart, 2009: 34). Also the introduction of predators (such as rat and dog) played a big role in the extinction of some of New Zealand's fauna. When the animals were no longer available as food source, people began to remove the forest cover to install gardens for cultivating crops. These two developments were the first major influences of human use on the Aotearoa New Zealand environment. After 200 years of settlement, Maori had reduced the forest cover of the land to about 60% compared to pre-settlement (Peart, 2009: 35). Furthermore, many species had went extinct, for example the large bird moa (Anderson, 2013).

These two contrasting positions towards Maori and their environmental practices show that there is no clear answer and not one stereotypic way how Maori interacted with the environment. To understand the complexities, it does not help to either romanticise Maori resource management nor to depict them as mere exploiters. Furthermore, there is hundreds of years in which Maori developed their resource management practices and their culture. Also, with colonisation, many traditional connections were cut and a diversification of lifestyles took place (for more on Maori culture see for example Barlow, 2015; NZQA - New Zealand Qualifications Authority, 2012).

The change of the environment interplayed with a change in Maori society as well. The deforestation helped to explore more of the country and to use the land for planting crops. This was followed by the development of institutions of territory and tribal customary land rights (Christensen, 2013: 311). New social institutions were needed to allocate resource use between the *whanau* (extended family), *hapu* (subtribe, primary political unit in traditional Maori society) and *iwi* (tribe, large group of people who descended from a common ancestor) (Christensen, 2013: 311). Land use was structured around use rights. Interestingly, Christensen describes how use rights could have been overlapping geographically and spatially: "people from different social groups potentially using the same areas at the same time for different purposes, or for the same purposes in a way agreed on or enforced socially" (Christensen, 2013: 312). The necessary spatial knowledge was stored in narratives.

Environment in Maori mythology

After I introduced some actual practices of Maori resource management in the section above, here I put the focus on a Maori mythology and worldview concerning the environment. The basis of a Maori world view is formed by *purakau* (myths and legends). These relations and the traditional knowledge are passed on orally between the generations, for example by stories, rituals, or songs. In Maori mythology and traditional knowledge, humans are not seen separate from the natural environment nor from the supernatural world, but are part of the environment (Taiapa et al., 2014). Like all other things in the world, humans are the descendants of Papatuanuku (earth mother) and Ranginui (sky father). Thus, they are directly related to the environment, there exists no human nature dualism but humans are part of nature (Taiapa et al., 2014). The concept of *whakapapa* comprises the relation of people with flora, fauna and all other natural resources (Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013). “Nature” or “environment” does not only include also humans, but the supernatural as well. For example, the term “ecosystem” cannot be translated directly into a single te reo Maori (Maori language) word (Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013). In this relation, people are not understood as superior nor do they have a dominant role over other parts of the system (Taiapa et al., 2014). Rather, their wellbeing is directly dependent on the wellbeing of the ecosystem (Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013).

The strong connection of *tangata whenua* (people of the land, term used for local or indigenous people) to their environment is reflected in the formal introduction, which refers to tribal boundaries, mountains, rivers and sea or lake (Love et al., 1993). Landmarks for example are considered as “relatives”, the people are related to the landscape through their genealogy. These markers of the landscape are part of the identity (Love et al., 1993). Mountains, forests, rivers and people are all interconnected and interdependent (Taiapa et al., 2014: 14). Walker elaborates further on the relationship:

If something is done to the natural environment [...] then it is done to oneself. [...] If a water body is polluted for example then not only is the water body polluted, but is in an affront to the atua [ancestor, spiritual being; MO] as well as oneself (Walker as cited in Taiapa et al., 2014: 11f.).

This perspective includes both people and the environment. Also the landscape is not divided into separate realms, but understood as interconnected from the mountaintops to the sea, there is no distinction made for example between features being above the water surface or below (this concept is called *Ki uta ki tai*, Harmsworth and Awatere, 2013).

Out of these *whakapapa* links (genealogical link) with the environment, a responsibility and guardianship arises. When people claim *whakapapa* to former inhabitants of an area, they inherit the responsibility to act as a *kaitiaki* (Taiapa et al., 2014). With territorial rights, one also gets the responsibility of *kaitiakitanga* over this area. A *kaitiaki* is originally understood to be a guardian spirit (Barlow, 2015), and *tikanga* describes a customary system. Thus, the people of the land are the guardians of the land. Again, this does not only comprise physical resources, but also spiritual realms. *Kaitiakitanga* describes the protection and guardianship of the natural world, including both spiritual and physical aspects of it. It manages not only the relation of people with the environment, but also between people in the past, present and future (Taiapa et al., 2014: 12). From a Maori perspective, healthy resources are maintained by upholding the spiritual links to the spiritual guardians (ibid.). A set of different practices is performed to fulfil *kaitiakitanga* duties. These include *karakia* (prayer), *waiata* (songs), *kawa* (protocol) and *tikanga* (practices). *Karakia* can be performed before going fishing or harvesting, for example for Tangaroa, the *atua* of fish and sea life, and the *atua* of Tauranga Moana. *Tikanga* and *kawa* guide harvesting protocols. The latter also serve to restrict access rights (Taiapa et al., 2014).

Based on this world-view, traditionally Maori did not have a concept of ownership of land similarly to a western understanding of this term. Mihinui states “Our old people never said, ‘we own the land’” (Mihinui, 2002: 23). Rather rights and ownership over land came with respect and responsibilities for that land. This is also described in the Waitangi Tribunal Report for Tauranga:

[...] although they had possessions and control, they never regarded themselves as the *owners* of ancestral taonga such as Tauranga Moana, the rivers and the mountains. Rather they were users and trustees – *kaitiaki* – of something ultimately possessed by their gods and ancestors, which they had a duty to pass on to their descendants. (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 495, emphasis in original)

However, these notions should not be romanticised or generalised undifferentiated. Byrnes reminds that “[...] the belief that Pakeha ‘own’ the land while Maori ‘belong to’ the land glosses over the realities of lived experiences” (Byrnes, 2001: 2), meaning that there is a variety of different life forms and positions among Maori as well as Pakeha nowadays. Still, there are differences that can be traced when we generalise these worldviews for analytical reason. Regarding coastal spaces, Greensill (2005) elaborates on these differences: “The western view differs markedly in that it is preoccupied with maps, measurements, parcels,

mean high water spring marks, distances, ownership and boundaries. In other words, space is delineated according to possible use and exploitation” (Greensill, 2005: 159). Here, she stresses the preoccupation of a Western scientific view with measurable and fixed boundaries and definitions. In *te reo Maori* (Maori language), the word *takiwa* means both space and time, these two concepts are not differentiated. However, Smith states that western concepts of time and space are encoded in language or science.

For the indigenous world, Western conceptions of space, of arrangements and display, of the relationship between people and the landscape, of culture as an object of study, have meant that not only has the indigenous world been represented in particular ways back to the West but the indigenous worldview, the land and the people, have been radically transformed in the spatial image of the West. In other words, indigenous space has been colonized. (Smith, 2012: 53)

Smith describes how indigenous space got colonized through the imposition of a Western conception of space. This perspective influenced how indigenous conceptions were represented, and moreover led a transformation of indigenous conceptions to fit a Western perspective. This did not happen unintentionally, but helped to exploit coastal space economically for capitalist gain (Smith, 2012). Ryks (2014) refers to these developments taking place at the coast as a “new colonial project”, Greensill (2005: 159) calls it a “new wave of colonization”, a view which is also shared by Smith (2012: 159).

Waterbodies in general are very important for Maori culture (Love et al., 1993), and the coast and oceans are specifically high valued: “The importance of the coast for Maori cannot be underestimated. [...] Many coastal settlements have long histories of Maori occupation and include land and places that have deep cultural significance” (Freeman and Cheyne, 2008: 40). This relationship is lived, felt and embodied through memories, emotions, practice, stories and songs: “Relationships hapu have with te takutai moana are captured in memories, engrained in hearts and passed on in practice, stories, and song to children” (Greensill, 2005: 159).

For all tribes living at the coast, *kaimoana* (seafood) plays an important role. The sea is the food basket or garden of *iwi* and *hapu*. Walker (2004) stresses the role food plays in general for Maori culture. It is not only to feed the body, but also a source of *mana* (prestige). The reputation of hosts “rose and fell according to their ability to be lavish with food” (Walker, 2004: 71). This must be kept in mind when discussing e.g. effects of projects on seafood. It cannot be compared to recreational fisheries, as it plays a much stronger cultural role (for

more on *kaimoana* see chapter 12.4). For example, the discharge of pollutants into the sea and similar practices are “abhorrent” from a Maori perspective, because they have a negative impact on the *mauri* and *mana* of the ocean (Love et al., 1993: 20).

Only with the start of colonisation, Maori became defined as one people from Europeans. The term “Maori” entered general use in the 1860s. The diverse groups of people, cultures and histories, therefore known as *tangata whenua*, became “Maori” in their encounter with Europeans (Mein Smith, 2008: 6). *Matauranga maori* (the completeness of maori knowledge, values and attitude) was cast aside in the colonial period and “replaced by a different [Western; MO] system of knowledge, together with its values, its philosophies and worldviews” (Mead, 2012: 10). Hand in hand with the suppression of Maori culture went the ignorance of their history. Especially because Maori do have an oral history and not a written one, which made it even more prone to be ignored by the colonizers (Mein Smith, 2008).

Even though Maori culture was heavily influenced by colonisation, it does not mean that it was overwritten by newly introduced cultures, but it still exists today. Formally, Aotearoa New Zealand self-identifies as a bi-cultural nation. However, in many cases *Pakeha* concepts and systems are dominant, especially in formalised areas such as law or planning.

7.2 Colonisation and the Treaty of Waitangi

In 1642, Abel Tasman was the first European to “discover” the two islands, that were given the name New Zealand. Tasman was followed by James Cook, who landed at New Zealand’s coast in 1769 (Mein Smith, 2008). Thereafter, *Pakeha* visits to Aotearoa New Zealand were happening more frequently, and trade was established as well as first settlements developed in the following decades. The initial interest on Aotearoa New Zealand was not on its land, but on its surrounding waters (Wynyard, 2017: 16). The sea was used for sealing and whaling. Only later, also the land became interesting for settlers. In January 1840, the border of New South Wales was extended to include Aotearoa New Zealand as well. Soon after, Hobson was sent from Australia to Aotearoa New Zealand as Lieutenant-Governor, to “secure annexation by consent” (Mein Smith, 2008: 44). Hobson drafted a treaty, which is known as “Treaty of Waitangi”. This is often referred to as the “founding document” of Aotearoa New Zealand as a Nation. In 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was signed between representatives of the British Crown and over 500 Maori chiefs (Orange, 2012). After the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, the immigration of settlers to Aotearoa New Zealand intensified, and a *Pakeha* culture became dominant (Hayward, 2012). In 1853, already about two thirds of the land had been purchased by Europeans (Peart, 2009: 43). In the beginning, settlement concentrated on the

coastline and favourably around safe ports, which ensured the movement of goods and people (Peart, 2009: 43). These coastal settlements were developed further, with “buildings, roads and urban infrastructure and the construction of wharves, sea walls and reclamations on the foreshore and seabed” (Peart, 2009: 43). As a consequence, the coastline changed in character. The material installation of infrastructures is also criticised for other reasons. Bunce and Desfor (2007) see the establishment of ports and the material production of land through reclamations as a part of the establishment and institutionalization of colonial power and capitalism in Aotearoa New Zealand as in other countries (Bunce and Desfor, 2007). Not only did the physical infrastructure occupy coastal areas, but it also allowed the colonizers to advance the appropriation of the country through the provision of mobility and supply with goods and people by ship.

The Treaty was and is, however, heavily criticised. It came in two versions, one in English language and one in *te reo Maori* (Maori language), and the Maori version differed slightly but critically from the English version. In the first article, for instance, Maori chiefs gave the Queen governance or government over the land, whereas in the English version, they gave her all rights and powers of sovereignty (Orange, 2012: 2). Generally, the English version “placed less emphasis on maintaining the authority of the chiefs than the Māori-language version” (Orange, 2012: 3). For several decades, the Treaty did not play an important role in New Zealand. For over a century, the state did not protect Maori culture. The plan was to “integrate” the smaller Maori population into the Pakeha population and culture (Phillips, 2015). However, this changed with the “Maori renaissance” in the 1970s, when Maori activist groups emerged (Ericksen et al., 2003: 98). Maori increasingly voiced their concerns, revolving around the issue that the Crown had breached the Treaty of Waitangi (Hayward, 2012). Especially the *hiko*, the Maori Land March in 1975, has to be mentioned, where Maori protested against land alienation which was even further enabled by a number of acts passed since 1967 (Mein Smith, 2008: 228). Subsequently, the state established the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 “to consider Māori grievances and to make recommendations for Crown settlement of Māori claims” (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 108). The establishment of the tribunal proved to be a “milestone” in the struggle for Maori rights (Mein Smith, 2008: 229). The state then describes the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand (Hayward, 2012). The self-concept of Aotearoa New Zealand changed, and the public sector adopted the idea that both cultures, Maori and Pakeha, should be officially recognised by the state (Hayward, 2012). In the 1980s, the term “biculturalism” starts to appear (Phillips, 2015). The idea behind this term is to have one nation with two peoples. In 1987, *te reo Maori* became an official language of New Zealand, and institutions adopt not

only Maori names, but for example also welcoming and farewell rituals (Hayward, 2012; Phillips, 2015).

Maori culture also suffered from the loss of land, which was either bought or taken by the colonisers to establish the British colony. English colonization was driven by the conviction that liberal rationalism and Western capitalism were omnipotent (and this conviction probably still prevails until today) (Kelsey, 2002). With the imperialistic approach of the English, also an instrumentalist approach to the natural world was imported to Aotearoa New Zealand (ibid.). In this context, the eviction of indigenous people from fertile lands seemed to be a logical step, to be able to use the land for production that was included in larger trade systems: “Land was the primary instrument through which these concepts and practices were legitimated and implemented, in colonial New Zealand and elsewhere” (Kelsey, 2002: 374). With concepts and practices, Kelsey means commodification of natural resources, the introduction of private property rights and the concept of exclusive ownership. These settlers and colonisers also brought their concepts and ideas about what New Zealand should be. In the 1840s, the chief ideologists of the colonisation, Wakefield, “prefabricated the very idea of New Zealand from Arcadian ideas embedded in the European imagination” (Mein Smith, 2008: 54). In this idea, land played a pivotal role: “[...] land was the central mechanism for the systematic creation of a colonial society that approximated a slice of a romanticised rural England, except with a thin sprinkling of friendly, assimilated natives” (Mein Smith, 2008: 54). This happened at the cost of Maori culture, as Western ethics, goals and practices for managing resources are in many cases incompatible to a Maori system (Kelsey, 2002).

7.3 Surveying, naming, and mapping the land

As the history of colonisation shows, issues concerning land or space in general can be deeply political and power-laden. If we look at the colonisation of Aotearoa New Zealand by the British Empire again, the appropriation of land happened not only in physical ways. It was also performed through conceptual, visual and textual strategies connected to the colonial practices of surveying, naming and mapping. Christensen (2013) argues that Aotearoa New Zealand environments were “continuously charted, measured, monitored and mapped” (Christensen, 2013: 311), also already by Maori. However, whereas the Maori system of “mapping” followed narratives and the performance of spatial knowledge, the British introduced another system. This was based on surveys and mapping. From their European perspective, the colonizers were “reading the land, writing over and about it, and negotiating its physical and cultural boundaries” (Byrnes, 2001: 6). With increasingly organised

settlement by the British, a surge of charting and surveying the land started. Especially harbour entrances, coastal waters and the sea were charted because of their importance for navigation, settlement and commerce (McKinnon, 1997: Plate 35). Furthermore, surveys were central to define property boundaries. This was a necessary prerequisite for European settlements: New settlers needed land, and this land had to be well defined so that the Crown could sell it to the settlers (Christensen, 2013: 316). Also, well-defined parcels of lands and property rights ensured safety for capital that was invested in Aotearoa New Zealand (Christensen, 2013: 316). With the acquiring of land and the selling to private owners, not only the land was lost to Maori, but “territory was commodified and usufructuary rights alienated, transforming land from a simple resource into capital, which could be sold or rented out” (Christensen, 2013: 317).

Byrnes describes the “surveyors’ naming, taming, marking out and mapping of the land” as assertions of colonising power (Byrnes, 2001: 4). Naming geographical features as well as charting and surveying the land are not “objective” or neutral measures of knowledge production but techniques to control the interpretation of the land (Byrnes, 2001: 4). At the same time, large areas, formerly rich in indigenous names, were rendered nameless as their original names were neither retained nor recorded (McKinnon, 1997: Plate 33). Maori history of the places became invisible and overwritten by (re-)naming places and incorporating them in a British culture of the colonisers (Byrnes, 2001: 6). Even though colonists were usually aware of the existence of Maori names for landscape features, they still renamed them to transform the “physical and spiritual ‘wilderness’ they encountered into an image of their homeland” (McKinnon, 1997: Plate 33). In effect, the land was alienated both symbolically as well as physically. Maori conceptions of space include metaphorical understanding of landscape, linked to myths, *whakapapa* and the oral transmission of knowledge. The colonists’ gaze differed from the Maori gaze in that they were reading the land “with a clear capitalist agenda in mind” (Byrnes, 2001: 8), reflecting their worldview influenced by Western scientific knowledge. Land was and is understood as a material resource with a commercial value. Surveyors were instructed to look for sites of commercial interest, like harbours, rivers, forests and arable land (Byrnes, 2001: 44). Harley notes that “[t]he surveyor, whether consciously or otherwise, replicates not just the ‘environment’ in some abstract sense but equally the territorial imperatives of a particular political system” (Harley, 1988: 279), and in the case of Aotearoa New Zealand this was British Imperialism. It can be stated that in New Zealand, “the surveyor, with his notebook and his theodolite, was imposing a new spatial reality” (McKinnon, 1997: Plate 35).

These spatialization practices produced artefacts such as written narratives, sketches, plans, paintings – and, of course, maps. These maps were superimposed over an already existing Maori conception of space (Byrnes, 2001: 92). Maori were aware of the surveying, however their protests against it were not successful in the long run. Maps are a way (or even a strategic device) to conceive and structure the landscape in a certain way, relating to a European system of knowledge (Byrnes, 2001: 90). Especially printed maps can have a formal and authoritative power, claiming to depict a universal truth, objectivity and reality (Christensen, 2013).

Together with maps and surveys came also the concept of boundary lines. Harley calls boundary lines a “medium of appropriation which those unlearned in geometrical survey methods found impossible to challenge” (Harley, 1988: 285). This specific expert knowledge was perceived to be superior to other forms of understanding and representing the land by the colonizers. In its formalised and ordered ways of work, surveying and map making were represented as superior techniques with an interpretational authority over other understandings or interpretations of the land. Until the middle of the 20th century, and for many up to today, maps were understood as a “presentation of stable, known information” (Crampton, 2001: 235). The majority of maps was and is produced by scientists, planners, military and other “experts”, and published in formal ways. These formal and scientific maps appear to be accurate and possess a technical authority, and this leads to a division between scientific and non-scientific maps. Through the domination of formalized, officialised maps, these ways of representing are naturalized (Wood and Fels, 1986), and other, alternative viewpoints are suppressed. Because of their “aureole of science”, they were included in law-making and ordinances, creating an ethic of “ever more precise definition” (Harley, 1988: 285). However, this “scientific correctness” is an illusion. Harley (1988) explains that maps are never a “correct” scientific image of the world. Rather, information is presented with a bias and influenced by the cultural mythology of the producer of the map (Harley, 1988). This mythology can be used to suppress and conquer other mythologies. Not only are the things included not represented in an objective way, but also what is left out, the silences of the map, can give hints about the power of definition of maps. In regards to colonial mapping, this can be understood as discrimination against native people (Harley, 1988: 292). However, for several decades now, the consciousness has grown that maps are indeed constructed (Crampton, 2001).

Authors such as Harley (1988) called for the deconstruction of maps, to reveal their hidden agendas of power and political interests. The “political task” of maps can be different on different scales: on a global scale, they help to build and maintain empires, on a national

scale they support the idea of the nation state, and on a local scale they enforce the assertion of individual property rights (Harley 1988: 282). Therefore, also a cadastral map is for example not a neutral depiction of land areas, but is imbued with the idea of property rights and ownership and therefore can play an important role in promoting capitalism. According to Harley, maps played an important role in the structural changes from feudalism to capitalism – without them, the capitalism we know today would have not developed in the same way: “Accurate, large-scale plans were a means by which land could be more efficiently exploited, by which rent rolls could be increased, and by which legal obligations could be enforced or tenures modified” (Harley, 1988: 285).

Even though Harley deals with historic maps, his work reveals and investigates how space is produced through maps and the role of knowledge and power. His central argument is that

maps are never value-free images [...] [b]oth in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of representation maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon particular sets of social relations. (Harley, 1988: 278)

It is worth to think about this argument in detail. First, Harley mentions that the content of maps is always a selection, or even an intentional omission. Furthermore, not everything can be displayed on a sheet of paper. Second, he talks about signs and styles of representation, which means the way things are represented on a map (symbol, size, ...). These two first points are part of a spiral process: conceiving the world, articulating it in a map, and this map then structures, i.e. influences again the (human) world. This happens in a “set of social relations”, which means that it is not a neutral sphere or a power vacuum, but that there is a social world with relations, actors and interests that shape and are shaped by maps. Especially when put in a historical context, e.g. colonialism or warfare, the role of maps and their political content becomes obvious. Harley underlines that is therefore important when analysing maps to look at the context in which they were produced, as well as who produced them and for whom (Harley, 1988: 281).

This critical analysis of spatial practices such as surveying, naming and mapping is not only applicable to historic events, but also valid for contemporary practices as well. Today, it is not so much practices such as (re-)naming or fundamental surveying that are carried out. Rather, the production of maps is carried out for planning, developments and other reasons. Furthermore, there is also a growing consciousness about the power of mapping and other space-producing practices. Planners, for example, are more aware that map-making is not an

objective or neutral and uncontested practice. In a workshop on the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement, organised by the Department of Conservation, the participants stated that

The issue is not just ‘where you draw the lines on the map’ [seen as a technical or expert issue and decision; MO] but that you have to draw a line. [...] lines will always be controversial – the moment things go on a map, people will comment. (Department of Conservation, 2011: 15)

This statement shows the awareness about the consequences of mapping, and that it does not stop with “drawing a line”, because society will respond to these lines. Also, the uneasiness of the workshop participants about the fact that they are obliged to “draw lines” is interesting. They are aware that they produce maps with contents that have effects on the society.

Boundary making

Ryks (2014) investigates how the coast was transformed in recent decades in regard to effects of dislocation and marginalization of Maori communities. He focuses on the production of coastal spaces through boundary-making. Ryks distinguishes two practices of boundary-making. First, there is a understanding of the coast which builds upon calculable boundary lines like the MHWS (mean High water springs) or the cadastral division of land. In regard to the economic utilization of the coast, the MHWS line plays an important role as boundary line between land and sea and therefore private and common property (Ryks, 2014). The construction of this boundary and its implications were highly contested when the debates around the Foreshore and Seabed Act erupted in 2004 (see below). Second, there exist constructions and definitions of the coast that do not relate to Western governance techniques, but to a Maori worldview and traditions. Generally, Ryks sees potential for conflict between formal coastal spaces and informal coastal places (i.e. not related to western governance techniques). For example the production of a cadastral map or the application of likewise techniques, is in his opinion a way of manipulating the coast in a way to meet the demands of “suitable tenants”, such as investors. This includes – in accordance to Lefebvres ideas about the production of space - not only techniques regarding conceiving space (designing a map, making plans, and creating surveys), but also the physical labour of developers and engineers in producing material structures (Ryks, 2014: 40f). Other coastal constructions (as informal Maori settlements and squatter communities), as well as dissenting *definitions* are understood as messy and troublesome (Ryks, 2014). According to

Ryks, there exists clearly a hegemony in regard to formalised coastal boundaries and coastal zones:

formal coastal boundaries and coastal zones that are established on the basis of a measurable index and enshrined in law and policy can be considered hegemonic as they are managed by planners and developers in an effort to maintain permanency, rigidity and certainty in accordance with Western property rights-based ideals and the orthodoxy of a linear perspective. (Ryks, 2014: 39-40)

In this reasoning, the hegemonic construction of boundaries aims at the economic preparation of space. These spatial conceptions are closely linked to other conceptions, e.g. amenity values, how access should be managed (or not managed), and what is understood as desirable development. These conceptions might differ from each other, depending on what is taken as a basis: economic considerations, historical or traditional connections to places or social relations (Ryks, 2014: 40).

7.4 Access and ownership

New Zealand's history "[...] was always a history of spaces and of the ability of its inhabitants to control space and resources cognitively, socially and physically" (Christensen, 2013: 310). This went hand in hand with conflicts and wars over land alienation, use rights and property rights. How political and contested the coast can be became visible in the debate about the foreshore and seabed. In 2003, the Court of Appeal ruled that Maori rights to the foreshore and seabed were not extinguished (see case *Attorney-General v Ngati Apa* [2003] 3NZLR 643; Brake and Peart, 2013). The court ruling allowed Maori in the Marlborough region "the right to seek customary title over the public foreshore and seabed in their traditional areas" (Kearns and Collins, 2012: 942). This decision made it possible for Maori to acquire titles over customarily used areas of the coast in New Zealand. This mere possibility led to a hot public debate: "Media-fuelled fear and confusion followed, centred on potential – although unlikely – loss of recreational beach access" (Kearns and Collins, 2012: 942). Many New Zealanders believed that the foreshore and seabed were owned by the Crown, on behalf of all New Zealanders. Therefore, they were opposing the customary titles (Brake and Peart, 2013: 25).

The Crown's response to the Court of Appeal's decision was the *Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004*, which vested the ownership of the foreshore and seabed to the Crown. This legislation practically extinguished Maori customary rights, "a move many Māori regarded as analogous

to confiscation” (Kearns and Collins, 2012: 942). Greensill understands this legislation as being part of a “new wave of colonization” (Greensill, 2005: 159), with the goal to exploit the coast for capitalist gain. For these reasons, many Maori did not accept the Foreshore and Seabed Act (Murton, 2006). A Waitangi Tribunal Report (Waitangi Tribunal, 2004a) criticised the Foreshore and Seabed Act for breaching the Treaty of Waitangi. Even the United Nations Commission on Human Rights proposed that the act should be repealed (Brake and Peart, 2013: 26). Consequently, the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 was reviewed, and a new act was passed in 2011, the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. In section 11(2), it is stated that the marine and coastal area is not owned by anyone: “Neither the Crown nor any other person owns, or is capable of owning, the common marine and coastal area, as in existence from time to time after the commencement of this Act”. One of the main goals of the Marine and Coastal Area Act was to restore customary interests (section 2(4)). Under the Marine and Coastal Area Act, foreshore and seabed are common land, and customary marine titles as well as protected customary rights are acknowledged. It aims at enabling the exercise of *mana tuko iho*, which means inherited right or authority derived in accordance with *tikanga* (section 9) in the marine and coastal area.

As already discussed before, contestation over coastal and marine land between Maori and Pakeha or the Crown is not a new issue. Murton (2006) illustrates another example with the case of the “Toheroa wars”, where Maori were resisting to management practices by the Crown which cut their traditional use of the *toheroa* (giant surf clam, *Paphies ventricosa*). He sees a strong connection between the issues of ownership of coastal land and waters and the issue about “the nature of resources and [...] who had the authority to access and manage resources” (Murton, 2006: 26). In both cases, there are two different systems, one building on property rights and the other on use rights.

7.5 Beach culture: Recreation and holidays

Tracing “official” or formalised techniques of producing space can be much easier than those of unofficial, unformalised ones. The former usually produce also official and formalised artefacts, such as maps or plans. Individual or collective everyday production of space can be harder to find. Often, these spaces just exist for certain groups of society and these groups might not be eager to share them with others, e.g. sub-cultures or political groups that might fear repression. Many uses of space are also temporally. A market is only busy during certain days and hours, a surf break only breaks in a surfable way in certain conditions, depending on wind, swell etc. On a flat day, no surfer is in the water. However, there are artefacts that

can give hints about what spaces are used for, like signs that allow or forbid certain activities. Also infrastructure for recreational activities, such as car parks or cafés indicate certain uses. Next to material artefacts, there are also stories, experiences or traditions that are distributed orally. Furthermore, also the human body can give insight into specific uses of the coast, for example the so-called “surfer’s ears”, where the inner ear changes as a response to a regular exposure to cold water.

Traditionally, New Zealanders have a close relationship to the coast. Raewyn Peart states that “The coast is part of what it is to be a New Zealander. Our history is steeped in our coastal environment, as is our present. It is deeply ingrained in our culture and identity” (Peart, 2009: 65). Both Maori and Pakeha arrived by the sea and many of the first settlements were close to the ocean, as it offered food in abundance and the possibilities for transport (Peart, 2009). However, many uses of the beach for recreation were unknown to Europeans. For them, the ocean was a dangerous place because they could not swim. In contrast, Maori used the sea for recreational swimming as well as surfing (Peart, 2009: 54). Only in the late 19th century, beaches were increasingly used for recreation like picnicking or strolling (ibid). Soon also swimming became popular, and with this the surf lifesaving was established, which is nowadays a popular sport in Aotearoa New Zealand (Figure 1).

Closely connected to this development, Summer holidays at the beach became a Kiwi tradition, with the famous “bach”-culture (Peart, 2009: 75–91), but also camping (Collins and Kearns, 2010a). After the second world war, New Zealand’s coast experienced a first wave of holiday home development with the small, self-constructed baches. However, these buildings have little to do with modern coastal houses. The baches were very simple, rather huts than houses in most cases and built from whatever material was at hand at the time (Peart, 2009: 75–78). The baches were a major element of Kiwi beach culture and a destination for family summer holidays for generations. Peart (2009: 78) describes these little baches as nested into the coastal environment and due to their size and location they were not very intrusive to the coastal environment.



Figure 1: Surf lifesaving event at Waihi Beach, February 2017. Picture: Mara Ort

From the mid-1990s to the late 2000s, there was a second big wave of coastal holiday-home subdivision and development (Peart, 2009: 95). These houses were much bigger in size than the traditional bach. Peart criticizes that they intrude into the landscape much more, due to their size but also due to the chosen locations, e.g. on the top of ridges. Also the rising prices make the coast less accessible to people with lower incomes, there are fewer campsites and cabins and more expensive holiday homes (Peart, 2009: 95–109).

7.6 Coastal infrastructures

There are two groups of infrastructures that are labelled “coastal infrastructures” within this work. First, there are material structures specifically belonging to coastal areas. This comprises ports or coastal protection structures (e.g. seawalls, Gesing, 2016). Second, there are infrastructures that are not necessarily specifically “coastal” but are located in the coastal environment. This is for example the case with the Wellington Airport, which is located close to the sea, partially on reclaimed land, but does not need a coastal environment to function nor serves to give access or any other service related to the coast.

Ports

New Zealand's main ports were established already in the 19th century (McLauchlan, 2012). Sea ports have the main function to provide and facilitate interlinkages in transport and trade

(Memon et al., 2004). In the early phase of colonisation, the British already established 112 ports until the year 1867, of which 26 were overseas ports of entry (Memon et al., 2004). Ports historically had a social function, such as to provide the community with services (ibid.). However, these services focused on the needs of the colonizers. Back then, Maori concerns were not considered, for example when a location for a port was chosen. Rather the suitability of the harbours or bays and economic as well as colonist ideologies were crucial (this was the case also for other developments). Issues such as nature conservation or Maori concerns only became important much later. Ports were governed by the New Zealand Port Authority, and every port had its own Harbour Board. Up to 1988, the ports were run on a non-profit basis, with the Harbour Boards' main job to provide service to regional users of ports. This means that they had to be able to cover their facility costs and provide enough money for capital works (Memon et al., 2004: 24). In the 1980s, the general climate changed in New Zealand, as neoliberal public policy reforms were brought on the way in many sectors. The whole infrastructural sector was affected by this development. For example, the Ministry of Transport reformed the transport sector. One principle was that services should be carried out in a corporate form, ideally under private ownership and on a competitive basis (Bollard and Pickford, 1998: 268).

The Port Company Act in 1988 led to significant changes in the governance of sea ports (Memon et al., 2004). The national New Zealand Port Authority was abolished and there was no national body to control port development any more. The Harbour Boards were replaced by corporate boards when the ports were transformed to companies owned by local governments (Memon et al., 2004: 16). The ports are now held at "arm's length" from the local governments, which in most cases still hold the majority of the shares. The aim of the deregulation was to increase the country's competitiveness (Memon et al., 2004: 16). Since the establishment of the Port Company Act 1988, ports have to be profitable businesses, and the job of the boards of directors is to produce a return from port assets (McDermott, 1996). Memon et al. (2004: 24) state that the changes in port governance also had an effect on the relations between the port and the local communities and stakeholder, such as dockworkers or farming interests. These connections can be seen for example in employment levels, social impacts of the port on the community (e.g. disturbances through emissions), and environmental effects of port activities (e.g. dredging) (Memon et al., 2004: 24). Where Harbour Boards had the mandate "to serve the needs of the various port users, while attending to the public interest of a region or locality" (Memon et al., 2004: 25), the port companies now have a commercial mandate which suppresses the social responsibility functions (ibid). There were also critical voices about the corporatisation of ports. These came

for example from the users of the port, as well as by actors fearing that local economic interests might suffer (McDermott, 1996). The corporatisation had also effects on the working conditions at the ports. The Waterfront Industry Commission was abolished, which led to a deregulation of the port-related labour conditions (McDermott, 1996). Moreover, thousands of waterfront workers lost their jobs, when ports had to become more “efficient” (Pyvis and Tull, 2017: 305).

Airports

In 2014, Aotearoa New Zealand had 38 airports and aerodromes, of which seven offered international connections (Abbott, 2015). Some of them have a long history, reaching back more than 80 years. Generally, the central government was not involved in establishing airports, but local authorities. Regarding their regulation, until the 1980s, policy development, air-traffic management and aviation regulatory functions were carried out by a single government department, the Civil Aviation department (Abbott, 2015). However, in the process of structural change, also New Zealand's airports were affected by the neoliberal policy. With the Airport Authorities Amendment Bill in 1986 a document was passed that enabled airports to set a company structure. At the same time, the bundling of the diverse functions within one department was challenged, and services were separated under the State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986. Consequently, this led to the Civil Aviation Act 1990, to further separate policy making and regulation of airports (Abbott, 2015). In the late 1990s the government also decided to withdraw from the ownership of airports. It sold its shares of the two major airports Auckland and Wellington to private investors.

7.7 Neoliberalisation and structural adjustment

A structural adjustment programme was carried out in Aotearoa New Zealand from 1984 to 1990. Its effects are still visible today. This phase is important for two reasons. First, the restructuring of the economy also had effects on the infrastructural sector in general and the ports and airports specifically. Second, during the same time also the environmental and planning laws were reformed, which led to the formulation and enactment of the Resource Management Act in 1991, New Zealand's main planning and environmental statute.

From 1984 to 1990, the main parts of the so-called “New Zealand experiment” were carried out. This was a radical structural adjustment, following a model of pure neoliberal economic theory (Kelsey, 1997: 1). A severe economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s was used by the government as a reason to implement this neoliberal programme (Humpage, 2017: 124). This

project had massive impacts on nearly all sectors and areas of society, not only economically, but also socially and environmentally (Humpage, 2017). The ownership and management of infrastructure were changed, as well as the principal environmental planning statute, the Resource Management Act 1991 was developed during that time.

The structural adjustment was started by a Labour government and, after elections in 1990, continued by a National government. The basis of this adjustment was market liberalization and free trade, a limited government that should not intervene with economy, a deregulated labour market, a narrow monetarist policy and fiscal restraints (Kelsey, 1997: 2). Supporters of the reforms evaluate them as a change from a system of “government intervention, ownership, and all-pervasive regulation, to one based largely on free operation of markets, with a correspondingly limited role for the public sector and government management” (Bollard and Pickford, 1998: 267). The international economic community and institutions like the World Bank and the OECD supported the development and celebrated the model (Kelsey, 1997: 5). However, there were many negative outcomes. From 1985 to 1992, the economy was shrinking, unemployment was rising to unprecedented levels, and the overseas debt was rising (Kelsey, 1997: 9). Even though economic growth kicked in in 1993 and 1994, Kelsey states that the numbers were just returning to the levels they had before 1984 (Kelsey, 1997: 10). Generally, the “experiment” had severe impacts on the society, especially as poverty and unemployment became “structural features of New Zealand life” (Kelsey, 1997: 10). Also cultural issues were not taken into account during the restructuring phase, for many decision makers Maori concerns were just a disturbance that was ignored (Kelsey, 1997).

The seeds for this economic restructuring were planted early. Colonisation brought the aggressive promotion of economic interests of colonisers into the country (Kelsey, 1997: 15). The English colonisation was built on the concept of liberal rationalism and economics of Western capitalism. Other worldviews were seen as illegitimate (Kelsey, 2002: 373). Law was used as an instrument to legitimate and implement western concepts and practices and introduce principles like commodification, private-property rights and exclusive ownership (Kelsey, 2002: 374).

Corporisation and privatisation

The neoliberal reforms in Aotearoa New Zealand in the 1990s also had effects on the infrastructural sector. The trust in market-based solutions and voluntary standards were a sign for the general rolling back of the state. A similar trend could be attested in the field of state-owned commercial operations. The Treasury was urging for converting these

operations into enterprises that should function like private sector businesses, run by an entrepreneurial board of directors (Kelsey, 1997: 115). It assumed that private ownership was even better than state ownership, and that missing competition lead to insufficient pressure and therefore inefficient operations (Kelsey, 1997: 117). In regard to infrastructures, this development meant that from 1986 onwards, “any state activity with a potentially commercial function was corporatized, placed in the hands of a government appointed board of entrepreneurial directors and required to run as an equivalent to private sector business” (Kelsey, 1997: 3).

In 1986, the State Owned Enterprises Act was passed. Many state owned enterprises and assets got first corporatized and then privatised during this period, such as railways, the national airline, local transport, shipping, telecommunication, electricity distribution, forests and fisheries (Humpage, 2017; Kelsey, 1997: 118). However, this was not the only action: “Over the next four years the Labour government applied the corporisation formula to almost every state activity with a conceivable commercial function” (Kelsey, 1997: 119), including also ports, railways and airport holdings. The wave of corporisation was soon followed by a wave of privatisation. In 1990, 18 government-owned enterprises had been sold (Kelsey, 1997: 129). However, even though the “New Zealand Experiment” was celebrated as a success story, in 2001, the Deputy Prime Minister Jim Anderton announced that “New Zealand's experiment with privatisation of publicly-owned strategic assets largely failed” (New Zealand Government, 2001: no page).

7.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined different ways of producing space at the Aotearoa New Zealand coast over the last centuries. Maori were the first settlers that changed the environment substantially and, subsequently, also adapted their own practices to the new environment. Their culture and resource management strategies were challenged with the start of colonisation and the import of new practices to produce space. These “scientific” techniques such as mapping or surveying as well as the (re-)naming of the land were not neutral, but highly political and power-laden acts that served to establish the practices of spatial production of the colonisers. Until today, practices such as boundary-making are carried out and can lead to disagreement between Pakeha and Maori population. Furthermore, the issue of indigenous land rights and ownership of coastal areas was hotly debated when the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 was passed. Parallel to these developments, since the beginning of the 20th century a beach culture emerged in New Zealand. This produced

artefacts such as the famous baches as well as the traditional summer beach holiday. Also recreational activities such as surfing and surf lifesaving became popular in the last decades and play a role in the strong connection New Zealanders have with their coastline. Also the coast was subject to the Neoliberalisation that took place in Aotearoa New Zealand in the last decades. The structural adjustment program influenced the management of the ports, and had an impact on the formulation of planning law such as the Resource Management Act.

This rough overview over historical and contemporary society-environment-relations at New Zealand's coast is the first main block of background information for my case studies. The second block about the Aotearoa New Zealand planning framework will be discussed in the following chapter.

8 The Aotearoa New Zealand planning framework

This chapter gives an overview about laws and policies in Aotearoa New Zealand that are relevant for developments in the coastal area and beyond. This is mainly the Resource Management Act 1991, with the corresponding New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010. Next to their role in guiding planning and development, they also give some insights into how space is conceived and what leading ideologies might influence how land is used and managed. Government institutions play a strong role in the formal conception of space. By incorporating and producing planning paradigms, and putting them into effect, they have an important role both in an intellectual conception of space as well as in the material “use” of the space, e.g. through zoning or allowing or forbidding certain uses of space. The laws and policies presented here provide the formal frame in which the conflicts in the case studies are negotiated. Landscape as a conceptual background serves as a link between the abstract theoretical thoughts of Lefebvre and the concrete case studies. In the RMA, landscape is a “type” of space that is explicitly addressed. Furthermore, the assessment of landscapes follows a set of formalised methods (landscape and visual assessment as well as natural character assessment). These are interesting opportunities to trace the production of space, especially regarding *espace conçu* and *espace perçu*.

In the first section, I introduce the development of the Resource Management Act 1991 and the planning system that was installed through it. I will also introduce the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement as an important mediator between the RMA and regional authorities. Chapter 8.2 details on how Maori concerns and issues are addressed in resource management law. Finally, in chapter 8.3, I discuss how landscapes are dealt with under the RMA and explain the methods of “landscape and visual assessment” as well as “natural character assessment”.

8.1 Resource Management Act 1991

The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is New Zealand’s main environmental statute and regulates the management of land, air and water under the premise of sustainability. The RMA sets the foundation for the current planning system in New Zealand, since it was enacted in 1991. Its purpose is “to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources” (RMA s5(1); s stands for section). Sustainable management is defined as

„managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their health and safety“ (RMA s5(2)).

Historical development

The RMA replaced 59 statutes, most importantly the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 (Gleeson, 1996). The goal was to introduce a more coherent, integrated and structured planning scheme (Supreme Court of New Zealand, 2014). Planning under the Town and Country Planning Act had been based upon prescriptive zoning schemes. With the RMA, regulation now focused on an effects-based approach to manage developments and the environment (Gleeson, 1996; Gregory, 2008: 144).

The first planning act in Aotearoa New Zealand was the Town-planning Act 1926, which gave local authorities the power of regulating and limiting the use of land for particular activities. This act was replaced by the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. It is noteworthy that already in this Act, the preservation of places of natural beauty was included (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). Another characteristic of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 was that the land was split into zones designated to specific uses. Also, the right of public objection and hearings was included. With the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board, the precursor of the later Environment Court was introduced. In 1977, the Town and Country Planning Act was renewed, and now comprised matters of national importance, amongst them the preservation of the natural character of the coast and its protection from subdivision and development; as well as the recognition of the relationship of Maori with their ancestral land (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 13). This Act was then replaced by the RMA in 1991.

From 1988 onwards, resource management law was subject to a review, until in 1991 the Resource Management Act was passed. The development of the Act was influenced by two trends. The first one was the environmental movement, linked to the global discourse around sustainable development since the 1980s. The RMA can be understood as an outcome of the development of environmental legislation both in Aotearoa New Zealand and worldwide, which became increasingly important since the 1960s (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). It was developed in a climate in the mid-1980s where sustainability and participation played an increased role and influenced environmental and planning law (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). The emergence of environmental planning was catalysed by the famous UN-report “Our common future” in 1987. The introduction of sustainable development in

consequence of the summit led to the emergence of environmental planning, or planning for sustainability. However, the RMA was not only influenced by global environmentalism, but also by neoliberal interests. Therefore, the economic restructuring was the second trend that influenced the development of the RMA. In the 1990s, governance in Aotearoa New Zealand was driven by efficiency principles and cost-cutting measures (Ericksen et al., 2003: 49). Neoliberal voices criticised the existing town and country planning regime for its “inflexibility” of planning schemes, the “generous” public participation options and the possibility to employ delaying tactics by community groups who were opposing developments (Gleeson, 1996: 253).

In this neo-liberal climate, the focus was on cost-cutting and not on capability-building. The position of the Labour government was that resource management laws should be liberalised to reduce transaction costs and attract foreign investments. Managerial and business principles were applied to public agencies, which had strong consequences for the cooperative elements in the RMA. Both the Treasury and the Ministry of Commerce were not fond of the RMA, as they perceived it as “intrusive”. They opposed funding that was meant to build capacity in councils to help implement the processes and goals of the RMA at the regional and local level (Ericksen et al., 2003: 50). The Treasury urged for a more market-oriented approach, which meant minimal regulation, promoting market-mechanisms like tradeable pollution permits (Kelsey, 1997: 110).

Thus neo-liberal interests led to a more streamlined decision-making process, e.g. through the establishment of time limits and the avoidance of public notification in planning processes under the RMA (Gleeson, 1996). Also economic players such as the tourism sector or mining put pressure on the government to liberalise resource management laws to become more attractive to foreign investments (Kelsey, 1997: 110). Gleeson argues that neo-liberal interests were strongly influencing how the RMA was written out. For example, the responsibility to future generations was narrowed down. Originally, sustainable development follows the premise that the present resource use should not compromise the needs of future generations. However, in the RMA the final wording limits the responsibility to “reasonable foreseeable need” (RMA s5 (2)(a)). Gleeson criticises further that this definition “effectively *desocialises future generations*” (Gleeson, 1996: 252, emphasis in original), as it limits their needs to natural and physical matters. The RMA has a relatively narrow understanding of the term “sustainability”, with a focus on the biophysical issues. Even though the Act mentions social, economic and cultural well-being, Gleeson (1996) criticises that social issues are not properly covered. Planning has little capacity to influence the social and economic parts (Gleeson, 1996: 252). Moreover, minerals are explicitly

excluded from a sustainable use (RMA s5(2)(a)). In a nutshell, “Planning was seen by many developers as unwarranted intervention in the marketplace” (Gleeson, 1996: 253)

However, also environmentalists as well as Maori had their ideas of how new resource management laws should be set up, and their concerns did not go completely unnoticed. When the Act was finally passed in 1991, it was still relatively proscriptive (Kelsey, 1997: 111). However, there was a focus on cost-effectiveness and no direct environmental regulation. Rather, the position of the National government was that voluntary industrial codes should solve environmental issues than national environmental standards (Kelsey, 1997: 111). Also Maori issues were not included strongly (Kelsey, 2002: 375). Gleeson describes the RMA as an “uneasy legislative compromise” (Gleeson, 1996: 251) between the different interests. On the one hand, it follows a more holistic approach, reflecting environmentalist demands and aiming at biophysical sustainability. On the other hand, it offers greater flexibility, fewer regulations and a more streamlined process to developers which facilitates developments, reflecting neo-liberal interests (Pawson, 1996b: 250).

Planning system under the Resource Management Act

In New Zealand, there is no general spatial plan that covers the entire country. Regional councils develop the mandatory coastal and district plans, as well as an optional regional plan, if they wish to do so (Ericksen et al., 2003: 81). The management system is three tiered – national level, regional level and local/municipal level. On the national level, central government sets the framework for planning, with the RMA and national policy statements (for example the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement), regulations and national environmental standards (RMA part 5 s43-58J). On the regional level, regional councils prepare regional policy statements and regional plans. Whereas regional plans are not always mandatory, there has to be a regional coastal plan for every region (RMA part 5 s59-71). On the local level, local/territorial authorities (city councils and district councils) prepare district plans, which are the most detailed and concrete plans for land use and subdivision, including zoning (RMA part 5 s72-77; see also OECD, 2017).

Generally, the underlying approaches of plan-making range on a continuum from a rational process, based on scientific methods and considerations, to a consultative and participatory process (Ericksen et al., 2003). In a rational approach, experts play a key role in “writing a ‘blueprint’ for the future”, Ericksen et al. (2003: 30) state: “This rational approach is assumed to rely on a scientific process in which facts and logic hold sway”. In a participatory approach, it is recognized that political power and processes are important factors in a planning process

and have to be considered. According to Ericksen et al. (2003), the RMA is a synthesis of both approaches. Research plays a role in determining desired environmental outcomes or assessing environmental effects of a development. And councils are required to consult relevant government agencies, *iwi* and other stakeholders (Ericksen et al., 2003). However, how this consultation has to be designed is not specified in detail. Other authors are much more critical of the participative possibilities within the RMA and see the possibilities to oppose very much restricted (Gunder and Mouat, 2002).

Resource consents

For all activities not explicitly allowed for in the RMA or the respective planning documents (for example larger construction projects), a resource consent application submitted to the local authority is necessary. In the RMA, there is a fundamental difference in how water and land are approached: On land, developers are generally allowed to do what they want, unless the activity is explicitly restricted by a district plan. In marine coastal areas (as well as water and air), only things that are explicitly allowed in a regional plan can be carried out. This is also due to the circumstance that land is usually in private ownership, whereas water and air are vested in the Crown. It also mirrors the high value of the coast and its preservation for New Zealanders (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). In regard to the coastal marine area, resource consents are called coastal permits (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 191).

A resource consent application has to be submitted by the person or company that wants to carry out the respective activity. It has to include an assessment of environmental effects (AEE). Schedule 4 of the RMA specifies on the issues that have to be covered by an AEE (RMA s7):

- (1) An assessment of the activity's effects on the environment must address the following matters:
 - (a) any effect on those in the neighbourhood and, where relevant, the wider community, including any social, economic, or cultural effects:
 - (b) any physical effect on the locality, including any landscape and visual effects:
 - (c) any effect on ecosystems, including effects on plants or animals and any physical disturbance of habitats in the vicinity:
 - (d) any effect on natural and physical resources having aesthetic, recreational, scientific, historical, spiritual, or cultural value, or other special value, for present or future generations:

(e) any discharge of contaminants into the environment, including any unreasonable emission of noise, and options for the treatment and disposal of contaminants:

(f) and risk to the neighbourhood, the wider community, or the environment through natural hazards or hazardous installations.

The schedule does not only include ecosystem or biological effects, but also social, economic and cultural effects as well as landscape and visual effects. It is explicitly stated in s7(d) of the RMA that aesthetic, recreational, scientific, historical, spiritual and cultural values have to be taken into account.

Generally, applicants of resource consents do not have to consult with the public (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 199; RMA s 36A). However, once local authorities receive an application, they have to decide whether the consent will be notified (full public notification or limited notification), or not. Non-notification means that the public does not have any possibility to play a role in the decision-making process (i.e. by filing submissions, give evidence in hearings, appeal to decisions at the Environment court) (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 202). Warnock and Baker-Galloway (2015: 202) state: “[...] non-notification locks the public out of the decision-making process”. If the consent is notified, all documents are accessible to the public. People can then submit against or in favour of the project. Those who submit do have “the right to be heard by any first-instance decision-making body (usually the local authority), and a right to appeal to the Environment Court on a de novo basis” (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 21). If they do appeal further, higher courts will deal with the case. In the case of public notification, every member of the public can file a submission. If the consent is notified on a limited basis, only affected persons are informed and can file a submission. Additionally, the local authority prepares a so called “Section 87F(4)” report, where it reviews the application and states its assessment of the planned activity.

The next step would then be a hearing, usually at the council level. This takes place if either there are submissions, the applicant wishes a hearing, or the consent authority decides that a hearing is necessary (RMA s100). At this stage, hearings are rather informal and no cross-examination is allowed (RMA s42). The council then decides if to grant the consent or not. If there was notification and therefore public consultation, the public also has the possibility to challenge the decision made by the consent authority by appealing it. The case will then be examined afresh by the Environment Court.

Even though submissions can be generally handed in by everyone (no specific affectedness or the like is needed as in many other countries, Stephenson and Lawson, 2013: 27), the

participation process is not equally accessible to everyone. Stephenson and Lawson state that “[w]hen planning proposals are publicly notified, the right to submit and be heard is intended to provide an equal opportunity to all, but this involves an assumption that the process will be equally accessible by all” (Stephenson and Lawson, 2013: 27). However, for several reasons, this is not the case. Gunder and Mouat even go as far as to propose that the RMA “actually dissipates the ability to resist for the majority of New Zealanders” (Gunder and Mouat, 2002: 126). They further state that well-resourced stakeholders do have the abilities to resist, however, the less resourced majority cannot (Gunder and Mouat, 2002: 129). Therefore, it must be kept in mind that the people who submit only represent a selection of possible positions and opinions towards planning processes.

New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010

The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) is a national policy statement, and the only mandatory national policy statement. The NZCPS is prepared by the Minister of Conservation and published by the Department of Conservation. Its aim is to interpret national goals and make them more applicable for councils on the regional and territorial level (Ericksen et al., 2003: 69). The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement is required by Section 56 of the RMA: „The purpose of a New Zealand coastal policy statement is to state objectives and policies in order to achieve the purpose of this Act in relation to the coastal environment of New Zealand“. This means that its purpose is to achieve sustainable development of natural and physical resources of the coastal environment (Brake and Peart, 2013). The first NZCPS was released in 1994, this version was replaced in 2010. The NZCPS 2010 has a more directive character and provides a higher level of protection for natural resources.

The NZCPS itself is a relative short document, comprising 7 objectives and 29 policies concerning New Zealand’s coastal environment. Nevertheless, it has a central role in giving effect to the RMA in coastal environments of Aotearoa New Zealand (High Court, 2015), and allows the national goals to be applied down the hierarchy (Ericksen et al., 2003: 69). Regional and territorial councils need to give effect to the NZCPS in their planning documents, i.e. their regional policy statements as well as regional and district plans. However, the boundary of terrestrial plans is marked by the shifting line of MHWS, which can create problems for example in terms of responsibilities (Gregory, 2008). The NZCPS defines the boundaries of the coastal environment different than the RMA. It extends to 12 nautical miles offshore in seaward direction. In contrary to the RMA, the landward boundaries are not defined but relate to local geography and local circumstances (Department of Conservation, no date).

I will not discuss the objectives and policies here in detail. However, I want to point out some of them, as they will be relevant for the case studies later on. First, the preservation of the natural character of the coast is objective 2 in the NZCPS. This issue is also taken up in policies 13 and 14 on preservation and restoration of natural character and policy 15 on natural features and natural landscape. The prominence of this “naturalness” of the coast links to the framing of the coast as “natural” (in contrast to cultural or urban) and “wild”, as I showed already above, and as will be further discussed in the case studies (e.g. ch. 10.2 and 11.2.2). Second, Maori interests are attended to in objective 3: It reminds to take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, as well as to recognise the role of Maori as *kaitiaki*. Furthermore, *tangata whenua* should be involved in the management of coastal resources. Policy 2 provides further detail in this respect. Third, access to the coast is addressed in the NZCPS as objective 4. It is stated that public open space qualities as well as recreational opportunities shall be maintained and enhanced. This is further detailed in policy 18 and 19, which focus on public open space respectively walking access. This reflects the role the coast plays in a New Zealand lifestyle and self-image, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Managing the coast

The Aotearoa New Zealand coast is managed by a variety of actors and institutions, amongst them territorial authorities, regional councils, local Maori (*tangata whenua*) as well as the Ministry of Fisheries and the Department of Conservation. In her work, Peart shows how the different management agencies that are concerned with managing the Aotearoa New Zealand coast do have very different underlying approaches and assumptions about people-nature relationships (Table 1) (Peart, 2007). These span on a range of a primacy of economic development up to the maximisation of conservation values. The apparently “incompatible” values are “people” on the one hand and “nature” on the other hand. Peart observes also different relations between people and nature. According to Peart, only in a Maori worldview (*tangata whenua*), people are considered being part of nature. From all other perspectives she shows, people and nature are understood as two different spheres that interact in certain ways, whereas human agency is clearly the stronger and defining force in most cases: either people are more important than nature, use it, or co-exist with it. The conservation perspective is in contrast to the councils’ and ministry view. Here, people are perceived as being in conflict with nature, and to maximise conservation, people have to be kept out. These competing approaches are to be weighed up in decisions on whether to grant a resource consent or not.

Table 1: Underlying orientation of different coastal management agencies. After Peart, 2007: 37

Management agency	Underlying approach	Assumption about people-nature relationship
Territorial authorities	Managing development	People are more important than nature
Ministry of Fisheries	Maximising value	People utilise nature
Regional councils	Balancing values	People co-exist with nature
Tangata whenua	Maintaining inter-relationships between people and nature	People are part of nature
Department of Conservation	Maximising conservation values	People are in conflict with nature

8.2 Maori concerns in resource management law

For many decades, Maori concerns were hardly taken into account by state law and decision makers when developments were carried out. Prior to the RMA, resource management was regulated through the Town and Country Planning Act and the Water and Soil Conservation Act. These Acts were in fundamental conflict with the Treaty of Waitangi, as the Waitangi Tribunal had found, e.g. the concept of ownership was an issue which caused some irritation (Kelsey, 2002). The Town and Country planning act did have a section in which it included Maori interests, however, “this section had seemingly been given little importance by decision makers” (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 108). Regarding the legal context, the introduction of the RMA brought some more attention to Maori issues. In the RMA, Maori issues are considered in several sections. First, the “relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga” (RMA s6(e)) is a matter of national importance. Second, the RMA gives regard to *kaitiakitanga* (section 7) as well as, third, states that the Treaty of Waitangi has to be taken into account (section 8) (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 106–107). Additionally, local authorities are required to consider *iwi* management plans when they prepare plans as well as to consult with Maori when they prepare, change or review either policy statements or plans (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 107). With the enactment of the RMA, intangible effects of developments were for the first time acknowledged by state law in Aotearoa New Zealand (Roberts, 2002). The law recognised “the unique relationship of Māori and their culture with the environment; acknowledging that Māoridom has its own understanding and view of the environment” (Roberts, 2002: 216). Still, this has to be translated into planning practice. Especially the “intangible” aspects of Maori culture are difficult to deal with for many (Pakeha) planners. They prefer to stay with the physical evidence (Roberts, 2002). Warnock and Baker-Galloway

indicate that it is difficult to translate Maori concepts into legal language (2015: 111). Even though the respect towards Maori culture in law is generally welcomed, some criticize that many terms and concepts that are included in laws are interpreted from a Western/Christian perspective and get new meanings through this translation (Mihinui, 2002; Roberts, 2002). Furthermore, especially in court cases it is an unsolved issue how to “proof” oral history accounts or how to address metaphysical beliefs (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015: 112–114).

However, the balance between different interests is complex. Kelsey criticises that “the wording of the Act assumed that responsibilities of *kaitiakitanga* could be weighed up and traded off against other objectives, including those of market-led capitalism and Western environmentalism” (Kelsey, 2002: 380). So even though Maori concerns get much more respected than in the past, Kelsey does not expect too much from the system:

From one perspective, the momentum that Māori had built up in the 1970s and 1980s had secured unprecedented recognition of Māori values and processes for ‘managing’ natural resources in the 1990s. From another, the legacy of colonisation had created a conceptual framework that distorted tikanga, degraded mana, devalued notions of kaitiakitanga and denied the legitimacy of a Māori worldview. (Kelsey, 2002: 382)

This was and is not only valid for the RMA, but also for other strands of resource management, such as the commodification of fishery resources under the quota management system (Hersoug, 2018).

8.3 Landscape in the RMA

The RMA is the principal statute that governs the management of New Zealand’s land use and is therefore also important in regard to landscapes. The predecessor of the RMA, the Town and Country Planning Act, had no specific reference to landscape protection (Peart, 2009: 218). With the RMA, there are now two ways in which terrestrial landscapes are specifically addressed. First, the RMA shall recognise and provide for “the protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development” (RMA s6(b)). Second, a resource consent application has to include an assessment of environmental effects, which has to address “any physical effect on the locality, including any landscape and visual effects” (RMA schedule 4, clause 7 (1)(b)). Furthermore, and specifically aiming at the coast, the RMA recognises “the preservation of

the natural character of the coastal environment (including the coastal marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers [...]” as a matter of national importance (RMA s6(a)).

The coast gets this much attention because human development was and is mainly located on lowlands and coastal environments, so that the coastal area in many places was and is subject to development, modified and lost its “natural character” (Department of Conservation, 2012). Generally, developments “can have a negative impact on coastal landscapes”, especially where human made structures and patterns intrude into “predominately natural areas” (Brake and Peart, 2013: 67). Brake and Peart suggest that developments on the coast can be more problematic than in other areas. The reason they give is that the “naturalness of coastal landscapes” is highly valued by the public, and can be reduced due to developments (Brake and Peart, 2013: 67). Furthermore, new structures on the coast are often highly visible along large areas the coastline. This understanding reflects the explanation that is also given for the natural character assessment: the more human influence, the less “nature”.

The RMA addresses four categories of landscape: landscapes with high natural character in the coastal environment (s6(a)), outstanding natural features and landscapes (s6(b)), cultural landscapes (s6(f)), and amenity landscapes (s7) (Ministry for the Environment, 2013). However, there is a lack of clear definitions and guidelines, which lead to different interpretations and expert debates about what a landscape actually is under the RMA. The Ministry for the Environment states that “landscape can be explained as a reflection of the relationship between people and place” (Ministry for the Environment, 2013: 3). This means that landscape is not understood as a section of the earth’s surface, but that people’s connections to it are explicitly included and play a role in the assessment. Therefore, the Ministry for the Environment recognizes as landscape attributes: (a) biophysical elements, patterns and processes; (b) associative meanings and values including spiritual, cultural or social associations; and (c) sensory or perceptual qualities (Ministry for the Environment, 2013: 3). These attributes are evaluated through landscape assessments. There are different occasions why and when landscape assessments are carried out. Area-based landscape assessments are usually carried out to generally identify landscape areas and values. Capacity-driven or issue-driven assessments are done as a response to development pressures or landscape management issues. Proposal-driven landscape assessments are usually part of a resource consent application (Ministry for the Environment, 2013: 9). These “proposal-driven impact assessments” usually comprise effects on the landscape and visual effects and can also be complemented by a natural character assessment. In the following

paragraphs, I describe landscape and visual assessment as well as natural character assessment in more detail.

“Assessment of landscape and visual effects”

A “landscape and visual assessments” is a method to describe and evaluate the effects a development could have on the physical landscape regarding its character, experiential values and perceived values. Visual effects are changes in views and a general effect on visual amenity (Ministry for the Environment, 2013: 10). Assessment of landscape effects and assessment of visual effects are not the same. This is often misunderstood even by professionals (Landscape Institute and Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment, 2013). Landscape assessment incorporates, next to scenic quality, also issues such as values and sense of place. Assessment of visual effects deals with the effect of change and development on view and visual amenity (Landscape Institute and Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment, 2013: 98). However, both assessments are closely linked to each other.

The Ministry for the Environment states that landscape assessments should be carried out by experienced professionals such as landscape architects or landscape planners (Ministry for the Environment, 2013: 11). However, also the community should be engaged and consulted with, as their perception of and connection with the landscape is also acknowledged. As there is no specific guideline for landscape and visual assessment in New Zealand, landscape architects and other professionals usually make use of the guidelines of the British Landscape Institute and Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (Landscape Institute and Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment, 2013). In their definition,

landscape and visual assessment (LVIA) is a tool used to identify and assess the significance of and the effects of change resulting from development on both the landscape as an environmental resource in its own right and on people’s views and visual amenity. (Landscape Institute and Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment, 2013: 4)

These assessments are valid both for landscapes being formally recognised as “outstanding” as well as “ordinary” landscapes. The guideline underlines that landscape is not only a matter of aesthetics and visual amenity but is a resource in its own right. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the British system is applied to the Aotearoa New Zealand context.

“Assessment of natural character”

The assessment of landscapes in general includes the overall composition and spatial structure of an area, as well as values and relationship of people with the place (Brake and Peart, 2013). “Natural character” is a more narrow concept. Here, the focus is on natural ecological, hydrological and geomorphological processes (Brake and Peart, 2013). Also natural character assessments are carried out by professionals, such as landscape architects. The concept of natural character is established in section 6a of the RMA, where the preservation of the natural character of the coast is defined as a matter of national importance. This is then further detailed in policy 13, 14 and 15 in the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement. The preservation of the coastal natural character was already incorporated into planning law in 1973, in response to public concern about the development of New Zealand’s coastline (Froude, 2015).

A lack of clear definitions and guidelines leads to confusion and uncertainty in how to understand and implement the assessment of natural character following the RMA and the NZCPS (Department of Conservation, 2011). The Department of Conservation therefore held a workshop in 2011 on natural character and the NZCPS (Department of Conservation, 2011). The workshop focused on Policy 13 (preservation of the natural character) and also touched on Policy 15 (natural features and landscapes). I will discuss the workshop report in the following, as it allows interesting insights into how it is dealt with the issue of natural character. As desired outcomes, the workshop documentation names the need for consistency, simplicity, and understanding, with the aim to develop criteria of what natural character is, indicators to measure it and a distinction between natural character and landscape. Additionally, while assessments for terrestrial areas are already well established, the marine realm poses some specific challenges. Most parts of the marine realm are not visible, because they are beneath the water surface and can therefore be easily overlooked in assessments and decision making processes (Department of Conservation, 2011: 8). Also, it is not clear to what extent and in in which way perception and context have to be included in natural character assessment.

The workshop report defines natural character as a term “used to describe the natural elements of all coastal environments” (Department of Conservation, 2011: 12). It states that the degree of natural character depends on a) the extent to which the natural elements, patterns and processes occur; and b) the nature and extent of modification to the ecosystems and landscapes or seascapes (Department of Conservation, 2011). Following the report, natural character can thus be understood as being an expression of natural elements,

patterns and processes in the landscape – and the degree to which these are modified and affected by human construction and influence. In this understanding, natural character is highest where there are the least human influences in the landscape, and “nature” is defined in contrast to “culture” or “human influence”. This human-nature-dichotomy is the foundation for the assessment of natural character. If human influence grows, natural character is automatically diminished by this definition (see also Froude, 2015). The report states as well that context plays a role in how strong certain modifications of the landscape diminish its “natural character”. Also, this can be perceived differently by different persons. An ecologist might rate for example farmland as not natural as all, whereas someone from the city might regard it as a very natural landscape, compared to an urban environment (I-26: 60). The workshop group also recognised that context and perception are important and can influence how “natural” we rate a certain area (Department of Conservation, 2011). So on one side, there is a strong wish for an objective indicator and measurement methods, ideally even a quantitative instrument, whereas on the other side it is clear that natural character also has a strong subjective character and can hardly be defined generally. Furthermore, “natural character” is not a “natural” thing, but a formal concept. I think that this poses part of the problem that professionals carrying out the assessment are searching for “objective” criteria or definitions, which do not exist. Also the New Zealand Institute of Landscape Architects states that “Landscape assessment is an expert skill, not an exact science” (New Zealand Institute of Landscape Architects, 2010: 3). The constructed character of the concept “natural character” also does not go unnoticed by the workshop participants. There is a call that natural character assessment should also reflect community values of an area:

Natural character may be important to a community even if it is not at the high or outstanding end of the scale. For example, a beach that is surrounded by a heavily modified environment but the community values that beach; it has a high perception of it and it feels that it still has a high coastal natural character. (Department of Conservation, 2011: 13)

This shows another problematic of the whole natural character discussion: Shall we only protect areas with high natural character and diminish the “naturalness” of other, already more modified areas even more? This is a problem that was also voiced by interview partners in my case studies.

These sections and policies in the RMA and NZCPS as well as the workshop report try to define and conceptualise specific features of the environment they subsume under the term

“natural character”. In theory, this might be possible. However, if applied in an assessment on the local level, it becomes much more complicated. And it can also unfold some unexpected power. The landscape architect Michael Steven tells me in an interview that there was a case where natural character actually stopped a project from going ahead, where no one had expected it (he refers to the case *Environmental Defence Society Inc. v The New Zealand King Salmon Co Ltd* in 2014).

[T]his was a particular case where avoiding adverse effects on outstanding natural character actually stopped the project going ahead. And it has caused a lot of consternation in New Zealand because when the Coastal Policy Statement was written and the word 'avoid' adverse effects on outstanding natural character was written, I don't know that anyone really had thought ahead to the possibility that this might put an absolute stop to certain developments, because there had always been the idea that decisions on projects were based on a sort of a balanced view of all effects. (I-26:34)

In this context, “balanced view” seems to mean that positive economic effects outweigh negative environmental effects. This is apparently expected by most people to happen in resource consent conditions.

Discussion of assessments: Landscape practice and landscape theory

Let us recall Don Mitchell's definition of landscape from chapter 3: “Landscape is [...] both a thing [...] and a social process” (D Mitchell, 1996: 30). In this respect, the definition of the Ministry for the Environment, that landscape is a “reflection of the relationship between people and place (Ministry for the Environment, 2013: 3) aims at a similar direction. The assessments incorporate also both physical-material issues as well as people-place-relationships. However, the investigation of the complexity of people-place-relationships seems to stay a tricky issue, as for example the interview with Mike Steven showed.

Mitchell also reminds us that landscapes are “produced, lived, and represented space constructed out of the struggles, compromises, and temporarily settled relations of competing and cooperating social actors” (D Mitchell, 1996: 30). If we adopt this notion of landscape as being produced, it becomes even more obvious that “objective” measurement techniques do have their limits in representing these dynamic spaces. Also the wish for consistency and simplicity in regard to natural character assessment (Department of Conservation, 2011) is understandable from someone who has to prepare a report. But here

as well: this happens in a tension field between legal terminology and official definitions on the one side and society's relation to landscape or nature, which can be very different, as I will show in the case studies.

Stephenson sees a rationalist understanding of space being carried on in landscape assessment practices. Mainly "experts" cover different fields, and reproduce the dominance of experts opinions over community-held place values and communities perception of place (Stephenson, 2010). Also in the implementation of the RMA mainly expert knowledge is used rather than community-centred knowledge (Stephenson, 2010: 12). The problem of these forms of assessment and planning is that the resulting planning documents and maps only carry one perspective of knowledge (see also ch. 7.3). Other views are excluded and made invisible. "The resulting planning documents convey this information in disparate schedules, zones, or 'resource areas'. The result is that there is almost no sense of the way that these sets of values relate to one another [...]" (Stephenson, 2010: 12). Only a specific form of knowledge and interpretation of the world is represented in maps and plans – usually a formalised one. Through the fixation in formal documents, this knowledge appears to be "true" and objective. However, it is not objective, but tied to power and ideology (Schmid 2010:218).

Landscape, then, is a tricky issue in the RMA. On the one hand, it is addressed in the act and had to be dealt with when a resource consent is submitted. In this regard, it seems to be a very formal and fixed category. However, on the other hand, if inspected closer, it becomes obvious that landscapes and their characteristics are not defined clearly. This is not necessarily problematic per se, and I would argue that it is rather a chance that opens up possibilities and options as it allows for interpretations and understandings that fit the specific context.

8.4 Conclusion

Whereas mapping, naming or surveying as described in chapter 7.3 are rather single techniques, planning is a more overarching method of conceiving space. In this chapter, I described the planning framework for New Zealand, focusing on the Resource Management Act 1991 and the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement. In a second step, I introduced the more concrete methods of assessment of landscape and visual effects and assessment of natural character. They are both usually carried out in the context of an Assessment of Environmental Effects in the process of resource consenting.

Both the legal documents as well as the assessment techniques and the discussion around them give insights into how *espace conçu* is produced in the New Zealand context. Interestingly, even though the planning system is often criticised for being “rationalist” and understanding space in a positivist way, the definitions in legal contexts I brought in this chapter show that this cannot be generally attested. The relationship of people with space is an essential part of both the definition of landscape and its assessment. So maybe on an abstract “space” level it is true, but medium-range concepts such as “landscape” probably help to break down theory and make it more applicable to concrete contexts and applications. Therefore, I am also suggesting that the “missing” clarity and definitions around what landscapes are is not a problem, but instead is an opportunity to adapt the concepts to the concrete cases. Thus, landscape can serve a link between abstract planning or theory on space and concrete assessments and case studies, as I have already argued before. Furthermore, also cultural issues are more and more taken into account, at least on an abstract law and policy level. How this works in concrete processes will be analysed in chapter 12.

Part IV At the coast: Aotearoa New Zealand Case Studies

In this part, I will introduce, analyse and discuss my case studies. With the case studies, I want to investigate actual, specific production processes of space. Lefebvre reminds us that space and its production processes only become relevant when investigated as concrete cases. There cannot be a generic theory of the production of space that is valid for all spaces at all times (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 31). Moreover, one has to have a look at specific production processes as well as the specific artefacts and spaces that are produced in a specific setting. It will be helpful to recall Lefebvres spatial triad (*espace conçu, espace vécu, espace perçu*, as discussed in chapter 2), and keep it in the back of our minds throughout the case studies in the following chapters. However, these three dimensions of space are an artificial divisions, and do not always meet the situation in the case studies. Therefore, I will first illustrate the case studies by their own inherent logic first, and come back to put them in relation to Lefebvres work in a combined discussion afterwards (chapter 13).

I choose three case studies to develop a better understanding of the role of spaces in conflicts on coastal infrastructures. They do have some commonalities as well as some particularities. All of them are located on the North Island of New Zealand, in the cities of Tauranga, Wellington and Auckland (see Figure 2). In Tauranga, the case revolves around a major dredging campaign of the shipping channel. In Wellington, the Airport wants to reclaim land to extend its runway. And in Auckland, the port planned to extend one of its wharves. In every case, the development either had, would have had or will have effects on the coastal environment as well as on the communities. All the projects met some resistance, either by local *iwi*, citizen initiatives or individual residents. In a more detailed look, the cases of course also differ due to their specific circumstances. These might be the composition of the opponents, the methods chosen to contest the projects, the success of the project, the environmental effects and others.

The contexts of the conflicts are influenced by different factors stretching over all scales. Local morphology allows for or prevents certain projects or developments, or the landscape is protected. Local, national and global economic networks affects incomes, real estate prices, trade patterns and flows of goods. Traditions such as the summer holiday at the beach evoke emotions and connections to the coast. Regional and national planning instruments, acts and policies regulate uses of the coastal environment. These are just some of the possible context conditions. In the following sections on the case studies I want to give a rich

description of the cases and the specific contexts within the conflicts developed. But next to all local specifics, there are also common and overarching issues that are shared by the case studies. These will be discussed in the conclusion in chapter 13.



Figure 2: Location of case studies on the North Island of Aotearoa New Zealand. Source: NordNordWest, 2008, modified

9 Methods of the case studies

In the following sections, I outline the methodology of my case study research. Emerging in the 1930s and promoted by the Chicago School of Sociology, case studies have a long and rich history in geography (Baxter, 2010). They can be understood as a broad methodology or approach, and are generally situated somewhere in between methods of data collection and methodological paradigms (Baxter, 2010; Lamnek, 2005). Case study research is strongly connected to qualitative research and the interpretative paradigm (Lamnek, 2005). On an overarching level, case studies help to understand concrete and practical aspects of a phenomenon (Baxter, 2010). For my work, this “phenomenon” is the production of space in conflicts on infrastructural developments at Aotearoa New Zealand’s coast, which is present in my three cases.

Communicative techniques and naturalistic research situations are central to case studies carried out in a qualitative paradigm. The best strategy to create credible and trustworthy case studies is, according to Baxter, to do rich and detailed research. This means to investigate many aspects of the phenomenon, and the context the case is embedded in on different scales. Baxter also stresses the point that context takes place on various scales, i.e. local, regional and other scales influence the case and interact with each other.

In a first step, I investigate and analyse the case studies separately. Second, in the discussion part, I also apply a joint analysis. Hereby I aim at finding out more about commonalities that exist across cases despite their different contexts (Baxter, 2010). My goal is not to find generalizable theories. Moreover, I want to present the case studies in their uniqueness, as rich and complex as they are. Still, I also want to see if I can find out transferable interpretations, patterns, mechanisms and meanings of space and spatial production that might be applicable to similar cases or are similar in the three cases (Baxter, 2010: 90).

Methods for data collection

Within my case studies, I deployed different methods of data collection. My main source of information is the material from semi-structured interviews. For context information on the cases, I additionally draw on the following material: documents, newspaper articles, official/formal maps, research participant’s maps as well as site visits. These methods are part of a common method set for case study research (Lamnek, 2005: 316). Contextual information helps to get a better understanding of what is happening in the case. Different

methods should be employed to ensure triangulation, and even more to draw a picture as rich and whole as possible of a case (Lamnek, 2005: 299). Deep research of a case allows to better understand the various interactions of the different sub-units involved (people, media, ...) (Baxter, 2010: 85).

I conducted the empirical data collection for my research during a six-month field stay in Aotearoa New Zealand between November 2016 and April 2017. The fieldwork was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Waikato, Hamilton. All data collection and analysis was done by myself.

Interviews

One of my main methods was the conduction of semi-structured interviews. Dunn (2010: 102) identifies four reasons why interviews can be chosen as a research method: (1) to fill a gap in knowledge, (2) to investigate complex behaviours and motivations, (3) to collect a diversity of meanings, opinions and experiences, (4) to show respect for and empower research participants. In my research, all of the above-mentioned points come into play. Dunn additionally stresses that there is not one opinion, one truth, but that interviews allow to reflect the multiplicity of interpretations of a situation. He states that "One of the major strengths of interviewing is that it allows you to discover what is relevant to the informant" (Dunn, 2010: 103). Interviews can enable research participants to voice their concerns, meaning, beliefs and opinions. Especially as I investigate different practices of spatial production and the related conflicts, this is an important point for my research. My intention is not to enter the field as the "expert scientist, who knows how things works", but I understood my role more of that of a learner, learning from my interview partners who are the experts for their views. Interview partners can allow the researcher to see the world through their eyes and minds for a moment. This is in my opinion also important because interview partners should be treated with respect as they share their time, knowledge and opinions usually without getting any immediate value back from the researcher (see also Walker, 2007). Therefore, a good atmosphere needs to be created during the interview so that interview partners are also willing to share their information, knowledge, experiences, and opinions with the researcher.

I conducted 25 interviews with a variety of interview partners (see Table 2), covering the following groups: residents, recreational users of the areas, Maori representatives, representatives from citizen groups, councillors, staff of regional and city councils, staff of the involved companies (ports and airports), experts (in regard to resource consent

application analysis). Some of the interview partners belonged to several groups at the same time, e.g. being both a resident, a researcher, and a representative of a citizen group.

Table 2: Overview over interviews.

Interview-ID	Case	Group affiliation	Type of interview
I-01	General	Professor	face to face
I-02	Tauranga	Scientist	face to face
I-03	Tauranga	Port representative	E-Mail
I-04	Tauranga	Council staff	face to face
I-05	Tauranga	Maori representative and researcher	face to face
I-06	Tauranga	Maori representative	face to face
I-07	Tauranga	Council staff (planner)	face to face
I-08	Tauranga	Hapu representative	face to face
I-09	Tauranga	Maori representative	face to face
I-10	Tauranga	Two Maori representatives	face to face
I-11	Tauranga	Surfer	face to face
I-12	Auckland	Citizen group representative	face to face
I-13	Auckland	Councillor	face to face
I-14	Tauranga	Anonymous	face to face
I-15	Auckland	Resident, architect and citizen group member	face to face
I-16	Auckland	Architect and citizen group representative	face to face
I-17	Wellington	Surfer	face to face
I-18	Wellington	Citizen group representative, resident	face to face
I-19	Wellington	Citizen group representative	face to face
I-20	Wellington	Council staff (planner)	face to face
I-21	Wellington	Resident	face to face
I-22	Wellington	Airport representative	face to face
I-23	Wellington	Citizen group representative	face to face
I-24	General	Consultant (Marine environment)	face to face
I-25	Auckland	Councillor	face to face
I-26	Wellington	Landscape expert	Skype

I identified potential interview partners in several ways. Either it was possible to find them online as contact persons or spokespersons (e.g. citizen groups, companies, council staff), or they were personally recommended by other interview partners or gate keepers (personal contact, e.g., through research cooperation within INTERCOAST and the University of Waikato). I contacted potential interview partners in most cases via email, sometimes also

via telephone. If they agreed to an interview, I sent my research information sheet, detailing on my research, the interview process and the rights of the interviewees. My preferred style were face-to-face interviews. People could choose the time and place for the interview. Before the interview started, the interview partners were asked to sign a consent form to document their agreement to be interviewed, their agreement or declination of an audio recording and their decision in regard of anonymization.

The interviews were open and semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are focused on content (in contrast to unstructured biographical or in-depth interviews, for example). They were based on an interview guide (with some pre-formulated questions), which gave me some structure but allowed as well for flexibility during the interview (in contrast to e.g. questionnaires) (Dunn, 2010; Flick, 2011). This form of interviewing enabled the conversation to meander, which helped not to disrupt the interview partner too much and therefor stop the flow of the interview. Furthermore, I was able to react to unanticipated information, issues and themes arising, not covered by my questionnaire. The interview guide helped to stay focused on the issues I wanted to talk about, and the pre-formulated questions helped in case I struggled with ad-hoc formulations. The basic questions of the interview guide were supplemented by specific questions for each interview individually (for an example interview guide see Appendix 2).

The interviews were documented by audio recording and note taking. Of the total of 26 interviews, 23 were audio recorded. 24 interviews were face-to-face-interviews, one was conducted via skype, and in one case I got written replies via e-mail. The interviews took between 30 and 120 min. After each interview, I wrote down a field note with general impressions about the interviews. The audio files were transcribed for analysis, most of them by a specialised company. I checked all transcripts I did not do myself. The transcripts were sent to the interview partners, as well as the agreement to be interviewed. This gave the participants the authority over their data, they could let me know if they wanted any changes to be made for example concerning their anonymization, or if there were any parts of the interview that should not be used in the research. Additionally, they could check for possible mistakes (misunderstandings or spelling). Even though most of the interview partners did not make use of this, some made corrections, provided further explanations or information or deleted parts which they did not want to be published or included in the research.

Problems encountered

One of the main challenges in interviewing is the interview situation itself. The interviewer has to create a productive interpersonal climate (Dunn, 2010), in my case talk in a foreign language, follow the course of the interview while at the same time preparing the next question in the head, taking notes, and so on. On the one hand, the interview partner should be treated with respect and feel comfortable in the situation. On the other hand, also tricky questions should be asked, which can pose a dilemma in the interview situation. Furthermore, sometimes I encountered strong power hierarchies in the interview, e.g. when my interview partner was a man much older than me, dressed in an expensive suit, fluent in the language, and used to professional settings, versus me as a young woman, not being fluent in the language. This made me feel uneasy and I did not manage to ask questions the ways I wanted to. Also some interviewers were non-stop talkers and it was hard to stop their monologue to ask the questions I needed to pose.

Another issue that can arise when using interviews as a method is the choice of interview partners. This can create a certain bias in the representation of the case: Interview partners were usually the most engaged ones and interested in the topic. This does not cover all opinions or aspects, there are many more people with different opinions, which were not included in the interviews. This has to be kept in mind, especially when formulating results: there are always also other stories out there.

Methods of analysis

The foundation for the analysis of my interviews is the written transcript. Analysing interviews means to construct themes, find relations between variables and patterns in the material (Dunn, 2010). Content analysis can be either focused on the manifest content, e.g. how often specific terms are used, or on the latent content, that means on the underlying themes (Dunn, 2010). After checking the transcripts, I used MaxQDA to code them. My analysis followed a both inductive and deductive path. Deductive in the sense that I applied topics, themes and categories I had identified from theoretical and literature work before my empirical data collection, and inductive in that I let the material speak for itself and reveal its own categories, stories and logics. This is related to content analysis as developed by Mayring (2010, 2014).

Participants' maps

Maps are a common way to “capture” space and visualise it in a document. As there exist many different perceptions of spaces, also many representations are possible. Maps are a tool that allow to depict one perspective to see the world (for participants' maps see Appendix 3). Their production is usually dominated by a formalized production process. Already for several decades, maps drawn by research participants were used to uncover spatial representations and the social constructedness of space (Ley, 2009). My method is loosely connected with the tradition of mental or cognitive maps as used in behavioural geography (see for example Gould and White, 1994/1974; Lynch, 1960).

Common formal maps are criticised for strengthening existing power relations, “freezing” social interaction and being totalizing (Harley, 1988: 302; Harvey, 1996: 4). I took this critique as a starting point and motivation to let my interview participants draw their own maps. I understand my participants' maps as a try to give the power of definition to others than “expert mapmakers”, and therefore try to use mapping as emancipative method to change the status quo and make social interaction visible and dynamic again.

I asked most of my interview partners to draw a map sketch for me towards the end of the interview. This map should cover the area they considered to be part of or affected by the development project. I formulated this as an invitation to visualise their perspectives and capture what they consider important, and stressed the point that there was no “right” or “wrong” way of doing it. The drawing process was very free. My initiating questions were to ask the interview partner to draw a sketch about what she or he considered as important regarding the project from their perspective. This allowed the participants to think freely about what they considered important. I conducted this mapping for several reasons. First, drawing the map offered an incentive for further explaining and talking about the issue. Sometimes new aspects came to the mind of my interview partners while drawing. Second, the maps were a possibility for my interview partners to create their own map, containing their views and perspectives. These representations can be used to counter official and formal maps, usually produced by “experts”, with maps that are produced by people with other motivations, views, perspectives and opinions. Furthermore, the participants' maps can be compared with each other.

I am aware that such a kind of map does bring its own problems and has its own limitations. It is still only a two-dimensional perspective on an issue. Many things cannot be drawn or should not be drawn in a map, even if they are relevant. Especially the maps drawn by Maori could include indigenous knowledge that now had to fit to the idea of a map brought by a

European researcher. Also, there is still some kind of “scientificness” or professionalism and authority around maps, so many people are reluctant to draw a map, are concerned to make “mistakes”, or stick to already existing formal or official maps. In some cases, I did not ask interview partners for a map, i.e. when the interview was already very long, the interview partner had no time anymore, or in situations where I felt uncomfortable in my position during the interview. Some interview partners refused to draw a map, for several reasons, but mostly they pointed out that there are already existing maps.

Historical and recent official maps

Next to the participant’s maps, I also used already existing maps, both contemporary as well as historical ones. The historical maps allowed me to trace the background and history of the cases. The comparison of maps showed for example changes in the coastline due to reclamation or the depths of the shipping channels in Tauranga Harbour. I gathered the maps mainly from planning documents, resource applications, reports, libraries, museums and archives.

Document and newspaper analysis

Documents and newspapers provide context information for the case studies. Documents are not an image of facts or a pre-given reality (Flick, 2011). Moreover, they are produced by specific actors for a specific reason, and therefore only reflect a specific version of reality. The main challenge lies in the several layers of meaning a document has, mainly the relation between explicit content and implicit meaning (Flick, 2011). As documents, I identified all documents concerning my case studies that were neither scientific literature nor newspapers, i.e. policies, plans, laws, reports, blog articles, and other publications from official sides, institutions, or companies. The analysis of the documents did not follow a strict method, but they were rather used as context material and basic foundation for understanding the cases. Both explicit and implicit contents were of interest for my work: explicit information often provided useful context and background information, whereas implicit content gave insight into ways of thinking or argumentation of institutions.

A specific form of document analysis is the newspaper analysis. I carried out a newspaper analysis for two reasons: First, I was interested in how the cases are represented in the media, and how much attention they got. Second, by including the period from 1900 to April 2017 in my research, I tried to trace back and find out about former conflicts around the same or similar issues in the areas. I included the two main newspapers on the North Island

of Aotearoa New Zealand, the *New Zealand Herald* and *The Dominion Post* (before the merging in 2002: *The Dominion* and *The Evening Post*). Next to these two newspapers, also smaller regional and local newspapers were considered in case they contained relevant articles about the cases (for example *Bay of Plenty Times*), as well as the online news site stuff.co.nz. The search was conducted using online databases (Papers Past, Newztext), and the online archives of the newspapers for more recent articles, as well as the local city libraries in Auckland, Wellington and Tauranga (search functions, paper catalogues, city archives). For a list of cited newspaper articles see Appendix 1.

Site visits

I visited all my case study sites and the surrounding environment several times. I had no access to the ports areas or airport operational areas, but could walk around them, observe for example recreational uses of the areas, watch ships or planes come and go, get an impression how the surroundings and the landscapes look like. In Tauranga, I had the possibility to be on board of a research boat taking water samples in February 2016, attending the dredging in process.

Positionality

As Cook et al. (2005: 16) remind us, all knowledge is situated, academic one as well. Moreover, the researcher itself – me – is positioned: as a person being in relationship to “objects of study”, material and the audience of the research (Cook et al., 2005: 19). (Scientific) knowledge is “produced by *positioned* actors working in/between all kinds of locations, working up/on/through all kinds of research relations(hips)” (Cook et al., 2005: 16). I did the research for this PhD being a White woman around her thirties, educated in the German school and academic system. With this background, I came to Aotearoa New Zealand to study situations I perceived as “conflicts”, with methods and theories I brought with me from Germany and international academia. This was especially tricky as I also worked with indigenous people.

Research that is carried out in a post-colonial context also needs some reflection about this circumstance. Smith (2012) takes the radical position that research has an “absolute worthlessness to [...] the indigenous world, and its absolute usefulness to those who wielded it as an instrument” (Smith, 2012: 3). In her opinion, research serves the power interests of former colonists or the “outsider’s” interest in her or his view on a post-colonial setting. The benefit stays within the research community, and indigenous people do not gain from that

(see also Walker, 2007). Regarding Maori, it can be seen extremely critical to go there and apply western science methods and procedures. Many Maori communities refuse to cooperate anymore with researchers using western science (Smith, 2012: 175). Identifying as Maori herself, Smith criticises research for that “it told us things already known, suggested things that would not work, and made careers for people who already had jobs” (Smith, 2012: 3). This makes clear once again that research is neither innocent nor neutral, but embedded in specific political and social conditions (Smith, 2012: 5).

In my opinion, the answer should not be to stop research altogether. However, researchers should be aware of the role they have and play, be sensitive of possible (un-)intended results of their research, and the power they have in the research situation. I was very grateful for the openness of my Maori interview partners, who patiently answered my questions, explained and described their viewpoints, and shared their knowledge, experiences and emotions. Of course, I can only take a very specific perspective with my research and do neither aim at nor think that a universal “truth” or a single explanation exists.

10 Auckland: contested wharf extension plans

In 2014, Ports of Auckland planned to expand one of its wharves to provide berthage for bigger ships. These plans led to public protest, because people opposed further development of the port and the impacts it could have on the Waitemata Harbour. Auckland's nickname "City of Sails" reflects the close connection New Zealand's capital has to its adjacent waters. This connection is especially strong to the Waitemata Harbour, which lies directly in the city centre. "Aucklanders have always lived in an especially intimate relationship with the sea, which still today governs the way they work and play", McLauchlan (2012: 21) describes the relationship. The harbour allows for recreational use as well as it caters for container ships and other economic uses: "[The sea] remains a blue highway for commercial vessels from around the world, with byways for ferry boats and pleasure craft of many shapes and sizes" (McLauchlan, 2012: 21). In this description of the relationship of Aucklanders with Waitemata Harbour, the conflict around the harbour is already inherent: citizens use the harbour for sailing and recreation, and the port needs it for its economic activities. As a protest to the extension plans of the port company, a citizen's initiative was founded, and the port company as well as the Council were taken to court.

10.1 Introduction to the case

In late 2014, Auckland Council granted a resource consent for the Port to expand two "fingers" of Bledisloe Wharf (for a timeline and overview of the events see Table 3). These should be built as piled structures about 92 m respectively 98 m into Waitemata Harbour to provide berthage for bigger ships. The council decided that the consent did not need public notification (High Court, 2015). However, the newspaper *New Zealand Herald* published a comment about the plans on 11 February 2015 ("Port's secret harbour grab"), followed by an article on 12 February 2015, which led to a public protest. The story was entitled "Officials quietly pass wharf plan", and the author criticises that "[t]he Auckland Council has approved two large wharf extensions into Waitemata Harbour for port use without notifying the public or councillors" (*New Zealand Herald*, 12 February 2015). He refers to a councillor who is critical of the process and thinks that this development may facilitate future reclamation.

The planned extension was contested by the public for several reasons (see chapter 10.1.4), such as the changes in water surface or current velocity which could impact recreational use

of the harbour. Furthermore, there was much discussion about the location of the port in general, or its possible re-location. Some opponents argued that the waterfront land in Auckland could be used much better than by industrial estates, and therefore the port should be relocated altogether. This topic was also picked up by a “Port Future Study” (Port Future Study, 2016), that discussed development opportunities of the port at its current position as well as a possible relocation of the port.

Table 3: Timeline of the events in relation to the conflict around the planned Bledisloe Wharf extension. Own compilation.

September and November 2014	Ports of Auckland Ltd. applies for resource consents
December 2014	Council grants resource consent for wharf extension without public notification
12 February 2015	<i>New Zealand Herald</i> publishes a first story about the planned extensions
March 2015	“Stop Stealing our Harbour” group is founded
22 March 2015	Protest march
3 May 2015	Protest march
2 and 3 June 2015	Hearings at High Court
19 June 2015	High Court decision, Port loses court case

The “hot phase” of the protests was from March to June 2015, with two protest marches and a boat flotilla in March and May 2015, two open letters published in the *New Zealand Herald* (*New Zealand Herald*, 20 March 2015 and 01 June 2015) and a number of advertisements and interviews. These public protests were organised by the citizens’ group “Stop stealing our harbour”, which was founded as a response to the wharf extension plans in March 2015.

Parallel to these actions, Urban Auckland, the second main group involved in the protest, filed a suit against Ports of Auckland and Auckland Council. The “Urban Auckland” society (consisting mainly of architects) was founded in 2000, with the objectives to protect and enhance the natural and built environment of Auckland City and Auckland Waterfront. In March, Urban Auckland solicitors informed the Port about the plans to bring the case to the court. Even though the Council asked the Port to stop extension works (*New Zealand Herald*, 01 and 02 April 2015), the Port did not do so (*New Zealand Herald*, 20 and 21 April).

Meanwhile, the whole issue of the wharf extension had become political. The *New Zealand Herald* published a news story entitled “These Councillors voted to violate your harbour!” (22 Mai 2015), explaining which Councillor had what opinion regarding the extension plans. Most councillors and the mayor thought that the extensions were necessary for the economic development of the port. However, opponents doubted that this extension was really

necessary. When they expressed this opinion, an opponent recalls that the chairman of the port told them that they would be responsible for Auckland's economy to stop if they would prevent the extension project being carried out (I-16:57).

The court hearings took place on 2 and 3 June, and a decision was made by the judge on 19 June 2015. The main issue in the court case was that the Council should have publicly notified the resource consent applications by POAL. The Port handed in four separate applications, two on 18 September 2014 and two 18 December 2014. Urban Auckland pleaded that a) the notification decisions were unlawful, b) the consents decisions themselves were invalid, c) both these decisions were made without the exercise of independent judgement or affected by bias, and d) POAL had failed to obtain all necessary consents (High Court, 2015). The High Court decided that the resource consents were not valid, because they should have been publicly notified by the council (High Court, 2015). The reason for this decision was that if the applications would have been bundled and evaluated in regard to the most restricted activity, the adverse effects of the project on the environment could have been more than minor. In this case, the council would have had to publicly notify the decision. Due to this decision, the Port could not proceed with the Bledisloe wharf extension.

10.1.1 Waitemata Harbour

Auckland sits at an isthmus between the two harbours Manukau and Waitemata and has more than 1,600 km of coastline. Waitemata Harbour once was a river valley, which was inundated by the sea due to sea level rise during the last 10,000 years (McClure, 2007: 2). The coastal landforms around Auckland vary and are complex, with many bays and inlets (Auckland Regional Council, 2004). In the east, the harbour is characterised by sandy beaches, whereas in the west, there are mudflats and salt marshes (McClure, 2007: 2). Especially in the urban parts of the Waitemata, the coastline is heavily modified by human activity. In the port area and adjacent sections of the coast, the original coastline has been completely altered due to land reclamation in the past.

10.1.2 History of the port area

To understand the context of the case study, some historical background is necessary. Many centuries before British colonisation and the foundation of the modern Port of Auckland, the Tāmaki Auckland region was already populated by Māori. Several *iwi* (Maori tribes) settled the region in the course of the last 1000 years, either cohabiting the area or displacing each other (Auckland Regional Council, 2004; McClure, 2007). The people were attracted by the climate and the fertile soil, as well as the seafood stocks and the mixture of sheltered bays

and navigable channels in the harbour (McClure, 2007: 2; McLauchlan, 2012). With colonization, Auckland became the capital of the new British colony “New Zealand” in 1841 (Mein Smith, 2008). One of the reasons for choosing Auckland was the sheltered harbour which facilitated the establishment of a port (McLauchlan, 2012).

The passing of the Auckland Harbour Act by the Auckland Provincial Government in 1874 led to the installation of a first *Pakeha* (non-Maori) organisation to control the Waitemata. This Harbour Board was also responsible for building wharves. McLauchlan states that “from the earliest days, the town was focused on the port” (2012: 24). Reclamation of parts of the Waitemata Harbour in the area where the city centre is located today began almost immediately. Around 1866, reclamation already reached where Customs Street is today, and Queen Street Wharf ran 425 m into the harbour (McLauchlan, 2012: 26) (see Figure 5 for a map). In 1875, 2025 hectares of seabed were given to the Harbour Board through the Auckland Harbour Foreshore Grant Act 1875. Subsequently, the port was developing between St Marys Bay in the West and Judges Bay in the East. The wharves that are still existing nowadays were constructed mostly between 1906 and 1971 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Wharves Port of Auckland. Data: McLauchlan, 2012; Ports of Auckland Ltd, 2016

Year of construction	Name of wharf
1906-1913	Queens Wharf
1909-1911	Marsden Wharf
1913-1923	Princes Wharf
1922	Captain Cook Wharf
1937-1948	Bledisloe Wharf
1952	Jellicoe Wharf
1961	Freyberg Wharf
1971	Fergusson Wharf

Figure 4 gives an impression of the port in the 1960s. The triangular shape of Freyberg Wharf is visible in the front, followed by Jellicoe Wharf and Bledisloe Wharf. At that time, Bledisloe Wharf consisted of two “fingers”. Later on, this area was closed, and today the wharf has a continuous surface. This can also be seen in Figure 3, which is a picture of the port area how it looks today. The most prominent difference is the large Fergusson container terminal in the front, which was finished in 1971. Further in the back, the picture also shows the older Marsden Wharf, Captain Cook Wharf and Queens Wharf (see also Figure 5). Also the tall buildings on the last wharf in the row, Princes Wharf, are visible.



Figure 4: Historical aerial view of the port of Auckland from the East (1964). The triangular shaped wharf in the front is Freyberg Wharf, with Jellicoe Wharf behind and Bledisloe Wharf in the back, at that time still consisting of two separate structures. Source: Auckland Museum Collection



Figure 3: Recent aerial view of the port of Auckland from the East. In the front, Fergusson container terminal is visible, behind the triangular Freyberg Wharf, Jellicoe Wharf and the enlarged Bledisloe Wharf. Further in the back, Marsden Wharf, Captain Cook Wharf and Queens Wharf are visible. The last wharf with the taller building is Princes Wharf. Source: McClure, 2016

Today, the Port of Auckland is still located in the city centre of Auckland, what is now the central business district (CBD). As space is limited and the port has grown substantially since its establishment, land reclamation and extensions on piled structures have been carried out

over the last 150 years to create more space for port operations, allowing the port to gradually expand into the harbour. Looking back in history, also a substantial area of Auckland's CBD was built on reclaimed land. The total land reclaimed amounts to approximately 328 ha (Gu, 2014: 270). The port occupies approximately 75 hectares (the size of appr. 105 soccer fields).

In recent years, the operational area of the port shifted from the western to the eastern parts. Also its way of operation changed with the introduction of containers. The first container ship called at Ports of Auckland in 1971 (Ports of Auckland Ltd, 2016). Areas such as Viaduct Basin and Queen's Wharf were abandoned by the port, opened up for the public and redeveloped (Auckland Council, 2005). Major changes of the waterfront took place in relation to the America's Cup yacht race in 1998 and afterwards (Gu, 2014). Prince's Wharf, for example, was redeveloped between 1999 and 2001 (Gu, 2014: 275). Today, the port precinct is defined as the land and coastal marine area north of Quay Street, the area between the western side of Marsden Wharf and the eastern side of the Fergusson reclamation.

In the course of changes in national legislation in the 1990s, namely the Port Companies Act 1988, regional councils became the owners of ports (Selsky and Memon, 1997). Ports were thereafter managed as stand-alone commercial enterprises, reflecting the general trend of neoliberalisation in Aotearoa New Zealand during that time (Selsky and Memon, 1997). For Auckland, this meant that the Harbour Board was abolished in 1989 and the port was reorganised as Ports of Auckland Limited (Bassett, 2013). Ports of Auckland Limited (POAL) was hereafter owned 100% by Auckland Council Investments Ltd., which itself is owned 100% by the council (see also ch. 7.6). This reorganisation meant that port had to operate as a profitable business. In the first four years after this reorganisation, Ports of Auckland reported a reduction of costs by 43% (McDermott, 1996: 207). This was achieved by a reduction of staff by two-thirds and an increase in the turnaround times of ships at the same moment. During the last decades, Auckland became the biggest import port of New Zealand. In terms of export, Tauranga is ahead of Auckland since 2000 (Memon et al., 2004).

In the last years, there has been an intensified discussion about the need of space of the port and its current location. A "Port Future Study" was prepared by a study group from July 2015 to July 2016, initiated by the Mayor of Auckland. Its goal was to identify possible options for the port development. The options included both retaining the port at its current location and moving the port to another location (Port Future Study, 2016).




Figure 5: Map of central Auckland districts and precincts. Source: Auckland Council, 2013, cropped and modified

10.1.3 Involved actors

When looking at the production of space, it is not only necessary to investigate what processes are taking place, but also who are the involved persons and groups. In all case studies, there is a mix of different actors. In the case of Auckland, in the “official process” there are the Council as planning and consent giving authority, as well as Ports of Auckland Ltd. as resource consent applicant. Opposition came mainly from citizen groups and individuals. Maori protest was hardly visible at all and did not seem to play a major role in this case. Many of the opponents came from higher classes: “influential individuals” (I-25: 84, also 130; I-12:19) supported the citizen groups with both money and their expertise. In the case of Stop Stealing our Harbour, there was for example an Auckland-based PR firm who offered its support, as well as a “wealthy businessman” (I-12:5). Also members of the prestigious Royal New Zealand Yacht Squadron supported the protest (I-13:79). Urban Auckland was supported by an experienced lawyer, who was one of several lawyers who worked for them for free (I-16:60, 64). This shows that the opponents dispose over both financial and social resources. A councillor from Auckland Council, whom I interviewed and who was supporting the port development, mentioned the issue that the people with most resources (time, money, contacts, class) are able to be heard more than others with less resources (see Bourdieu, 1983; Gunder and Mouat, 2002). The decision-making process is thus not equally accessible to all citizens (Stephenson and Lawson, 2013: 27), but those are favoured who have resources and access to knowledge and expertise (Gunder and Mouat, 2002: 139).

Regarding the discussion about the relocation of the whole port, this councillor stated that all people should be involved: “But if you’re gonna do it [relocate the port; MO], you gotta take the public with you [...] And we need to listen to all of them and not just the noisiest most intelligent, most resourced people” (I-25:120). She also questioned the legitimacy of the opponents, i.e. in that they did not represent the majority of Aucklanders. Also, the port provides jobs for people who did not protest (I-25).

The interaction between the port and the opponents was also an issue of discussion. The behaviour of “the port” was perceived as arrogant by an interview partner (I-12:210). He thinks that “the port” has an attitude as if it could just expand as it wants (I-15:27). People suspected the port to have a step-by-step strategy of development, so that it goes unnoticed (I-16:67 and I-15:157). Michael Goldwater is a founding member of the citizen’s initiative “Stop stealing our harbour” and was also prominent in the media during the conflict around

the extension. He perceived the port people behave as if they were able to get what they wanted for over 100 years (I-12:22). In his eyes,

they're quite an aggressive outfit and [...] their sort of *raison d'être* is essentially to maximise their processes at all costs, in the sense they don't seem to have that much awareness of... well, up until now, of both what the community want and [...] respect for the environment. (I-12:59)

Michael Goldwater described the port as “aggressive” in that its aim is purely economical, and social or environmental issues are not taken into account. He acknowledges that the port is a necessary infrastructure. However, in his eyes it does not add any social or environmental value, rather it is “taking away the waterfront”, i.e. people cannot access it or use it for other purposes (I-12:90).

The planned extension of Bledisloe Wharf is of course not the first construction project of the port. Therefore, there also exists a history of the interaction between the port and the public. One example is the development of Westhaven Marina. John Hill is a member of the St Mary's Bay Association, that was formed in 1975 as a reaction to plans to fill in parts of Westhaven and redesign the area. He worked as an architect and has been living in the area since 1975. He tells me how in earlier times, the former Harbour Board and the Council were not keen on involving the public, e.g. in the Westhaven marina development: “[O]n the Westhaven deal they were a bit reactive to start with”, because they had an “it's none of your business” attitude (I-15:94). Apparently, some of the opponents feel that this mind-set has not changed over the years: “[The port was] coming from an attitude that they've had for 100 odd years, of ‘we want more’, and that ‘the harbour is ours’, basically; ‘we have a right to this’, and that ‘we have an economic and moral imperative to have it’” (I-16:20). On the other side, the public has the impression that it owns the waterfront and should have access to it (I-15:236).

The protests were strongly supported by the national newspaper *New Zealand Herald*, which published over 40 articles on the topic between February and July 2015 (for a list of cited articles see Appendix 1). The coverage starts with an article on 11 February 2015, and the position of the newspaper was generally supportive of the protestors. Its articles take up some of the opponents themes, like the reduction of the water surface (“Auckland Harbour been turned ‘from a harbour into a river’”, *New Zealand Herald*, 20 March 2015). Furthermore, they were printing comments from opponents of the project (e.g. “Port history littered with blunders”, *New Zealand Herald*, 2 June 2015). Even though the positions within the opponents were diverse, the media was drawing another picture. In their stories, the

frontlines run between the port and council on one side and “the people” on the other side. The *New Zealand Herald* posted headlines such as “Port v Council: The battle for Auckland’s harbour” (25 April 2015), “Wharf war” (29 April 2015) or “The people v the port” (8 April 2015) using a militaristic language. In the article from 8 April 2015, it is explained how “Ports of Auckland kept Councillors and the public in the dark” about the extension plans. The reporter introduces the “players” in the “Bledisloe Battle”. The newspaper also refers to older extension plans that were stopped, and the current debate was just reopening “old sores” (25 April 2015). The authors discuss that even though the port assured that it would not develop much further in terms of size, there is a “lack of trust”, and people do not believe this: “In August 2013, the port company promised to “consult widely” when the time came to seek consent to extend Bledisloe wharf. A year later it applied for, and was granted, non-notified consent without telling even city councillors - let alone the public” (*New Zealand Herald*, 25 April 2015).

10.1.4 Contested issues and effects of the wharf extension

A number of issues were mentioned by my interview partners, in court documents or newspaper articles. The issues that were brought up by the opponents reflect the view of people that see the harbour as site for recreation or “natural beauty”, and see this threatened by the port extension. Namely, these issues were the diminishment of the water surface by the “incremental growth” of the port and possible changes in current velocity. Both could pose a danger for small recreational boats. Another demand by protestors was that the waterfront should be accessible to the public. Additionally, view lines to and visual aspects of the harbour played a role in their argumentation.

The discussion did not only revolve around the wharf extension plans in question, but also generally if the location was suitable for the port, if the port should not be relocated altogether or be converted to an inland port, because in the city centre, there is just limited space for the port to grow. Amongst the opponents, the perception of the port was ambivalent. Some interview partners stressed issues like noise and air pollution from the port, that port-related traffic blocks the city centre, that the ships are ugly to look at and that generally the port is a large industrial estate in the city centre. Arguments were brought forward by opponents that the waterfront area could be used much better than by a port: Citizens could benefit through access to the waterfront, jobs, housing and parks. This alternative development of the port area could be even more economic viable for the city in general, some opponents argue. Whereas in the case of an extension, the opponents understood the port as the big economic winner from the project, whereas residents and

recreational users would suffer. However, proponents of the expansion say that moving the port will be very expensive, as well as it will be very hard to find another place for it, for example due to environmental reasons. This is not a new discussion, but one that has been going on for decades already (I-15:19).

Even though a number of different issues were discussed by the opponents and the media, the line of argumentation in court was different. Here, Urban Auckland and its lawyers focused on the topic of public notification. Unfortunately, I did not have access to the consent application or any impact assessment. Therefore, I cannot discuss any potential effects mentioned in these documents here.

10.2 Natural harbour v industrial port?

Waitemata Harbour is generally highly appreciated by the public. It is described as “Jewel in the Crown” and praised for its natural beauty. The resident, sailor and co-founder of “Stop stealing our harbour”, Michael Goldwater (I-12) compares the Waitemata harbour to a monument like Eiffel Tower – for him, it is an asset to the city. Also the Auckland Unitary Plan describes the important role of the harbour in generating attachment and identity for Aucklanders. It explains the cultural and social values of the coast by the long history of Maori and Pakeha settlement: “The coast is one of the earliest places of settlement in New Zealand and continues to play a fundamental role in the character and identity of Auckland” (Auckland Council, 2016: section B8.6 10). The landscape as well as the coastal environment is recognized as a “fundamental part of the region’s identity” (Auckland Council, 2016: section B8.1), respectively “[...] Auckland’s wider landscape and maritime setting provides a sense of identity at the local level” (Auckland Council, 2016: section 4.6).

This close connection to the coast is also reflected by the statement of a Councillor of Auckland Council: “I think, people in Auckland are very wielded to their coastline. [...] They love it. And people want to be near it, it’s feels like a birthright for Aucklanders” (I-25, Councillor Auckland Council). Even though this comment came with a bit of sarcasm, it shows the strong and intimate relation of people to the coast, perceived as a “birthright” (see also Kearns and Collins, 2012: 943). Already Kearns and Collins (2012) explained how people can have an especially strong emotional connection to coastal landscapes. In their research on resistance against residential developments in a “pristine” and “wild” sandspit, they discuss how this strong emotional connection can lead to opposition against development plans in the coastal environment.

Also through their practices, people are closely connected to the harbour. The harbour is used extensively for recreation, especially sailing: “There’s a high identity with the harbour and particularly with recreational [use] and people commuting across it. It’s a very integral part of our city. [...] The harbour space is very much at the heart of our city now” (I-16: 228). Julie Stout, president of Urban Auckland and architect, says the harbour is “at the heart” of the city, it becomes a viable part, important for the survival of the city. According to Julie Stout, people identify more with the whole Auckland region nowadays: “And of course, the harbour is the centre of that; and the water, it’s very important to us [...]. So, people start going, ‘This is ours, [...] We have a say in how this is looked after’” (I-16:74).

Before this background, the opponents understand the port as a huge intrusion into the “heart” of the city. This is illustrated by Julie Stout’s map (Figure 6). She draws the coastline gently curved, which gives an organic, natural impression. In the middle, she puts the port area, a dominant rectangle. The circle around it indicates how it sits just in the middle, in the “heart” of the city, how Julie Stout perceives it. Julie Stout also includes the old shoreline into her map, to show how reclamation and wharves already intruded into the harbour and diminished its size. As view lines are one of her core topics, an arrow shows the direction of the view from Queen’s Wharf to the harbour that would be blocked.

Whereas the port represents for many the ugly side of industrialisation and development, with dirt, noise and ugliness, Waitemata Harbour gives the perfect opposite as “pristine nature”. This contrasting of “nature” with the urbanized and industrialized city is a common comparison (Castree, 2005: 137). It is based on the understanding of nature as being the non-human world (Braun, 2009; Castree, 2005: 8). Julie Stout explains her romantic picture of the harbour:

we’re very lucky here in that [...] geographically it’s a lovely, beautifully formed area, and the harbour is a nice contained size and the bays, it’s not like a big open blast out thing; it’s quite an intimate harbour and it’s nurtured a lot of *iwi*, Māori tribes have lived here over the years and then now it’s a lot of villages who grew up [...] (I-16:228)




Figure 6: Map by Julie Stout (I-16). She draws the coastline in a soft, curvy way, trying to match the natural form. The port area is depicted as a rectangular, disturbing the coastline. The Bledisloe Wharf extension is also indicated by a rectangular that extends the Wharf to the north. The extension covers a large area in her drawing, which reflects her impression that the extension would have a big effect. She circles the port area and draws an arrow pointing south to the city centre to show the impact the port has on the city. Julie Stout also includes view lines (indicated by the long arrow from Queen's Wharf out to the harbour).

She describes the “lovely forms” of the harbour, the “nice size and bays” and its intimacy. This is also reflected in her map, where she tries to draw the outlines of the harbour as detailed as possible. The history of human use of the area seems to be only acceptable in the description of Maori who have been “nurtured” by the harbour, and the settlements were “villages”. These former times and especially the Maori use is romanticized and opposed to the industrial use of the area now: Julie Stout describes it as an industrial area and mentions the pollution from ships (i.e. soot) and noise emissions from the port. The “natural” harbour is set in contrast to the “industrialized” port. This idea of a “natural” landscape that is valued for its beauty and has to be protected has its sources in the 19th century (Cronon, 1995: 79) (see also chapter 3.3). Back then, a wealthy city population started to romanticize the “wilderness” – a practice that endures until today, as we can see in the example of Julie Stout’s description. However, there are also other positions, e.g. taken by the resident John Hill: “It doesn’t really worry me that the port’s there. I think it’s part of the character of Auckland” (I-15:155). Here, the port is perceived as being part of the character of city, a link to its history as a port city.

Being an architect, Julie Stout can also take a meta-perspective on space. She understands the waterfront space and wharves at the city centre as a welcome space:

[Queen's wharf] has that connection between the city and the Waitemata Harbour, and that end was sort of important for that ceremonial space that's that gateway. The Māori have a whole notion of *marae* atea space, which is the ceremonial space where people are welcomed and it's the front door. (I-16:24)

Also the Auckland Unitary Plan understands the buildings next to Quay Street as being part of the gateway to the city (Auckland Council, 2016: section I208.2(5)). This idea of an open welcome space, and also the connection between the city and the water that is also drawn in official documents is contrasted by the fenced off port area. Due to health and safety issues as well as customs and the port operations, the area is not accessible to the public. Some areas are fenced by the "red fence". This fence was erected between 1913 and 1923 and, interestingly, it is now used as a tourist attraction (cf. "Red Fence Heritage Walk" by Ports of Auckland).

There is a strong feeling of loss when it comes to further development in the harbour. Councillor Darby (I-13), a councillor of Auckland Council and opposing the wharf extension, gives voice to the concern that once land gets reclaimed in the harbour, that part is lost (I-13:11). Julie has the same opinion: "once you've ruined it, it's ruined forever" (I-16:58). Also Michael Goldwater joins in this tenor: "we've got to maintain what we've got" (I-12:48) and "we can keep it or we can fill it in with concrete" (I-12:90). There is this fear of incremental growth, that the land will keep on growing in the water until the harbour is destroyed (I-12:90).

However, there are also contrasting opinions. Whereas in Julie's map, the port is depicted as dominant in the city centre, the councillor's map (I-25) shows a different perspective (Figure 7). In her sketch, the port does not stand out at all in comparison to other parts of the city she was drawing, and also the extension looks much smaller. In her understanding, the waterfront area is fairly divided between port operations and areas for public access. Both areas take approximately the same size on her map. She includes the redeveloped areas of Silo Park, Viaduct Basin, and Wynyard Quarter. Additionally, she writes "public access" on top of these areas, to indicate that the former port area is now open for the public. Also Queen's Wharf gets a thick arrow and the label "government/council owned". She includes the waterward boundary of the port precinct to indicate that the fear of the people of an ever growing port is not justified, because there is limit, a "line" in the shipping channel that

cannot be penetrated. Views are as well included in her map. However, in contrast to Julie Stout's map, she focuses on the views from Devonport towards the port and city centre.




Figure 7: Map by Councillor (I-25). In this map, most elements are drawn with straight lines in a schematic way. The navigation channel is in the centre of the map, to indicate the area that cannot be penetrated by the port. The port area is on the bottom of the map and does not take a dominant position. In this drawing, the port covers approximately the same or even less area than the redeveloped and public accessible sections of the waterfront. These are located on the west of Queens Wharf (Ferry terminal, Prince's Wharf, Viaduct Basin, Silo Park and the marina at Westhaven). Also the Councillor includes views in her maps, those from Devonport to the port area.

These two maps show many differences that also reveal the perceptions and position of the drawing person. The curved, "natural" lines in Julie Stout's map are a contrast to the straight lines in the Councillor's map. Whereas in Julie Stout's map, the port is evidently a dominant intrusion, in the other map it just one part among others, it does not stand out in any way. As discussed in this section, these two interviews and maps can stand as examples for two different constructions of the coastal landscape. One reflects a romantic image of the Waitemata Harbour as "natural", and argues that it should be protected from further intrusions of the city development. This resembles a perspective that is typical for settler societies (Cronon, 1995; WJT Mitchell, 2002), where landscape is constructed as a picturesque, pristine natural beauty (WJT Mitchell, 2002: 21). On the other hand, there is a position that understands that there will be always an environmental impact from a port. Economic development is seen as inevitable and also as important, for example to provide

jobs. This argument seems to be more rational. However, linking it back to the history of New Zealand, the construction of ports can also be understood to be part of the establishment of colonial rule and a capitalist economic system (Bunce and Desfor, 2007). Furthermore, in this line of argumentation, an understanding of nature that is there for human use seems to prevail.

10.3 Landscapes of labour

The different perceptions of port and harbour reflect the different uses of the harbour and coastline. The most oppositional uses are on the one hand the economic operations by the industrial estates of the port, and on the other hand the recreational use of the harbour, to get away from the city life and industry. This wish for “untouched” places or big water areas for sailing or looking at is not only an individual feeling or opinion from some interview partners, but is also reflected in the Auckland Unitary Plan in 2016 (Auckland Council 2016). In its section on the coast, the Plan addresses the issue of wilderness, and areas that give people the possibility to escape the city: “as Auckland grows and there is greater intensification and less private open space it will be important to ensure that there continue to be areas that people can still ‘escape’ the city and experience wilderness values” (Auckland Council, 2016: section B8:14).

The “escape” from city life to nature and “wilderness” is not a new theme, but dates back at least to the 19th century, where the wealthy city population started to seek remedy from urban development (Cronon, 1995, see also section above) – a trend that persists until today. Wilderness “is readily contrasted with the stress and pollution associated with urban-industrial ways of life” (Castree, 2005: 137). By defining nature and culture as binaries, nature or wilderness can be seen as a remedy to urban life. This theme is taken up by my interview partner Chris Darby. To him, “[t]he sea is a thing of much beauty and calming to look out on, to contemplate, to provide relief from the hustle and bustle of commercial life, nine to five Monday to Friday in the city centre.” (I-13:19). In this view, the harbour provides exactly this space for retreat from the city life. The harbour itself is set up as a counterpart to a capitalist lifestyle in his statement. It is needed as a relief from this lifestyle. Of course this only works if people forget about wagework when looking at the harbour. Therefore, industrial structures and other things that remind of paid work are not welcome. The less human influence is visible, the better. Also, “naturalness” and human use seem absolutely incompatible (cf. chapter 8.3): “we’ve got a beautiful harbour and we’ve got a choice –we can keep it... and that’s our equivalent to great monuments or whatever, we can keep it or

we can fill it in with concrete. So, it's simple choice" (I-12:90). There seems to be not middle ground.

Also the coastal expert Raewyn Peart refers to the theme of wilderness and nature. She explains how increased coastal development leads to a loss of coastal wilderness and amenity (Peart, 2009: 152). Natural coastal landscapes are therefore valued especially high, she argues (Peart, 2009: 64f.). In her argumentation as well, developed coastal areas are contrasted to "untouched" coastal wilderness. In the case of the Waitemata, people project this ideal of a "natural coastal landscape" on the water surface of the harbour, as the coastline is heavily developed in most places in Auckland. Wilderness is commonly seen as good or positive, and its "naturalness" as beautiful and uplifting, Castree states (2005: 137). This is exactly what we can see in Peart's argumentation as well as in the statements of the opponents and in the council documents quoted above.

Related to the discussion of relocating the port, one councillor explains: "[...] I have had many emails saying 'I don't wanna lose my job'" (I-25:9, Councillor Auckland Council). She refers to the employees of the port who were afraid that the protests might have led to a change in the port operations or a relocation. However, also the job argument is turned around and used by the opponents. They argue that, if properly developed, the same area could provide many more jobs, e.g. in the service sector. There seems to be a differentiation between wanted labour and unwanted labour. Wanted labour, which is accepted to take place at the waterfront, comprises restaurants, cafés or banks, so service sector work that creates a lot of income in a small place, without noise or other emissions. Furthermore, cafés or restaurant are of course work sites for the employees, however, for the customers they are spaces of recreation and leisure time. The unwanted labour, which is dirty, noisy and ugly (in this case the port operations and adjoining industry) does not stand for what Aucklanders want to represent, it is an "old" picture in the view of some interview partners. Julie Stout contrasts these two development possibilities:

Our waterfront could be just fantastic and it'll just bring so much more people back into the city and not industry; [but] jobs and housing and parks [...]. It could be fantastic [...] And as opposed to an industrial estate, with all the iron sands and concrete bunkers and used cars, car storage.
(I-16:167)

She imagines how "fantastic" the waterfront could be, if there would not be the port but residential areas, parks, and jobs in the service sector. Looking at the bigger picture, the moving of the port operations to the eastern parts of the port area and the development of

the now “free” areas changed the composition of jobs and economic structure in these areas, where there are now expensive restaurants and hotels. People working in classic port jobs or related jobs are excluded of this sector:

We argued for the fishermen to stay there, so it’s got the character [...]. But you’re pushing sort of proverbial uphill because what happens of course is that the values of the land go up ‘cause of all the other things there. I mean, a fisherman can’t afford to be there so they start going anyway. (I-15:214, about waterfront development at Viaduct Basin)

Here, the fishermen should not stay because they make a living out of their job, but because they add to the “character” of the area, which is also a tourism hot-spot. The fishermen serve as a symbol for the former times of Auckland and the port area. Even though the port was the “birthplace” for Auckland, and central to its economic development, many people now do not want to have it in the city centre anymore. Rather, they favour a modern, redeveloped waterfront. Here, we see how especially D Mitchell’s (2005) thoughts on landscape as a site of production and reproduction resonate with the understanding of Waitemata Harbour as a coastal landscape of labour and leisure.

10.4 View lines

For Julie Stout, the issue of view lines was a main motivation for opposing the wharf extension:

The thing that interested me, it was the business of the views to the harbour. [...] Especially in young cities, the views that get set up, key views are really important for a sense of place and identification of where [you] are [...]. And it’s really easy for those to not be recognised by people who are just looking at a site plan within fifty metres of where they are. [...] And the view goes out to the outer islands and the gulf. Once that view’s blocked, you’re just looking at the land ahead of you, or a wharf, or a ship or something; it’s got no bigger emotional resonance to it. (I-16: 22)

Julie explains here how the issue of view lines is one of her central motivations to resist the planned wharf extension. The opponents fear that view lines might get blocked, especially when ships are lying at the wharf. This could e.g. block the view from Queen’s Wharf (which is public and accessible to everyone) to the eastern parts of the harbour, including open water space as well as the northern parts of Auckland and hills, islands and headlands. These

view lines create an “emotional resonance”, the view is “important for a sense of place and identification of where you are”. So the view serves for orientation within the city, but also for orientation within feelings for the place. Julie also criticises those who are blind for these visual connections that lead to emotional connections, e.g. people “just looking at a site plan” (I-16:22). This statement underlines how people look at the same space with different eyes, and what they perceive to be part of that area, that view – how big their picture is. This also puzzles Julie Stout:

[I]t always, as an architect, astounds me how few people actually have a visual picture of their city, or their world; [...] I don't know what they see but they don't see it quite like we see it. (I-16:24)

Certainly, many people do have a visual picture, but a different one to Julie's trained architects gaze. There are not only three different modalities of space (*espace vécu*, *perçu* and *conçu*, see chapter 2.2), but many more ways of producing these spaces. The visual picture people have depends on many factors, such as their experiences, their daily life spatial patterns, or their professional training. This topic is also closely related to map making (see also chapter 7.3).

The issue of view lines and visual amenity was also part of the court case. Urban Auckland raised the issue of visual and coastal landscape effect and amenities (High Court 2015: [145]). However, under the coastal plan there was no scope for the council to control these issues (High Court 2015: [70]). Actually, view lines are considered in the planning documents. The Auckland Regional Coastal Plan (Auckland Regional Council, 2004) deals extensively with the issue of view lines, mostly related to buildings and their height. The plan acknowledges the importance of views in relation to the harbour:

Buildings and other significant structures in Port Management Areas shall be designed and located as far as practicable, in accordance with the urban design criteria [...] and so as to avoid, remedy, or mitigate significant adverse effects on views from and to adjoining land and water. (Auckland Regional Council, 2004: 25-5)

There are also protected so-called view shafts around Captain Cook Wharf (Auckland Regional Coastal Plan, Map Series 2, Sheet 4A), however they do not cover the area of the wharf extensions.

The Auckland Unitary Plan covers the issue of views in several chapter as well (e.g. sections 3.2, 4.3.2). Even though it became only operative in 2016, it gives some insight into how

planning authorities deal with the issues of views. Generally, the plan states that “Individual viewing points, and their significant viewshafts from public places, contribute to the unique character of many of our neighbourhoods and coastal areas” (Auckland Council, 2016: section 4.6). Regarding the general coastal marine zone, it “require[s] structure in the GCM [general coastal marine] zone to be located to minimise [...] visual impacts, particularly in areas sensitive to effects such as headlands or the outer edges of enclosed bays, as seen from both land and water” (Auckland Council, 2016: section 5.1). In Appendix 7.1, the Auckland Unitary Plan caters for view lines, which include also view from the city centre to the harbour. The whole issue of local public views gets its own chapter (Auckland Council, 2016: section 4.6). In the case of the wharf extension, the wharf structure itself might not have been the biggest problem, but the ships berthing there. The extension might have blocked views from Queens Wharf to the harbour.

Presumably, the resource consent application of Ports of Auckland included a landscape assessment and an assessment of visual impacts, which deal with issues such as view lines. Unfortunately, I had no access to the consent documents.

10.5 Waterfront development

Several interview partners were very fond of the idea of waterfront development and would like to see that happen in the areas where the port is at the moment, like it has already taken place in the Wynyard Quarter, at Viaduct Basin or Westhaven Marina. Waterfront development in Auckland started with the redevelopment of Viaduct Basin for the Americas Cup in 1998. Next to infrastructure for boats, commercial areas were designated and residential areas built (Xie and Gu, 2015). The development continued in other close by areas such as Princes Wharf and Wynyard Quarter, now hosting hotels, cafes, restaurants, offices and apartments.

Generally, urban waterfront development is a “well-established phenomenon in Western countries” (Galland and Hansen, 2012: 203). Waterfront development means the transformation of waterfront space that was formerly used by industry and port operations (Marshall, 2001). Main drivers are the wish to revitalize these areas, increase economic competitiveness, place promotion and tourism (Marshall, 2001; Xie and Gu, 2015; for a discussion of waterfront development as “infrastructuring” see Herbeck and Flitner, 2019). The redevelopment of waterfronts is strongly influenced by market forces and the economy (Marshall, 2001). This is also visible in Auckland, where waterfront planning was and is influenced by the liberation of market forces under neoliberalism (Xie and Gu, 2015: 109).

The waterfront development creates new urban spaces, which, according to Xie and Gu (2015), shall attract more capital and people. In the case of Auckland these are for example businesses like banks and people such as tourists as well as leisure infrastructure in the form of restaurants, bars, cafés and outdoor sitting and playing areas (see Figure 9).

This can be positively interpreted in the way that waterfront development enhances the social status of the area and provides access as well as space for commercial activity at the waterfront (Xie and Gu, 2015). However, waterfront development is not undisputed. As other processes of urban restructuring, it can start or intensify processes of exclusion and polarization (Swyngedouw et al., 2003: 13). Also, waterfront development in Auckland is dominated by processes of privatization of space (Xie and Gu, 2015: 110).

That waterfront development can be an accumulative process (Desfor and Jørgensen, 2004) does not go unnoticed by opponents of the wharf extension. The port land is framed as a valuable resource by opponents: the port area is described as “77 hectares of the most prime real estate in the whole of New Zealand” (I-12:99). Therefore, in the logic of the opponents, other uses of that area would make much more sense in economic terms, i.e. generate more income and jobs. Here, my interview partner sees an enormous opportunity cost:

in terms of opportunity cost we can see as a comparison to Wynyard Quarter and Viaduct Harbour that we're paying a substantial price because we don't have that economic activity and we don't have the social and environmental engagement that would be transformative to Auckland. (I-12:139)

In the spokesperson's view, the motivation for the citizen group Stop Stealing our Harbour is to maximise the value for Auckland: “I wouldn't describe myself as an environmentalist [...], or what we're trying to do I wouldn't describe as [...] an environmentalist group. What we're trying to do is maximise the benefit to Auckland” (I-12:265). This is an interesting argument. Apparently, it is not desirable to be perceived as an environmentalist. Rather, Michael Goldwater stresses that he and his group are interested in “maximising benefits” for Auckland. This seems to be the more promising strategy. As was discussed earlier, e.g. in regard to landscape (chapter 8.3), many decisions concerning resource consents “balance” the effects of the development, which in many cases is perceived as such as that the economic aspects outweigh environmental or social issues. Therefore, following an economic logic might be a more promising way to influence a development.

10.6 Public access

The interview with John Hill gave me insights into another aspect of the conflicts around how the coastline should be used. John Hill was not directly involved in the wharf case, but had a long personal history of engaging in a citizen initiative and the port. Living in St Marys Bay since 1975 already, he had experienced a lot of changes of the waterfront in the last decades. He outlined how the whole port operation area had gradually moved from west to east, and how there were discussions about what to do with the areas vacated by the port. His involvement with the port and the waterfront started some decades ago with the St Mary's Bay Association engagement against the plans reclaim parts of Westhaven and redesign the area. Public access to the water was one of his main topics. He described how the "yachties" did not want the area to be open to the public. In the map he was drawing about Westhaven Marina (Figure 8), he included little arrows to indicate where public access is now possible, because he and his colleagues from the Association were fighting for this. In his map, the pathways along the coast and on the build structures of the marina are the main elements. He also includes buildings that were demolished during the redevelopment of the marina, namely an old salt water pool and the old rowing club, which were opportunities for the public to access and use the coast.




Figure 8: Map by John Hill (M-15). The map shows Westhaven Marina. John Hill includes historic elements of the area that were removed/destroyed during the redevelopment of the Marina (salt water pool and rowing club building). Next to heritage issues, environmental issues such as water quality and public access are his main points. Yellow highlights indicate where public access is possible. Highlights by Mara Ort.

There are parallels between the struggle for public access to the water at Westhaven Marina and at Viaduct Basin. John Hill explained:

And we pushed for access and [now] there is access. You can walk right around it and all that sort of stuff. Well, that wasn't going to be there because you imagine, if you're wanting to sell expensive apartments with boats, they can park their boat just in front, you don't want people [walk] through there, you know, [laughs] simple as that. (I-15:18, about Viaduct Basin)

This also shows the tensions that can arise from the high-price waterfront development. Even though the port is not blocking access to the water anymore, other users now claim an authority over the water access. In these cases, this were either boat owners or residents of the adjacent apartments. This issue of access to the coast can also be related to a wider discussion in New Zealand. On the one hand, this has been part of the debate about the Foreshore and Seabed Act (see ch. 7.4), on the other hand in relation to gentrification and high price residential developments in coastal communities (Freeman and Cheyne, 2008). Also other people and documents bring up the issue of public access to the coastline. The Regional Coastal Plan for Auckland is required by the RMA to maintain and enhance public access to the coast (Auckland Regional Council, 2004: 7-1). It also explains that New Zealanders expect that "land of the Crown in the coastal marine area shall generally be available for free public use and enjoyment" (Auckland Regional Council, 2004: 7-1). Also the general position of the public towards access to the waterfront is discussed by several interview partners and authors. Apparently, there is "a desire for the public to get that [the waterfront] more open" (I-25:52). McLauchlan discusses the developments in the last decades:

Aucklanders' appetite for waterfront access has been stimulated by the development in the 1990s of Princes Wharf and Viaduct Harbour, followed by the return to the public in 2007 of the Wynyard Quarter [...], and by the retrieval of Queens Wharf in 2010. (McLauchlan, 2012: 35)

He links the different waterfront areas that became publicly accessible in the last decades to the "appetite for waterfront access". Michael Goldwater from Stop Stealing our Harbour values the open access to Queen's Wharf, which enables the public to enjoy the harbour: "[T]here's open access to it. You can go off the end and have a panoramic view of the harbour" (I-12:47). He uses the example of Wynyard Quarter and Viaduct Basin to argue that the waterfront land is prime real estate in Auckland's CBD. In his opinion it is questionable if

the best use for that area is a port, or if another use would be better to “unleash the value” (I-12). These former port area were developed around the turn of the millennium, and are still further developed up to today, with expensive residential areas, hotels, banks, restaurants etc. (Figure 9). Michael Goldwater thinks that the waterfront has a high economic but also social value, and therefore it should be developed, rather than having the port sitting on this land.

When talking about how the waterfront can look like and what kind of businesses and uses should be there, John Hill remembers the developments at Wynyard Wharf. There used to be several mineral oil companies using the areas for storage, which – according to his account– brought high revenues for the port, so the port company did not want to change these uses. However, also the redevelopment of an area, e.g. through a change of use, can actually increase the value of the area and lead to rising prices for housing and services.



Figure 9: Waterfront at Wynyard Quarter. The new buildings host the ASB bank, the ASB Waterfront Theatre, the Park Hyatt hotel, as well as a number of restaurants and bars. On the left picture, the outdoor furniture on Karanga Plaza is visible, with permanently installed benches and sun chairs. On the right pictures, there are buoys as “decoration” elements, to reflect the port history of the area. Along the promenade, there are several restaurants and bars. Pictures: Mara Ort

However, the shift of the port from east to west in recent decades and the vacation of former port areas for other uses does not mean that these areas are open to everyone. Especially a high-level waterfront development leads to increasing prices. Even though the area would be open to the public, it is questionable who actually uses such waterfront areas. Figure 9 shows the redevelop waterfront at Wynyard Quarter. The area now hosts several restaurants, bars, a hotel, and an event centre. In contrast to the port areas, which are closed for health and safety reasons, people have access to the waterfront here. There are wide promenades and outdoor furniture invites tourists and locals to linger. But the fishermen are not there anymore.

10.7 Conclusion

Even though the case study focused on the Bledisloe Wharf extension, the case cannot be understood without the bigger context of the development of the port of Auckland and its ambivalent perception from the public, the local economy and the political sphere. The conflict around the Bledisloe Wharf extension and the port in general builds on different perceptions, uses and visions of the coastline and harbour, or, in Lefebvrian terminology, on different productions of space. The resulting spaces overlap each other and can lead to conflicts. However, they can also be a key to understand the different positions better.

There are three major points in this case study, all of whom are closely intertwined. First, a contrast can be observed between the framing of the port as industrial estate and the Waitemata Harbour as natural area. The Waitemata is much appreciated for its recreation opportunities, its role as counterpart to the city life, and its “naturalness”. The port operations seem to be in direct conflict to this. However, the Waitemata is not framed as “nature” for its own sake, but as a remedy for city life and work (a “recreational infrastructure”), as an asset equally to a great monument to attract tourists, and as increasing the monetary value of the adjacent coastline. The “naturalness” of the harbour is deeply commodified. Still, the Waitemata is perceived as public area and contrasted to the port area, which is portrayed as a symbol for capitalism and consumerism. The issue of view lines is closely connected to this. These are considered important by my interview partners and official plans for several reasons. They provide visual connection and orientation and help to build identity. In this regard, they can be understood as practices to produce both *espace perçu* (through the visual connections) and *espace vécu* (through the emotional attachment to the sea and the coastline).

The second main issue revolves around waterfront development or the use of the waterfront area. Many opponents do not generally oppose economic rationalities but would welcome a redevelopment of the waterfront also for economic reasons. By incorporating economic rationalities, opponents enter the production of *espace conçu*. Usually, this is the realm of “experts”, planners, technocrats etc. However, some of the opponents are themselves experts and professionals (such as architects) and therefore able to enter this way of spatial production.

The third point is the issue of access to the coastline and the harbour. This can be understood in direct terms, i.e. public walkways along the water, but also figuratively, i.e. who is able to use the waterfront area for what purposes (what is built there, who can afford an apartment or a flat white etc.). Public access to the waterfront area is not self-evident. The areas where

the waterfront has been transformed in the last years are open to the public now, even though there is generally a strong trend towards privatization in waterfront development. There are public spaces like playgrounds, however some of the residents might not like that. In contrast, port operation areas usually have no possibility to have areas open to the public due to health and safety concerns. Spatial networks such as walkways are part of the production of an *espace perçu*.

In the end, none of the three main issues of the case study discussed above stopped the planned extensions. Rather, a procedural fault was identified by the High Court, in that the resource consent applications of Ports of Auckland Ltd. should have been bundled and publicly notified by the Council. Even though the Bledisloe plans were stopped in 2015, there were already new attempts to expand the port area. The whole issue of port expansions and reallocation became an issue in the election campaigns for the mayoralty of Auckland. In a newspaper article,

Auckland mayoral candidate Phil Goff is promising to move the city's port and turn the waterfront land into upmarket residential, high-value commercial and public spaces. Mr Goff is today launching his "Protecting the Waitemata" policy, which will include a commitment to stop Ports of Auckland from reclaiming any more of the harbour. "My commitment is to restore Aucklanders' access to this prime waterfront site, so that people, rather than imported cars, get to enjoy its natural beauty," Mr Goff said. (*New Zealand Herald*, 04 June 2016)

The topics addressed here are the same as the ones in the protests in 2015: The waterfront land is too valuable to "waste" it with being occupied by the port, and it should rather be developed. Also the kind of development is specified here: upmarket residential and high-value commercial areas. So this would not be for all Aucklanders, but only the ones that can afford the prices for homes there as well as in the shops. The quote then reads somewhat ironic when it says that people shall enjoy the natural beauty of the waterfront, as the plans are not to re-establish natural features but a highly urban business district. Probably these already seem to be "natural" in the eyes of some.

The three conceptual themes from Part II, landscape, infrastructure and planning, are lying across the whole case study. The coastal landscape around the Waitemata Harbour is largely urbanised, and also hosts the port as large industrial estate. The water surface is therefore highly appreciated, as it seems to be "natural". The port as a classical "grey" infrastructure incorporates the disadvantages of industrial development, such as emissions. The Harbour,

however, is not labelled as infrastructure, even though it provides several services to society, such as recreational space, mobility, or ecosystem services (Carse, 2012; Flitner, 2017). Regarding planning, the Auckland case also gives some interesting insight. The RMA provides for public notification under specific circumstances. The people did not see that the council or the port were sensitive to their concerns and were therefore looking for other methods to have their voices heard. However, it were mainly people that had many resources that were active in the protest (see also Stephenson and Lawson, 2013).

11 Wellington: land reclamation for runway extension

My second case study is the contested land reclamation plans of Wellington Airport to in Lyall Bay to extend its runway to the South. Even though an airport is not usually coastal infrastructure, this one has close connections to the surrounding bays. The Airport is located east of Wellington's city centre, on an isthmus between Evans Bay in the north and Lyall Bay in the South. The reclamation would be an intervention into the coastal environment.

11.1 Introduction to the case

In April 2016, Wellington International Airport Ltd. (WIAL) applied for resource consents for the construction, operation and maintenance of a 355 m long runway extension. As the runway borders on the ocean on both its ends, this would implicate land reclamation into the coastal marine environment. After evaluating both opportunities, reclamation to the north or to the south, WIAL decided for Lyall Bay at the southern end of the runway (see Table 5). The reclaimed area would comprise 10.82 ha and a total construction footprint of 13 ha (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). Currently, the runway is 1945 m long, and has 150 m protection areas at each end. Technically, the reclamation would be done by building a dike into the coastal and marine area and fill it up with material (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). The fill would be provided by a quarry in the Wellington region. Dredged material could also be used. According to the Airport, the construction time would be 3 to 4 years (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: xvi). During construction, there would be a temporary exclusion zone around the construction area. This would cover an area of 300m around the existing breakwater and include large parts of Lyall Bay. Recreational and other uses would be very limited. The Airport seeks permit to work 24 hours on seven days a week. Next to the main reclamation, several mitigation measures and amenity improvements are planned by WIAL. These include, amongst many other, walking trails, seating areas and a Submerged Wave Focussing Structure (SWFS) to enhance surf amenities (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: 222ff.).

The airport company portrays in its consent application that the airport operations are constrained by the length of the existing runway. The extension would allow larger aircraft to land in Wellington, thus enable long-haul direct connections with North America or East Asia. Wellington Airport International Ltd. sees three main benefits in a runway extension,

which would mean that “around 65% of the world’s population will be able to fly within one stop to Wellington” (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: x). First, the improved international connectivity would support business. Second, the tourism sector would benefit. Third, a direct link could attract more overseas students to Wellington which would support the education sector (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: x). In this line of argumentation, the city is displayed as a part of a globalising world and a globalising economy. The development of certain infrastructure seems to be inevitable to keep pace with the global developments and not be left behind. Internationalization and globalization seem to be strong overarching normative frameworks that structure how a city should develop.

However, the extension is controversial, and the arguments supporting it are not shared by the opponents. The current resource consent application of WIAL provoked 776 submissions in total. 525 submissions were in opposition and 228 in favour of the project (Wellington City Council, 2016: 8). In the submissions, issues raised include amongst others noise effects, traffic effects, effects on surfing, recreational effects and ecological effects. The point raised the most often, 492 times, are economic effects, i.e. project viability or doubts about potential benefits (Wellington City Council, 2016). Critics of the project doubt that the extended runway would really attract as many passengers and boost the economy as much as the reports suggest. The citizens’ groups “Guardians of the Bay” and Moa Point Residents group were established to fight the land reclamation plans. Next to residents and other affected groups and stakeholders, also surfers are opposing the projects, because an important surf break would most likely be completely destroyed. The current conflict is not the first in the history of the airport (*Evening Post*, 13 November 1997). In the past, there were controversies about noise issues and costs (*Evening Post*, 16 May 1992). Already in 1974, Lancaster (1974) attested the airport geographical as well as economic and political problems that characterised its development – a circumstance that has not changed much until today.

WIAL sought and was granted a direct referral process (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016). This means that the hearings and a decision at council level are skipped, and the case goes to the Environment Court directly. This is possible when it can be assumed that the case will go to Environment Court anyway, for example because of appeals to the council’s decision. After WIAL submitted its resource consent applications, Greater Wellington Regional Council (GWRC) and Wellington City Council (WCC) prepared reports regarding the application. Then, the public could hand in submissions. After submitting, people had the

opportunity to become so-called s274 parties, which allow the submitters to appear before court in the case.

Even though the application went to Environment Court directly, so far there were no hearings. The reason for this is that the New Zealand Airline Pilots' Association took WIAL and the Director of Civil Aviation to court in respect to the safety areas at the ends of the runway (see below). They argued that the safety areas for the extended runway were too short and to operate bigger planes there would therefore be insecure. Currently, the consent process is on hold, with regular meetings at the Environment Court to discuss the actual status.

Some opponents criticised the direct referral process. The Environment Court hearings could be more intimidating, formal and official to members of the public than a hearing at the local council. A planner from the council told me that a court hearing can be a "daunting experience" (I-20:22). Also, to be able to be heard at court, most submitters had to hand in a "section 274 form". The opposing group "Guardians of the Bays" provided a form for submissions on their webpage, because they assumed that participation following the formal ways can be hard for an average resident. First, people have to prepare a submission, then fill in the "very official looking section 274 form" (I-23:68), and then ideally turn up at a court hearing, Tim Jones from Guardians of the Bays explains. These issues resemble the findings from Stephenson and Lawson (2013). They state that there are several reasons that prevent people from submitting, amongst these is the perception of the formal submission and hearing process as intimidating.

Table 5: Timeline of events. Own compilation.

2010	Release of Master Plan which considers the need for runway extensions and land reclamation in the future
2012	Plans of the WIAL to extend North into Evans Bay, founding of Guardians of the Bay
2014	Focus changes to extend to the South into Lyall Bay
August 2014	WIAL starts meetings and individual consultation with affected parties, neighbours, authorities and other stakeholders
September 2014	WIAL's project homepage for the extension goes online
December 2015	Three public consultation events by the WIAL
April 2016	Resource consent application submitted by WIAL
October 2016	Officers direct referral reports of WCC and GWRC published
December 2017	Supreme Court decides Director of Civil Aviation has erred in Law, safety areas at the runway's ends will have to be reconsidered

Runway safety dispute

The whole issue of the runway extension got major opposition from the New Zealand Airline Pilots' Association. They considered the 90 m runway safety areas at the ends of the runway that were proposed by WIAL as too short. The runway end safety areas (RESAs) have to be at least 90 meters long, and if practicable more than 240 meters at each end of the runway (Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, 2017: Appendix A). WIAL considered 90 meters to be long enough for its extended runway. This length was confirmed by the Director of Civil Aviation in March 2015. As the Environment Court states in a description of the process, "the Director's approval as to the length of the RESAs is fundamental to the resource consent application made by WIAL" (Environment Court, 2018: [9]). The decision of the Director was challenged legally by the New Zealand Airline Pilots Association. Their position is that the RESAs should be at least 240 meters long. The case went through several courts, until the Supreme Court found in December 2017 that the Director had erred in law, i.e. choose the wrong process to come to his decision (Supreme Court of New Zealand, 2017). This could have been the end for the whole consent process. However, WIAL intends to resubmit an application to the Director for approving a 90 meters RESA. In their opinion, the result could be a positive decision, if the matters for consideration identified by the Supreme Court are considered. Until January 2019, there was no decision made by the director. For the direct referral process in the Environment Court, this means that the process is on hold (so far until Mai 2019), until the Director has reconsidered the new application (Environment Court, 2018).

11.1.1 Lyall Bay and the South coast

Wellington is located in the south of the North Island. As the capital, it is also the political centre of New Zealand. Its city centre lays at the coast of Wellington Harbour. In Maori tradition, the first who entered the harbour was the Polynesian navigator Kupe (McLauchlan, 2012). European immigrants started to settle the area in the 19th century, and the city has a long history of reclamation. Wellington has a very hilly landscape with a steep coastline in the southern part. However, flat areas can be found where the city centre is, and in Petone and Lower Hutt. The city developed around Lambton Harbour in the western parts of Wellington Harbour. In 1855, a massive earthquake was raising the land. As a result, the area in front of the new town was easy to reclaim, McLauchlan (2012) describes: "All the land seawards of present-day Lambton Quay and Wakefield Street was reclaimed within the first decades of settlement" (McLauchlan, 2012: 40).

The isthmus between Evans Bay and Lyall Bay, where the airport sits (see Figure 10), only developed around 1460. Before, Miramar was an island. An earthquake raised the seabed and lifted it above the water level (Maclean, 2007). Another earthquake in 1855 lifted the area again, which created the rocky platforms along the coast (Maclean, 2007). This isthmus is the area that was chosen for the airport. Lyall Bay, located in the South of the airport, is part of Wellington's South Coast. The South Coast is relatively little developed and retains a "wild" character in comparison with the densely settled central regions of Wellington City (Wellington City Council, 2002). There are reefs and small bays, followed by narrow shore platforms and steep escarpments (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016). However, Lyall Bay is rather untypical for the South Coast (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 7). It is a semi-circular open bay, with the headlands Te Raekaihau in the West and Hue te Taka in the East (also called Moa Point, see Figure 11). As the shoreline of the Wellington Region is rocky in most parts, the sand beach of Lyall Bay is a distinctive feature and unique in the region. Immediately adjacent to Lyall Bay in the West is the Taputeranga Marine Reserve. The whole South Coast is exposed to strong ocean currents as well as southerly winds. While the area around the beach is covered with buildings, the headlands are still undeveloped. Lyall Bay has already been modified by the historic construction of the Airport (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016: 5). The dunes and sandy hills in this area of the peninsula were levelled to allow planes to land. Later, also the installation of sea walls, a road close to the beach and residential, commercial as well as recreational developments had an impact on the natural geomorphology of the area (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016: 5). The natural form of the beach is interrupted by the former reclamations for the existing runway, which altered 850m of the coastline (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 6). It is armoured with rocks, tetrapods, akmons, and accropodes. East of the runway, there is the small residential area of Moa Point. At Moa Point, the closest house to the runway is at a distance of only 220 m (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 23).

Even though Lyall Bay and the surrounding areas can be considered as highly affected by the airport (older reclamations into the bay, noise etc.), Lyall Bay is a popular beach for recreational activities (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016). These include sightseeing, scenic drives, visiting cafés, walking and running, using the playground near the surf lifesaving clubrooms, dog walking exercise area, cycling along the bays of the Wellington South Coast, plane spotting, swimming and diving, fishing and collection of seafood, surfing, kayaking and paddle boarding, surf lifesaving, Kite surfing, Wind surfing, and boating (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016: 8).




Figure 10: Map of Wellington Airport and the surrounding areas. Source: Bay of Plenty Regional Council, no date, modified

11.1.2 Airport History

Wellington Airport is located on Miramar Peninsula. The current runway is oriented between Evans Bay in the North and Lyall Bay in the South. The area was used for aviation first from 1920 to 1947, as the so-called Rongotai Aerodrome. In that time, the runway was still orientated from east to west. The aerodrome was closed for safety reasons in 1947 (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016). In 1953 there was a new proposal for an airport. Construction works started soon and lasted until 1959. In total, 28 hectares of land were reclaimed, mainly in Lyall Bay but also in Evans Bay (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). A large hill was levelled, and 150 houses were purchased and removed to realise the project (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). Struthers (1975) speaks of “gigantic proportions” of material that was moved for reclamations: more than 250,000 m³ to be reclaimed in Evans Bay, 420,000 m³ taken from Moa Point for the reclamation in Lyall Bay, 90,000 m³ from Rongotai Terrace to Evans Bay (Struthers, 1975: 96). 1959 the new airport opened, with the runway now facing north-south (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016). The last major extension of the runway about 306 meters was finished in 1972 (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). It involved land reclamation south into Lyall Bay, including the construction of a seawall (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016). On

Figure 11, an aerial view of Lyall Bay shows the existing extension. The blue line indicates where the shoreline was initially in 1941.



Figure 11: Geomorphologic features and key sites of Lyall Bay. The blue line indicates the 1941 shoreline and rock outcrop, now covered under the 1972 land reclamation. Source: Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: 52

In consequence to the Airport Authorities Amendment Bill 1986, Wellington Airport was incorporated in 1990 (Lyon, 2011: 200). The shares were distributed between the Minister of Finance (33%), the Minister of State Owned Enterprises (33%) and City Investments Limited (34%, this company is owned completely by Wellington City Council). In 1998, the Crown sold its shares to a group of investors, now owned a 100% by Infratil Limited (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). Infratil holds 66% of the shares nowadays, and Wellington City Council 34% (through City Investments Limited).

11.1.3 Involved actors

The citizen's group "Guardians of the Bays" is the main opponent to WIAL in the case of the current runway extension. It was founded in 2012, initially as a response to plans of the airport company to reclaim land in Evans Bay, north of the runway. Plans changed, however, and so the "Guardians of the Bay" (Evans Bay) changed their name to "Guardians of the Bays"

(both Evans and Lyall Bay). The Guardians can be understood as an umbrella organisation, with many individuals as well as groups being a member and represented through the Guardians. In 2017, the Guardians had approximately 500 individual members, and 40-50 residential, recreational and environmental groups under their umbrella. The actual work is carried out by a small group of people. I interviewed three of them, Sea Rotmann, Clive Anstey and Tim Jones. The reasons of the citizen group to protest the development are manifold, as also their members represent different viewpoints. However, one of their main points is the large economic investment, which would partially come from Wellington City Council. Guardians of the Bays think that the economics do not make sense, and they doubt that there is really a need for these long-haul flights (I-18:18).

Relationship between opponents and the airport

Under the RMA, the WIAL is not obliged to do any consultation with the public. However, there was action taken by WIAL. According to the Airport, there were meetings and individual consultations since August 2014 with affected parties, neighbours, authorities and other stakeholders (such as Moa Point residents, surfers, residents living close to the haulage routes etc.) (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). In 2015, there were three public events for the general public, with approximately 200 persons attending (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016). Next to that, there is a project website since 2014 with information material provided by the airport (connectwellington.co.nz), as well as media releases and advertising campaigns in print and radio.

However, the relationship between the opponents of the extension and the airport company is not perceived as good by some members of Guardians of the Bays. In consultation processes, it is often details like the atmosphere or the attitude that can determine if stakeholders or the general public have the impression that they are taken seriously. So if there is no trust and no real power sharing, people often perceive the consultation as patronising or just a “mock”. In the case of the extension, Clive Anstey criticizes the behaviour of the airport. As a global corporate, they just ignored the people around the airport, he thinks:

[T]hey've paid little regard to the recreational groups, the local residents, and [...] they pitched the benefits to the business community, the council, [...] if you read the newspaper, the letters in support are coming from people who don't even live in the environment. (I-19:15)

Other opponents have more trust into the process in general. For Mark Shanks, it is obvious that the airport is there, and that people have to accept this: “we just have to accept the fact there is an airport there, but we don’t want a bigger one, that’s all” (I-17:150). However, they also mention that it costs money because lawyers have to be engaged, for example. Clive Anstey underlines the fact that the process does not only cost money, but also energy (I-19:33). The opposition is mainly carried out by people who do this next to their jobs or other duties and are not paid for this effort. Here, as in all other cases, obviously resources are needed to take part in participation or protest (see also Stephenson and Lawson, 2013).

11.1.4 Contested issues and effects

There is a number of controversial issues around the planned reclamation. These are described in greater detail in the councils’ reports (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016; Wellington City Council, 2016), as well as in submissions and the interviews.

One of the main controversial subjects is if there is really a demand for a longer runway and more direct flights and if the incomes generated from the extension will be as high as estimated. Economic issues were the topic that was addressed in the submission most often (Greater Wellington Regional Council, no year). Furthermore, there are concerns regarding the marine ecology. Marine life would be directly buried under the reclamation, as well as being affected by the construction noise, vibrations, and sediments. The landscape would be altered both ecologically as well as visually, and the “natural character” (see below) of Lyall Bay would decrease. General concerns were voiced towards the fact that Wellington sits on active fault lines. Natural hazards such as earthquakes or tsunamis pose threats to the airport. Furthermore, residents also fear that their houses may lose value. Other issues are aiming at the restraints during the construction. There would be an inaccessible area around the construction site, which would reduce the area that could be used for recreational activities. Traffic would increase dramatically in the neighbouring residential areas, if the material for the reclamation would be transported by trucks. Additionally, more flights in and out of Wellington would mean more road traffic after the completion of the reclamation as well. The noise emissions during construction would also affect residents.

Next to these issues, there are also some opponents who oppose the project in more general ways. They see a discrepancy between the economic interests of the airport company and more altruistic norms and motives. Some opponents criticise the capitalist system in general, and understand the airport as one part of it, which functions according to the growth paradigm and the hegemony of economy. Economic interests seem to be more important than the threat they pose to the society, or even the world, when considering global

warming. They do not believe that the extension is necessary for any greater good, just the airport wants to make profit (I-18, I-19). For the airport company, however, this is a reasonable behaviour, as it is a business. Sea Rotmann, co-chair of Guardians of the Bays, has an overarching critique on projects like the runway extension:

For them it's a cash cow. [...] Typical neoclassical capitalism. Short-term shareholder returns go over long-term risks and impacts. [...] The sad thing is that the city council is not meant to think like that. But unfortunately our politicians are much more tied into the neoliberal economic system than into what's right socially or infrastructurally or planning wise. (I-18:129)

Sea Rotmann, an environmentalist, marine biologist, a co-chair at Guardians of the Bays, and a co-chair of the Moa Point residents group Hua tē Taka society, puts the whole conflict into a wider context. She sees the case as a typical example of the behaviour of companies in a neoclassical, capitalist society, where profit maximisation and growth are the dominant paradigms. Nevertheless, not only companies behave in this way of economic logic, also the council and the political-administrative system in general are part of this system. Because Wellington City also holds shares of Wellington International Airport Ltd., they would also contribute to the costs of the extension. For Tim Jones, this is an example of how the public subsidises private profits, he calls it “socialise the losses and privatise the profits” (I-23:37-40). Also, some of my interview partners suspect that the main motive for the airport to expand the runway is to increase its asset base, either to increase the landing charges or to sell the airport for a higher price (I-18; I-23:37-40).

Also the ecological arguments are brought forward strongly by the opponents, especially the effects on and by climate change. Here, they argue that flying in general should not be expanded and promoted in any way. First, because it has negative effects on the climate and accelerates climate change. Second, because fuel might also get more expensive and flying in general might decline in the future. Third, because Wellington Airport sits on low lying land, and might be affected both by a general sea level rise and stronger or more frequent storm surges. Opponents do not see that WIAL is taking climate change enough into account in its submission and reports (there is a technical report on coastal processes also looking at climate change effects such as sea level rise, National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research Ltd, 2016).

In the following, however, I want to focus on two main groups of themes, which were observable in the Wellington case much stronger than in the other cases. These is first, the

issue of landscape perception and its assessment. Here, I will discuss the formal approaches to landscape assessment and contrast them to alternative perceptions. Second, I will investigate the issue of emotional attachment and personal relationship to the coast, using the example of residents and a surfer.

11.2 Perceptions of the coast: Landscape assessment versus people's opinion

How the landscape is perceived, and especially what is perceived as beautiful or natural, differs depending on who you are and who you ask. On my first visit to Lyall Bay, I realized the strong influence of the airport on the Bay. There is already a large reclamation in the bay, and large boulders protect the structure from erosion (see Figure 13). The landing and starting planes are very loud, close, and indeed intimidating. Behind the beach, there is a seawall and then the road. This looked like a very urban environment to me. On the beach, there were school kids playing, and people going for a walk. The café was packed with people, the carpark was full. When I looked over the water, I realized that there were many small black dots: surfers, sitting on their boards in the water and waiting for a wave to break (Figure 20). On my following visits I saw the beauty of the bay more and more: Moa Point with its rocks, the small beach of Moa point with more vegetation, the feeling of walking on the sand and close to the water, the surfers that are always there, the sun on the water (Figure 12).



Figure 12: Lyall Bay beach, view from the "surfers' carpark" to the West. Picture: Mara Ort



Figure 13: Lyall Bay, view from the “surfers’ carpark” to the East. The already existing reclamation with the runway on top is visible, also the rock armouring that protects it from erosion. Picture: Mara Ort

Some of my interview partners stressed the circumstance that Lyall Bay is the only sand beach in town, and therefore valuable for activities like children digging in the sand, walking barefoot or serving as an easy surf sport (the beach break). One of my interview partners underlines the role the beach plays for the people: “it’s a real social beach” (I-17:16). So the beach does not just provide a physical area to use, but also a role for the social relations of the citizens. Especially the residents I talked to really love their Bay, despite the modifications that happened to it in the past. Sea Rotmann, a local resident of Moa Point and active member of Guardians of the Bays, sees the South Coast as a very special and wild place she feels very connected to, even though the area is close to the city and especially Lyall Bay is already very modified:

That’s one of the great things about living in Wellington on the South Coast, and why we’re so connected to it, because you become physically connected to nature and the elements like you don’t do in almost any other space. [...] This is a wild, wild place. (I-18:101)

She refers to the strong winds that the South Coast experiences, and the high waves. Sea Rotmann describes how she feels physically connected. The immediate exposure to strong winds and high waves, the rough weathers in general, connects her to nature and the elements. This framing of the coast as a natural and wild landscape that shows “raw power” which can be experienced by humans is a common theme in Aotearoa New Zealand (Peart, 2009: 10–11). The circumstance that the South Coast is strongly affected by the rough

weather is not only stressed by Sea, but also by the Airport's Assessment of Environmental Effects:

The climate and weather also have a strong influence on the South Coast, especially on the vegetation; and while parts of Lyall Bay are relatively sheltered, the climate and exposure is a major factor that has shaped and continues to shape the environment. (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: xiv)

Also, parts of the South Coast are a marine reserve, the Taputeranga Marine Reserve. For Sea Rotmann, Lyall Bay is part of this environment, even though it is formally not part of the reserve. She thinks that "it certainly is one of the great treasures of Wellington that I think most of the people are most proud of" (I-18:107). Furthermore, the constructions around the Bay and the beach do not altogether stop the natural processes. For example, the seawall disrupted natural dune building processes. Therefore, the wind often blows sand to the adjacent street and environs – processes go on regardless of the interference of humans.

From another point of view, one could argue that Lyall Bay is anything but pristine, it has been subject to a lot of modifications in the past. When I talked to the landscape architect Michael Steven (who is engaged by the councils as a professional to review the technical reports provided by WIAL), he argued that it is still influenced by natural forces like swell, tides, or currents (I-26:62-68). However, the existing runway is already a major modification of the natural character of Lyall Bay. Michael Steven assumes that a lot of people must have forgotten what it used to look like, they even include the runway in their perception of the "naturalness" of Lyall Bay (I-26:64). This shows how the perception of a landscape and the landscape itself change over time. Furthermore, this breaks open a nature-culture-dichotomy in an interesting way: over time, apparently, the "cultural" parts of the landscape were merged into the image people had of Lyall Bay, so that the current status appears "natural" to them.

In professional terms, landscape, natural character and visual effects had to be assessed by the airport in its AEE-report. The contents of the report are then reviewed by experts, commissioned by Wellington City Council and Greater Wellington Regional Council in so called section 87F(4) reports required by the RMA. Wellington Airport provided a Landscape and Visual Assessment and a Natural Character Assessment (Boffa, 2016; Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016). These assessments were then reviewed by Michael Steven for GWRC and WCC. In the following sections, I will focus on these expert assessments.

11.2.1 Landscape and visual effects

The technical report 24 of the Airport, provided by a consultancy, assesses the landscape and visual effects (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016). This includes effects on biophysical elements, effects on visual amenity and effects on landscape/seascape character. The report comprises 115 pages, including many pictures and photo simulations about how the reclamation will look like in the existing environment. The authors of the report describe Lyall Bay as a highly modified environment, with the airport as a key element.

The Lyall Bay landscape/seascape is highly modified by the commercial, residential, infrastructural and recreational development that has occurred. It is an urban landscape rather than a natural landscape, and WCC in commissioning the 2014 landscape character study defined the study area and excluded the urban area. (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 7)

However, the report also recognizes that there are still natural features present, especially the sea, waves and tidal action (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 8). In contrast to how some of the residents perceive the area, the report states that “While the South Coast in general is recognised as having a sense of wildness and remoteness this is not evident in Lyall Bay because of the existing levels of development” (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 11). The report finds that an extension to the airport runway would introduce further modification to an area that is already highly modified. The evaluation of the landscape follows the RMA and the NZCPS (see ch. 8). The report identifies the significance of the visual effects for different viewpoints at different distances from the runway, on a range from very low to very high. It recognizes that “[v]isual amenity is a major component of overall amenity and therefore contributes to peoples’ appreciation of the pleasantness and aesthetic coherence of a place” (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 9). The report comes to the conclusion that the significance of landscape effects on Lyall Bay would be low to moderate, only high during construction (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 44). It acknowledges that “for a small number of residents”, the runway extension will sit dominantly in their view. However, they assume that “[f]or others, the whole of the runway extension or part of it will be clearly visible but it will not dominate the view and instead simply become part of or an element in the view just as the existing runway and airport is” (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016: 24). The authors of the report are optimistic that people will just get used to the extension.

11.2.2 Natural character

Next to the assessment of landscape and visual effects, also an assessment of the natural character of Lyall Bay has been carried out by a consultant on behalf of the airport (Boffa, 2016). The assessment of the report takes into account physical attributes, biological attributes, and experiential attributes (perception of naturalness). The authors of the report describe how natural character is generally assessed:

Natural character is generally assessed on a continuum of modification that describes the expression of natural elements, patterns and processes (or the 'naturalness') in a coastal landscape/ecosystem. As natural character is assessed over a continuum from highly natural (pristine) to totally modified (urban), half of the continuum (i.e. above moderate) can be considered to be predominantly "natural", while the half below moderate can be considered to be predominantly modified. Consequently, and in natural character terms, the higher thresholds for susceptibility to change occur within the very high to high rankings in terms of both adverse and significant adverse effects. (Boffa, 2016: i)

This evaluation is based on a nature – culture dichotomy, where more culture diminishes the natural character and the other way around (see also ch. 8.3 and 10.2). To assess the natural character, physical and biological attributes are taken into account. For the terrestrial areas, the report considered geomorphology, coastal processes, fauna, vegetation, habitats and ecological associations. For the marine area, physical attributes such as reefs or the beach were considered, as well as biological attributes including fish, mammals, seabirds, benthic and pelagic life and the water column in its entirety (Boffa, 2016: 13). The third group of attributes relates to the experience of the area, considering senses of wildness, isolation, sounds and smell of the sea (Boffa, 2016: 13).

The report considers the South Coast to have a high natural character in general: "At a broad scale, the South Coast is seen as being 'wild and natural'" (Boffa, 2016: i). The report acknowledges that the South Coast is perceived as isolated and wild, and retains high levels of natural character. On a finer scale, however, some of the bays, including Lyall Bay, are more developed. Therefore, Lyall Bay has only a moderate natural character according to their analysis (Figure 15). The report divides Lyall Bay into six "Component Areas", which it considers will stay mainly unaffected by a reclamation. Only Moa Point Embayment Area and the Airport Area will be negatively affected, and natural character will change from moderate to low (Moa Point) and from low to very low (Airport) (Figure 14). These changes are judged

as being adverse, but not significant, and the proposed mitigation measures will address these issues.



Figure 15: Lyall Bay, view to the South. Natural character according to the technical report: moderate/low. Picture: Mara Ort



Figure 14: Close to the tip of the former reclamation, view to the South-West. Natural character according to the technical report: low. Picture: Mara Ort

The technical reports (Boffa, 2016; Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016) were discussed extensively by Michael Steven (Steven, 2016), a landscape architect engaged by Greater Wellington Regional Council to provide expert advice in the officers direct referral report (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2016). He criticises that natural character is referred to in both the technical reports and the expert advice but defined in neither the RMA nor the NZCPS. Additionally, there is no best practice approach how to assess natural character for the purpose of the NZCPS (Steven, 2016:45). He explains that there is “no objective verifiable cut off point between ranges on the scale” (Steven, 2016: 25) of naturalness, ranging from very low to very high. The scale represents how natural processes and cultural processes are balanced, e.g. if the natural character is high, natural processes dominate over cultural processes. The technical report considers Lyall Bay to be not a natural landscape (Boffa, 2016). However, Michael Steven argues that the seascape in his opinion would qualify as a natural seascape, i.e. natural components dominate over the influence of human activity (Steven, 2016: 26).

Clive Anstey, who is also a landscape architect, commented on the landscape and visual assessment carried out for the airport during the interview. He agreed that the area around the airport is highly modified. However, he thought that the extension would not only be “more of the same”, as it intrudes into a seascape that has not been modified so far:

So, my argument is, the existing airport sits in a developed and very cultural context. But the further you go out the more it intrudes into a natural context. I mean, you go 400 metres into the southern coast and it's highly natural, it's got a really high natural character. So, you can't say it's urban but [...] the way they've done the assessment I think, whether they've done it consciously or not, they've sort of skewed it to saying, oh well, the airport extension is more of the same, you know. So, what exists is [...] a strong cultural element sitting in a cultural environment and therefore extending it will just be more of the same. My argument is, well no, it won't be because the extension is going into the context that's highly natural. (I-19:13-14)

These discussions around the naturalness reveal how hard it is to find objective indicators that allow a characterisation and evaluation of the landscape, its naturalness, and the scope of the effects. An even bigger discrepancy exists between the formal “expert’s” assessments and the perceptions of residents and users of the area. Whereas the technical report comes to the conclusion that the area is heavily modified, and distinguishes between different areas

of the bay, the residents seem to see things more connected and have a more general view of the landscape. For the residents, the argumentation of the report is sometimes hard to follow. Yvonne Weber assumes the airport thinks “oh, well, it’s an industrial area anyway therefore we can extend it and there’s not a problem.” (I-21:48). Michael Steven (I-16:18) explains to me that anthropogenic impact may diminish natural character, however it does not necessarily diminish the overall value the community attributes to the landscape.

The language between the “technical reports” and the residents and users description of the area differs a lot. It starts already with the naming of the reports as “technical”, even though they also take experiential or aesthetic values into account. The assessments and reviews use technical and expert terms, and a logic which is hard to follow even for me. In contrast, the residents and users language is more descriptive and understandable, the connection to the area becomes more visible, and also the feelings the landscape evokes in the people. This can be understood as two ways to produce different space. The technical reports would produce *espace conçu*, with their language as well as the artefacts such as documents and maps. The residents, however, using another language, and describing other practices and landscape qualities as important for them, produce either *espace vécu*, or, when referring more to physical activities or their perceptions of the coast, the wind, the sea, *espace perçu*.

Michael Steven is aware of the discrepancy that can occur between the communities’ opinion and the experts’ opinion. He therefore criticizes the assessment of landscape and visual effects (Boffa Miskell Limited, 2016) for not including the community enough into the evaluation of the visual effects:

there is no reliable basis for assuming that the assessor’s analysis conforms to those members of the community on whose behalf the assessor has conducted the assessment. In my opinion, the obvious approach to resolving this uncertainty would be to ask the community, rather than presume to speak on its behalf, on the basis of certain untested assumptions. (Steven 2016:37)

He sees a general “reluctance among members of the landscape profession to engage directly with community views on matters of amenity and visual effects” (Steven 2016:37). He ascribes this to a number of reasons, i.e. project budgets, time frames, and a lack of familiarity with methods to engage with the public:

But we don't have a history of doing community surveys in projects such as this [visual impact assessment]. [??] there has been no funding for it,

or often it has been dismissed as unnecessary on the grounds that the professional can act as a surrogate for community opinion. (I-26:26-28)

He thinks that especially in the case of the runway extension, the public should have been involved much stronger. However, landscape architects and other professionals seem to stick to the familiar methods and keep on with (re)producing *espace conçu*.

But the practice of actually designing a community survey and going out into the public and designing, gathering data and analysing that data is not a skill which most landscape architects have and so I think this is why they resist the idea and prefer to put themselves in a surrogate role of spokespersons for the community and do a determination of visual impacts on the basis of their own views. (I-26:32)

Generally, the planning system in Aotearoa New Zealand is criticised by Stephenson for conceiving space largely “in terms of physical structures and morphology (and the implications of these for social and economic activities), rather than meaning and cultural attachment” (Stephenson, 2010: 9). She argues that mainstream planning practice largely overlooks “[...] the role of people-place relationships in reflecting and maintaining local cultural diversity and identity” (Stephenson, 2010: 14). Stephenson understands culture and identity as profoundly spatial relationships that should be incorporated much stronger into planning. Even though she refers to planning here, this can be compared to the issues observed in the Wellington case. Her call to incorporate people-place-relationships more fits to the arguments of Michael Steven.

11.2.3 Mitigation

To mitigate the adverse effects the construction of the runway extension might have, WIAL proposes a number of mitigation measures. These include a modification of the rock armourings around the existing and the new runway, and the creation of a “softer’ more natural edge on the part of the eastern side of the runway extension” (Boffa, 2016: i). Moreover, marine and terrestrial ecological habitats shall be created. Also, public access along the road and to Lyall Bay shall be enhanced (ibid.).

Also about the mitigation, opinions are mixed. Mark Shanks tells me that some of the measures the airport plans to do after the reclamation to make the area nice for people are detrimental:

What they also want to do is along that area where they've been dumping the rocks, where currently some cars can park there ["surfers' car park" east of Lyall Bay close to the runway], they wanted to sort of do a 'beautification', um, and that's in inverted commas 'cause what they see as beautiful is [??] different things. They wanna have a nice viewing platform there where people just have tables to sit and everything. But that will probably mean they wanna put more rocks out there which will actually further decrease the quality of the wave [for surfing]. (I-17:61)

So what might be an amelioration in the eyes of the airport might actually be negative for other users. In this case, the rocks might decrease the quality of surf breaks. Sea Rotmann even goes a step further in criticizing the "amelioration" plans of the airport in a more drastic way:

They've mocked up images of this breakwater which is on the other side of the tunnel where they're gonna have like viewing platforms down to the water level and children and dogs playing on it. That is one of the most dangerous places in Wellington. Like you'll have corpses littered there if you have anyone getting near it. There are often 3 metre waves breaking over this. So, you know, like whoever drew that has obviously never even looked at this in even a minor southerly swell, which is twice a week. I mean, you know, that's the kind of bullshit that they sell to the public, which is of course very powerful, visual images is of course very powerful. [...] to make it look as benign as possible. (I-18:99)

In her opinion, this is not a place to have a platform, because of the strong forces of the ocean and its high waves. She thinks that this are images some consultancies produced to make the development look nicer and tell people that it might have positive effects in regard to amenity values. However, Sea doubts that these people ever *experienced* this place. Plus, she assumes that the planned mitigation in form of public access could even be dangerous. Also the expert's opinion is critical. According to Michael Steven, the effects the extension would have on the eastern parts of Lyall Bay would be unacceptably adverse, and could not be mitigated (Steven, 2016). These statements show that there is also not a single *espace perçue*, but a multitude of *espaces perçus*. The materiality is perceived and evaluated differently by different persons or groups.

11.3 Relationships with the coast

In the previous sub-chapter, I took the official/formal landscape assessments as a starting point, to show how they can be a technique in producing *espace conçu*. Now, I want to focus more in the people's relations to the coastal area of Lyall Bay. After a residents perspectives in the first part, I will introduce a surfer's point of view in the second part. These relations are much more tied to the production of *espace vécu* and *perçu*.

11.3.1 Living at Lyall Bay

The airport sits very close to residential areas, Kilbirnie, Rongotai and Lyall Bay on the western side and Miramar, Strathmore Park and Moa Point to the east (residential buildings close to Lyall Bay beach see Figure 16, map see Figure 10). The closest residents to the planned extension would be the residents of Moa Point. Moa Point is a street with 19 houses and 21 residential properties on the eastern side of the runway and Lyall Bay (Figure 17).



Figure 16: Lyall Parade with adjacent residential area, view to the West. On the left side, the remnants of the former dunes are visible. Picture: Mara Ort

For the residents of Moa Point, the extension could have existential impacts, because the area might become uninhabitable due to health and safety reasons if the runway would be extended, the Moa Point resident Sea Rotmann fears. In 2015, the Airport offered residents of Moa Point to buy their houses as well as pay them NZ\$ 10,000 solatium, even though the houses are not actually in the way of the project (2 October 2015, *stuff.co.nz*). This can be understood as a “commodification of resistance” (Gunder and Mouat, 2002: 137), where for example compensation is offered to avoid or reduce costs of the decision-making process or

purchase silence. If the runway gets extended, the views off Moa Point would be blocked as well as the coast would be very much closed by the reclamation, becoming rather lagoon-like.

Sea Rotmann is directly affected as a resident of Moa Point, where she has been living for 13 years now. She assumes that people that live on the South Coast of Wellington are special in a way, “the people who live and love the South Coast of Wellington are the people who are meant to be on the South Coast of Wellington” (I-18:105). For her, the South Coast and Moa Point are her home. The closeness to the ocean is an important factor. She loves being in the water, changed her name to Sea, and left her land-locked home country to be near the ocean. Personally, as a resident, the extension is an existential issue for Sea: “this is my Tūrangawaewae [domicile]. This is where I live. [...] it would become unliveable for Moa Point residents.” (I-18:10). For her, this would be a big loss:

I wanna live here for my whole life [...] I am not Māori, but [...] I understand the concept of *kaitiakitanga* [guardianship] and the idea of being the guardian to your [...] *Tūrangawaewae* and what that means and so I [...] feel very connected to this land, as do most of the community here. (I-18:14)

She feels closely connected to the area, wants to take care of it, she feels responsible: “For us, it's our *taonga* [treasure], it's our livelihood, it's our existence, [...] it's our love. It's our coast” (I-18:76). The strong feelings she shows for her coastal surroundings are not a unique phenomenon. Also Kearns and Collins describe how “ideas of belonging” and “feelings of connection” (emph. in orig.) can characterise peoples relationship to the coast – and fuel their resistance to development projects (Kearns and Collins, 2012: 939).

In a blog article for the Guardians of the Bays website, Sea Rotmann provides a description of Moa Point:

we [...] boast the best sunset spot in town, with a straight view to the snowy Kaikouras over the turquoise Cook Strait. We harbour a tiny gravel beach, with wonderful snorkelling, fishing and kayaking spots, which is never over-run in summer. We showcase a huge abundance of wildflowers, including 69 indigenous and 33 naturalised plant species. We have one of the few Little Blue Penguin nesting sites in Wellington and can hear them call during calm, cold nights. We regularly have seals, purpoises, dolphins and the occasional Orca and Southern Right Whale

come to visit. We even have a species of algae that can only be found at Moa Point, and in Otago Harbour. And we have a giant kelp forest harbouring a huge abundance of species – by the way, the same species that made the Taputeranga Marine Reserve special enough to be declared a reserve. (Rotmann, 2015)

Sea Rotmann describes the natural beauty of the landscape as an asset, which can be used for recreation as well. Furthermore, she describes the biodiversity of the bay. Her argumentation frames Lyall Bay as a natural area (in contrast for example to the technical reports), which are therefore valuable and need to be protected. The dichotomy she sets up here is between the natural areas and urban or industrial areas.



Figure 17: Moa Point, view from the edge of the existing extension to the east. Picture: Mara Ort

During the interview, Sea Rotmann also touches upon the issue of knowledge. She has the opinion that the people who live in the area and are in contact with it every day have the important knowledge and are the experts:

We are the experts. We are the actual experts on Moa Point. They are not [WIAL and the professionals preparing reports for WIAL; MO]. They have no idea, you know. They have been out there for two weeks taking some samples, and for three days they couldn't do anything and almost lost

their equipment, because of the Cook Strait. No surprise to us. Because we see it every day. (I-18:101)

She describes how unprofessional she perceives the proceedings of the people who were taking samples in the bay. To her, it seems as if people from “outside” are coming, do some measurements and write a report and tell the residents how things are, whereas people living in the area already know how it is. Of course, the residents do not know “the objective truth” which does not exist. But they know what it means to them, or, as an interview partner in Tauranga put it “we know what we know”. This specific knowledge, they feel, is not taken into account or taken seriously. Rather, scientific expert knowledge is perceived as superior (see also Stephenson, 2010). Also Le Heron et al. (2019: 6) stress that the question “What counts as evidence?” is an important factor in participatory processes. They observe that in New Zealand, still there is often a clash between scientific expertise and place-based knowledge.

Yvonne Weber is another resident, living close to Lyall Bay, and an urban planner. She submitted mainly because of landscape effects, view lines and cumulative effects. She grew up in a street close to the runway and recalls older struggles with the airport, mostly about noise. With the extension in 1971 and 1972, jets started to land at Wellington Airport. They were much louder than the planes before, and since then the airport had a much stronger influence on the community. She recalls the situation in school when jets were landing or taking off: “Miramar South School teachers had to stop teaching as you couldn’t hear them” (I-21:16). However, this did not impact her connection to the area and the sea in general:

Lyall Bay [...] has always had a real strong attachment. Such a strong attachment that every time any doctor looks in my ears they go, ‘Oh, you must have done a lot of cold water swimming in your life,’ [...] ‘cause I’ve got [...] what they call ‘surfer’s ear’, it’s all built up. (I-21:233-234)

Her connection to the coast is so strong that it physically altered her body. Her practices that build upon an emotional connection to the coast even made her body adapt. To her,

it’s [...] quite important to be near that coastline [...]. [T]he one time in my life that I spent two years in the West Midlands and Staffordshire in England and [...] in summer [...] whenever I could, I was in the car heading towards the coast. [Laughs] [...] that idea that you’re land bound is not good. [Laughs] (I-21:233-234)

She tries to describe these strong feelings she has towards the coast and the ocean “just that connection with the water and the energy, that the waves and the water give you and that sort of... [...] there’s just something there.” (I-21:243).

Yvonne Weber brings up the topic that the eastern suburbs also were not valued very high, there is not only the airport but also sewage discharge into Lyall Bay:

[T]here was this sort of idea that the eastern suburbs were somewhere where you just dumped things, [...] it just wasn’t considered as, [...] nice and you didn’t have to worry about it. There’s [...] in Wellington a real east/west divide. You’re an east or southern person or you’re a western in Wellington [...]. South/Eastern suburbs could be considered working class suburbs with schools close to the airport, major roads or industry. (I-21:22)

In this quote, issues of environmental justice appear. Yvonne Weber describes that the eastern and southern suburbs did not have a good reputation and were used to “dump” things. For her, this might be a reason why the airport was put there, and why she probably fears that the extension might be built. Next to the negative impacts from the airport (noise, emissions, etc.), there is also a sewage outfall into Lyall Bay. Even though the water quality is generally good, the beach is still closed from time to time because of the discharge of untreated sewage into the bay, for example after intensive rainfall (Figure 18). Flitner (2007) describes a similar phenomenon: in his research on airplane noise, residents of the Alsace region had the impression that they were the “dustbin” (Flitner, 2007: 183), as planes were more frequently flying over their region than for example the adjacent Suisse areas. Furthermore, there was a history of waste discharge by Suisse companies in the Alsace region, which strengthened this image (Flitner, 2007: 183–184). In both cases, the residents of the affected areas had the impression of being inferior to other regions and therefore, their residential areas are used as “bins” for emissions such as noise or wastewater.



Figure 18: Sign at Lyall Bay. After a storm event, the bay is closed for recreational activity because “partially treated” wastewater is discharged into the sea. Picture: Mara Ort

However, Yvonne Weber feels attached to the area anyways, and would not move away:

‘Cause that’s the thing, you like the area, [...] there’s something about being in this landscape that you sort of become a bit like a limpet and decide to stay. [...] this place is pretty good. It’s got the bays right near. [...] you can walk to the coast, [...] everything’s here so why would you want to move. (I-21:221)

She refers to the environment of the area, the bays and the coast in general. Also, there is something she cannot name properly, she describes it as “there’s something about being in this landscape”, the landscape does something with her. This makes very obvious that not everything is measurable and explains in a way why the residents are critical about the “expert reports”. The residents think that these experts did not experience this “something”, that they do not consider it in their reports. This close relationships of residents to the coast has also been observed by Döring and Ratter (2017). In their research on coastal landscapes in North Frisia (Germany), they describe the strong bonds people have to the coastal areas, generated by visual and non-visual aspects, feelings, observation and knowledge as well as a local identity (Döring and Ratter, 2017: 2, 4-5).

bought in 1961 they didn't know that the jets were gonna happen. They didn't know this things were actually gonna happen. [...] how do you predict what an entity like an airport, how it's gonna change? (I-21:25)

She includes many things in her map that refer to these older developments and conflicts. There are the older reclamations in Evans Bay, the houses that were pulled down at Rongotai Terrace to enlarge the airport. There is her old school, Miramar South School, where teachers had to stop teaching when a plane was landing or starting because it was so loud. The residential areas of Kilbirnie and Lyall Bay appear to be pressed into the area with all the other uses and developments around them. The map gives the impression that there are and were many things happening in the area, that it is changing and developing. Her professional gaze becomes visible in the section she is providing to show that the views from Moa Point to the sea would be blocked by the extension. Also, the views from the beach towards the headlands of Moa Point would be interrupted by the extension (see also above). While drawing, Yvonne Weber comments "I like my little view" (I-21-293). Her view, the issues of the local residents appear to be small in comparison with the big extension project.

Yvonne Weber also referred to view lines in the interview. She told me of views from the playground or the surf club, where often there are many people. Similar to Julie Stouts arguments about the view lines in Auckland, she explains: "actually what it [the runway, MO] does when it extends out, you lose that connection between Lyall Bay and the other point that's there." (I-21:49). She also refers to the connection that is enabled by view lines.

Furthermore, she brings up the topic of cumulative effects. This motive was arising in the other case studies (Auckland, Tauranga) by my interview partners as well. In Auckland for example, people had the impression that the port would just proceed to fill in Waitemata Harbour until there would be no water left anymore. Yvonne Weber tells me what she thinks:

I think the other thing is it's like that cumulative effect [...]. You have one extension and then you have another extension and you have another extension. [...] there's gotta be a tipping point and I... this extension that they're talking about now is definitely a tipping point. It's like way over and above what anyone, you know, conceived initially when in the 1950s they put the airport there. (I-21:116)

In her opinion, there is one extension following the other, without assessing if there is anything such as a tipping point. For her, this extension plan is a tipping point. She thinks that the people would never have imagined a reclamation like this.

11.3.2 Surfing in Lyall Bay

Lyall Bay is used for a number of recreational activities, as outlined above. One recreational group affected by the extension would be surfers. Surfing is a popular recreational activity, with growing numbers. Moreover, surf breaks possess amenity values which should be protected, e.g. for social and economic reasons (Scarfe et al., 2009: 684). However, surfers are often ignored in coastal management decision making (Scarfe et al., 2009: 684).

When I was there on several days during my field work, there were always people in the water surfing, black dots in the waves (Figure 20), both at the beach break and (for more advanced surfers) near the reclaimed structures and the wave breakers made of tetrapods and boulders. The runway extension would affect the surfing quality of Lyall Bay both during construction as well as afterwards. In the short term, during the construction period, large parts of Lyall Bay would be a temporary exclusion zone, and surfing would not be possible in the areas close to the reclamation (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: 10). In the long term, after construction, the extension could reduce surf quality in general, and the break “Airport Right’s” would be completely lost (TRC, 2016). This shall be mitigated by a submerged wave focusing structure (SWFS) (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: 8). The structure would have a footprint of 2 ha, with side lengths of 180mx140m (Wellington International Airport Limited, 2016: 91). Also the running operations of the airport affect the surfing. Apparently, the airport is dumping boulders and other material next to the old reclamation, which impacts the surf and makes it also more dangerous for surfers (I-17).



Figure 20: Surfers in Lyall Bay. Picture: Mara Ort

The surfers are not a homogenous group with one opinion, and they are also not organised in one group. In the runway extension case, several surf groups have handed in a submission (Greater Wellington Regional Council, no year). On the beach, there are two surf clubs, Maranui Surf Live Saving Club and Lyall Bay Surf Live Saving Club. Maranui Surf Live Saving Club opposes the application of the airport. The submission of Lyall Bay Surf Live Saving Club is conditional, as well as the Wellington Board Riders Club. The latter wants adverse effects being ameliorated. If there would be too much uncertainty that the mitigation measures, such as the SWFS, work, they would oppose the application. The nationwide surfers representative group "Surfbreak Protection Society" strictly opposes the extension. Their goal is to preserve surf breaks, and in this respect they do not want any developments that could negatively impact the surf in Lyall Bay. They do not accept the SWFS as a mitigation for the unknown effects on "The Corner" (Surfbreak Protection Society Incorporated, 2016). There are several waves in Lyall Bay which can be surfed (The Surfbreak Protection Society lists at least ten different surfable waves, Surfbreak Protection Society Incorporated, 2016). There is a beach break which is suitable for beginners. The former land reclamation also creates surfable waves, called "Airport Right's" and "The Corner" or "The Wall". It is somehow paradox that some surfers fight against an extension to protect a wave that was created by a similar development. However, it is not unusual that the construction of coastal infrastructure can both create as well as modify or destroy surf breaks (Scarfe et al., 2009).




Figure 21: Map by Mark Shanks (I-17). Important surf breaks are sketched out, and everything that affects them is drawn with great detail, such as boulders, breakwaters, or the proposed Submerged Wave Focussing Structure, which sits very dominant in the middle of the map. The map covers mainly the water surface of Lyall Bay, and the land features are more of a frame here (the road, the runway, the rough outline of the coastline). He includes himself surfing (orange circle inserted by author). The map reveals the detailed knowledge Mark Shanks has about the surf-related characteristics of Lyall Bay.

I had the opportunity to talk to Mark Shanks, who has been surfing for 50 years. He has lived in Wellington for a couple of years now. Mark Shanks is not only concerned about the surf in Lyall Bay, but is also engaged for the protection of surf breaks in general. In Mark Shanks opinion, the advantages the expansion of the runway could bring do not weigh out for the losses of beach and surf amenity. He does not support the paradigm of growth, which would create even more problems such as more traffic. Rather, what is there should be protected. He thinks that “it’s conveniently I suppose, you could fly out of Wellington and fly to Hawaii or whatever, but it’s not necessary, because what we lose to get that is too great.” (I-17:75). The uniqueness of the place makes it special and irreplaceable for him. That he cares for Lyall Bay can also be seen in his map (Figure 21). The main part of the paper is filled by the outline of the bay. The airport is hardly visible, only the part of the runway that intrudes into the water plays a role. Mark Shanks draws the waves, and indicates where they break. There is the beach break on the right side, and on the left it is “The Corner” or “The Wall”. At the top, near the breakwater, an arrow indicates where “Airport Right’s” is, a wave that seldom

breaks in a surfable way, so it did not get its own drawn wave. The structure of the shoreline is traced very detailed. The boulders, tetrapods and debris are depicted by little circles, the breakwaters are sketched in a detailed way, not found on any other participants map. He indicates the main swell direction, and how it might be blocked by the extension. In his map, the extension is just indicated with a dashed line, whereas in Yvonne Weber's map, it is a dark hatched space. Also the effects of the structures are drawn in a detailed way: how waves are broken, reflected, where they lose their power. Preston-Whyte stated that "interaction with the material environment contributes to the construction of surfing spaces" (Preston-Whyte, 2002: 307). This material environment comprises the waves, the water, the currents and so on. Some of these are also included in the map, such as the main waves or the main swell direction. This specific knowledge about the area allows surfers to know where and when to surf (Preston-Whyte, 2002: 307). Moreover, surfers do often have a strong identification with surf spots (Preston-Whyte, 2002: 321). Mark does not live close to Lyall Bay – but he draws himself surfing in the waves.

Obviously, one of the main disturbances for Mark Shanks is the artificial reef of the SWFS, which is meant to focus the waves to improve the surf. On his map, it looks much bigger than the planned reclamation, even though the reclamation will be more than five times larger. The SWFS is also filled out and looks more massive than the dashed reclamation area. He comments the SWFS on the map: "unproven. Will end up washed on the beach. Waves will break on it. Destroys sandflow". Additionally, he adds some more surf specific information, the two surf clubs on the beach and the information that Lyall Bay was the place where Duke Kahanamoku, a famous surfer from Hawaii, surfed in Aotearoa New Zealand the first time.

The technical report prepared for WIAL regarding surf breaks assesses the possible impact of the reclamation on surf breaks (TRC, 2016). Airport Right's will be completely lost and there is probably a reduction of surf rides on all other breaks. The report considers this to be only a minor effect (TRC, 2016: 22): "Airport Rights is a surf break that is utilised a few times a year during certain conditions by experienced surfers. The loss of this surfing amenity will therefore only affect a very small group of expert surfers" (TRC, 2016: 16). As a mitigation measure, the airport proposes to build a submerged wave focusing structure, like an artificial reef. Mark Shanks is not happy about the proposed reef. He considers the effect to be unproven, and

we don't believe it could even stay there under the swell, and [...] we're looking at it and it looks like it's too close to the beach anyway, because

waves already break in that area and it's supposed to just focus the swell, not for the swell to break on it. (I-17:107)

Additionally, in his opinion the airport does not behave responsibly. He fears that they try this mitigation measure, and that the airport has an attitude of "if it all turns to custard well we'll just walk away from it." (I-17:107). He expresses his feeling of powerlessness: "And there'll be nothing anybody can do" (I-17:107).

Mark Shanks tells me that when Airport Right's is breaking, it attracts a lot of surfers. Also Michael Steven, the expert who reviewed the report for GWRC, challenges the conclusions of the authors.

The loss of the Airports Right surf break is considered a '...localised loss affecting a small group of people.' I consider the matter of whether the effect is localised (or not) and the numbers of affected recreationists involved to be secondary to the magnitude of the actual effects, which in this case will be significant, i.e., total loss of the Airport Right's surf break. In considering the scale of effects, I understand that consideration of impacts on the resource itself (in this case a popular, but rare wave break), is of greater relevance than the numbers of participants who use that resource. (Steven, 2016: 13)

Mark even links this to a bigger picture:

there's a lot more at stake than just 'oh, there's some guys out there surfing'. And the thing is, even though we've got a huge coastline in New Zealand [...], there's only a small percentage of beaches that are actually good for surfing. So, you can't lose them really. (I-17:121)

Mark perceives surf breaks as a finite resource which needs to be protected. This goes along to the results Preston-Whyte observed in his research, where waves were perceived as a scarce resource (Preston-Whyte, 2002: 320), not only in the way that there is not an endless amount of surfable waves, but also that they can get quite crowded.

Michael Steven considers the effects on marine-based recreation and especially surfing more than minor: "The recreation report concludes that adverse effects [...] will be minor or less than minor. With respect to surfing amenity I regard this conclusion as an under-estimate of the level of likely effects" (Steven, 2016:12). Because surfing is dependent on the right conditions, it is an activity that is relying on the natural circumstances very much. These

create the right conditions only in certain times, so the “surfing space” is a temporary one. If this wave is then also only accessible to some surfers, like Airport Right’s, there are different opinions on how to evaluate this space. For the authors of the technical report, they think that it is neglectable. Surfers, on the other hand, might value this precious temporary space even higher than a wave that works all the time, because it is something special. Also Michael Steven stresses the point that not the number of users is crucial for the evaluation of the effects, and also not that is a local phenomenon, but the scale of the effect, which means that the break will be lost completely.

11.4 Conclusion

In the case of the Wellington airport runway extension, I focused on the issues of landscape and natural character assessment and the role the coast plays for residents and recreational users. These issues are closely intertwined and illustrate how difficult the concept of landscape can be pinned down, and how manifold the spaces on the same area of the earth’s surface can be. Not only was there sometimes a large discrepancy between the formal landscape assessment by experts and the perception of the public, but also landscape professionals had different opinions about how to define, analyse and evaluate a landscape. Even though landscape and visual effects as well as natural character have to be formally assessed for a resource consent of this scope, there is no single “right” way of how to do this. Boundaries are drawn, sub-regions classified, ranges set and surfaces of the earth get a label of having a certain natural character. In contrast, perceptions of the residents are openly subjective and intuitive. Emotional attachment plays a role, and the landscape is perceived and evaluated in other ways. This discrepancy leads to a certain suspicion towards formal methods applied by experts. Residents do not have the impression that their view is considered and taken seriously. Also, they doubt that the so called “experts” have the expert knowledge. Rather, they see themselves as being the experts. Interestingly, the opponents I interviewed for this case study did not only stick to their very personal motives to oppose, such as the protection of their neighbourhood and the surrounding environment, and their personal connection to the places. They also had larger issues in mind, like climate change and economic relations and constraints.

Whereas most people do have relatively differentiated knowledge of the terrestrial areas, the sea seems to be a uniform surface, more or less. Here, the surfers view on the ocean can add more detail. Surfers usually know exactly where the waves break in what conditions, how the currents are, or what is under the water (dangerous rocks, for example). The natural and

environmental conditions create temporal surfable spaces. As I could show in the previous sections, the material component together with environmental conditions are crucial for surfing spaces. These spaces can be categorized as *espace perçu*.

The conflict between opponents and WIAL can be understood as a clash of different spaces, and also of different ways to produce space. WIALs reports are called “technical reports”, also those on landscape for example. This suggests that all the issues the reports deal with are of a technical nature and can be solved by a “technical” approach. None of the reports is called social report or so. The reports stick to a “traditional” (re)production of *espace conçu*. In contrast, there are people with their perceptions of the landscape and the places, and for them, this is not a “technical” issue or something a technical report can deal with. The opponents fear that they might lose their *espaces perçus* and *vécus* if the extension would be built. Emotions and (personal) meanings are probably hard to capture within a technical report. It is not impossible, however, there has to be a certain willingness to engage with the public to understand their spaces. Kearns and Collins state that

At a more conceptual level, to achieve more ‘fully human’ accounts of the coast, we contend that there is a need to take people’s feelings as well as their perceptions [...] and embedded experiences [...] seriously. Emotional discourses may be dismissed by the often ‘rationalist’ orientation of planning, with its emphasis on the technical and quantifiable. (Kearns and Collins, 2012: 951)

This case of Wellington is a good example for this, as the strong attachment and feelings of Yvonne, Sea and Mark became clear. And on the contrary, there were the technical reports with their technical language as well (even though experiential values for example are not completely eclipsed). However, as the landscape architect Mike Steven pleads in line with the argument Kearns and Collins bring forward here, people’s perceptions and feelings should be taken much more serious in planning processes.

Interestingly, the argumentation regarding landscape is mainly revolving around the naturalness of landscape. The more natural it is, the more it should be protected. Therefore, the technical reports rather suggest that Lyall Bay is not very natural, whereas for example Sea Rotmann explains which sealife can be found in the area. However, the underlying argument is hardly challenged at all, as if a cultural or social landscape was not worth protecting. Some engagement in this direction can probably be seen in the surfers arguments. They also want to protect surf breaks that have been initially created by humans.

To conclude, it could be observed that a multitude of spaces exists in this case study as well – there is a number of different processes that produce *espaces conçus, vécus* and *perçus*.

12 Tauranga: dredging the shipping channels

Once, there was a nameless hill on the edge of a forest close to Tauranga Harbour. Close to it stood the hill Puwhenua, clothed in the finest ferns, shrubs and trees of the forest. The nameless hill was deeply in love with Puwhenua. However, she was herself in love with the chiefly mountain Otanewainuku – the nameless one had no chances. Therefore, he decided to drown himself in the sea. He asked the fairy people to pull him to the sea during the night. However, the first rays of the sun caught him before he reached the ocean, and he was stopped in his current position. So he got his name, Mauao, which means caught by dawn. Since then, he stands at the entrance of Tauranga Harbour (traditional, as described in Environment Court, 2011; Stokes, 1980b).

12.1 Introduction to the case

Mauao (Mount Maunganui) is a hill at the entrance of Te Awanui (Tauranga harbour), close to Tauranga and the suburb Mount Maunganui (Figure 22). It is not only a distinctive landmark, but also an important site for local Maori. The story about how it got to where it is today illustrates an alternative way to understand the coastal landscape, and gives a hint about the conflict potential a development in this area can have. The case in Tauranga revolved around a major dredging campaign of the Port of Tauranga to deepen and widen its shipping channels. The main conflict potential of the whole dredging undertaking unfolds in the first sentence of the Environment's Court ruling:

How do we integrate the competing interests of the Port of Tauranga [...] seeking to widen and deepen the entrance to its entry channel to accommodate larger ships, while recognising and providing for the legitimate cultural concerns and relationship of relevant local iwi who have an interest in Mauao (Mt Maunganui), Panepane Point on Matakana Island, and the large pipi beds in and around the entrance to the wider harbour of Tauranga Moana known as Te Awanui? (Environment Court, 2011: 4)

The Environment Court saw the main difficulty in balancing Maori cultural issues with the economic interests of the Port of Tauranga. According to the Environment Court, the cultural

effects and impacts have to be considered alongside the economic significance of the Port of Tauranga for both the region and the nation. These functions are for example to support and enable economic growth and provide access to international markets. In a more theoretical framing, this case reveals issues of epistemic injustice (Pitts, 2017; Smith, 2012; Tsosie, 2017). These issues revolve around post-colonial power relations, that can be observed in the planning framework in general or the role of different forms of knowledge, as I will further explain below. Generally, they can be read as a tension between different “worldviews”, which also lead to the production of different spaces. For this reason, I chose a traditional Maori story about Mauao for the introduction, as it represents a perspective on space that is easily marginalised in planning processes.

The port sits at the southern end of Tauranga harbour and is New Zealand’s largest export port (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010). There is a strong Maori population in the Tauranga region, and they opposed the dredging because of the adverse effects it could have on the environment and thus subsequently on their culture. A long dispute started in 2009 with the submission of a resource consent application of the Port of Tauranga. It lasted until 2013, when the Minister of Conservation approved the decision of the courts to grant the consent.




Figure 22: Mauao (Mount Maunganui), with Pilot Bay in the foreground. Picture: Mara Ort

Even though Te Awanui (Tauranga Harbour) was dredged for decades already, the latest capital dredging campaign led to an open conflict between the Port of Tauranga and opposing *tangata whenua* (local Maori) of Te Awanui. In July 2009, the Port submitted its application for a resource consent to deepen and widen the shipping channels and dispose the dredged material (Table 6). The plan was to deepen the channels from 12.9 m to 16.0 m below chart datum inside the harbour entrance, and from 14.1 m to 17.4 m in the entrance channel. The goal of the project was “to enable Port of Tauranga Limited to accept larger vessels up to 7,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) with a draught 14.5 m and length of 347 m, requiring channel depth of up to 17.4 m” (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010: 13). The amount of dredged material was estimated to 15 million m³, which equals to a cube with approximately 250 m edge length. The underlying vessel dimensions for the dredging were the dimensions of the so-called “Post-Panamax vessels”. The Port stressed the point that New Zealand needs a port where these new big ships can call, otherwise it would become a mere feeder port to Australia (e.g. *Bay of Plenty Times* 9 March 2010 and 4 June 2010). Therefore, they assumed that the dredging would support the economy of Tauranga as well as whole New Zealand.

Table 6: Overview over the events around the dredging. Source: own compilation

July 2009	Port of Tauranga hands in resource consent application
August 2009	The application is publicly notified and receives 91 submissions
March to May 2010	Hearings before the Panel
June 2010	Bay of Plenty Regional Council grants consent 3 appeals against the decision
April and November 2011	Hearings at the Environment Court
December 2011	Environment Court supports the decision of the Council to grant consent The decision is appealed by local iwi
September 2012	High Court confirms the decision of the Environment Court
March 2013	Final approval of the consent by the Minister of Conservation
August 2015 to July 2016	Capital dredging carried out

When the application was publicly notified in August 2009, it received 80 submissions in opposition and 9 in support (*Bay of Plenty Times*, 11 March 2010). In support of the application were mainly companies relying on the Port to export their products (e.g. the multinational dairy co-operative Fonterra and the global kiwifruit marketing organisation Zespri), and the economic development agency Priority One, seeking to ensure the economic

growth and development of Tauranga. The arguments brought forward were that large vessels would offer economies of scale and raise the productivity of New Zealand's supply chain. In contrast, the main opponents were *tangata whenua* (local Maori) of Tauranga Moana and an environmental NGO called Harbour Watch (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010). The *iwi* feared a number of cultural, social and spiritual effects, caused by environmental impacts of the dredging such as deterioration of the water quality, sedimentation, damage of shellfish beds and damage of sites of cultural importance.

Because the Bay of Plenty Regional Council owns major parts of the Port (54%, through its investment arm Quayside Securities Limited), it appointed independent commissioners to the Panel for the hearings. The Commissioners asked the Port for a proper engagement with *tangata whenua* (as the Council also already had before) and therefore directed the Port to elaborate, respectively facilitate cultural impact assessments (CIAs). The hearings stopped so the CIAs could be prepared by the *iwi* until February 2010. The elaboration of the CIAs was funded by the port. However, the proceedings were criticized by the *iwi*, as there was little time for the preparation of the reports, and that they had only been involved into the process at such a late stage (for example the Cultural Impact Assessment of Te Rangihouhiri Oruarahi Marae).

The hearings took place from March to May 2010. In its decision from June 2010, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council officially granted consent to the application of the Port. This decision was challenged by local *iwi*, who appealed against it. Therefore, the case went to the Environment Court. The Environment Court hearings took place in April and November 2011. Alongside the hearings, a *hikoi* (protest march) was organised on 14 November 2011. Approximately 200 people were participating, performing chants and *haka* (*Bay of Plenty Times*, 15 November 2011). The decision of the Environment Court was made by the judge on 21 December 2011 (Environment Court, 2011). In the decision, the Environment Court recommends to the Minister of Conservation (who had to give the final approval) to grant consent to the Port's application, and backed up the previous decision of the council, however with changes to the conditions, especially with regard to mitigation. Again, a small group of local Maori (but not all the applicants who were involved before) appealed this decision, which brought the case to the High Court. The High Court confirmed the decision of the Environment Court, and in March 2013, the Minister of Conservation gave his final approval. The dredging was carried out from 2015 to 2016 (Figure 23 shows one of the dredges at work in the harbour). Before I discuss the dredging conflict as such more deeply, I will give some background information on the harbour and the history of the port in the following sub-chapters.



Figure 23: Dredging in process in February 2016. Picture: Mariana Coppede Cussioli

12.1.1 Te Awanui Tauranga Harbour

Te Awanui (Tauranga harbour) is a large natural tidal harbour located in the Bay of Plenty on Aotearoa New Zealand's North Island. Reaching from Bowentown in the northwest to Tauranga City in the southeast, the harbour is sheltered by the barrier island of Matakana Island, with the only two entrances to the harbour being at each end of it (see Figure 24). Tauranga has approximately 115,000 inhabitants (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). The large harbour lagoon covers an area of 200 km² (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010). Numerous rivers and streams coming down from the Kaimai range drain into the harbour. Along the coastal lowlands, a variety of landscape features, ecosystems and habitats can be found: sandy beaches, rocky shores, shellfish and seagrass beds, wetlands and swamps around the estuaries, mudflats influenced by the tide, and tidal pools (Stokes, 1980a; Waitangi Tribunal, 2010). The whole harbour is an area of Outstanding Natural Feature and Landscape (Environment Bay of Plenty, 2003: 187). The majority of the harbour is identified as an Area of Significant Cultural Value for *tangata whenua* (Environment Bay of Plenty, 2003: 301–302). In 2008, the Te Maunga o Mauao Mataitai Reserve around Tauranga was established, which protects customary fisheries and the special relation Maori have with the area. It comprises approximately 6 km² in the area around Mauao and in the Harbour. Parts of it were directly affected by the dredging (Environment Court, 2011: 56).



Figure 24: Overview Tauranga Harbour. Source: Bay of Plenty Regional Council, no date, modified



Figure 25: Port area view from Mauao, on the right the Sulphur Point reclamation is visible. Picture: Mara Ort

12.1.2 History of Tauranga Moana

The controversies around the dredging cannot be understood without the historic development of the area and the port. Tauranga Moana was among the first areas of Aotearoa New Zealand that were settled by Polynesian immigrants, and Maori have lived in the area for more than seven centuries (Stokes, 1980a: 17). It has been a popular region to live for a long time, and is one of the most continuously and densely settled landscapes in

Aotearoa New Zealand (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010). The region has a favourable climate and the harbour offers safe anchorage, which is already implied in its name: Tauranga means anchorage, resting point or fishing ground (Stokes, 1980a). The coastline offered a variety of food, especially *kaimoana* (seafood), and forests as a source of food and timber.

The first permanent Pakeha settlement at Te Awanui was the mission at Te Papa, installed in 1835 (Stokes, 1980a). Before that, traders and missionaries had already visited the area since the beginning of the 19th century. However, relations did not stay peaceful for a long time, as in the 1860s war between Maori and Europeans broke out. This war was mostly about land. Maori were realising that selling their land meant permanent alienation, and so opposed further selling. The Crown was however under increasing pressure to provide land for the growing number of settlers (Stokes, 1980a). One year after the outbreak of the war in 1863, troops landed at Te Papa. The Pakeha government suspected local *iwi* to support *iwi* fighting in the Waikato. After fights with the troops, Ngai Te Rangi surrendered. Subsequently, a quarter of their land located between Waimapu and Wairoa Rivers was confiscated in the same year as a punishment for the “rebellious” Maori. Additionally, some land north of Wairoa River was bought by the Government (Stokes, 1980a).

The confiscation proclamation of 1865 included the whole Tauranga district, with its approximately 117,000 hectares (Waitangi Tribunal, 2004b: 149). The Crown retained 20,200 hectares of this area (known as “confiscated block”). The land outside the confiscated block was returned to Maori between 1865 and 1886. However, most of this land was soon lost again, either bought by the Crown or private purchasers. The remaining land was of poor quality and no longer held under customary title (Waitangi Tribunal, 2004b: 279, 2010). Some decades later, in 1912, the Tauranga Harbour Board was established. This meant that after the land, now also the authority over the Te Awanui was lost. The harbour got under direct jurisdiction of the Board (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 516).

Development of the Port of Tauranga

With the new Harbour Board, an outburst of activity started in the port area in 1915. The harbour was dredged and training walls were installed (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010). In 1923, one shipping channel was dredged and another channel deepened. In 1925 the government approved the construction of a concrete wharf at Mount Manganui. In 1950, it was decided that the port in Tauranga should be developed as a deep-water sea port with overseas port facilities at Mount Maunganui. The deep-water port was needed by the pulp and paper industry and to export the products of the ripening forests in the region (Stokes, 1980a;

Waitangi Tribunal, 2010). The Ministry of Works supported the proposal, which aimed at developing the port at Whareroa (Stokes, 1980a). However, the Maori landowners had other plans. They wanted to subdivide and sell 113 hectares of the Whareroa land and use the profit to develop housing around their *marae* in Matapihi (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010). Their intention was to improve housing conditions for the people already living close to the *marae*, and therefore to support their traditional lifestyle, being organised around the *whanau* (extended family comprising three generations) and *hapu*. Housing conditions were poor and the Crown's plans were "a conscious effort to disperse Maori among Pakeha in order to facilitate the adoption of the nuclear family and associated lifestyle" (Nightingale as cited in Waitangi Tribunal 2010:251). To be able to subdivide and sell the land as planned, the Maori landowners had to vest the land in the Maori land board. This application was made in 1948. The Minister of Maori Affairs had to approve this vesting. However, when he conferred with his colleagues at the Ministry of Work and Ministry of Forestry, these Ministers objected the proposal, as they were planning to develop the port in this very area (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 253). The Minister for Maori Affairs delayed his consent, and the next two years, no progress was made. However, during the same time, Pakeha were able to subdivide and sell land in the same area. Eventually, in 1952, the land was taken for "better utilisation" under the Public Works Act of 1928 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 254). In the following, compensation had to be assessed. Maori wanted that the value of their land would be based on the planned subdivisions, not as a block, whereas the Crown estimated the value as if the land was sold as one block. This process took until 1961 and went through several courts (Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and the Privy Council). The chief judge of the Maori Appellate Court finally decided about the amount of the compensation, which was substantially less than what would have been realised when selling the land as subdivisions. The Crown started to sell the land in 1959 to companies associated to port business for prices up to £5000 per acre, compared to the average £430 per acre they had paid for it (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 256).

Figure 26 shows the status of land ownership in 1950. The map indicates where land was taken for "better utilisation" under the Public Works Act. This land is occupied by the port today (see also Figure 28).




Figure 26: Land ownership in Mount Maunganui in 1950. It is indicated where Maori land was taken under the Public Works Act. Source: Stokes, 1980a: 361

To Maori, the development of the port did not only mean a loss of land, but also a loss of development opportunity. The Whareroa Marae was now spatially isolated: “On one side of the *marae* are fertiliser works, a cement depot, cargo sheds, grain silos, oil tanks, plywood factories, and timber yards, the result of the ‘better utilisation takings’. On another is Tauranga Airport” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 256). The report of the Waitangi Tribunal states there is “no evidence of Māori involvement in the decision to develop the port, nor of any consideration being given to Māori needs or values” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 533).

In 1953, works begin to develop the new Mount Maunganui wharf (Stokes, 1980a). The development of the port is described as “extraordinarily rapid” (Environment Court, 2011: 9). The works were declared as national interest to accelerate the construction. However, this also had its costs: “The fast tracking of the construction may have contributed to potential adverse effects being overlooked” (Environment Court, 2011: 9). These effects

were for example siltation, effects on the harbour ecology and most notably on shellfish beds, as well as impacts on Maori culture. In the subsequent years, numerous works were carried out to develop the port. Amongst them were dredging activities: “Harbour channels were realigned, or deepened, or both – including [...] the blasting of Pane Pane Reef (an important source of *kaimoana* for local Māori) to widen the harbour mouth between Mauao and Matakana” (Waitangi Tribunal 2010:534). Major dredging activities were carried out in Tauranga harbour from 1961 to 1978 to increase the port’s draught from 7.3m to 10.7m (Port of Tauranga, 2013; Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 538). In 1967, 1.34 million m³ were removed from Cutter channel (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 538), from 1971-1973, Cutter Channel was dredged again to 9.4m. In 1973, works begin to deepen the complete shipping channel to 10m depth (Stokes, 1980a).



Figure 27: Mauao from Sulphur Point, with the marina. Picture: Marine Le Minor

In 1968, the Port of Tauranga started the next big project with the Sulphur Point reclamation (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 535). Sulphur Point was an intertidal area with a high ecologic value (Environment Court, 2011: 39). Not only the reclamation, but also the construction of the marina would destroy shellfish beds (Figure 27 shows a view from the western part of the Sulphur Point reclamation to Mauao, with the marina in the foreground). Wildlife Service

(the predecessor of the Department of Conservation) objected the proposal, arguing that this was an important bird roosting area. However, their objection was rejected, and the marina was built (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 535). Not only birds were using the shellfish beds as source for food, but it was also significant for local Māori. In the case of Sulphur Point land reclamation, again, “there is no evidence of consultation with Māori when decisions were made about the development” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 537).

In 1992, dredging was restarted with a major project, and since then every two years maintenance dredging has been carried out (Sinner et al., 2011). Until 1974, the port only needed approval from the Minister of Marine to conduct dredging. Only in 1974, with the passing of the Marine Pollution Act, the Port of Tauranga had now to take into account the effects of its activities for the marine environment and other users (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 538). And it took more than another decade before the Port was obliged for the first time to consult with *tangata whenua* (by the Department of Conservation) (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010). During the many decades of the port development, local Maori opposed many of the works. However, for a long time, there was no way of voicing their concerns, they were ignored and usually not consulted. In most cases, the development of the port was celebrated, as it was perceived as supporting the local economy and generating jobs. Newspapers kept to “neutral” descriptions and did not mention any potential conflicts or cultural issues that could arise out of the developments (see for example *Bay of Plenty Times*, 10 November 1990, 3 March 1992).

The Waitangi report on the post-*raupatu* claims lines out the mind-set of the Tauranga Harbour Board, with its belief in economic development and growth.

From its establishment in 1912, the Tauranga Harbour Board was animated by a ‘spirit of progressive development’, with ‘economic expansion’ the prevailing philosophy. The expansionist vision found its fullest expression in the 1950s and 1960s, but it was already evident much earlier. (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010: 531)

In addition, the Port of Tauranga was subject to the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. In 1988, it became incorporated under the Companies Act 1955, and was then known as Port of Tauranga Limited (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2018; Port of Tauranga, 2013). Subsequently, in 1989 the Harbour Board was abolished (Port of Tauranga, 2013). Since 1992, Port of Tauranga Ltd is listed on the New Zealand stock exchange (Port of Tauranga, 2018). The port company belongs to 54% to Quayside Securities Limited, which belongs mainly to the Bay of Plenty Regional Council.

12.1.3 Involved actors

In the following sections, I will introduce the involved actors and their position as well as the possible effects of the dredging. Local *iwi* were leading the opposition against the dredging. They opposed the project for several reasons (further specified below). The *iwi* who appealed were Ngai Te Rangi, Ngati Ranginui, and Nga Potiki. At the Environment Court, evidence was given by *iwi* through *waiata* (songs), stories, tribal names, customary and cultural practices. Generally, it is important to stress that neither Maori nor Pakeha are homogenous groups. There are different groups and people with different opinions in the Maori population, as well as in the Pakeha population.

In comparison to my two other case studies, there was not much coverage of the dredging issue in the newspapers. The latest major dredging campaign was mostly covered by the regional newspaper *Bay of Plenty Times*, with little notion of the issue in nationwide newspapers. The *Bay of Plenty Times*, *New Zealand Herald*, and *Dominion Post* published approximately 12 articles in the period between 2010 and 2013. Compared to the Auckland case with 40 articles in 6 months, this is a relatively small number. Also some interview partners state that there was not very much interest by the media (e.g. I-07). This is surprising, as the conflict went on for at least three years and involved several council and court hearings. My interview partner Graham Bidois Cameron, a local Maori, tells me that in his opinion, there has been good coverage in Maori media, however mainstream media ignored the topic:

The mainstream media outside of the Bay of Plenty ignored [the dredging], essentially, except for the odd piece in the *New Zealand Herald* which was about 'what exciting new times for Tauranga Port. We're gonna make lots more money.' And then the local media, the *Bay of Plenty Times* and the *Weekend Sun*, which are the two opinion drivers in terms of print media - were both very supportive of the dredging, had lots of articles with like the chief executive of the Tauranga Port talking about how it's gonna be great. (I-06:84-85)

He perceives that in most newspapers, the economic benefits for the region were highlighted, and contested issues were not mentioned. Tribal objections, he explains, would provoke comments and letters to the editor that were racist, accusing Maori to just trying to get money or land out of the process. In his view, the media mainly supported the dredging and was dismissive of Maori concerns (I-06:84-65).

I interviewed *iwi* and *hapu* representatives, as well as a scientist, two members of the Regional Council, and a surfer. From the port, I got written replies to my interview questions via e-mail.

12.1.4 Effects of the dredging

The possible effects of the dredging were discussed in the hearings of the Council as well as Environmental Court. Also my interview partners had their views on possible effects. There were different ways of how these effects were framed and understood, depending on the actors, their backgrounds, positions and worldviews.

In its decision, the Environment Court extensively examined the potential effects the dredging could have on hydrodynamics, morphology, ecology, culture and economy (Environment Court, 2011). The direct environmental effects would happen during the immediate dredging, the generated sediment plume (suspended sediment in the water column) and the deposition of the dredged material. Reuben Fraser from Bay of Plenty Regional Council stated that there were possibly adverse effects on culture, ecology and hydrology, whereas the economic effects were considered to be positive (I-07). Evidence in regard to effects on hydrodynamics, morphology and ecology was presented by scientists. The following discussion on effects on morphology, hydrology and ecology are a summary from the court documents (Environment Court, 2011). Morphological effects were expected mainly in relation to sedimentation processes caused by the dredging. The ebb tide delta was expected to be the most affected area of the harbour. Around the base of Mauao, the application foresaw to remove boulder material. Hydrological effects were discussed based on numerical model results and field studies. Here, the strongest effects were estimated to be the ones on the water velocity, which could change sedimentation and erosion patterns. This can lead to morphological changes, either by erosion or sedimentation. Here, the concerns revolved for example around Matakana Island and especially Panepane Point, which already have problems with erosion. Turbidity of the actual dredging process also affects water quality through suspended sediments. These might have an impact on benthic communities, and therefore link to ecological impacts. The ecological impacts are mainly discussed around the possible impacts on Te Paritaha, the big shellfish bed also known as Centre Bank. Te Paritaha would be impacted by the dredging in two ways. First, parts of it would be dredged away in the course of the deepening and widening of the shipping channel. Second, suspended sediments can negatively impact shellfish as they block their filtering system. Chris Battershill, a scientist working for Waikato University at the field station in Tauranga, tells me that the sediment plumes are the biggest problem for the environment,

because especially small sediments travel far in the water column and already a small amount is enough to stop the functioning of seabed communities (I-02). The ecologists in court agreed that the disturbance on the ecology of Te Paritaha would be substantial, but the impact very small in comparison to the overall size of the shellfish bed. However, the Environment Court correctly states that

as acknowledged by the ecologists, the evaluation of the significance of these effects on pipi does not end with the scientific assessment. The impact must also be considered in the context of the cultural importance of Te Paritaha and its values to local iwi. (Environment Court, 2011: 45)

These “cultural effects” were the major issue in the conflict around the dredging and the main motivation for the opposition. For local *iwi*, the effects of the dredging are not only environmental, but also cultural, social, emotional and psychological. In a Maori worldview, humans are not seen separate from the environment. Therefore, cultural effects and ecological or geomorphological effects are closely intertwined. The next section gives an overview over these cultural effects, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

The cultural effects

If we recall the all-encompassing understanding of the environment in Maori mythology (chapter 7.1) and especially that it includes people as well, we see that ecological, hydrological and geomorphological effects cannot be seen separated from cultural effects, or in other words, that the environmental effects lead to cultural effects. Asked for environmental impact, a staff member from Bay of Plenty Regional Council answers:

[D]epends how you think of the environment. [Laughs] [...] so if you include the relationship of people with it as part of your definition of the environment then I think there are some significant impacts there. If you take that part out and you just think about, are the shellfish going to survive, is there still habitat, is it going to cause massive erosion, then no, there haven't been significant effects. (I-07:202)

The planner explains how it makes a difference how the term “environment” is understood. When people are not included, the environmental impact of the dredging would not be as severe as when people, or more precisely Maori, are included. An important prerequisite to understand the cultural effects is that in a Maori worldview, humans are not separated from

the environment. They share the same ancestors, and people are therefore linked to the landscape as well as animals, plants and inanimate objects (such as rocks) by *whakapapa* (genealogical links). As humans are last in the creation story, they have to look after their environments as *kaitiaki* (guardians) (see also chapter 7.1, these topics will also be discussed later in this chapter). Therefore, ecological effects are at the same time cultural effects.

My interview partners voiced their consternation and their fears regarding possible effects, both “natural” and “cultural”. These concerns range from effects on the individual to effects on the whole *hapu* or *iwi*. In the submissions, there were three main issues (I-07:34). First, the ecological effects on the environment. Second, the effects of the dredging on the relationship Maori have with the harbour and Mauao. And third, that the port did not engage early with Maori. Furthermore, many opponents think that generally a “tipping point” is reached. The harbour is already under stress, and no further negative impacts should be added (e.g. I-06; I-08; see also Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010). Also the impact on customary fisheries was mentioned by two *iwi* representatives (I-10).

During the process, the court extensively dealt with the so-called cultural effects. It is required to have regard to the provisions in the RMA in Part 2 concerning Maori issues (sections 6(e), 6(f), 7(a) and 8; Environment Court, 2011: 67). The Court discussed the implications this has for the case. First, it acknowledged that the Mauao, Te Awanui and the surrounding environments “are the ancestral lands and waters of the tribes of Tauranga Moana”, regarding section 6(e) and (f) (Environment Court, 2011: 67). Second, the judge states that the Maori of Tauranga Moana are the *kaitiaki* (guardians) of the region. Third, the court as well as “all persons exercising functions and powers under it [...] shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” (Environment Court, 2011: 68). Subsequently, five cultural effects are identified by the court. The court considers these effects to be more than minimal, which means that they have to be avoided, remedied or mitigated. The cultural effects are first, the interference with Mauao; second, the potential effects on Panepane Point; third, the damage to Te Paritaha; fourth, potential loss of *tikanga* and *matauranga* (knowledge); and fifth, limitations of *rangatiratanga* and *kaitiakitanga* (Environment Court, 2011: 68–69). Obviously, the effects all stem from physical-material changes of the environment that lead subsequently to cultural effects.

The court also acknowledges that there are many sites of historical, cultural and spiritual significance in and around the harbour, for example battle sites or arriving places of *waka* (voyaging canoe). In the decision the Environment Court states:

To the tangata whenua, these cultural sites have a mauri (or life essence) binding each member of the tribes through mana (prestige), tapu (sacredness), and whakapapa (genealogy) to these sites and the early ancestors of the canoes who discovered them. It is these links from the past to the present that create the relationship the tribes have with their ancestral lands and waters. (Environment Court, 2011: 49)

In this statement, the court acknowledges the relationship the local Maori have with Te Awanui. It argues that this relationship stems from the *whakapapa* (genealogy) links as well as other concepts. By referring to the life essence *mauri*, the court includes the “intangible” cultural aspects into its decision. These “intangible” aspects are linked to actual material practices, such as fishing or gathering seafood.

In Figure 28, a map is displayed that was prepared by the port in cooperation with local *iwi* to indicate the culturally sensitive areas. The map was handed out to the dredge operators. The location of Te Paritaha is visible, as well as the approximate outline of the shipping channel. I use this map to illustrate approximate locations and do not aim at discussing here the accuracy of the exact indications of cultural significant areas or the shipping channel.

Even though the court was sensitive to Maori issues, still Western scientific evidence played an important role as a deliverer of “objective” facts (Tsosie, 2017: 359). The experts for the Port for example argued with science and an “objective level” in their cultural evidence (Environment Court, 2011). One witness assumed that the cultural landscape values would not be affected by the dredging, because it takes place under water and is therefore not visible. This shows a certain degree of ignorance towards a Maori world view. Before the court, representatives of the *iwi* Ngai Te Rangi expressed the view that the Port did not understand their association with the environment (see also Tsosie, 2017 for a comparable analysis of cases in the US). Here, issues of epistemic injustice and post-colonial power relations are visible. These will be discussed below.

Even though several concerns were voiced in the interviews, submissions, and court documents, I want to focus on three issues in the following sections. These are the decision-making process as such, the effects of the dredging on *kaimoana* (seafood), and the cultural landscape.




Figure 28: Areas of cultural importance. The blue line indicated the shipping channel. Map: Port of Tauranga, modified

12.2 Cultural landscapes: “Second layer of geography”

The previous section already gave an example of how landscape features can be perceived. In the following sections, I will further detail on different coastal landscapes around Te Awanui. The story of Ruahine is just one of the many examples of landmarks or landscape features around the harbour that the *tangata whenua* of Te Awanui can tell a story about – stories that stress the links to the environment, their history and their cultural identity. The Ruahine Bank is located at the harbour entrance, between Mauao and Matakana Island. To some, it was just a disturbance for shipping that had to be destroyed in the beginning of the 20th century. To others, it still is a *tapu* place. Here, Rua sacrificed herself (or was sacrificed), when the Tainui *waka* (canoe) grounded on the reef. The pinnacle of rock at the base of Mauao represents her, called Te Kuia or Kuia Rock (Stokes, 1980b: 32). The harbour entrance in general is significant to many *iwi*, for those in the region as well as for those whose ancestors travelled through. Many *waka* visited the area, as fishing vessels but also as voyaging *wakas* from Hawaiki (I-10). Graham Bidois Cameron explains that the story about Rua is “connected to our story of who we are and our identity and our connections with other tribes round the country.” (I-06:44). He tells me how he feels connected and related to the area:

[...] the harbour is not an object. The harbour is not a resource. It’s a narrative. The harbour’s connected to me by genealogy. The harbour’s alive. Saying well, Mauao’s alive and I can trace my genealogy back to those places. [...] In our creation stories, we’re always the youngest. We were the last ones created. So, all of those things, all those fish, shellfish and places are our elder and it’s our responsibility to look after. (I-06:128)

Graham Bidois Cameron explains how the harbour to him is not an object or a resource, but a living thing he is related to by genealogy. The different organisms like shellfish, but also landscape features are his elders, and have to be looked after. Not only do the environment or the landscape have a specific meaning to Maori like Graham, but he also sees different things than for example an uninformed Pakeha resident:

When I drive round my city here [...], I see kind of two geographies layered on top of each other. There’s the geography of Tauranga city, Cameron Road, Fraser Street, going into our falling apart CBD [central business district] and bridges across the harbour and the Mount, but then layered on that, or underneath that, is a Māori geography which is a one of narrative, which is pa, fortified villages, kainga, old villages that people

used to live in, significant locations of story and of conflict in love, of food gathering, of death and life. (I-06:121)

In his words, he describes Maori geography as a geography of narrative. Because he knows the narratives, the story and the history, he can even see these geographies when he drives around in his car. Even though the landmarks are often not visible anymore, they exist as an invisible layer, a “second geography” beside the visible, material one. Second here means not that this Maori geography comes second, but that is not the first thing visible and usually needs context Maori knowledge to “see” it (whereas “seeing” is interchangeable with “knowing” here). What Graham is doing while driving through the city is similar to what Murton (2012) describes in his article when he refers to knowledgeable Maori who can “literally walk” (or drive) through the landscape “pointing out named places and recounting their stories” (Murton, 2012: 99). Knowing the stories and the history is important to strengthen the sense of belonging, Graham says:

So, that’s one of the things I value about who I am as an indigenous person is that I also see that. So, I live up the road here in a place called Merivale, it’s like literally 200 metres that way, and we live, you know, 200 metres from a pa, from an old fortified village that most people would just think of as a park [??] but knowing the history, the genealogy, the whakapapa, knowing the activities that went on informs my sense of belonging to this place. (I-06:122)

He describes how without the specific knowledge about a place, people do not understand it. He uses the example of an old pa, a fortified village, that is used as a park nowadays. This knowledge about history and *whakapapa* strengthen his connection to the place. This is fundamental in *matauranga* (Maori philosophy): identity is build – amongst other – upon *whakapapa* (genealogy) and the locality to which one belongs by birth and ancestry (Murton, 2012: 95–96).

I only understood much later after the interview what the meaning of the “second layer” of geography implied as well. Murton explains how for Maori, “to know something is first of all to locate it in space and time through genealogy (*whakapapa*). [...] To ‘know’ about a tree, a rock, the wind, or the fishes in the sea, is to know their respective genealogies” (Murton, 2012: 92, *emph. in original*). And the literal meaning of *whakapapa* is “to place layers, one upon another” (Murton, 2012: 92). This might be what Graham sees in the landscape: the different layers of *whakapapa*. It is not just a second layer in contrast to a common map or a common view on what is obviously visible (streets, houses, ...), but one of the many layers of

genealogy. So his map gets a temporal dimension as well, in that it helps to locate his position in space and time and be thus able to know one's self (Murton, 2012: 92).

Stories like the one Graham told me, or the ones about Mauao or Ruahine related to places and landscape features are typical for the oral tradition of Maori, which also includes oral maps (Kelly, 1999). The stories and quotes mentioned in this section showed how “ecology based knowledge such as ancestral myths inscribed in the landscape” can be important for identity (Horowitz, 2015: 239).




Figure 29: Map by Graham Bidois Cameron (M-06). The map displays sites of cultural importance for Maori, including marae (meeting houses), pa (old fortified villages) and landmarks such as hills and rivers. No streets or settlements are included. Also the dredging is not sketched on the map.

Graham Bidois Cameron was drawing this “second layer of geography” for me in his map (Figure 29). In this way, Graham generously shared with me his knowledge. After sketching the curved outlines of the coastline, Graham included the rivers flowing into the harbour. He uses three symbols to include *marae* (meeting houses), *pa* (old villages) and hills or mountains into the map. The symbol for *marae* is a stylised front, the symbol for the *pa* is a fence-like structure. These elaborate symbols or rather miniatures reflect the careful and artistic way in which Graham prepared the map. He takes the task serious and uses different colours to illustrate. Graham strictly used Te Reo Maori (Maori language) in his map, only for

the legend he includes the English word “hill/mountain”. Streets, settlements, port structures or anything alike are not included in the map. The only structure he included for orientation is the Harbour Bridge.

Pa and *marae* are obviously important cultural sites. In this way, the map links the past with the present, as it includes old sites of *pa* as well as present *marae*. Additionally, by also including important landmarks like hills, mountains, reefs or rock formations, Graham put them on the same level as “cultural sites” – because they are as important and stand in direct relation to the *iwi*’s history and culture. Landscape features, *pa* and *marae* seem to be equally important to Graham. Interestingly, the dredging issue is not at all included in the map. Moreover, he refers to the bigger context of his cultural landscape. So even though the dredging is a major interference with the harbour, it does not seem strong enough to fundamentally disturb or even find a place on his map of Te Awanui.

Graham’s map is clearly a map of *espace vécu*. It is based on history and stories as well as his local knowledge as an indigenous person. However, I do not want to force this Maori knowledge into Lefebvres framework. Rather, I think that Lefebvres thoughts on space can help to highlight some aspects that might be interesting in the whole picture and in comparison to the other cases.

One Maori interview partner refused to draw a map for me, at least he would not do it on the spot. He said that the map would be very big, because everything is connected, and he would have to think about it (I-05). Apparently, to him, it did not make sense to sketch a small map of the harbour or the dredging area, as it would be oversimplified and not show his perspective on the issue as well as his understanding of the environment in general.

Another map was sketched by the scientist Chris Battershill (Figure 30). Unsurprisingly, he had a different focus and his map includes different things than Graham’s. Chris Battershill drew a very detailed outline of the harbour. Then he went on equally detailed with depicting mainly the shellfish problematic around the dredging. He included the dredging area, Centre Bank (Te Paritaha), the dredge spoil dumping area as well as the sediment plumes that develop during dredging and dumping. He indicated with arrows where shellfish were relocated from Centre Bank to other areas of the harbour as well as where rocks were relocated in the harbour entrance due to the dredging. As he is a biologist working on sponges, he also indicated where reefs and sponge gardens are outside the harbour that might be affected by the sediment plume generated by the dumping of the dredged material. “Port” and “city” are written into the map to indicate where they are.




Figure 30: Map of Chris Battershill (M-02). He tried to draw the outline of the harbour as realistic as possible. He focused on the ecological impacts of the dredging, indicating where mussel beds are, or sponge gardens. Also the relocation experiment is included in the map.

Chris Battershill used simple and common symbols for formal map-making like hatchures or asterisks. His map (Figure 30) resembles more what one would expect of a “scientific” or official map: he tried to draw the outlines of the harbour’s edges as well as the locations of everything as realistic as possible. He indicated where north is. Interestingly, he also included an evaluation of some processes in his map. Because it is still unclear if the pipi relocation worked out, he put a check mark and a question mark next to it. The rock relocation is finished and in his view it worked fine, so it got a check mark. In contrast to Graham’s map, there are much more things sketched in the harbour, not on land. The focus is on processes that take place in the harbour. People hardly play a role, they are only in the map in the “city” and the “port”. Chris Battershill includes his location and position by including the “lab” (Field station from University of Waikato) in the map.

How landscapes are sketched, mapped or described can reveal underlying world-views of or important themes to the person or institution behind. This was visible through the participants’ maps above.

The maps of Graham Bidois Cameron and of Chris Battershill showed in an exemplary way how different the same area can be understood. It also became obvious that landscapes are much more than only the visual perception of an area. Rather, these drawings and descriptions of coastal spaces reflect the knowledge and world-views of individuals and groups and the multitude of meanings.

12.3 Problematizing the decision-making process

The Environment Court framed the conflict in its decision as a collision between the economic interests of the Port of Tauranga and the cultural concerns of local *iwi* (Environment Court, 2011: 4). It sees two worldviews in conflict with each other. Even though this binary can be seen critically, I want to put the focus here on the domination of one system of knowledge. In this case, it is a western, scientific knowledge system that dictates the institutions, laws, regulations (the whole process) and produces the knowledge that is seen as valuable under this system (see Smith, 2012). As has been shown before (see ch. 8), there is some recognition of Maori concerns by the official side. However, epistemic injustice (Spivak, 2008; Tsosie, 2017) is still observable in many instances, as I will show in the following. In this sub-chapter, I will first focus on participation and consultation with Maori in the application process as well as decision-making process. Some of my interview partners perceived the consultation as inadequate. Therefore, in the second part of this sub-chapter, I will detail on three possible “reasons” for this perceived imbalance in the decision-making process: the role of the economy, (post-)colonial power relations and different knowledge systems.

Participation and consultation

One of the main issues for Maori during the process was that they had the impression that the Port did not understand their point of view, and also did nothing to engage with them and take them seriously. At the start, even though the council proposed to the Port to engage with local *iwi* early and before the official submission of the application, the Port did not do so. The Bay of Plenty Regional Council planner remembers their advice to the Port: “Our advice, [...] as I remember it was for the port to engage with *tangata whenua* early and try and understand those things. The port decided to not do that” (I-07:21). An *iwi* representative (I-10) stated that they found out about the plans of the Port when the Port contacted them to get a document from them they needed for the application:

One of their conditions through the application was to review our harbour management plan [...] And so they asked us for a copy of it. That was it. [Laughs] That was the only contact we had until they made the application. So, we were saying there’s been no consultation with us about how they should recognise this plan. They’ve taken it into account, which is the legislative rule, and they’ve decided that the impact is minimal. [Laughs] So, that was it. And we were saying we should have had better consultation so that they held one *hui* [meeting] and presented

their case, but there was no real discussion with *iwi* and *tangata whenua*.

(I-10:37)

According to the *iwi* representatives, the Port of Tauranga did not get in contact with them until they needed their harbour management plan for the application. There was no discussions, they state. The Port stated that there was an initial meeting in April 2008, where the plans were outlined to senior *iwi* representatives (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010: 23). According to one interview partner (I-14), there were two public information events before the dredging started, but they were very poorly attended. However, these meetings took place when the decisions were made and the consent granted. At this stage in a development process, the plans are already made, and profound changes or input is usually not integrated (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein understands information and consultation as degrees of tokenism (Arnstein, 1969: 217). These ways of “consultation” led to disappointment amongst Maori. Local *iwi* did not feel involved into the case by the Port, and when the Port started to consult with them, they perceived this as being too late. My interview partners stressed the point that the Port should have consulted with them early, and not only informing, but looking for a real dialogue. A local *hapu* representative perceived this way of “consulting” as patronising: “They lined up all their people and they gave us all a good talk and quite patronising actually” (I-08:60). Holland (2017) describes a similar scenario in her work on procedural justice in climate change adaptation. Here as well, consultation is often structured in a top-down manner, and used to get information from the public which is then interpreted and drawn on as chosen (Holland, 2017: 398).

At least in the beginning there did not seem to be an honest interest for Maori culture: “it started off with no sort of recognition or acknowledgement of our cultural integrity or mana” (I-10:27, *iwi* representative). In contrast, the Environment Court was sensitive to the issue of how consultation was approached and carried out. The judge states in his decision that “[u]nsurprisingly, *tangata whenua* were both surprised and disappointed at the way in which the Port consulted well after the application was filed” (Environment Court, 2011: 13). He shows understanding towards the perception of *tangata whenua* that the consultation came at a late point in time

The interesting things are not only the formal possibilities of engagement and consultation, but also how a Maori world-view got integrated in the process. The RMA includes Maori concerns and interests at several points (e.g. as a matter of national importance in section 6). However, how are Maori interests actually dealt with in the process? And are all actors aware of what “Maori culture” is? A *hapu* representative describes that she had the

impression that they had to educate the Port of Tauranga. Some argument and debate was needed before the opposing groups could meet in respect with each other:

[A]t the end of the day we met in the spirit of respect and all of that but there was a lot of banging on the table and the quick realisation that we had to turn it into an education process. Because they just weren't getting us and it's almost like we were talking past each other. (I-08:48)

Initially, she had assumed that discussions would be easier, that there would be some common ground between "Western paradigms" and "Maori paradigms". However, she did not see her culture respected by the ongoing practices and incidents. Rather, she realised that there was a need to educate the Port so that they understand their culture. She suspected that the Port of Tauranga was not interested in Maori perspectives and did not take them serious: "They just didn't want to know about it. And earlier on in the piece I think they were looking for a tick the box exercise and I guess you could say that that was consultation" (I-08:51). Richard Ngaha, who is a scientist and part of a local *iwi*, had a similar experience (I-05). He explained how what is called "*tangata whenua* cultural values" from a Pakeha perspective is "everything" to Maori. He thought that the Environment Court or regional council did not really understand that, and that is an important issue for Maori to communicate their world view in a better way.

In this respect, the dredging process also helped to establish a relationship between the local *iwi* and the Port of Tauranga. As beforehand, the relationship was described as non existing, now there is much more dialogue. To an *iwi* representative, this is one of the best outcomes. This makes sense as most are sure that the dredging was not the last project carried out by the port in the harbour. Additionally, also the consent conditions, like the mitigation measures, improved throughout the court cases. However there is still a lot of frustration among the opponents with the whole process and its result. An *iwi* representative describes that "Once council gave the tick it felt like a losing battle" (I-10:144). The decision to grant the resource consent struck the Maori community hard:

This sort of works goes against all our values and principles of *tangata whenua* and what we need to stick to in terms of being *pono* [honest, sincere] to who we are. It goes against everything we believe in to be honest. It was pretty hard call. (I-10:200)

However, seen in a larger context, *iwi* involvement and consultation in general already developed. A planner from Bay of Plenty Regional Council describes that the involvement of

iwi has become stronger in the last decades (I-07:111). He leads this stronger involvement back to a growing awareness of Maori cultural concerns and a growing capacity and resources of *iwi* to be even able to be part of these often lengthy and cost intensive processes. Furthermore, he thinks that the faith in the process itself might have become stronger, when *iwi* see their concerns addressed and respected. In his opinion, an early and serious engagement with local *iwi* is important, even though they cannot impose it on the resource consent applicants:

I think [pause] for us as a consent authority it depends a lot on how willing the applicant is to do that engagement. The advice that we usually give to applicants, and I'm thinking specifically about cultural stuff because the RMA says that there's no duty to consult with anybody and a lot of applicants pick that up and say, "Hey, you can't tell us to go and talk to anybody." But the act says that you do have to assess effects and we think that the best way to assess effects is to ask people about what those effects are, right? And we say to people that the measure of good engagement often is that your proposal changes as a result of that. And so if the applicants are willing to do that and recognise the value of it then I think it can be really good. If they're not and they don't want to engage then we have to sort of fall back on the tools that the legislation gives us. And that, by default, is a bit of an adversarial sort of process. (I-07:69-70)

Reuben Fraser acknowledges that the dispute in court is not the best way to engage with affected *iwi*. He encourages submitters of resource consents to consult early with affected people, and he thinks that ideally, a proposal changes in course of a consultation process. Especially when Maori are involved in the consent process, his experience is that the whole process ends up with better environmental outcomes (I-07). However, the council cannot force anyone to consult before handing in a resource consent submission. The planner describes a learning effect also for the council from this case, in the future they will put much more focus on an early consultation and engagement with cultural effects. So the advocacy of local *iwi* for Maori interests and concerns has led to a development of relationships with the port. Furthermore, the council seems to be much more aware of this topic now and even changed its behaviour.

Economy v Maori culture?

The first issue that could be identified in my material to have an impact on the decision making process was the tension between economic interests and Maori culture. Among my Maori interview partners, a belief of “the economy always wins” was very common. This has two meanings: First, economic interests win against Maori interests, when weighed up against each other, i.e. in a resource consent decision. Second, the actors with better financial resources have better chances in the process, i.e. can afford lengthy court cases, better lawyers and so on.

The second point is relatively straightforward. The financial resources of the port are much larger than those of the local *iwi*: “the port has the bucks to be able [...] to carry on through the court process and at some point you have to know when to withdraw because you just don’t have the bucks to carry it on” (I-08:125, *hapu* representative). At some point, the Maori opponents just had to stop their protest and accept the court decision. Also the *iwi* representatives stress this point: “You’re gonna have to spend a hell of a lot of money on lawyers and time to come up against both the Port of Tauranga and the regional council.” (I-10:144, *iwi* representative). A similar issue was already discussed in the Auckland case (ch. 10). Entry costs to the Environment Court can be extremely high (Gunder and Mouat, 2002: 138). Knowledge, access to expertise and resources remain the main constraints that hinder participation (Gunder and Mouat, 2002: 131).

The first point needs a more detailed discussion. The weighing up of cultural and environmental effects against economic benefit was problematized during the interviews as well as in the Environment Court decision. The outcome of the court process did not seem to have surprised the Maori opponents of the dredging. To Graham Bidois Cameron, it is obvious that neither the Crown nor any Pakeha organisation would object the consent, as the port is the largest financial driver of the city and the region (I-06). The Bay of Plenty Regional Council planner describes the process as a weighing up of the different aspects: “But in the end it [...] often comes down to weighing up the economic benefits and jobs against whatever the adverse effect is” (I-07:91). Many of my interview partners thought that in this system, Maori hardly have a chance. An *iwi* representative stated that “[w]e’ll always get trumped by the economic card that comes out all the time” (I-10:113).

For Carlton Bidois, it is an example of how cultural values and customary rights are disregarded easily when there is commercial gain

These laws, rules and regulations that protect customary right, they're all open to [...] being just ripped apart and disregarded. In situations like that the Treaty means nothing. The Treaty principles and customary law, customary right, backed by Western law still mean nothing which is shocking. The Resource Management Act, all of that, at the end of the day meant nothing in a situation where it's economics against cultural values. And [...] there's no other bigger example of it than that dredging case. (1-09:13)

Even though law protects Maori interests, he has the impression that these are ignored and overridden when there are strong economic interests. The dredging case, for him, is a perfect example of this. This relates closely to the discussions about epistemic injustice and postcolonial power relations, discussed above and below in this chapter. Tsosie also refers to examples where "maximising the value of the land" for the "public benefit" (Tsosie, 2017: 362) was prioritised to cultural concerns.

The Environment Court discusses this point of "culture v economy":

That the Port would file an application without any prior consultation with iwi tends to reinforce perceptions, currently raw because of the Treaty of Waitangi process, of ignoring the legitimate cultural concerns of local iwi in pursuit of economic outcomes. It has been a general theme of this case that the port does not deny the cultural concerns of iwi, but simply reiterates the economic importance of their application being granted. (Environment Court, 2011: 14)

The judge explains that the port was not completely ignorant of Maori concerns. However, the economic arguments were given higher urgency than the cultural ones. One could understand the imperative of economic development above cultural issues as a logical continuation of European imperialism, which aimed at incorporating new territories to the capitalist world economy (Pawson and Brooking, 2013: 17). The concern of actors focusing on economic interests is that without the dredging, Tauranga will not be called at by bigger ships and thus loose connection to the world market. Therefore, the material modifications of the environment in and around Tauranga harbour are necessary in their logic to stay part in this economic system.

Postcolonial power relations

The second issue that came up in the context of consultation and weighing up Maori concerns with other interests was the issue of power relations. Many of my interview partners – Maori and Pakeha - had a strong awareness of colonial and post-colonial power relations. Next to the cultural, social and psychological damage that was done by colonialism, Maori also lost large parts of their land. Around Tauranga, the customary titles over rivers and waterways as well as land areas got lost due to *raupatu* (confiscation of land) and the application of the introduced law with its own understandings of concepts like ownership (Waitangi Tribunal, 2010, 2010: 518). Maori views were usually irrelevant for development projects like dredging in former times. In this regard, the Treaty Settlements helped to strengthen the rights of Maori. Also in Tauranga, things were handled differently some decades ago. The *iwi* representative Kia Maia Ellis looks back at the early times of the establishments of the port in Tauranga:

When you look at the change in generations, like our parents' generation were up against the same thing but [...] in their thinking the mitigation at that time was work for our people. So, all of my uncles, my dad, all worked at the Port of Tauranga when it was first established which was hard for our people too 'cause a lot of them were from the place where the maunga [mountain] was that was desecrated to build the port. So, it was another situation where they had to just keep going and make the best of the result. And at that time, it was to provide employment for the community. (I-10:217)

She describes that also in earlier times, the development of the port was an issue for local Maori. There was no consultation of Maori or acknowledgement of their culture. However, the jobs they got by the port were probably perceived as a way of mitigation, she supposes. This also shows the long continuity of conflict potential regarding the development of the port area. Even though laws and practices have changed much over the last 100 years, and Maori culture is much more respected and considered when it comes to developments than in the past (see also ch. 8.2), some do not see a big difference. To Carlton Bidois, the decisions are still made by “the powerful”, and Maori can hardly influence that.

In the end it didn't really matter what *tangata whenua* did, how well they put their case forward and what it cost us, the minister had a cup of coffee, the Minister of Conservation and the Minister of Transport, and the Minister of Transport overrode the Minister of Conservation. And

pretty much that's how that dredging happened and through a mitigation package that we could do nothing but accept. (I-09:11)

He repeats this at a later point in the interview: "it didn't matter how hard we fought, it was gonna be up to two ministers having [...] a mochaccino together" (I-09:31). The networks of the powerful seem to be stronger to him than all protest. Richard Ngaha has a similar opinion. He thinks that since the beginning, many were pessimistic about the effects the protest could have: "When whānau were going into this we knew we would go through the court process and that but [...] a big part of us knew that it's gonna happen no matter what because it's business" (I-05:57). From the beginning on, it seemed clear to him that the opposition did not have a chance to stop the dredging plans, because they were carried out by powerful economic actors serving an overriding growth paradigm.

Competing knowledge

Closely connected to the issue of (post-)colonial power relations is the discussion about scientific evidence and cultural evidence, which is my third point. The conflict around the dredging can also be understood as a conflict of knowledge systems, a Western scientific one and a traditional Maori one (see also ch. 2.1). I do not aim at setting up a dichotomy here between "local" and "scientific" knowledge (for critical accounts see Agrawal, 1995; Horowitz, 2015: 237). Still, it is helpful to use these labels here to explain different ways knowledge is produced, passed on, evaluated, and more by different actors in this case study. Maori knowledge can be framed as local environmental knowledge in this context (Horowitz, 2015), whereas the knowledge used for example to provide scientific evidence in court falls under the category of Western scientific knowledge. Le Heron et al. (2019: 3) observe an "unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of differentiated place-based knowledges", which leads to constrains when dealing with complexities and tensions around multi-user spaces.

The Environment Court sees as its task "to integrate the competing interests of the Port of Tauranga [...] while recognising and providing for [...] cultural concerns [...] of [...] local iwi" (Environment Court, 2011: 4). However, the methods of how the system works are largely dominated by a Pakeha system (see also Tsosie, 2017). For Maori involved in the court process, it felt unbalanced that their traditional lifestyles and worldviews were weighed up against Western scientific knowledge. Furthermore, Maori knowledge has traditionally been passed on orally, for example by songs or stories. Local environmental knowledge is typically passed down orally, and not codified in written form (see for example Wynne, 1992). Even

though today there exist also documents such as *iwi* management plans, oral sharing of knowledge is still very important.

The planner Reuben Fraser picks up the topic of the imposition of Western planning and development process on Maori: “It feels to me that it’s a very non-Māori system [laughs] and Māori are asked to participate in that system and I think historically that they haven’t gotten good results from it” (I-07:299). This is similar to the issue of how Maori knowledge can be brought into the process e.g. at Environment Court. Smith explains that indigenous peoples and their ways of knowing were coded into Western systems of knowledge, and had to fit into the imported procedures (Smith, 2012: 45). This was experienced by Richard Ngaha. He described that to voice concern and oppose a development, *tikanga* (the customary system of values and practices that have developed over time and are embedded in the social context) had to be adapted to fit Pakeha procedures and policies. To him, this is a heavy burden: “It’s another form of colonisation. It’s another form of grief. And it’s huge disregard to cultural values” (I-05:107). Tsosie states that cultural constructions of the past “continue to inform Western law and policy”, laws which are portrayed as fair and neutral, even though they mask the epistemic injustice which is inherent in this system (Tsosie, 2017: 356),

Western scientific knowledge uses standardized methods to investigate for example water quality (Cussioli et al., 2015), and follows the paradigm of positivism (Smith, 2012: 44). It is typically built upon a “rationalist, secular epistemology that elevates the importance of science, economics, and technology” (Tsosie, 2017: 359). Maori knowledge, however, includes also spiritual and cultural aspects, and is collected by other methods following its own ideologies, norms and worldviews (Smith, 2012). Indigenous knowledge systems “are often seen as deficient because they are perceived as faith-based ‘religious systems’ and or as the more primitive forms of cultural knowledge” (Tsosie, 2017: 359). Kia Maia Ellis, a Maori researcher working for a local *iwi*, explains how they tried to “battle” scientific experts with cultural knowledge:

So there was the pipi bed, pāua beds, crayfish, mussels, all of those things can potentially be impacted, and they were providing us information through Western science that said the impact would be minimal. So, we had to battle scientific experts with our own cultural knowledge which is always difficult because it’s not a statistical kind of value that is credible in Western governance. (I-10: 8)

This is one of the main problems: Western scientific knowledge is often perceived as objective, factual, based on statistics, numbers and robust methods, even though due to

uncertainties this is often not as “true” as it appears (Forsyth, 2008; Holland, 2017: 400). On the contrary, in “expert-lay”-conflicts, local environmental knowledge is often framed as “neither legitimate nor authoritative” (Holland, 2017: 401). In places with a colonial past, such as New Zealand, research was an important part of colonization, as it served as a tool to define what legitimate knowledge was (Smith, 2012: 175). This dominance of a Western knowledge system marginalised and de-legitimised Maori forms of knowledge (Smith, 2012: 177).

A *hapu* representative perceives this dominance of scientific knowledge as bumptious. The scientists appeared to feel dominant and having the “better” knowledge: the port “bought these scientists in who were quite rude actually and I head butted with that Professor [...] just because he was trying to overwhelm with his science and his knowledge.” (I-08:99). This has been similarly observed by Wynne in his research on Cumbrian sheep farmers, who perceived the “experts” as “ignorant but arrogant” (Wynne, 1992: 295). Also the Port’s representatives and experts behaviour was perceived as arrogant in the court hearings. An *iwi* representative has the opinion that “the port was used to getting its way and steamrolling the issues of Māori” (I-10:118). He links the present case to the former developments of the port, where Maori concerns were not taken into account.

Horowitz refers to exactly this situation when she explains how conflicts can arise around developments projects because “scientists and local residents make very different predictions of environmental impacts” (Horowitz, 2015: 239). This is connected to the different ways of obtaining knowledge, but also to the evaluation of impacts. Whereas from an ecological point of view an impact on the overall pipi population might be not severe, for local Maori the impact is a different one because it also touches upon their culture. Also in the hearing before the Panel, this issue was discussed:

A major issue raised by submitters, was that indigenous systems and knowledge are often perceived as being outside ‘conventional scientific’ understanding and lack scientific rigour and objectivity. Iwi advised the Panel that it should not ‘dismiss’ or ‘not take seriously’ the issues raised by Tangata Whenua because it was not ‘technical or scientific’. They stated that both indigenous research and ‘western science’ have their limitations and that neither will be appropriate in all circumstances. (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2010: 35)

On a general level, Peart observes a similar situation in her research:

There is an uneasy relationship between the respective role of scientific knowledge and indigenous knowledge in informing coastal management. Tangata whenua representatives interviewed all expressed dissatisfaction with the resource consent process under the RMA and their ability to have any impact on it. This was because indigenous knowledge was considered to be inferior to scientifically derived knowledge. (Peart, 2007: 44–45)

Peart refers to coastal management in Aotearoa New Zealand and shows that the perception of having no power to impact consent decisions is not a unique issue only in Tauranga, but a general problem. She states that indigenous knowledge was perceived as inferior to scientific knowledge. This shows again that knowledge is not “neutral”, but that knowledges are evaluated, and some are perceived as being “better” (more valid, objective, reliable, ...) than others. Also Le Heron et al. (2019: 6) state specifically on the situation in Aotearoa New Zealand that many coastal and marine conflicts revolve around the question of whose knowledge is valued.

Richard Ngaha describes the struggle his people had when trying to challenge the port’s plans at court on cultural grounds. In contrast to the competition or the potential for conflict between the two knowledge systems, Maori also try to use Western knowledge systems to strengthen their case and make their concerns heard. Richard Ngaha, who is a scientist, tried to transmit Maori values in connection with science: “we can communicate with science [...] especially ecological sciences, because there’s a huge parallel between cultural values and environmental sustainability and that might be a way of communicating those values” (I-05:63). Interestingly, also “Western scientists” see these parallels. According to Chris Battershill (I-05:57), Maori concerns also reflect concerns of a wider community and that the public benefits from their engagement to achieve the best for the harbour. However, translating Maori values into science to make them better understandable to e.g. the port and the council in this case also creates difficulties. Especially, because many resources are needed for this (I-05:63). These points link back to the beginning of this sub-chapter and underline that a dichotomy does not make sense (see also ch. 2.1). However, as long as the decision making process is dominated by a Pakeha world view, it might still have potential for conflicts and not allow a full consideration of *matauranga* Maori.

On a more general level, the conflict can be understood as revolving around a question formulated by Robbins: “How do specific ideas about nature and society limit and direct what is taken to be true and possible?” (Robbins, 2012: 70).

Conclusion

In this sub-chapter, my point was to analyse the decision-making process regarding Maori participation and integration. Three points were important for this: the tensions between economic and cultural interests, the continuation of postcolonial power relations and the consideration of different knowledges in the decision-making process. The case in Tauranga was especially prone to become conflictuous as it has the heritage of a long history of disregarding Maori values and cultures by port developers. In this sense, all three issues are closely connected to each other. Even though there have been changes in legislation and the corresponding processes such as consenting, the system is dominated by a Pakeha worldview and it remains questionable how a Maori worldview can be integrated in this. However, the two systems are not closed to change or completely antithetic. There are also overlaps, mutual learning and actors that try to understand perspectives that are not their own.

12.4 *Kaimoana*: Tauranga harbour as seafood garden

The story of Mauao at the beginning of this chapter illustrated a Maori perspective on space, landscape and the environment. Maori do have a traditional understanding of “the environment” or “nature” that includes people. Pakeha systems often work with nature-culture-dichotomies. In Maori mythology, people as well as all other things around them descended from the same ancestors. Therefore, Maori are linked through *whakapapa* (genealogy) with their surroundings (see also ch. 7.1). This can be also observed in the traditional *pepeha*. Murton describes *pepeha* as identity axioms, inseparably linking land and people (2012: 96). The Ngai Te Rangi *pepeha* (kind of proverb and introduction of where they are from respectively where they belong to) starts with “*Ko Mauao te Maunga, ko Tauranga te Moana*” which means “Mauao is the mountain, Tauranga is the sea” (Environment Court, 2011: 57). Other *iwi* have similar *pepeha*, referring to their local landmarks. An *iwi* representative outlines the connection he and his people have with the area around Te Awanui:

We’ve got a couple of *whakatauki*, proverbs that we use here. One that I’ll share with you goes: *Ko au ko te patiki, ko te patiki ko au*. Which [...] basically translates to: I am the flounder and the flounder is me. We’re one and the same. [...] And the other one that we use here and still is probably the most famous one is *Tauranga Moana, Tauranga tangata*: When we look at the *moana* we look at ourselves, salt water of this *moana* runs through our veins and we see ourselves intrinsically linked

with the *moana*. That's one and the same. So any sort of impact upon the *moana* is an impact upon us as a people, and our culture and that's always gonna be the case. (I-10:201-202)

The *iwi* representative introduces two proverbs in this statement. The first one links *tangata whenua* to the flounder. The second one refers to how people and Tauranga Moana are one and the same. He explains that it is as if the water from the ocean and the harbour was running through their veins. This shows the strong connection of local *iwi* to the marine environment. Through *whakapapa* (genealogical links), local *iwi* are also related to Mauao, the hill at the harbour entrance. In a cultural sense, it is their grandfather. This sheds a new light on the so-called "morphological" effects of the dredging. If the dredging would take off boulders of the base of Mauao, it is as if the Port company "got a permit to cut off the foot of our grandfather" (I-09:130). Furthermore, landmarks can be understood as a group's "physical manifestation" (Murton, 2012: 99), the people being an "expression of the land".

The landscape is also the connection to the ancient homeland of Hawaiki, where the spirit or soul (*wairua*) of a deceased person might travel to: "Spiritually, Mauao and Te Awanui remain for the tribes the passage way to Hawaiki" (Environment Court, 2011: 50). These stories and myths "inscribed in the landscape" are important for indigenous cultural heritage and identity (Horowitz, 2015: 239). Even though non-Maori persons are generally not familiar with *matauranga* maori and might find it hard to understand before their own world views, the above mentioned points might have helped to explain how severe the dredging can be perceived by local Maori.

Connected with the relation to the sea and the environment in general is the role of *tangata whenua* as *kaitiaki* (guardians of the environment) and the performance of *kaitiakitanga* (guardianship over the natural world). It is the duty of local *iwi* to protect and manage Te Awanui to preserve it for future generations. In respect to fishing for example this means returning the first fish to the ocean, only take as much as one needs and practice *karakia* (ritual chant). This responsibility was also expressed by a *hapu* representative: "It's all around *kaitiakitanga*. We have responsibilities. [...] nobody gets paid to do any of this stuff. [...] It's just a responsibility so you just have to stand up for it" (I-08:165). I will detail on the shellfish bed Te Paritaha and the role of seafood in the following section to explain the role of the environment for local *iwi*, and its inseparable connection to Maori culture.

Te Paritaha

Next to Mauao, Te Paritaha is another site of great significance for *tangata whenua*. The mussel bed, also known as Centre Bank, is an important harvesting area for pipi (*Paphies australis*). Regarding the dredging case, one of the major concerns of local *iwi* was the impact it could have on Te Paritaha. The shellfish bed would partially be dredged away, and be affected by the sediments dispersed in the water. Additionally, currents might change as well, which could also have an impact on the pipi. Many port development activities during the last century already had negative impacts on *kaimoana* in Te Awanui. In course of dredging, *kaimoana* beds were either directly destroyed by removal or affected through sediments, as well as other port activities, urban, industrial and agricultural runoff or discharge which polluted the harbour (Environment Court, 2011: 10).

When we think about the destruction or negative impacts on *kaimoana*, we have to take into account that it is more than simply food to eat for Maori. Walker (2004) explains that food is a major source of tribal *mana* (prestige, status), and the reputation of an *iwi* is strongly tied to its capability of providing plenty of food for guests. This symbolic and cultural role has to be kept in mind when assessing the impacts of dredging or any other activity on *kaimoana*, as gathering *kaimoana* cannot be compared to e.g. recreational fishery. Everything that would e.g. pollute the sea is seen as “abhorrent” (Love et al., 1993: 20), because it also has negative impact on *mana* and *mauri* of the sea. A *hapu* representative describes the role of *kaimoana* for her *hapu* and *iwi*:

for us on our *maraes* and whenever we have visitors, [...] because we are the sea people you must give something from the sea. So, even if there’s nothing else on the table at least there’s something from the sea on the table. (I-08:73)

If there are visitors to the *marae* (meeting house), the *tangata whenua* of Te Awanui will at least serve them seafood. Also, Carlton Bidois describes shellfish as a staple diet for *hui* (meeting) and *tangi* (funeral). Furthermore, he underlines the role *kaimoana* has as a source of *mana*: “It’s well-known throughout the country that the *mana* of our *marae* is having shellfish seafood on the table” (I-09:48). An *iwi* representative describes the cultural tradition tied to the collection of shellfish, especially for *tangi* when many guests are expected:

Our tradition is to go out and collect that *kai* and bring it back to the *marae* and it’s part of sustaining the *mana* of that hapū. So, being able to provide these *taonga* or special species. Each *marae* has certain

kaimoana that they always provide during *tangi*. (I-10:76, *iwi* representative)

Kaimoana is the traditional food served at the ritual of *tangi*. This and the previous quotes show that if *kaimoana* is lost, also the *mana* (prestige) of a *hapu* or *iwi* is threatened. However, seafood is not only important for special occasions or guests, but also for the everyday life of local Maori. A *hapu* representative (I-08) describes the role pipis play in her life:

We eat of that pipi bed [Paritaha] every day. [...] We eat out of the sea because that's what we like to eat. I'll have that any day over going to Pak'n'Save [supermarket]. [...] when something threatens your food source, [laughs] the humble pipi, it's worth scrapping for. (I-08:59)

The traditional use of pipi and other seafood is part of a long tradition and tied to her culture. She does not want to give that up and go to the supermarket to get shellfish and is ready to defend the shellfish bed from negative impacts. Also, she understands the harbour as a backyard, as an extension of her garden: "Just as we have gardens on the land, we have gardens in the sea." (I-08:73). In her understanding, this is her garden, and she wants to be able to eat out of it. Furthermore, the collection of pipi also serves the individual wellbeing:

going to pick pipis is so much more than just an activity. It's actually good for your soul, it's good for your wairua [soul, spirit]; it fulfils so many of your well beings, not just the activity itself. So, to me, one of the best most perfect days that you could ever have is to be out on that pipi bank picking pipis with the sun on your back and you're in the water with the people that care about *kai* and it's just a wonderful thing. (I-08:203)

The activity of collecting pipi serves important purposes as a social activity and for the wellbeing. So *kaimoana* plays a role both for the personal wellbeing of individual *iwi* members, as a social activity as well as for the *mana* of the whole *hapu* or *iwi*.

In its decision, the Environment Court was aware of the importance of the seafood to Maori. There were some measures prescribed to mitigate the effects the dredging would have on the shellfish. The marine facilities of the University of Waikato in Tauranga were involved in doing research on the environmental effects of the dredging. Furthermore, as the biologist Chris Battershill explains, they also looked at the establishment of the restoration of *kaimoana* beds. The idea was to relocate shellfish to other areas of the harbour that used to have shellfish and see whether they resettle these areas. The mitigation plan also included

monitoring by a Maori research team. However, not everyone was happy with that solution.

The *hapu* representative talks about the transplantation of the pipi:

And so it was that they offered a solution to [...] transplant those pipis. I mean, that might be a solution to them, a quick fix solution, but heck, if pipis were meant to be growing in other parts of the harbour they would be there. Uplifting pipis and expecting to transplant them into other areas is like taking the *mauri*, the life force of a species and moving it somewhere else where it's a foreign environment. If it's meant to be there it would be there. So, our worlds collided I guess over those sorts of things. (I-08:92)

She understands that the different world-views collide on this issue: whereas from a scientific or Pakeha view, a transplantation of pipi to other areas of the port might be a viable solution, to the *hapu* representative this is absolutely a no-go. It would mean to take the life-force of that species to a place where it is not meant to be. In her belief, the pipi grow where they are meant to grow, and humans should not interfere with that and mess up this system. But it has to be said that opinions were mixed about the relocation of the pipi, not all of the people opposing the dredging were against the relocation. Also, a team of Maori researchers was involved in the relocation programme.

The *hapu* representative takes up the topic of a "clash of world-views" again at a later point in the interview:

We look at this pipi bed [...] it's almost like the womb of a woman. So when you go hacking away at it, what are you doing to that woman? She'll be infertile before too much longer. It sounds far fetched to some who's looking at it with a Western brain to think that, oh, what the hang are they on about? They [laughs], they're talking a lot of crap. But that's how we're looking at it. That bank is covered in all sorts of different types of pipi and even sizes. It's like the nursery out there. (I-08:138)

Here, similar to the story of Mauao, natural features are personified. She compares the pipi bed to the womb of a woman: a fertile nursery of shellfish. She is aware of the fact that to people with another world view, this might sound unfamiliar and is probably hard to follow. She also stresses that of course it is not only the pipi she and other Maori are concerned of, moreover they care for the whole environment:

But it's not only about the pipis, it's about everything else associated with the pipi. [...] it's everything else within the environment. It's all interconnected. It has a right to be there, have their whakapapa. We have respect for what is there [...] everything, all of those things in the sea they all matter. (I-08:147)

The *tangata whenua* have the obligation to look after the environment surrounding them, and to respect everything, as everything is connected and linked to them through *whakapapa*. And the *hapu* representative also thinks of the next generations:

So, we want to be able to have our kids knowing this is how we get *kai*, this is where we go. I want them to know with all of their being that this is where our *kai* is. They know their way to Pak'n Save [supermarket]. They know their way to Countdown [supermarket]. But they need to know too where all our *kai* is and that that's where they go to feed yourself, to feed your family. It's also where you go [...] [when] we need to feed guests on our *marae* [...]. So, I mean, we give our kids DNA but they also need to know about where all our *kai* spots are as well, and to look after it, cherish it, care for it. Clean it up if you need to. That's it. (I-08:204)

Gathering *kaimoana* is a cultural traditional practice that the *hapu* representative wants to keep alive and pass on to the children. These are already familiar with getting their food in the supermarket. Therefore, Te Paritaha is important to teach Maori traditions to them. If the pipi beds are threatened, she also sees a threat to her cultural traditions. With the use of the seafood also comes the responsibility for it. With all these points in mind, it becomes more understandable to non-Maori why "buying pipis from the supermarket [...] would be terrible" (I-08:146).

This sub-chapter showed that the environmental effects of the dredging, such as morphological or hydrological effects, do have immediate effects on cultural issues as well and therefore cannot be seen separate from cultural effects. What was described as different world-views by an interview partner can be further specified in the conception of "humans" and "nature". Western systems tend to separate humans and nature: "Our common definition of nature is that it is the non-human world" (Castree, 2005: 8). Furthermore, this nature is placed outside human settlements, Castree continues. For Maori, there is no such divide between humans and nature. Therefore, the environment effects of the dredging would also impact their culture and traditions.

Regarding New Zealand, Pawson and Brooking explain that “[e]verything that surrounds us – rural and urban landscapes, coastlines, even the sea – is shaped, traversed and harvested in accordance with cultural imperatives and social needs. Our awareness of these environments, and our representations and interpretations of them, reflect human traditions and expectations” (Pawson and Brooking, 2013: 19). The plural form already indicates that there is a multitude of traditions and expectations, as well as representations and interpretations. These became visible in the Tauranga case. The harbour, its surrounding landmarks and landscapes as well as specific features were perceived differently and had different roles and importances in the life realities of the actors, such as local Maori, planners or port representatives. Also the expectations that were formulated towards the harbour were manifold, they play a role as shipping channel for transport and economy, as a place linked to myths and spirituality, or as a provider of food and mana.

In Lefebvrian terms, Te Paritaha is an *espace vécu* and *perçu* for local Maori. *Espace perçu* is relevant because they use the area to collect pipi and physically engage with it. Furthermore, Te Paritaha is a source of their mana, and needed to teach and keep alive cultural practices and knowledge. In this sense, Te Paritaha plays a role as an *espace vécu*. By naming landscape features and linking myths and stories to them, an overlap develops between *espace vécu* and *espace perçu*. This shows that there is often no clear separation between the different modalities of space. Often, they fade into one another. The categories of *espace vécu*, *perçu* and *conçu* help to focus on different aspects of space. However, the goal is not to separate different spaces and the processes that produce them.

12.5 Conclusion

In the Tauranga dredging case, the conflict lines ran mainly between the Port of Tauranga and local Maori. For several years, Maori were fighting to prevent the dredging. On the positive side, several mitigation measures were implemented, and a relationship with the port established. However, the dredging was carried out in the end and could not be stopped. The Environment Court saw the big problem in balancing economic benefits for the port, the region and probably whole Aotearoa New Zealand on the one hand, and Maori interests on the other hand. In this case, the historical context and developments are especially significant, as the dredging can be understood as one event in a continuum of the tension field between Pakeha developments and Maori culture. After losing authority over Te Awanui in the 19th century, local Maori also seem to have lost their authority to define what Te Awanui is or how it is seen. Whereas for local Maori, the harbour is rather a relative,

descending from the same ancestors as the people, and having its own life force (*mauri*), the Port of Tauranga sees it as a mainly physical-material object that can be formed by humans so that it fulfils services such as providing a shipping channel for the transport of goods. Maori had the impression that their worldview and culture was seen as a thing that could be weighed up against other issues such as economy and remedied with mitigation measures and money.

I identified three main issues in this case study that are all closely connected to the issue of how to integrate Maori and Pakeha world-views with each other. First, I focused on the decision-making process to investigate how the different interests are integrated and especially how Maori concerns influence the process. Here, the underlying power-relations and the different systems of knowledge became visible, with structures that reach back to the colonial period. Thus, in Tauranga, the conflict is closely tied to issues of epistemic injustice. Second, the role of Te Paritaha and *kaimoana* was outlined to better understand the relation of Maori with their environment. Their fight against the dredging and the strong emotions can be understood as a way to fight for their culture and their understanding of the environment, as well as for the power to define what “environment” is. Local Maori were so much concerned about the shellfish bed, because they wanted the port and the council to respect the value and cultural traditions that these mussels represent. This issue again is closely linked to the third point, the ways the coastal landscape is perceived by different groups. Two different maps of my interview partners as well as the description of the “invisible” cultural landscape revealed the multitude of space and spatial knowledges in the area of Tauranga Harbour.

As in all my three case studies, there is always a wider context to the conflict. My interview partners deliberately told me about issues that were connected to the conflict, or were overarching issues in which the current conflict is embedded or a symptom of. One of these overarching issues is the general development of the port, which was generally seen with big concerns from Maori side. Since the initial development of the port, many significant and traditional Maori places were destroyed or damaged. In the past, space seemed to be perceived by the port as a *tabula rasa* which could be used as wished. Maori claims to the same area were not taken very serious until some decades ago. With the Treaty settlements and newer legislation like the RMA, the situation seems to improve. The Environment Court accepts for example *waiata* (songs) and stories as evidence. The regional council puts more emphasis on consultation with *iwi* as an effect of the process. Also, despite the conflict, a relationship between the port and local *iwi* developed. Still, many Maori have the impression that the primacy of economic development excuses any adverse effects on their culture or

the environment. The hegemony of capitalist space as attested by Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1991/1974: 39) seems to be quite clear in this case. Maori spaces that developed out of a different world view and build much more on cultural and spiritual issues are taken into account but are not strong enough to stop the development. With the shellfish bed, cultural traditions are also “dredged away”. The Maori perspective reveals an approach to how landscape and the relation to it can be perceived and lived, such as genealogical links to landscape features for example. Other forms of space begin to be accepted more and taken more serious, and cannot be neglected or ignored any more in development processes. From a Lefebvrian perspective, it became visible in this case how closely the different modalities of space are linked to each other. Economic space as is represented by *espace conçu* is not only a thought space, but one that need specific materialities for its functioning. In this case, this would be the dredging of the shipping channels so that large ships can call at the Port of Tauranga so it stays linked to the world economy.

13 Discussion and Conclusion: Producing coastal spaces

In this dissertation, I investigated the production of space at Aotearoa New Zealand's coast on the basis of three conflicts around coastal infrastructures. I showed that there is not just one coast, rather, a multiplicity of coastal spaces is constantly produced. These spaces serve different purposes, are linked to a variety of practices, and the multiplicity can be a reason for conflicts. In my case studies, conflicts emerged when different spaces were produced in the same coastal area.

Coastal landscapes are produced in many ways, with actors drawing from everyday experiences, cultural traditions, spiritual beliefs, visual perceptions or emotional connections. Next to this, also economic conditions influence the production of space, either as an argument, i.e. for economic development, or as determining the resources the actors have to produce spaces and defend them. Moreover, structures such as the legislative or planning system frame the options for action to produce spaces or include these spaces in decision-making processes.

Often, the "rational" or professional perspective of experts was incompatible with other social group's perspectives on the coast, which could for example base on emotions or culture. In Wellington, these are for example residents that use the bay for swimming or surfing. In Auckland, people want to keep the Waitemata Harbour accessible for sailing, or they favour a different form of waterfront development. In Tauranga, the harbour means something completely different to local Maori than to the port company. In the following, I will recapitulate and discuss my research questions as well as draw general conclusions from this work.

Production of coasts

My first set of research questions revolved around the production of coasts. More specifically, the questions were (a) What coastal spaces are produced in the case studies? (b) How do different actors produce these spaces? (c) Which concepts of space are relevant in which way?

My first research question 1(a) aims at finding out what coastal spaces were produced in my case studies. Following Lefebvre, on an abstract level, there is just one space (Lefebvre,

1991/1974). However, if we investigate a case concretely and detailed, a variety of spaces can be observed. I was able to show empirically that a multitude of coastal spaces was and is produced. These were for example natural coasts, social coasts, economic coasts, emotional coasts, or cultural coasts. This reflects the different themes and issues that were relevant in the three cases, and also on a general level regarding the production of space at New Zealand's coast. However, these coasts do not exist as clear types. They always overlap with other conceptions, as the actors that produce them usually have several motivations or drivers. In the case studies, each setting had its own specific coastal spaces produced by a variety of actors and processes. Regarding Lefebvres spatial triad, elements from all modes of space (*conçu*, *vécu*, *perçu*) were existing in all cases.

In Auckland, *espace conçu* was produced by the framing of the port as important economic driver of the city. Furthermore, the port area has its own precinct and defined boundaries in the planning documents. Not only supporters of the project, but also opponents produced *espace conçu*. Economic development is not per se rejected by the opponents of the project. Some put an economic argument forward as well, while highlighting other development opportunities for the port area, such as waterfront development. The opponents of the project were also active in the production of the lived and perceived spaces, *espace vécu* and *espace perçu*. Here, the main role attributed to the harbour was space for recreational use, i.e. sailing, and visual amenity through its perceived naturalness and the visual connection it provides. Opponents feared that the port might intrude into "their" parts of the harbour. They were concerned that this would disturb their recreational activities. Furthermore, the development could have affected view lines. Both effects could have had an impact on the emotional connectedness of Aucklanders to the Waitemata Harbour. Even though the harbour is a highly developed environment, it is still perceived as natural by some opponents. In contrast to the harbour, they describe the port as ugly and unhealthy. As I showed before, the Waitemata harbour serves as a counterpart to a capitalist lifestyle, it is needed to provide relief from city life, work, and the built environment. Furthermore, the residents of the city identify with the harbour. One and the same harbour caters for the needs of leisure and work.

In Tauranga, the water of the harbour provides the port with a transportation possibility for ships. It is a technical space, monitored to guarantee ship safety. The shipping channels are regularly enlarged to meet the demands of the shipping industry and the global development towards bigger ships, because more goods are traded and transported. This modelled, calculated, technical and economic space, which for most parts falls clearly into the category of *espace conçu*, is contrasted by a Maori perspective on the harbour. They create an *espace*

véçu through the stories they tell about Te Awanui, the oral history about the area that is passed on between generations, and other cultural practices. Furthermore, the harbour provides them with *kaimoana* as a source of food and *mana*. However, these production processes are not completely separated from each other. For example, Maori researchers integrate Western science in their work, and employ it as a tool in Environment Court trials. This shows that there are no clearly separable ways of producing *espace conçu*, *véçu* or *perçu*. A dichotomic understanding of for example *espace perçu* and *véçu* does not make sense here. Rather, a complex relation between actors, environments and knowledges produces spaces, employing practices, knowledges or arguments from different fields.

In Wellington, I focused on the professional landscape assessment, and on the residents and users of the coastal area and their connection to the coast. Here, again, the production of *espace conçu* happened mostly from the official side, carried out by landscape planners or architects, for example. These were appointed by either the airport to produce technical reports for the assessment of environmental effects for the consent application, or by the councils to evaluate these reports. The experts were drawing from international and national standards and methods to create their assessments and evaluations. However, there is not one agreed procedure to assess the landscape, or its naturalness, which leads not only to contestation of the reports by opponents of the project, but also to a general disagreement between experts as well over methods and definitions. Not only is it hard to assess the landscape in apparently objective ways, but also the participation of the public and the incorporation of public opinions was perceived as insufficient by several of my interview partners. In the case of Wellington, the landscape assessments produce *espace conçu*, but also *espace perçu*, as they built upon perceptions of the landscape. *Espace perçu* is furthermore produced in this case by material changes and practices. This includes (potential) construction works, and the land reclamation itself (transforming the coastal waters in land). Temporary closure of coastal areas during construction would also create new spaces and change uses and perceptions of the area. This has happened in the past as well, as there was already land reclaimed for the current runway. Also residents and users engage with the physical-material space, e.g. through recreational activities such as swimming, snorkelling, or surfing. Residents and users are also the groups that are mainly producing *espace véçu* through their experiences, their everyday lives and their emotions towards the coast.

However, I do not only want to focus on the spaces themselves, but on the actual production processes. The discussion above already incorporated some points that are also interesting for the research questions 1(b), aiming at *how* different actors produce these spaces.

The practices of the production of space differ in time and place and are on the one side very specific to each situation. However, on the other side, there are also some general practices, as I already discussed in chapter 2. There are several practices that mainly (re-)produce *espace conçu*. The main driver for this is planning (in my cases especially the consenting process), which is based on Western laws, frameworks and procedures, which favour scientific knowledge. This process is per se exclusionary, as it is not always possible to be involved in the consenting process (in the case of Aotearoa New Zealand either because the consent authority decides that the case does not have to be publicly notified, or because not all actors can afford the resource-intensive processes of participation and appealing). Laws and policies such as the RMA and the NZCPS are further methods to produce spaces and strengthen distinct ideas about coastal spaces. Moreover, the experts' opinions in reports and statements is a strong mechanism to produce *espace conçu*. Generally, especially economic actors frame coastal infrastructures and their services as indispensable, progress and development are seen as unstoppable (and desirable), and a natural part of a globalization process. These practices appear to be impersonal, objective and science-driven, and therefore legitimate.

Espace vécu is produced through the different life realities of residents and users of the coast. The practices revolve around how people live in the coastal areas, and how they are connected to it. Here, the everyday practices as well as traditional and cultural practices add to the production of the lived space and create its meaning to the people. Issues such as emotions, identity, or attachment are intertwined with the production of *espace vécu*, which became visible in the interviews as well. My interview partners told personal or traditional stories about these spaces, have memories, feelings and experiences tied to the coast. How space is produced through narratives and stories can be well seen in the example of Tauranga Moana. Proverbs and stories, e.g. on how Mauao came to the place where it is today, are one part of producing *espace vécu*.

Espace perçu is produced by material practices, daily routines and perceptions of spaces. In my cases, the material construction practices obviously were changing the built and/or natural environment, either through adding structures, material, and land or taking them away. Collective practices such as surfing or sailing, and the collection of seafood are also part of the production processes of *espace perçu*. Moreover, the visual perception of the landscape plays a role in the production of *espace perçu*, and was voiced by interview partners in all case studies.

It has to be noted again that there is no clear distinction made between practices that produce specific modalities of space. Rather, practices produce spaces which can have characteristics of more than one modality of space (e.g. being both *espace perçu* and *conçu*). A good example to show how closely intertwined the three modalities of space and their production processes are, is the case of collecting seafood. It is at the same time a material practice, a cultural tradition, and can be subject to regulation or protection in laws, plans or policies. Thus, it relates to all *espaces vécu, perçu, and conçu*. However, it remains a challenge how to deal with the perspectives and practices of indigenous people. Imposing a Lefebvrian terminology on these concepts can be seen very critically as just another way of colonizing indigenous ways of knowing and living with Western thinking (Radcliffe, 2017: 329).

My third research question 1(c) asks which concepts of space are relevant in what way. As an overarching concept, I chose landscapes to moderate between Lefebvre's abstract theory and the specific spaces of my case studies. Landscapes do have both material as well as immaterial aspects, which makes them especially suitable to understand the production of space. Moreover, the coast can be understood as a specific landscape type. And, last but not least, landscapes were a conception of space that was explicitly included in the decision making processes in the form of landscape assessment.

Of course, also other conceptions of space could have been interesting to look at. I think here especially of place (Graham and Healey, 1999; Hubbard, 2005; Jessop et al., 2008). Issues such as sense of place, identity, emotional attachment or belonging are often discussed using place as spatial concept (Kearns and Collins, 2012; Ruru et al., 2011a; Stephenson, 2010). Also scales could have been a spatial concept offering interesting insights, especially regarding argumentation strategies and networks, for example how local life is affected by developments that are driven by global processes. Or how the conservation of a local strip of coast is framed as an issues of national importance. However, this would have been beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Implications

Now I turn towards the second set of questions, which focuses on the implications of the production processes. This means that spaces are not just produced for their own sake. They are part as well as product of social relations, processes and practices. The questions of the second set are (a) What are the aims and interests of the production of coastal spaces with regard to infrastructural development projects? (b) What power structures are (re)produced

in the processes of coastal production? (c) How, if so, do marginalised and subaltern actors and discourses get integrated in planning processes? Where and how are they excluded?

So, what are the aims and interests of the production of coastal spaces with regard to infrastructural development projects? The production of space is usually happening unconsciously. Actors are not aware that their behaviour, lives, work, or, more generally, practices produce space. This perspective is an analytical tool used by the researcher. However, even though the production of space happens unconsciously, it is embedded in and a product of social practices and therefore not neutral, as practices follow an (sometimes unconscious) aim. In this case, actors produce coastal spaces in such a way that their own position is legitimised. The production of space establishes certain (world-)views as well as norms and values. Often, these are linked to the material circumstances of the coastal landscape. If an actor or a group of people is successful in establishing his/her/their space as the legitimate or dominant one, it is easier to legitimate their interests because they seem to be obviously linked to the (material) space.

Supporters of the developments usually used an economic argumentation to legitimate the infrastructural projects. Space was mainly produced as *espace conçu*, and other aspects of it were rather diminished than emphasized. They framed the infrastructure such as port or airport as an important player in the global economy and as a vital link for local business to these markets. Therefore, they argue this infrastructure needs to be developed. Furthermore, the coastal area is usually already altered by the infrastructure, and, in their eyes, not natural anymore anyways. Actors who focus on economic arguments stress the national or even global significance of this specific infrastructure. Economic growth and keeping up with the world economy seem to be crucial drivers for the developments. For example, container ships are getting larger, therefore Aotearoa New Zealand ports „have to have” the preconditions to enable these ships to call at Aotearoa New Zealand ports. On a national scale, this argument seems to fit equally: the infrastructures are needed to support Aotearoa New Zealand’s economy in the best way, and the developments such as enlargements are needed by the economy. Everyone who does not follow this logic seems to be against the public interest. Putting the issues on a national or global scale makes them more important and severe. “Local” arguments against the developments appear to be egocentric and narrow-minded. Science and technical perspectives are used to make the arguments sound objective, neutral, true, or rational. As I showed before, “objective” reports are not objective, but draw from specific knowledge, function in a specific system and have a certain perspective. They represent just one position of many. However, they seem to be legitimised by following a dominant capitalist growth paradigm. Or, in other words, in my

material the necessity of development and growth in general was seldom questioned, only the *how* was discussed, for example the location.

Opponents follow more diverse strategies. One is to frame the coastal space as a natural or wild area that needs to be protected. Here, the same area that an experts report has evaluated as not very natural anymore can still be perceived as natural. Nature is seen as deserving protection both for its own sake, but also as a provider of recreational opportunities, identity, and emotional attachment, and as a counterpart to a capitalist, urban lifestyle. Furthermore, also opponents follow economic argumentation strategies. Some criticise the calculations of the developers, and therefore their validity and the necessity of the infrastructural development, as for example in Wellington. Some opposed developments in general – they were critical of capitalism and the economic imperative. Others, however, had the opinion that coasts are valuable also in monetary terms, for example as an asset for tourism or as a site for waterfront development. In Auckland, opponents were not generally against economic development. However, they favoured other forms (e.g., relocating the port and transforming the waterfront area). Thus, they engaged in an economic line of argumentation and entered the production of *espace conçu* to refute the arguments of the supporters of the development. This can also be understood as a strategy to use the dominant and successful ways of producing *espace conçu* for their own interests.

Moreover, opponents of the developments also use national or global framings to support their arguments, for example regarding nature protection. They brought up the topic of climate change in the case of the airport development, and argued that the number of flights would not increase because it would become either too expensive or socially not accepted to fly anymore. Furthermore, with sea level rise, the runway in Wellington might be flooded by the sea. On a national scale, the concerns about the conservation of a natural and wild coastline prevail. The argument is that the Aotearoa New Zealand coastline as a whole experiences strong development pressure, and for this reason, there should not be more development but rather it should be preserved. Still, people who oppose the projects because of their connection to the place seem to stay in a localised perspective. The personal experiences or localised knowledges are often not taken seriously and seen as emotional, personal, subjective and irrational.

I will now turn to the issue of power structures that are (re)produced in the process of production of coastal space as well as the marginalisation of certain actors. Question 2(b) and (c) are closely related, therefore I will discuss them jointly.

Power is enabled by disposing over resources/capital that allows to take part in the decision-making process (money, time, social contacts, status, knowledge, ...). In my case studies, opponents voiced that they needed resources to be able to protest against the developments. People that already dispose over resources or capital can thus participate more easily and advocate their spatial conceptions. Furthermore, the willingness of decision-makers, planners, experts, and so on to include a greater variety of perspectives also decides about how strong e.g. members of the public can participate in the process. If we look at the councils or experts in the processes, a planner explained that he wants to enhance the participation of local *iwi*, and a landscape architect stated that it is very important to include the communities.

These points are not surprising, however, the case studies showed how constructed groups such as “residents” are not a homogenous group but rather very heterogeneous. When it comes to participating in the development processes, the access to resources poses a problem in making one’s voice heard. The processes are often lengthy and time consuming. Financial resources (for example to pay a lawyer) and knowledge are necessary to understand the complicated technical reports or language of the courts (Gunder and Mouat, 2002). Furthermore, also social capital plays a role. This became obvious in the Auckland case: Here, relatively well-off residents were the main opponents. They had the financial resources to stem such a project, they had personal connections to lawyers, PR professionals and so on that supported them. This were for sure not the only factors that supported their success over the port. However, these factors facilitated participation in the process and the assertion of their position.

Furthermore, there are also structural conditions that enable or hinder how people and groups can influence the decision-making process. This becomes especially visible when focusing on the issue of epistemic injustice that was discussed in the Tauranga case. As I showed already in the historical overview in chapter 7, all my case studies are set in the (post-)colonial context of Aotearoa New Zealand. An originally European system of law and planning was imported to Aotearoa New Zealand and imposed on Maori. Even though Treaty Settlements and a growing awareness of indigenous rights lead to some improvements and the incorporation of Maori issues in several sections of the RMA, for example, the system itself is unchallenged. It is still a non-Maori system that automatically marginalises certain knowledges and practices. *Pakeha* institutions and processes structure the way in which things are negotiated and decided.

Moreover, plans in general can support or inhibit the production of spaces. If for example a coastal area is categorized as port zone, it is clear that port development will be favoured here. If an area is labelled as “outstanding natural landscape”, landscape protection can outweigh economic development. However, this formal codification is not the only way of establishing landscapes, as I showed in my research.

How do different constructions of coastal space influence development processes for infrastructural projects in Aotearoa New Zealand?

The research showed that there are always several coastal spaces produced in each case study area. There are more formal ones, relating to *espace conçu*, that are manifest in laws, policies, plans and resource consent applications. Even though the economic spaces of the applicants and supporters are often quite dominant, also other forms of spaces are included in law, policies and plans. However, economic interests still often count as the most important ones (and easy to measure ones) that override other interests. Recreational uses, feelings or spiritual meanings are more easily dismissed or not taken as serious. This has been ascribed to a number of reasons, such as a lack of methods or training of experts in social research, the dominance of a growth paradigm, or structures that favour certain types of knowledges and spaces over others. It is also important which actors produce space, and how they can articulate their interests.

Furthermore, I want to point out that the production of space is a process that is influenced by the historical context. People have specific associations with the coast, memories, or myths, that are based on historic developments. Also laws, planning and so on were developed in distinct contexts. For example, Maori ways of interacting with and understanding the environment were disrupted by the arrival of European colonisers and the import of other practices and knowledges regarding space and coastal environments. The emergence of a beach culture later on has led to a strong attachment of New Zealanders to their coast, and also fuels protest to development plans. Furthermore, the neoliberalisation of many sectors in Aotearoa New Zealand such as planning or port management, or a general attitude towards economic development affected the coast. This context also frames the influence actors and their spaces can unfold within development processes. Therefore, the production of space in the case studies cannot be singled out, but has to be analysed and interpreted in both historical and recent context. My aim is not to give policy recommendations here. Still, to identify and understand these spaces and their production processes can be important in untangling conflict settings, understanding the positions of different actors and finding solutions for them.

On the conceptual level, planning is one of the most important practices that influences the production of space. This includes law in general such as the Resource Management Act 1991 and the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement, down to specific details within them, for example how landscape assessment is dealt with. These laws and policies codify how coastal landscapes are understood, what is important for their definition, who is allowed to make official claims on it and to decide what happens in the coastal area. In the case studies, especially in Wellington, there was an obvious divergence in how the coastal landscape was understood. On the one hand, residents had a strong emotional attachment, and on the other hand, landscape planners were analysing the coast with their streamlined methods. However, the Environment Court also accepts evidence such as personal statements or *waiata* (songs). Still, to enter the process is tied to hurdles, especially if the developer chooses certain procedures where the hearing at the local council is skipped and the matter goes to the Environment Court directly. This should be avoided if more diverse perspectives are to be represented in the process.

In the Aotearoa New Zealand example, a tendency can be observed towards a more inclusive decision making process, and laws and policies try to incorporate different interests. However, the development of coasts remains a question of who has the power to decide what happens at the coast. This includes all the aspects I have discussed in this dissertation, such as what knowledge is included, or who can participate.

The wild coast

One overarching interest in my work next to the production of space are environment-society relations. The understanding of nature is closely intertwined with the production of space, as it informs for example a motivation to protect certain coastal areas. A nature-culture binary (Castree, 2005) was prevalent in my case studies, especially in Auckland and Wellington. This became observable in the notion of the Aotearoa New Zealand coast as a wild, untouched area. In this dichotomic thinking, the dispute is about how “natural” the coast is. The more natural, the more it deserves protection, so the common argumentation, which can also be found for example in the assessment of natural character. More cultural influence thus means automatically less naturalness. Especially conservationists state that areas of coastal wilderness are rapidly diminishing and that urban infrastructure dominates the coast in many regions, “rather than a beautiful natural coastline” (Peart, 2009: 10). This line of argumentation could also be found in my case studies. The case of Wellington is especially interesting regarding “nature” and the coast. Here, the coastline was already severely modified in the last decades by the airport development, as well as residential

development and other industry and infrastructure. Still, residents described the area as a wild place, and wanted to protect it from further development. Nature or wilderness are constructed as a counterpart to economic or industrial development. Kearns and Collins (2012) argue that people can feel connected to the coast because they experience nature and wilderness there. The authors refer mainly to undeveloped coasts. However, apparently also developed coasts can fulfil this function, and coasts do not need necessarily to be untouched for people to get in contact with what they define as nature. "Naturalness" can hardly be measured in objective ways, as the cases showed. Thus, the constructedness of a nature-culture binary becomes obvious here, and a first step to dissolve it. However, it is still inherent in many argumentation lines. Opponents of the project tried to frame the affected areas as "natural" as possible, to underline that they were worth preserving. Generally, a contrast was usually made between industrial or urban areas (such as ports, airports, commercial areas) and natural or recreational areas (such as beach, water, currents, wind). Cronon (1995: 80) argues that the construction of a dualism between nature or wilderness on the one side and culture on the other side completely separates humans from nature by definition and therefore blocks any ways of finding solutions. Allowing diversity rather than setting up binaries could be helpful to escape this trap.

The coast as infrastructure?

Next to the production of the coastal landscape, I also want to touch upon on the relation of coasts and infrastructure. As already introduced in chapter 4, not only a port or an airport can be understood as infrastructure, but also nature or landscape (Carse, 2012). One way of thinking infrastructure and the coast together is to understand the coast itself as infrastructure (see also Herbeck and Flitner, 2019). The coastal landscape provides services to society, such as amenity values or touristic assets. Or, even though it was not subject to this work, some natural coastal processes such as dune accretion can also serve as protection against storm surges (Gesing, 2019). From another angle, coasts are also cultural infrastructures. For example, Maori teach their children about cultural traditions and beliefs. This can be compared to a school or a church building, just that in this case, the coastal landscape provides this space. Understanding landscape as infrastructure in either of these two ways can open new lines of thinking and arguing. It allows to compare landscapes with technical infrastructures, or completely abolish this distinction and discuss them together. This also immediately makes apparent the possible tensions that can arise out of this conceptualisation. There are different expectations towards the role the coast should fulfil, and these can be incompatible.

Embracing complexity, embracing conflicts

The theoretical approaches and concepts used in this dissertation turned out to work together well. Their openness allowed to combine them and make them fit for the purpose of this work. Moreover, also other combinations could lead to interesting findings in future research, such as the incorporation of other concepts of space (e.g., place, scale). However, critically reviewing my theoretical framework, the question arises how much the use of Lefebvres theory helped to generate insights. It became clear to me throughout my research, that the spatial triad cannot easily be applied to space, and there is a risk to merely label spaces and sort them into different categories. Just labelling space as either *espace conçu*, *perçu*, or *vécu* remains a pitfall. However, it was helpful to use the framework to be reminded to always get back to the underlying processes and embrace the complexity and diversity of spaces. Using Lefebvres theory is one way to investigate conflicts around coastal infrastructures and its openness allows to incorporate other relevant concepts and approaches. Still, it remains questionable if these three modalities of space are really necessary to get these insights. As there is still relatively little research using Lefebvres theory combined with a political ecology background in human geography, both more theoretical work as well as grounded empirical research could be helpful to further evaluate this approach. The method of research participant mapping proved to be a fruitful way to investigate the production of space. The maps provided alternatives to official documents and allowed to capture the spatial images the research participants had of the coast.

Especially due to growing development pressures on many coastlines worldwide, qualitative research on coasts will remain an important field of studies in the future. Even though I aimed at a broad analysis of the production of coastal spaces, it could also be interesting to carry out more detailed analysis of the political economy, the nature-culture binary or the political system. Moreover, investigating the production of space in settings without an open conflict could put even another angle to the issue. This would allow to uncover more hidden and subtle processes, and engage with silent actors (Gunder and Mouat, 2002; Stephenson and Lawson, 2013). In cases with manifest contestation (as in this work), research can be blind for some issues that are not publicly voiced. Furthermore, even though I think that research should always also be allowed to be carried out for its own sake, I still think that it is important to bring thoughts, ideas and findings out of academia into the actual processes, reporting back to the research participants and get into a dialogue.

In this work, I delved into three Aotearoa New Zealand case studies and showed the complex and diverse ways of the production of space at Aotearoa New Zealand's coastline. I

empirically investigated the production of coastal spaces in Aotearoa New Zealand, revealed different layers and underlying narratives around coastal spaces. Even though I did not aim at developing a general theory, still the results of this research can be compared with other research, not only on the coast, but in all settings where (competing) processes of spatial production take place. The themes I identified in this work can be expected to be an issue in many cases, even though probably in different form. This comprises the role of economic rationalism and capitalism, the understanding of nature, forms of epistemic injustice and postcolonial power relations, the set-up of the planning system, and the role the coast has in culture, everyday life, as well as people's perceptions and emotions. However, the actual spaces and processes of the production of coastal landscapes in Aotearoa New Zealand cannot be generalised in their complexities.

I want to conclude that it is important to understand coasts not as a pre-given object or entity, but as a produced space and constructed idea. This constantly takes place by actors in their social relations, in structures such as planning or the economic system, framed by history, culture, politics, and power. Moreover, also the physical-material world plays a role, in the form of natural environment or built structures. I think it is important to acknowledge and accept this multiplicity and complexity of spaces and to analyse them carefully in every single case. This can also help in development and planning processes. Here, the focus should not lay on avoiding contestation and conflict. Rather, these can be valuable indicators and entry points to explore spaces.

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Appendix 1

List of cited newspaper articles.

Auckland			
<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Author</i>
New Zealand Herald	11.02.2015	Port's secret harbour grab	Brian Rudman
New Zealand Herald	12.02.2015	Officials quietly pass wharf plan	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	20.03.2015	Auckland Harbour been turned 'from a harbour into a river'	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	01.04.2015	Council asks Port of Auckland to halt wharf extensions	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	02.04.2015	Stop wharf extensions or else - council	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	08.04.2015	The People v The Port	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	20.04.2015	Port stoush: Extension going ahead	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	21.04.2015	Port presses on with extensions	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	25.04.2015	Port v Council: The battle for Auckland's harbour	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	29.04.2015	Auckland port: Options floated in wharf war	Bernard Orsman
New Zealand Herald	22.05.2015	These Councillors voted to violate your harbour!	Advertisement by Stop Stealing Our Harbour
New Zealand Herald	02.06.2015	Port history littered with blunders	Kim Goldwater
New Zealand Herald	04.06.2016	Phil Goff promises to move port for new homes, businesses and public spaces	No author
Tauranga			
Bay of Plenty Times	10.11.1990	Ability to handle all ships dredging objective	Andrew Campbell
Bay of Plenty Times	03.03.1992	Boulders tough tasks for dredges	Andrew Campbell
Bay of Plenty Times	09.03.2010	Deepen channels or lose ships: Port	Martin Tiffany
Bay of Plenty Times	11.03.2010	Iwi stand united against dredging	Martin Tiffany
Bay of Plenty Times	04.06.2010	Port has green light for \$50m dredging	Graham Skellern
Bay of Plenty Times	15.11.2011	Port passions overflow in hikoi	John Cousins
Wellington			
Evening Post	16.05.1992	The song remains the same	Tony Wood
Evening Post	13.11.1997	Airport battle lines were drawn 90 years ago	Barry Hawkins
Stuff.co.nz	02.10.2015	Wellington Airport 'gifts' \$ 10,000 to home owners affected by runway extension	Michael Forbes

Appendix 2

Example for interview questions. The guideline was customised individually for each interview.

Introduction

Please introduce yourself and your position.

How and why are/were you related to the opposition against / support for [*development*]?

How did you get aware of the situation?

For how long have you been involved?

Situation

What is the conflict all about in your opinion? How far does the conflict date back?

Who is involved? Who is supporting and opposing the extension works?

What is your (institutions) position within the planning process? Why are you (your institution) opposing/supporting the project?

In what ways are you (your institution) affected by the project?

Who will gain, who will lose by the project in your opinion?

Did the conflict situation change in the course of time? How? Why?

Did the reasons for opposing/supporting the [*development project*] change in the course of time?

What impact do opponents have on the process? How they included in the planning process?

Do you think the existing forms of consultation and participation are adequate? Are they adequate forms and instruments to reflect opponent's issues? If not, what would be better?

Space and the coast

What is the coastal area used for?

What role does the setting at the coast play?

What does the region/place/ the coast mean to you (your institution)? What do you connect to the place/landscape? What qualities are important for you?

Are there any local stories/histories specific to this area/place/landscape?

What role do sacred places and places of special cultural importance play?

Would you support/oppose the project if it would take place somewhere else? Are there place-specific arguments?


Is there anything you would like to add?

Map Sketch


I would like to give you the opportunity to sketch what you consider important in regard to the project/situation from your perspective. It can resemble a map, but does not have to be "perfect" at all. Just a rough sketch. There is no right or wrong way of doing it.

Appendix 3


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
M-02 (Tauranga) with comments




M-07 (Tauranga)




M-07 (Tauranga) with comments




M-15 (Auckland)




M-15 (Auckland) with comments




M-16 (Auckland)




M-16 (Auckland) with comments




M-17 (Wellington)




M-17 (Wellington) with comments




M-18 (Wellington)




M-18 (Wellington) with comments



M-23 (Wellington)



M-23 (Wellington) with comments



Eigenständigkeitserklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich

- 1) die Arbeit ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt habe;
- 2) keine anderen, als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe; und
- 3) die den benutzten Werken wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe.

Ich stimme einer Überprüfung der Dissertation mit qualifizierter Software im Rahmen der Untersuchung von Plagiatsvorwürfen zu.

Bremen, den 28. Oktober 2019

(Mara Ort)

