

Ethnic Construction and Journalistic Narrative.  
A Discourse Analysis of Selected Hungarian and Romanian  
Newspapers in the Light of the Hungarian Status Law.

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*To my grandparents and Mihaela*  
*Meinen Großeltern und Mihaela*  
*Nagyszüleimnek és Mihaela-nak*  
*Bunicilor mei și Mihaelei*

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Table 1: Frequently used abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full name
A	Adevărul
CE	Council of Europe
CHN	Certificate of Hungarian Nationality <sup>1</sup>
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
H	Hungary
HTMH	Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad
KSH	Central Statistics Office
MÁÉRT	Hungarian Standing Conference
MH	Magyar Hírlap
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSZ	Népszabadság
ONM	Orbán-Năstase-Memorandum
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RL	România Liberă
RO	Romania
SCG	Serbia and Montenegro
SK	Slovakia

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Orbán-Năstase-Memorandum the name was changed to Hungarian Certificate. For reasons of simplicity I shall be always using the abbreviation CHN.

Table 2: Relevant political parties

Party	Official name	English translation	State	Orientation <sup>2</sup>
FIDESZ	Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége	Young Democrats' Union	H	Conservative
FKGP	Független Kisgazdák Pártja	Independent Smallholders Party	H	-
MDF	Magyar Demokrata Fórum	Hungarian Democratic Forum	H	Conservative / liberal
MIÉP	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	H	Nationalistic
MSZP <sup>3</sup>	Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party	H	Social Democratic
PCR	Partidul Comunist Român	Romanian Communist Party	RO	-
PNL	Partidul Național Liberal	National Liberal Party	RO	Conservative
PD	Partidul Democrat	Democratic Party	RO	Liberal
PRM	Partidul România Mare	Greater Romania Party	RO	Nationalistic
PSD <sup>4</sup>	Partidul Social Democrat	Social Democratic Party	RO	Social Democratic
SMK / MKP	Strana Maďarske Koalície / Magyar Koálició Párt	Hungarian Coalition Party	SK	Conservative
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	Alliance of Free Democrats	H	Liberal
UDMR / RMDSZ	Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România / Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania	RO	Liberal

<sup>2</sup> Obviously, the estimations of orientation are just tendencies, which are difficult to differentiate. They should only be used as a rough indicator.

<sup>3</sup> Not to be confused with its predecessor, the MSZMP, the Hungarian Socialist Labour Party, that ruled during the socialist era.

<sup>4</sup> FSN was the PCR's successor and later changed its name to PDSR and eventually to PSD.

Table 3: Relevant cities, regions and states<sup>5</sup>

Official Name	Romanian	Hungarian	English <sup>6</sup>	German <sup>7</sup>
Alba Iulia	-	Gyulafehérvár	<i>Alba-Iulia</i>	Karlsburg
Banat	-	Bánság	Banat	Banat
Bratislava	Bratislava	Pozsony	Bratislava	Preßburg
Bucureşti	-	Bukarest	Bucharest	Bukarest
Budapest	Budapesta	-	Budapest	Budapest
Cluj-Napoca <sup>8</sup>	-	Kolozsvár	<i>Cluj-Napoca</i>	Klausenburg
Crişana	-	Körösvidék	<i>Crisana</i>	Kreischgebiet
Magyarország	Ungaria	-	Hungary	Ungarn
Maramureş	-	Máramaros	<i>Maramures</i>	Marmarosch
Moldova <sup>9</sup>	-	Moldva	Moldavia	Moldau
România	-	Románia	Romania	Rumänien
Slovensko	Slovacia	Szlovákia	Slovakia	Slowakei
Ţara Românească	-	Havasalföld	Wallachia	Walachei
Târgu Mureş	-	Marosvásárhely	<i>Targu Mures</i>	Neumarkt am Mieresch
Timişoara	-	Temesvár	<i>Timisoara</i>	Temeschwar
Ţinutul Secuiesc <sup>10</sup>	-	Székelyföld	Szeklerland	Seklerland
Transilvania / Ardeal <sup>11</sup>	-	Erdély	Transylvania	Siebenbürgen

<sup>5</sup> Sources: Lelkes 1992 and Szabó 2003.

<sup>6</sup> English names when available. Otherwise official names without diacritical signs and in italics.

<sup>7</sup> Due to the extended literature in German, I decided to add the old German names to this table.

<sup>8</sup> Cluj-Napoca was called Cluj up to 1975 when the town's name was extended with the name of the Roman garrison that used to be in the vicinity. It was supposed to be a constant reminder to the city's Roman origin. Practically, the town is still called Cluj and the full name is used only for official purposes.

<sup>9</sup> All synonyms refer to the region within Romania and not to the Republic of Moldavia.

<sup>10</sup> Sometimes also referred to as Ţara Secuilor.

<sup>11</sup> Although Transilvania is the official name, the inhabitants of the region are called *Ardeleni*.

## Preliminary remarks

„The only absolutely certain thing is the future, since the past is constantly changing.”<sup>12</sup>

One of anthropology's prime objectives is the analysis and comparison of cultural phenomena. The element of comparison is derived from the realisation that humans live in different social settings and within different cultural frameworks (Fischer 1992). These differences are not only performed by individuals and groups in social interaction, but are also displayed in the language they use, oral and/or written. Groups and individuals use language as a means of communication in order to transfer their concepts and ideas, e.g. displaying identity, into the public sphere and by doing so influence others. However, they will be influenced as well in turn. Identity in its widest sense is one of the key social settings to comprehend and analyse human society and it is essential to anthropology for its understanding of social interaction. By applying concepts of identity, groups can include or exclude members while individuals could obtain social acceptance from the group at stake. Therefore I consider the display of identity by using written language to be a cultural phenomenon that varies between different social settings.

Another important aspect for anthropology since the late seventies has been the question of discourse and its analysis. Going back to the critique of cultural analysis and challenging the position of the speaker, discourse analysis has become an essential instrument of interpretative anthropology. Discourse analysis, the way I understand it, is theory and method at the same time, since it is a way of conceptualising the public sphere while enabling a thorough analysis of the same. Consequently, I will apply discourse analysis in this thesis to demonstrate the way in which producers of texts construct different ethnic groups by using concepts of identity and specific language. These concepts of identity are the linguistic manifestation of ethnicity within a discourse.

This thesis is a piece of comparative work about language and identity. I will analyse texts that connect concepts of identity with narrative discourse on the background of a specific Hungarian law: The Hungarian Status Law<sup>13</sup>. This law came into effect on the 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002. It grants the Hungarians in Hungary's neighbouring states certain educational rights and financial benefits and it binds them to Hungary

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<sup>12</sup> Yugoslav aphorism quoted in Verdery, Katherine 1991, p.215

<sup>13</sup> Henceforth simply Status Law. For official name see Appenides 1 and 3.

itself through a semi-official identity card handed out by the Hungarian state. The Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin can be divided into two groups: Those who are Hungarian citizens and those who are not. For reasons of simplification, I will refer to the latter ones as co-ethnics<sup>14</sup>. The Status Law is interesting to anthropology for three reasons: Firstly, it includes a definition of who is entitled for the Status Law's benefits, which is an act of ethnic denotation by a political authority. Secondly, it has sparked off the debate over minority issues between Hungary and its neighbouring states, which is again an issue of ethnicity and hence identity. Thirdly, the debates in the media about this law reveal the cultural differences between Hungary and other states.

This work will focus mainly on the co-ethnics in Romania, since they make up about 60% of all co-ethnics. They live predominantly in the region called *Transilvania* or *Ardeal* [Transylvania]. Being the largest political group of co-ethnics, the Hungarians in Romania are an issue in Hungarian as well as in Romanian politics. The Status Law's application has become a source of serious political strife between the two states. This needs further explanation since it is a question of political conceptualisation. Apparently, in the political frame of the state, identity is no longer a social performance but becomes a question of power (Sökefeld 2004: 119-120). Both states, i.e. Hungary and Romania, consider their respective nation to be in the French style, which means a community of citizens who were born in the same state, i.e. *ius soli* (Sundhausen 2003). However, there are differences between the two. In contrast to Romania, Hungary is still more influenced by the German concept of the nation, which is a community based on common descent, i.e. *ius sanguinis*. In line with these thoughts, after 1990, there was a discussion going on in Hungary as to the Hungarian state's relation to the co-ethnics. These people considered themselves to be Hungarian by their ethnicity and were citizens of their respective states by political status. The Hungarian Status Law is an attempt to tie the Hungarians from abroad legally to Hungary. This law establishes a relationship between citizens of various countries on the one hand and the Hungarian state on the other hand on a voluntary, ethnic basis. Consequently, Romania considers the co-ethnics who are Romanian citizens to be a strictly internal issue while Hungary regards the co-ethnics' well being a matter that also concerns the Hungarian state. But the strife also has deeper roots.

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<sup>14</sup> This denotation has two faults: it does not show exactly which state I am referring to and it also takes a Hungarian point of view in the context of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is a much shorter expression and should suffice for the purpose of this work.

On 9<sup>th</sup> October 2002, journalist Gábor Miklós wrote in the Hungarian<sup>15</sup> daily Népszabadság:

*„A magyar-román kapcsolatokban minden gesztust patikamérlegesen mérlegelnek. Annyira tele a viszony történelemmel, valódi és vélt konfliktusokkal, elharapott átkokkal és kimondatlan félelmekkel, hogy itt gyakorta értelmetlen a racionális, haszonelvű politizálás is.“<sup>16</sup>*

[In the Hungarian-Romanian relationship every word is weighed on golden scales. The relationship is so full with history, with true and pretended conflicts, dogged bans and unspoken anxieties that rational, meaningful political action is often useless.]<sup>17</sup>

The unspoken anxieties Gábor Miklós wrote about are one of the core issues in understanding the ethno-political debate in the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. These anxieties are the result of the nationalism that has been present in this relationship at least since the revolution of 1848-1849 (Hitchins 2003a; Puttkamer 2003; Verdery 1991). This relationship has been evident especially in Transylvania.

Anxiety in this context encompasses a different set of experiences on each side, hence it is history laden within each group's collective memory. The anxieties are usually projected at the "other" side, i.e. Hungarians from the Romanian point of view and vice versa. However, this "other" has been a social construct of nationalist politics, especially in communist Romania and was still present in politics after 1990 (Verdery 1991; Verseck 1997). From the Romanian side, the nationalist politics of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) in the seventies and eighties have created a self-image of a Romania threatened by internal and external enemies. The external ones were usually the Soviets. This fear was based on experiences during and after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War (WWII) when the Red Army not only looted on Romanian territory but also took over political power until the sixties. Since Ceaușescu became secretary general of the PCR in 1965, his policy of pseudo-neutrality within the Warsaw Pact was presented as a policy aimed at keeping Romania neutral to avoid a Soviet invasion à la Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The internal peril in Romania was that of a multiethnic state in which the Hungarians, who composed the second largest ethnic group after the 1<sup>st</sup> World War (WWI), were accused of wanting Transylvania to be part of Hungary again, as prior to

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<sup>15</sup> The ethnonyms Hungarian and Magyar are used in this work synonymously. For simplification and avoiding confusion I shall use the ethnonym Hungarian, unless it is a translation.

<sup>16</sup> All non-English quotation will be in italics.

<sup>17</sup> All translations by me. NSZ09.10.2002, path: 14.08.2003  
wysiwyg://149/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

1920<sup>18</sup>. This was based on the latest and most vivid experience in Romania from WWII when Romania had to cede large parts of Transylvania to Hungary. Consequently, ethnic minorities in general and Hungarians in particular were portrayed as destabilising factors within the state's framework, which were supposed to be assimilated into the Romanian majority (Verseck 1997).

The Hungarian experience is twofold since it varies between Hungary and Transylvania. The Hungarians in Romania have had mostly bad experience with the Romanian authorities. The promises and commitments made by the various governments between the two world wars were hardly kept and there has been a constant feeling of ethnic oppression (Verseck 1997). The communist rule was not nationalistic against the Hungarians during its first decades and therefore conflicts only started in the seventies when the regime began a policy of forced assimilation by taking measures such as closing Hungarian-speaking schools, reducing the number of Hungarian faculties at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and drastically reducing the number of books published in Hungarian<sup>19</sup>.

In post WWII Hungary, discussing the state's relationship to the Hungarians who live in the neighbouring states only became an issue in the seventies with the *táncház* movement. This movement called for a quest to "rediscover" the nation's folklore that was "lost" due to communism and was supposedly found again among the ethnically "genuine" Hungarians of Transylvania (Kürti 2001). Furthermore, according to unofficial estimations approximately 25% of Hungary's ten million inhabitants consist of Hungarian refugees and their descendants (Fischer 1999). They were either expelled from the neighbouring countries or left territories that used to be part of Hungary until the Treaty of Trianon (1920) or territories regained and then lost again during WWII. Consequently, they have a considerable influence on Hungarian suffrage and I assume that their relation to the neighbouring states is somewhat biased. Their experience is one of regaining supremacy and then losing it yet again.

According to my understanding and experience, the "unspoken-ness" that Miklós was referring to in the quotation above shows both sides' incapability or unwillingness to tackle the fears and anxieties that have been abused by political and academic elites for such a long period. Interestingly, this incapability has the same pattern among Romanians and Hungarians alike and has prevailed for quite some time (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999). This attitude has resulted in a chronic lack of communication

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<sup>18</sup> See Table 4.

<sup>19</sup> See [www.ubb.ro](http://www.ubb.ro)

between public representatives of both sides. This, of course, does not include the individual level where numerous inter-ethnic marriages clearly indicate that personal relations are based on criteria other than ethnicity. These various national discourses are the result of power struggles and they have drawn and redrawn ethnic and cultural borders. By doing so these discourses have dominated political relations in the region for the last hundred years. During the socialist era they were represented in the official state doctrine and in academia. After the events of 1990, they became a part of the public discourse fought out in the new, free media. Consequently, there are two discursive segments that concern Hungarians who live in Romania, one from a Hungarian discourse and the other from a Romanian discourse<sup>20</sup>. The discourses from which these overlapping segments originated are the following:

- Public discourse in Hungary on Hungary's relationship to the Hungarians in the neighbouring states.
- Public discourse in Romania on Romania's relationship to the various ethnic groups in Romania.

Bearing in mind the situation mentioned above, I will show in this thesis how public texts from Romania and Hungary, written in each country's respective language, have played their role in discursively forming the Hungarians in Romania. These public texts are carefully chosen newspaper articles that relate to the Hungarian Status Law.

Although there is some work already published in this domain (Bakk – Bodo 2003; Császár 2002; Kántor 2004), it rather tended to focus on the sociological and statistical aspects of the Status Law's impact on the media. Other publications were more concerned about the Hungarian side of this debate (Bárdi 2003; Kántor 2002) or just the Romanian side (Andreescu 2001). Yet others analysed the legal aspects of the Status Law (Küpper 2006; Voigt 2005). This thesis is the first anthropological piece of work about Hungarian-Romanian relations in relation to the Status Law. The topic, the questions and the different methods chosen for the analytical part form a unique combination. Due to the nature of the analysis I shall use one of the pillars of cultural anthropology for this work, i.e. comparison. By comparing articles from two Hungarian and two Romanian dailies, which refer to the same discursive segment, i.e. the co-ethnics in Romania, I will answer the following questions:

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<sup>20</sup> See Figure 1.

1. How did the journalistic texts construct the co-ethnics in the light of the Hungarian Status Law?
2. How is the specific journalistic narrative manifested in each newspaper within their respective discourse?

Out of the repertoire of anthropological methods I shall use three methods for this discourse analysis, which I consider most appropriate for the purposes of this thesis: diachronic analysis, synchronic analysis and interviewing. The first one will be a diachronic analysis of all articles for an overview of the ethnic denotations used and for the purpose of general estimation and detection of the specific narrative in each newspaper. Ethnic denotations play a significant role within the discourse and the respective narrative, since they demonstrate the patterns of thought and argumentation regarding ethnicity and identity. The second will be a synchronic analysis of selected articles from all four newspapers regarding a specific discursive event: the so-called Orbán-Năstase Memorandum<sup>21</sup> (ONM). This assessment will be a text analysis whose aim will be to demonstrate with the help of selected examples the differences between the four newspapers and between the two discourses previously mentioned. The third analysis will consist of a closer look at the interviews conducted. In this context, the interviews are not only a mechanism of verification but also a source of information

In the first chapter I will examine some of the main terms used in this work. Terms such as discourse and ethnicity need to be discussed beforehand. Ethnicity plays a particularly vital role in interpretative cultural anthropology and has been heavily contested over the last two decades. The examination of these and other terms will enable a better understanding of the thesis and will indicate its position in the current scientific debates.

The next chapter will include an insight into the object of the two discourses, the Hungarians in Romania. At that point I will take a historical and political look at the changes that have occurred over the last hundred years so that the reader will be able to apply the analysis not only to scientific discourse, but also to the political debates in Central and Eastern Europe. Besides, the chapter will give a differentiated view of the Status Law.

The three methods of analysis I have mentioned above, i.e. diachronic, synchronic and interviewing, will be the core of the third chapter. In this chapter I will also explain my approach during my preparatory work for the field research. The critical

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<sup>21</sup> See Appendix 2.

attitude represented in this thesis towards the texts will also reflect my position in the scientific field.

The results of my analysis are the subject of the fourth chapter. There I shall analyse the results from all four newspapers going step by step. Each analysis will be concluded by a short summary.

In the fifth chapter I will draw the conclusions from the results demonstrated in the preceding chapter. The conclusions will also summarise the main features of this thesis. The bibliography will follow in chapter six and the appendices in chapter seven will present some of the main texts of reference in this thesis.

This thesis contains many abbreviations. To facilitate comprehension and overview I have listed the most common general abbreviations in Table 1. Table 2 contains a list of all the political parties that played an important role in the discourses surrounding the Status Law. Although it is exhaustive for Hungary in the years 2001 to 2003, it is not so for Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.

Finally, in order to avoid cases of "nationalising geography" (Donnan – Wilson 2001), I have decided to use the English names for all geographical names when available. For those cases when the English language does not have a specific name, I have used the official name.

## Acknowledgements

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## 1. Theoretical and methodological framework

“You can only say something by positioning yourself in the discourse.”<sup>22</sup>

Theory and empirical research are two of the three elements of academic endeavour. The 3<sup>rd</sup> element, the academic exchange of results and views, places theory and empiric data into the wider context of academic life and hence also into perspective. Before drawing out the empirical data gathered for this thesis, the methods behind it and the results that go with it, I will sketch the theoretical mainlines behind this discourse analysis. Consequently, this chapter’s aim is to take a closer look behind the main theoretical background of the following discourse analysis. Among the myriad of publications concerning discourse analysis there are considerable differences, not only in their methodological approach but also in their conceptual frame. The issue of discourse in anthropology is the issue of texts. Be it verbal, visual or written, there is a general consensus that discourse refers to social phenomena that can be expressed in texts, i.e. can be described or partially transformed into written words (Van Dijk 1997). Since this thesis is about the analysis of a large amount of newspaper articles, I will take into consideration those publications that are suitable for a discourse analysis that encompasses hundreds of separate texts.

### 1.1 Analysing the discourse

#### 1.1.1 General overview

Discourse has many definitions. Dating back to Foucault, who considered discourse to be societal talk, many scientists have been discussing the essence or the meaning of discourse (Dracklé 1991). Others consider discourse to be the flow of information in time (Jäger 2001; 129). This definition, however, excludes the participants’ active element, which I consider essential. A flow of information does not simply happen, since there are people within it who keep on producing new texts. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, discourse is an exchange of texts concerning a specific topic within the given limitations of time, language and medium<sup>23</sup>.

The specific topics of this thesis are the ongoing debates in Hungary and Romania concerning the Hungarians living in Romania in the light of the Hungarian

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<sup>22</sup> Hall, Stuart 1991, p.44.

<sup>23</sup> This is obviously a simplified definition that does not encompass all facets of discourse studies. See also Van Dijk 1997.

Status Law. Since discourses do not exist by themselves, the topic is in itself a fiction. In other words, discourses have to be carved out of the multitude of texts relating to many different subjects. Then again, the topic I have chosen for this thesis is a topic carved out by others before me who also considered the exchange of texts about this particular subject to be discursive. More specifically, I have taken up the thought that there is an exchange of texts about the Hungarians living in Romania and this exchange shows certain features in the respective texts that make up the exchange. Taken at face value, one could suggest that there is no discourse if you do not see it. This is partially true. Finding the discourse resembles solving a crossword puzzle. On first sight the observer sees only rows and columns of letters, which apparently do not end up in anything. At a second glance he discovers a word or two and after a while the whole pattern reveals itself. Hence, the discourse is there to the one that sees it and is subject to individual perception. This can then be explained and demonstrated by actually marking the words on the puzzle. Thus, the discourse is visible to those who search for it and want to see it.

Bearing in mind the fact that the discourse's topic is carved out of the multitude of different topics to which it is related in one way or another, discourse analysis is always a partial analysis (Jäger 2001). This means that each and every topic is related to other topics and they are related to topics further away and so on. Therefore the researcher has to define the topic as part of a discourse and limit it to certain boundaries. Otherwise the topic will become endless and no analysis will be possible.

This still leaves the question of subjectivity unanswered. Following these ideas of interpretative anthropology, I consider that a scientific investigation need not prove its objectivity. What it needs is factual adequacy (Stellrecht 1993). By that I mean the comprehensibility of the researcher's methods. Even if the methods, when applied by a different person, lead to different results, they both have to be taken as two different experiments that have a legitimate claim of representing scientific results. This means that analysing a discourse is not a search for the ultimate scientific truth, but rather an investigation to try and understand the discourse's mechanism and its effects.

Exchanging texts requires at least two participants, a text and a medium: A text can be written by X, read by Y who describes the text to Z who on his turn writes a text that is read by X again<sup>24</sup>. Some participate only as passive recipients who read the text but do not produce any by themselves and hence transmit their private thoughts verbally

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<sup>24</sup> See Figure 1.

without publishing them (observers). Those who not only read texts but also write texts by themselves will be considered as producers in the sense of a discourse analysis.


Discourses need to be limited within a well-defined frame to be able to be analysed, otherwise they could be continued endlessly. The limitations of a specific discourse, however, need explanation:

- Time. This criterion is important for the historical perspective and for a limitation of chronology. Certain aspects of the discourse can change in time and take up new forms. The discourse can also cease to exist or merge with another discourse to form a new, third discourse. Whilst bearing in mind the time aspect, the researcher who analyses the discourse can carve out a time frame that shows a unique pattern in the chronology of the discourse. This is a simplification that needs careful attention. On the other hand, the analysis can go to the other extreme and neglect the time aspect completely. In this case the researcher takes up a practically synchronic standpoint of analysis that shows no time aspects. This can be considered as the analysis of a moment within the timely flow of the discourse. This type of analysis is useful for investigating a discursive event.
- Language. While neglecting certain semiotic features of texts in the field of semantics, texts are a means of communication. Exchange can only take place when the different participants of the discourse, i.e. those who write texts and those who read them, can understand what is written. Hence communication can exist only when the participants can exchange texts in the same language. Again, in the context of this work, I assume that all participants of the Hungarian discourse master the Hungarian language. The same criterion applies to the Romanian discourse.
- Medium. The physical limitations of the discourse are given through the media in which the texts are communicated and exchanged. The media can vary from the press to political rallies and from books to TV programmes. To enable an exchange the media have to be accessible to those who want to participate in the discourse. Passive accessibility is usually a question of interest and affordability, as in buying the newspaper or having the time to participate in a political rally. The texts in this analysis originate from the press and are accessible either through the newspaper or through their respective homepages on the World Wide Web.

Bearing in mind the three criteria mentioned above, time, language and medium, a discourse analysis is always a partial analysis. Completeness does not exist. If we take for example Jäger’s examination of the image foreigners have in the German press, we will find out that despite his team’s tremendous efforts, he has chosen only a few newspapers from the multitude of journalistic publications (Jäger 2001). He further limited his research to a certain time frame and, obviously, to a certain language: German.

Limitations guarantee a given framework, which enables the researcher to make certain statements about the discourse he or she is analysing. Consequently, the statements are valid mainly within the premises of the set frames.

Figure 1: The Circle of texts.



### 1.1.2 Dialogic relationships

The production of texts is the corner stone of the discourse. However, producers of texts are difficult to define as a single group unless they are restricted to well defined categories. For the purposes of this thesis, I will consider only those producers who have written texts, which concern the topic of the discourse and do not have a political office. Furthermore, the texts have been published and only texts from the selected newspapers will be taken into consideration. Excluding producers who have a political office is crucial especially in Hungary, where politicians often publish articles to express their personal views. Since the overwhelming majority of producers consists of those who do not have a political office, I shall use the terms journalists and producers synonymously.

According to my understanding, published texts in newspapers can take up different forms, e.g. interviews, bulletins or personal reports. The texts are then published and thus become part of the respective discourse. Accordingly, there is a triangular dialogical relationship that emerges (Bakhtin 1986; 47)<sup>25</sup>. The first relationship is between the journalists and the texts they have produced. Journalists produce texts in the sense that they put their thoughts down in coherent words and sentences. While writing they develop a specific relationship with their texts. The text then represents its author or producer, irrespective of the text's form. Even in an interview where the interviewee is apparently the centre of the text, the questions reveal the journalist's thoughts, aims, perhaps desires. While interviewing a Hungarian student a few years ago for a university project, I asked her about her relation to Transylvania. She replied that the whole issue does not really concern her. Then she went on to tell me that the question must be obviously very interesting for me as an interviewer, bearing in mind the fact that I originated from that area. Consequently, the clear hierarchic relation of subject and object became somewhat opaque.

The next step is the transformation of text from one context to another. If we take for example the short quotation from Gábor Miklós' article in *Népszabadság*<sup>26</sup>, we could regard Miklós as the producer of a specific text that concerns Hungarian-Romanian political relations. That very text, which is only a part of Miklós' article, was transformed from a text in the public discourse in Hungary into a quotation, which has hence become part of this thesis. This thesis, however, is part of the academic discourse


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<sup>25</sup> See Figure 2.

<sup>26</sup> See preliminary remarks.

concerning the Hungarian Status Law. Thus, Miklós produced a text within the frame of a journalistic discourse, and I reproduced it in the academic discourse.

Figure 2: Triangular dialogical relationship



But did Miklós really produce a text or was he reproducing ideas he has obtained from a different place or from a different source? In other words, the question is whether his text is genuine or does it entail fragments from other texts. There is no exact answer to the question of origin, like the deadlock between the chicken and the egg: it is unclear which was there first. Nevertheless, there has to be a starting point for a text and in this thesis it will be the published texts from selected newspapers. This is again a simplification, but necessary for the purpose of this analysis. Also, texts do not represent their producer’s ideas but also other texts. These could then be quotations or references to texts, which the author considers to be known to the reader, such as the Hungarian Status Law. This can be regarded as a relationship between the texts and its discourse. The discourse contains many texts that influence each other. Therefore, each text in the discourse represents its producer as well as previous texts, which have influenced him.

The second relationship is the one between texts and the respective discourse. If we consider discourses to consist of texts, then the multitude of texts about a specific topic form a stream of texts (Jäger 2001). These streams, when bundled, make up the material essence of the discourse, which can then be analysed. Taking a different perspective, texts can also be regarded as fragments of a discourse. The nature of the texts in the discourse shows a great deal of variety. Considering the discourse in Hungary about the co-ethnics, there are different kinds of texts that make up the

discourse: scientific publications, public debates, news bulletins, articles in the press and political manifests. Since this thesis is about a discourse in the daily press, I shall consider only newspaper articles as texts in the sense of this analysis. Furthermore the texts have to fulfil certain conditions: They have to relate to the Hungarians living outside Hungary and they have to be part of the public, political discourse about the Status Law in either Hungary or Romania. The first condition is about mentioning the Status Law in the text; if it is not mentioned then the text cannot be taken into consideration for this analysis. The second condition excludes texts that refer to the Status Law but not to the political debate over it. These texts are usually about secondary aspects, such as the Hungarian Railways' technical problems organising subsidised railway tickets for the co-ethnics. Furthermore, their producers place texts on a specific level within the discourse, such as the political, academic or medial. The texts have a certain quality and accessibility within the discourse, which depends on the level (Jäger 2001). The texts for this analysis, since they are published in the press, are accessible to the speakers of those languages who can either buy the newspaper or read it on the Internet.

The third relationship is between the discourse and the journalists. As already mentioned, journalists are active participants in the discourse. They place their articles at a specific time on a particular level within it. In other words, they are able to change the discourse's direction. This ability is only an option since the discourse's change depends on various elements, which have an impact on different levels. Journalistic texts have a strong influence within the discursive level of the media, but it is unclear whether that influence is valid in other levels, e.g. the academic level. Consequently, we must ask what power the journalists have on the discourse in general and subsequently what power the discourse has on the journalists. These questions have different answers (Van Dijk 1997). Just like texts, journalists are part of the discourse. I do not consider it possible that someone can produce texts about the discourse, which are placed outside of it (Hall 1991). They write from within the discourse about it and hence they have a certain limited influence on its course. On the other hand, journalists are continuously influenced by the flux of information that the discourse contains and the constant flow of texts produced by other journalists. To use Bakhtin's words again, there is dialogical relationship not only between the journalists and their texts, but also between the journalists that participate in the debates and the respective discourse. This dialogical relationship requires a further explanation regarding the function of power. Power, according to Foucault (Foucault 1976), is not possessed but exerted. According to him

those who supposedly possess power can only exert it within a very limited spatial and timely frame. Thus power cannot be possessed but only exerted within the given framework (Foucault 1976; 114). This is also true for the journalistic texts analysed in this thesis. The power exerted by the journalists is limited since they can exert it only within their level of endeavour. They surely have an influence on the political level and perhaps even on the academic one, but their main sphere is the media and there lies their exerted power. The level of power varies according to the individual journalist's position inside the discourse, which practically means his position in the newspaper's hierarchy.

Another issue that relates all three elements is the debate over discursive events. The Hungarian Status Law is a discursive event, because it is a text that concerns the Hungarians in Romania, which is the topic of the discourse. Furthermore, it caused an avalanche of texts in different forms and at different levels that have revived the debates over this contested topic to an unprecedented height. But how does a text become an event? Unlike historicism, which considers the event to be pre-existent and then writes the texts about it (Bhabha 1999; 302), interpretative anthropology considers the discourse and hence the texts to be pre-existent and events are created in the course of this ongoing production of texts. Events do not exist if they are not transformed into text, which are then made available in the discourse. Exemplified on the Status Law, it is a political and juridical text that has certain implications for a limited amount of persons. The debates about it in the various parliaments and the media have made it part of the public concern and an issue within the discourse. Consequently, a discursive event is a cluster of texts concerning a specific aspect of the discourse's main topic.

### 1.1.3 Narration

The discourse analysed in this thesis consists of texts. These texts are mainly produced by journalists and are published in a newspaper. This publication means that the journalistic texts are available for purchase in the sense that they are printed and sold or they are made available on the Internet. In this stream of texts it is impossible to analyse each and every article in comparison to hundreds of other articles. Furthermore, bearing in mind the fact that every newspaper has a certain position within the various discourses it participates in; I shall consider the sum of all the articles published in one newspaper as the journalistic narrative of the newspaper concerning a specific discourse. The newspapers function as funnels, which gather all the texts into one flow with more or less one direction. Hence, this thesis will consist of four journalistic

narratives since articles from four newspapers will be analysed. But how does this conception of a narrative correlate with the two main questions?

One of the main issues in this thesis is ethnic construction. By that I am referring to Anderson's concept of imagined communities (Anderson 1998). According to him, every community, where the members of a given community cease to know all other members of the same community, is an imagined community. Anderson's main emphasis was on the division between rural and urban communities. Rural communities were considered genuine while urban or larger ones as fictional. By using this differentiation he went on to demonstrate how modern nation states are imagined communities held together by the various national discourses. Different authors challenged this idea, which is part of the constructivist stream in academia concerning nations and nationalism. These scientists considered all communities to be fictional or imagined (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker – Cooper 2000). Even the village communities are fictional, since they have their own mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Hence, in concurrence with constructivism, all communities are imagined.

Following this line of thought, narration is a form of construction. Bearing in mind the concept of imagined communities, I regard ethnic groups as an ongoing discursive construct composed of public narratives. These narratives in this thesis, which are made of published texts, shape and reshape the groups of people they refer to, which ends up in a constant shift of the boundaries of the ethnic group in question, the co-ethnics. These boundaries, which are often portrayed as divisive and impermeable (Barth 1970), begin to fluctuate and show cracks when analysing the discourses concerning them. This timely process of construction is a historical one:

“The emergence of the political ‘rationality’ of the nation as a form of narrative – textual strategies, metaphoric displacements, sub-texts and figurative stratagems – has its own history.”<sup>27</sup>

Consequently, the journalistic narratives keep on changing the co-ethnics' boundaries with every new text published in the newspaper. By analysing the narrative of each newspaper the overview of this constant process is being unveiled. Furthermore, the narratives' particular direction within the discourse can be revealed. This means that they have a specific direction and position, which can be unveiled through a thorough analysis of the texts.

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<sup>27</sup> Bhabha, Homi K., 1999, p.2.

## 1.2 Ethnicity

Discussing ethnic issues, ethnic groups or ethnicity has become popular not only in the humanities but also in the media and in politics. Also, ethnicity plays a significant role in the general debate over identity. However, due to this work's emphasis on groups, I shall concentrate only on ethnicity and neglect all aspects of individual identity. This leads to the problem that various academic disciplines or segments of the public discourse use the term ethnicity differently. Therefore, in the first part of this subchapter I shall clarify what I mean by ethnicity and ethnic groups, thereby referring to recent changes of paradigm over the past few years (Andreescu 2004; 79-84). In the second part of this subchapter I shall focus my attention to the idea of ethnic denotation and the consequences it bears for this thesis.

### 1.2.1 Definitions and theoretical background

Definitions have a basic dilemma: if they are specific and poignant, they are too narrow to encompass all the phenomena they are supposed to be applied to. If they are general, then they are too wide to be practical for scientific purposes. Consequently, every definition is a compromise. Regarding ethnicity, Rogers Brubaker formulated one of the most recent definitions of ethnicity, which I consider useful for the purposes of this work:

“Ethnicity is not a thing, not a substance; it is an interpretative prism, a way of making sense of the social world. And it is one among many such interpretative frames.”<sup>28</sup>

This definition, which is very general, entails certain aspects that are crucial to this thesis:

1. Ethnicity should be understood as a product of social construction. It is not given. It is made.
2. Ethnicity is part of a set of categories or interpretative frames that can be used to classify groups of people. Other frames would be gender, age, caste etc. However, by positioning ethnicity as equal among other frames, it negates primordialism.

These expostulations I have made require further explanation. I shall begin with the term constructivism. Essentialism and constructivism form a contradictory couple

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<sup>28</sup> Brubaker, Rogers 2006, p.15

that has been the cause for many disputes. In a very simplified way, essentialism means that belonging to an ethnic group is a given state of affairs inherent to all humans, i.e. everybody belongs to an ethnic group from the moment he is born. Thus, the world is divided into ethnic groups with their individual systems of inclusion and exclusion. Constructivism, on the other hand, considers belonging to an ethnic group to be a product of social performance, a result of each individual's capacity to decide on which group he or she wants to belong to (Heckmann 1992, Márton 2002). Current theoreticians in social anthropology undoubtedly support constructivism and so do I.

The second statement refers to the idea of primordialism. Basically, this concept suggests, that ethnic belonging is always the first among all other categories of social differentiation or interpretative frames, as Brubaker put it. This concept, often related to the work of Anthony D. Smith, consists of elements from the constructivist as well as from the essentialist side (Heckmann 1992). Thus, according to the primordialists, ethnic belonging is constructed but in such a manner that there is no difference whether it was obtained by birth or chosen later on. Like Brubaker, I do not share this opinion. I consider ethnicity to be highly contextual, as are all other social frames. Furthermore, these frames differ in time, culture and position within society.

As I mentioned above, too general definitions are often difficult to apply in practice. I will specify Brubaker's definition by adding an aspect, which is essential for this work, namely ascription, and neglect other aspects, which are not significant for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the new definition reads as follows:

Ethnicity is not a thing, not a substance; it is an interpretative prism of ethnic ascription and/or self-ascription.

Ascription in the sense of this thesis can include two different aspects: performing ethnic identity and ethnic denotation.

Performance means that individuals have the agency to perform their ethnic identity. In other words, individuals are able to articulate their belonging by using different means of communication, e.g. speech, dress, behaviour etc (Sökefeld 1999). Ascription also means that the individual becomes a part of a group; in this case an ethnic group. According to my understanding, an ethnic group is a social category encompassing a conglomerate of people as sharing the following elements for purposes of identification<sup>29</sup>:

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<sup>29</sup> For a different perspective see Elwert, Georg 2002.

1. A set of rules for inclusion and exclusion from the group. This does not mean that the group's boundaries are rigid and impermeable. It means that ethnic groups perform boundary maintenance despite the fact that persons can move into the group as well as get out of it (Barth 1970). These boundaries, however, are highly political and therefore contextual: "Political boundaries tend to set the dimensions of the field within which group contact occurs. This contact, in turn, renders it necessary for groups to sort out affinities and disparities."<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, by exclusion and/or inclusion, the difference between "we" and "they" emerges, which is crucial for understanding interethnic relations. The reason is that the "they" or the "others" are often used to separate the "we" as a distinct group.
2. Notion of a common past. This aspect of a common temporal depth is important for the discursive maintenance of boundaries. The idea that the group has "always been there" sustains its strength as a group. Furthermore, historic arguments are often brought forward in order to justify a certain way of conduct or a specific policy in the present. In other words, when discussing ethnicity and ethnic groups, "The historical discourse is the matrix for a normative model."<sup>31</sup>

One of the problems that arise when discussing ethnic groups and identities is the question of ethnic performances and their hierarchy, since every individual performance of ethnic identity depends on the circumstances he is in. As Jensen has demonstrated, the inhabitants of the Finale region in northern Italy display different collective ethnic identities on different occasions: as Finalese, as Ligurians or as northern Italian (Jensen 1996). This flexibility in performing identities raises the question of hierarchy among the different identities an individual can display. By hierarchy I mean each individual's process of choosing which (ethnic) identity is displayed first in a given context:

"Ascriptive identity is highly contextual. It embraces multiple levels or tiers, and it changes with the environment."<sup>32</sup>

Bearing in mind the definition of ethnicity and the active as well as the passive aspect of ascription, the controversy between the individual and the group he ascribes

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<sup>30</sup> Horowitz, Donald 1975, p.121

<sup>31</sup> Elwert, Georg 2002, p.33

<sup>32</sup> Horowitz, Donald 1975, p. 118

himself to needs further explanation. The reason is that there are two elements to this aspect: one regarding the individual (self ascription) and the other regarding his environment (ascription). The “we” and the “they” cannot be separated:

“The ‘other’ is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, when we think we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’.”<sup>33</sup>

Adopting and adapting Bhabha’s explanation, ascription and self-ascription are inseparable and interwoven despite their obvious distinction. The reason for this is the fact, as Hall put it, is that you cannot say something about the discourse without positioning yourself within it (Hall 1991; 44). Therefore, just as there is no strict separation between an emic and an etic approach, ascription and self-ascription need each other in the process of ethnicity formation.

On the other hand, talking, writing or debating about a group is also a part of the ongoing process of creating and positioning oneself, as the actor in the discourse. The actor could be a journalist reporting on such issues, a politician trying to position himself in favour of more votes, or a researcher trying to understand how ethnicity functions in the limits of a journalistic discourse.

The individual’s motives when performing ethnicity are personal and need research on the individual level and can thus not be part of this work, which has its focus on the group level<sup>34</sup>. The environment, in this case the narratives of two discourses, can be analysed by an investigation into published texts. The texts include denotations and they can be categorised and analysed. The results would then reveal the purposes behind each denotation and the ends the authors had in mind by using them.

### 1.2.2 Denoting and power

A key aspect regarding ethnicity in this thesis is denoting. By this term I mean the naming of ethnic groups. Naming has implications upon the boundaries of each group on the one hand, and raises the question of power on the other hand. If we consider ethnicity as a result of discursive construction, then there can be no such an entity such as *the* ethnic group. It is rather the ethnic *groups* that are debated. The ethnic

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<sup>33</sup> Bhabha, Homi 1999, p.4.

<sup>34</sup> See also Sökefeld, Martin 1999.

groups in this thesis have a common background: they all relate to Hungarians or Magyars in Romania<sup>35</sup>.

Continuing this line of thought, ethnicity is a product of power within the discourse. Using Foucault's idea that power does not exist by itself, it is rather a position from which different actors can exert it (Foucault 1976; 114), journalists writing about Hungarians in Romania are in the position to exert a power by writing. The ethnic denotations they use define different ethnic groups, since every denotation encompasses a different set of people. Consequently, using Saussure's terminology, ethnic denotations are signifiers through which the signified, i.e. the ethnic groups, are created (Prechtel 1994). There can be no groups without the denotations that go with them. This is important for the discourse theory previously discussed<sup>36</sup>. Also, this means that ethnicity is not ascribed only from a naïve point of view, but rather from a perspective of intent in order to exert power. Practically, since every denotation ascribes a different group, a physical conglomerate of people can find itself under very different denotations, some of which it might reject. The Gypsies or Roma are a good example for this fuzziness<sup>37</sup>. Due to new liberal ideas for denotation, the derogative term *Cigány* in Hungarian and *Țigan* in Romanian (both meaning Gypsy) were considered unfit for the current political correctness. Therefore, they were replaced with derivations of the word 'rom', which means man in Romani, the Indo-European dialect continuum many Gypsies use: *Romi* in Romanian and *Rómák* in Hungarian. These denotations, however, have proved to be misleading and ineffective. The problem starts with the fact that not all those who are now called Roma speak Romani. They might speak Serbian, Romanian, Hungarian or any other regional language. Even further, some groups in Romania preferred to continue to be called *Țigani* (in plural) instead of *Romi* (Okely 1993; Reemtsma 1996; Romsics 1998). How absurd things have become is shown by the change in Romania, when the government decided to change the name yet again, by adding another R. Thus an impossible situation in the Romanian language was created by the government by having a consonant cluster at the beginning of a word: *Rromi*. It is assumed that the denotations *Români* (Romanians) and *Romi* (Roma) were too similar and could have been confused. Another example that refers to the catastrophic

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<sup>35</sup> Linguistically, there could be a difference between Magyars and Hungarians, since the first is derived from the Hungarian ethnonym *magyar* whilst the latter from Latin, *hungarus*. However, Hungarian language, unlike English or Romanian, which are used in this work, does not distinguish between the two since the stem *hungarus* does not exist in Hungarian. For their usage in English I shall consider both ethnonyms to be identical.

<sup>36</sup> See subchapter 1.1

<sup>37</sup> I shall refer only to Gypsies in Eastern Europe.

economic situation of many Roma in Eastern Europe, was a poster on Parade Square in Budapest in autumn 2003<sup>38</sup>. The poster showed a middle-aged man with poor clothing on and the following text:

*“Régebben cigány voltam. Most róma vagyok. De mégis csóró<sup>39</sup> maradtam.”*

[In former times I was a Gypsy. Now I’m a Rom. Nonetheless, I’m still broke.]

Consequently, ethnicity is constructed and reconstructed within the limits of the discourse in which it is presented and signified. However, when analysing ethnic denotations, one has to bear in mind the following questions:

- Who is denoting?
- What is his/her position in the discourse?
- Which connotations and ends does that specific denotation entail?

The first question is determined by how the specific discourse is carved out from the myriad of available possibilities. This has been done in the previous subchapter regarding discourse and narrative. The second question refers to the position of power from which the denotation is used. Bearing in mind that this thesis is about journalistic texts, it refers to the position of the press within the public discourses in Romania and Hungary regarding the Hungarian Status Law. The third and last question is subject to analysis, but does require background information in order to be understood fully. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will take a few glimpses into the historical and political context in which Hungary and Romania are interwoven.

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<sup>38</sup> Poster exposition on Felvonulás tér, Budapest, September 2003.

<sup>39</sup> The slang word *csóró* also means burned out. Hence the phrase has a double meaning by referring to the fact that Gypsies often have a darker skin colour than the average Hungarian. This difference in pigmentation was used as an excuse for racist provocations, which the change in denotation was not able to prevent.

## 2. Context

Texts are not written in a context-free environment, they are bound to social and timely parameters that need to be clarified beforehand. Consequently, no analysis in cultural sciences can stand by itself. A certain amount of background information is essential to be able to understand the context of this analysis. This is especially important when discussing discourses in two different countries, whose histories shows a trail of common historical events interwoven in a frame of contested geography. Accordingly, in this chapter I shall explain two issues that concern the discourse analysis in this thesis': a short historic background of the Hungarians in Romania and a few remarks on the Hungarian Status Law. However, I should like to take a look at the role of power in this context first.

Power is one of the main elements in this contested historical-political-geographical field. Power in this sense is the capacity to enforce a specific perspective and hence interpret historic events. Power, as Foucault said, is not possessed; it is exerted since it cannot be transferred simply from one public sphere to another (Foucault 1976). Therefore it is those who are in power, as the communist regimes in Hungary and Romania have been for over forty years, who have the capacity to dominate through exerting power. Every event or public figure is historic or important only if it is created to become one by dominant forces within the public discourse: articles in the press, massive presence on television and/or continuous presence in other media. Therefore I do not consider historical events to be historic due to a primordial essence. Neither do I contest their existence. Action in the form of events has always taken place. It is the discursive interpretation from the position of power that turns action into historical events.

The socialist regimes that took over in Central and Eastern Europe after WW2 created a pantheon of heroes and idols to enhance their ideology and political legitimacy. The realm of historical myths was functionalised in order to justify political power (Jensen 1976). According to my understanding, historical myths are the result of an amalgamation of fact and fiction. The quest for truth within these historical myths is at best secondary. Since some of these myths have lasted even after 1990, I shall give a short overview of certain aspects of these domains.

## 2.1 Historic background or political battleground: The Hungarians of Romania

History in the context of this thesis is a contested field of perspective and power. Hence, history has been shaped and re-shaped for political purposes thereby relying on alleged historic rights thus legitimising specific demands (Sundhaussen 2003). As I shall demonstrate with the example below, historic events can be viewed from different angles and therefore research in this field can obtain different results on the same subject. This background information is needed to be able to understand specific aspects of the discourses in both countries concerning Hungarians in Romania and their geographical space.

Back in 1940, the Hungarian and the Romanian governments were competing for Hitler's favour. The reason for this competition lay in a matter that concerned both states: Transylvania's contested political affiliation. Hungary's policy of revisionism, which did not bear any fruits up to 1938, demanded a reunification with Transylvania, which was lost to Romania due to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Romania, on the other hand was keen on keeping Transylvania (Fischer 1999)<sup>40</sup>. After its guarantor in the west, France, capitulated in Compiègne and the Small Entente ceased to exist due to the German occupation of Poland and Czechoslovakia's break up, Romania was surrounded by three hostile states: Hungary, Bulgaria, eager to regain southern Dobruja and the Soviet Union, which had its own ambitions in the north-eastern parts of Romania, mainly Moldova (Hitchins 2003a). Both sides tried to influence the new power in Europe: Nazi Germany. Hitler, after having played out both Hungary and Romania to obtain certain advantages for Germany and for the German minorities in Hungary as well as in Romania, had eventually decided to make a decision in this matter. In the already annexed Vienna he decided that Crisana, Maramures, the Szeklerland and the rest of northern Transylvania should go back to Hungary while the southern part of Transylvania and the Banat should remain with Romania. Both states followed Hitler's decision. Like this, most of Transylvania's Hungarians became Hungarian citizens once again while the majority of Transylvania's Romanians remained Romanian citizens.

Language	Name	English translation
English	Vienna Award	-
Romanian:	Dictatul de la Viena	[Dictate from Vienna]
Hungarian:	Bécsi döntés	[Viennese Decision]
German:	Wiener Schiedsspruch	[Viennese Award]

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<sup>40</sup> This is a simplification, since the territories demand are much larger than just Transylvania. They include Crisana, Maramures and a portion of Banat, all with significant Hungarian minorities.

This act taken in Vienna received in each country's historiography a name that reflects the respective political perception and intention in that country<sup>41</sup>: There is an obvious semantic difference between the Hungarian and the Romanian name. The Hungarian name has the connotation of a judicial procedure in which a super-instance has justly and fairly decided that certain territories should be returned to Hungary. The Hungarian word *döntés* [decision] implies neither injustice nor preferential treatment. On the other hand, the Romanian name reveals a connotation of something oppressive, something that has been brought upon Romania by an external force without any chance of avoiding it or fighting it back. There is no sign of a just decision or a process of mutual consent. Interestingly, both sides use Vienna as a point of reference and not Hitler. By using Vienna, both sides avoid mentioning the embarrassment of being connected with Nazi Germany and Hitler, which Hungary and Romania had practiced since the late thirties. Although it is obvious that Hitler was the one who decided and not Vienna, by using that city's name both Hungarians and Romanians blurred the uneasy fact that a single man could decide upon their faith and told both states how to redraw their common political border.

History played and continues to play an important role in public life in Hungary as well as in Romania, especially when it comes to the relationship between the two states and to ethnic questions (Boia 2002, pp. 13-49; Verseck 1998, pp. 34-38). One example is the analysis of the medieval *Gesta Hungarorum*, a chronicle written by Anonymus Notarius, a legal advisor to King Béla of Hungary<sup>42</sup>. The chronicle mentions a certain Gelou, who was Prince of the Blacs in the region called Ultrasilvana:

*“... dum capisset audire de incolis bonitatem terre Ultrasilvane, ubi Gelou quidam Blacus dominum tenebat ...”*<sup>43</sup>

This sparked off a serious debate in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, since historians from both sides interpreted this chronicle differently. Romanian historians saw this as a clear indication of the fact that the Blacs, or Vlachs and hence Romanians, already lived in Ultrasylvania, apparently Transylvania, when the Hungarians' ancestors arrived in the Carpathian Basin. The Hungarian side saw this chronicle as a proof of the earlier presence of the Hungarians in that region, since the chronicle relates to events that took place centuries

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<sup>41</sup> I have added the German name for purposes of comparison.

<sup>42</sup> Hungary had four Kings by the name of Béla. Apparently it is King Béla III. See also: <http://mek.oszk.hu/00300/00355/html/> Date: 25.08.2006.

<sup>43</sup> Popa-Lisseanu, G. 2000, p.46.

after the Hungarians' arrival in Transylvania (Popa-Lisseanu 2000). Further investigation and comparison to other sources eventually proved the chronicle to be a very unreliable one.

Table 4: Transylvania's political affiliation since the foundation of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1000 A.D.

Years	Affiliation	Event
1000-1541	Hungary	Transylvania part of the Kingdom of Hungary
1541-1570	<i>de jure</i> : Hungary <i>de facto</i> : sovereign	Hungary defeated at Mohács (1526). Fight for the Hungarian throne. Sovereign principality
1570-1699	Ottoman Empire <sup>44</sup>	Treaty of Speyer: Autonomous principality, later restricted autonomy
1699-1848	Habsburg Empire	Treaty of Karlowitz. The Habsburgs administrate Hungary and Transylvania separately
1848-1849	Hungary	Revolution: Reunification of Hungary and Transylvania
1849-1867	Austria	Revolution crushed. Separation from Hungary
1867-1920	Hungary	Act of Compromise. Reunification with Hungary
1920-1940	Romania	Treaty of Trianon. Transylvania part of Romania
1940-1945	Romania/Hungary	2 <sup>nd</sup> Vienna Award: Northern Transylvania part of Hungary while the south remains Romanian.
1945-	Romania	Treaty of Paris: Northern Transylvania reunified with Romania

This line of thought concerning perspective and power was present in Romania as well as in Hungary during the socialist era when discussing power, legitimacy and ethnic relations in Transylvania. It is this very area that caused the most severe academic disputes (von Puttkamer 2003). Both sides tried to demonstrate their legitimate claim over this contested piece of land, using archaeological, archival, linguistic, demographic and judicial arguments to do so. The search for any objective statements became futile as the nationalistic propaganda, especially in Romania, gained the upper hand and consciously manipulated and abused the results of historical research for its own political purposes (Verdery 1991). Consequently, it is import to outline a few short remarks on the main disputes about ethnicity, geography and power relationships over Transylvania and its inhabitants. The thought that Transylvania belongs to Romania because the majority of that territory's inhabitants wish it to be was rarely seriously considered (Boia 2002). Considering the liberty Romania's citizens have had since 1990, any powerful movement by Hungarians from Romania towards

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<sup>44</sup> In the years 1599-1601 Mihai of Muntenia, who has previously conquered Moldova, has also conquered Transylvania for this short period of two years. Romanian historiography has considered this conquest to be a personal union and therefore the first unification of the Romanian lands. See also Boia, Lucian 2002; Introduction to the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.

the territory's secession from Romania or unification with Hungary would have been a serious issue in politics. Such discussions were usually dominated by the right wing extremists on both sides and have been short lived (Andreescu 2001).

### 2.1.1 The Romanian historic narrative

The leitmotif of the Romanian historic narrative concerning Transylvania is the constant need for justification. Scientists have tossed and turned historic events to prove why Transylvania is and should always be a part of Romania:

1. Historic continuity: The principle of *prior tempore potior iure* has been the corner stone of the Romanian position in the last two centuries. Based on the idea that Romanian is a Romance language, a heritage of the Roman occupation of Dacia in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries AD, the idea of continuity began to play an important role in Romanian historiography and hence in politics. If the Romanians were the heirs of the Roman Empire in the former province of Dacia Traiana, then it means that they are the oldest inhabitants of today's Romania<sup>45</sup> and therefore Transylvania's. Subsequently, the Hungarians could not have been there beforehand, since they reached the Carpathian Basin only in 895/896 AD (Puttkamer 2003, pp. 349-362). By applying the principle mentioned above, historic continuity grants Romanians the historic right to rule the area. Further, the communist regime (1947-1989) renamed the minorities in Romania from *minorităţi naţionale* [national minorities] to *minorităţi conlocuitoare* [co-inhabiting minorities]. This change of denotation had two consequences: First, it gave the impression that Hungarians, Germans and other minorities were guests in a country that belonged only to Romanians and were "kind" enough to share it with others (Verdery 1991). Second, it had a touch of threat: if the minorities do not "behave" or do as they are told, they could be expelled. In the case of Germans and Jews this did eventually happen: West Germany and Israel paid unknown sums of money to get Romanian citizens out of Romania, who were of German and Jewish ethnic background respectively.
2. The Grand Assembly in Alba Iulia (1<sup>st</sup> December 1918)<sup>46</sup>. At this assembly the Romanian delegates of Transylvanian, Banat and other territories from the Kingdom of Hungary declared their wish to be united with the Kingdom of Romania on the basis of equality and justice for all ethnic groups. This

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<sup>45</sup> The territory of today's Transylvania was part of Dacia Traiana and Romania after 1920 alike.

<sup>46</sup> Alba Iulia is a town in Transylvania and by December 1918 was occupied by Romanian troops.

declaration was the first general public articulation of Transylvania's Romanians to be a part of Romania and is considered nowadays as the solid proof of the Transylvanians' desire to be part of Romania. However, this event was played down by the regime in the seventies and eighties during the nationalistic phase of socialism in Romania. The straightforward and democratic demand for equal rights to all minorities did not suit nationalistic propaganda. After the political change in 1989/1990 this date was declared a public holiday to commemorate the Transylvanian Romanian's will for unification (Boia 2002). Interestingly, despite the fact that 1<sup>st</sup> December was declared a public holiday and that the House of Assembly in Alba Iulia was turned into a museum, the text of the declaration is difficult to find. Even the museum itself had only parts of the declaration engraved on marble. Upon my visit there in September 2003, I could not obtain a copy of the text. Apparently the myth around the Grand Assembly is more important than the actual declaration.

#### 2.1.2 The Hungarian historic narrative

The Hungarian narrative's main emphasis is on the injustice that was brought upon Hungary at the peace treaty after WW1:

1. Injustice. Hungarian historiography sees the reason for Transylvania's belonging to Romania not in the fact that Romanians composed the majority of the population in 1918, but rather the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy lost the war and was punished by the Allies. This resulted in an unjust treatment in the shape of ethnically disadvantageous political borders. The Wilsonian Principles included self-determination for all nations, also for the Axis Powers that lost the war. The peace treaties in Trianon, Saint-Germain and Versailles included new borders that did not comply fully with those principles. In Hungary's case this meant that territories with an overwhelming Hungarian majority were lost, such as the southern parts of Slovakia in the newly founded Czechoslovak Republic or the western parts of Crisana. The peace treaty's consequence was that about  $\frac{1}{3}$  of all Hungarians lived under foreign rule (Fischer 1999). Obviously the Wilsonian Principles could not be implemented to the last village, especially when bearing in mind how ethnically mixed the Carpathian Basin was and still is<sup>47</sup>. Thus, Hungarian historiography is not blaming the Romanians for conquering Transylvania but rather blames the

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<sup>47</sup> See Map 1.

former Allies for granting Romania territories, which it should not have received, had the Wilsonian Principles been implemented properly.

2. *Prior tempore potior iure*. There is a general consensus among historians about the fact that the Hungarian's ancestors arrived in the Carpathian Basin around 895/896 AD. By the beginning of the 10<sup>th</sup> century there is evidence that a people called Szeklers, a Hungarian-speaking group, was settled in today's Transylvania by the Hungarian leaders. However, Hungarian historiography doubts the existence of Vlachs and Moldavians, as the Romanians were called up to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, in Transylvania proper. If there were no Romanians in that area and no other ethnic group survived the centuries, then it means that the Szeklers, hence Hungarians, were the first ones to settle in Transylvania (Puttkamer, 2003; pp. 325-339). Going back to the *prior tempore potior iure* principle, this gives the Hungarians the legitimate right over Transylvania.
3. Politics. The counter argument to the Grand Assembly is that Romanian organisations have not expressed any wish to unite Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania up to the end of WW1 (Fischer 1999). Hence the conclusion that this assembly was only a reaction to the presence of Romanian troops and Hungary's imminent defeat in the war. In other words, the Romanians of Transylvania only organised the Assembly in order to adapt themselves to the new situation in which Romanians from Romania would be at the centre of power and not Hungarians. Furthermore, the demand formulated in the Alba Iulia declaration contained the demand for minority rights, which have not been fulfilled by Romania's governments after 1920.
4. Merit. Hungarian historiography emphasises the fact that it was Hungarians together with Transylvanian Saxons and Szeklers who founded cities, paved roads, cultivated the land and built modern institutions over the centuries. Consequently, it is their merit that Transylvania has become an independent medieval principality that practiced religious tolerance and has reached considerable wealth. In other words, providence should grant Hungarians the right over Transylvania due to their cultural and financial investment (Puttkamer 2003; pp. 325-339 and 363-370).

### 2.1.3 After 1989/1990

Every epoch in history has its rules for the political game. After Glasnost and Perestroika, the states of the Soviet block have experienced a political change, which

ranged from the Velvet Revolution in Prague to the coup d'état in Bucharest<sup>48</sup>. How did these events affect the Hungarians in Romania?

**Table 5:** The number of Hungarians (co-ethnics) who live in Hungary's neighbouring states.<sup>49</sup>

State	Co-ethnics	Share of all co-ethnics (%)	State's total population	Share of total population (%)
Romania	1,434,377	58.9	21,698,181	6.61
Slovakia	520,528	21.4	5,379,455	9.68
Serbia and Montenegro <sup>50</sup>	293,299	12.0	7,498,001	3.91
Ukraine	156,600	6.4	48,416,000	0.32
Croatia	16,595	0.7	4,437,460	0.37
Austria	6,641	0.3	8,032,926	0.08
Slovenia	6,243	0.3	1,964,036	0.32
<i>Total amount:</i>	<i>2.434.283</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>-</i>

According to the most recent statistical data, there are about 1.5 million Hungarians living in Romania<sup>51</sup>. They are the largest group of Hungarians outside Hungary as the table clearly demonstrates, although they do not live in such compact settlements as the Hungarians in Slovakia or Ukraine<sup>52</sup>. This means, that there are 1.5 million citizens in Romania, who made a cross on the statistical questionnaire against the item regarding ethnic belonging and/or wrote 'Hungarian' as an answer. The overwhelming majority of these people live in the historic territories of Transylvania, Banat, Maramures and Crisana<sup>53</sup>. Due to the large number of Hungarians in Transylvania (over 70% of all Hungarians in Romania), the region's name is sometimes used as a synonym for the Romanian territory inhabited by Hungarians<sup>54</sup>.

The conservative Hungarian government voted into office in 1990 has made a sharp turn in the Hungarian state's policy towards the Hungarians who live in the

<sup>48</sup> According to the new Romanian constitution (2004), the events of December 1989 in Bucharest are considered 'the Romanian revolution' (Appendix 5). I do not share this politically motivated definition, since the details of those events have never been fully made public and there is an ongoing manipulation of archives and other sources by the former political elite, which took over before Christmas 1989.

Apparently it is their aim to prevent the public from discovering all the facts regarding those events.  
<sup>49</sup> Source: Gyurgyík – Sebök 2003. *Comments*: 1. Austria: Data only for the Burgenland and for native Speakers. Austria in total: 40.583 and therefore also a total of 2.468.225 co-ethnics. 2. Serbia and Montenegro without Kosovo. 3.Data from 2001 and/or 2002.

<sup>50</sup> As political events happen sometimes faster than one thinks, on 21<sup>st</sup> of May 2006 the majority of Montenegro's citizens voted in a referendum for a separation from Serbia. Assessing Montenegro's population at about 800,000 and assuming that the vast majority of the co-ethnics will remain in Serbia, the share of the co-ethnics will rise to about 4.33% of Serbia's population.

<sup>51</sup> See Table 5.


<sup>52</sup> See Map 1.

<sup>53</sup> See Map 2.

<sup>54</sup> See Table 4.

neighbouring states (co-ethnics). Unlike socialist times, when public debates concerning the co-ethnics were taboo, the new government led by Prime Minister József Antall considered the co-ethnics to be a national issue, which should have a top priority on the political agenda. His remarks about himself as the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians who were taken at face value in the neighbouring states, especially Czechoslovakia and Romania, and have caused serious political unease (Sitzler 1992). Despite these neighbours' protests, the Hungarian prime ministers that followed Antall have all made similar claims, although each with minor differences (Stewart 2004). Consequently, Hungary's declared concern with the co-ethnics has become a pillar of the state's foreign policy regardless of the government's political orientation<sup>55</sup>.

Map 1: Hungarians in Central and East Europe.<sup>56</sup>



Generally, the socialist and social-liberal governments were more interested in a dialog with the neighbouring states in order to facilitate more possibilities for the co-ethnics, while the conservative ones, bearing in mind the hostile political environment the co-ethnics often had to face, opted for a direct support. Hence it was the content of the policy that has varied from one legislative period to another (Bárdi 2004).

<sup>55</sup> See also Appendix 6.

<sup>56</sup> Map designed by Dr. László Sebők and published with the kind permission of the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad [www.htmh.hu/en/](http://www.htmh.hu/en/) Source: [http://www.htmh.hu/en/033\\_map/text037/doc\\_upload/back.jpg](http://www.htmh.hu/en/033_map/text037/doc_upload/back.jpg) Date: 23.05.2006:

On the other side of the political border, in Romania, the nationalism that dominated the communist discourse (Verdery 1991), continued to linger on until 1996. The governments after 1990 did not follow a specific nationalist policy, but the political elite ignored any endeavour to implement basic rights for ethnic groups<sup>57</sup>. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which was formed in the early nineties and turned into a unifying force among the co-ethnics in Romania, became an associated party in the large coalition following the 1996 elections. It was the first time ever that a political party representing the Hungarians living in Romania took an active part in governing the state (Andreescu 2001). After the 2000 elections the UDMR formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and after the 2004 elections the UDMR formed a coalition with the National Liberal Party - Democratic Party (PNL-PD)<sup>58</sup>. This means the UDMR participated in governing the state for a considerable time. Unfortunately for the co-ethnics, this participation did not yield the expected results such as a Hungarian-speaking state university. Nevertheless, the UDMR has been able to achieve some goals: receiving a part of the ecclesial estates and properties confiscated by the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) in the pre-1989 period and an improvement in the Hungarian language schools.

## 2.2 The Hungarian Status Law<sup>59</sup>

The background of the articles selected for this thesis is the Hungarian Status Law, which is part of the ongoing political discourses between Hungary and Romania over Hungarians living in Romania<sup>60</sup>. The Law is a political and judicial act that emerged from Hungary's self-assigned obligation to be responsible for the Hungarians living in Hungary's adjacent states<sup>61</sup>. This obligation is also manifested in the foundation of a Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad<sup>62</sup> in 1992 (Iordachi 2004). Hence I would like to outline the main chronological features that surrounded this law.

The Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), the party that has won the electoral campaign in 1998, has made during its legislative period from 1998 to 2002 a sharp shift from the liberal towards the conservative part of the political spectrum. Some of

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<sup>57</sup> The Romanian Constitution (1992) does, however, grant each and every registered ethnic group a seat in the Lower House. Roma and Hungarians, due to their large number, were granted two seats.

<sup>58</sup> See Table 2.

<sup>59</sup> This short overview of the Law does not include juridical assessments. For further details see Voigt 2005 and Küpper 2006.

<sup>60</sup> See also the preliminary remarks.

<sup>61</sup> See Appendix 6.

<sup>62</sup> Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala. See also: [www.htmh.hu](http://www.htmh.hu)

the participants, such as foreign office secretary Németh, the honorary president of the UDMR, László Tókécs, and Miklós Duray from the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) of Slovakia, have put forward the idea of a law that should regulate Hungary's relationship to the co-ethnics<sup>63</sup>. This initiative was presented at the Hungarian Standing Conference's (MÁÉRT) second session. This conference consisted of

“... the Hungarian Government, the parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament, representatives of the political organizations of Hungarians living beyond Hungary's borders having parliamentary or provincial representation, and representatives of Hungarians living in the West.”<sup>64</sup>

The MÁÉRT's aim was to create a forum in which all co-ethnics and the representatives of Hungarian politics could exchange thoughts and views (Bakk – Bodo 2003). This proposal was laid down in the meeting's closing act on the 12<sup>th</sup> of November 1999 (Kántor et alii 2004: p. 529)<sup>65</sup>. The idea was repeated the following year in the closing act of the conference on the 14<sup>th</sup> of December 2000. Since then the initiative gained momentum and was finally debated in political circles and gradually also in the media. By the beginning of 2001 the parliamentary debate was full on. The six parliamentary parties represented different opinions about this law: The Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) supported FIDESZ. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) hesitated for quite a while before agreeing and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), having about 7% of the parliamentary seats, objected the initiative. The SZDSZ' argument was, that there have not been consultations with the neighbouring states. Consequently, the law passed through parliament on the 19<sup>th</sup> of June 2001 with an overwhelming majority and came into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2002 (Schöpflin 2004). The tense relations with Slovakia and Romania became more acute after the voting in parliament. Romania threatened to impede the law's application, if the two states will not reach a compromise concerning the law's application on Romania's territory. The Romanian side rejected the law for three main reasons: the law was considered to have an extraterritorial character, to be discriminatory towards Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnic background and it was considered incompatible with European Law.

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<sup>63</sup> Interviews with Norbert Molnár and Tibor Kis.

<sup>64</sup> Kántor, Zoltán et alii, 2004, p. 529.

<sup>65</sup> See also : [http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4\\_ses/contents.html](http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4_ses/contents.html) Date: 23.05.2006.

Table 6: Brief chronology of relevant events<sup>66</sup>

Year	Hungary	Romania
1998	Elections: The Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) becomes the largest party in Hungarian parliament and forms coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) (1998-2002). New prime minister is Viktor Orbán. In the course of four years FIDESZ transforms from a liberal to a conservative party.	-
2000	The first draft of the Status Law is discussed at the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT)	Elections: PSD (Social Democratic Party) becomes largest party and forms coalition with the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). Adrian Năstase is elected prime minister (2000-2004)
2001	19.06.2001: Status Law voted in parliament. 22.12.2001: Orbán and Năstase sign a memorandum (ONM) that allows Hungary to apply the Status Law on Romanian territory.	22.12.2001: Orbán and Năstase sign the ONM, which includes Hungary's agreement to grant all Romanian citizens a working permit for three months p.a.
2002	01.01.2002: Status Law and ONM come into effect. April 2002: Elections. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) win and form coalition. New prime minister is Péter Medgyessy (2002-2004).	01.01.2002: Status Law and ONM come into effect.
2003	23.06.2003: MSZP-SZDSZ government modifies the Status Law	23.09.2003: Agreement between the two governments upon the final modalities concerning the Status Law

The two prime ministers, Viktor Orbán and Adrian Năstase, eventually reached an agreement, which was signed on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of December 2001. One of the main features of this agreement, also called Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM)<sup>67</sup>, was the fact that every Romanian citizen, regardless of ethnic belonging, had the right for a three months working permit per annum for Hungary. Another feature is the fact that spouses are excluded from the benefits. Romania, on the other hand, agreed to stop its resistance to the Status Law's application in Romania. After the elections in Hungary (April 2002), which resulted in the government party losing its majority and a new constellation in parliament, the new social-liberal government, after having modified the law<sup>68</sup>, signed an additional agreement with the Romanian government on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September 2003.


<sup>66</sup> Bakk, Miklós – Bodo, Barna 2003.

<sup>67</sup> See Appendix 2.

<sup>68</sup> See Appendix 3.

That agreement the political quarrel slowly faded<sup>69</sup> and the academic discourse began gathering momentum (Kántor 2004; Küpper 2006). These two agreements, one from 2001 and the other from 2003, are the result of the fruitless efforts both sides initiated by appealing to European institutions. By the end of the day, it seems that direct negotiations were the far better solution: for Hungary, for Romania and especially for Hungarians in Romania.

Map 2: Hungarians in Romania's counties.<sup>70</sup>



<sup>69</sup> See Appendix 4.

<sup>70</sup> Map designed by Dr. László Sebők and published with the kind permission of the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad [www.htmh.hu/en/](http://www.htmh.hu/en/) Source: [http://www.htmh.hu/en/033\\_map/text037/doc\\_upload/romhun1.jpg](http://www.htmh.hu/en/033_map/text037/doc_upload/romhun1.jpg) Date: 23.05.2006

### 3. Methods

In one of film director Akira Kurosawa's masterpieces, *Rashomon*, a woman and three men each tell a story from their personal perspective: a couple (husband and wife), a bandit and a hidden observer of the other three's doings. The film is presented to the spectators by the observer and his listeners. The observer tells his listeners what he has seen as a single, stringent story. In other words he has presented his own personal truth about the events that occurred. In the course of the film the observer narrates the deeds from the perspectives of the other three participants as they were presented at the tribunal. All four stories have a few points in common, e.g.:

- A married couple travels in the forest.
- There is an armed bandit in the same forest.
- The bandit attacks the couple.
- The bandit forces the woman to have sexual intercourse.
- The husband dies.
- The woman's precious dagger disappears.

Each and every one of the three participants presents a different course of events at a tribunal: the bandit presents himself as a hero; the husband as an honourable man<sup>71</sup> and describes his wife as a slut; the wife portrays the husband and the bandit as brutes and cowards. Further, it is not clear who exactly killed the husband and whether the bandit raped the woman or was it sexual intercourse with the woman's consent. By the end of the film the spectator still does not know what 'really' happened between the three participants. To top it all, the listeners eventually challenge the observer's own story by revealing the observer as a thief who stole the woman's precious dagger. Hence the question "What did *really* happen in the forest?" remains unanswered.

The reason why this perplex situation is of importance to this thesis is because of the question it raises: Does the observer in *Rashomon* tell a single story from four different perspectives or do the three participants and the observer himself tell different stories that intersect because they have some points in common? To put it differently and paraphrasing it for this study, do newspapers narrate a single story from different perspectives or do they tell four different stories that intersect? In congruence with the basic theoretical approach of this thesis I consider all four newspapers to refer to events that took place but tell different stories about those specific events. If I consider truth or reality to be personal, subjective and limited to a specific timely frame, then there can be no 'true' story in different varieties. Declaring a story or a narrative as 'true' would

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<sup>71</sup> Since the husband has died, his story was presented through a spiritual medium.

suggest that there is a correct and an incorrect perspective upon it which is hence exerting power over it. There can be, however, consent upon events that took place, e.g. the Status Law did pass through parliament on 19<sup>th</sup> June 2001 or the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum was signed on the 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001 in Budapest<sup>72</sup>. Consequently, the discourses mentioned in Chapter 1 about the Hungarians living in Romania consist of four different narratives. They do *not* tell a single story about the Status Law and the Hungarians living in Romania from four different perspectives. They tell different stories which intersect at specific discursive events. Although the newspapers shape the story as they publish, these intersections are the basis of the discourse in the media and thus are the basis for the comparison applied in this thesis.

When analysing the Romanian and Hungarian discourses surrounding the Hungarian Status Law in the huge number of newspaper articles, I decided to apply two methods: a diachronic and a synchronic method. The aim of the first one was to have an overall view about the discourses and how they developed in the years 2001-2003 while the latter's aim was to accentuate the differences between the newspapers using a decisive and representative discursive event from the flow of the discourses and analysing just the articles covering that very event. Further, I consider diachronic analysis to be composed of a myriad of synchronic texts and therefore events. This means that the synchronic analysis entails diachronic elements that have been neglected for the sake of a structuralist analysis. However, despite the fact that both methods are related to the same object, there is still the question as to whether they are compatible for the discourse analysis mentioned in the first chapter. There are a few facets about this question that need further explanation.

The first of these facets is the question of timely depth within the analysis. Discourse analysis, the way I understand it, is a post-structuralist, diachronic analysis. This means that the element of time is essential. Discourse is composed of texts and other forms of communication that are interwoven in a limited physical and timely space or as Jäger put it, discourse is the flow of information in time (Jäger 2001; 129). Scientists analyse the texts in the given frame and take a look behind the mechanisms of power and representation (Foucault 1976). To be able to see how a mechanism works it has to run, to flow. Just like a river, the flow can only be viewed when the water is running, changing its position constantly. In other words, time cannot be disregarded in the deconstruction of the power mechanisms. Consequently, I have chosen newspaper articles from an extended period of time (2001-2003) to be able to illustrate the flow of

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<sup>72</sup> See also Chapter 2.

the discourse. Further, the diachronic method enables a large database for the eventual analysis.

Considering the abundance of data available in the case of the Hungarian Status Law, it is difficult to compare hundreds of articles with each other. Further there is no possibility to analyse each and every article to the full. It would be a task beyond the limits of this thesis. On the other hand, there is the option of exemplifying the discourse on a discursive event. As already mentioned<sup>73</sup>, events in general, and therefore also discursive events are products of the forces applied within the discourse. Thus, something that has occurred becomes an event when those who can exert power within the discourse regard and postulate the occurrence as an event. Analysing a single event, however, requires synchronic analysis. Going back to the ideas of Structuralism's founder, Ferdinand de Saussure, linguistic analysis can only take place in a space without time (Prechtel 1994). Since language is in a constant change we have to exclude time in order to be able to make assertions. If time is being taken into consideration, then the assertions will lose their validity the moment one of the linguistic elements or phenomena analysed have changed. Since change is taking place continuously, this will happen instantly. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis I shall consider the analysis of a single event as a synchronic analysis. This is obviously a simplification since the articles concerning that event were not all published at exactly the same time but rather in the time frame of a few days. Nonetheless, if we compare these few days with the period of three years of the diachronic analysis in perspective, they can be regarded as synchronic. Consequently, I shall consider the examination of a single event to be a simplified manner of a synchronic analysis in which time can be neglected.

The next difficulty when concerning the application of structuralism and modern discourse analysis in one thesis is the question of limitations and boundaries. Structuralism, in the way it is applied in anthropology, suggests that cultures should be viewed as wholes, as entities with strict and impermeable boundaries in which rigid power mechanisms regulate social life (Prechtel 1994, Hirschberg 1988). This conception of culture is a synchronic one, because every transformation within the system leads to different results. Subsequently, the change of actors from one entity to another is not permissible since change implicates a timely dimension and would therefore contradict the postulate of synchronicity. On the other hand, discourse analysis is a constant process of defining and redefining the very boundaries or borders, which were set up by the powerful discourse in question. If boundaries are a social construct,

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<sup>73</sup> See Chapter 1.

then they can be contested, changed or moved according to the social forces acting upon it. Furthermore, they are permeable. These two points of view clash when analysing ethnic denotations in a political context: Journalists from Hungary and Romania write about Hungarians in Romania. If, for example, a Hungarian journalist writes from Budapest about the situation of the Hungarians who live in Romania, then we have a clear cut. The journalist is in the political structure of the Republic of Hungary while the people he writes about are Romanian citizens. This situation changes drastically when a Hungarian from Romania writes about his fellows in an ethnic background in a Hungarian daily from Hungary. Thus he is physically in Romania while his text is published in Hungary and is therefore in both discourses at the same time. According to my understanding this is a change in the system and a trespassing of boundaries. This will have a practical impact when discussing the interviews and the personal aspects present in some of the articles.

The last important issue of the methodological part is the way the results are being analysed, i.e. the interpretative method in cultural anthropology. Since texts are not just produced but also reproduced<sup>74</sup>, we have to take a look at one of the key factors behind the mechanism of production and reproduction: Interpretation. As this thesis' theoretical background derives from the realm of interpretative anthropology (Stellrecht 1993), I understand interpretation in this sense as a cognitive process bound by cultural, linguistic and spatial limits with specific characteristics. Thus I shall explain some of Stellrecht's guidelines, which I have utilised in this thesis:

- Personal subjectivity. This thesis does not write itself. I am writing it. This means that writing is a personal process of continuous struggle with theory and available data. Consequently, whichever statement is being made, it is done from a personal point of view and therefore it cannot be objective. Humanities lay an emphasis also on the personal background of the researcher. It is not just the questions *what* and *why* that are important, but also *who*. When I make a statement, then it is also a reflection of my universe of experience<sup>75</sup>, of what I have learned and experienced in the context of the subject to be debated. As previously mentioned, I descend from a Transylvanian family with mixed ethnic background. This means that I am personally affected by the problems raised by the Hungarian Status Law through people in my social surrounding.

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<sup>74</sup> See Figure 2.


<sup>75</sup> I borrowed this expression from Anderson (Anderson 1998), although he used it in different context.

- Uniqueness. Interpretation is distinctive in two aspects: the unique nature of subjectivity and the nature of communication. The first aspect refers to comparison and repeating. If another researcher had analysed the same texts as I did, he would have most probably arrived at different results and hence different conclusions. This is again due to his or her universe of experience. He might have noticed different aspects in the same text, which I did not discover and vice versa. Communication, on the other hand, refers to the exchange between different producers of texts. In other words, there is a second triangular dialogic relationship in every text between the producer, the text itself and the researcher: the producer transfers information through written text, which is read by the researcher. Then the researcher interviews the producer to verify the text. Therefore, communication between different producers is unique since they are all individuals and hence subjective<sup>76</sup>.
- Unrepeatable. Again, due to subjectivity, interpretative analysis is unrepeatable. This does not mean that the analysis cannot be repeated. It means that each analysis is a fresh start. Between two analyses there will always be differences that could matter for the outcome. This could be a different setting or context but also additional information, of which the researchers might not be aware.
- Adequacy. According to interpretative anthropology there is no right or wrong but outright adequacy. This means that also different perspectives on the same matter can be adequate. Adequacy in this sense is the moment the researcher has described his method and has made it comprehensible to others. Although the same method may produce different results every time it is applied, it is permissible as long as its application has been made transparent. Adequacy, as I understand it, is the objective aspect of subjectivity in interpretative anthropology.
- Reflection. This aspect is about the researcher's own assessment of his role in the writing process. Being subjective requires a self-awareness of one's subjectivity. Practically, this means that the researcher has to be aware of his shortcomings and so that one can accept the facts but doubt the interpretation.

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<sup>76</sup> See Figure 4.

Figure 3: From public discourses to relevant segments




### 3.1 Newspaper analysis

Before analysing newspaper articles one has to bear in mind the nature of the texts at hand. Newspaper articles are a means of communication without direct face to face interaction (Dracklé 1999: p.262). They come in the form of published texts that fulfil a specific set of characteristics within the discourse, e.g. affordability, accessibility and comprehensibility. The physical access to the texts varies between the two media used most frequently by the newspapers: the press and the Internet. In this thesis, for purposes of simplification and efficiency, the Hungarian articles analysed were downloaded from the Internet and afterwards analysed. The respective editorial boards in Bucharest printed out the Romanian articles, due to the lack of accessibility via the Internet. All journalists whom I have interviewed assured me that the Internet version of the text is always identical with the one published in the press.

The newspaper articles that concern the Status Law from each and every paper form the specific narrative of the respective paper to that theme. Since the newspapers are conglomerations of different views that form a stream of thoughts, it was vital to set up certain criteria when I approached the issue and was about to choose the newspapers to be analysed. This means that the newspapers were chosen according to specific criteria. Obviously, the criteria could encompass more than two newspapers from each country. However it would have been an impossible task to analyse all the newspapers that would have fulfilled the criteria and hence only two papers from both countries were chosen. Consequently, the four newspapers represent fragments of the ongoing respective discourses.

Figure 4: Second dialogic relationship



### 3.1.1 Criteria for the newspapers

The criteria's aim for the newspapers is to assure a certain degree of comparability among all four papers. Clearly, despite every newspaper's own style, they should still remain comparable. Hence I have chosen the following set of norms:

1. Daily newspapers. The papers had to have a daily edition for two reasons. The first one concerns the quality of the information and the second its quantity. By quality of information I do not mean any linguistic level but rather a fast and less 'filtered' way of writing. The daily issues have to work fast to be able to print on time. Unlike weekly or monthly papers, which present a more 'digested' and thorough opinion, daily papers have a 'raw' presentation of the current themes. This category also includes articles from the weekend edition, which usually presents the main issues from a more differentiated point of view. Consequently, this category's aim is to guarantee a fast and unfiltered reaction to the ongoing political events. The second reason for choosing daily papers is the quantity of data available. Dailies allow a high number of publications to a specific theme. While weekly papers often publish one article per event, dailies could publish seven or even more articles (weekend edition added). It is difficult to say how much data is required for a discourse analysis. However, it is not necessarily the quantity of data, which sets the limits but rather the timely frame and the abundance of information within that frame. The Hungarian Status Law has been present in the media for the period of almost three years after which the discourse concerning the Hungarians living in Romania has moved on to different events and segments, such as the dual citizenship.
2. Nationwide edition. The paper has to be published nationwide to have a maximum impact in the discourse. Regional papers also write about national or international issues, but they are read only in a limited geographical area. This aspect of regionalism is neglected in the present thesis<sup>77</sup>. Including regional papers would have required a matrix of examinations: the regional papers of each country among themselves, then a comparison on the national level and then an international comparison to round it up. Regional aspects can also vary due to the nature of the region in question. The narrative of a daily from Târgu Mureş would surely be different from those of the big Bucharest dailies. However, the aim of this thesis is an analysis on the national level, since it is also the level perceived by the 'other side': when newspapers refer to articles

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<sup>77</sup> For a different assessment to regional papers see Maho Awes 1983 and Bakk – Bodo 2003.

published in other countries they usually refer to those published on the national level and *not* to the regional papers. The fact that the articles from regional papers are also published online can compensate that deficit only to a certain extent, because the paper has to be known in other regions as well for readers to visit their homepage.

3. High circulation. Papers, that don't have a high circulation, do not play a dominant role in the public discourse. It is difficult to define the point where it can be said that the paper has a high circulation. Again, the Internet can compensate this to a certain extent. At this step the size of the target population has to be taken into consideration. A German paper such as Bild with a circulation of millions of sold copies per day cannot be compared with the Hungarian paper with Magyar Hírlap, which has a daily circulation of approximately 40,000 copies. Hence the decision to chose papers which are among the dominant ones in the discourse. In Hungary there are 4-5 papers that dominate the discourse while Romania has 7-8 such papers. The four papers were chosen from among these groups. This criterion incorporates another one: the paper has to be sold. There are papers that are distributed free of charge, often at railway stations, and hence also have a high circulation, e.g. METRO in France and the Netherlands. The fact that a paper is being sold indicates an active interest of the readers by purchasing the paper. They are keen on having the information in the way that a specific paper offers them and not otherwise. This is not the case with free papers.
4. Claim of neutrality. Evidently, as mentioned earlier, there is no such thing as a neutral newspaper. Every expostulation is bound to a certain context and a specific time. Some newspapers declare themselves to be neutral or represent opinions beyond the strife of political parties. These declarations have to stand the test of analysis and often fail, such as the German paper Bild<sup>78</sup>. This criterion aims at political newspapers that either belong or visibly support a political party. The Hungarian daily Magyar Nemzet presented a banner of the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) party on its homepage<sup>79</sup> throughout 2001 and continued to do so until autumn 2003. Hence the paper was visibly taking sides in favour of that party. This was not so for the two newspapers which I chose for purposes of analysis. However, bearing in mind the timely restrictions, in the

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<sup>78</sup> Bild declares on its front page: unabhängig [independent], überparteilich [above party belonging].

<sup>79</sup> [www.mno.hu](http://www.mno.hu)

spring of 2006, before the general elections in Hungary (April 2006), Népszabadság presented political advertisement of Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) on its homepage<sup>80</sup> while Magyar Nemzet, yet again, took up sides and supported FIDESZ on its homepage. Consequently, if I were now to select newspapers with a claim of political neutrality, Népszabadság would not be among them. There are also newspapers, which belong to political parties. In Romania, for example, the daily România Mare belongs to the party of the same name<sup>81</sup>. With this category I tried to avoid newspapers that were too obviously favouring one of the political parties or opposing it too obviously.

5. General papers. There are dailies that are entirely dedicated to a specific field, especially economics or sports. The Hungarian Status Law has influenced many fields of social life and therefore should be examined in newspapers that cover different spheres. The most important one is the political scene where the Law has been debated most, and not in dailies that cover sports or economics. This does not mean that these papers do not pick up political issues. Gazeta Sporturilor dedicated its entire edition from 21<sup>st</sup> August 2002 to regional discrimination in Romanian football and interviewing various politicians to that subject. The paper showed that the Romanian national football team has played only two international matches in Banat and Transylvania in the fifty years from 1938 to 1998.
6. Published in the state's official language<sup>82</sup>. The aim of this category is to ensure the public's maximal accessibility to the national press. There are other national newspapers in Hungary, such as the Pester Lloyd that publishes in German, but these do not have such a high circulation as Népszabadság or Magyar Nemzet. This category is especially important for Romania, since there is not a single Romanian daily in Hungary. The overwhelming majority of Hungary's ethnic minorities also use the Hungarian language for keeping up communication and acquiring information. Although most Hungarians in Romania can read and write in Romanian, there is a large press in Hungarian, with nationwide newspapers such as Krónika or regional ones like Szabadság. However, being only about 6% of the total population it is still the papers in Romanian language that dominate the journalistic discourse. To put it differently, the vast majority

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<sup>80</sup> [www.nol.hu](http://www.nol.hu)

<sup>81</sup> See also Table 2.

<sup>82</sup> See also Appendix 5.

of Hungarians in Romania can read the Romanian papers while the overwhelming majority of Romanians in Romania cannot read Hungarian.

7. No tabloids. Tabloids appeal to emotion. The newspapers I have chosen do not. The reason for this criterion was the aim to pick out more or less balanced opinions on the Status Law and to avoid banal polemics and nudities. It is difficult, however, to draw a clear line between 'serious' journalism and the tabloids. Nudity or sexy photographs are not always of help. The German weekly *Der Spiegel* often has nudity on its cover but is still one of Germany's most distinguished papers. Except for objective categories such as the price, one could consider the headline of the newspaper as the most important indicator. Yet again, Finland's most distinguished daily, *Helsingin Sanomat*, traditionally has an advertisement that fills the entire front page. Thus, I have put up three criteria for avoiding tabloids: firstly, Tabloids have a very emotional, short and provocative headline. Secondly, they make excessive use of red ink in combination with black. Thirdly, there is a constant change in the size of the text: Big headlines, which are followed by a smaller text up to short texts in tiny fonts. Nonetheless, public discourse in many countries does rely a lot on tabloids, whenever they have a strong position in the press, like *Blikk* in Hungary or, to a lesser extent, *Ziua* in Romania. This means that they are an integral part of the discourse. Since I am analysing only a segment of the press, this is a segment that I shall neglect.

### 3.1.2 Introducing the newspapers

The four newspapers chosen for this thesis perform their respective narratives in a specific cultural and political frame. The following short passages have been put together to enable a short background for every paper (in alphabetic order). The data available on the respective newspapers' circulation is contradictory and should therefore not be regarded as solid information but rather as a general indication. The information was gathered via the Internet<sup>83</sup>, through discussions with scientists and members of the faculty, through the newspapers themselves and eventually through interviews with journalists.

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<sup>83</sup> [www.brat.ro](http://www.brat.ro)

### 3.1.2.1 Adevărul

This paper published in Bucharest is the successor of Scîntea that ceased to publish under that name after 1990. Scîntea was the official newspaper of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) and hence had the strongest position in the press prior to the political changes of 1989-1990. Up to 1995, the newspaper, which was then called Adevărul, struck strong nationalistic and socialist tones following the PCR's tradition<sup>84</sup>. This tendency changed only gradually. From the dozens of employees the paper had back in 1990, only about five are still employed. The others left and were replaced by younger journalists. The journalists' average age is between 35 and 37 years. Out of the total sum of sold samples of 150.000, about 2/3 are sent to subscribers. Unlike Libertatea<sup>85</sup>, which is the best sold daily newspaper in Bucharest Adevărul has a better distribution net in the countryside<sup>86</sup>. Hence the paper's influence is stronger in the counties rather than in the capital<sup>87</sup>. Adevărul has also gained a considerable reputation due to its chief editor from 1994-2003, Cristian Tudor Popescu. By using sharp words and ruthlessly exposing the Romanian political class' faults, corruption and mismanagement he was in a constant row with the leading politicians<sup>88</sup>. The newspaper also offers its entire current edition on the Internet, although without a proper archive. The homepage also bears a quotation from the Romanian Constitution, Article 16: 'No-one is above the law'<sup>89</sup>. According to my own estimation, after carefully reading the daily edition for a few weeks, is that the paper still has light tendencies to the economical left. In other words it supports more state control in economic life. On the other hand it has preserved a slightly nationalistic tone, especially in comparison with România Liberă. Furthermore, the newspaper has made a sharp turn in its profile during autumn 2006. There is a new editorial board; the tone is less nationalistic and, according to my estimation, politically more neutral. Concerning the journalists' liberty to write whatever they please, my interview partner, who heads the political section at Adevărul, assured me that journalists had the freedom to write whatever they wanted. Upon my question about conflicts between journalists and the editorial board she replied that there were conflicts once in a while. However, she added, these conflicts were usually settled by mutual consent.

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<sup>84</sup> See also Verdery 1991.

<sup>85</sup> See also: <http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=publications&id=87&index=0>

<sup>86</sup> See also: <http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=publications&id=11&index=0>

<sup>87</sup> Romania has forty counties and a capital territory, Bucharest.

<sup>88</sup> Interview with Rodica Ciobanu.

<sup>89</sup> Original Romanian text: "*Nimeni nu esti mai presus de lege*". See also Appendix 5.

### 3.1.2.2 Magyar Hírlap

According to the criteria mentioned above Magyar Hírlap, published in Budapest, is Hungary's third largest newspaper. It has a circulation of approximately 40.000 copies per day. According to one of my interview partners, Magyar Hírlap writes more about Hungary's ethnic minorities than about the situation of the Hungarians outside Hungary. According to him, the paper's emphasis lays in marginal social and gender groups, e.g. the Roma or the homosexuals<sup>90</sup>. He added further that the newspaper is a liberal daily that used to be more conservative at the beginning of the nineties. Nevertheless, Magyar Hírlap is the only newspaper that has criticised every government since the transformation 1989/1990. According to another interview partner, the paper is trying to compete with dailies that are wholly dedicated to finance, such as Napi Gazdaság and Világgazdaság. The aim is to attract more readers that are not necessarily interested in politics, sports or literature, but rather in economics. The political section has a very bad relation to Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) and in 2001 the party stopped Magyar Hírlap journalists from attending the party congress. Further, FIDESZ tried to buy the paper, which failed due to the owners' refusal to sell it. There is a growing number of politicians who want to publish articles in the paper. Most of them belong to the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) or to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) but there are also a few from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the FIDESZ<sup>91</sup>. Although the same company owns Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság, all interview partners who work for Magyar Hírlap confirmed that they consider Népszabadság to be their toughest rival on the market. Additionally, some of the employees come from abroad, e.g. my interview partner Iván Zsolt Nagy, who comes from Timișoara, Romania. According to my interviewees the journalists are solely responsible for their articles while they give them a free hand to write however they please<sup>92</sup>.

### 3.1.2.3 Népszabadság

The paper, also published in Budapest, has the highest circulation of all Hungarian dailies. It varies from 150,000 to 210,000 copies. One journalist said that Népszabadság is trying to be a symbiosis between a source of reference and a mass paper without turning into a tabloid<sup>93</sup>. It used to be the Hungarian communist party's

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<sup>90</sup> Interview with Norbert Molnár.

<sup>91</sup> Interview with Miklós Újvári.

<sup>92</sup> Interviews with Miklós Újvári and Iván Zsolt Nagy.

<sup>93</sup> Interview with Tibor Kis.

official newspaper; hence it had the same powerful position as *Adevărul* had in Romania. During the nineties there were quite a few journalists that sympathised with the political left. This has changed during that decade. Nowadays there are also journalists who sympathise with the extreme right, such as the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)<sup>94</sup>. According to one interview partner, the political direction depends on the chief editor. There are three of them, and they change on a weekly basis and each has his personal political direction<sup>95</sup>. This, in my opinion, does guarantee a certain equilibrium within the newspaper. These chief editors decide upon the themes but not upon the content of the articles. In other words the journalists are free to write whatever they please. According to another interview partner<sup>96</sup>, despite being somewhat to the left, the paper criticised both former socialist prime ministers, Gyula Horn and Péter Medgyessy<sup>97</sup>. Furthermore, according to my third interview partner, *Népszabadság* also has an impact on Romanian political life. The newspaper's main articles are translated into Romanian and published on the Romanian government's homepage in the section dedicated to the Hungarian press<sup>98</sup>. Like with *Magyar Hírlap*, there are quite a few politicians in Hungary who want to publish articles in the newspaper. This is a clear indication of a newspaper's relevance to the country's political life and to its role in public discourse.

#### 3.1.2.4 România Liberă

*România Liberă*, published in Bucharest, is Romania's oldest daily, while *Adevărul* is eleven years younger<sup>99</sup>. With an average daily edition of about 70,000 it is also one of Romania's leading papers<sup>100</sup>. According to my interview partner<sup>101</sup>, the chief editors' goal is to place the paper in the political spectrum somewhere in the middle, neither too far to the left nor to the right. The paper is trying to keep its distance from all political parties. Nevertheless, in recent years *România Liberă* has quite conservative tendencies. *România Liberă* considers itself to be the Social Democratic Party's (PSD) and its supporters' toughest opponent. By supporters I do not mean the voters, but rather those who profit from the widespread corruption within the party's entourage. The close

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<sup>94</sup> Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with Tibor Kis.

<sup>96</sup> Interview with József Szilvássy.

<sup>97</sup> Ferenc Gyurcsány became prime minister in 2004 and therefore after the debate over the Status Law.

<sup>98</sup> Source on the 23.05.2006: <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339&par1=1&idl=2>

<sup>99</sup> *România Liberă* was founded in 1877.

<sup>100</sup> Source on the 21.04.2006:

<http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=publications&id=110&index=3&indexPer=0>

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Simona Popescu.

reading of the paper prior to the analysis revealed that România Liberă has constantly criticised the PSD government on matters of corruption and mismanagement. In comparison to other dailies such as Ziua or Libertatea, România Liberă has not shown any tendency to become a tabloid. Unlike the Hungarian press, the Romanian press is very dynamic. During the time of my research (2001-2003) Libertatea, Curentul or Curierul Național had not had such a strong circulation. This however changed after 2003. Nonetheless, Adevărul and România Liberă have remained in a strong position.

### 3.1.3 Analysing the articles

For this analysis a substantial quantity of newspaper articles was collected<sup>102</sup>. The articles were chosen according to two main criteria: they had to explicitly mention the Hungarian Status Law and they had to show relevance to the ongoing political debate regarding the Status Law. Practically, this meant that I looked for Hungarian articles that included the word *státustörvény* and for Romanian articles that included the phrase *legea statutului*, both meaning Status Law. The relevance of the articles to the political debate is an important criterion, because there were articles that concentrated on different issues, e.g. the applicability of the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) in the Hungarian State Railways' system. These topics, as important as they may be, were irrelevant to the political debate and were consequently neglected. Further, the articles had to show relevance to the co-ethnics in general or to the Hungarians in Romania in particular. Articles with relevance to other geographical-ethnic spheres only, e.g. the Hungarians in Ukraine, were also neglected.

This large amount of data was segmented in order to be able to compare certain elements, which are of importance for the analysis. Therefore I have dissected this mass into two main categories for better handling: ethnic denotations and motifs. These categories will help sort out the main features of the four narratives and hence the different discourses in which they are active. Subsequently, they will demonstrate the differences between the four newspapers. While the ethnic denotations are vital for the construction of ethnicity, the motifs reveal the different facets in each newspaper's narrative. They 'show' how the paper works and which conceptions stand behind it (Maho Awes 1983). The motifs I have chosen for this thesis, Europe, comparison, discrimination, NATO, history and legal aspects, are obviously not the only ones possible (Császár 2002). Nevertheless, they enable an analysis from different perspectives, which I consider to be crucial for the debate over the Hungarian Status

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<sup>102</sup> See Table 9.

Law. The last category, other aspects, includes the journalists' explicit personal views (when available), time aspects and also what I regard as missing information. By this term I mean the situation that arises when journalists, for whatever reasons, omit or neglect information, which according to my understanding should have been mentioned.

The method chosen for this synchronic analysis will follow a specific pattern, which will be repeated for all the articles<sup>103</sup>. I have reconsidered all the articles that were selected for the data basis of the diachronic analysis and were published on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001, the day when the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) was signed, or in the two weeks that followed. Consequently, the articles have also appeared as part of the diachronic analysis. The individual steps chosen for this method are the following:

1. Re-reading the article and jotting down first notes and ideas for a better segmentation of the article and a useful guideline.
2. Genre, structure, voices<sup>104</sup>. These three categories facilitate a better segmentation of the article and subsequently enable a more profound understanding of the discourse at hand. I will consider 'genre' as one of the following categories: essay, report and account. Essay in this sense will mean the personal assessment of a journalist concerning a specific topic, a report will be a descriptive text representing different points of view about an event and an account will be a short report often used by news agencies as shown in see Figure 5. Furthermore, the ties from report to account and report to essay are more intensive (double arrow) than between essay and account. This indicates that the differences between reports and essays and reports and accounts are more flexible or permeable than those between essays and accounts.
3. Literary means, e.g. metaphors, myths and style. The journalists may also use elements previously mentioned in the diachronic analysis, such as Europe, discrimination and history.
4. Target group. This category, when predictable, is essential for the discourse analysis: if there is a target group, then one can identify the author's intentions more easily.
5. Assessing the text. Optionally, if the author of the respective article has been interviewed, e.g. Miklós Újvári or Tibor Kis, I will compare the article(s) to the content of the interview.


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<sup>103</sup> Obviously, text analysis has many different methods. For a different methodology see Fairclough 2003.

<sup>104</sup> This triple division does not comply with literary categories. I have introduced them in order to distinguish between the different categories that have occurred to me during the diachronic analysis.

The articles will be analysed in alphabetical order of the newspapers and chronologically according to their date of issue. This analysis does not encompass all the article's facets, since a full analysis of all the details of each and every article will definitely supersede the objectives of this thesis. The assessment's aim is to demonstrate the article's tenor and the direct as well as indirect statements made by the journalist in reference to the discourse concerning the Hungarians in Romania in general, and the discursive event of the ONM in particular. Further, due to the nature of the obtained results, texts and interviews, I shall have to use references which regard forthcoming chapters.

Figure 5: Article genres



### 3.1.3.1 Ethnic denotations

Ethnic denotations reveal the Hungarian Status Law's ethnic aspect. This category is also of substantial importance due to ethnicity's vital role in cultural anthropology. The main objective is to find out how journalists constructed the Hungarians outside Hungary in general and the Hungarians in Romania in particular. For this purpose I gathered ethnic denotations that were used in the articles according to a single criterion: only denotations that include Hungarians in Romania were being considered. This meant that denotations such as *Vajdasági magyarok* [Magyars from Vojvodina] were neglected. Following this line of argument, by Hungarians in Romania I mean people in Romania that consider themselves to be ethnically Hungarian<sup>105</sup>. Preliminary lecture of the papers has shown that there are different ways to describe the

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<sup>105</sup> This is obviously also a denotation. However I do need a denotation with as few connotations as possible to be able to start off my analysis.

Hungarians in Romania and this multitude of denotations bears a problem within which needs to be explained.

Structuralism according to de Saussure encompasses two postulates that are relevant to this thesis: language cannot exist without difference and this difference is regulated according to a man-made binary code of the signifiers, e.g. tree, and the signified, the plant itself. In this system the signifier transforms the physical or ideological object into the spoken language. By neglecting time at a given synchronic moment, there is congruence between the signified and the signifier (Prechtl 1994). This becomes difficult, as in the case of the Hungarians in Romania, when journalists apply different signifiers to what they consider to be one signified. Following structuralist logic, this would mean that there are as many ethnic groups as there are denotations. In other words, every denotation carves out or *constructs* a new ethnic group from the myriad of available possibilities. One could say that these are only stylistic synonyms that refer to the same group. I cannot follow this line of argument. In my opinion there is a substantial difference between denotations such as *Romániában élő magyarok* [Magyars who live in Romania] and *Erdélyi magyarság* [Transylvanian Magyars]. Although they may overlap physically, they are anything but synonymous. Many denotations overlap physically to a large degree, i.e. they cover frequently large proportions of the same groups of people. This, however, still does not solve the basic problem at stake: while the journalists used the different denotation in a synonymous manner and therefore they referred to a single group, I considered each denotation as the creation of a new group<sup>106</sup>.

### 3.1.3.2 Motifs

#### 3.1.3.2.1 Europe

Europe is by far not just the name of a geographical entity or a continent. In the sense of this discourse analysis it encompasses the geographical meaning, the economic and political establishment of the European Union (EU), the supranational Council of Europe (CE) and all the organisations linked to them. But Europe is more than that. Europe, or any of the above-mentioned institutions, plays a significant role in many public discourses in Central and East Europe (CEE). It has become a symbol of order and justice, even synonymous with civilisation. The European organisations are considered by many to be unprejudiced supra instances that can settle the disputes of the

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<sup>106</sup> This has a clear parallel to Bourdieu's categories of analysis (for scientific discourse) and categories of practice (for daily use). See also Bourdieu – Wacquant 2006.

‘small’ CEE states. This idea of a supra instance can also be regarded as tutelage or oppression. However, these elements do not play a role in the discourse concerning the Hungarian Status Law.

#### 3.1.3.2.2 Comparison

Several states in Central and Eastern Europe have laws with a similar function to the Hungarian Status Law and are therefore comparable. By comparison I mean the fact that politicians and journalists often compare the Hungarian Status Law to similar laws in other CEE states, i.e. Slovakia, Romania or Croatia. Consequently, comparison as a motif plays a significant role. The element of comparison, however, is understood as a discursive element and not as a juridical juxtaposition. It is the element of comparison in itself that is important for this analysis.

#### 3.1.3.2.3 Discrimination

The Status Law grants Hungarians who live in Hungary’s neighbouring states certain benefits that could be regarded as their compatriots, who do not receive them, as a discriminatory act. The benefits can take up different forms such as financial aid, working permit, health care or gratuitous education. For this reason, several Romanian politicians, among them President Ion Iliescu (1990-1996 and 2000-2004) and Prime Minister Adrian Năstase (2000-2004), condemned the Law as discriminatory, because it gave only Romanian citizens who defined themselves as ethnically Hungarian privileges while refusing them to their fellow citizens, who did not define themselves as Hungarians. A precise answer to the question ‘what is discrimination?’ is not the issue in this motif’s analysis. Each participant or actor in the discourse has his own conception of what discrimination is. Generally, I consider discrimination to be an unjust treatment by a third party: C treats A better than B, although, according to the rules or laws, it should not do so. This can be manifested in a negative way, e.g. denying benefits, or in a positive way, such as granting surplus benefits.

#### 3.1.3.2.4 NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) does not play a crucial role as Europe does, but, nevertheless, it is present in both discourses. It has the connotation of law, order, security and peace. If Europe is the leading figure for economic prosperity and institutional stability to be copied and perhaps attained, NATO is the supra instance that can calm down adversaries and bring them to reason. Furthermore, NATO

membership transmits a certain sense of security and confidence that might not be viewed with favour by those states that are not yet members. This is of importance when bearing in mind the time span of this analysis (2001-2003). Hungary received full NATO membership in March 1999 while Romania only in April 2004. NATO is also a part of the slogan 'Euro-Atlantic integration' which has been used both in Romania and Hungary. This slogan refers to the Central and Eastern European states prior to their integration either in NATO or the EU. The fact that the slogan was used as reference to those states' integration in such different organisation, bears evidence to the fact that there is a correlation between the two: an antithesis to the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

#### 3.1.3.2.5 History

Historic events and processes in Romania and Hungary have been and still are often used and sometimes abused for political purposes. In other words, historic data was transformed from its original time context, the past, to the present and by doing so modified to suit today's political needs. Consequently, the data is transformed and reproduced by the actors of the respective public discourses. This abuse is usually used in disputes that concern Transylvania and the Hungarians in Romania. A good example is the Treaty of Trianon from 1920, which forced Hungary to secede Transylvania and some adjacent territories to Romania<sup>107</sup>. There are therefore different points of view in Hungary and Romania about the historic connection between the Hungarian state and the Hungarians in Romania. This category is not aiming at the pursuit of an ultimate truth, of who might have been right or wrong. It rather tries to find out which historic arguments have been brought forward by journalists and politicians and hence what role history plays in the respective narratives.

#### 3.1.3.2.6 Legal aspects

Arguing with laws and juridical aspects, just like disputing with historical facts and their interpretation, shows a specific attitude and way of discussion. It presupposes a frame of mind that respects the rule of law and expects others to do likewise. The Status Law as such does not play a vital role in this. It is the arguments themselves that matter<sup>108</sup>. The Romanian historic narrative argues that Transylvania belongs to Romania because of ethno-historic rights. The Hungarian historic narrative retorts that

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<sup>107</sup> See Table 4

<sup>108</sup> See Chapter 2.

Transylvania belongs to Romania due to the Treaty of Trianon, an international legal act, which both parties signed and respected<sup>109</sup>.

### 3.2 Interviews

Next to the newspaper articles I have also included interviews within the framework of this work. This had different goals. The first one concerned the verification of the information that was already available. As I had previously mentioned, there is no such thing as a neutral or completely objective newspaper. Hence I interviewed at least one journalist from every newspaper about his or her views concerning the respective newspaper. The second reason was the verification of the information that I already had about the Hungarian Status Law. Despite profound reading beforehand I wanted to receive first-hand information from those who participated in the discourses and hence are part of their newspaper's journalistic narrative. The third reason relates to the aspect of time. I wanted to know whether the journalists have changed their minds in the course of events or perhaps after the political tensions have calmed down. Interviewing them from September 2003 onwards<sup>110</sup>, there was a time span, which enabled them to recapture the events of the years 2001 and 2002. This proved to be a very useful source of information about the Hungarian government's external as well as internal political ambitions concerning the Hungarian Status Law. Finally, regarding the synchronic analysis, the role of transcultural characteristics was essential for a full understanding of the journalistic narrative.

#### 3.2.1 Criteria for the journalists

Sampling the Hungarian journalists for interviewing was done according to the number of articles published. I picked those journalists who wrote the highest number of articles relating to the Law in the years 2001 and 2002. This also meant including cumulative articles that had two or more authors. For that I have set a statistical table of all the articles published to see who were the most active journalists. Statistical data by itself is not enough. A high number of published articles is obviously an indicator of a strong presence in the discourse, but it also depends on the style of the article. The articles' reception in public varies according to the readers' interest. Some may not be interested in politics and others may want to read articles by certain journalists only. These speculations reduce the statistical data's importance but not its basic essence:

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<sup>109</sup> Idem.

<sup>110</sup> The first interview was on the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2003 and the last one on the 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2004.

delivering the respective discourse's main actors in the journalistic narratives (Schlehe 2003)

**Table 7:** Journalists from Magyar Hírlap and the number of articles they published about the Hungarian Status Law

Journalist	2001	2002	$\Sigma^{111}$
Bernát, Anikó	-	1	1
Biczó, Henriett	1	-	1
Bilkei-Gorzó, Borbála	1	-	1
Bodnár, Lajos	2	1	3
Bogdán, Tibor	31	10	44
Dobozi, Pálma	1	1	2
Dusza, Erika	1	-	1
Dzindzisz, Magdaléna	1	1	2
Erdei, Éva	1	-	1
Gergely, László	-	1	1
Haiman, Éva	-	2	2
Havas, Iván	1	-	1
Joób, Sándor	-	1	1
Kántor, Barbara	-	1	1
Kecskés, Ferenc	1	-	1
Kordos, Szabolcs	1	-	1
Kósa, András	-	3	3
Locsmándi, Andréea	-	1	1
Márk, Edina	-	1	1
Molnár, Norbert	-	22	22
Nagy, Iván Zsolt	33	27	60
Nagy, Szilvia	4	5	10
Németh, Szilárd	-	1	1
Neumann, Ottó	1	-	1
Rockenbauer, Nóra	3	1	4
Scipiades, Erzsébet	1	-	1
Szarka, Klára	-	2	2
Szép, Zsuzsa	1	2	3
Szilágyi, Béla	-	1	1
Szombathy, Pál	1	1	2
Újvári, Miklós	5	7	12
Varga, Gergely	2	1	3
Zipernovszky, Kornél	4	8	12

The table showed clearly a small number of dominant journalists whom I tried to contact (light grey background). This meant, that I had five journalists from Magyar Hírlap (MH) and three from Népszabadság (NSZ).

<sup>111</sup> Data from 2003 is not included but it showed a similar pattern in both newspapers.

**Table 8:** Journalists from Népszabadság and the number of articles they published about the Hungarian Status Law

Journalists <sup>112</sup>	2001	2002	Σ
Aczél, Endre	1	3	4
B.T.T.	1	-	1
Bednárík, Imre	1	4	5
Csónyi, Vilmos	1	-	1
Czene, Gábor	1	-	1
Danó, Anna	-	1	1
Deményi, Péter	1	-	1
Eörsi, István	1	1	2
Farkas, József György	1	-	1
Ferencz, Gábor	-	1	1
Füzes, Oszkár	4	3	7
Gergő, Judit	1	-	1
Gömöri, Endre	1	1	2
H.Sz.	-	1	1
Hovanyesz, László	1	-	1
I.B.	1	-	1
I.E.	1	-	1
K.J.T.	-	1	1
Kácsor, Zsolt	-	1	1
Kis, Tibor	18	19	37
Kőszeghy, Elemér	1	7	8
Kun, J. Erzsébet	-	1	1
L.K.	2	-	2
M.L.L.	-	1	1
Máté, József	4	3	7
Mihálovits, András	-	1	1
Miklós, Gábor	-	2	2
Nagy, Emese	-	1	1
Pócs, Balázs	3	1	4
R. Hahn, Veronika	1	-	1
R.R.	1	-	1
S.L.	-	1	1
Seres, Attila	-	3	3
Sz.J.P.	4	4	8
Sz.L.L.	6	-	6
Szabó, Brigitta	1	-	1
Szabó, József	2	4	6
Szilvássy, József	13	27	40
Szűcs, László	3	-	3
T.M.	-	1	1
Tenczer, Gábor	1	-	1
Tibori Szabó, Zoltán	67	29	96
Várkonyi, Iván	-	1	1
Zelmanovic, Djordje	1	-	1

<sup>112</sup> Some of the journalists use their initials. Since none of those using this abbreviation played an important role I decided to leave the initials as they were.

From those working for Magyar Hírlap I could interview three and Tibor Bogdán, who is working in Bucharest, was kind enough to thoroughly answer my questions via email<sup>113</sup>. Hence I interviewed Norbert Molnár, Iván Zsolt Nagy and Miklós Újvári.

Since both Adevărul (A) and România Liberă (RL) have a limited online archive, I relied heavily on the data available from the editorial boards in Romania. Further, unlike the Hungarian newspapers, the Romanian articles do not always contain the author's name and I could not put together statistical data to determine the most significant journalists of these papers' respective narratives. Hence I interviewed one journalist from every Romanian paper who had an important role within the newspapers hierarchy: Rodica Ciobanu from Adevărul and Simona Popescu from România Liberă. Both of them are heads of the political section in their respective newspapers and were usually responsible for articles concerning the Hungarian Status Law.

In a similar way to Magyar Hírlap, I chose Népszabadság's dominant journalists (light grey background). Table 8 shows three journalists that dominate the narrative: Tibor Kis, József Szilvássy and Zoltán Tibori Szabó. Consequently I interviewed all three of them.

### 3.2.2 Interviewing method

The semi-structured interviews were structured as a discussion with open and closed questions in order to gain qualitative as well as quantitative data (Weller 1998; 367). Due to the nature of the topic, i.e. journalistic narratives in the light of the Hungarian Status Law, the interviews were thematically focused. The idea was to give my interview partners the possibility to express themselves freely (open questions) while gathering comparable data (closed questions). In other words, the questions that regarded their personal biography, e.g. place of work, previous employment and education, was fixed and took a small part of the time available. The other part regarding questions such as the policy of the respective newspaper or their personal view concerning the Status Law, took more time since the journalists had a free hand and could express themselves at length (Schlehe 2003).

Language was an important aspect of the interview. I insisted interviewing the journalists in the same language in which they published their articles. Hence there remained a linguistic continuity between the articles and the interviews. Due to my command of Hungarian and Romanian I did not need a translator. Furthermore, I decided not to record the interviews. The reason for this lies in my assumption that

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<sup>113</sup> By September 2003 Kornél Ziperovszky did not work for MH anymore.

some of the journalists might not talk as freely as I would have liked them to. Considering the difficulties I had in persuading some of them to be interviewed and reassuring them that the information would be used for strictly scientific purposes, my decision proved to be correct. After each interview I prepared a protocol containing the information gathered during the session. This protocol was later used to adjust, correct or add information to the general data already gathered and for comparison with the results from the articles' analysis. Thus the questions I asked in each interview:

1. Personal questions. These concern predominantly tertiary education. My assumption was that all journalists are part of the academic elite in the sense that they are all university graduates. With one single exception this turned out to be true<sup>114</sup>. Furthermore, I asked about their working contract, to find out whether they were full employees of the newspaper or not. The reason behind this question was the role the journalists played in the newspaper's hierarchy. Journalists with a permanent contract can have a greater influence on the editorial board than those who are freelance journalists. Another question concerned the journalist's auxiliary endeavours. Basically, whether he or she had worked or was still working for another newspaper.
2. Questions concerning the respective newspaper. The first question in this domain was about the newspaper's political orientation, bearing in mind that all newspapers have a certain, at times very subtle political tendency. Reading some of the articles beforehand, I had already noticed a certain orientation in every newspaper and this question was aimed at the verification of the data previously obtained. The next question was about the newspaper's influence on the public discourse and hence among politicians. Regarding the fixed set of criteria I have put up for choosing the newspapers, it was important to find out whether the journalists concurred with them and consider 'their' newspaper to be an essential factor in the respective country's public discourse.
3. The Status Law. At this point I wanted to find out the journalist's personal view concerning the Status Law. This information is essential, since it will be compared with the results that were provided by the analysis of the articles.

In the following chapter I shall apply the theoretical and methodological approaches to the data obtained from my research: ethnic denotations, narratives and interviews.

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<sup>114</sup> The only journalist who was not a graduate actually studied for three years and then quit.

## 4. Results

In this chapter I will present the results of the three analyses: the diachronic analysis, the synchronic analysis and the interviews. There will be a short summary following at the end of each subchapter.

### 4.1 Diachronic analysis

The diachronic analysis in this subchapter regards the variation of the discourse as one of its prime objectives. This means that the turns and movements of the respective journalistic narratives will be analysed over a long period of time. Since all four newspapers have been written in their country's respective discourse, it is the discursive event of the Hungarian Status Law that brings all four newspapers to a common denominator<sup>115</sup>. This diachronic approach carves out the sector mentioned and takes a look at different elements used in the newspapers' narratives. Consequently the results will be presented as a whole and not as segments. The minor discursive event of the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum will be discussed in the next subchapter.

The bulk of data, which has been gathered for this section, encompasses newspaper articles over a range of three years<sup>116</sup>. Due to the previously set criteria for choosing articles, the number of articles analysed varies very strongly between the Hungarian newspapers on the one side and the Romanian ones on the other. Nevertheless, despite the relatively low number of Romanian printed publications, the data was enough to take a diachronic view of the narratives represented by *Adevărul* and *România Liberă*. The methodology of the diachronic analysis relies on the works of Siegfried Jäger, Katja Keweritsch and Abduraman Maho Awes, who took a long-term approach to analysing the press (Jäger 2001, Keweritsch 1999, Maho Awes 1983). By long-term I mean a period of at least two years. Unlike other works concerning the Hungarian Status Law (Császár 2002, Bakk – Bodo 2003), this thesis will not require graphs to show how many articles were published each and every week. The idea is to show an overview that enables the analysis of each and every newspaper's narrative during that respective period.

The results are divided linguistically and hence politically: first, the two Hungarian newspapers and then the two Romanian ones. Each linguistic section is then divided into two elements of analysis: ethnic denotations and motifs. The ethnic

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<sup>115</sup> See Figure 3.

<sup>116</sup> See Table 9.

denotations are an indicator to the journalists' construction of ethnic identity and therefore ethnicity. Although every denotation encompasses a different group of people, the denotations are often used synonymously. The motifs, on the other hand, disclose the narrative each newspaper uses to describe the co-ethnics. The six motifs chosen for this part of the analysis are a result of a selective pre-reading and of a close observation of the discourse during the years 2001 and 2002. The selected motifs are not exhaustive. However they reflect the narratives from different perspectives<sup>117</sup>. A comparison between the Hungarian and the Romanian newspapers will conclude this subchapter.

Table 9: Period of analysis

Newspaper	Period of analysis	Number of articles
Adevărul	24.12.2001-08.09.2003	30
Magyar Hírlap	10.01.2001-03.02.2003	227
Népszabadság	12.04.2001-23.12.2002	265
România Liberă	12.09.2001-19.07.2003	25

#### 4.1.1 The Hungarian articles

Since the Hungarian articles were more numerous than the Romanian ones, I shall consequently refer to them first and afterwards deal with the Romanian ones. For a better overview of the available data I shall begin the analysis with the ethnic denotations that have been utilised in Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap and then continue with the motifs.

##### 4.1.1.1 Ethnic denotations

In her introduction to Jacques Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak wrote the following lines:

“Word and thing or thought never in fact become one. We are reminded of, referred to, what the convention of words sets up as thing or thought, by a particular arrangement of words. The structure of reference works and can go on working not because of the identity between these two so-called component parts of the sign, but because of their relationship of difference. The sign marks a place of difference.”<sup>118</sup>

Further,

<sup>117</sup> For a different set of motifs see Császár 2002.

<sup>118</sup> Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1997, p. xvi.

“Such is the strange “being” of the sign: half of it always “not there” and the other half always “not that”.”<sup>119</sup>

These short quotations reflect the nature of ethnic denotations: they are signs within the discourse used by producers of texts, e.g. journalists, politicians or researchers, to try to model, capture, symbolise and therefore create groups on an ethnic basis. With each and every denotation there are connotations, open and hidden, that reveal the user’s intentions. By using ethnic denotation the producer either changes the denotations’ notion or he carves an ethnic group out of the myriad of possibilities. In other words, ethnic denotations are signs, or signifiers for that matter, that are utilised to create the signified, i.e. ethnic, groups. These groups, however, exist only through the signifiers and their disposition in the respective discourse. These denotations are therefore either ‘not there’ or ‘not that’. Another aspect lies in the positions of power in which the denotations are being placed and for which they are being used. Subsequently, there are no ethnic groups as such. There are only ethnic groups, which exist through the sign, i.e. the ethnic denotation.

Consequently, this category is very important to anthropology. Ethnicity and identity are interwoven in these denotations, as ethnic denotations are politically highly discursive. Writing about peoples or ethnic groups is not only an attempt to define them but it also puts an inclusive and exclusive boundary around that group. One must bear in mind that there is a certain balance in journalism between literary diversity, which is meant to curb repetitions, and the more professional approach, which is trying to achieve a certain consensus among authors by using fixed, technical terms. This consensus means that everybody means the same thing by the same denotation. Thus, Bourdieu’s division between categories of analysis and categories of practice is blurred.

#### 4.1.1.1.1 General features

Careful reading of the Hungarian newspapers has brought forward a considerable sum of ethnic denotations in both *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Hírlap*. This data is represented in Table 10 below. There are some 126 different denotations, which all describe different groups, but have one common denominator: they all encompass people who consider themselves or are considered by others to be Magyar, i.e. Hungarian, and live outside Hungary’s borders. Even though the ethnonym is not always mentioned, e.g. *külföldiek* [foreigners], the context surrounding it delivers the

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<sup>119</sup> Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1997, p.xvii.

information that the author of the text is referring to Hungarians in Hungary's neighbouring states. In order to enable a better overview, here a few explanations on this table:

- The first column represents a serial number for better reference.
- The second column gives the original denotation in Hungarian in alphabetical order.
- In third column is the English translation of the respective Hungarian denotation.
- The fourth column indicates the number of appearances the respective denotation had in Népszabadság (NSZ).
- The fifth column indicates the number of appearances the respective denotation had in Magyar Hírlap (MH).
- Colours. Denotations that appeared only in Népszabadság, have been marked in red, while those denotations that appeared only in Magyar Hírlap, have been marked in blue. Denotations that appeared in both newspapers have been left black.
- The table itself encompasses 23 denotations that explicitly refer to Transylvania or Romania. They have a dark grey shade and are written in italics. These denotations have been picked out and placed together in Table 10a, which will be discussed separately in the following segment. Consequently, they will not be analysed in this segment of the thesis.

Table 10: Hungarian denotations, which encompass the Hungarians of Romania

	Hungarian denotations	English translation	MH	NSZ
1	Adott államokban élő magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities that live in the indicated states		1
2	Államon kívüli magyarság	Magyardom outside the state		1
3	Általános magyarság	General Magyardom		1
4	Anyaországon kívül élő magyarok	Magyars who live outside their homeland	1	
5	Anyaországtól elszakadt honfitársaink	Our compatriots who are separated from the homeland		1
6	Azokban az országokban élő magyarok ... amelyek idővel az Európai Unió tagjai lesznek	Magyars living in countries that will with time become members of the European Union		1
7	Elszakított területeken élő magyarok	Magyars that live in detached territories	1	
8	<i>Erdélyben élő magyar közösség</i>	<i>Magyar community that lives in Transylvania</i>		1
9	<i>Erdélyben élő magyarok</i>	<i>Magyars who live in Transylvania</i>	1	
10	<i>Erdélyi magyar kisebbség</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyar minority</i>		3
11	<i>Erdélyi magyar közösség</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyar community</i>	2	2
12	<i>Erdélyi magyar népesség</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyar population</i>	1	
13	<i>Erdélyi magyar társaság</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyar society</i>		1
14	<i>Erdélyi magyarok</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyars</i>	7	14
15	<i>Erdélyi magyarság</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyardom</i>	7	27
16	<i>Erdélyiek</i>	<i>Transylvanians</i>	2	1
17	Etnikumú magyarok	Ethnical Magyars	1	1
18	Határainkon túl élő magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities who live beyond our borders	1	
19	Határainkon túl élő magyarok	Magyars who live beyond our borders		2
20	Határainkon túl élő magyarság	Magyardom that lives beyond our borders		1
21	Határon kívül élő magyarok	Magyars who live outside the border	2	1
22	Határon túl élő magyar közösségek	Magyar communities, which live beyond the border	1	2
23	Határon túl élő magyar nemzetiségű emberek	People of Magyar nationality who live beyond the border		1
24	Határon túl élő magyarok	Magyars who live beyond the border	5	9
25	Határon túl élők	Those who live beyond the border	1	1
26	Határon túl rekedt magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities that stuck fast beyond the border		1
27	Határon túl rekedt magyarság	Magyardom that stuck fast beyond the border	1	
28	Határon túli kisebbség	Minority beyond the border	6	3
29	Határon túli közösségek	Communities beyond the border	1	1
30	Határon túli magyar emberek	Magyar people beyond the border		1
31	Határon túli magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities beyond the border	1	6
32	Határon túli magyar közösségek	Magyar communities beyond the border	5	5
33	Határon túli magyarok	Magyars beyond the border	148	117
34	Határon túli magyarság	Magyardom beyond the border	29	38
35	Határon túli személyek	Persons beyond the border	1	

36	Határon túli tartalék	Reserves beyond the border	1	
37	Határon túliak	Those beyond the border	30	10
38	Helyi magyarság	Local Magyardom	1	
39	Kárpát medencei magyarok	Magyars of the Carpathian Basin		3
40	Kárpát medencei magyarság	Magyardom of the Carpathian Basin		1
41	Kárpátmedencei magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities of the Carpathian Basin	2	1
42	Kisebbségben élő határon túli Magyar közösségek	Magyar communities beyond the border that live state of minority	1	
43	Kisebbségben élő határon túli magyarok	Magyars who live beyond the border as a minority		1
44	Kisebbségek	Minorities	2	9
45	Kisebbséghez tartozó személyek	Persons belonging to the minority	1	
46	Kisebbségi magyar közösségek	Magyar communities in state of minority		1
47	Kisebbségi magyar közösségek tagjai	Members of Magyar communities in state of minority		1
48	Kisebbségi magyarok	Magyars in state of minority		12
49	Kisebbségi magyarság	Magyardom in state of minority		5
50	Kisebbségi sorba jutott magyarság	Magyardom that has become minority		1
51	Kisebbségi sorsban élő magyarok	Magyars who live in the destiny of a minority		1
52	Környező országokban élő magyarok	Magyars in the surrounding countries	2	5
53	Közösségek	Communities		1
54	Külföldi állampolgárok	Foreign citizens	1	
55	Külföldi magyarok	Magyars from abroad	1	
56	Külföldiek	Foreigners	1	
57	Külföldön élő honfitársak	Compatriots that live abroad	1	
58	Külföldön élő magyarok	Magyars living abroad	2	2
59	Külföldön élő magyarság	Magyardom that lives abroad	1	1
60	Külhoni magyarok	Magyars outside the home land		1
61	Magukat magyarnak valló személyek	Persons who consider themselves Magyars		1
62	Magukat magyaroknak vallók	Who consider themselves Magyars		1
63	Magyar etnikumhoz tartozók	Those who belong to Magyar ethnic		1
64	Magyar etnikumhoz tartozó állampolgárok	Citizens who belong to Magyar ethnic		1
65	<i>Magyar etnikumú román állampolgárok</i>	<i>Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnic</i>	1	
66	Magyar kisebbség tagjai	Members of the Magyar minority		1
67	Magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities	7	32
68	Magyar kisebbséghez tartozó személyek	Persons who belong to the Magyar minority	1	
69	Magyar közösség	Magyar community	1	5
70	<i>Magyar nemzetiségű román állampolgárok</i>	<i>Romanian citizens of Magyar nationality</i>	1	2
71	Magyar Nemzet	Magyar nation		1
72	Magyar nemzethez tartozó csoportok	Groups that belong to the Magyar nation		1
73	Magyar nemzetiségű	Of Magyar nationality	2	1
74	Magyar nemzetiségű állampolgárok	Citizens of Magyar nationality		1

75	Magyar nemzetiségűek	Those of Magyar nationality		3
76	<i>Magyar önazonosságot valló román állampolgárok</i>	<i>Romanian citizens who declare their Magyar identity</i>	1	
77	Magyarok	Magyars	3	5
78	Magyarok akik önhibájukon kívül kerültek a határainkon túlva	Magyars not guilty for falling beyond our borders		1
79	Magyarország határain kívül élő Magyar nemzetiségű személyek	Persons of Magyar nationality, who live outside Hungary's borders	1	
80	Magyarország határain kívül élő magyarok	Magyars who live outside Hungary's borders	1	1
81	Magyarország határain túl élő magyarok	Magyars who live beyond Hungary's borders	1	
82	Magyarország szomszédos államaiban élő magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities who live in Hungary's neighbouring states	1	
83	Magyarországon kívül élő magyarok	Magyars who live outside Hungary	1	
84	Magyarság	Magyardom	6	9
85	Nem magyar polgárságú magyarok	Magyars who are not Magyar citizens		1
86	Nemzet	Nation		1
87	Nemzet külföldi fele	The nation's part abroad		1
88	Nemzet részei	Parts of the nation		1
89	Nemzeti kisebbség	National minority		3
90	Nemzeti magyar kisebbség	National Magyar minority	1	
91	Ország határain kívül élő magyarság	Magyardom that lives outside the country's borders		1
92	Országban élő magyar kisebbség	Magyar minority that lives within the country		1
93	Ott élő magyar közösségek	Magyar communities that live there	1	
94	Ott élő magyar származású polgárok	Citizens of Magyar origin who live there	1	
95	Ott élő magyarok	Magyars that live there		3
96	Ottani magyarok	Magyars from there	1	3
97	Ottani magyarság	Magyardom from there	2	
98	<i>Románia területén élő magyarok</i>	<i>Magyars who live on Romania's territory</i>		1
99	<i>Romániában élő magyar nemzeti kisebbség</i>	<i>National Magyar minority that lives in Romania</i>		1
100	<i>Romániában élő magyarok</i>	<i>Magyars who live in Romania</i>		1
101	<i>Romániában élő nemzeti kisebbség</i>	<i>National minority that lives in Romania</i>		1
102	<i>Romániában élő, magát magyar nemzetiségűnek valló, nem magyar állampolgárságú személyek</i>	<i>Persons, who live in Romania, consider themselves to be of Magyar nationality not Hungarian citizens</i>	2	
103	<i>Romániai magyar kisebbség</i>	<i>Romanian Magyar minority</i>	5	5
104	<i>Romániai magyar közösség</i>	<i>Romanian Magyar community</i>	2	3
105	<i>Romániai magyar nemzeti kisebbség</i>	<i>Romanian national Magyar minority</i>		1
106	<i>Romániai magyarok</i>	<i>Romanian Magyars</i>	12	18
107	<i>Romániai magyarság</i>	<i>Romanian Magyardom</i>	16	25
108	Státusmagyarok	Status Magyars	5	3
109	Szomszéd államokban élő magyarok	Magyars who live in the neighbouring states	24	7
110	Szomszéd országok magyar származású lakosai	Inhabitants of the neighbouring countries of Magyar descent		1
111	Szomszéd országokban élő magyar	Magyar communities and those of		1

	közösségek és magyar nemzetiségűek	Magyar nationality that live in the neighbouring countries		
112	Szomszéd országokban élő magyarok	Magyars who live in the neighbouring countries	15	12
113	Szomszédos államok magyarsága	Magyardom in the neighbouring states		1
114	Szomszédos államokban élő magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities that live in the neighbouring states		1
115	Szomszédos államokban élő magyar nemzetiségűek	Persons of Magyar nationality who live in the neighbouring states	1	
116	Szomszédos államokban élő magyarság	Magyardom that lives in the neighbouring states		3
117	Szomszédos országbeli magyarság	Magyardom of the neighbouring countries	1	
118	Szomszédos országokban élő magyar kisebbségek	Magyar minorities who live in the neighbouring countries		5
119	Szomszédos országokban élő magyar nemzetiségűek	Persons of Magyar nationality who live in the neighbouring countries		1
120	Szomszédos országokban élő magyarság	Magyardom that lives in the neighbouring countries		2
121	Szomszédos országokban élő nemzetrészek	Parts of the nation which live in the neighbouring countries		1
122	Szórványterületeken élő kisebbségi magyarok	Minority Magyars who live in scattered settlements		1
123	Szórványterületeken élő magyarok	Magyars who live in scattered settlements		1
124	Területén élő magyarság	Magyardom that lives within its territory		1
125	Trianoni határokon kívül rekedt magyarság kisebbsége	The minor part of Magyardom that remained outside the Trianon borders		1

The main features of this table will be discussed first and afterward I shall turn to some of the differences between the two Hungarian newspapers. Hence, the general characteristics of the table are:

1. Abroad. There are different expressions, which are used to symbolise the notion of abroad: *határ* [border] in Nos. 18-37, 78-81 and 91, *külföld* [abroad] in Nos. 54-59, *ott/ottani* [there/from there,] in Nos. 93-97 and *szomszéd* [neighbour] in Nos. 109-120. The denotation *határon túli magyarok* is the most common denotation of them all. The semantics of describing a group of people as being something abroad bears evidence to the ambiguity of the relationship between the Hungarian state and the Hungarians in the neighbouring states: political separation on the one hand and cultural and linguistic unity on the other. *Határ*, *külföld*, *szomszéd* and *ott* describe a group of people, who are somewhere apart, beyond, separated from the core, which is the position of the author, in this case the journalists publishing in Hungary. This is somewhat confusing when journalists from Romania, Ukraine or Slovakia write from their home state about

the Magyars beyond the border, i.e. from the Hungarian state's perspective, and referring at the same time to fellow Slovak or Romanian citizens with ethnic Hungarian background.

2. Trianon. Although mentioned explicitly only in one denotation (No. 125), there are many that imply a connotation to that Treaty from 1920: Nos. 5, 7, 26, 27, 50, 51, and 78. The ascendants of the Hungarians who live in Hungary's neighbouring states were prior to 1920 in Hungary<sup>120</sup>. Consequently, the Treaty of Trianon has created a situation in which there are Hungarians in all of Hungary's neighbouring states. The denotations suggest a clear situation: the fact that Hungarians live in the neighbouring countries in a state of minority is obviously not their fault. Relating to *sors* [destiny], *önhibájukon kívül* [not their fault] or *rekedt* [got stuck] suggest that those groups would have liked the situation to be different but cannot do anything about it. While Trianon has a connotation of the revisionist period between 1920 and 1945, the listed denotations, with the exception of No. 125, try to recall the reason for the Hungarian minorities' 'existence' by leading the reader to the conclusion that it was Trianon's fault without explicitly mentioning the name. Evidently, these denotations' impact is difficult to understand without prior knowledge of the historic events they are relying on.
3. Nation. Referring to the co-ethnics as a nation, expatriates or parts of a nation, or for that matter of the homeland, is a very common motif: Nos. 23, 57, 60, 71-75, 79, 86-90, 111, 116, 119 and 121. However, the term "nation" is used in a somewhat indistinct manner, since its usage does not include the structure of a state. There are three main references: first there is the reference to "nation" as being *the* cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation. This means that the nation is conceived as an entity that is beyond the existent political borders, and therefore the element of the state is excluded. This is a debate that has gathered momentum with the significant enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007<sup>121</sup>. According to some, e.g. Krisztián Ungvári, the Hungarian cultural and linguistic nation will be reunited in a EU without the political borders that have hampered it since Trianon (Ahn 2006). Secondly, 'nation' is considered as a substitute for ethnic minority, relying on the Hungarian

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<sup>120</sup> See Chapter 2 for further detail.

<sup>121</sup> Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Slovenia have joined the EU in 2004 while Romanian joined in 2007. Thus, over 80% of all co-ethnics and 96% of all Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin are members of a single supra-national political entity: the European Union.

definition of minorities. This usage refers to the Hungarian law concerning the national and ethnic minorities within Hungary from 1993. This very progressive law only made linguistic differentiations between ethnic and national minorities: the latter have a mother-nation, which the first ones do not (Küpper 1998). In other words, when applying this logic to the Hungarians that live in Romania, Slovakia or Serbia, they are not just a local ethnic phenomenon, but they are part of a greater whole, namely the Hungarian nation. Thirdly, there is the notion that refers to the personal belonging to a nation. On the personal level, this notion of ‘nation’ can be interpreted as a performance of ethnic or national belonging, as a means of expression, identification and/or segregation.

4. Self-definition. The reference to a group’s emic definition is rare and is represented only in denotations Nos. 61 and 62. These two denotations are an indicator to the fact that the journalists use their own categories and do not relate to the self-definitions initiated by those personally affected<sup>122</sup>. Had the journalists used more of these denotations they would have given up the position of power they exert in the discourse in question. However, I still consider these denotations to be concealed etic ones. By using denotations 61 and 62, the journalists transmitted an impression that the denotations are more neutral and more authentic than the other denotations. Nevertheless, if the group they are referring to consists of *people who consider themselves to be Magyars or Hungarians*, it is still an etic definition because it is not the ones involved, i.e. the Hungarians or Magyars, that speak but the journalists who carve out a group that they say considers itself to be a group with distinct characteristics. It is not those who perform their ethnicity that talk. Hence, there are people who consider themselves Magyars and who are defined by the journalists as a group. It is still the journalists that decide and not those who are denotated.
5. Reserves. This denotation, No. 36, used by Hungarian prime minister Orbán in a radio interview in January 2001 and repeated in Magyar Hírlap has a clear economic reference. Orbán was trying to push the debate surrounding the Hungarian Status Law into the economic segment of the political discourse. The denotation *határon túli tartalék* [Reserves beyond the border] suggests that Hungary has a depot of labour force beyond its borders, which it can plug on in case of need. It also suggests that the Hungarians in Hungary’s adjacent states, to whom Orbán was referring, stand there waiting for the mother nation to call

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<sup>122</sup> When the journalist writes from abroad, he does refer to himself indirectly.

them. Orbán was trying to show that the Status Law is a necessity to the Hungarian economy due to the brain drain from Hungary to the West. His idea was to get skilled personnel from the neighbouring states that speaks Hungarian, is highly qualified and is willing to work for a better wage in Hungary. Experience after 2002 has shown that the benefits granted by the Status Law and the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) have *not* instigated a wave of emigration from the neighbouring states to Hungary<sup>123</sup>.

6. Carpathian Basin. The denotations with reference to the Carpathian Basin, Nos. 39-41, pay tribute to a specific political correctness. The Kingdom of Hungary up to 1920 encompassed roughly the geographical territory of the Carpathian Basin. Consequently, there was a certain superposition between the political and the geographical borders. This coincidence is used to name the territory of the defunct kingdom in geographical and not in political terms<sup>124</sup>. This usage also avoids probable political controversies. The basin in question hence becomes synonymous with a territory that includes all the Hungarian lands and that is inhabited by Hungarians in Central Europe.
7. Status Hungarians. This denotation, No. 108, is mentioned only in a single form but eight times: three times in *Népszabadság* and five times in *Magyar Hírlap*. Astonishingly, it is the only direct reference to the Status Law in the entire table. I assume that most denotations were common before the debate over the Hungarian Status Law was set loose and therefore the journalists did not need any specific denotations to correlate the Status Law with the Hungarians in the neighbouring states. Apparently, the journalists took it for granted that the readers knew whom they meant.
8. Abroad versus Nation. There is a hidden contradiction when using elements that refer to 'abroad', like the ones already mentioned above, in combination with expressions that refer to 'nation' or 'Magyardom' (Nos. 23, 79, 111, 113, 115-117 and 119-121). The problem lies in the discord between the concept of nation or Magyardom and the political reality in Central and Eastern Europe. Abroad suggests segregation and division while nation and Magyardom suggest unity. If the journalists talk of the Magyar nation, then it should be used in a way that excludes the political reality of a cultural and linguistic group that is dispersed in different states. The modern nation, the way I understand it, includes some

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<sup>123</sup> Interview with Norbert Molnár.

<sup>124</sup> Another possibility would be the land of St. István's [St. Stephen] Crown with reference to King István, who was the first Hungarian king.

relation to the political structure of a state. There cannot be a political nation without a state. This state of affairs, however, reflects a stubborn problem in the Hungarian political discourse regarding the co-ethnics (Ahn 2006).

The two Hungarian newspapers analysed in this section, *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Hírlap*, also reveal a set of differences in the ethnic denotations they have used in the course of the discourse:

1. Neighbours<sup>125</sup>. There is a basic difference between the two Hungarian newspapers in relation to the usage of *szomszéd* [neighbour]. From the 13 denotations that include *szomszéd*, *Magyar Hírlap* used only two exclusively, while *Népszabadság* used nine. The two denotations, which were common to both papers, were Nos. 109 and 112: “Magyars who live in the neighbouring states” and “Magyars who live in the neighbouring countries”. However, *Magyar Hírlap* made an extensive use of these denotations while *Népszabadság* used other, e.g. Nos. 116 and 118. As a result, the journalists at *Magyar Hírlap* laid an emphasis on the fact that the co-ethnics live in the neighbouring states/countries while those at *Népszabadság* took a larger variety of possible denotations into consideration. This bears evidence to the fact that the journalists at *Magyar Hírlap* shared a more common perception of denoting the co-ethnics while the journalists at *Népszabadság* had a more differentiated perspective.
2. Abroad<sup>126</sup>. The three denotations 33, 34 and 37 make up over half of the denotations used in the Hungarian newspapers at stake between 2001 and 2003. Bearing in mind the fact that *Népszabadság* has not only used more denotations exclusively than *Magyar Hírlap*, 52 denotations at *Népszabadság* in comparison to 23 at *Magyar Hírlap*, but has used these also more frequently, two of the three denotation mentioned above are an exception: No. 33 and 37. These frequently used denotations show a tendency among *Magyar Hírlap* journalists to stick to a restricted set of denotations, which has an official character. The Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, for example, bears the Hungarian name *Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala*<sup>127</sup>. Both denotations use the expression *határon túli*, which means beyond the border or abroad. Using abroad frequently also shows that *Magyar Hírlap* journalists are more conscious or more aware of the political border’s existence. There is less appeasing and perhaps deceiving talk about the Hungarian nation and a stronger emphasis on the political reality:

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<sup>125</sup> Denotations Nos. 110-122

<sup>126</sup> Denotations Nos. 19-38

<sup>127</sup> See also [www.htmh.hu](http://www.htmh.hu).

the co-ethnics are citizens of different adjacent states and *not* part of a nation composed of an ethnic group with its state.

3. Minority<sup>128</sup>. The journalists at Népszabadság make an extensive use of *kisebbség* [minority]. Using minority in this context stresses the numerical inferiority and the consequential political vulnerability of the co-ethnics in Hungary's neighbouring states. Népszabadság uses 16 denotations exclusively while Magyar Hírlap uses only six of them exclusively. It is, however, denotations 44 and especially 68, which are used by journalists from both newspapers, that reveal the quantitative difference. Apparently, the journalists at Magyar Hírlap are not keen on underlying the co-ethnics state of minority. Furthermore, writing about a group and defining it as a minority has political connotations: minority rights. This is again a hidden indication of the law concerning the national end ethnic minorities in Hungary. In other words, if the co-ethnics form minorities in Hungary's neighbouring states, then they should also receive the minority rights they deserve. According to my assessment, this point of view is represented in Népszabadság articles more dominantly than in Magyar Hírlap.
4. Nation and ethnic<sup>129</sup>. There is a high number of denotations regarding national belonging and ethnicity. Both Hungarian newspapers have used them with a significant frequency. However, reference to the co-ethnics' national belonging and ethnicity has been more common in Népszabadság than in Magyar Hírlap. Népszabadság has used 14 denotations exclusively in comparison to Magyar Hírlap's four. Relating to the co-ethnics by using terms such as 'nation', 'national' or 'ethnic' enhances the image of trans-border belonging. In other words, the co-ethnics form a part of a larger whole: the Hungarian nation. Hence the co-ethnics are not separated groups in different states. Furthermore, by using the terms such as national, the co-ethnics gain a certain political prestige: being part of a larger nation puts the co-ethnics in a stronger position than other ethnic groups or minorities which cannot do the same, e.g. the Roma (Gypsies).

#### 4.1.1.1.2 Denotations regarding only Romania and Transylvania

Taking a deeper look at 22 denotations, which refer to Transylvania or Romania only, is important because of the semantic fields that engulf these denotations<sup>130</sup>. These denotations' disposition is where the two discourses intersect: The public discourse in

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<sup>128</sup> Denotations Nos. 1, 18, 26, 28, 31, 41-51, 66-68, 82, 89, 90, 92, 114, 118, 122, and 125

<sup>129</sup> Denotations Nos. 17, 23, 63-65, 71-75, 79, 86-90, 111, 115, 119, and 122

<sup>130</sup> See Table 10a.

Hungary concerning the Hungarians in the neighbouring states and the public discourse in Romania concerning the minorities in Romania. The discourses overlap in the sectors regarding the Hungarians in Romania<sup>131</sup>.

Table 10a: Hungarian denotations, which refer explicitly to Hungarians in Romania

	Hungarian denotations	English translation	MH	NSZ
1	Erdélyben élő magyar közösség	Magyar community that lives in Transylvania		1
2	Erdélyben élő magyarok	Magyars who live in Transylvania	1	
3	Erdélyi magyar kisebbség	Transylvanian Magyar minority		3
4	Erdélyi magyar közösség	Transylvanian Magyar community	2	2
5	Erdélyi magyar népesség	Transylvanian Magyar population	1	
6	Erdélyi magyar társaság	Transylvanian Magyar society		1
7	Erdélyi magyarok	Transylvanian Magyars	7	14
8	Erdélyi magyarság	Transylvanian Magyardom	7	27
9	Erdélyiek	Transylvanians	2	1
10	Magyar etnikumú román állampolgárok	Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnic	1	
11	Magyar nemzetiségű román állampolgárok	Romanian citizens of Magyar nationality	1	2
12	Magyar önazonosságot valló román állampolgárok	Romanian citizens who declare their Magyar identity	1	
13	Románia területén élő magyarok	Magyars who live on Romanian territory		1
14	Romániában élő magyar nemzeti kisebbség	National Magyar minority that lives in Romania		1
15	Romániában élő magyarok	Magyars who live in Romania		1
16	Romániában élő nemzeti kisebbség	National minority that lives in Romania		1
17	Romániában élő, magát magyar nemzetiségűnek valló, nem magyar állampolgárságú személyek	Persons who live in Romania, consider themselves to be of Magyar nationality are not Hungarian citizens	2	
18	Romániai magyar kisebbség	Romanian Magyar minority	5	5
19	Romániai magyar közösség	Romanian Magyar community	2	3
20	Romániai magyar nemzeti kisebbség	Romanian national Magyar minority		1
21	Romániai magyarok	Romanian Magyars	12	18
22	Romániai magyarság	Romanian Magyardom	16	25

As with Table 10, the red colour is used for denotations used only in Népszabadság (NSZ) while blue is used for those denotations that appear only in Magyar Hírlap (MH). Those denotations, which are represented in both papers, were left black. The numbers in the last two columns, NSZ and MH, represent the number of appearances in each newspaper.

<sup>131</sup> See Figure 3.

Before analysing a few differences between the two Hungarian newspapers, I would like to take a look at some of the table's main features: starting off with the denotations concerning Transylvania, then moving forward to those concerning Romania and ending with a few characteristics of this table:

1. Power and hegemony. Using *Erdély* [Transylvania] to describe a certain ethnic group is not just a geographical localisation. It is a *nationalisation of geography* (Donnan – Wilson 2001). Bearing in mind that Transylvania was a sovereign Hungarian principality for a considerable time in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, *Erdély* is a symbol of power. The Renaissance principality has kept up the light of Hungarian culture and language during the period of division in those centuries, while the Ottomans reigned in central Hungary and the Habsburgs ruled in the western and northern parts<sup>132</sup>. Despite the loss of its extended autonomy by the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Transylvania remained a principality in which three groups dominated political and economic life: Hungarians, Transylvanian Saxons and Seklers<sup>133</sup>. This internal political situation did not change significantly until Transylvania became a part of Romania. However, *Erdély* is not used against the Transylvanian Saxons, but against competing claims over Transylvania from the Romanian side (Puttkamer 2003). In all, using *Erdély* casts aside the Treaty of Trianon, by which Hungary had to give up Transylvania to Romania.
2. Superiority. *Erdély* also encompasses a trait of supremacy. As already mentioned, Hungarians, together with the Hungarian-speaking Seklers and the Transylvanian Saxons, were economically, politically, academically and even ecclesiastically the dominant groups in the sovereign principality of Transylvania. In contrast, Romanians, or Vlachs, as they called themselves up to the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, were mainly farmers and shepherds, who were not allowed to settle in the Hungarian or Saxon towns. According to some estimation, Romanians formed the majority of the population by the end of that century (Hitchins 2003). Consequently, *Erdély* represents a time when Hungarians were dominant in Transylvania and therefore has an aura of superiority.
3. Exclusion. By using denotations that refer to *Erdély* to describe the Hungarians in Romania, the journalists avoid mentioning Romania: if the term *Erdély* is

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<sup>132</sup> See also Table 4 for further details.

<sup>133</sup> See Chapter 2.

used, then there is no need to use Romania as a geographical or political reference. Consequently, the political connotation that goes with Romania, which was often one of ethnic oppression and discrimination (Andreescu 2001), is put aside and only the historical, illustrious Hungarian term is valid. Here language is changing the political perception.

4. **Synonym.** When discussing the Hungarians in Romania using *Erdély* could imply that one is referring only to a certain group of Hungarians within Romania. While Romania is a political name and has only been existent since the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, *Erdély*, on the other hand, *ceased* to be a political entity 150 years ago. However, *Erdély* has remained a geographical term and a synonym for all the territories Hungary lost to Romania after World War I. Subsequently, *Erdély* also includes other regions in Romania with a considerable Hungarian population, e.g. Banat or Crişana.
5. **Authenticity.** *Erdély* has become a symbol of genuine Hungarian culture in the seventies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In that period of socialist Hungary, young people initiated a movement, which was later to be known as the *Táncház* [dancing hall] movement. Trying to break free from the regime's indoctrination, the members of this movement practiced a revival of Hungarian folklore, mainly in dance (hence the name), dress and music. Realising that many folkloristic elements were still commonly practiced in *Erdély*, many travelled to Transylvania in order to 'go back to the ethnic roots'. This has created an image of *Erdély* as a genuine Hungarian piece of land where old traditions are kept and practiced. In other words, a different Hungary, which was not corrupted by the urbanising, proletarian-socialist system at home (Kürti 2001).
6. **Romania as territorial point of reference.** One of the significant issues in the Romanian discourse concerning the minorities within Romania is the issue of approving territorial autonomy to the Seklerland, where Romanians form a minority. Those journalists, who use the term Romania, avoid distinguishing between different zones in Romania. Hence, Romania becomes a general point of reference without a hint to any aspirations of territorial autonomy in Seklerland in particular or to Transylvania as a whole.
7. **Representation in the whole of Romania.** Using the denotation *romániai magyarok* [Romanian Magyars], suggests that Hungarians are considerably

represented in every *judet* [county] of the 40 counties in Romania. According to the latest statistics, this is not the case<sup>134</sup>.

8. Simplicity. No other geographical name from Romania with Hungarian population is used, such as Banat or Crişana. By using Romania the journalists cover all the areas concerned and do not have to produce a detailed list. Again, it leaves the impression that Hungarians are represented in all of Romania's 40 counties.
9. *Nemzet* [nation]. The derivations *nemzeti* [national] and *nemzetiség* [nationality] in combination with the numerical category *kisebbség* [minority] are used only in connection with Romania and not once with Transylvania. I assume that the journalists take for granted the idea that the Hungarians of Transylvania represent a nation. Not so in Romania as a whole, where there seems to be a need to distinguish between at least two nations: a Hungarian and a Romanian one.
10. Magyar/Magyardom. The ethnonym and its derivation are used for different trajectories. Magyar is used together with a classifying social quantification: *állampolgárok* [citizens], *kisebbség* [minority], *közösség* [community], *személyek* [persons], *népesség* [population] or *társaság* [society]. The quantification shows what the author intended: political correctness (citizens), peril of extinction (minority), social interaction (community), individualism (persons), national consciousness (population) or complex social structure (society). Magyardom, on the other hand, symbolises an entity, which is beyond just the physical presence of the people. It refers to literature, culture, mentality and even stereotypes, which are supposed to characterise the Hungarians and distinguish them from others, i.e. Romanians.

A close analysis of Table 10a reveals that there are four principal differences between Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap:

1. *Erdély* versus Romania. There are two sets of denotations, which are common in Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap alike: *erdélyi magyarok* [Transylvanian Magyars] and *erdélyi magyarság* [Transylvanian Magyardom] on the one hand and *romániai magyarok* and *romániai magyarság* [Romanian Magyars and Romanian Magyardom] on the other (Nos. 7, 8, 21 and 22 respectively). At Népszabadság they have a ratio of 41:43. In Magyar Hírlap they have a ratio of 14:28. This clearly indicates that the journalists of Magyar Hírlap prefer to use

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<sup>134</sup> See [www.udmr.ro](http://www.udmr.ro) for further details.

Romania instead of Transylvania. The Hungarian Status Law's official name refers to the neighbouring states, which in this case means Romania<sup>135</sup>. The usage of *Erdély* in this context reveals a more national narrative at Népszabadság. Magyar Hírlap's narrative is politically less controversial and therefore uses Romania more frequently than Transylvania.

2. Emic approach. Unlike Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap presents two denotations (Nos. 12 and 17), which bear evidence of the co-ethnics' own definition: Denotation 12 is about Romanian citizens who declare their Magyar identity while denotation 17 quotes the Status Law's definition of Hungarian<sup>136</sup>. Again, this is a part of Magyar Hírlap's different approach to ethnicity, which is not present in Népszabadság. However, it does not solve the basic problem of denoting the previously mentioned: the narrative creates a group by denoting a group of people and then it goes on to suggest that that very group wants to denote itself in the same way. The problem is that the created group cannot articulate itself because it exists only through the denotation used in the narrative. To use Spivak's words again, the ethnic group is either 'not that' or 'not there' (Spivak 1997). Consequently, there is no significant difference between whether a group is called 'Hungarians in Romania' or 'Those in Romania who call themselves Hungarians'. As long as it is not a group that defines itself, both denotations would be a part of a discourse, which shows that journalists are in the position to exert power upon a specific group of people in Romania. Nevertheless, the denotations used by Magyar Hírlap at least show certain *awareness* to the position the groups in question might be taking.
3. *Nemzet* [Nation]. Népszabadság uses *nemzet* and its derivation *nemzeti* [national] more often than Magyar Hírlap. If we exclude denotation 17, which is a clear reference to the legal definition of the Status Law, then we find that there are three denotations with *nemzeti* (Nos. 14, 16 and 20) which are used solely in Népszabadság and one denotation which is used in both papers: No. 11. Using the term 'nation' in this context suggests two things: firstly, the Hungarians in Romania are a nation or a national minority. Denoting Hungarians as a nation has the connotation of an ethnic group which has an equal status to that of other major groups, in this case the Romanians. Subsequently, the conclusion is that there are at least two nations in Romania: a Romanian and a Hungarian one.

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<sup>135</sup> See Appendices 1 and 3.

<sup>136</sup> See Appendix 1.

Secondly, Hungarian law differentiates between national and ethnic minorities within Hungary, who have the same rights and vary only by name. Furthermore, the minorities' rights in Hungary are guaranteed by the constitution. Therefore I conclude that the reference to the term *nemzeti* should evoke the same important position for Hungarians in Romania, as is the case with the national minorities in Hungary: the status of state-building factors<sup>137</sup>.

4. Magyardom/Magyars. *Magyarság* [Magyardom] is used more frequently in both papers than *magyarok* [Magyars]: For Népszabadság they have a ratio of 52:34 while in Magyar Hírlap the ratio is 23:20. Although the difference in Magyar Hírlap may not be large, the Status Law, about which this discourse is concerned, clearly refers to Hungarians (Magyars) and not to Magyardom<sup>138</sup>. Therefore, Népszabadság is referring to more than just the people they consider to be Hungarians. According to this extended use of Magyardom, Népszabadság's narrative also encompasses Hungarian art, culture, language et cetera. Magyar Hírlap's narrative is closer to the official definition and is more concerned with people than with abstract constructs.

#### 4.1.1.2 Motifs

The motifs chosen for this discourse analysis represent a visualisation of the discourse's flow. Their existence is an indicator to the means of argumentation and description used by the journalists to make their case<sup>139</sup>. Although not exhaustive, they nevertheless demonstrate the traits of the respective narratives' and enable a comparison among the four newspapers. For the analysis below I shall always start by describing the motif in Népszabadság's narrative and then continue with Magyar Hírlap's narrative.

##### 4.1.1.2.1 Europe

The leitmotiv of many articles is Romania's allegation that the Hungarian Status Law is not compliant with European norms. With few exceptions, the authors do not mention the European norms with which the Status Law is supposedly not compliant<sup>140</sup>. It was only after Romania appealed to the Council of Europe and Hungary asked the Venice Commission<sup>141</sup> to analyse the Status Law in comparison with similar laws that

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<sup>137</sup> See Appendix 6.

<sup>138</sup> See Appendices 1 and 3.

<sup>139</sup> See also Chapter 3.

<sup>140</sup> See also Voigt 2005.

<sup>141</sup> The Venice Commission is an advisory body to the Council of Europe in matters of human and minority rights.

Romanian politicians started explaining what they consider faulty about the Law. It was the principle of non-interference that worried them. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which concerns minority rights, states that ethnic minorities should be protected by the state in which they live and not by other states that share similar ethnic or linguistic features<sup>142</sup>. Hence, from the Romanian politicians' point of view, protecting the rights of Romania's Hungarians is Romania's obligation and not Hungary's.

Népszabadság's journalists enable both sides to put forward their thoughts and concerns about the Status Law. On a specific issue there is a consensus between both sides and it is manifested in the declarations made in Bucharest as well as in Budapest. Both sides seem to agree on the fact that Hungary should help Romania in its efforts to become a member of the European Union (EU). However, the Romanian politicians do not mention *why* Hungary is so keen on supporting Romania. Apparently it was common sense in Hungarian politics to support the EU membership aspirations of Slovakia (after 1998) and Romania (after 1996). Out of 2.5 million Hungarians living in Hungary's neighbouring states, those living in Slovakia and Romania make up over 80% of the co-ethnics<sup>143</sup>. Taking for granted that their judicial and economical status will be safer within the framework of the EU, it was in Hungary's interest that these states should receive full EU membership. One exception to this general consensus is Orbán's statement that a EU that does not share Hungary's policy towards the Hungarians in the neighbouring states cannot be a partner of the Hungarian government<sup>144</sup>.

The most frequently named politicians in Népszabadság's narrative about the Status Law's conformity with European law were the Romanian prime minister, Adrian Năstase<sup>145</sup> and the Hungarian secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh<sup>146</sup>. This is remarkable since they have different political duties. Nevertheless it is Németh who defends the Hungarian point of view most vehemently and Năstase is the Romanian politician who attacked the Status Law most fiercely. It is further noteworthy that it was Németh who announced the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum in Hungary once it

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<sup>142</sup> See path: 22.09.2006

<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/Basic+Texts/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights+and+its+Protocols/>

<sup>143</sup> See Table 5.

<sup>144</sup> NSZ25.01.2002, path: 11.08.2003 wysiwyg://120/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>145</sup> NSZ26.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://130/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>146</sup> NSZ19.04.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://128/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

was signed, and not one of his superiors, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán or Foreign Minister János Martonyi.

Magyar Hírlap's narrative regarding this motif is balanced between Hungarian, Romanian and various European representatives. The tenor of the argumentation is the question as to whether the Hungarian Status Law conforms with European law. Unfortunately, neither the journalists nor the politicians explain to which European law they are referring. Furthermore there is a blur between the different European organisations and institutions, e.g. the Council of Europe (CE) or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Thus, Europe and its various institutions have been transformed from a geographical expression encompassing different political entities to become a symbol used for various political purposes.

Members of the Hungarian cabinet, especially Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Foreign Minister János Martonyi, have constantly insisted throughout the debate that the Hungarian Status Law corresponds with European law<sup>147</sup>. The Alliance of Free Democrats' (SZDSZ), which opposed the Status Law from the very beginning, was hardly referred to in Magyar Hírlap<sup>148</sup>: March 2001 and then January 2002<sup>149</sup>. It is also remarkable that Magyar Hírlap does not make any reference to the leading opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), before this party won the elections in April 2002. Unlike in Népszabadság, secretary of state in the Hungarian Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh, is not mentioned at all in Magyar Hírlap's narrative regarding Europe.

Magyar Hírlap referred to Prime Minister Orbán at one point when he stated that the co-ethnics are a European issue<sup>150</sup>. This statement indicated the characteristics of the Orbán government through the year 2001: informing only the Western States, the European Union and other European institutions. This was considered essential while informing the neighbouring states was not. By informing all EU member states and ignoring the neighbours, as Orbán<sup>151</sup> and Martonyi<sup>152</sup> declared, the Orbán government has shown both Romania and Slovakia how little they think of these states' opinion. In my opinion they, i.e. Orbán and Martonyi, have considered Hungary to have a strong enough stand diplomatically in the European institutions to be able to pull through the Status Law without taking the neighbouring states into consideration.

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<sup>147</sup> MH10.01.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://288/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php and MH11.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://713/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>148</sup> MH01.03.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://353/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>149</sup> MH22.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://687/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>150</sup> MH26.10.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://154/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>151</sup> MH03.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://646/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>152</sup> MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://693/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

Magyar Hírlap's narrative also presents Romania's case, which is mainly represented through the declarations made by President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Adrian Năstase. While Năstase considers the Hungarian Status Law not to correspond with EU law<sup>153</sup>, Iliescu considers the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN), which enables the co-ethnics to benefit from the Status Law, to be "un-European":

“... *Ion Iliescu román államfő szerint “nem európai” gesztus.*”<sup>154</sup>

[... according to Romanian head of state, Ion Iliescu, [the CHN] is an un-European gesture.]

It is interesting to note that the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) has not been quoted at all in reference to the Status Law's compliance with European laws, although the position of other Romanian parties in this issue is documented<sup>155</sup>.

The third party involved in Magyar Hírlap's presentation of this motif is the European side. This side, however, is heterogeneous and represents the views of different European institutions. Both the report put forward by the Venice Commission<sup>156</sup> as well as the European Union's report<sup>157</sup> have been interpreted by the two governments in their own favour and as supporting their respective political stand against the other side. Apparently, it was not so important *what* the reports on the Hungarian Status Law said and how it stood in comparison to other laws of status. It was the reports' interpretation in both states that varied. However, the president of the European Commission at that time, Romano Prodi, has emphasized the quintessence of all reports: the two states have to negotiate in order to achieve a consensus on the Status Law<sup>158</sup>.

#### 4.1.1.2.2 Comparison

The narrative presented by Népszabadság in this motif is almost entirely from the Hungarian point of view. If we exclude the two short interviews with Hungarian politicians from Romania who are members of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians

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<sup>153</sup> MH14.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://433/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php and MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://676/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>154</sup> MH19.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://548/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>155</sup> MH15.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>156</sup> MH20.10.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://132/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php and MH30.10.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://171/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>157</sup> MH14.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://226/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>158</sup> MH25.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://794/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

in Romania (UDMR) and a short commentary by Romania's president Ion Iliescu, then it becomes obvious that Népszabadság has used the element of comparison only from the Hungarian perspective. Considering that the Romanian politicians kept repeating the Law's un-European character, one would have expected them to bring some examples for similar laws that could be used as a counterpoint to the Hungarian stand. This, however, did not take place and it is not clear whether it is because the Romanian politicians did not react to the Status Law with by comparing it to similar laws or because Népszabadság has not published their views. Subsequently, the arguments put forward by different journalists and politicians include the following various arguments:

1. Other states also have similar laws<sup>159</sup>. This is to demonstrate that having such a law is common practice in Europe. Hence, Hungary is acting just like any other state in the region and the Status Law itself is not unusual.
2. The Hungarian Status Law grants much less than similar laws<sup>160</sup>. This argument is aimed at the various states in Hungary's vicinity that have a similar law. It says indirectly that the other states, in this case most probably Slovakia and Romania, grant their own co-ethnics across the border, e.g. Slovaks in Hungary and Romania or Romanians in Hungary or Moldova, more than Hungary does for its co-ethnics. In other words, the other states are in no position to complain since they are doing much more for their own co-ethnics than Hungary<sup>161</sup>.
3. Romania did not complain about the Slovak and Croatian laws of status<sup>162</sup>. This claim is an old one and dates back to the beginning of the nineties, when Germany granted Romania's Transylvanian Saxons the German citizenship. Granting that group the German citizenship, however, has led to the group's exodus. The line of thought is, if Romania did not bother about Germany granting its citizenship to about 300,000 of Romania's citizens, why should it bother about the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) that includes less benefits and privileges than a citizenship? Or, why bother with the Hungarian Status Law, when Romania did not bother with the similar laws of other states? There is an undertone and even accusation of unjust treatment of the matter towards Romania's political elite. A senator of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), György Frunda, argued in this matter: "...  
*România nem ellenezheti a magyar törvény alkalmazását, miután a hasonló*

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<sup>159</sup> NSZ14.05.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://416/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>160</sup> NSZ25.04.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://273/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>161</sup> See Halász – Majtényi 2002.

<sup>162</sup> NSZ29.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://165/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

*szlovák és horvát jogszabályok ellen nem emelt semmilyen kifogást.”*<sup>163</sup> [... Romania cannot oppose the application of the Hungarian law [i.e. the Hungarian Status Law] since it has not raised any objections against the Slovak and Croatian laws].

4. Romania did not lead any consultations with the Republic of Moldova before passing its own naturalisation law<sup>164</sup>. One of Romania's main accusations was that Hungary did not conduct any consultations with the neighbouring states. Hence, the Hungarian political elite's argument is aimed against the Romanian naturalisation law vis-à-vis Ukraine and especially Moldova. The government of Moldova accused Romania for trying to undermine the state's authority by granting Romanian citizenship to all those living in Moldova, whose ancestors were Romanian citizens between 1920 and 1940. Practically, this means that about 67% of Moldova's citizens are entitled to Romanian citizenship. Consequently, with this argument, Hungary is saying that Romania does not practice what it preaches.
5. Romania also demands identification cards, which declare the holder's ethnic group. Hungarian students of Romanian ethnic background are entitled to study free of charge at Romania's institutions of tertiary education<sup>165</sup>. The Romanian state, however, does demand an act of identification that clearly shows that the holder is a Romanian co-ethnic holding a foreign passport. The statement behind this argument is, that Romania should not complain about the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) for its co-ethnics in Romania, since Romania is demanding the same thing from foreign students. Again, Romania is practicing something, which it condemns when done by others.

Népszabadság also adds the translated texts of the two most crucial laws in this debate: the Romanian Naturalisation Law<sup>166</sup>, passed through Romanian parliament on the 15<sup>th</sup> March 2000 and the Slovak Status Law, passed through Slovak parliament on the 14<sup>th</sup> February 1997. The fact that the texts appear as a supplement to the articles is a very important step towards a differentiated point of view and therefore a better understanding of the complex situation. It enables the reader a short comparison between all three laws and hence to make up his own mind.

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<sup>163</sup> NSZ07.09.2001, path: 06.08.2003 wysiwyg://73/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>164</sup> NSZ23.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://116/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>165</sup> NSZ28.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://150/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>166</sup> NSZ23.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://116/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

The use of this motif in Magyar Hírlap is restricted to positions represented by Hungarian politics. The Romanian side is not represented at all. The only non-Hungarian voice to be referred to in respect of this motif is the European Peoples' Party (EPP). This European party stated that Germany grants its co-ethnics in other countries much more than the Hungarian Status Law does, namely German citizenship.

Roughly, the main difference in all statements made in this regard is whether the comparison is aimed at the neighbouring states or at other states, which did not complain about the Hungarian Status Law. Comparisons with Portugal<sup>167</sup>, Germany or any other European state<sup>168</sup>, are an attempt to take the debate about the Hungarian Status Law out of its Central European context and give it a European perspective. Magyar Hírlap offers a short list of comparable information only a year after the Status Law came into effect<sup>169</sup>. The essential comparison made by Hungarian politicians is between the Hungarian Status Law and the comparable laws in Slovakia and Romania. On one occasion the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán even announced that the Slovak Status Law had inspired the Hungarian government while drafting the Hungarian Status Law<sup>170</sup>. Hungary's president at that time, Ferenc Mádl, presents a different point<sup>171</sup>. According to him, the difference between the various laws of status in the region is the number of people affected. In Hungary's case, it is the large number of co-ethnics that makes it so different from the laws of status in the surrounding states<sup>172</sup>.

The main features of the Hungarian standpoint, as Magyar Hírlap presents it, can be summed as follows:

- Other states also have their laws of status so there is no justification to the aggravation surrounding the Hungarian Status Law.
- Neither Romania nor Slovakia has consulted Hungary when these states passed their similar laws.
- Referring to the Slovak Status Law as a guideline to the respective Hungarian law, Prime Minister Orbán and other members of his party<sup>173</sup>, the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), have tried to present the Slovak complaints as ludicrous.

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<sup>167</sup> MH10.01.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://288/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>168</sup> MH25.01.2003, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://113/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>169</sup> Idem.

<sup>170</sup> MH24.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://405/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>171</sup> MH19.02.2003, path: 09.11.2001 wysiwyg://215/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>172</sup> The ratio between Slovaks in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovakia is approximately 1:30. The ratio between Romanians in Hungary and Hungarians in Romania is circa 1:180. See also Table 5, Demeter Zayzon 1999 and Gyurgyík – Sebök 2003.

<sup>173</sup> MH28.11.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://817/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

- The Romanian Status Law is mentioned a single time when journalist Tibor Bogdán compares the Romanian law with the Hungarian one<sup>174</sup>.

#### 4.1.1.2.3 Discrimination

It is difficult to define discrimination. In the context of this work I understand discrimination as a condition of unfair treatment of a group of people by the given state's authorities. Unfair in the sense that specific groups receive certain benefits, which other groups do not, although there is no legal justification to that preferential treatment. Furthermore, the actual perception of the groups involved does not play a significant role. The political elite set off the accusation of discrimination and utilised the situation for their own purposes. In other words, it is not those affected that contest the situation that led to discrimination. According to my knowledge there have not been any public demonstrations in Romania in this sense, be it by Hungarians or Romanians. The elites involved are an external factor claiming injustice in the name of people whose position in this matter is hardly representative.

Népszabadság's narrative evolves around two basic exclamations: the Romanian side saying that the Status Law is discriminative and the Hungarian side saying it is not. This already indicates that Népszabadság is trying to put forward arguments from both sides. It is noteworthy that the Romanian side hardly says what exactly it considers to be discriminatory in the Status Law. There are only a few cases where Prime Minister Năstase clearly indicates what he means: working permits for Hungary<sup>175</sup>. He considered the Hungarian Status Law to be discriminatory because it grants only the Hungarians from Romania a working permit for Hungary while Romanians from Romania are not entitled to it. To him, this was a bias on ethnic grounds that did not concur with international law: either all of Romania's citizens should be entitled to those working permits or none at all. The Hungarian side, especially Foreign Minister János Martonyi, insisted on the Status Law not being discriminative<sup>176</sup>.

Unfortunately, Népszabadság does not comment on the change of mind that occurred in Romania after the two Prime Ministers, Viktor Orbán and Adrian Năstase, signed the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM)<sup>177</sup>. The same is true after the new Hungarian government was in office following the general elections in April 2002.

<sup>174</sup> MH25.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://580/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>175</sup> NSZ30.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://340/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>176</sup> NSZ14.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://252/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp,

NSZ18.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://273/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp and

NSZ24.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://303/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>177</sup> See Appendix 2.

After both prime ministers signed the ONM, the Romanian side started talking about ‘differentiating elements of the Status Law’ and ceased lamenting about ‘discrimination’<sup>178</sup>. Népszabadság did not discuss this change of attitude manifested in the discourse. On the other hand, the new Hungarian government formed by a coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) did not acknowledge that the Hungarian Status Law had a discriminative side, but admitted that it did discriminate families with a single child<sup>179</sup>.

Magyar Hírlap presents a different narrative in this context. Unlike Népszabadság, the journalists from Magyar Hírlap offered more room to Romanian complaints than to the Hungarian political elite’s point of view. Hungarian foreign minister János Martonyi is the only representative from the Hungarian political spectrum that expresses his views<sup>180</sup>. According to Martonyi, the Hungarian Status Law is discriminative. However, he added, it is the destiny of minorities to be discriminated in one-way or the other. In an extensive interview he said that minorities *have* to be discriminated, in order to be protected:

*“Martonyi elismerte, hogy a törvénytervezet pozitív diszkriminációt hoz létre, de szerinte ez csak kisebbségi létből fakadó hátrányok kiegyenlítését célozza.”*<sup>181</sup>

[Martonyi admitted that the planned law [i.e. the Hungarian Status Law] creates a positive discrimination, but in his opinion this aims only at counter-balancing the disadvantages, which arise from being a minority.]

It is noteworthy that Magyar Hírlap does not present any comments by Zsolt Németh, the secretary of state in the Hungarian Foreign Office, who supported the Status Law vehemently.

On the other hand, Magyar Hírlap has presented the views of various Romanian politicians who expressed their concerns regarding any discriminating aspects of the Status Law. Predominantly Romanian Prime minister Adrian Năstase has repeated this allegation constantly<sup>182</sup>. Năstase also related to the European Union’s anti-discrimination laws as a reason for his rejection of the Status Law, although he did not

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<sup>178</sup> NSZ11.07.2002, path: 14.08.2003 wysiwyg://35/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>179</sup> NSZ10.08.2002, path: 14.08.2003 wysiwyg://81/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

The Law granted annually the sum of HUF 20,000 (about € 80,-) to parents who sent at least two of their children to Hungarian speaking schools. Practically this meant that families which had only one child or did not send both children to such a school received nothing.

<sup>180</sup> MH31.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://482/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>181</sup> MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://693/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>182</sup> MH24.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://405/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php and MH 22.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://569/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

go into detail explaining which ones he was referring to<sup>183</sup>. Two days beforehand Năstase even gave the Hungarian government a piece of advice: Hungary should support its co-ethnics but should not practice social and economic discrimination while doing so<sup>184</sup>. Romanian President Ion Iliescu took a different point of argumentation. According to Iliescu it is the Romanian people that consider the Status Law to be discriminatory<sup>185</sup>. It is unclear whether he considered himself in this context as part of the Romanian people or as their speaker. The nationalist mayor of Cluj-Napoca, Gheorghe Funar, presented a polemic anecdote by saying that the Status Law was a racist law<sup>186</sup>. Romania's leading Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), is referred to only a single time. Moreover, their comments were given after the Hungarian prime minister and his Romanian counterpart had signed the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM)<sup>187</sup> and the Status Law had come into effect, i.e. in 2002. According to the UDMR, it was the Romanian side's sole aim to abolish the discrimination in the labour regulations set up by the Status Law<sup>188</sup>. Indirectly the UDMR suggested with this statement that all other accusations put forward by the Romanian side were irrelevant.

Furthermore, Magyar Hírlap presents the views of people who represent different European institutions: the European Commission (EC), the Council of Europe (CE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Peoples' Party (EPP). The views they represent can be divided into two categories: those who consider the Hungarian Status Law to contain discriminating aspects, i.e. EC, CE and the OSCE on the one hand, and the EPP on the other. While the EC speaks of disadvantages<sup>189</sup> and later of the premise of non-discrimination within the European Union<sup>190</sup>, the CE is more direct and explains why it rejects the Hungarian Status Law<sup>191</sup>: it differentiates between citizens of another state and it grants working permits to ethnically selected citizens of other states. Interestingly, Magyar Hírlap does not mention any of the Venice Commission's comments on this aspect.

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<sup>183</sup> MH28.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://826/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>184</sup> MH30.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://832/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>185</sup> MH02.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://641/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>186</sup> MH12.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://723/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>187</sup> See Appendix 2.

<sup>188</sup> MH18.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://643/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>189</sup> MH26.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://591/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>190</sup> MH21.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://409/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>191</sup> MH27.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://597/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

#### 4.1.1.2.4 NATO<sup>192</sup>

This aspect of the discourse is closely interwoven with the notions of Europe and the European Union but nevertheless it has its own unique characteristics. During the discourse the expression *euroatlanti integráció* [Euro-Atlantic integration] was used on a number of occasions. This clearly indicates that the two supranational organisations are regarded as complementary: the EU for financial and judicial stability on the one side and military and political security on the other. It becomes more difficult to assess when the Romanian foreign minister, Mircea Geoană, talks about Euro-Atlantic values<sup>193</sup>. Regrettably, it is not clear what he means by those values and the interviewer, Zoltán Tibori Szabó, did not put any further questions in this direction.

Both sides are well represented in Népszabadság's narrative. Hungarian and Romanian politicians alike keep mentioning Hungary's ongoing support for Romania's integration in NATO. Despite the frequent repetition, neither side explains what is behind this constant support. There is only one hint in the articles<sup>194</sup> from which I can conclude the following:

- It is in Hungary's interest because through Romania's NATO membership the region will be politically more stable. One just has to bear in mind the Yugoslavian wars that lasted from the first conflict in Slovenia in 1991 until the 1999 war in Kosovo.
- Furthermore, if Romania becomes a member of NATO the Hungarians in Romania would have a safer status within the Romanian state's framework.
- By supporting Romania in its endeavour, the Hungarian government wanted to support the more moderate political forces within Romania and to show the right wing elements, like the Greater Romania Party (PRM), that Hungary is not anti-Romanian and does not wish Romania any harm<sup>195</sup>.

Népszabadság also brings another interesting facet: the element of threat. This is manifested in two interviews: one with Romanian president Ion Iliescu and the other with Hungarian prime minister Orbán. Iliescu exclaims that NATO has caused political tension in the region by admitting Hungary in the first round of extension (1999) but refusing Romania:

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<sup>192</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

<sup>193</sup> NSZ05.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://213/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>194</sup> NSZ16.06.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://1066/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>195</sup> See also Andreescu 2001.

*“... Iliescu kifejtette: a NATO hibát követett el, amikor nem kérte fel csatlakozásra Magyarországgal együtt Romániát is, mivel ezzel újabb feszültséget támasztott a térségben.”<sup>196</sup>*

[... Iliescu expounded: NATO made a mistake when it did not ask Romania together with Hungary to join in, thus having caused new tensions in the area.]

Unfortunately, Iliescu does not continue explaining what kind of tensions he meant and the interviewer does reveal any further details. In the other interview with Orbán<sup>197</sup>, the Hungarian prime minister threatens Slovakia by blocking its application for membership in the NATO if it does not change its policy towards the Hungarian Status Law. Although this threat is directed at Slovakia, which also was not a member of the NATO at the time of the interview, it does bear an undertone of intimidation towards Romania. Again, there is no further comment from the interviewing journalist. Both interviews reveal Hungary's stronger political position vis-à-vis Romania. This position is contested by one of the journalists who said that Romania has a stronger political stand because it cottoned up to the United States (US) by granting the US military privileges beyond NATO standards<sup>198</sup>.

The comments made by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán form the key issue of Magyar Hírlap's narrative in this motif. His first comment is a retort to the accusations put forward by certain Romanian politicians. They accused Hungary of not informing its neighbouring states about the Status Law, although it affected their citizens. Orbán's reply two weeks after the Status Law was passed by parliament is noteworthy: the Hungarian government has informed all NATO embassies about the content of the Status Law<sup>199</sup>. This reply contains the following issues:

- Romania was not a NATO-member until March 2004, i.e. it was not informed by the Hungarians.
- It also means that, according to Orbán, only those states that are members of NATO, are important enough to be informed. In 2001 it also meant that with the exception of four states, namely Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, all other EU states were informed, since they were also NATO-members. Consequently, states that did not have anything to do with the disputes in the Carpathian Basin, e.g. Turkey or Canada, were considered to be more important than the

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<sup>196</sup> NSZ22.09.2001, path: 06.08.2003 wysiwyg://109/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>197</sup> NSZ15.02.2002, path: 11.08.2003 wysiwyg://291/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>198</sup> NSZ28.09.2001, path: 06.08.2003 wysiwyg://124/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>199</sup> MH03.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://646/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

neighbouring states, e.g. Slovakia or Romania, on whose territory the Hungarian Status Law was about to be applied.

- Finally, since none of NATO-members is reported to have had any comments on the Status Law, the Hungarian government could conclude that they had no objections.

Orbán's second comment is a reference to the Treaty of Trianon<sup>200</sup>. According to him, Hungary's NATO-membership has terminated the country's isolation since Trianon (1920). This utterance is historically false. The isolation Orbán was referring to is the *Petite Entente*, which was initiated after World War I by France and Great Britain. It consisted of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia). The aim of this Entente was to ensure that both Germany as well as Hungary were kept in check in Eastern Europe. This isolation ceased by the end of the thirties with Nazi Germany taking over power in Central Europe and supporting Hungary's revisionist ambitions.

The only other Hungarian politician to be represented is Foreign Minister János Martonyi. He confirms Orbán's statement about informing all NATO embassies<sup>201</sup>. Much later, after the two prime ministers Orbán and Năstase had signed the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) to settle the controversies regarding the application of the Status Law in Romania, Martonyi added that Hungary supported Romania's endeavours to become a member of NATO<sup>202</sup>.

The Romanian side is somewhat underrepresented in this section. Magyar Hírlap mentioned only two Romanian politicians who had commented on the debate by relating to NATO. The first one, Paul Păcuraru, vice-chairman of the National Liberal Party (PNL), admitted that Romania needed a good relationship to Hungary and its support to become a member of NATO<sup>203</sup>. Unfortunately, the author of the text, Tibor Bogdán, did not go into further detail. The other Romanian politician, Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană, stressed the fact that NATO had criticised the tensions between Hungary and Romania<sup>204</sup>. This comment can be understood as a soft intimidation: if both sides will not behave, the common supra-instance NATO will be angry. Geoană is

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<sup>200</sup> MH23.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://766/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>201</sup> MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://693/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>202</sup> MH27.03.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://508/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>203</sup> MH25.06.2001, path: 14.02.2001 wysiwyg://580/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>204</sup> MH02.08.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://854/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

trying to say that Hungary could be rebuked by NATO despite being a member state, and Romania not<sup>205</sup>.

#### 4.1.1.2.5 History

The element of history or historical consciousness is well represented in Népszabadság's narrative. The articles reveal a stronger emphasis on the Hungarian than on the Romanian side. Nonetheless, the Hungarian side represents the entire spectrum of Hungary's political parties from the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)<sup>206</sup> to the right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)<sup>207</sup>. There are a few key issues that politicians kept repeating and hence became part of the motif in Népszabadság's narrative:

1. Trianon. One of the main protagonists is Hungary's secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh. He kept on repeating numerous times that Hungary bears a historical obligation towards the Hungarians living in the neighbouring states<sup>208</sup>. This obligation is laid down in the Hungarian Constitution<sup>209</sup> and dates back to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Other politicians, e.g. Romanian prime minister Năstase, argue that Hungary's intention is to correct the borders drawn under that Treaty. Some journalists accused Orbán of completing the effects of Trianon through the labour market policy manifested in the Status Law. They referred to Orbán's declaration that the Hungarian labour market consists of 14 million employees, hence referring to the Hungarians in the neighbouring states<sup>210</sup>. This accusation consists of the threatening danger that with the privileges granted by the Status Law the number of Hungarians in the adjacent states will decline rapidly, since many will leave home and start looking for a better paid job in Hungary. This could then diminish the size of the Hungarian minorities substantially<sup>211</sup>. Orbán himself considered the Status Law as a process towards unifying the different parts of the Hungarian nation<sup>212</sup>. There is a very fine nuance between unifying the

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<sup>205</sup> Half a year later the Washington Post published an article about the calming effects the NATO extension in Central and Eastern Europe will have on the interstate relationships. See:

MH27.03.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://508/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>206</sup> NSZ27.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://140/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>207</sup> NSZ13.03.2002, path: 13.08.2003 wysiwyg://55/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp and NSZ04.04.2002, path: 13.08.2003 wysiwyg://142/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>208</sup> NSZ19.04.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://128/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>209</sup> See Appendix 6.

<sup>210</sup> Hungary has a population of about 10 million inhabitants. Gyurgyik and Sebők, 2003.

<sup>211</sup> NSZ13.06.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://942/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>212</sup> NSZ10.01.2002, path: 08.08.2003 wysiwyg://599/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

Hungarian nation and unifying the different *parts* of the Hungarian nation. The first version could be regarded as revisionist expostulation while the other could be interpreted as a cultural or economical endeavour. Unfortunately, the journalists who wrote the article did not comment on this very carefully chosen declaration. Németh went even further to exclaim that the historical moment (meaning the years 2001-2002) is favourable for a unification of the Hungarian nation across existing boundaries. By adding *határok* [borders, boundaries], he was obviously trying to avoid a revisionist declaration. The Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), which ruled Hungary from 1998-2002, is also accused for abusing Trianon for its own political purposes<sup>213</sup>. Another aspect of Trianon is the ping-pong between the two prime ministers, Orbán and Năstase, concerning the recognition of the borders as they were laid down in Trianon. The Romanian prime minister frequently asked the Hungarian government to do this while the Hungarian side constantly refused to do so<sup>214</sup>. Orbán explained the refusal by pointing out that the bilateral agreement signed by both states in 1996 clearly indicates both states' recognition of the existing borders and forbids any territorial claims<sup>215</sup>.

2. Revisionism. Some journalists and politicians use the terminology of the interwar period, such as *Petite Entente* or revisionism<sup>216</sup>. This reveals one of Hungary's key problems regarding the relationship between the Hungarian state and the Hungarians living in the neighbouring states, i.e. how to discuss this relationship without using the language of revisionism? Furthermore, how to talk about this relationship without provoking fears in the neighbouring states? The fears that are occasionally provoked are usually taken a step further by nationalistic forces that abuse the situation for their own political agenda. However, since the political change in 1989/1990, Hungary's political elite has tried hard to avoid stirring up anti-Hungarian sentiments in those states, but has not always been successful<sup>217</sup>.

Consequently, Népszabadság's narrative on this subject is a varied one and there is very little critique on the abuse of historical data and historical symbolism used by the

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<sup>213</sup> NSZ17.05.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://516/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>214</sup> NSZ26.11.2001, path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://315/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>215</sup> NSZ30.11.2001, path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://368/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>216</sup> NSZ27.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://140/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp and NSZ12.01.2002, path: 08.08.2003 wysiwyg://636/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>217</sup> See Sitzler 1992.

political elite<sup>218</sup>. Trianon and revisionism are two slogans heavily loaded with symbolism, which bear implications upon the historical consciousness on both sides.

The key issue in Magyar Hírlap's narrative, just as it was in Népszabadság's narrative, is the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences. Hence, I shall introduce the Romanian and the Hungarian perspectives on this issue, since both are well represented in Magyar Hírlap:

- The Status Law as a historic obligation. The Hungarian state, according to Foreign Minister Zsolt Németh<sup>219</sup> as well as other state officials<sup>220</sup> and members of the then ruling Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ)<sup>221</sup>, has an eighty years old obligation towards the co-ethnics: "*A magyar állam 80 éves adósságot törleszt a státustörvény elfogadásával ...*"<sup>222</sup> [The Hungarian state pays off with the acceptance of the Status Law its 80 years old obligation ...] This obligation has been paid off by the Hungarian Status Law, which legally binds the co-ethnics to the Hungarian state. Trianon has been regarded as an act of injustice committed against Hungary, as the journalist Ferenc Kecskés wrote<sup>223</sup>. FIDESZ officials also added that the Status Law is necessary in the light of ongoing efforts in Romania to assimilate the Hungarians. They added that these Romanian assimilation efforts are intended to eliminate the consequences of Trianon<sup>224</sup>.
- Revisionism. Members of the nationalistic Greater Romania Party (PRM) accused the Hungarian government of trying to re-establish the old kingdom of greater Hungary<sup>225</sup>. The nationalist mayor of Cluj-Napoca, Gheorghe Funar, repeated this accusation<sup>226</sup>. In another article Magyar Hírlap published a synopsis of an article published by the Romanian daily *Cronica Română*, which underlines this accusation even further<sup>227</sup>. Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase was more reserved and stated that Romania should not become a terrain for revisionist thoughts<sup>228</sup>. Although he does not mention Hungary explicitly, the

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<sup>218</sup> NSZ12.05.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://377/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>219</sup> MH21.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://466/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>220</sup> MH19.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://548/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>221</sup> MH21.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://654/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>222</sup> MH21.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://466/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>223</sup> MH24.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://400/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>224</sup> MH07.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://209/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>225</sup> MH15.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>226</sup> MH12.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://723/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>227</sup> MH24.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://788/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>228</sup> MH28.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://826/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

context of the article and the historical background leave only one party possible of revisionist claims: Hungary.

- Borders. In the heat of the debate Romanian prime minister Năstase demanded the Hungarian government to include a confirmation of the current political borders between the states within the framework of the Status Law<sup>229</sup>. This demand was utterly refused by the Hungarian side arguing that the current border had been confirmed by the bilateral agreement from 1996<sup>230</sup>.
- Imperialistic attitude. In a parliamentary debate Romanian president Ion Iliescu accused Hungarians of an imperialistic attitude and therefore being guilty of the tensions between Hungary and Romania. According to him, this attitude hailed from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy when Hungarians were the dominant ethnic group in the empire's Hungarian half. A member of parliament from the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) retorted by pointing out the fact that the Dual Monarchy had lasted for only 51 years. He added that that would not be enough to create such a lasting attitude<sup>231</sup>.

A last disturbing anecdote is presented in a synopsis of an article published in the Romanian daily *Cronica Română*. In that article the authors suggest in a very polemic way that the current political situation between Romania and Hungary resembles 1940. Despite the polemics there is a parallel aspect: both in 1940 as well as in 2001 Hungary and Romania could not solve their disputes by themselves and therefore went to seek justice at a higher instance. In 1940 it was Hitler at Vienna<sup>232</sup> and in 2001 it was the European Parliament and the Venice Commission.

#### 4.1.1.2.6 Legal aspects

The main feature of this specific aspect of the narrative presented by *Népszabadság* is the question of extraterritoriality. This aspect is repeated often and both sides are well represented. While the Romanian side argued that the Hungarian Status Law has an extraterritorial character<sup>233</sup>, the Hungarian side kept denying it and saying that the Law is valid in its present form. The Romanian foreign minister, Mircea Geoană, and his Hungarian counterpart, János Martonyi, represented different standpoints:

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<sup>229</sup>MH26.11.2001, path: 14.02.2001 wysiwyg://278/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>230</sup>MH30.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://316/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/popup\_index.php

<sup>231</sup>MH28.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://294/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>232</sup> See Table 4.

<sup>233</sup>NSZ14.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://252/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

“... *Geoană elmondta: Románia a jogszabályt ... diszkriminatívnak tartja, alkalmazását pedig területen kívüli jellegűnek.*”<sup>234</sup>

[... Geoană said: Romania considers the law ... to be discriminating and its application to have an extraterritorial character.]

And,

“... *Martonyi közölte: ... a törvény nem diszkriminatív, nincs területen kívüli jellege ...*”<sup>235</sup>

[... Martonyi announced: ... the law is not discriminating, it does not have an extraterritorial character ...]

Regrettably, neither side explained exactly what it meant by using this word, nor have the journalists at Népszabadság done so. Apparently, the journalists took it for granted that the readers would immediately understand the meaning of extraterritoriality. At this point I can only assume that the Romanian side saw the Hungarian Status Law as an act that trespassed on the judicial competence of the Hungarian state. Hence, according to my understanding of the Romanian line of argument, they accused the Hungarian parliament for passing a law that granted Romanian citizens certain rights without prior arrangements with the Romanian authorities. In the multitude of texts published, which tackled this issue, Népszabadság has quoted the chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), Béla Markó, as often as the Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoană or his secretary of state, Ciprian Diaconescu. The Hungarian government, especially foreign minister, János Martonyi, and his secretary of state, Zsolt Németh, said the Status Law did not have an extraterritorial character, since it granted rights to foreign citizens only in Hungary and not in the neighbouring states. However, the Hungarian side never mentioned the financial aid for families, who sent at least two children to Hungarian speaking schools. Interestingly, neither did the Romanian side. Népszabadság's narrative conveys the impression that neither side really wanted to have a debate on the judicial correctness of this law; there was no Hungarian-Romanian commission of experts that would have analysed the Status Law and drawn conclusion. As mentioned above, both sides opted for a debate that ran through the various European institutions.

Another aspect within this segment is Romanian prime minister, Adrian Năstase's threat to pass a law that would be directed at impeding the Hungarian Status

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<sup>234</sup> Idem.

<sup>235</sup> Idem.

Law's applicability in Romania, a counter-law so to speak<sup>236</sup>. Năstase repeated this threat in 2001 until the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) was signed<sup>237</sup>. He started again after the elections in Hungary (April 2002) were completed. The threat, however, was never put into practice. In December 2001, after the signing of the ONM, the threat did not make any sense, due to the benefits now granted to all Romanian citizens. After the new socialist-liberal government took office in Budapest, they started negotiating with the Romanian side about amending the Status Law. As the negotiations continued, the threat was taken off the Romanian prime minister's political agenda.

Magyar Hírlap, unlike Népszabadság, mentions only once the aspect of extraterritoriality<sup>238</sup>. The Romanian side puts the aspect of the Hungarian Status Law's extraterritoriality forward. Interestingly, it is done so in May 2002, long after the Status Law came into effect (01.01.2002) and the Orbán-Nastase Memorandum has been signed (24.12.2001). This comment is directed as a reminder of the debate at the new Hungarian government in Budapest.

The main aspect in Magyar Hírlap's narrative is the working permit for Hungary. This issue was discussed controversially in Romania as well as in Hungary. In Romania it was the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) that supported the working regulations for Romanian citizens in Hungary, as they were laid down in the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM)<sup>239</sup>. Béla Markó, chairman of the UDMR emphasised that the working permit for Hungary would sanction the legal status of many seasonal workers there<sup>240</sup>. Other Romanian parties that objected to the working regulations laid down in the Status Law<sup>241</sup> ceased to criticise after the ONM has been signed and every Romanian citizen was granted a yearly working permit for the period of three months.

On the other hand, in Hungary, Magyar Hírlap presents only the comments made by the opposition, mainly the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)<sup>242</sup> and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)<sup>243</sup>. The socialists were complaining about a possible invasion of labour migrants from Romania, which could upset Hungarians. István Csurka, chairman of the right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) opposed the ONM

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<sup>236</sup>NSZ30.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://335/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

<sup>237</sup> It has also been debated in the Slovak parliament before and after Hungary and Slovakia's EU membership in May 2004.

<sup>238</sup>MH11.05.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://587/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>239</sup> See Appendix 2.

<sup>240</sup>MH27.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://449/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>241</sup>MH19.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://398/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>242</sup>MH26.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>243</sup> Idem.

as well. Csurka objected the fact that the Hungarian state could grant benefits to foreign citizens who are not co-ethnics<sup>244</sup>. The fact that Magyar Hírlap does not represent a counter-point by the ruling party, the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), could be understood as a positioning of the newspaper on the opposition's side. However, after the Status Law and the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum had come into effect, Magyar Hírlap was keen on showing that the opposition parties were wrong, since there was no invasion of migrant workers<sup>245</sup>.

The last aspect in this motif in Magyar Hírlap's narrative is the aspect of legal bonding. Secretary Zsolt Németh from the Hungarian Foreign Office stressed that the Hungarian Status Law is a legal bond between the Hungarian state and the co-ethnics<sup>246</sup>. Hungarian foreign minister János Martonyi added that it is not only a legal bond as Németh said, but also the first law of its kind<sup>247</sup>. Béla Markó from the UDMR underlined this opinion<sup>248</sup>. The only counter-comment made on this was by Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase concerning minority politics. Referring to the Hungarian Status Law he declared that neither Romania nor Hungary should become fields of experimentation in law<sup>249</sup>.

#### 4.1.2 The Romanian articles

Unlike the Hungarian articles, there are few Romanian articles and their author is not always indicated. In congruence with the previous subchapter, I shall first take a look at the ethnic denotations and then analyse the six motifs for the newspapers' narratives.

##### 4.1.2.1 Ethnic denotations

The ethnic denotations in the Romanian newspapers are different from the Hungarian ones in two main aspects: firstly, there is the difference between the ethnonyms *ungur* [Hungarian] and *maghiar* [Magyar], which does not exist in Hungarian. Second, the perspective from which the Romanian journalists write is politically and ethnically a Romanian one, since there are only a few Romanian co-

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<sup>244</sup>MH03.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://523/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>245</sup>MH02.04.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://525/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php, MH18.04.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://551/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php, MH22.04.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://556/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php, MH25.10.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://757/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php and MH16.12.2002, path: 14.03.2003 wysiwyg://44/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>246</sup>MH01.03.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://353/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>247</sup>MH19.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://394/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>248</sup>MH02.01.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://506/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>249</sup>MH28.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://826/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

ethnics who live in Hungary or other adjacent states. This is because of the Romanian discourse's internal character<sup>250</sup>. Consequently, Romanian journalists usually write from Romania for a Romanian readership. Otherwise the analysis follows the same pattern as with the Hungarian denotations<sup>251</sup>.

#### 4.1.2.1.1 General characteristics

Table 11, which is presented below, follows the same pattern as its counterpart, Table 10. However, it also needs a short preliminary explanation:

- The first column represents a serial number for better reference.
- The second column gives the original Romanian denotation.
- The third column is the English translation of the respective Romanian denotation.
- The fourth column indicates the number of appearances the denotation had in Adevărul (A).
- The fifth column indicates the number of appearances the denotation had in România Liberă (RL).
- Colours. Denotations that appeared only in Adevărul, have been marked in red, while those denotations that appeared only in România Liberă, have been marked in blue. Denotations that appeared in both newspapers, have been left black.
- The table itself encompasses six denotations that explicitly refer to Transylvania or Romania. They have a dark grey shade and are written in italics. These denotations have been picked out and placed together in Table 11a, which will be discussed in the following segment. Consequently, they will not be analysed in this segment of the thesis.

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<sup>250</sup> See Figure 3.

<sup>251</sup> See subchapter 4.1.1.1.

Table 11: Romanian denotations, which encompass the Hungarians in Romania

	Romanian denotation	English translation	A	RL
1	<i>Cetățeni români de etnie maghiară</i>	<i>Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos</i>	1	1
2	<i>Comunitatea maghiară din România</i>	<i>Magyar community in Romania</i>	1	
3	Comunități maghiare	Magyar communities	2	
4	Comunități maghiare din afara Ungariei	Magyar communities outside Hungary	1	
5	Etnici maghiari	Ethnic Magyars	2	5
6	Etnici maghiari de peste hotare	Ethnic Magyars beyond the boundaries	1	
7	Etnici maghiari din statele vecine Ungarici	Ethnic Magyars from Hungary's neighbouring states		1
8	Etnici maghiari din țările vecine Ungariei	Ethnic Magyars from Hungary's neighbouring countries	1	
9	Etnici unguri	Ethnic Hungarians	2	
10	Etnici unguri de peste hotare	Ethnic Hungarians beyond the boundaries	1	
11	Etnie maghiară	Magyar ethnos	2	
12	Maghari din vecinătatea Ungariei	Magyars from Hungary's vicinity	1	
13	Maghiari	Magyars		3
14	Maghiari de peste hotare	Magyars beyond the boundaries	2	1
15	Maghiari din statele vecine Ungariei	Magyars from Hungary's neighbouring states		2
16	Maghiari din afară Ungariei	Magyars from outside Hungary	2	
17	<i>Maghiari din România</i>	<i>Magyars from Romania</i>	1	2
18	Maghiari din străinătate	Magyars from abroad		1
19	<i>Maghiari din Transilvania</i>	<i>Magyars from Transylvania</i>		2
20	Maghiari în afară granițelor	Magyars outside the borders	1	5
21	Maghiari în afară granițelor Ungariei	Magyars outside Hungary's borders	2	8
22	Maghiari în statele vecine	Magyars in the neighbouring states	1	1
23	Maghiari în străinătate	Magyars from abroad	1	
24	Maghiarime	Magyardom		1
25	<i>Maghiarime transilvană</i>	<i>Transylvanian Magyardom</i>	1	
26	<i>Minoritate maghiară în România</i>	<i>Magyar minority in Romania</i>		1
27	Minorități	Minorities	1	
28	Minorități maghiare	Magyar minorities	4	1
29	Minorități maghiare din afara granițelor	Magyar minorities outside the border	1	
30	Persoane de etnie maghiară	Persons of Magyar ethnos		1
31	Populație de etnie maghiară	Population of Magyar ethnos	1	1
32	Unguri	Hungarians	1	
33	Unguri în țările care trăiesc	Hungarians in the countries in which they live	1	

Apparently, due to the comparatively small size of the available articles from both Romanian newspapers, the denotations for the Hungarians in Romania are far less diverse than the ones in the Hungarian papers. While *Adevărul* applied 14 different forms exclusively, *România Liberă* utilised only six exclusively. The common denotations amount to seven. Nevertheless, the Romanian articles show certain specific features:

1. Magyar community/communities. Adevărul utilised the substantive *comunitate* [community] a few times (Nos. 3 and 4) but România Liberă does not use it at all. There are two notions of ‘community’ that are of importance here: Quantification and sporadic settlements. By using ‘community’ the authors are referring to something that is of local character and perhaps of less significance than a minority or a group, which would mean protection by law, either national or international. Secondly, community also means a group on a local and social level spread throughout the country, and not a bulk of settlement. This is surprising when considering that about 50% of all Hungarians living in Romania are settled in the Seklerland<sup>252</sup> where they make up a considerable majority of the population.
2. Ethnos. By ethnos I mean the various derivations, e.g. ethnic or ethnical, which can be traced back to the Greek origin *ethnos*. This term is used more frequently in Adevărul (Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 31) than in România Liberă (Nos. 5, 7, 30 and 31). Denotations that combine Magyar with ethnos indicate that the people referred to are specified: not just Hungarians or Magyars, but specific ones, those that are of ethnic character or form an ethnic minority. It implies a distinction between Hungarians from Romania and those from Hungary who do not need the supplement *ethnos*. In other words, ethnos could be understood as a reference towards a minority.
3. Hungarians/Magyars. Unlike in English, there is a crucial difference in Romanian between *unguri* [Hungarians] and *maghiari* [Magyars]. The first ethnonym refers to the country, which is called *Ungaria* [Hungary] and can be traced back to the Latin *Hungarus*. The other ethnonym is based on the Hungarians’ own denotation *magyarok* [Magyars]. During the socialist era in Romania, the denotation *unguri* meant the Hungarians living in Hungary while the other one, *maghiari*, meant the Hungarians living in Romania. Hence the linguistic differentiation aimed at separating those Hungarians from Hungary proper from those living in Romania. Despite this situation, the Hungarians in Romania insisted on being one and the same ethnic group together with the inhabitants of Hungary. After 1990 the name *unguri* has been losing ground to *maghiari*. Adevărul uses *unguri* in 4 out of 27 denotations (Nos. 9, 10, 32 and 33) while România Liberă does not use it at all. Choosing *maghiari* instead of

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<sup>252</sup> Seklerland consists of the Romanian counties of Harghita, Covasna and a part of Mureş, situated geographically in the centre of Romania. See also Map 2.

*unguri* shows that România Liberă is aiming at respecting the Hungarians' own denotation.

4. Ethnic Hungarians/Magyars. This denotation, which is frequently repeated in both newspapers, România Liberă (Nos. 5 and 7) and Adevărul (Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10), is most probably taken from the CNN (Cable News Network) jargon. Just as CNN reporters were talking about ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during the troubles in that Yugoslav (later Serb) province back in 1999, to distinguish between the Albanians from Kosovo and the Albanians from Albania proper, so does the denotation *etnici maghiari* [ethnic Magyars] sound like in Romanian. This obviously raises the question, whether there are also people who are un-ethnic Magyars. Using *ethnos* and its derivations also emphasises a lack of statehood. This brings back the discussion conducted in Hungary about a concept for the Hungarian nation and the relationship between the Hungarian state and the co-ethnics<sup>253</sup>. Furthermore, the table shows clearly that the journalists from România Liberă are keen on using the ethnonym Magyar instead of minority or *ethnos*. This bears evidence to the fact, that they refer to the Hungarians living in Romania as equals to the ones in Hungary and try to avoid further specification, which could be interpreted as degrading or discriminating. In other words, România Liberă gives the impression that Hungarians as a single people spread across different countries without any differentiation between them. This is in congruence with the light in which Hungarians in the eight states of the Carpathian Basin often see themselves: a single ethno-linguistic group living in different political entities.
5. Magyar minorities. The journalists of Adevărul prefer to refer to Hungarians living in Romania by using the word minority (Nos. 27-29), while those writing for România Liberă hardly use it (No. 28). By using minority the journalists are acting on two levels. On the first one they draw a line of separation between minority and majority. Hence there is a boundary to overcome if there should be any communication or cooperation between the two groups. On the second level minority means that the group referred to is in a numerical disadvantage and therefore in a weaker political position.
6. National/Ethnic minority. Neither side has used these possible denotations. It is perhaps because the term was abused in former times. The last reference to minorities in communist Romania was *minoritățile conlocuitoare*, which means

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<sup>253</sup> See subchapter 4.1.1.

the co-inhabiting minorities. Hence they divided people into ethnic groups with primordial attitude, clear-cut boundaries and a hidden threat: co-tenants could also be expelled. By avoiding this terminology the boundaries between the groups become more flexible and permeable.

7. Persons, people. These two terms enable journalists to avoid using group related terms such as minority or ethnonyms in the plural form (Nos. 30-31). Using these forms concurs with the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) from December 2001 and other modifications in the Status Law<sup>254</sup>. These speak of people considering themselves to be Magyars and not of Magyars per se or any minorities.
8. Borders, boundaries, outside, abroad and neighbourhood. This semantic field enhances the image of the Hungarians/Magyars not being in Hungary, but in a different place. This could be the journalists' attempt to refer to all the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin and avoid a Romanian centrist attitude. On the other hand it could also be interpreted as an attempt to specify the Hungarians abroad as a separate group that is foreign to the countries in which they live.
9. Status Law. Apparently, the Status Law has not been mentioned in any of the denotations<sup>255</sup>. This is surprising since all the articles from *România Liberă* and *Adevărul* had been a part of the public discourse about that law.

#### 4.1.2.1.2 Denotations regarding only Romania and Transylvania

Although few, the six denotations with clear reference to Transylvania and Romania form an important part in this analysis. The reason is that the Status Law as an intersecting segment of the Romanian discourse is an internal one, i.e. within the political boundaries of the Romanian state.

Table 11a: Romanian denotations, which refer explicitly to Hungarians in Romania

	Romanian denotation	English translation	A	RL
1	Cetățeni români de etnie maghiară	Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos	1	1
2	Comunitatea maghiară din România	Magyar community in Romania	1	
3	Maghiari din România	Magyars from Romania	1	2
4	Maghiari din Transilvania	Magyars from Transylvania		2
5	Maghiarime transilvană	Transylvanian Magyarhood	1	
6	Minoritate maghiară în România	Magyar minority in Romania		1

<sup>254</sup> See Appendices 2 and 3.

<sup>255</sup> Compare to *státusmagyarok* [Status Magyars] in Table 10.

1. *Ardeal* [Transylvania]. Apparently the reference to the Romanian denotation of Transylvania, *Ardeal*, is completely missing. This is even more surprising when bearing in mind that the vast majority of Hungarians from Romania live in that region. I assume that *Ardeal* is avoided since it is derived from the Hungarian name for Transylvania, *Erdély*, while *Transilvania* is of Latin origin, to which the Romanian language is closely related.
2. Magyars/Hungarians. The six denotations do not use the ethnonym *ungur* [Hungarian] a single time; they always use *maghiar* [Magyar]. As mentioned previously, this indicates certain awareness among Romanian journalists to the Hungarians' emic ethnonym and a willingness to use this form rather than *ungur*.
3. Romania/Transylvania. Most journalists in both papers take it for granted that when they talk of Magyars or minorities they mean the Hungarians living in Romania. The explicit references to Romania as a state or to Transylvania as a region are seldom. Writing for the Romanian public, the journalists take it for granted that it is the Hungarians in Romania that are of importance to the readers.
4. *Maghiarime* [Magyardom]. This derivation of *maghiar* is a somewhat awkward one. Unlike the Hungarian term *magyarság*, which literally means the same, it does not have the same connotation. However, unlike *magyarság*, *maghiarime* has a slightly derogatory connotation in Romanian and the equivalent to it for Romanians is hardly ever used: *românime* [Romaniandom].

#### 4.1.2.2 Motifs

As with the Hungarian papers, I shall analyse every motif in both newspapers. The analysis will follow the following pattern: *România Liberă* first and *Adevărul* second.

##### 4.1.2.2.1 Europe

The European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CE) or Europe as a term play an important role in the general public discourses of Hungary and Romania, as well as in the specific ones analysed here about the Hungarians in Romania. Despite being very different, the EU, the CE and other related institutions on the European level will be considered as one semantic field for the purpose of this thesis. In the 16 articles from

România Liberă that mention Europe's role there is a clear tendency towards three images: conformity, sideshow and supra instance.

The first image handles the role the EU played for the states that aspired membership in the EU. Since the EU was the centre of economic and political power in Europe, it was able to issue certain demands or expectations towards the candidate states if they wanted their application for membership to be viewed with favour. This also affected the respective states' respect for international law and, even more important, their attitude in solving international disputes. That is why journalists kept on quoting politicians making remarks about the Status Law, which have to do with its conformity. By conformity they, the politicians and the journalists, meant 'European-ness' or the lack of it without clear reference to any specific juridical aspect. Romanian politicians kept on repeating that the Status Law lacked conformity with European law but never specified which European laws they meant. On the other hand, members of the then ruling party in Hungary, the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), claimed the Status Law did concur with the European law system. In other words, conformity or the lack of it replaced the adjectives 'good' and 'bad' respectively.

The second image relates to the scene of the discourse and the way politicians from both states took up Europe as their battleground to carry out their disputes. This is an aspect that the journalists took for granted, since not a single journalist from România Liberă commented on this evasive sideshow, although the political dispute affected Hungary and Romania<sup>256</sup>. However, the journalists from România Liberă conveyed in their articles an image, that politicians and civil servants from both states were busier lobbying in Brussels and Strasbourg than actually travelling to the other state's capital to try to resolve the problems. Thus I consider Europe with its institutions and various commissions to be a sideshow for the political dispute.

This situation, however, does lead to the third image of the EU as a supra instance. The journalists convey the image of the EU as a judge or a referee who has to decide which party is right. By doing so, it became evident that the political representatives from both sides were not keen on meeting or trying to convince each other, but rather anxious to receive a positive response from the supra institution EU or other related institutions, such as the Venice Commission. The big exception to this tendency was a short period of time in December 2001, when the Hungarian side realised, that the Romanian state will prevent the Status Law's implication on its

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<sup>256</sup> This is a simplification since the Status Law affected six of Hungary's seven neighbouring states.

territory on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2002. This intermezzo has led to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM).

Nevertheless, the journalists from *România Liberă* were keen on representing both sides of the dispute and therefore quoted Romanian and Hungarian politicians alike. Furthermore, the articles show a clear difference in the politicians' attitudes towards their counterparts after the parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2002. The new coalition in Budapest decided to step forward and pick up the dialogue with the Romanian side<sup>257</sup>.

In a similar manner to the journalists from *România Liberă*, the reporters from *Adevărul* describe the EU or one of its metaphysical substitutes, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the Council of Europe (CE), as a supra instance, something to be admired, respected and hopefully someday becoming a member in it<sup>258</sup>. There is a strong emphasis on both states' desire to become full members of the EU. It is considered to be a common feature for both sides and hence a solid basis for the art of future relationship between the two states. Furthermore, according to Hungary's new foreign minister László Kovács, Hungary was in favour of Romania's EU membership:

*“România, și o dată cu ea Transilvania, ca și Ungaria sunt parte a Europei. Și acolo merg toate împreună.”*<sup>259</sup>

[Romania, and Transylvania along with her, like Hungary, is a part of Europe. And they all go there together.]

At this point there is no such endeavour from the Romanian side. This is perhaps due to the fact that in 2003 Hungary's EU membership was imminent while Romania's chances were still unclear.

The critique on the Status Law, which Romanian politicians expressed in the articles, especially Prime Minister Năstase, very often took a European standpoint of argumentation. He did not say that he objected to the Law, but rather that the Law was against European principles and norms and, since he considered himself to be a European, objected to the Law not as a Romanian, but rather as a European. This switch of identity from Romanian to European, which can also be observed with president Iliescu, requires an explanation. Arguing about the Law from a Romanian political

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<sup>257</sup> RL28.05.2002 and RL08.07.2002. Both printed: 04.02.2004.

<sup>258</sup> A24.12.2001 and A06.03.2003. Both printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>259</sup> A02.09.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

angle could be regarded as nationalistic. Arguing from a European perspective has the advantage of leaving the nationally charged Central and Eastern European arena and moving to a higher point and, in a figurative way, standing above old rivalries and misunderstandings<sup>260</sup>. It is also a more neutral position that cannot be attacked that easily. Furthermore, arguing about who is more European actually brings both sides closer since they both have the same field of dispute: their common goal for becoming members of the EU.

Parallel to *România Liberă*, the Romanian side criticised the Law for not being European or not having a European character. Unfortunately, not one journalist explains what this lacking element of European-ness is supposed to be. Unlike the articles in *România Liberă*, where the recommendations of the Venice Commission and other reports on the European level play a significant role, *Adevărul* hardly mentioned those points. One article out of the 12 that contain the motif Europe is unique, since it is the only article in which a Romanian politician, Toro T. Tibor from the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), criticised the EU for not criticising Romania's policy of dual citizenship vis-à-vis the Republic of Moldova<sup>261</sup>.

#### 4.1.2.2.2 Comparison

The three articles in *România Liberă* concerning the element of comparison were published before the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum<sup>262</sup>. Quoting different politicians from Hungary saying that having a law such as the Status Law is a common practice in Europe while various politicians from Romania were saying exactly the opposite, the journalists do not take sides openly. This is interesting when bearing in mind president Iliescu's expostulations regarding the Status Law. Furthermore, he compared the minority protection system in both states:

*“El a adăugat că “în timp ce minoritatea maghiară din România s-a bucurat întotdeauna de drepturile ce decurg din acest statut, singura politică a Ungarei față de minorități a fost asimilarea”, a spus șeful statului.”*<sup>263</sup>

[He [Ion Iliescu] added, “while the Magyar minority in Romania has always benefited from the rights that go with such a status, Hungary's sole politics vis-à-vis the minorities [in Hungary] has been assimilation”, said the head of state.]

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<sup>260</sup> There is, of course, also the issue of European nationalism. However, it does not play a decisive role in this controversy between Romania and Hungary.

<sup>261</sup> A14.01.2003. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>262</sup> RL19.09.2001, RL07.10.2001 and RL16.10.2001. All printed: 04.02.2004.

<sup>263</sup> RL19.09.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. All diacritical signs added by me.

Iliescu added that there is no comparable law in Europe to the Hungarian Status Law while the Hungarian state secretary in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh, said that it is a common European practice. Obviously one of them had to be wrong. There is of course no law which says *exactly* the same but there is a series of laws in different European states that regulate the respective state's relationship to citizens of other states who are considered to be ethnically similar.

Adevărul has also published only two articles that contain the aspect of comparison regarding the Status Law. The first one<sup>264</sup> quoted Romanian prime minister Năstase, who emphasised the Status Law's unique negative character. It is not a new position, but the time of the declaration is crucial, since the newly elected Hungarian government has just started working (May 2002). Năstase most probably wanted to put pressure on the Hungarian side and make it clear that the Romanian side still wants the Status Law to be modified, despite the Orbán-Năstae Memorandum (ONM). The other article<sup>265</sup> quoted a right wing member of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), Toro T. Tibor, who compared the Romanian policy of dual citizenship regarding the Republic of Moldova with the Status Law. Furthermore, he demanded a similar attitude towards Hungary from the Romanian government. Implicitly, he suggested a dual citizenship, Romanian and Hungarian, for the Hungarians that live in Romania. However, the idea of dual citizenship for the Hungarians in Romania was avoided by the leading members of the UDMR for a long time.

It is noteworthy that there is not one single comment in the Romanian papers referring to statements made by Romanian politicians on the policy of dual citizenship for the Moldavian citizens. I assume that this is due to the unpopularity of this policy in Romania.

#### 4.1.2.2.3 Discrimination

The eight articles published by România Liberă that mention this subject can be divided into two groups: those mentioning the reason for discrimination and those that do not. The first group shows that Romanian politicians were complaining about the discrimination of Romanian citizens with a Romanian ethnic background. They were referring to the fact that, according to the Law, only those entitled to a Certificate of

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<sup>264</sup> A28.05.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>265</sup> A14.01.2003. Printed: 28.01.2004.

Hungarian Nationality<sup>266</sup> (CHN) have the right to apply for a Hungarian working permit<sup>267</sup>.

Unlike România Liberă's editorials, the eight articles published in Adevărul show a more detailed picture of the Romanian complaints regarding discrimination created by the Status Law. The articles speak of discrimination regarding the working permits for Hungary, the economic bias due to the better possibilities Hungarians from Romania will have and of the cultural consequences the Status Law will have in Romania. Unfortunately they do not contain further detailed specifications as to which aspects the politicians are referring exactly. In May 2002 Năstase recommended the new Hungarian government to avoid any discriminating legislation:

*“Premierul Adrian Năstase a avertizat că desființarea Memorandumului de Înțelegere va pune autoritățile de la București în situația de a reanaliza posibilitatea adoptării unei legislații interne adecvate vizând blocarea elementelor de extraterritorialitate și discriminare, care sunt cuprinse în Legea statutului și care au fost eliminate din procesul de aplicare al acesteia prin înțelegerea dintre guvernele român și ungar.”<sup>268</sup>*

[Premier Adrian Năstase has warned that the annulment of the Memorandum of Understanding [Orbán-Năstase Memorandum] would cause the Bucharest authorities to reassess the possibility of adopting an adequate internal legislation aimed at blocking the extraterritorial and discriminating passages, which are part of the Status Law and which have not been applied due to the understanding between the Romanian and Hungarian governments.]

This statement, in my opinion, is directed at the Romanian constituency and not at the Hungarian side. The parties that won the elections in Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), have declared their intention to modify the Status Law and to negotiate it with Hungary's neighbours prior to the elections. Hence, Năstase knew beforehand that the new government in Budapest would not take any steps towards discriminating Romanian citizens. Therefore, with this statement, Năstase tries to show the Romanian public his strong stand against Hungary.

#### 4.1.2.2.4 NATO

The two articles in România Liberă that mention the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)<sup>269</sup> refer to the organisation's importance to Romania. Prime

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<sup>266</sup> According to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum the name was changed to Hungarian Certificate. For reasons of simplicity I shall be always using the abbreviation CHN.

<sup>267</sup> RL27.12.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004.

<sup>268</sup> A09.05.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>269</sup> RL19.09.2001 and RL27.10.2001. Both printed: 04.02.2004.

Minister Năstase has pointed out that the quarrel over the Status Law might hurt Romania's prospects for full NATO membership. However, he does not talk about the quarrel's impacts on Hungary's role within NATO. Romanian president Ion Iliescu, however, emphasized NATO's mistake in having accepted Hungary as a member in 1999, but not Romania<sup>270</sup>:

*“Președintele Iliescu a declarat că, pentru păstrarea stabilității în regiune, ar fi trebuit fie că ambele țări să devină membre ale Alianței, fie că nici una dintre ele să nu fie acceptată.”*<sup>271</sup>

[President Iliescu has declared that for keeping the stability in the region, either both states [Romania and Hungary] should have become members of the Alliance [NATO] or none should have been accepted.]

The fact that Hungary would help Romania to become a full member of NATO was mentioned in two out of the three articles in *Adevărul* that discussed this motif<sup>272</sup>. In one article, the author expressed his concern about Hungary's advantage of being a member in NATO whereas Romania was not. However, he did not go further to explain what kind of advantage (economic, military, political) Hungary would have in this case<sup>273</sup>.

#### 4.1.2.2.5 History

Unlike *România Liberă*, that has not published a single relevant article containing the element of history in it, *Adevărul* published four articles in this matter. Two of them related to the fact that both sides, Romania and Hungary, had a long common and difficult history<sup>274</sup>. Returning to the previously mentioned different historic perceptions in both states, with this the journalists were trying to avoid taking sides in the historic debates. By pointing at the length of Romanian and Hungarian history, the journalists have gallantly made a diplomatic statement. The following quotation, referring to a meeting between Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoană and his new Hungarian counterpart, László Kovács, is a representative example of this kind of presentation:

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<sup>270</sup> Compare subchapter 4.1.1.2.4

<sup>271</sup> RL19.09.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004.

<sup>272</sup> A08.07.2002 and A06.09.2002. Both printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>273</sup> A24.12.2001. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>274</sup> A24.12.2001 and A17.03.2003. Both printed: 28.01.2004.

*“Cei doi miniștri împărtășesc ideea că bunele relații româno-ungare se dovedesc un factor de stabilitate în această regiune greu încărcată de-a lungul istorie.”<sup>275</sup>*

[Both ministers [Geoană and Kovács] share the idea that the good Romano-Hungarian relationship proves to be a stabilising factor in this region so heavily burdened throughout history.]

Another important element in the Hungarian historic debate, Trianon, was mentioned only once when Prime Minister Orbán said, that the Status Law was a partial reparation to the Hungarians living in the neighbouring states after what they had suffered due to the injustice committed at Trianon<sup>276</sup>. In one of the articles<sup>277</sup>, the journalist wrote about the large canvas in the Hungarian parliament showing the Huns' arrival in Transylvania and their encounter with the local sedentary population. This comment is a parable at the Theory of Continuity, since Hungarian historians claimed for a long time that the Carpathian Basin was hardly, if at all, inhabited when the Hungarians' ancestors crossed the Carpathian Mountains and arrived in Pannonia in 895/896 A.D.. Hence my conclusion, that the journalist was pointing out very different aspects:

- History was repeating itself,
- He compared the Huns to the Hungarians.
- He compared the local sedentary population to the Romanians and
- continuing the parable, the Hungarian side in the historic dispute indirectly admitted through the canvas that the Romanian side was right, and that the Romanians, or their ancestors, had settled in Transylvania before the Hungarians and the Sekler<sup>278</sup>.

#### 4.1.2.2.6 Legal aspects

The juridical leitmotiv in the articles published by România Liberă is the issue of extraterritoriality. The articles contain statements from representatives of different parties in Romania who share the same fear of extraterritoriality by the Status Law. However, not a single article explains what extraterritoriality exactly means, because presumably politicians and journalists alike consider the term to be understood by the general public without further explanation. I understand the term extraterritoriality in the context of this discourse as the unacceptability of passing a law in state X that has

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<sup>275</sup> A17.03.2003. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>276</sup> A15.04.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>277</sup> A24.12.2001. Printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>278</sup> See also Chapter 2.

an implication in state Y. In other words, Hungary cannot pass a law that concerns the citizens of another state, in this case Romania.

The next important issue that derives from objecting to extraterritoriality is the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). This certificate is necessary for all formalities concerning the benefits that derive from the Status Law. The Romanian political objection does not refer to the certificate as such, since it does not hold any political implications concerning the Romanian state<sup>279</sup>. They objected to the handing out of the CHN on Romanian territory by non-governmental organisations or by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). According to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) from December 2001, the Hungarians from Romania could apply for this certificate in Romania but would have to collect it in Hungary. Interestingly, bearing in mind the regulations of international law, this is an agreement that goes beyond the actual problem, since every state has the right to hand out its official documents at the embassy or consulate general.

The fact that the year 2001 was the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the bilateral agreement signed between the two states was mentioned only once<sup>280</sup>. Obviously, the jubilee did not play a significant part in the discourse. Furthermore, it was only the Romanian side that was present in the articles. Not a single Hungarian politician was mentioned in this respect. However, the Venice Commission's report was received with enthusiasm on the Romanian side, as Prime Minister Adrian Năstase exclaimed:

*”Premierul a confirmat că observațiile României privind efectele de extraterritorialitate ale Legii statutului au fost confirmate de către Comisia de la Veneția.”*<sup>281</sup>

[The prime minister [Năstase] has confirmed that the Venice Commission has confirmed Romania's remarks regarding the Status Law's extraterritorial effects.]

One of the main issues in respect of the legal aspects presented by Adevărul is the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM). It is considered to be a breakthrough in the deadlock between the two states, which lasted from July to December 2001. The eight articles from Adevărul that picked up this issue are more concerned with Năstase's comments. Năstase warns the old as well as the new Hungarian governments on various

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<sup>279</sup> However, Romania did object the Hungarian coat of arms on the certificate's cover and the heroic pro-Hungarian text on the inside. See also Appendix 3.

<sup>280</sup> RL27.12.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004.

<sup>281</sup> RL20.10.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. All diacritical signs added by me.

occasions not to interfere with Romania's matters and threatens with judicial counter-measures<sup>282</sup>. Another aspect mentioned is the bilateral agreement the two states signed back in 1996. The new Hungarian socialist foreign minister Kovács insisted that the changes in the Status Law should follow the general outlines of the bilateral agreement<sup>283</sup>.

The Venice Commission's reproach of the Law's extraterritorial character is marginal in Adevărul's articles. Apparently Adevărul's journalists concentrated more on the general European motif that the politicians kept repeating in order to demonstrate the Law's legal aspects. Furthermore, Adevărul has not published a single article concerning the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality. I assume this was a non-issue for the journalists.

#### 4.1.3 Summarising the diachronic analysis

In analogy with the results, the conclusions will be divided into two segments: the first one will be a general comparison of all four papers regarding the ethnic denotations they have utilised and the second segment will be a broad-spectrum evaluation of the motifs used by the analysed newspapers.

##### 4.1.3.1 Ethnic denotations

A short look at Tables 10 and 11 reveals a clear difference between Adevărul and România Liberă on the one hand and Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap on the other:

- With a ratio of almost 4:1 the Hungarian papers have used considerably more denotations than the Romanian papers. Bearing in mind that the ratio between the Hungarian articles and the Romanian ones is about 10:1 and the popularity of the denotation *hatáon túli magyarok* [Magyars beyond the border] among Hungarian journalists, I could draw the conclusion that the Romanian denotations are just as diverse as the Hungarian ones.
- While Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság make an extensive use of the term 'nation', Adevărul and România Liberă avoid it completely. This is probably due to the previously mentioned concept of 'nation' present in Hungarian historiography and public discourse. There is hardly any correlation between the

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<sup>282</sup> A09.05.2002 and A06.03.2003. Both printed: 28.01.2004.

<sup>283</sup> A12.12.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

term ‘nation’ and the Romanian discourse over the ethnic minorities within Romania.

- The dominance of *hatáon túli magyarok* [Magyars beyond the border] or *határon túli magyarság* [Magyardom beyond the border] does not have a parallel among Romanian denotations. They are more balanced in the number of appearances than the Hungarian ones.
- Neither side is really eager to use denotations which bear evidence to a group’s self-definition. Those denotations, e.g. *magukat magyarnak valló személyek* [Persons who consider themselves Magyars] or *cetățeni români de etnie maghiară* [Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos], are rare and are seldom repeated.
- Astonishingly, the Romanian denotations show the same ratio between general denotations regarding the Hungarian co-ethnics and those regarding only the Hungarians that live in Romania. This is unusual due to the fact that the Romanian discourse mainly refers to the Hungarians within Romania and not in other states surrounding Hungary. On the other hand, the Hungarian newspapers are almost obliged to use denotations that encompass all the Hungarians in Hungary’s neighbouring states.
- Since the Hungarian language uses a single ethnonym for people called in English Hungarians, *magyarok* [Magyars], there can be no comparison to the differentiation between *ungur* [Hungarian] and *maghiar* [Magyar], which is possible in Romanian. Practically, from a Hungarian point of view, this lack of variety in Hungarian bears evidence to the unity of the cultural-linguistic Hungarian nation.

#### 4.1.3.2 Motifs

The analysis of the six motifs chosen for the diachronic analysis has shown significant differences between the respective newspapers’ narratives. However, these differences vary from one motif to another. While there might be some congruence on certain issues, there are different perspectives on other ones. Consequently, I shall compare the four newspapers motif by motif starting with the Romanian newspapers and then continuing with the Hungarian ones:

- Europe. The three images of Europe, conformity, sideshow and supra instance, are portrayed clearly by România Liberă’s narrative. România Liberă was also keen on representing both the Hungarian as well as the Romanian side.

Consequently, the paper quoted Romanian and Hungarian politicians alike. *Adevărul*, on the other hand, describes Europe and its metaphysical substitutes, such as the OSCE or the CE, as a supra instance, an entity to be admired and respected. There is a strong emphasis on Hungary's and Romania's endeavours to become full members of the EU. In Hungary, *Népszabadság's* journalists also enable both sides to put forward their ideas and concerns about the Status Law in a European perspective. The most present politicians in *Népszabadság's* narrative in this context were Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase and the Hungarian secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh. *Magyar Hírlap's* narrative regarding this motif is balanced not only between Hungarian and Romanian sources, but also includes various European representatives. The tenor of *Magyar Hírlap's* narrative concerning Europe is about the Hungarian Status Law's conformity with European law. Furthermore, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and his foreign minister János Martonyi, have been the most frequently quoted politicians in *Magyar Hírlap's* narrative regarding Europe.

- Comparison. *România Liberă* used this motif only before the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM). This indicates the newspaper's acceptance of the ONM as a legal measure to even out the discord created by the Status Law. *Adevărul*, on the other hand, has only quoted two politicians in this matter: Romanian prime minister Năstase and one of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania's (UDMR) leading senators, Toro T. Tibor. It is noteworthy that there is not one single comment in the Romanian newspapers referring to statements made by Romanian politicians on the policy of dual citizenship granted by the Romanian state to Moldavia's citizens. The narrative presented by *Népszabadság* regarding this motif is almost entirely from the Hungarian point of view, except for two short interviews with Hungarian politicians from Romania and a short commentary by Romania's president Ion Iliescu. The use of this motif in *Magyar Hírlap's* narrative is restricted to the positions represented by Hungarian politics. Consequently, the Romanian side is not represented at all. The only non-Hungarian voice to be referred to in regard of this motif is the European Peoples' Party (EPP).
- Discrimination. *România Liberă* refers only to Romanian politicians in this motif, who were saying that the Status Law was discriminatory for Romanian citizens with a Romanian ethnic background. Going a step further and giving

more details, Adevărul speaks of discrimination regarding the working permits for Hungary, the economic bias due to the better possibilities Hungarians from Romania will have and of the cultural consequences the Status Law will have in Romania. Népszabadság's narrative evolves around two extreme positions: the Romanian side saying that the Status Law is discriminative and the Hungarian side saying it is not. Subsequently, Népszabadság is trying to represent the Hungarian as well as the Romanian arguments. On the other hand, Magyar Hírlap has presented various Romanian positions in this respect, predominantly by Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase. Furthermore, Magyar Hírlap's narrative presents the views from different European institutions: the European Commission (EC), the Council of Europe (CE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Peoples' Party (EPP).

- NATO. România Liberă has two main points: First, Prime Minister Năstase's comment, that the quarrel over the Status Law might hurt Romania's prospects for full NATO membership. Second, Romanian president Ion Iliescu's emphasis NATO's mistake to have accepted Hungary as a member in 1999, but refusing Romania. In Adevărul, only one journalist expressed his concerns about Hungary's advantage of being a member in NATO and Romania not. Népszabadság's narrative represented both the Romanian and the Hungarian side. Politicians from both sides keep mentioning Hungary's ongoing support for Romania's integration in NATO. Despite this frequent repetition, neither side explained what is behind this constant support. Népszabadság also introduced a different facet: the element of threat. Both Romanian president Ion Iliescu and Hungarian prime minister Orbán discussed this element by saying that Hungary's membership and Romania's lack of it destabilise the region. The comments made by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán form the key issue of Magyar Hírlap's narrative in this motif. According to him, the Hungarian government has informed all NATO embassies about the content of the Status Law. Consequently, he did not inform Romania. Orbán's second comment is a reference to the Treaty of Trianon. According to him, Hungary's NATO-membership has terminated the country's isolation since Trianon (1920). The Romanian side is mainly represented by Mircea Geoană, the Romanian foreign minister.
- History. Unlike România Liberă, that has not published a single relevant article containing the specific element of history in it, Adevărul published a few on this

matter. Népszabadság's articles reveal a stronger emphasis on the Hungarian side than on the Romanian one. Nonetheless, the Hungarian side represents the entire political spectrum in Hungary. Consequently, there is hardly any critique on the abuse of historical data and historical symbolism that was used by the political elite: Trianon and revisionism. The key issue in Magyar Hírlap's narrative is the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences. Both the Romanian and the Hungarian perspectives are well represented in Magyar Hírlap: The Status Law as a historic obligation, the accusation of revisionism by the right wing Greater Romania Party and Romanian president Ion Iliescu's claim of a Hungarian imperialistic attitude.

- Legal aspects. The juridical leitmotiv in România Liberă's articles is the issue of extraterritoriality, although extraterritoriality is never explained. Basically, it is Romania's objection to the handing out of the CHN on Romanian territory by non-governmental organisations. Adevărul's main issue in respect of legal aspects is the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM). The main feature of Népszabadság's narrative of legal aspects is also the question of extraterritoriality. Especially the two foreign ministers, Mircea Geoană and János Martonyi, are repeatedly quoted. Another aspect within this segment is Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase's threat to pass a counter-law to impede the Hungarian Status Law's applicability in Romania. Magyar Hírlap mentions only once the aspect of extraterritoriality. Interestingly, it was done in May 2002, long after the Status Law came into effect and the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum had been signed. Magyar Hírlap's narrative main aspect is the working permit for Hungary and those who oppose it: Socialists, liberals and right-wing nationalists. Magyar Hírlap's other aspect in this motif is the element of legal bonding. Hungarian secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh, stressed that the Hungarian Status Law is a legal bond between the Hungarian state and its co-ethnics. Hungarian foreign minister János Martonyi added that it is also the first law of its kind. Béla Markó from the Hungarian party in Romania (UDMR), underlined this position. The only counter comment made on this position was done by Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase concerning minority politics. Referring to the Hungarian Status Law he declared that neither Romania nor Hungary should become fields of experimentation in law.

## 4.2 Synchronic analysis

The synchronic analysis is focused on selected articles from all four newspapers, which relate to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) from 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001. This memorandum opened the way for Hungary to implement the Status Law on Romania's territory. It also included a few supplementary regulations, e.g. granting all Romanian citizens a Hungarian working permit for three months p.a. and administrative restrictions regarding the handing out of the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN)<sup>284</sup>. The ONM has eased the tensions between Hungary and Romania. For the Hungarian newspapers I chose articles from the first week that followed the ONM and from the Romanian newspapers, whose data basis is more restricted, also one from 7<sup>th</sup> January 2002.

### 4.2.1 Adevărul (A)

The only article published by Adevărul is an indicator for the author's personal views and, since he is an editor, to the newspaper's political values.

#### 4.2.1.1 A 24.12.2001<sup>285</sup>

This article by Bogdan Chirieac, stylistically a report that gradually turns into an essay, is a disguised polemic text with connotations to different aspects of the Romanian-Hungarian relationship. The text itself consists of a title, an introductory segment and six other segments. Published on Christmas Eve, it is an immediate reaction to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM), which was signed just two days before. Although Chirieac goes into minute detail about the ONM's content, the text also contains fragments of an interview with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Chirieac then adds his personal view regarding the Status Law and the ONM. Consequently, the article's title is the first indicator for the author's standpoint:

*“Printr-un memorandum semnat la Budapesta de premierii Năstase și Orban Legea legitimației de maghiar – golită de conținut”<sup>286</sup>*

[Through a memorandum signed in Budapest by Prime Minister Năstase and Orbán the Law of Hungarian Certificate – emptied of essence]<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> According to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum the name was changed to Hungarian Certificate. For reasons of simplicity I shall be always using the abbreviation CHN. Compare also Appendices 1 and 2.

<sup>285</sup> See Appendix 7 for a scanned copy of this article.

<sup>286</sup> Due to difficulties with computer programmes, the Romanian articles are printed without the diacritical signs. When quoting, I added the signs for a better understanding, since the signs obviously do appear in the printed edition. See also footnote to 4.3.4.1

<sup>287</sup> All quotations are from the respective article. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

Although the author repeats the name of this law again in the first segment, there is no such thing as ‘Law of Hungarian Certificate’. In the introductory segment Chirieac writes about Năstase and Orbán who at Budapest have “... *consfințit moartea Legea statutului.*” [... confirmed the Status Law’s demise], so he *is* aware of the law’s customary name<sup>288</sup>. Regarding the ONM as a confirmation to the Status Law’s demise is a far-reaching conclusion. Furthermore, by reducing the Status Law to just a law concerning the Certificates of Hungarian Nationality<sup>289</sup> (CHN), Chirieac focuses on the aspect of extraterritoriality. This domain, which regards the Status Law’s applicability on Romania’s territory, has been one of Romania’s main objections to the Status Law. Therefore, this false name for the Status Law carries a connotation of patriotism, which appeals to the more patriotic or nationally aware readers of Adevărul.

Chirieac gives in the first segment an account of what the ONM has changed for the implementation of the Status Law. His main concern is the abolition of elements, which he describes as discriminating. The term *discriminare* [discrimination] is used five times in this article, which again emphasises the injustice done by the Status Law to Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnic background. Again, it is an appeal to patriotic sentiments. Furthermore, he discusses three other points, which need a more detailed observation:

- Consulting the neighbouring states. The Status Law, according to Chirieac, has passed through parliament in Budapest without prior consultations with the states involved. Austria, he continues, has very subtly but firmly managed to convince the Hungarian side to exclude Austria from the list of beneficiary states. The fact that Chirieac insists on an Austrian subtle and firm attitude, is in direct contrast to Romanian reaction which was very loud and not that effective. However, he added, Austria was already a member of the European Union (EU) and therefore had a better negotiating position. Slovakia, on the other side has joined Romanian in rejecting the Status Law. Serbia and Ukraine have accepted the Status Law’s application on their respective territories<sup>290</sup>. Chirieac does not make any reference to the last two of Hungary’s neighbouring states, Croatia and Slovenia.

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<sup>288</sup> For the official name in English see Appendices 1 and 3.

<sup>289</sup> According to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum the name was changed to Hungarian Certificate.

<sup>290</sup> On a seminary in Slovakia back in 2002, fellow Slovak students told me that they consider the ONM to be a Romanian treason in the common Slovak-Romanian cause against the Status Law.

- The European dimension. Chirieac argues against the Status Law since, according to him, it does not stand up to European standards, although he does not explain what these standards exactly are. After having reminded the reader that all three states, i.e. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, have applied for membership in the EU, Chirieac demonstrates the contradiction between Hungary's endeavours and the Status Law: "... *această lege violă chiar principiile europene.*" [... this law violates precisely European principles.]. The ONM, added the author, has brought the Status Law "... *în conformitate cu spiritual European.*" [... in conformity with the European spirit.]. As previously demonstrated in the diachronic analysis, Europe and the European Union are used as synonyms, which stand for a specific legal and social system. This system is often described as a target to be achieved by the candidate states. Chirieac used this image to manifest his discontent with the Status Law.
- Hungarian politics. The first segment starts off with a declaration that the Status Law was Orbán's invention to catch more right-wing nationalistic voters for the forthcoming elections of April 2002. Although of deep insight, Chirieac discredited with this sentence the entire Hungarian foreign policy towards the co-ethnics since the political changes of 1989/1990 including the Hungarian constitution<sup>291</sup>. The issue of electoral tactics was repeated again to justify Orbán's actions: Orbán needed the ONM to show the Hungarian public that he can handle foreign policy well. Should his party, the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) win the elections, modifying the Status Law, as the ONM demands, will be a minute issue.

The second and the third segments entail details from the ONM. In the forth segment, however, Chirieac gives an account of what he saw in Budapest when the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum was signed. The author mentioned that the document was signed with a background of a huge canvas representing the Huns' dismounting in Transylvania, where they were *întâmpinați* by the locals, who were already sedentary. The verb *întâmpina* has two meanings: The first one is to contest or to object and the second one is to welcome<sup>292</sup>. Understandably, it is up to the viewer to decide whether the locals objected or welcomed the Huns. I assume that Chirieac was referring to the first meaning. This small detail has an enormous symbolic background. The Hungarians

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<sup>291</sup> See Appendix 6.

<sup>292</sup> Bantaș, Andrei, Dicționar Român-Englez. București.2004.

upon arrival in the Carpathian Basin were considered by many to be the Huns' descendants. On the other Hand, Romanian Theory of Continuity suggests that the Romanians' ancestors, the Dacians, were in Transylvania before the Hungarians' arrival<sup>293</sup>. This results in two images:

1. The Huns represent the Hungarians and the locals, probably, Dacians, represent the Romanians. The Romanians contest the Hungarians in Transylvania, who have just dismounted.
2. Orbán is the Hun, Năstase is the Dacian and the Status Law is the act of dismounting. Năstase therefore objects to Orbán's attempt to dismount in Transylvania, e.g. to apply the Status Law on Romania's territory.

The forth segment is a preparation for the fifth segment, which consists of a question put forward by Chiriac and Orbán's own answer. Chiriac asked Orbán what had remained of the Status Law after the discriminatory elements had been taken out. The question is a clear reference to the article's title. Orbán's answer is threefold:

- When the Status Law passed through parliament he did not even think it might entail discriminatory elements. From this point on Orbán talks only of differences created by the Status Law and not of discrimination.
- Orbán continues by adding that there has been a dialogue with the Romanian side and they have reached a mutual agreement, the ONM. This declaration suggests equal footing between Hungary and Romania. Indirectly, by pointing out the consultations for the ONM, Orbán suggests that there have not been talks prior to the passing in parliament of the Status Law.
- Orbán used a metaphor to conclude his answer: the materials used for its construction and the soil it had been built upon are not the only indicators for measuring a house's value. It also depends on its neighbours. If the neighbours' prestige rises, so does the house's prestige rise. Consequently, if Bucharest is doing well, then it is also good for Hungary. Hungary is also content with its neighbours' success.

This answer is an appeasing one. Orbán does not really answer Chiriac's question and he does not retort by pointing out other aspects of the ONM, which are favourable to Hungary: the consulates can still hand out the CHN and all other financial benefits, such as the children's allowance, can be administered in Romania. In other words, Orbán was being very diplomatic in flattering Romania and avoiding sensitive issues.

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<sup>293</sup> See Chapter 2.

The sixth segment is a show down and a conclusion. Chiriac writes about Romanian diplomacy's success and its steadfast attitude. This appraisal has a distinctive structure:

- Hungary is a strong adversary: Hungary has the stronger international lobby and is an excellent candidate for joining the EU.
- Romania has succeeded in imposing its will just like in 1996, when the two states signed the bilateral agreement. Romania refused to sign the agreement lest Hungary withdrew its demand of territorial autonomy for ethnic minorities, i.e. the Hungarians in Romania.
- Chiriac admits that the European Union played a decisive role in bringing Orbán back to his senses. According to the author, the EU does not differentiate between the candidate states and had enough foresight to want to integrate both states.
- Finally, Chiriac emphasises Hungary's NATO-membership, which results in a disadvantage for Romania.

Chiriac contradicted himself in this segment. On the one hand side he was trying to show that Hungary was diplomatically the 'stronger' state due to its good relations to the European Union and its NATO membership. On the other hand he said that the EU did not differentiate between the candidate states and he did not give any details as to why Hungary's NATO-membership was so diplomatically useful. Romanian diplomacy, he continued, was successful when it showed steadfastness and continuity and the success would not have been possible without the EU's intervention via the Venice Commission. He added: both countries have had a centuries long relationship, which has not always been easy. By 'centuries long' he suggested a Romanian state, which did not exist prior to 1864<sup>294</sup>. Moreover, Hungary was a European power up to 1526 and from 1867-1918<sup>295</sup>, something Romania had never been.

In all, this article's author is obviously glad that the ONM has stopped some of the Status Law's regulations. He is also content about Romanian diplomacy's success. However, the fact that he congratulates Năstase's government does not necessarily mean that he supports Năstase's party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD). It could be primarily a patriotic feeling and the fact that the PSD achieved this diplomatic success was secondary. Consequently, the article's target group has strong patriotic feelings. Chiriac also makes a mistake when he writes that the CHN cannot be used in Romania

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<sup>294</sup> The principalities of Moldova and Wallachia's union (1859) was only internationally recognised as a state in 1864.

<sup>295</sup> With Austria in the Dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

and not even “... *depozitată pe teritoriul țării noastre.*” [... deposited on our country’s territory.].<sup>296</sup> It is my assumption that Chiriac, in his patriotic euphoria did not read the text properly, the signing of which he had witnessed.

#### 4.2.2 Magyar Hírlap (MH)

The six articles from the Magyar Hírlap stretch over a period of ten days: from Christmas Eve 2001 until 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2002. Although different journalists wrote them, they all relate to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM), which was signed by the two prime ministers on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001.

##### 4.2.2.1 MH 24.12.2001<sup>297</sup>

This report by Miklós Újvári was published two days after Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Adrian Năstase signed the ONM. The author quotes statements by various politicians who represent four different parties respectively: Young Democrats’ Union (FIDESZ), Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). It follows the structure of a title, an introductory segment and a main text consisting of eight segments. The author describes the discursive event, i.e. the ONM, in a general manner while the leitmotif of the article is about the working permit the Hungarian government is willing to grant to all of Romania’s citizens regardless of ethnic background. Hence the title of the article is “*Szabadon jöhet a román munkás*” [Romanian workers can come freely]. The opening section starts off with a sentence that sums up the quintessence of the ONM from Újvári’s point of view:

*“Januártól megnyílik a Magyar munkaerőpiac Románia munkavállalói előtt, akik évente több hónapot is itt dolgozhatnak.”*

[From January onwards, the Hungarian labour market will be open to Romania’s work seekers who may work here for several months per annum.]

This beginning is followed by the journalist’s conclusion to the ONM:

*“Ez volt az ára, hogy Románia hozzájáruljon a státustörvény életbe lépéséhez.”*

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<sup>296</sup> Compare with Appendix 2.

<sup>297</sup> Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

[This is the price for Romania's acceptance of the Status Law coming into effect.]

The article could have almost stopped at that. The essence of the ONM has been transmitted and the author's personal conclusion as well. However, in this introductory segment the author does not quote any of the two main characters of the 'plot', Năstase and Orbán, but rather quotes the Hungarian socialist politician Csaba Tabajdi. Tabajdi is against the ONM, because, according to him, it opens up the Hungarian labour market to millions of Romanians who are seeking work. This declaration is actually not an answer to the question as to why he objected to the ONM. The problem that the Hungarian labour market will be open to approximately 21 million Romanian citizens is not clearly explained. I presume that both the author and Tabajdi did not go into detail to explain these circumstances due to the clarity of the facts, at least from their point of view: Romanian labour is cheaper and it would cause wage dumping on the Hungarian job market. This could become fatal for the Hungarian labour market and it could eventually crumble. The fact that Romanian labour in general is cheaper than Hungarian labour is not mentioned in the article. It is taken for granted. Tabajdi, as a high representative of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which opposed the Status Law for a long period of time and changed its position in the last minute, symbolises the ambiguous relationship the MSZP has with the Status Law. In my opinion the MSZP voted for the Status Law not to appear unpatriotic in the Hungarian public and lose voters. However, it has not ceased to criticise the Status Law.

The author refers to the ONM by different names: *megállapodás* (eight times) *megegyezés* and *kompromisszum* (each only once). The first two mean agreement whilst the latter means compromise. Due to the nature of the ONM, it is the third denotation that suits it best, since the ONM was a transitory solution to be reassessed after the Law has been modified by the Hungarian parliament in the course of the following six months<sup>298</sup>. Hence I conclude that the usage of different synonyms of the lexeme *agreement* is somewhat euphemistic. They suggest that the ONM has ended the political strife that has been going between Hungary and Romania since the Status Law was passed by parliament in June 2001.

The introductory segment gives the reader a hint about the author's view concerning the ONM. The author talks about the price that had to be paid for Romania's consent. Then he brings in the Tabajdi's critique regarding the labour market. I consider

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<sup>298</sup> See Appendix 2: Section 1; Paragraph 11.

this combination to be the author's disguised comment on the ONM: politics means haggling and the working permit for Romania's citizens is the price Hungary has to pay for the Status Law's implementation in Romania. Consequently, the working permits are the main issue not only in the ONM but also in this article. The quotations from Hungary's Prime Minister in segments two, three, five and six refer mainly to this topic. His Romanian counterpart, Năstase, is only mentioned in segment four with the information that in the deal the two politicians have struck the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) will not be handed out to family members who are not Hungarians, e.g. spouses or partners. Interestingly, both MSZP and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) criticise the ONM for the working permits and not for any other aspect that definitely concerns the Hungarians of Romania: they have to travel farther to obtain the CHN, non-Hungarian spouses or partners will not benefit from the Law and the competition they could face with their Romanian expatriates on the Hungarian labour market.

Furthermore, it is the working permits that draw a line between the two large parties quoted, Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) and MSZP, on the one hand and the small parties SZDSZ and Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) on the other. The comments from the latter ones refer to more general aspects. While István Szent-Iványi from the SZDSZ rejects any working permits for foreign citizens to avoid discrimination, Béla Győri from the MIÉP rejects any benefits for Romanian citizens who are not of Hungarian background.

Not a single expert in economics is quoted and not one representative of the Hungarian labour unions is mentioned. This is striking when considering the fact that it is the labour unions that should fear cheap foreign labour most. Therefore it is my conclusion that the article aims at politically interested readers. It is the reaction of political representatives that is important and not that of those affected. Accordingly, not a single representative of the Hungarians in Romania is mentioned. Újvári, as he told me during the interview almost two years later, objected to the ONM from the beginning on for it showed the inconsistency in Orbán's politics. The inconsistency lay in the fact that the ONM was applied in Romania but not in other neighbouring states, such as Serbia and Slovakia.

#### 4.2.2.2 MH 24.12.2001a<sup>299</sup>

This article is unmistakably a clear-cut point of view: the authors of the text have taken a strong position against the Orbán government's actions regarding the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM). It consists of a title and four segments. The title of the article, "*Egy papír ára (MH-álláspont)*" [A paper's price (MH-viewpoint)], already indicates its political direction: Hungary had to pay a high price for Romania's consent and hence for the ONM. Without mentioning any specific authors, the article was most probably written by members of the political section of the editorial board at Magyar Hírlap<sup>300</sup> and can therefore be considered as an essay aiming to support readers who object to the ONM. They write in the first person plural and have no intention of being objective. They follow a chronological path that leads from the government's attitude towards Hungary's neighbours in the time before June 2001, it continues with the mistakes (from their point of view) the government has made and eventually goes on with the hazardous impact the ONM would have on Hungary.

The article's clear structure goes as follows:

- It starts off with a statement about the quality of the two states' diplomacy: "*A román diplomácia jobb, mint a magyar...*" [The Romanian diplomacy is better than the Hungarian one]. The authors add that it is an old statement, although they did not have to mention the statement's timely depth. This statement is a reference to the Treaty of Trianon, where the Hungarian diplomacy has failed dismally. The authors continue by adding that in the case of the ONM it is not necessarily Romanian diplomacy's superiority, but rather an opportunity the Romanian side could not resist: "*... a román fél csupán kihasználta azt a lehetőséget, amit Budapest, a magyar kormány tálcán kínált neki.*" [... the Romanian side has simply used the opportunity, which Budapest, the Hungarian government offered him on a tray.] This current Romanian supremacy, the authors added, is self-made by the Hungarian side and no foreign power can be blamed for it.
- The authors then continue with a critique on what the Orbán government has done wrong in enforcing the Status Law. They do not criticise the Status Law in itself, they only point out what they consider to have been the government's faults: no consultations with the neighbours, no discussions with the European Union (EU) and the blinding, self-deceiving ideas about Hungary's role in

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<sup>299</sup> Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg//462/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>300</sup> Interview with Zsolt Iván Nagy.

Central Europe: “... a “*regionális középhatalom vagyunk*” típusú önámításba ...” [... the kind of “we are a medium size regional power” self-delusion ...] The authors suggest that Hungary should have consulted the neighbours before taking action and not to get carried away with self-deluding ideas over Hungary’s political power and its role in Central Europe. Even so, when the government realised that Romania and Slovakia would object to the Status Law’s implementation on their respective territories, they should have at least postponed the application until matters had calmed down and only then started negotiating. The arrogance presented by the Hungarian government could not have gone unpunished, i.e. the incapacity to implement the Law in Romania. Consequently, the only option the Hungarian side had was to haggle at any price to be able to implement the Law: “*Maradt tehát az alku – a jelek szerint bármi áron.*” [Well, only the haggle remained – apparently at any price.] It is this weak standing point that allowed Romania to go on with its demands, which the authors consider unfavourable for Hungary.

- Next to the Hungarian government, it is the ONM that is in the line of fire. The critique focuses on two main issues: the opening of the Hungarian labour market to approximately 23 Million Romanian citizens<sup>301</sup> and the fact that according to the ONM spouses will not be granted a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). According to the journalists, the ONM is just a piece of paper without much importance: “... *egy papír, amit azután nemzetközi fórumokon lehet lobogtatni.*” [... a paper, which can be later waved at international conferences.] However, since the text has a single narrative, i.e. that of the journalists’ common point of view, there is no quotation or reported comment from other actors in the field of this discourse, e.g. representatives of the trade unions or government officials, who could have put the authors’ remarks into perspective.

The article’s last sentences are two questions that sum up the article’s quintessence in regard to the ONM:

*“Miközben tehát most már bizonyos, hogy a kormány elérte a célját, s a törvény január elsején életbe lép, csupán az nem világos: miért jó ez így Magyarországnak? Vagy akár a határon túli magyaroknak?”*

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<sup>301</sup> The statistical data in table 5, indicating Romania’s population at circa 21 Millions, is from 2002.

[While in the meantime it is certain that the government has achieved its goal and the law will come alive (sic!) on January first, the only thing remaining unclear is: why is it good for Hungary this way? Or, for that matter, to the Hungarians beyond the borders?]

The first of the two questions suggests that it is not evident how the Hungarian government's arrangement with Romania, the ONM, is for Hungary's own good. Practically, the journalists are saying that the government has not acted in Hungary's interest but rather to the politicians' advantage. They go one step further by asking what advantages the ONM will bring to the co-ethnics, because, at the end of the day, it is the co-ethnics that should benefit from the Status Law and not Hungary's citizens. As one of my interviewees told me<sup>302</sup>, Magyar Hírlap's main concern, when discussing minority issues, is focused on the minorities within Hungary and not the co-ethnics. By minorities in Hungary he was referring to social, ethnic and sexual minorities. This could explain the order of the questions: Hungary's interests stand first and the co-ethnics' situation is consequently of secondary importance. Interestingly, the journalists refer in the second question to the co-ethnics in general, although the ONM regards only the citizens of Romania. The second question could be understood as an answer to the first question: if the ONM is not good for Hungary, then maybe it is at least good for the co-ethnics. Another aspect is the choice of the verb regarding the Status Law's coming into effect. The expression "... *életbe lép*..." [to come alive] describes the Law's implementation in a somewhat awkward manner, since the correct term would have been *hatályba lép*, to come into effect. Coming alive suggests a connotation of creation, birth and artificiality. It creates an image of the Status Law as the Hungarian government's baby that can be finally delivered due to the mutual understanding between Hungary and Romania, the ONM.

Another aspect is the strong feeling of anger in the article. The authors convey the impression that they are cross with the Hungarian government for numerous reasons: it has put Hungary in an uneasy political situation, it has damaged the positive image Hungary had within the EU, it has endangered the Hungarian labour market and it has discriminated the co-ethnics' non-Hungarian spouses. They also do not fail to mention that the Hungarian government should have known better in time, when it excluded Austria. The Austrian government objected to the application of the Status Law on its territory, since it violates, among others, the European Charta of Human Rights.

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<sup>302</sup> Interview with Norbert Molnár.

In all, the title and the two questions at the end of the text can also be read together as a statement with the conclusion to it: The ONM's price: is it good for Hungary? Or, for that matter, for the co-ethnics?

#### 4.2.2.3 MH 27.12.2001<sup>303</sup>

This article's four authors<sup>304</sup> described the storm that swept through Hungary's political scene after the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) was signed. The text can be considered somewhere between a report and an essay. The target group is not quite clear. Presumably readers that would like to see what the different Hungarian parties have to say about the ONM. The article is divided into nine segments of which some have their own title (segments four to nine). The segments two to eight represent different actors within the discourse. The second and third segments represent the main opposition parties' view while the following segments all have titles that indicate their content and their actor: organisations and parties that support the ONM, Romania's main Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), the Hungarian labour unions, the authors' differentiated views and the last segment, mainly contains statistical data, regards unemployment rates from Hungary's neighbouring states (except Austria). The article tries to represent different facets of the ONM whereby it includes opinions pro and contra the ONM. The first segment is the introductory one and shall be discussed together with the title.

The title and the introductory segment of this specific article used a military language to describe the political rows that followed the ONM. The title goes as follows:

*“Státustörvényvita: háború karácsonykor (A nap témája)”*

[Dispute over the Status Law: War at Christmas time. (The day's issue)]

The introductory segment that follows it continues with similar language:

*“...ezekkel az érvekkel lőtt egymásra a két oldal. Össztűz alá került Orbán Viktor és Adrian Năstase megállapodása a román állampolgárok magyarországi munkavállalásáról.”*

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<sup>303</sup> Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://449/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>304</sup> The authors are: Pál Szombathy, Iván Zsolt Nagy, Ottó Neumann and Gergely Varga.

[... both sides shot at each other with these arguments. Viktor Orbán and Adrian Năstase's agreement regarding the Hungarian working permits for Romanian citizens was brought under crossfire.]

War, shooting and crossfire indicate a martial vernacular aiming to demonstrate the severity of the political dispute regarding the ONM. This semantic field also makes obvious the tough standing different actors within the discourse took up, e.g. opposition, government or labour unions. It also suggests uncompromising positions between the different participants. Especially the title, War at Christmas time, contains an extreme contrast: Christmas symbolises joy, happiness and peacefulness in the Christian sense while war is diametrically opposed to it with its connotations of sorrow, grief and disturbance. Furthermore, and again from a Christian perspective, Christmas can be regarded as a holy time in which wars are forbidden or at least interrupted. Consequently, those who wage war can be regarded as sinners who have broken a divine peace. The introductory segment also refers to expostulations made by members of the leading opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), and does not refer to the ONM as such. This means, that the authors take it for granted that the reader already knows what the ONM is about. Finally, the title is contradictory to the content of the article since the article refers to the dispute over the ONM and not over the Status Law.

The second and the third segment, i.e. the ones following the introductory segment, concentrate on the MSZP's and the Alliance of Free Democrats' (SZDSZ) objection to the ONM. The MSZP representative states that the ONM is against the Hungarian nation's interests and it heavily violates the law, although he does not go into detail to explain which laws exactly are violated by the ONM:

*“Orbán Viktor és Adrian Năstase megállapodása ellentétes a magyar nemzet érdekeivel, és súlyosan sérti a törvényeket.”*

[Viktor Orbán's and Adrian Năstase's agreement is against the interests of the Hungarian nation and gravely violates the law.]

The SZDSZ, on the other hand, accuses Orbán indirectly for succumbing to Romania's diplomacy by claiming that Károly Grósz was the last Hungarian prime minister to be humiliated by the Romanians in such a manner. This comparison between Orbán and Grósz is particularly poignant since Grósz was the last prime minister of the old socialist regime. The poignancy lies in the fact that Orbán presented himself on several occasions as one of the old regime's toughest opponents. Furthermore, the head of the

Foreign Council in the Hungarian parliament, István Szent-Iványi, who is member of the SZDSZ, has suggested excluding all paragraphs regarding working permits from the Status Law as well as from the ONM. This demand was put forward by the SZDSZ before the Law was passed by parliament<sup>305</sup>.

According to the structure already presented, i.e. introduction and the presentation of the two main opposition parties, one could have expected the government's reaction in the following segment. This balancing does not take place. The governing party, the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), is represented in the fourth segment, but only as one of three voices: the MKDSZ<sup>306</sup>, FIDESZ itself and the political state secretary in the Prime Minister's Office. The MKDSZ, a conservative organisation close to FIDESZ, condemns the opposition for spreading hatred in the country, especially against Romanian citizens. Only then FIDESZ is allowed to present its case, but instead of protecting the ONM and justifying its necessity, the FIDESZ representative starts a personal attack against Szent-Iványi. He accuses him of putting his own political interests as a leading figure of SZDSZ first instead of his obligation as the head of the Hungarian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Council. Finally, the secretary from the Prime Minister's Office reminds the reader of the various Hungarian-Romanian councils which will meet to discuss the remaining ambiguities and unsolved details of the ONM. The whole presentation of the political narratives is out of proportion. Before reaching the seventh segment, where the authors represent their opinion more directly, the journalists have already made a statement by overemphasising the opposition's stand vis-à-vis FIDESZ. Orbán and FIDESZ, as the prime minister's party, which is brought heavily under political accusations, do not get enough space in the article to present their case properly. Properly in this sense would mean counter-arguments and a balanced amount of text.

The fifth segment is the first segment in Magyar Hírlap in the debate over the ONM in which representatives of the Hungarians of Romania express their concern regarding the ONM. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which can be considered as that group's political voice, shows its appreciation to the ONM for legalising co-ethnics who work illegally in Hungary. They are further grateful for the ONM since it eases the UDMR's situation on the Romanian political scene; Without explicitly pointing his finger at it, Béla Markó, chairman of the UDMR,

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<sup>305</sup> The SZDSZ was the only party in parliament to vote against the Law.

<sup>306</sup> Hungarian Christian-Democratic Union.

admitted that the Status Law had created tensions between the UDMR and the other government parties in Bucharest. The ONM had eased these tensions.

The following segment, like the one before it, is a novelty, since it is the first segment in which representatives of different labour unions state their views on the ONM. They express their dissatisfaction with the ONM due to their concerns over the working permits for Romanian citizens. Political parties, especially the MSZP, have previously claimed to represent the Hungarian labour class by suggesting that the ONM has endangered Hungarian workers' position by allowing an influx of cheap labour from Romania. The labour unions' comments are important because they leave the strict political and somewhat theoretical scene and move towards a more concrete level of application. They are the ones who are directly endangered by the ONM, and not the politicians. According to the leaders of the Railway Workers' Union (VSZ), for example, the government has sold the workers' interests for the politicians' own short-term advantages:

*“A VSZ elnöksége úgy látja: a kormány rövid távú önös politikáját szem előtt tartva a magyar munkavállalók érdekeit eladta a munkaerőpiacon.”*

[The VSZ' leaders see it like that: the government, bearing in mind its selfish short-term political goals, has sold the Hungarian workers' interests on the labour market.]

The segments seven and eight represent the authors' different views on two of the ONM's main issues: the working permit for all Romanian citizens regardless of ethnic background and the denial of the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) to spouses and partners who are not Hungarians. In the seventh segment the authors rely their arguments on statistics supplied by the Central Statistics Office (KSH), which indicate contrarily to the politicians' viewpoint, that an influx of qualified labour would be good for the Hungarian economy. In other words, the authors have tried to put the aspects of the ONM that regard labour migration into professional perspective. They continue by saying that Romanian work seekers came to Hungary in large numbers before the ONM was signed. Indirectly they are indicating that those who are warning of a great labour immigration should take a closer look and realise that the influx of labour seekers has already taken place. It is their status that is about to change, and not their geographical position.

The eighth segment relates to the CHN and the medical care Romanian workers can receive in Hungary. The authors describe the changes the ONM has brought to the

CHN regulations and does not refrain from attacking the government, and hence the ONM, once again:

*“Románia ellenezte bevezetésüket, és ebben (is) győztek.”*

[Romania opposed their introduction and it has won in this matter (as well).]

Although the authors do not oppose this step openly, the previous sentences reveal their concealed discontent with the ONM. They report on the cabinet communiqué, that puts the new regulation in a different perspective: practically, anybody in Romania can obtain the CHN. According to the Status Law, Romanian applicants, regardless of their command of the Hungarian language, can declare themselves as ethnically Hungarian and be members of any Hungarian association, political party or Church<sup>307</sup>. If the authors had not been against the spouses' automatic exclusion from the CHN, then they would not have brought this issue. Hence the remaining question: if any Romanian citizen can obtain the CHN, why did the authors bother about the matter at all? In the last phrase of the eighth segment the journalists reveal a certain anxiety regarding the Hungarian medical system's capacity to treat all the Romanian immigrant workers. Bearing in mind the Romanian medical system's catastrophic state, the authors, relying on external experts, also assume that many Romanian work seekers would apply for the CHN just to benefit from superior medical care in Hungary:

*“Szakértők szerint nem kizárt, sokan már csak azért is munkavállalási engedélyt szereznek Magyarországon, mert így a tragikus állapotban lévő román kórházak helyett itt kezeltethetik majd magukat.”*

[According to experts it is not excluded that many will apply for a Hungarian working permit just to get their medical treatment here and so to avoid the Romanian hospitals, which are in a tragic condition.]

The ninth segment, although it consists of statistical data, nevertheless gives a few hints about the authors' intentions. First, they do not show the same kind of data to all states. For example, Croatia is said to have an unemployment rate of 22% while Slovenia with a population of about two million has 97,824 registered unemployed. These figures are not comparable and it is unclear from where the authors have taken them. This segment is an attempt to display the potential of labour immigration in Hungary from its neighbouring states. Basically, the authors have tried to relate

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<sup>307</sup> See also Appendices 1 and 3.

unemployment rates with labour migration. The two are correlated, but not in the simplistic manner suggested by the authors. High unemployment rates in Ukraine do not necessarily generate a labour emigration towards Hungary. If we consider the unofficial data regarding Romanian labour migration, by 2005 there were presumably one million Romanians in Italy and at least half a million on the Iberian peninsula. Together they make a sum higher than the number of Hungarians in Romania<sup>308</sup>. The way the figures are represented implies a threat to the Hungarian labour market. This threat arises from the unemployment in Hungary's adjacent states. In my opinion, the message sent by these figures is contradictory to the statements made in the seventh segment, where the authors tried to calm down the hysteria regarding illegal work and relied on data from the KSH.

The article also includes two photographs: one in the third segment, which is about the SZDSZ, and one in the seventh where the authors argue against the MSZP with statistical data from the KSH. The first picture shows István Szent-Iványi from the SZDSZ with another man and a background consisting of a SZDSZ poster. The two men do not have eye contact and do not seem to communicate. Although without a title, the poster on the photograph clearly suggests that the men are related to the SZDSZ. The second picture, also without a title, shows the two prime ministers Năstase and Orbán happily exchanging folders, presumably copies of the ONM. The second picture can be understood as the representation of an action that actually took place in Budapest. These two pictures create a misbalance between the political actors. The SZDSZ is one of the opposition parties but is not the main one. The picture gives the SZDSZ an optically important role within the text although it does not relate to the context of the article. The second photograph, also without a title, almost certainly visualises the ONM: two happy prime ministers who got what they wanted. Năstase haggled well and blackmailed Hungary to the limit while Orbán is content, since 'his' Status Law will be applied in Romania despite the Romanian side's months of rejection.

#### 4.2.2.4 MH 29.12.2001<sup>309</sup>

This article is dedicated in its entirety to the Alliance of Free Democrats' (SZDSZ) political ambitions. Unlike other articles, which tried to a certain extent to represent more than one political point of view, the authors of this publication have produced a text in which the SZDSZ or rather one of its MPs, Bálint Magyar, has the

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<sup>308</sup> See Table 5.

<sup>309</sup> Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://501/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

first as well as the last word regarding the ongoing debates about the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) and the Status Law. This intention is amplified when bearing in mind that this article is not an interview. The title of the article, “SZDSZ: javaslat a státustörvény módosításáról” [SZDSZ: a suggestion for modification of the Status Law], already reveals the main speaker in the article. The structure of the article consists of a title, an introductory segment and three segments following it. The target group is the interested SZDSZ voter.

The introductory segment starts off with a critical stand against the ONM and the SZDSZ’ counter-proposal. This counter-proposal is a contradiction in itself. The SZDSZ, as the authors remind the reader, was the only party in parliament not to vote for the Status Law. Now, the SZDSZ’ counter-proposal suggests that the ONM is unacceptable, since it excludes privileges promised to the co-ethnics’ spouses and children by the Status Law, which the ONM now excludes. If the SZDSZ was against the Law in the first place, then why does it condemn the government for modifying it? Unfortunately, there is no answer to that in the text. The SZDSZ’ criticism can be regarded as part of the general political debate about the Status Law and uses the ONM to start an attack on Prime Minister Orbán. This attack includes his politics vis-à-vis Romania and his stand regarding the Hungarian labour market:

*“A román-magyar egyetértési nyilatkozat semmiféle, a román munkavállalókkal szembeni korlátozást nem tartalmaz, ezzel veszélyezteti magyar állampolgárok itthoni munkavállalási lehetőségeit...”*

[The Romanian-Hungarian communiqué of understanding [ONM], does not include any restriction for Romanian employees, and thus it endangers the domestic working possibilities of Hungarian citizens ...]

The structure of the article is an essay about how the SZDSZ positioned itself in the discourse and which arguments it has used: it attacks the government for not protecting the Hungarian workers position on the Hungarian labour market, it goes on with its counter-proposal, continues with a direct attack on Orbán and concludes with an appraisal of the party’s own political congruent behaviour. In the following lines I shall demonstrate this pattern:

- Due to its dissatisfaction with the ONM, the SZDSZ has initiated its own proposal as to how to modify the Law. Bearing in mind that the SZDSZ considered itself to be the more ‘honest’ opposition party due to its constant opposition to the Status Law throughout its various stages of development, this

counter-proposal aims not only at the ruling Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) but also at the largest opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which criticised the ONM but did not bring in its own counter proposal. Subsequently, the SZDSZ' action was a declaration of consequent action in its political agenda. Furthermore, the electoral campaign for the 2002 elections has just started so that this tough stand against the Orbán government could also be interpreted as a signal to the voters that the SZDSZ remains true to its politics.

- The SZDSZ vehemently criticises the ONM for excluding benefits, which otherwise would have been part of the Status Law. It further suggests other benefits, which are not included in the Law and refer to the basic principle of Hungary's policy towards the co-ethnics: They, i.e. the co-ethnics, should receive support on their home ground. This goal combined with the better economic opportunities in Hungary for most of the co-ethnics, has become a difficult task, which the Status Law has tried to solve: how to support the co-ethnics by granting benefits in Hungary without initiating an exodus? The SZDSZ' suggestions remind the government that working permits for Hungary, be it for the Hungarians in Romania or for all Romanian citizens, is the wrong means to support the co-ethnics. The co-ethnics should be supported by offering more possibilities in their native land and not in Hungary: “... *szerecséebb lenne, ha a romániai magyaroknak szülőföldjükön bővülnének a lehetőségeik, az oktatás, nyelvtanulás, könyvkiadás, a nyomtatott és elektronikus sajtótermékekhez való kedvezményes hozzáférés révén.*” [... it would have been more fortunate, if the possibilities of the Hungarians of Romania would have had better possibilities in their native country through education, language training, book printing, and through favourable obtainment of printed and electronic media products.]
- The SZDSZ starts a personal attack on Prime Minister Orbán suggesting that he plays the *kemény fickó* [tough guy] but is *hihetetlenül puha* [unbelievably weak] when it comes down to negotiations with the EU and Romania. The comparison to Károly Grósz is there once again<sup>310</sup>.
- To boost its own political integrity, the reader is reminded that back in 2001, the SZDSZ proposed its own version of a law that would allow the co-ethnics to benefit from Hungary's prosperous economy and educational system. The other

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<sup>310</sup> See previous article 4.2.2.3

parties, however, turned down this proposal. In combination with the fact that Hungary had to modify the Status Law, e.g. through the ONM, thus the SZDSZ is showing that the party was right by not approving the Status Law in the first place.

- The article's relevance to the electoral campaign is manifested even more in the last segment. This last segment includes a statement made public by the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) at a press conference. The statement accuses the socialists, i.e. MSZP, and the SZDSZ for being anti-Hungarian in respect of the opposition parties' stand regarding the Status Law. This statement by MIÉP is used by the SZDSZ to retort and say that there is already a FIDESZ-MIÉP coalition and that MIÉP is *a FIDESZ pitbulja* [FIDESZ' pit-bull]. The SZDSZ' comment is hence an indirect answer since it does not refer to MIÉP's accusation. At first it is not quite clear as to what the MSZP's and SZDSZ' stand regarding the Status Law and the ONM has to do with the possible coalition between FIDESZ and MIÉP. The background is Orbán's ever-closer tie to MIÉP and MIÉP's ambition to be part of the coalition after the April 2002 elections. In other words, this pseudo attack on the SZDSZ (and MSZP) is turned against MIÉP by degrading it to a dog or a thug. This was confirmed a few weeks later, i.e. in 2002, when Orbán declared in a radio broadcast that he could very well imagine a coalition between FIDESZ and MIÉP, should the elections turn out favourably for these two parties.

In the introductory segment the authors tell the reader that the SZDSZ has initiated a modification of the Law. This modification refers to two issues: first, spouses of Hungarians in the neighbouring states should be able to enjoy the Law's benefits as well and second, the local Hungarian organisations should be given a free hand to regulate the Law's application. The SZDSZ has taken a critical position towards the Status Law and has continued to do so regarding the ONM. However, the SZDSZ is using the ONM for electoral propaganda and this specific article to lay down its politics regarding the Status Law. It is unclear why Magyar Hírlap has published such a one-sided article. It would have been understandable if an SZDSZ party member or MP had written it. Bearing in mind the fact that the authors of the article are unknown, since it says only *MHO-információ* [Magyar Hírlap Online – information], it is difficult to make any further assessment. Obviously, this article would not have fulfilled the criteria of the claim of neutrality previously mentioned in Chapter 3.

Finally, segment two also includes a small, untitled photograph, presumably Bálint Magyar, whose statements compose the larger part of that segment. This photograph has the shape of pictures used for job applications or passports. Unlike the previous MH-article, where the photos represent action and interaction, this one is static and visualises the ‘real’ speaker in this article, MP Bálint Magyar. It gives the article a face in contrast to the faceless authors, who are not even mentioned. Not forgetting the pro-SZDSZ structure and line of argumentation, the article can also be compared to an electoral advertisement: Slogan, text and a photograph, which shows the politician in a favourable light.

#### 4.2.2.5 MH 30.12.2001<sup>311</sup>

This article can be regarded as an answer to the previous article, where only the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) was represented<sup>312</sup>. Therefore, it is directed at the readers that do not necessarily share the SZDSZ’ views. It is also a combination of an interview and a report. Zoltán Pokorni, chairman of Young Democrats’ Union (FIDESZ), is the one to articulate the party’s point of view in this short article, which contains a title and two short segments. The first segment repeats the title and continues with Pokorni’s views. This creates a flow of text between the title and the segments: The title is repeated in the text and the text is a detailed explanation of the title. The title, and therefore the first sentence in the first segment, reveals the tenor of the article, namely an attack or, if one takes into consideration the previous article, a counter-attack:

*“Pokorni: tudatosan keltenek félelmet a magyar munkavállalók körében”*

[Pokorni: they deliberately awaken fears among Hungarian workers]

Pokorni, in the name of FIDESZ, postulates three claims with this title: the suggestion that FIDESZ defends the working class’ rights, the presumption that somebody has spread fear among Hungarian labourers and the accusation that it has been done deliberately.

The first part regarding the workers’ protection is also common to other parties. SZDSZ and Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) have claimed to fight for the Hungarian

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<sup>311</sup> Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://470/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

<sup>312</sup> See 4.2.2.4

labourers' rights as well<sup>313</sup>. It seems to be a common political issue for all three parties, although it is usually the syndicates and trade unions that represent organised labour vis-à-vis employers and government. Consequently, it is my assumption that the claim to being expressed in the name of working Hungarians is politically motivated and has no real basis. Political parties are supposed to represent their voters. In this case, however, all three parties FIDESZ, MSZP and SZDSZ have tried to occupy a strong position within the discourse from which they can claim to speak for people that they do not necessarily represent.

The claim to knowing that there is fear among Hungarian labourers is obscure since there is no explanation as to how FIDESZ found out about these fears of the working class, if they exist at all. Furthermore, Pokorni fails to explain what working Hungarians are actually afraid of. Thus, this accusation demands prior knowledge of the political debate surrounding the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM): a working permit for all Romanian citizens regardless of their ethnic background. These working permits started off the supposition that due to Hungary's thriving economy they could start a considerable cheap labour migration from Romania to Hungary. Hence the idea that Romanian migrant workers might become too big a challenge for the Hungarian labour market.

The third part, the accusation of deliberately spreading fear, is the basis of Pokorni's attack on László Kovács, Chairman of the MSZP. Subsequently, the attack's formation has the following structure: general attack on an unknown third party by using a conjugation in the third person plural *keltének* [wake or awake] or *állítják* [declare, claim or assert], a direct attack on Kovács and finally offering suggestions to relieve the workers' fears. Pokorni claims that the ONM was sealed by FIDESZ in concurrence with the other four parties and that socialist party leader Kovács approved of the ONM. Since he does not go into detail as to which four parties he was referring, it can be assumed that the fifth one would be SZDSZ, which also did not vote for the Status Law<sup>314</sup>. In other words, Pokorni is saying that Kovács has changed his mind within a very short period of time, which is supposed to suggest unreliability and political opportunism. Pokorni continues with the following expostulation:

*“A legnagyobb kormánypárt elnöke politikai hecckampánynak nevezte a megállapodás körüli vitát.”*

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<sup>313</sup> See previous articles.

<sup>314</sup> The five parties are: FIDESZ, MSZP, FKGP, MDF and MIÉP.

[The chairman of the largest party in government [i.e. Pokorni] called the debate surrounding the agreement [i.e. the ONM] a teasing political campaign.]

Pokorni then goes on to suggest a solution: the number of Romanian migrant workers should be monitored and the *Országos Munkaügyi Tanács* [National Labour Council] should meet regularly on a monthly basis to discuss and assess the immigration's development, especially that of Romanian workers.

Pokorni, instead of using the term *megállapodás* [agreement], uses the term *nyilatkozat* [declaration] twice. This usage needs a contextual explanation:

“... a magyar-román egyetértési nyilatkozat ...”

[... the Hungarian-Romanian declaration of understanding ...]

and

“... a két ország között megszületett nyilatkozat ...”

[... the declaration that has come into being between the two countries ...]

These fragments presented by Pokorni show the following characteristics:

- They refer to the countries and not to specific persons, in this case the two prime ministers, Orbán and Năstase. By *magyar-román* [Magyar-Romanian] or *a két ország* [the two countries] Pokorni transfers the responsibility for the ONM from the personal to the national level. This means that the ONM is not the result of some haggling between two individuals, e.g. Orbán and Năstase, or political parties, but between Hungary and Romania, two sovereign states.
- The two fragments also transmit the notion of negotiations, as if the two states had negotiated the issue and have reached a solution acceptable to both sides. This notion aims at the accusations made by other parties, especially SZDSZ, that the ONM is a proof of the fact that Hungarian diplomacy has succumbed to Romania's demands<sup>315</sup>. Pokorni therefore displays the ONM as the result of a negotiation between the two states that has taken place on equal footing.

The conclusion of this article is that it is trying to compensate the strong pro-SZDSZ article previously discussed. By compensation I mean representing the criticised

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<sup>315</sup> See previous article.

FIDESZ' point of view and allowing it to make its statement and hence defend itself. This compensation, however, is only a half-hearted one: in size it is a third as long as the previous article and it does not include a photograph. Consequently, when comparing these two articles, Magyar Hírlap, despite the declarations made by some of the interviewees<sup>316</sup>, definitely has a tendency to represent SZDSZ more strongly than FIDESZ.

#### 4.2.2.6 MH 02.01.2002<sup>317</sup>

This article by Miklós Újvári is an interview with the chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), Béla Markó. It consists of a title, an introductory segment followed by nine questions and the respective nine answers. There is also a photograph of Markó. The title of the article is a testimony to the UDMR's involvement in the process leading to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM):

*“Markó: a megegyezés elemei érdekünk volt”*

[Markó: the agreement was of basic interest to us]

The introductory segment continues with three declarations, which are to become the leitmotif of the interview:

- Markó does not think that the ONM will harm the Hungarian labour market. This expostulation's goal is to calm down the fears awoken in Hungary by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) that the ONM will cause an invasion of migrant workers from Romania to Hungary.
- The ONM is in the interest of the Hungarians in Transylvania and therefore he supports it. Although Markó does not go into detail as to why the ONM is good for the Hungarians in Romania, I assume that it is the fact that the ONM ended the political dispute between Romania and Hungary.
- The Status Law requires further negotiations with Hungary due to possible linguistic requirements for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). The Law per se does not mention any knowledge of the Hungarian language as a preliminary requirement to obtain the CHN, but the issue seems to be of

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<sup>316</sup> Interviews with Iván Zsolt Nagy and Miklós Újvári.

<sup>317</sup> Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://506/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup\_index.php

importance to those who process the applications<sup>318</sup>. For the Hungarians in Romania it is mainly UDMR.

The questions put forward by Újvári vary from general problems regarding the Status Law's application and its importance (Nos. one, two and three), to questions regarding the Hungarian labour market (Nos. six, seven and eight) and one personal question (No. nine). Question four relates to UDMR's preparations for the Law's application while question five relates to the probable Hungarian language tests.

Markó displays in this interview his agency to perform different roles or identities. He does not transfer them in time and space since he is talking to Újvári within a limited framework of time and space, so it is not a case of *différance* in the classical sense. Nevertheless, the answers he presented reveal the various roles he plays in the political arena in the contested fields of ethnicity and politics. The following quotation is the key to Markó's self estimation and positioning in his performances:

*“Nekem a saját közösségem érdekére is kell gondolnom, és az erdélyi magyarságnak az volt az érdeke, hogy ez a feszültség megszűnjék.”*

[I have to think *also* of my own community, and the Transylvanian Magyardom's interest was that this strained situation should be brought to an end.]<sup>319</sup>

The small word *is* [also, too] is of great importance to be able to understand Markó's previously mentioned performance in those contested fields. With *is* he admits that he has other obligations, which he has to attend to. However he does not go into detail explaining them so the reader has to deduct them from other sources in this text.

Due to the multiple layered performances I shall dissect them into four main features, which will be discussed. These four features obviously intersect at various points, but this is the agency's essence, since they all represent different facets of *Self*:

1. Markó as a politician from Romania representing the Hungarians in Romania vis-à-vis Hungary. Hungary in this case is the Hungarian media embodied by the author of the present text, Miklós Újvári. This role is represented in the introductory segment and in the answers one, two, three, five, six, seven and eight. From this position Markó analyses the situation created by the Status Law and the ONM. Arguing from this particular position, the ONM is for the good of Romania's Hungarians:

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<sup>318</sup> See also Appendix 2

<sup>319</sup> My emphasis.

- The Status Law and the ONM have transformed many benefits into a single comprehensive, juridical form. Both legislative measures are a proof to Hungary's concern of the co-ethnics in general and the Hungarians of Romania in particular, which has now been laid down in a law: "... törvényben rögzíti a Magyarország és a Magyarországon kívül élő magyarok kapcsolatát." [... it holds in law form Hungary's and the co-ethnics relationship.] However, both interviewee and interviewer fail to mention the Hungarian state's obligation towards the co-ethnics already laid down in the Hungarian constitution<sup>320</sup>.
  - The ONM will legalise the status of those Romanian citizens already in Hungary and engaged in illegal work. Nonetheless, there will not be many Romanians who will use their working permit for Hungary for two reasons: it is limited to the period of three months per annum and the permit is useful only for migrating, seasonal, unskilled labour and not for highly qualified scientists who might be seeking permanent residence.
  - The ONM and the Hungarian Status Law entail quite a few *szűrők* [filters]. In other words, Markó is indicating that the Hungarian authorities might make it difficult for Romanian migrant labourers to actually obtain the working permit. These words have come true in the months that followed the Status Law's and the ONM's implementation<sup>321</sup>.
  - As an UDMR politician he is quite astonished at the heated debate in Hungary concerning the ONM: "*Megmondom őszintén, én nem is számítottam arra, hogy e körül olyan nagy viták lesznek Magyarországon.*" [Honestly, I did not even think that there would be such big debates in Hungary about it [Status Law]] This astonishment, if taken at face value, can only be understood when bearing in mind that he speaks in the name of Transylvanian Magyardom emphasising that the only thing that matters is that there is an agreement. This leads me to the conclusion that the Hungarians of Romania did not really care about the content of the ONM as long as the two governments reached any agreement that would allow the Status Law to be implemented on Romanian territory. Practically, Markó is saying that the Hungarian public should not take the ONM literally.
2. Markó as an UDMR politician representing the Hungarians in Romania vis-à-vis Romanian government. This performance is present in the sixth answer where Markó talks about the Hungarian-Romanian relations that have turned sour

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<sup>320</sup> See also Appendix 6.

<sup>321</sup> Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

during the previous months without actually going into detail about the reason behind it. He continues by saying that the ONM is in the interest of the Hungarians in Transylvania and that they supported it. Furthermore, by using the plural *mi* [we] and *jártunk* [we went] he includes himself as part of the group just mentioned: the Hungarians of Romania. They went to both governments to show their support of the ONM: “*Éppen ezért mi egyértelműen támogattuk ezt a megállapodást, és közben is jártunk ennek érdekében a mindkét kormánynál.*” [This is why we harmoniously supported this agreement and we attended both governments in this matter] He is disguising his high-ranking position as a Romanian politician of ethnic Hungarian background that was caught between Orbán’s ambitious endeavour in the /Carpathian Basin and Năstase’s stubbornness and political opportunism.

3. Markó as chairman of the UDMR. This performance is evident in the introductory segment as well as in the answers four and five. The introductory segment and the fifth answer both entail Markó’s concern about any language tests applicants will have to pass to be granted the CHN. The Status Law does not mention any tests<sup>322</sup> and according to Markó the UDMR does not intend to introduce this kind of test: “*Markó szerint a tegnap életbe lépett státustörvényről még egyeztetni kell Budapesttel, például hogy kell-e magyarul tudni a magyarigazolványokhoz, mert az UDMR vizsgáztatást nem vállal.*” [According to Markó, there should be consultations with Budapest about the Status Law that came into effect yesterday, e.g. whether one needs to know Hungarian in order to obtain the CHN, since the UDMR does not intend to introduce tests]. In the fourth question Újvári asks whether the UDMR is ready for the Law’s application and Markó, as the party’s chairman, answers with ‘yes’.
4. Markó as a Romanian citizen of ethnic Hungarian background. This performance is most evident in the ninth answer, where Markó answers Újvári’s question, if he, i.e. Markó, will also apply for the CHN. At this point Markó is trying to avoid any national pathos or display of pride and insists that he will apply for the CHN after a while when the rush has ebbed. He will not apply because he needs it for economic reasons or to show his ‘Hungarian-ness’, but rather because of its symbolic character and the struggle for it. This struggle is represented again in the plural *mi* [we] although Újvári’s question is

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<sup>322</sup> See Appendix 1.

unmistakably personal and in the singular, *ön*<sup>323</sup> [you]. Consequently, if Markó did not want to apply for the CHN to use its benefits, did not need it to show his ‘Hungarian-ness’ and insisted upon the CHN’s symbolic role, then there should have been an explanation as to what the symbolism is exactly about. My estimation is that Markó intended applying for the CHN simply to justify the struggle for it.

The journalist’s role becomes evident in the eighth question when Újvári asks Markó whether the Hungarians of Transylvania really need this seasonal working permit and if it had not been better to take the whole issue with the working permits out of the Law’s list of benefits and hence out of the ONM. Markó replies affirmatively to the first question but does not answer the second one directly. He goes on to explain that there are many who work illegally in Hungary and that the working permit could legalise their status. On the one hand Markó says that there will be only a few who will go to work in Hungary and on the other hand he does not condemn the ONM for the political hysteria it has caused in Hungary. In other words, he is in favour of the ONM and its regulations concerning working permits.

The eighth question is an indicator for the journalist’s political perspective. In the interview I conducted with Miklós Újvári a year and a half after this article was published, he admitted to supporting the SZDSZ position on the labour issue, which meant that he was against granting working permits of any kind on an ethnic basis. Furthermore, he said that the ONM showed a lack of a clear political line in the Orbán government because the Status Law referred to almost all neighbouring states while the ONM involved only Romania. This meant that the co-ethnics outside Romania could benefit from the Law in specific matters, e.g. CHN for spouses of ethnically mixed marriages. Upon my question, if he challenged Orbán with this issue, he said he did and that Orbán had no intentions of signing similar agreements with other states.

#### 4.2.3 Népszabadság (NSZ)

The six articles by Népszabadság stretch over a period of nine days: from 22<sup>nd</sup> December to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2001.

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<sup>323</sup> *Ön* is comparable to French *vous* and German *Sie*, which are polite addressing forms. It also has a plural variation: *önök*.

#### 4.2.3.1 NSZ 22.12.2001<sup>324</sup>

This article, whose authors are mentioned as *munkatársainktól* [from our work-fellows], represents two extremes of the Hungarian political spectrum: the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the nationalist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). Consequently, this report's target group is a varied one. The article consists of a title and three short segments. The first two represent the SZDSZ while the third one the MIÉP. István Szent-Iványi represents the SZDSZ while Béla Győri represents the MIÉP. The title of the article is a description of the text that follows it:

*“Az SZDSZ és a MIÉP a munkavállalásról”*

[The SZDSZ and the MIÉP about the labour engagement]

The choice of the lexeme *munkavállalás* [labour engagement] already indicates the authors' main focus; they do not want to discuss the ONM in its entirety, just the specific aspect of labour migration. In fact, the journalists do not even mention the ONM since they presume that the reader already knows which labour engagement they are writing about.

Szent-Iványi presents different objections to the working permits that could be granted to all of Romania's citizens. He starts off by trying to avoid the inner-Hungarian debate:

*“Nem tartom szerencsésnek egyetlen államra, Romániára kiterjeszteni a szabad munkavállalást ...”*

[I do not consider the extension of free labour engagement on single state, namely Romania, to be fortunate ...]

Thus Szent-Iványi does not start arguing with the dangers such a labour regulation harbours for the Hungarian labour market, but rather with the fact that Romania's working force could be a danger to any state when it comes to labour migration. In other words, he is suggesting that the Romanian labour market is in such a poor situation that any other state would be better for Romanian's work seekers. In the second part of the phrase he already suggests a solution, which is repeated by all SZDSZ politicians: the paragraph regarding the working permits for three months per annum should be cancelled. Once again, the ONM is not mentioned explicitly. The politician then throws

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<sup>324</sup> Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://119/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

in the co-ethnics and says that the working permit is too short to have any positive effect for them.

The second segment holds Szent-Iványi's three statements: the ONM is one of two possibilities to avoid discrimination, the ONM could be regarded by Ukraine and Yugoslavia as precedence and the impact of the ONM on the Hungarian labour market has not been analysed before signing the memorandum. Szent-Iványi's strategy of argumentation reveals a certain pattern: reminding of the problems the neighbours have in the first instance and then going on to discuss the difficulties for Hungarians and co-ethnics.

The third segment consists of remarks by MIÉP's speaker, Béla Győri. He is against granting the benefits of the Law to Romanian citizens for a specific reason:

*“... a romám állampolgárok ugyanis nem tartoznak ahhoz a kultúrkörhöz, amelynek kedvezményeket kívánunk nyújtani.”*

[... Romanian citizens do not belong to that cultural circle to which we want to offer benefits anyway.]

Győri makes a mistake in this sentence, because by using the denotation *román állampolgárok* [Romanian citizens] he also includes the 1.5 million Hungarians who live in Romania. They are also citizens of Romania just like members of all the other ethnic groups. By using a cultural circle, or *Kulturkreis*, which is an concept that goes back to ethnographers such as Leo Frobenius and his ideas of Diffusionism and *Kulturkreislehre*, Győri chooses a cultural border to separate Hungarians from Romanians and not a political, geographic or economic one. Indirectly he is saying that Romanians are not on the same cultural level as Hungarians. Non-Hungarian citizens of Romania should receive benefits from the Romanian prime minister Năstase, says Győri. According to him the benefits should be granted to those Hungarians who *“önhibájukon kívül kerültek a határainkon túlra”* [are not guilty of falling beyond our borders]. This is an explicit hint on the Treaty of Trianon, when Hungary, due to its heavy territorial losses after the First World War, also lost approximately one third of all Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin to the neighbouring states. Győri does not even mention the situation on the Hungarian labour market, which is otherwise a popular reason to reject the ONM's labour market regulations<sup>325</sup>.

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<sup>325</sup> See articles from Magyar Hírlap.

The unknown authors of this article have chosen representatives from two parties that do not share the same views about the co-ethnics except for their rejection of the working permit the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum grants to Romanian citizens: SZDSZ and MIÉP. By relating only to these parties the authors suggest that the other parties of the political spectrum in Hungary approve of the ONM. Consequently it is a one-sided article despite its pretence to represent two very different parties.

#### 4.2.3.2 NSZ 22.12.2001a<sup>326</sup>

This article, also published on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001, has a more sophisticated structure than its predecessor; it consists of a title, a subtitle and short introductory segment, which is followed by four other segments. The author, László Szűcs, chose a chronic mode of relating in order to describe the events that occurred the day before, and those yet to happen. Therefore, this article can be regarded as a compromise between a report and an account. However, the article's target group is vague. Szűcs describes what the two state secretaries in the Foreign Office, the Hungarian Zsolt Németh and his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, agreed upon the previous day, the 21<sup>st</sup>, and what was yet to be done on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. The article also includes two photographs: one of each state secretary. The title and the subtitle bear witness to this style of writing:

*“Megállapodás a státustörvényről.  
Ma Budapestre várják Adrian Năstase román miniszterelnököt.”*

[Agreement on the Status Law.  
Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase is awaited today in Budapest.]

The introductory segment's first sentence sums up the quintessence of what happened on 21<sup>st</sup> December:

*“Tegnap este Budapesten létrejött a megállapodás a magyar és a román tárgyalódelegáció között.”*

[An agreement has been reached yesterday evening in Budapest between the Hungarian and the Romanian delegations.]

Subsequently, the first segment is about the formal side of the agreement whilst the next two segments join in with information regarding the content of the agreement. The

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<sup>326</sup> Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://124/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

fourth and last segment is a look into that day's future, where Németh predicts that both prime ministers will sign the agreement that very evening.

The structure of the information upon the agreement presented by Szűcs resembles a dramatic rise or a crescendo: it starts off in the second segment with issues that are described as unproblematic, continues with more difficult matters and finishes with a climax:

- The first phase fills the entire second segment. Szűcs starts with an explanation that the agreement consists of three parts, of which two were easily solved by the delegations. These less problematic aspects of the agreement are the mutual support regarding the Euro-Atlantic integration, especially for Romania's NATO membership, and aspects referring to the bilateral agreements and the common councils of coordination.
- The second phase is described in the third segment. The negotiations took so long because they were about the Hungarian Status Law. These parts of the agreement were mainly formal-administrative decisions. In short, Hungary agreed to apply the Venice Commission's recommendations regarding non-discriminatory modalities.
- The peak, which was previously mentioned in the introductory segment, is reached when Szűcs announces "*A tegnapi tárgyalások legfontosabb eredménye ...*" [Yesterday's negotiations most important result...] and continues with the working permits for three months per annum. These permits are to be granted to all of Romania's citizens, whether they have a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) or not.

There are a few aspects in this article that are not very clear. One of these aspects is the aura of mystery surrounding the flow of information from the delegations to the press. Szűcs presents the reader with the following information:

- The text of the agreement has not yet been made public.
- Németh has informed the press about some of its main points. He did so by using the telephone. Hence, there was no press conference in the usual sense of the term.
- The photo showing State Secretary Diaconescu says: "*... Diaconescu a tervekkel ellentétben nem vett részt a sajtókonferencián.*" [...contrary to planning Diaconescu did not participate at the press conference.]

This leaves the reader in a bit of confusion: was there a press conference or not? How did Szűcs get his detailed information? Why was there no proper press conference and why was the agreement's text not published? Many questions, but unfortunately no satisfying answers. Maybe Zsolt and Diaconescu were instructed to wait for the prime ministers to sign the paper and publish the text afterwards. This could explain Németh's move: he did not publish the text, because it was not signed and therefore could not hold a press conference, but he called the press, so that the content could reach the wider public without the usual means of a conference. Németh's and Diaconescu's role as representatives of their respective prime ministers is enhanced by the expression "... *a miniszterelnöki személyes megbízottak ...*" [...the prime ministers' personal representatives...]. The text gives the reader the impression that two heads of government, Orbán and Năstase, have each sent a representative to negotiate in their name and decide in the name of their respective state. In other words, the text suggests that the agreement is more between the Orbán and Németh on the one side, Năstase and Diaconescu on the other and not between Hungary and Romania. This impression is also supported by the fact that the two foreign ministers, Martonyi (Hungary) and Geoană (Romania), are not mentioned at all. The reason could be Németh's close ties with Prime Minister Orbán. During the entire legislation Németh has been the one who shared the same political ideas as Orbán and not Martonyi, who preferred negotiations and a more moderate foreign policy.

Szűcs does not mention what Romania agreed to. It can only be assumed, since it is not mentioned in the text, that Romania had agreed to implement the Hungarian Status Law on its territory. The two photos, one of Németh on the 21<sup>st</sup> sitting at a desk showing a paper and the other of Diaconescu walking away, has a symbolic meaning: two adversaries after the fight. Németh smiling and showing a draft of the agreement like a trophy, while Diaconescu could be regarded as the one who has lost the fight and is having to leave the arena. Furthermore, Németh announces that this agreement, later to be called the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM), will make any changes in the Status Law obsolete. This statement will be challenged in the weeks that followed the ONM.

Németh's behaviour, at least the way Szűcs describes it, reveals a display of *différance*. In those two days, the 21<sup>st</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001, Németh plays different roles in Hungarian politics of which he is aware of:

- On the 21<sup>st</sup> he is Orbán's right hand who decides what the Hungarian state is willing to concede to the Romanian side at the negotiations table.

- Although it is not his duty, Németh does inform the press about the agreement, which has neither been signed by those who are entitled to it, nor has it been published.
- The phone call to the press is somewhat of a break of confidence and collides with his role as Orbán's trustee.
- Subsequently, at the end of the article, Németh announces that the prime ministers will almost certainly sign the agreement he has drafted with his counterpart, Diaconescu. By saying that, indirectly, he gives his superior the order to sign the agreement.

It is therefore my conclusion that Németh has used these roles to show the public that he is the one behind the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum and not the Hungarian prime minister. My interview partners later supported this view<sup>327</sup>.

#### 4.2.3.3 NSZ 24.12.2001<sup>328</sup>

This article by Zoltán Tibori Szabó is an overview of the reactions in Romania after prime ministers Orbán and Năstase have signed the memorandum, whose aim was to settle the dispute over the Status Law's application in Romania. The article's target group is a general one: readers who want a broad overview on the course of events. This report is composed of a title and an introductory segment, which is followed by five other segments. Published two days after the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) was signed, Tibori Szabó was already able to catch quite a few comments, which represent different positions on the Romanian political scene.

The title of the article is somewhat of a provocation:

*“Bukarest győzelemről beszél”*

[Bucharest speaks of victory]

Writing about ‘victory’ has a connotation of debate, competition and battle. It gives the reader the impression that the two states were in some form of struggle with one another and that Bucharest, i.e. Romania, was the victorious one. This is repeated in a modified form in the introductory segment:

*“Romániában győzelemként értékeli a magyar-román nyilatkozatot”*

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<sup>327</sup> Interviews with Norbert Molnár and József Szilvássy...

<sup>328</sup> Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://134/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

[The Hungarian-Romanian communiqué is appraised as a victory in Romania]

On the other hand, if this were a victory, it would mean that Hungary lost the battle. Unfortunately, throughout the entire article Tibori Szabó fails to tell the readers who exactly in Romania is talking of victory. All the organisations and persons the journalist is referring to do not explicitly talk of victory but rather of a success that Romania has achieved in the struggle over the Hungarian Status Law's application.

In the first segment Tibori Szabó gives a few details about the communiqué the Romanian government has announced. He then continues with two high-ranking politicians: Prime Minister Adrian Năstase and the head of the Romanian Senate's Foreign Affairs Council, Gheorghe Prisacaru. Năstase reminds the Hungarian government that it is obliged to modify the Status Law within the coming six months, regardless of the forthcoming election results, while Prisacaru mentions two aspects which played an important role in the diachronic analysis: extraterritoriality and discrimination. According to Prisacaru the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) has changed the situation in a positive way: the Status Law will not discriminate Romanian citizens and the Law's application will not violate Romania's territorial rights. Interesting at this point is the difference between the official communiqué that talks of *megkülönböztetés* [distinction] while Prisacaru talks of *diszkrimináció* [discrimination], which is a harsher word to use. However, neither the communiqué nor Prisacaru give any details as to what they exactly mean by distinction or discrimination.

The second segment is reserved for Béla Markó, chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). He appreciates the ONM and does not forget to remind the reader, that the UDMR had an essential part of the ONM's development. The ONM, Markó added, is important for the application of the Status Law, its benefactors and the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. At this point he has demonstrated his different roles in this discourse: as a Hungarian in Romania, as a politician in Romania representing the Hungarians' interests vis-à-vis the Romanian political scene and as a Romanian politician representing Romania's interests in a political dispute with a neighbouring state, i.e. with Hungary<sup>329</sup>. Unlike Năstase and Prisacaru, whose remarks formed a textual flow with the information about the communiqué in the first segment, Markó's statements are visualised better through the separate segment in which the author has placed them. In other words, Markó has a

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<sup>329</sup> See also subchapter 4.2.2.6

segment of his own which puts his remarks in an advantageous position. Finally, Markó criticises those who say that the ONM will lead to a wave of emigration. Although he is not specific about it, it can be assumed that he means Hungarians from Romania emigrating to Hungary. The statement obviously aims at those Hungarian politicians in Hungary and in Romania who criticised the Status Law in general and the working permits in particular.

The next segment, the third one, is connected to the title and to the introductory segment, where ‘Bucharest speaks’ thus suggesting a unison reaction to the ONM. In this segment, Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, a senator from the National Liberal Party (PNL), speaks out a conditional congratulation to the Romanian government’s accomplishment, if the ONM will be applied as the communiqué suggests. The author mentions only a single detail of the ONM, which Ionescu-Quintus himself, among other aspects, considers to be important:

“... Magyarország kötelezte magát Románia NATO- és EU-betagolódásának támogatására”

[... Hungary has obliged itself to support Romania’s NATO and EU membership]

This aspect of the ONM reveals again, as already mentioned in the diachronic analysis, the importance of NATO and EU membership to Romanian politics.

In the fourth segment Tibori Szabó leaves the political arena and refers to news bulletins and press agencies. He does not mention any names and relates to them in the third person plural, e.g. *vélekedtek* [they have expressed] and *kiemelték* [they have pointed it out]. These anonymous speakers emphasise a specific aspect of the ONM, which has not been mentioned by others: In future Hungary will not be able to grant the Hungarian political associations in Romania any help without Romania’s consent. By using this denotation the anonymous speakers do not object to the Hungarian government’s direct support to Hungarians in Romania. It is only the support for the political associations they object. This could be a hidden attack on the UDMR as at the beginning of the nineties, when right wing discourse in Romania accused the UDMR of being Hungary’s agent in Romanian politics<sup>330</sup>.

Tibori Szabó allows these Hungarian associations to express their views in the following and last segment. Just like in the previous segment, the author does not

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<sup>330</sup> See also Andreescu 2001.

indicate any names and mentions only “*Erdélyi magyar körökben ...*” [Among Transylvanian Hungarian circles ...]. This tends the assertions made by these circles to seem somewhat opaque. Their most interesting statement is related to xenophobia in Hungary. They say that the Hungarian labour market’s opening to all Romanian citizens seeking work will only increase the anti-Transylvanian sentiments in Hungary, which have already been witnessed in former times.

The remarks made by all speakers in the text, whether they were mentioned by name or not, were not commented by Tibori Szabó. I consider the article’s goal is to permit the Hungarian public a short insight into the reaction of Romanian politics to the ONM. Obviously, Tibori Szabó could have captured more reactions to be represented in this article, e.g. the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM), and could have also mentioned the names of the circles represented in the fifth segment. The missing names are a blot in this text.

#### 4.2.3.4 NSZ 24.12.2001a<sup>331</sup>

This text by László Szöcs is divided into two halves: The first half is a report about the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM), which the two prime ministers signed, while the second half is an account of the main points of the ONM. I shall refer mainly to the first half since the second half is less essential for the discourse analysis. However, the second half has an interesting remark that should be noted: the author emphasises the fact that the ONM has been drafted in English, which is neither side’s official language. Unfortunately, there is no explanation as to why the two sides did not draft a bilingual memorandum in Hungarian and Romanian. I can only assume that it was because of the time pressure to finish the draft before the Status Law came into effect. A bilingual version could have taken more time and could have been a source of misunderstandings. The first half of the text consists of a title, a subtitle, an introductory segment and five other segments. There is also a photograph of the two prime ministers. An interesting aspect of this article is the numerous quotations, which is unusual. Presumably the author wanted to demonstrate the accuracy of the coverage. The article’s target group is the readers that want concise information, accounts, quotations and need facts.

The title represents a more or less neutral standpoint:

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<sup>331</sup> Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://139/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

*“Státustörvény: közös memorandum”*

[Status Law: common memorandum]

This is then overruled by the subtitle:

*“Orbán és Năstase megegyezése a romániaiak magyarországi munkavállalásáról”*

[Orbán and Năstase’s agreement upon the Romanians’ seek for work in Hungary]

The subtitle reduces the title and consequently the ONM to an agreement upon labour politics. The introductory segment continues where the subtitle stopped by adding more information regarding the Hungarian working permits for all Romanian citizens. Orbán is mentioned first in the article and Năstase is second. Orbán’s comment in this segment is a positive reaction to the ONM: The Status Law will be applied from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002 and Hungary has reached a consensus with all neighbouring states except Slovakia. These statements are self-made compliments, which are directed at an unseen third party: the critics, perhaps the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which has constantly rejected the Status Law and has criticised the ONM. Interestingly, Orbán does not mention the labour market regulations, which are so dominant in the subtitle and in the first half of the introductory segment.

The first segment turns back in time and reminds the reader that the ONM was drafted by the prime ministers’ personal representatives. The author further adds that Năstase went to Budapest to sign the ONM accompanied by a large entourage including two ministers and politicians from the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). That bit of information about the UDMR-politicians accompanying Năstase is an indicator for the importance of the UDMR in this matter. It is also an acknowledgment of the UDMR’s efforts to solve the dispute over the Status Law’s applicability on Romanian territory.

Szűcs allows Năstase to have his say in the second segment. Năstase is keen on pointing out that the ONM enables the application of the Status Law from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002 onwards without causing any friction between the two states. Năstase is quoted with the following statement, which Szűcs reminds the reader, is contrary to Năstase’s previous statements:

”A kedvezménytörvény csak Magyarországon hatályos”

[The Status Law is valid only in Hungary<sup>332</sup>]

There is no indication as to why this is contrary to Năstase’s previous remarks, since the Romanian prime minister rejected the Status Law all along and contested its extraterritorial character. However, it is Orbán who has the last word in this segment, when he sees a bright future for the Hungarian-Romanian relationships, despite all hardships in the past

In the third segment, Szócs adds that the UDMR did not object to the ONM’s regulation, which says that all those Romanian citizens who can work in Hungary for three months p.a. can also extend their permit. For the UDMR this is a big step, and I assume this is why Szócs mentions it. The UDMR, like other Hungarian political organisations in Hungary’s neighbouring states, e.g. the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ) from Yugoslavia, were not keen on Hungary letting Hungarian migrant workers stay too long in Hungary. The reason for this is their fear of a massive brain drain to better-paid jobs in Hungary. Consequently, agreeing to the ONM is a political sacrifice by the UDMR. Orbán closes this segment by stressing that the Status Law’s economic aspects will not be predominant.

The fourth segment is reserved for Prime Minister Orbán’s political statements. He makes the following points:

- The ONM does not take anything away from anybody; it rather gives more to everybody. In his consideration, the Romanian work seekers will not impede the chances of the co-ethnics on the Hungarian labour market. When referring to the Romanian work seekers he uses the verb *felemelés* [elevation]. By this he indicates that the Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnic background have been ‘lifted’ to the same position as their compatriots of Hungarian ethnic background.
- The Hungarian labour market regulates itself and it is not up to the Hungarian government to decide how many workers are needed. With this statement Orbán is already refusing any responsibility, should the Hungarian labour market face severe problems due to the ONM’s regulations.
- The aim of the Status Law is to ensure the co-ethnics’ livelihood in the countries in which they live. In other words, the Law’s aim is not to initiate an emigration

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<sup>332</sup> *Kedvezmény* actually means benefit, but the expression *kedvezménytörvény* [law of benefit] has become a synonym to *státustörvény*.

wave from the adjacent states to Hungary. This statement should reassure the Hungarian parties and organisations in the neighbouring states, which have been fighting emigration since the nineties.

In the fifth and last segment Szócs adds that Hungary, according to the ONM, will support Romania in becoming a member in NATO. It is striking, since the usual discussions about this aspect refer to the Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration and not just NATO<sup>333</sup>.

The photo of Năstase and Orbán shows two happy prime ministers sitting at a table and looking at each other. The picture transmits the impression of a mirror image, since they do the same things, e.g. holding a paper in their hands and staring at each other. This is probably the table where the two men sat down to sign the ONM. It is a symbol of harmony and joy for both sides: Năstase got what he wanted and so did Orbán. However, the photograph's symmetry cannot disguise the dissymmetry in the article. It is Orbán who presents his point of view in almost all segments and hence has the leading role, while Năstase has only a supporting role. Politically, Năstase's signature on the ONM makes Orbán look good and he is actually smiling on the photo.

#### 4.2.3.5 NSZ 27.12.2001<sup>334</sup>

This essay by Tibor Kis is a criticism of the Orbán government's actions in the year 2001. Consisting of a title and 13 segments, it offers harsh critique all along. Due to the nature of the text, which jumps to and fro and does not handle every aspect mentioned in a linear form, I shall analyse this article by going from one issue to another instead of chronologically analysing each segment. Kis' target group is the reader that was pro-Status Law but anti-Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM).

The main issue for Kis is the Orbán government's political mismanagement with regard to the Status Law in general and the ONM in particular. The title already suggest the text's direction:

*“Képtelen ár”*

[Impossible price]

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<sup>333</sup> See subchapters 4.1.1.2.4 and 4.1.2.2.4

<sup>334</sup> Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://144/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

This title suggests that someone has paid much too high a price. At first sight it is unclear who paid the price and for what. However, in the ONM's context, Kis clearly refers to the price Hungary had to pay for Romania's consent to allow the Status Law's application on its territory. Lexically, the Hungarian word "*képtelen*" has different meanings and consequently different connotations. It can mean unreasonable but also incompetent, which would clearly be a reference to Kis' lack of appreciation of Orbán's politics. With a single word Kis makes reference to the ONM's impossible political price, Orbán's incompetence in the political arena and the unreasonable contents of the ONM itself.

Kis puts forward different aspects, which he criticises. They range from the labour market issues of the ONM to the Status Law's conformity with European law:

- Home policy. Kis said that the ONM had been signed on the grounds of political tactics with regard to the forthcoming elections. According to him, Orbán was obliged to reach an agreement with Romania to avoid embarrassing questions during the election period: "*Orbán legfőképpen azt akarta elkerülni, hogy a kedvezménytörvényt, mint megoldatlan problémát az orra alá lehessen dörgölni a választási kampány során.*" [Predominantly, Orbán wanted to avoid the Status Law being regarded as a non-finished business during the electoral campaign, so that the issue will not be rubbed under his nose.] Orbán further wanted to show the voters his resoluteness as a tough prime minister. Kis' focus in this matter is wholly fixed on Orbán and there is not a single word about other political parties, such as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) that criticised the ONM only half-heartedly.
- Labour market regulations. With irony and bitterness Kis talks of eighty million work seekers who would be coming to work in Hungary, if Orbán followed the political line of non-discrimination. Kis indicates that other neighbouring countries such as the Ukraine and Serbia will not tire of trying to achieve the same benefits that Romania has achieved for its citizens. According to him, this would have a disastrous effect on the tax payers and the Hungarian labour market, especially on those counties which are close to the respective states and already have to deal with a high unemployment rates: "*Az igazi vesztes azonban mégiscsak a magyar adófizető, a magyar vállaló lesz.*" [After all, the real loser will be the Hungarian tax payer, the Hungarian employee]
- Foreign policy. Kis condemns Orbán for being arrogant and ignorant in foreign policy, since Orbán thought that he could have it his way without any

consultations with the neighbouring states. In other words, the ONM's disaster is Orbán's own fault since he did not take Năstase's warning seriously, to forbid the Status Law's application on Romanian territory. To top that, the ONM, according to Kis, has shown Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia that Hungary can be blackmailed. This would lead to other agreements a la Orbán-Năstase Memorandum, which would be harmful for Hungary. At this point Kis emphasised the fatal connection between Orbán's desire to be re-elected, the political necessity to apply the Status Law and the neighbouring states' advantageous position for making demands on Budapest.

- Co-ethnics. Kis reminds the reader that Orbán signed the ONM not for the good of the Hungarians in Romania but to improve his chance of being re-elected: *“Orbánék a nagy nehezen benduló konzultációkon sem a kisebbségek érdekeit tartották főleg szem előtt. Hanem valami egészen mást, ennél sokkal praktikusabb dolgot, nevezetesen: saját választási szempontjaikat.”* [Orbán's people<sup>335</sup> did not consider the minorities' interests to be on top of the agenda at the consultations, which began so wearily. Rather something completely different, something much more practical, namely: his own electoral considerations.] Kis added that due to the ONM the benefits the Status Law was supposed to grant have been reduced at the expense of the Hungarians in Romania.

This article is one long crusade against Hungary's prime minister Viktor Orbán; Unfortunately, the author fails to take into consideration other factors, which are of essence. I would even go as far as to say that Kis is obsessed with criticising Orbán's politics. The fact that he compares him twice to former socialist prime minister Gyula Horn does not change much. This comparison between Orbán and Horn refers to Horn's policy towards Romania and the signing of the bilateral agreement back in 1996. That agreement is just a façade, since it did not tackle the most essential problem between the two states: the minority issue. Kis reminds the reader that the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) wrote Horn off as a traitor at that time, for not standing up for the Hungarians' rights in Romania. History, according to Kis, could repeat itself and it is the FIDESZ prime minister who was labelled a traitor for giving away the Hungarian workers' and the co-ethnics' interests. Furthermore, Kis fails to make any comments on

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<sup>335</sup> *Orbánék* means literally those who belong to the Orbán family or clan. In this context it means his subalterns, such as State Secretary Zsolt Németh, who drafted the ONM with his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu.

the role played by representatives of Hungarian parties from the neighbouring states, e.g. Miklós Duray from the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) in Slovakia and László Tőkés from the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). The two men played a decisive role in the debate surrounding the Status Law. This is striking, since Kis does mention Duray and Tőkés in the interview as the ones who pulled the strings behind the enforcement of the Status Law.

Kis does not leave any doubts as to his political position. Although he does not criticise the Status Law, he is unable to acknowledge the benefits it brings to many co-ethnics: free education in Hungary, medical care, railway tickets free of charge for the elderly and the children's allowance of HUF 20,000 p.a. Furthermore, the author uses the pronominal *nálunk* twice to position himself in the discourse. *Nálunk* could mean 'with us', 'over here' or 'in this country'. All three possibilities fit in Kis' position: a Hungarian from Hungary proper complaining about his prime minister's mismanagement in domestic and foreign policy. Also, Kis' text is pro MSZP: no criticism towards the MSZP' topsy-turvy policy regarding the Status Law and the party's eventual support to Orbán. Kis does mention that when parliament voted for the Status Law the parliamentarians did not expect the ONM. Nevertheless, I do think that Kis is trying to cover up for the MSZP in this case, because the MSZP also voted for the Law and it knew that there have not been any consultations with the neighbouring states.

#### 4.2.3.6 NSZ 31.12.2001<sup>336</sup>

The *szerző* [author] of this article is given with *hírösszefoglalónk* [our news recapitulator]. I therefore assume that different persons gathered the news. The report consists of a title, a subtitle, an introductory segment and five other segments. The target group is the wider public without any specific political preference. Four of the six parties represented in the Hungarian parliament give their comments on the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) and their critique of other parties. The authors, when applicable, also give the politicians' contradictory statements.

The title of this article, together with the subtitle, is already a hint at what will come next:

*“Mit írt alá Orbán?  
Értelmezési vita a magyar-román egyetértési memorandumról”*

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<sup>336</sup> Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://165/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

[What did Orbán sign?

Debate over the Hungarian-Romanian memorandum of agreement's interpretation]

The introductory segment follows suit and refers to two political parties which represent the two ends of the debate over the Status Law in general and the ONM in particular: the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). According to the SZDSZ, the Orbán government, by signing the ONM, has put the Hungarian health service at risk. At this point the SZDSZ takes it for granted that numerous Romanian citizens will use the opportunity of a better medical treatment in Hungary, which could result in the health system's collapse. FIDESZ retorts and criticises those who object to the ONM:

*“A Fidesz elnöke szerint a megegyezés bírálói félelmet akarnak kelteni a munkavállalók körében”*

[According to the FIDESZ' chairman, those who criticise the agreement want to arouse fear among employees]

It is unclear whether the SZDSZ relies on any statistical data. If it does, then it is not mentioned. I assume that the SZDSZ' fear is based simply on the Hungarian health care system's higher efficiency in comparison with the Romanian one.

The five segments that follow the introductory one include the points of view of another two parties: Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)<sup>337</sup>. The parties are then represented as thus:

1. Segment: MSZP and SZDSZ.
2. Segment: MSZP and SZDSZ
3. Segment: MIÉP
4. Segment: FIDESZ and MSZP
5. Segment: FIDESZ

Representatives from both parties, i.e. MSZP and SZDSZ, complain about the danger for the Hungarian medical system should migrant workers from Romania flood the country. They also criticise the working permits for all of Romania's citizens, since cheaper labour from Romania could be hazardous for the Hungarian labour market. To put it differently, both parties want to represent the interests of the Hungarian working

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<sup>337</sup> The fifth and the sixth parties represented in parliament, the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), are not mentioned at all. However, when FIDESZ talks of the five-party-agreement they mean these two plus FIDESZ, MSZP and MIÉP.

class. SZDSZ further criticises FIDESZ' attitude of rushing ahead and signing the ONM without prior consultations and a general debate in Parliament. László Kovács, the MSZP's chairman, has stressed that FIDESZ did not lead any consultations with the other parties, although FIDESZ insists they did. According to Kovács, the so-called Five-Party Agreement, which took place before the ONM was signed, was merely an informal meeting led by Prime Minister Orbán:

*“... nem volt egyeztetés, a miniszterelnök csupán tájékoztatást adott a nyilatkozatról.”*

[... there has been no agreement, the Prime Minister merely informed about the communiqué.]

MIÉP appears only in the third segment where its chairman, István Csurka, makes his comments on the opposition parties SZDSZ and MSZP. He considers their criticism to be *magyarellenes* [anti-Hungarian]. MSZP and SZDSZ, said Csurka, are trying to abuse the taciturn situation in relation to the Status Law for their own electoral propaganda. He added that Orbán had no other opportunity but to sign the ONM. This little passage is a demonstration of how the two parties, FIDESZ and MIÉP, drew closer at the end of 2001 and beginning of 2002. One has to bear in mind that despite Csurka's sympathetic words to Orbán, MIÉP was not a coalition party and that MIÉP initially criticised the ONM for granting benefits to people whom Hungary need not support, i.e. Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnics background.

FIDESZ, being represented in the introductory, the fourth and the fifth segment, has the last word in this article. Perhaps words, because the article's authors bring in two different and contradictory positions within the FIDESZ. Zoltán Pokorni, the party's chairman, points out the fact that all Romanian citizens can come to seek work in Hungary, while Prime Minister Orbán announced that only those Romanian citizens who have the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) will be able to work in Hungary. Pokorni insists that the other four parties agreed to the ONM and that Kovács had no objections to the working regulations. Kovács, as mentioned above, denied this. Pokorni further suggests that the National Labour Council should monitor the number of migrant workers from the neighbouring states. Unfortunately, he does not go on explaining what purpose the monitoring would have. It can only be assumed that Pokorni would like to show that the number of migrant workers will be very limited and that MSZP and SZDSZ were wrong.

This article's potpourri of political accusations and retorting is a clear indicator for the forthcoming elections of April 2002. The speculations about an invasion of migrant workers from Romania are also an overestimation of Hungary's attractiveness to Romanians. Hungarian politicians, and at this point also the journalists, have simply overseen the fact that from the day on when the Status Law and hence the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum will come into effect, Romanian citizens will no longer need a visa for the European Union (1<sup>st</sup> January 2002). As it turned out to be, Romanians did prefer to immigrate into other countries, e.g. Italy, Spain and Portugal, than go to work in Hungary. The states in Southern Europe offered better paid jobs, good infrastructure and perhaps languages, which are easier for Romanians to understand.

#### 4.2.4 România Liberă (RL)

The two articles from România Liberă stretch over a period of eleven days: the first one from 27<sup>th</sup> December 2001 and the second from 7<sup>th</sup> January 2002. Despite this time span the second article refers mainly to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum, which was signed almost three weeks before.

##### 4.2.4.1 RL 27.12.2001<sup>338</sup>

This article is a report about the content of the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) and the two protagonists' reaction after the memorandum was signed. It consists of a title, an introductory segment and four other segments. While the first segment describes the changes the ONM has brought in the Status Law' application, segment two adds further details, which an official Romanian note made available. Segment three is Romanian prime minister Adrian Năstase's comment on the ONM while Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán concludes the article in the fourth segment. The article's target group is the general reader.

The title is somewhat misleading because it refers to one of the ONM's aspects:

*“Depunerea cererii și eliberarea legitimației de maghiar se vor efectua pe teritoriul Ungariei”<sup>339</sup>*

[Depositing the application of the Magyar Certificate [CHN] and its issuing will be performed on Hungary's territory.]<sup>340</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> See Appendix 7.

<sup>339</sup> The diacritical signs in Romanian, â, ă, î, ș and ț, are omitted in the original text. For a better understanding, I have modified the texts orthographically and corrected the letters a, i, s and t when necessary.

This title is an indicator for one of the core problems of why Romanian politics objected to the Status Law: extraterritoriality<sup>341</sup>. The introductory segment gives some chronological information about how and when the two prime ministers signed the ONM and continues immediately with the restriction that spouses, who are not of Hungarian ethnic background, cannot apply for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). The first segment picks up the issue and gives more details, which concern the issue of ethnic discrimination<sup>342</sup>:

*“Astfel a fost eliminată discriminarea între cetățenii români de origine etnică nemaghiară ...”*

[Thus the discrimination of Romanian citizens of non-Magyar ethnic origin has been eliminated ...]

The issue of discrimination is mentioned two more times in this article: when regarding the medical care Romanian workers can now receive in Hungary and when Orbán comments on the ONM. It is interesting at this point that the first two times, when the author refers to Romanian information sources he refers to *discriminație* [discrimination], while Orbán talks of “... *diferențierilor pe criterii etnice* ...” [... the differentiations on ethnic grounds ...] There is a semantic difference between the two, since discrimination could have a negative connotation and suggests injustice while differentiation is more neutral and does not necessarily have a negative connotation. This distinction shows the difference between the Hungarian and the Romanian point of view regarding some of the Status Law’s benefits, which were made available only to a limited group of citizens in Romania.

The author turns the aspect of extraterritoriality indicated in the title only after he started the first segment with the new regulation regarding the CHN for non-Hungarian spouses of CHN holders. He continues in this segment with the other issues, which have been resolved by the ONM:

- Extraterritoriality. The CHN can be applied and issued only on Hungarian territory. The author does not go into detail and therefore he does not mention that the CHN could be, theoretically speaking, applied for at the respective Hungarian consulates in Romania.

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<sup>340</sup> Due to the difference in Romanian between *maghiar* [Magyar] and *ungur* [Hungarian], I shall translate each ethnonym accordingly.

<sup>341</sup> See also subchapter 4.1.2.2.6.

<sup>342</sup> See also subchapter 4.1.2.2.3.

- Support for Hungarian associations. Hungary can no longer support Hungarian associations in Romania without Romania's consent. This issue has been very controversial between the two states for a specific reason: Germany's support for the Transylvanian Saxons. Romania accepted German assistance for the Transylvanian Saxons on the basis of a bilateral treaty, but has continuously jeopardised Hungarian efforts to support the Hungarians in Romania. According to international law, both Germany and Hungary had to have Romania's consent to sustain their respective co-nationals or co-ethnics. Despite the illegal nature of this support, Hungary did assist the co-ethnics in Romania arguing that the Romanian side would refuse Hungary's request anyway and would practice discrimination between Hungary and Germany. Practically, the Hungarian support was illegal but tolerated. Due to the ONM Hungary had obliged itself to go the official way.
- Medical care in Hungary. Romanian citizens working in Hungary could apply for medical treatment in Hungary.
- Extension of working permits. According to the ONM, the seasonal working permit for Romanian citizens can be extended upon the workers' request.
- Minority issues. Unlike Hungarian newspapers, Romanian newspapers do mention the existence of a Romanian minority in Hungary<sup>343</sup>. The ONM will plan a mutual accord which will grant this group preferential treatment in Hungary.

The second segment refers to a note by the Romanian government, which has two main issues: the positive effect of the ONM on Romanian-Hungarian relations and the Hungarian government's obligation to modify the Status Law within the coming six months. If the ONM had not been signed, the Status Law would have caused a serious deterioration of the bilateral relations as from the 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002 onwards. That was the date the Status Law came into effect:

*“Partea română consideră că această soluție este concepută în scopul detensionării situației începând cu 1 ianuarie 2002.”*

[The Romanian side considers that this solution is conceptualised in order to relax the situation starting of the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2002]

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<sup>343</sup> The Romanian minority in Hungary consists of around 11,000 people. See also Demeter Zayzon 1999.

Năstase and Orbán, whose reactions are represented in the third and fourth segments respectively, display a clear-cut difference in their comments to the ONM. While Năstase speaks of celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral agreement, Hungary's obligation to modify the Status Law, the possibility of a regular annual meeting of both prime ministers and possible joint Romanian-Hungarian cultural projects in the near future, Orbán has other things on his mind: he accepted the Romanian wish to eliminate all discriminative aspects of the Status Law and that those who work in Hungary have to solve their problems with their employers. In the first part of his comments, Orbán refers to "... *interprinzătorii români*, ..." [... Romanian entrepreneurs ...], while the Romanian side in the first segment talks about "... *muncitorii sezonieri* ..." [... seasonal workers ...] Orbán's formulation is obviously more eloquent and courteous. Since it is not a quotation, I am not sure whether Orbán was being ironic or politically correct. The second part of his comment, about "... *persoane aflate pe piața muncii din Ungaria* ..." [... persons who are on the Hungarian labour market ...], has no correlation to the rest of the text: which problems is he referring to? Neither Orbán nor the author give an answer to that.

The author of this article has applied a very simple and codified way to give the reader a balanced account of what has happened: information about the changes the ONM has brought about and the reaction of the two prime ministers involved. However, the article shows a very one-sided aspect: the Romanian side. Orbán's comments are few and also not wholly comprehensible. Nevertheless, the prime ministers' comments at least show who was more content about the memorandum: Năstase. Without actually saying it, the author suggests that the Romanian side gained much more from the ONM than Hungary. Actually, the article does not give evidence of what Hungary did gain from the ONM, namely Romania's consent to allow the application of the Status Law's on its territory. In all, the text suggests that Romania has convinced Hungary to change its plans without having to give back something instead.

#### 4.2.4.2 RL 27.12.2001<sup>344</sup>

This brief article is a combination of an account with elements of a report. The structure of the article consists of a title and two segments. The lack of the introductory segment is usually an indicator of an account, but the descriptive information and the quotations by Béla Markó, Chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in

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<sup>344</sup> See Appendix 7.

Romania (UDMR), resemble a report. Unexpectedly, the article's target group is the readers who are interested in UDMR politics and requires prior knowledge in this field.

The title of this article is confusing for those who are not familiar with abbreviations used in Romanian politics:

*“CRU al UDMR despre Legea statutului”*

[UDMR's CRU about the Status Law]

CRU stands for *Consiliul Reprezentanților Unionali* [Council of the Union's Representatives], which is a body that represents the top UDMR officials in the counties. The first segment also starts with the CRU, which met at Târgu Mureș. According to the author 50 representatives from 16 counties<sup>345</sup> have come together to discuss two issues: regulations for obtaining the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) and the protocol with the other governing party, presumably the Social Democratic Party (PSD). However, there is not a single hint in the entire text as to which protocol the author is referring. I shall discuss the article's first issue only.

The author states, when he presents the two issues, that the CHN, according to the regulations of the Status Law, can only be obtained and issued on Hungary's territory. The first segment continues with a few details about the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM), which has changed the regulations for obtaining the CHN. The second part of the first segment consists of a quotation by Markó, in which he appreciates the ONM for having lifted the obstacles for the application of the Status Law on Romania's territory and that the regulations of the ONM should be continuously applied.

The article's second segment belongs to Markó alone. There he adds that the ONM has contributed a “... *climat pozitiv* ...” [... positive atmosphere ...] for the application of the Status Law's and for the future development of Romanian-Hungarian relations, in politics as well as in economy. The second segment concludes with Markó's idea of the tasks the UDMR should fulfil to be able to help with the applications for the CHN: giving information and transferring data necessary for the issuing of a CHN.

This article leaves quite a few questions unanswered:

- What were the CRU's conclusions?

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<sup>345</sup> Romania's administration consists of 40 counties and the municipality of Bucharest.

- Since the Status Law and hence the ONM have come into effect already a few days beforehand and the CRU has come together to exchange views, where are the first comments about the new situation?
- Why are there no comments about the ONM from the other 50 delegates?
- It can be assumed that not all members of the UDMR share Markó's views. Where are the counter-statements?

Furthermore, the author writes about the ONM as a memorandum signed by the prime ministers of the two respective states, while Markó talks about the Status Law's application "... *conform înțelegerii dintre cele două guverne ...*" [... according to the understanding between those two governments ...] While the author presents the two prime ministers as the leading figures of the ONM, Markó, by talking about governments, includes himself and the UDMR among the ONM's initiators.

There is also a small inconsistency in the text: the order of Hungarian names. In Hungarian, the last name is always mentioned first. Hence, my name in Hungarian would be Márton Mihai and not Mihai Márton. The author mentions two Hungarian names: Viktor Orbán, Hungary's prime minister, and Béla Markó. He writes Markó's name in the Hungarian fashion and Orbán's name in the Romanian one: Markó Béla and Viktor Orbán. This difference, which I assume is incidental, nevertheless shows the reader that the author is aware that Hungarians write their names in a different order than Romanians and that he is trying to apply his knowledge<sup>346</sup>.

#### 4.2.5 Summarising the text analysis

The Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) represents a turning point in the Hungarian-Romanian political relationship after the Status Law was passed by parliament in Budapest on 19<sup>th</sup> June 2001. If the Romanian political elite kept calm before that date, it was very busy protesting and complaining after 19<sup>th</sup> June. Eventually, the ONM's mutual understanding was perceived differently in Bucharest and in Budapest. This different perception is represented in the journalists' comments and reports regarding the ONM. The results of the 15 articles analysed above show specific patterns, which are typical to each newspaper's respective but also to the respective country. I shall discuss the results according to the main issues presented in the articles, such as working permits, discrimination etc.

First, the Hungarian-Romanian comparison:

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<sup>346</sup> In the Hungarian texts I have analysed for this thesis all Hungarian names are written according to the Hungarian fashion and other names in the other order.

- Working permit for all Romanian citizens. This is the Hungarian newspapers' main issue. The ONM grants every Romanian citizen the possibility to work in Hungary for at least three months p.a. These permits became a strong argument for the opposition parties in Budapest to attack the government. According to the articles, with one exception, neither the journalists nor the politicians have bothered to ask experts on this matter. This issue is present in *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Hírlap* alike. While *Magyar Hírlap* constantly relied on statements made by members of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), who objected not only to the ONM but also to the Status Law, Tibor Kis from *Népszabadság* in his essay, although in an exaggerated manner, talked of eighty million foreign workers who could come to seek work in Hungary. There is an element of threat that goes through the Hungarian papers. It is the threate of cheap labour from Romania that could bring the Hungarian labour market to a collapse. The Romanian papers, on the other hand, celebrate these working permits as the end of the discrimination initiated by the Status Law, which would have granted working permits only to those Romanian citizens who possess a Certificate of Hungarian National (CHN), practically the Hungarians in Romania. This element of discrimination on the Hungarian labour market is especially present in the article by Bogdan Chirieac from *Adevărul*.
- Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). This aspect of the ONM seems to irritate both Hungarian and Romanian politics. According to the Status Law, those who want to benefit from it, have to apply first for the CHN. Only with this certificate could they claim the Law's benefits. Furthermore, spouses and children, even if they do not consider themselves to be Hungarian, could also claim them. The ONM changes this aspect and only those who declare themselves to be of Hungarian background could obtain the CHN. It is the Hungarian newspapers' turn to talk of discrimination, since spouses and children in ethnically mixed marriages will not be able to share the benefits, which the owner of the CHN can claim. *Magyar Hírlap* is predominantly engaged in this debate. This is particularly evident with the travelling benefits, e.g. free railway tickets to Budapest. The Romanian newspapers consider this to be a just measure, since only those who possess the CHN should benefit and not their entire non-Hungarian kin.
- Medical treatment in Hungary. The ONM grants Romanian workers the benefits of the Hungarian health care system. Interestingly, this aspect is not mentioned

in Adevărul. However, there is a clear difference between Népszabadság's and Magyar Hírlap's point of view and România Liberă's. The Hungarian newspapers spoke of the Hungarian medical system collapsing due to a massive influx of workers from Hungary, all wanting to benefit from it. Magyar Hírlap does not forget to mention that the Romanian hospitals are in a catastrophic condition. România Liberă, on the other hand, talked only of the end of discrimination between migrant workers in Hungary. The ONM would grant all Romanian citizens who work in Hungary the benefits of a medical treatment.

- Extraterritoriality. This aspect played an important role in the Romanian government's objection to the Status Law. Be it the financial support for Hungarian organisations or handing out the CHN, Năstase and his government considered them to be acts that would violate Romania's sovereignty. Consequently, issuing the CHN would have to take place in Hungary. Both Romanian papers emphasised the ONM's role in avoiding this would-be state of affairs. Adevărul goes even farther to exclaim that the CHN cannot even be brought into Romania, a detail, which is untrue. The Hungarian newspapers, on the other hand, hardly discussed the issue. While Népszabadság practically ignored it, Magyar Hírlap reminded its readers of the discriminating effect it would have on the applicants, since they would have to pay their trip to Hungary, where the CHN were to be issued.

Second, the Romanian-Romanian comparison:

- Status Law. While the two articles from România Liberă take the Status Law as a serious issue, Adevărul discredits it as a propaganda trick for Orbán's electoral campaign. Consequently, România Liberă goes into more detail and tries to underline which aspects of the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) are important for Romania, while in the article from Adevărul there is the notion that the ONM is a successful act of self-defence by Romania against the Hungarian attack, i.e. the Status Law.
- Romanians in Hungary. România Liberă is the only newspaper to mention the ONM's regulations concerning the Romanians in Hungary. This is in congruence with the information I received in the interview with Simona Popescu<sup>347</sup>. Although very small in number when compared to the Hungarians in Romania (approximate ratio of 1:150), nevertheless, it gives the bilateral

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<sup>347</sup> See subchapter 4.3.4.1

relations a notion of parity: both states have co-ethnics or co-nationals who live in the other state and try to act in their interest.

- On the whole, România Liberă is trying to represent a more balanced account of the reactions surrounding the ONM: the details are more accurate and the tenor is less polemic. Adevărul, on the other hand, congratulates the Romanian government for its success, an act unrepeated by neither România Liberă nor the Hungarian newspapers. Furthermore, Adevărul takes the opportunity to create the illusion of competition between Hungary and Romania by using historic arguments.

Third, the Hungarian-Hungarian comparison:

- Political orientation. All newspapers were chosen according to their claim of neutrality, although every newspaper has a specific political tendency or narrative. My suggestion that Népszabadság was closer to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) while Magyar Hírlap has shared common political perceptions with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) turned out to be true. These tendencies were manifested in each newspaper respectively: while the SZDSZ' role was overemphasised in Magyar Hírlap and the MSZP was constantly criticised, Népszabadság avoided criticising the MSZP too sharply and the SZDSZ was underrepresented.
- Hungary as an economic magnet. Apparently, journalists have taken up this idea from the political scene. Consequently, Hungarian journalists took it for granted that Hungary is a magnet for work seekers from the entire Carpathian Basin. There is not a single thought about migrant workers from Romania who could seek their fortune in other countries rather than in Hungary. Consequently, the ironic comments against Orbán in Magyar Hírlap about Hungary being a medium-size regional power also apply to the journalists that wrote it.
- Criticism of Orbán's actions. Both Hungarian newspapers share a common constant critique of Orbán himself and his FIDESZ-led government. Magyar Hírlap uses an entire article for the benefit of the SZDSZ to criticise the prime minister and does not offer a balanced representation. In some of its articles Népszabadság offers plain critique without granting FIDESZ any possibility to state its case.

### 4.3 Analysing the interviews<sup>348</sup>

Interviewing journalists who write about the Hungarian Status Law requires a passport, good travel possibilities and patience. This somewhat banal exclamation is the result of my search for interview partners in five different cities of which only one is in Hungary, namely Budapest.

Table 12: Interviewees

Journalist	Venue	Newspaper	Published	Date <sup>349</sup>	Time (min.)
<i>Bogdán, Tibor</i>	(Bucharest)	MH	Budapest	-	-
Ciobanu, Rodica	Bucharest	A	Bucharest	28.01.04	30
Kis, Tibor	Paris	NSZ	Budapest	30.10.03	45
Molnár, Norbert	Bratislava	MH	Budapest	11.09.03	40
Nagy, Iván Zsolt	Budapest	MH	Budapest	16.09.03	25
Popescu, Simona	Bucharest	RL	Bucharest	04.02.04	60
Szilvássy, József	Bratislava	NSZ	Budapest	11.09.03	50
Tibori Szabó, Zoltán	Cluj-Napoca	NSZ	Budapest	26.09.03	120
Újvári, Miklós	Budapest	MH	Budapest	17.09.03	35

Just like the Status Law itself, interviewing journalists took place mainly in the adjacent states: four in Romania and two in Slovakia. When possible, I dispatched an email to the respective journalist containing a short synopsis of my thesis, a request for an interview and my curriculum vitae. Those whose email address I could not find I contacted by the phone. With one exception, Tibor Bogdán, who had to cancel the interview at short notice, I met all eight journalists<sup>350</sup>. The interviews are listed in alphabetical order of the newspapers and within each paper in alphabetical order of the journalists' last name.

#### 4.3.1 Adevărul

##### 4.3.1.1 Rodica Ciobanu

Rodica Ciobanu was Adevărul's editor of the political section at the time of this research. She has been working for Adevărul since 1994, which meant ten years at the time of the interview. She considers the paper to be liberal although it has not been so up to 1995. Until then it had strong nationalistic and socialistic undercurrents, which have been the legacy of its predecessor, Scîntea, the Romanian Communist Party's

<sup>348</sup> As already mentioned, I conducted the interview in the language the respective journalist published in.

<sup>349</sup> Date: dd.mm.yy.

<sup>350</sup> Bogdán was kind enough to answer some questions on the phone and the rest via email.

(PCR) official daily. Being nationalistic *and* socialistic was not a contradiction in Romanian history<sup>351</sup>. These tendencies faded after 1995. From all those who used to work for *Scîntea* only five remained active in *Adevărul*<sup>352</sup>. Ciobanu considers *Adevărul*'s influence stronger in the countryside than in Bucharest, where newspapers such as *Libertatea* have higher selling rates. *Adevărul*'s policy is one of freedom of writing. However, there are occasionally conflicts between reporters and editors. These conflicts are usually settled by mutual consent of the parties involved. In the worst case both the journalists and editors can stop an article from being published. This piece of information is unique. No other journalist admitted any conflicts between themselves and the editors, although I assume that there are conflicts, just like in any other company. Ciobanu continued by pointing out the fact that all employed journalists have a college degree. However, she added, this does not mean much in today's Romania, where college degrees can be bought for a price raging from \$300 to \$500. According to her, *Adevărul* has an influence on the political class; Politicians read it, comment on it and react to it. Prime Minister Năstase even accused *Adevărul* for losing the 1996 elections due to the newspaper's ongoing critique against his party, the Social Democratic Party's (PSD)<sup>353</sup>. He has not stopped retorting to political articles since.

Ciobanu regrets not being able to read Hungarian and has therefore based her information on Romanian sources only. This means that she had access to translated information only, which was very fragmentary in the case of the Status Law. She added that *Adevărul* had tried to represent the different positions taken by political parties, labour unions, newspapers and other organisations. However, *Adevărul* had monitored closely and documented the number of Certificates of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) handed out to co-ethnics in Romania. Some articles, she said, tried to show the Status Law's discriminating impact on Romanian society and on the Romanian labour market. Furthermore, she explained that Hungarian villages in Romania had a better infrastructure and were financially better off in comparison to Romanian villages. This was because of the money earned by Hungarians from Romania who took up seasonal work in Hungary. She compared the situation to Romanian labour migrants in Spain. After the Law's amendment<sup>354</sup>, the political tension between Hungary and Romania had cooled down. This was, according to her, because the Status Law did not grant the right of settlement to those who held the CHN anymore.

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<sup>351</sup> See Chapter 2 and Verdery 1991.

<sup>352</sup> In 2006 the entire editorial board has changed, including Rodica Ciobanu.

<sup>353</sup> See footnote regarding PSD in Table 2.

<sup>354</sup> See Appendix 3.

Ciobanu has confirmed some of my assessments concerning Adevărul:

- Adevărul is one of the most influential newspapers in Romania,
- Its articles have an impact on the political class,
- Adevărul was quite critical concerning the Status Law. The fact that the newspaper monitored the handing out of CHNs shows a particular interest,
- The newspaper still has slight nationalistic and socialist tendencies and
- The aspect of discrimination plays an important role.

Another interesting aspect is the question concerning the so-called ethno-business or ethno-corruption. She confirmed the wide spread corruption in Romania and among members of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) too. As she told me, together with some other colleagues they were wondering how Béla Markó, the UDMR's chairman, and other high-ranking party members had become so wealthy. She said that before each and every election a large sum of NGOs (non-governmental organisations) is founded. These NGOs receive great sums of money, which they transfer to other NGOs until their track is lost. The Ministry of Finance, so Ciobanu, is either unwilling or unable to monitor the flow of money. The NGOs close down soon after the elections. According to her, this is a system of money laundering for political parties, in which the UDMR is no exception.

#### 4.3.2 Magyar Hírlap

##### 4.3.2.1 Tibor Bogdán

Being Magyar Hírlap's chief correspondent in Romania, Tibor Bogdán has an influential position on the flow of information from Romania to Magyar Hírlap. He graduated from the Theatre College in Târgu Mureş, worked for Előre, the only Hungarian daily published in Romania in the socialist era and became unemployed for two years due to political disciplinary measures (1982-1984). Afterwards he worked at Munkásélet, the labour union's weekly. From 1990 onwards he worked for Magyar Hírlap as chief correspondent in Bucharest. Bogdán also worked for the Hungarian Kossuth Rádió (1990-1997) and holds the chief correspondent's position for DUNA TV<sup>355</sup> in Bucharest. Finally, he is also head correspondent of Radio România Informații's Hungarian edition.

According to Bogdán Magyar Hírlap used to be more conservative in the first half of the nineties and by the end of that decade it turned slightly to the left and has

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<sup>355</sup> A Hungarian tv channel concerning mainly the co-ethnics.

also gained a liberal touch. By conservative he means politically close to the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and by liberal he means close to the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). In the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Magyar Hírlap had become even more liberal and very close to SZDSZ. However, he emphasised, these shifts had not changed Magyar Hírlap's basic attitude of critically assessing every one of the government's movements, be it from the political left or from the right. In other words, Bogdán is saying that despite the shifts, Magyar Hírlap has remained a daily newspaper that is true to its credo.

According to Bogdán, Magyar Hírlap follows a politics that gives journalists their freedom of writing. Bogdán, according to his personal experience at Magyar Hírlap, has never experienced any restraints in his work and bears testimony to the fact that Magyar Hírlap follows its non-interference politics. He says that it is the readers' interest that dictates the journalist's work. In other words, the public interest decides which subjects the journalists should write about and not the editorial board. According to my assessment, this is a clear case in which the circle of texts closes: publicly debated issues influence the content of the newspaper articles and vice versa<sup>356</sup>. Magyar Hírlap's influence on its readers, says Bogdán, is neither stronger nor weaker than any other Hungarian newspaper's impact. The different dailies already have their 'clientele', i.e. the rightists read Magyar Nemzet while the leftists read Magyar Hírlap<sup>357</sup>. I assume that Bogdán includes the liberals in this category. According to Bogdán, this corresponds to the readers' concept of information: they read the version they would support anyway. In other words, he is saying that conservatives, for example, read Magyar Nemzet because they want to evaluate the news from a conservative narrative's perspective. Consequently, if leftists and liberals read Magyar Hírlap than the newspaper does not have such an impact on the readers because they are already in congruence with the transmitted narrative. Although the number of readers has gone down in recent years, numerous politicians, from the coalition and from the opposition alike, read it regularly. This has become evident in times of political strife, when politicians quoted passages from Magyar Hírlap that suited their political purpose. Bogdán emphasised the fact that Magyar Hírlap had the ability to annoy both the coalition and the opposition at the same time. This state of affairs was something good for a newspaper, which was trying to remain independent of political influence.

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<sup>356</sup> See also Figure 2.

<sup>357</sup> This is a slight contradiction because I would have expected the liberals to read Magyar Hírlap.

Bogdán considers the Hungarian Status Law to be a political mistake, because its preparation and implementation came too late. The Law has become somewhat of an adventure. The Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), while still in opposition (before 1998), promised the co-ethnics the Hungarian citizenship, should FIDESZ come to power. After winning the elections they realised it was not easy. FIDESZ had to take into consideration the Hungarian public, the neighbouring countries' majority population and the European Union's reaction to such a step. Afraid of the storms that may break out, FIDESZ renounced its initial idea and came up with a law, whose aim was to grant *kedvezmények* [benefits] to the co-ethnics. However, says Bogdán, FIDESZ had to reckon on the neighbouring states' objection. And this is what eventually came out of it: FIDESZ and the social-liberal coalition that followed in office had to modify the Status Law drastically. Except the sum of 20000 HUF p.a. for children's educational allowance and the free of charge trips, the Law does not contain essential social benefits, health care, medicine etc. any more. Bogdán says that Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geonă (2000-2004) is absolutely right by saying that they managed to *kiherélni* [empty] the Law of any substance. In all, the Status Law was inapplicable in its first version and is senseless in its current form. Thus it has become superfluous.

The Status Law, according to Bogdán, was undoubtedly harmful to the Romanian-Hungarian relationship. It has also complicated the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania's (UDMR) position, which had to manoeuvre between its obligation as a coalition party in Romanian politics and the desire not to hurt Hungary's feelings, whose help they appreciate. It also caused headaches to the Hungarian side, mainly FIDESZ. The Law and the following Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) have been the second defeat Hungarian diplomacy suffered by the Romanian side in the ongoing political skirmishes since the late eighties. Bogdán added that the Venice Commission supported the Romanian side in many concrete issues. Consequently, the Hungarian government had to change the Status Law according to Romania's will and not according to the co-ethnics' expectations. This has changed the relationship between the two sides completely: Hungary is the one justifying itself while Romania is the accusing one.

#### 4.3.2.2 Norbert Molnár

Molnár works not only for Magyar Hírlap, but also for Slovakia's largest Hungarian daily, Új Szó, and for one of Hungary's critical weeklies, the liberal Magyar Narancs. He studied history in Bratislava but gave up after three years. Later he worked

with the Hungarian section of Slovak Radio. At the time of the interview he told me he had been working with Magyar Hírlap for quite a few years. Molnár also presents information bulletins concerning Hungarians in Slovakia at DUNA TV.

Magyar Hírlap, said Molnár, has a daily circulation of approximately 40,000 copies, which makes it Hungary's third largest newspaper. However, he was referring to serious newspapers and did not take tabloids into consideration, e.g. Blikk, which have a much higher selling rate. He added that the same publisher owns Magyar Hírlap as well as Népszabadság and that the supervising state authorities have started an investigation into the matter to prevent a cartel. The authorities assume that the publisher would have too great an influence on the Hungarian press. Molnár added that Magyar Hírlap's interests were more with the minorities living within Hungary than with the Hungarians living in Hungary's neighbouring countries, the co-ethnics. The minorities within Hungary, in his opinion, also included groups such as social and sexual minorities, e.g. homosexuals.

According to Molnár, Magyar Hírlap does not set any rules, how the articles should be. In other words, the editorial board gives journalists a free hand to write however they please without any political preferences. Molnár himself admitted that he represents views which are also common to the liberal party in Hungary, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). He said that he got the job at Magyar Hírlap because the newspaper already knew his previous work and that he represented liberal standpoints. Consequently, Magyar Hírlap is a politically liberal paper because they employ people who represent those specific views. Upon my question whether Magyar Hírlap had an impact on Hungary's political elite he answered with an evasive 'yes'. The 'yes' was evasive since, according to Molnár, it was unclear as to how influence could be measured. Molnár added that politicians from all parties read the big newspapers regularly. Magyar Hírlap is also among these papers, together with Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet.

Magyar Hírlap, said Molnár, was constantly against the Status Law from the debate's beginning onwards. This political standpoint was also shared by the SZDSZ a fact that brought the newspaper and the party even closer. Molnár said that a law was worth anything only when it can be applied properly. To put it differently, he was saying that the Status Law is not applicable in practical life due to the disapproval of neighbouring countries (Slovakia and Romania). He added that the Hungarian government could have had the chance to support the co-ethnics if it had not made such a fuss and pushed the Law so undiplomatically. Furthermore, he said that it was

Hungarian politicians from Slovakia who planned the Status Law anyway. Miklós Duray, one of the Hungarian Coalition Party's (SMK) leading figures, initiated it, a man who according to Molnár represents Hungarian nationalistic and separatist ideas in Slovak politics. Together with other politicians they contacted Zsolt Németh, state secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Office at that time, and the Hungarian foreign minister himself, János Martonyi. They drafted the first version of the Status Law. Duray also had close relations with former prime minister Viktor Orbán (1998-2002) and even joined him at an electoral rally where he spoke: "*Viktor, a Felvidék*<sup>358</sup> *veled van*" [Viktor, Upper-Hungary is with you]. Molnár added vehemently that Duray did not speak for him.

Following Molnár's information, only 10% of the Hungarians in Slovakia have applied for a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN)<sup>359</sup>. The reason for this low percentage, Molnár added, lay in the very similar standard of living between Slovakia and Hungary, not to mention the Hungarians in Slovenia and in Austria who had an even higher standard of living than the Hungarians in Hungary proper. Subsequently, only few Hungarians from Slovakia went to work in Hungary on the CHN's basis. The economic effect that the Hungarian government might have had in mind had failed in Slovakia and Slovenia. However, Molnár appreciated the support granted to the educational system, although the investments were concentrated on real estate rather than on teaching materials, which would have been more efficient. The local parties, e.g. SMK in Slovakia or the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) in Romania, founded organisations, whose aim was to administer the flow of money from Hungary: subsidies, children's allowances etc. Although he had not yet been able to find solid proof, Molnár insisted that large sums of money had been embezzled in these organisations.

In all, Molnár considered the Status Law to be superfluous and as a symbolic gesture of the Hungarian government towards the co-ethnics. Upon my question as to what he thought of the modified version of the Law he answered with a single word: "*eufemizmus*" [euphemism]. The new socialist-liberal government in Hungary (2002-), he added, had not managed to bridge the gaps with Slovakia and the political climate between the two states had not improved. While Slovakia insisted on discussing minority issues within the frame of the bilateral agreements and on the basis that every

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<sup>358</sup> *Felvidék* is a geographical denotation, which roughly covers present-day Slovakia. Unlike *Erdély*, Transylvania, which was a principality in medieval times, *Felvidék* does not belong to the politically correct vocabulary used by liberals and socialists. It bears a certain connotation of Hungary's possession over that area.

<sup>359</sup> September 2003.

state is responsible for the ethnic minorities that live in it, Hungary persisted on the Status Law's application and the right to support its 'own minorities' abroad, i.e. the co-ethnics.

#### 4.3.2.3 Iván Zsolt Nagy

The third journalist from Magyar Hírlap to be interviewed, Iván Zsolt Nagy, first studied at the Polytechnic in Timișoara and later took up journalistic studies in Budapest. He worked eight years for Magyar Nemzet (1992-2000) and then changed to Magyar Hírlap. Knowing the different political tendencies of both newspapers, I asked him how he managed this big change. Nagy said that in April 2000, Napi Magyarország, a newspaper smaller than Magyar Nemzet, took over Magyar Nemzet. Napi Magyarország was very close to the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), the main coalition party at that time. The name remained the same, but the absolute majority of the journalists were now from Napi Magyarország to ensure that Magyar Nemzet followed the same political route. It is unclear, said Nagy, from where Napi Magyarország had the money to buy Hungary's second largest newspaper. This bit of information has proved my suspicions for excluding Magyar Nemzet from this analysis due to its constant advertisement for FIDESZ. Nagy quit, since he did not approve of the new board's pro-FIDESZ policy. Magyar Hírlap offered him to become the head of the Foreign Affairs Section and he took the job. Consequently, he is responsible for all articles in that section that do not have an author.

Magyar Hírlap, Nagy said, was a liberal newspaper and it was the journalists themselves who bore the responsibility for their articles. Personally he agreed with the liberal policy Magyar Hírlap stands for. He added that the newspaper's influence is much larger than selling rates might suggest. This means that despite being one of the smaller newspapers among the big ones, e.g. Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hírlap can compete with both.

Nagy considers the Status Law to be superfluous. However, he does think that the Hungarian state should pay attention to the co-ethnics' needs. He added that no symbolic gesture could prevent a minority from being assimilated. By that he was referring to the Status Law as a symbolic gesture of the Hungarian government towards the co-ethnics. Furthermore, he added that there were a few issues the Status Law that could have been more efficient:

1. Support for the Hungarian schools abroad. According to Nagy, it would have been better to invest the money in the quality of the education offered than in the

allowance granted to families who send their children to Hungarian-speaking schools. This allowance, as he added, came in laggingly anyway. Nagy suggested direct investments in teachers' instruction, in the quality of education in general and in the real estates that went with it. He added that schools, which had a good reputation in Romania, were more attractive to parents than any schools, which might appeal to ethnic or linguistic affiliation. He himself graduated from the German-speaking secondary school in Timișoara because his parents, although they both spoke Hungarian as their mother tongue, thought that the German school offered the best available education in Timișoara.

2. Mobility problem. Many pupils of ethnic Hungarian background, especially in the Transylvanian countryside, would rather go to Romanian speaking schools than to Hungarian ones. The reason was simple: Romanian schools were often in the next village while the Hungarian school could be up to 30 km away. Nagy continued by suggesting investments in school busses, which could easily transport the children to the next Hungarian-speaking school and back. He considered such an investment to be much more efficient than just granting the parents a children's allowance.
3. Labour market politics. The Status Law had hardly changed anything on the Hungarian labour market. Every person that was seeking work in Hungary had to prove first that no qualified Hungarian citizen was willing to do the job he was applying for. Those who had the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) on the basis of the Status Law did not have to go through this procedure. However, they still had to go to other bureaucratic trouble: forms, applications and visits to the Consulate. According to Nagy's information, since the Status Law had come into effect only 400 co-ethnics had applied for a long-term working permit on the basis of the CHN. In comparison, 8000 seasonal workers had come from Romania alone (summer 2003). Subsequently, the Status Law's economic effect had been practically zero. The bilateral agreements that also referred to labour market regulations, the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) among them, had more serious consequences than the Status Law.

In all, Nagy concluded that the importance of the Status Law had been constantly declining. The next step in the Hungarian-Romanian relations, the agreement

of 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2003, was about to substitute the ONM and practically a part of the Status Law<sup>360</sup>.

#### 4.3.2.4 Miklós Újvári

Miklós Újvári wrote his first articles for Magyar Hírlap back in 1994. He has a degree in German Studies from the University of Szeged. In 1996 he started as a full-time employee with the newspaper. Between 2000-2003 Újvári led the Foreign Politics section at Magyar Hírlap and from 2003 onwards, i.e. at the time of the interview, he headed the *napi témája* [today's topic] section. This section encompasses 1-1.5 pages in the daily edition and contains 3-4 articles that concern an acute issue. Furthermore, he specialised on other issues, e.g. European Union and war coverage.

According to Újvári, Magyar Hírlap is a liberal paper that publishes quite a few articles about minorities in Hungary. Despite the paper's general liberal points of view, the economic section is rather to the political left. He added that Magyar Hírlap wants to compete with two other newspapers in this sector: the dailies *Napi Gazdaság* [Daily Economy] and *Világgazdaság* [World Economy]. It is Magyar Hírlap's aim to attract more readers who are interested in economics. Újvári stressed Magyar Hírlap's competition with *Népszabadság*, although at the time of the interview Magyar Hírlap's owners also possessed 51% of the *Népszabadság* stocks. He added that Magyar Hírlap had a strong influence on political life in Hungary and that there were many politicians who wanted to publish articles in the newspaper. Most of them were from the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) but also a few from the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF).

The heads of the various sections usually wrote their own articles and hence express Magyar Hírlap's editorial board's official view on each edition's third page. Nevertheless, journalists were allowed to express their views freely, which meant that the journalists represented views that could be considered to represent most political parties. Újvári added that it did not matter which political direction each and every journalist followed. What mattered was their basic liberal *Zeitgeist*. However, Magyar Hírlap had a very bad relation to the largest conservative party, FIDESZ. Things went so far, emphasised Újvári, that in 2001, when FIDESZ was in power, Magyar Hírlap reporters were excluded from the Party congress. FIDESZ even tried to buy Magyar Hírlap afterwards, but the newspaper's owners had refused to sell the paper.

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<sup>360</sup> The agreement was signed exactly one week after the interview took place. See Appendix 4.

Former Hungarian governments did not follow a consequential political stand regarding the co-ethnics, said Újvári. When the socialists ruled (1994-1998), the Hungarian government supported Béla Markó, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania's (UDMR) chairman. Later, when the conservatives came to power (1998-2002) they supported László Tőkés, the UDMR's honorary president<sup>361</sup>. This taciturn policy has been very harmful to the UDMR, whose various wings were busy fighting each other.

Újvári objected to the Hungarian Status Law for various reasons:

- The Status Law and the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) that went with it created discrimination among citizens in the areas where Hungarians lived. He was referring mainly to the financial benefits and the working permit for Hungary.
- He considered the CHN to be a bad symbol, since it carried the Hungarian coat of arms, which symbolised the old kingdom<sup>362</sup>. This was, as he added, “*nem racionalis, hanem érzelmi döntés*” [a sentimental, not a rational decision] by the Hungarian government.
- The Status Law's modified version from June 2003 was better than the first version from June 2001, but he added that there was still some room for improvement.

Furthermore, Újvári accentuated his disapproval of the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM). The reason was once again the Hungarian government's inconsistency: the ONM applied to Romania but not to other states with a substantial Hungarian minority, e.g. Slovakia or Ukraine. I asked him whether he challenged Prime Minister Orbán with this problem and he answered affirmatively. Orbán, however, said that the government had no intentions of extending the ONM to other states. Újvári added, that from November 2003 onwards Hungary would be obliged to introduce a visa for Ukrainian and Yugoslav citizens. At this point possessing a CHN would have the advantage of less bureaucratic hurdles, the visa fees would be less and they would be issued for a longer period of time.

Politically, Újvári considered the MSZP to be opportunistic, since it argued against the Status Law but eventually voted for it. At this point he also criticised Népszabadság, which was also against the Status Law until the MSZP changed its mind.

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<sup>361</sup> These two men, although they both represent the UDMR, have a very bad relation, which has not been helpful for the interests of the Hungarians in Romania.

<sup>362</sup> The old kingdom, which was disintegrated at the Treaty of Trianon, included almost all the territories in which Hungarians live nowadays.

From that point on, when it was clear that the MSZP would vote for the Status Law, Népszabadság stopped its criticism. Subsequently, Újvári admitted that he approved of the SZDSZ' position in this matter, since the SZDSZ constantly refused the Status Law but nevertheless demanded that the Hungarian state should support the co-ethnics. He added that the CHN gave the co-ethnics something real, something they could touch and not just another empty promise from Budapest. The CHN was therefore a symbolic bond between Hungary and the co-ethnics.

#### 4.3.3 Népszabadság

##### 4.3.3.1 Tibor Kis

Tibor Kis studied International Relations and Journalistic Studies in Moscow. He has been working for Népszabadság since 1975 and has never worked for another newspaper. According to him, Népszabadság's political orientation depends on the deputy chief editors, of which there are three. Kis works for the section *publicisztika* [political journalism], which is under the supervision of the chief editor himself. There are between eight and ten journalists working in that section. The deputy editors choose the current theme and then decide which qualified journalist will write about it. The deputy chief editors work on a weekly turn and they have specific ideas about which themes should be discussed in the newspaper. Consequently, the journalist "*arról ír, amire a lapnak szüksége van*" [writes about what the newspaper needs]. Within these limits, the journalist may write what he pleases.

Kis estimates the majority of his colleagues to be politically left, which makes Népszabadság on the whole a left-wing/liberal daily. However, this does not mean that Népszabadság did not take a tough stand against the socialist governments of Gyula Horn (1994-1998) and Péter Medgyessy's (2002-2004) and criticised them. Nonetheless, Kis considers Népszabadság to be a newspaper in which the information, the news has the top priority. According to his assessment, Népszabadság is trying to become a source of reference and a mass paper at the same time. He added that many politicians read Népszabadság and very often they felt vilified. Nevertheless, Kis emphasised that unlike Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság was not bound to any political party. He exemplified with an encounter he had with former minister Géza Eszszky from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). During a public discussion, the former minister challenged Kis personally from the high table about an article Kis wrote about that minister and then started an argument.

Back in 2001 Kis considered the Status Law to be a good idea and he revised this position step by step. He told me that the government, which was led at that time by the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ), published information that was simply false: “*konzultációk nem voltak, tájékoztatások voltak*” [there have not been consultations, there have been notifications]. Kis referred to the dispute between Hungary and its two neighbours Slovakia and Romania about this lack of information about the Status Law. While FIDESZ insisted that there have been consultations with those two states, Slovakia and Romania denied having had any. Therefore, Kis said that the Hungarian government informed the neighbouring states but did not lead any negotiations or consultations with them.

Kis, however, at least considered the cultural grants to be very useful: scholarships, fellowships and investments in Hungarian language education facilities in the neighbouring states. According to him the Status Law had three major goals:

1. Home affairs. The Status Law's aim was to gain votes for the 2002 electoral campaign. The idea behind it was to show that FIDESZ has done something for the co-ethnics. For this goal one has to bear in mind that almost a third of all Hungarian citizens have relatives in the adjacent states. FIDESZ has tried to plug on that sentiment to gain more votes.
2. The Status Law was very important for the FIDESZ clientele, especially in Romania and Slovakia. Important, because through the money that flowed for different projects FIDESZ could also grant official financial assistance “*a havereknek*” [to the buddies]. Predominant among these were Miklós Duray, a high-ranking politician of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) of Slovakia, and Bishop László Tőkés, honorary president of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).
3. To top it all, FIDESZ was able to refinance itself with the money the Hungarian government sent abroad. The idea was to transfer government money to different organisations close to FIDESZ abroad and these organisations would transfer the money back on FIDESZ bank accounts. This money was then used to finance the FIDESZ' electoral campaign 2002. Kis used the expression “*etnokorupció*” [ethno-corruption] to describe these dubious affairs<sup>363</sup>.

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<sup>363</sup> I do not subscribe to all of Kis' assessments regarding the Hungarian government's and hence FIDESZ' goals in respect of the Status Law. Upon my question whether he has any proof to this alleged so-called ethno-corruption, Kis had to admit that he does not have any. However, during the interview I conducted with Béla Markó on 26<sup>th</sup> January 2004, I asked the UDMR's Chairman about ethno-corruption in the party. He admitted that there was and that it had become worse since the Status Law had come into

Concluding two and a half years after the Status Law has been passed by parliament, Kis considers the Status Law to be “*jelentéktelen*” [of no importance] since it hardly serves the co-ethnics, who were supposed to be the principal benefactors.

#### 4.3.3.2 József Szilvássy

József Szilvássy not only works as a journalist for the Hungarian daily Népszabadság. His main occupation is being the chief editor of Slovakia’s largest Hungarian daily, Új Szó. Since he spoke Czech fluently, he was sent to Czechoslovakia back in 1968 and has stayed there ever since. In 1990 he was elected by the journalists of Új Szó to become their new chief editor. Szilvássy is the only journalist who at the time of the interview was working as a chief editor and as a journalist. Therefore, his comments upon the journalists’ freedom of writing came from both sides of the medal. According to Szilvássy’s estimation Népszabadság has a daily edition of about 180000 to 210000 copies. The Friday edition usually supersedes 220000<sup>364</sup>. Szilvássy considers Népszabadság to be Hungary’s most influential daily newspaper, since politicians from all parts of the political spectrum are reading it. He added that many politicians did not like the newspaper but nevertheless they still read it.

Népszabadság’s advantage, said Szilvássy, lay in its very competent economic section. Szilvássy also emphasised that there were no political directives at Népszabadság, only professional priorities: “*a tény tiszta*” [nothing but the fact]. This quotation by Szilvássy can also be interpreted that there are no misunderstandings between journalists and editorial board. He added that each and every journalist was responsible for his own articles in which he made his statements.

Szilvássy’s personal opinion of the Status Law is that it was a compromise, which was haggled between László Tókécs, bishop of the Reformed Church and honorary president of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), Miklós Duray, high-ranking politician from the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) of Slovakia and state secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh. The compromise was made for the sake of Hungarians who live in Slovakia and the Ukraine. According to the laws of these two states, citizens who own another citizenship cannot become civil servants. By granting the Hungarian citizenship, which was the initial idea, many Hungarians in Slovakia and the Ukraine who are state employees could have lost

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effect on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2002. I take it for granted that if the chairman of a political party admits such doings in his party, there should be no doubt about their existence.

<sup>364</sup> Norbert Molnár estimates Népszabadság’s edition to be at about 150000 copies per day.

their job. Furthermore, Szilvássy assumed that the governments of Slovakia and Romania had worked together to weaken Hungary's position in the political debates over the Status Law. He saw two main problems that occurred in the debate over the Status Law. Both of them concerned sovereign authority:

1. The neighbouring states had to give their consent to foreign states granting benefits to their citizens. In the context of the Status Law it would mean that Hungary should have negotiated with its neighbouring states about the benefits it wanted to grant the co-ethnics prior to passing the Status Law.
2. Minority protection had to be a task, for which the respective state was responsible and not any foreign state. This would be in concurrence with the bilateral agreements that Hungary signed with its neighbours.

Szilvássy considered the support Hungary had granted the co-ethnics in the domain of education and training to have a very positive effect. However, he regarded the co-ethnics' possibility for medical treatment in Hungary to be a romantic idea, since the Hungarian medical care system would collapse instantly should the co-ethnics come in large numbers. Furthermore, he assessed the labour market regulations, i.e. the possibility to work in Hungary, to be without any effect in Slovakia, but very important for other regions, which have a high unemployment rate such as Carpathian-Ukraine<sup>365</sup> and Transylvania. According to his information, the only ones who seek work in Hungary were the Hungarians who live close to the border. They would drive across the border into Hungary every morning and would come back in the evening. However, these people crossed the border in search of work long before the Status Law had come into effect and therefore do not need it.

The Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN), Szilvássy said, was mainly used by four categories of people: pupils, students, pedagogues and pensioners. The Hungarian Ministry of Education regarded the first three groups as inlanders when granting admissions to colleges and other institutions of tertiary education. Szilvássy emphasised the importance of training co-ethnic pedagogues in Hungary.

In all, Szilvássy has mixed feelings about the Status Law: there are some benefits to the co-ethnics but much of it is just a symbolic gesture.

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<sup>365</sup> This region is the most western one in Ukraine. Most of the Hungarians in Ukraine live in that region.

#### 4.3.3.3 Zoltán Tibori Szabó

Zoltán Tibori Szabó has three college degrees: he graduated in Mechanical Engineering from the Polytechnic of Cluj-Napoca, History of Art at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca and Media Management in California, USA. Back in 1989, just before Ceauşescu was overthrown, he founded with some friends Szabadság, a Hungarian daily newspaper. He was elected chief editor, which he accepted under the condition that he would resign from that post when the newspaper finally had trained enough young, qualified personnel to take over the job. Consequently, the newspaper started sending young journalists to the West for training and experience. Tibori Szabó quit the chief editor's post in 1997. He described his problems with writing as thus: as a scientist you always know how much you do not know. This is not compatible with journalism, where you have to react fast and take the risk of not knowing everything. From 1990 onwards he started working for Népszabadság parallel to his job at Szabadság.

At the beginning of the nineties there were many journalists at Népszabadság who were politically left, said Tibori Szabó. Nevertheless, there was a very open and liberal atmosphere at Népszabadság, which enabled freethinking and writing. Tibori Szabó called that period “*szellemi műhely*” [intellectual workshop]. Nowadays the journalists at Népszabadság represented all sides of the political spectrum. There were journalists that supported the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ) and even the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). The atmosphere was no longer as liberal as it used to be. However, the journalists had complete freedom to write what they thought was right. Political tendencies in the newspaper therefore depended on each and every journalist's preference and conviction. According to Tibori Szabó's assessment, Népszabadság has a great influence on Hungarian politics but also on the Romanian government. On the Romanian government's homepage there was a section called *presa maghiară* [Hungarian press], where the surfer could read articles from Népszabadság, which had been translated into Romanian<sup>366</sup>. Hungarian politicians reacted very fast to articles in Népszabadság published about them and often wished to publish themselves.

Upon my question regarding Hungarian politics towards the co-ethnics, Tibori Szabó told me the following little anecdote: In 1990 he went to Hungary as a journalist from Transylvania and asked all parties about their intentions in regard of the co-ethnics. They all answered that they will do their utmost possible to ease the co-ethnics'

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<sup>366</sup> This was true at the time of the interview. However, in April 2006 that specific section of the homepage did not contain any Hungarian newspaper articles at all. Apparently the translation service has been closed.

situation. A short time later, as an interpreter for the Swiss newspaper *La Suisse*, he asked the same parties the same questions and received from all sides the same answer. Only this time around it was different: all parties told him that Hungary had enough troubles of its own and that the country cannot take care of the co-ethnics' problems too.

Despite his critical stand against the Status Law, Tibori Szabó still thinks that there are a few aspects that have helped the co-ethnics. The Hungarian government would have achieved much more if it had not made so much noise about the Status Law. He hoped that the Hungarian government would keep its promise and pay the children's education allowance it had promised. According to his information there had been serious delays in the payments. Financial support in general, he added, was only useful when it helped the co-ethnics there where they lived, and not in Hungary. Otherwise emigration could eventually dissolve the Hungarian communities in Hungary's neighbouring states.

Money, however, was not always essential for supporting the co-ethnics. Tibori Szabó gave an example of how Hungary could help with simple gestures: The Széchenyi National Library's (OSZK) Board of Directors had decided to enable all co-ethnics to use the library free of charge. When Tibori Szabó went to Budapest to look for some books at the OSZK, they asked for his passport and whether he was a co-ethnic. Upon that he was able to use the library free of charge. There are, however, also bad examples. He met an elderly lady at the National Museum in Budapest, who possessed a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN), that according to the Status Law otherwise would have guaranteed her free entry to the museum. She was obliged to pay the entry fee, because the museum's directors decided that even those who possessed the CHN had to pay. Tibori Szabó admitted that the CHN had more of a symbolic than financial or practical meaning and that many elderly kept the CHN as proof of their 'Hungarian-ness'.

Tibori Szabó also spoke of dual citizenship. According to him the whole issue of *kettősállampolgárság* [dual citizenship] was initiated by FIDESZ after losing the 2002 elections. Their idea was to grant Hungarians in the Vojvodina the Hungarian citizenship, because Hungarians from Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania no longer needed a visa. It became clear that Slovakia and Slovenia (together with Hungary) would join the European Union (EU) and therefore the Status Law would become obsolete in those states. Furthermore, since Romanian citizens no longer needed a visa for the EU and the situation calmed down after the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum,

Hungarian politics focused on the two remaining states with a Hungarian minority, which at the time did not have a chance to join the EU: Serbia and Montenegro and Ukraine.

In congruence with the information I received from Norbert Molnár and Tibor Kis, Tibori Szabó also talked about ethno corruption. According to his information the Hungarian government transferred about HUF 10 billion to Romanian accounts, at the beginning of 2002. This money was supposed to be used for the children's educational allowance and to support other projects initiated by the Status Law. Unfortunately, this money was administered by those members of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) who sympathised with FIDESZ. These people embezzled a great deal of that money. When Tibori Szabó wrote an article about this grievance, the chief editor in Budapest called him and asked him whether he had proof of these accusations, in case one of the mentioned persons would sue *Népszabadság*. Tibori Szabó reassured that he had UDMR members who would be willing to testify and so the article was published.

#### 4.3.4 România Liberă

##### 4.3.4.1 Simona Popescu

Simona Popescu graduated from the College of Journalistic Studies in Bucharest. She worked for two other newspapers since 1990: *Dreptatea* (1990) and *Evenimentul Zilei* (1991-1992). In 1992 she joined *România Liberă* and from 1997 onwards she headed the departments *Anchete speciale* [special investigations] and *Politica internă* [home affairs]. After the opposition had won the elections in December 1996 and Victor Ciorbea had become Prime Minister, Popescu worked for half a year as the director of the Romanian Government's Press Section.

*România Liberă* was trying to maintain its status as a politically independent newspaper, said Popescu. Politically independent meant in the context of *România Liberă* not to be bound to any specific political party and remain strictly pro-democratic. Although the newspaper was positioned somewhere in the middle of the political spectrum, she added, the paper did show conservative facets. Popescu considers the newspaper to have an important role in Romanian society. According to her, *România Liberă* had driven the post-Communists out of office at the 1996 elections. At this point she referred specifically to former Romanian President Ion Iliescu (1990-1996; 2000-2004), who is still honorary president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), heir of the former Romanian Communist Party (PCR). Popescu indirectly considers it *România*

Liberă's goal to fight the post-Communists: "*Sunten coșmarul celor de la PSD*" [We are the nightmare for those from the PSD]. Members of the PSD did admit, she added, that they regularly read the daily issue's third page, which was about home affairs, and were keen to retort. Opposition parties read România Liberă too, continued Popescu, so that they can have new ideas for their communiqués. Opposition, in Popescu's terms, are democratic parties. This definition excludes the PSD and the Greater Romania Party (PRM).

Otherwise, România Liberă's influence was particularly high among two age groups: those between 30 and 40, who had a clear perception of democracy, and the elderly, who had never accepted communisms' influence. România Liberă also dedicates an entire page in every edition to the readers' comments, which the editorial board considers to be a very important issue. Popescu emphasised the fact that România Liberă was the only newspaper in Romania in which an editor could tackle all journalistic styles without hindrance and a journalist could develop his skills. Since all editors were below the age of forty, some even under thirty, they were free of communist indoctrination; they were willing to speak up and to practice their profession in the liberty they want.

The Status Law, said Popescu, was a good law for the Hungarians, because it helped them maintain their possibilities to develop and to sustain their rights. She considers the Status Law to be a bridge between Hungary and the co-ethnics. At a given moment she was even jealous of the Hungarians in Romania, because the Romanian government did not allocate the same resources for the Romanians who lived in Romania's neighbouring states, which could have been done if the government had appealed to a different resource: solidarity with the Romanians abroad. However, Popescu considered that the Status Law would become ineffectual when both states joined the European Union. Popescu admitted that România Liberă has written very little about the Status Law. Other papers, such as Adevărul or Dimineața, had published more articles and were against the Status Law. However, she considered these two newspapers to be very close to the government and hence to the PSD. She went even as far as to consider Dimineața to be the PSD's "*oficiosul*" [semi-official newspaper]. Both of România Liberă's sections which dealt with the Status Law, home and foreign affairs, Popescu concluded, had treated the matter in a strictly informative manner.

#### 4.3.5 Conclusions from the interviews

One of the predominant aspects revealed by the interviews was the trans-cultural notion. The Status Law with its attempt to emphasise and underline ethnic and political borders was revealed as a construction by the same persons who discussed the issue in the public discourse surrounding the Status Law: the journalists, who write in Hungarian. Unlike Rodica Ciobanu and Simona Popescu, who lived in their native country, wrote in Romanian and worked for a Romanian newspaper, most of the Hungarian-speaking journalists had at least one point where they cross the political border: either the newspaper was abroad, e.g. Zoltán Tibori Szabó of Norbert Molnár, or they themselves had moved to work in another country, e.g. Iván Zsolt Nagy or József Szilvássy. This made monolithic statements such as ‘the Hungarian journalists’ lose their validity and raise questions: who is Hungarian, who and what defines it? These thoughts questioned the very basic supposition of human sciences that cultures had borders. According to Welsch, cultures should no longer be regarded as entities with rigid boundaries. Since cultural boundaries had become more permeable, one should speak of the trans-cultural aspects or simply transculturality (Welsch 1999). The application of this trans-cultural concept to the results of the interviews meant a revision of the binary Hungarian-Romanian structure of the discourse presented previously<sup>367</sup>. Therefore it was difficult to speak of ‘Hungarian journalists’ or ‘Romanian journalists’, since the ethnic specifications ‘Hungarian’ and ‘Romanian’ were imprecise. Consequently, the only differentiation I can rely on is the language used in the article. In other words, by saying ‘Hungarian journalist’ I mean a journalist who writes in Hungarian. The same is valid for their Romanian counterparts. The polyglot and often multi-ethnic surrounding in which they work is an indicator for the Status Law’s practical problems, which has also been demonstrated by the Romanian-Hungarian political debate over the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum.

The interviewed journalists had an ambivalent attitude towards the mechanism of cultural segregation initiated by the Status Law. They constantly challenged the Status Law for the differentiation, discrimination or any other synonym for the strife it provoked on the political level. However, none of them, and this also included the Romanian journalists, opposed the idea that Hungary should support the Hungarians in the neighbouring states.

The newspapers’ formal aspects had confirmed some of my initial assessments:

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<sup>367</sup> See Figure 3.

- All journalists considered ‘their’ newspaper to be one of the most important dailies in Hungary or Romania, if not the most important one.
- They all agreed that journalists had the freedom to write whatever they please. Obviously they were referring to the political aspects of their text and within the frames of judicial restrictions.
- The claim of neutrality had proved to be wishful thinking from the point of view of a discourse analysis. My supposition that each of the four papers had a specific political tendency in regard of the Status Law has proved to be correct: Magyar Hírlap’s views were very close to the ones of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), Népszabadság was closer to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) than to any other party in Hungary. In Romania, România Liberă turned out to be the slightly conservative paper with strong democratic notion and steadfastness for fighting against corruption and mismanagement in Romanian politics. Adevărul on the other hand, had apparently a more ambivalent relationship to political power. Although Ciobanu insisted on Adevărul being a liberal newspaper, there had been articles, which clearly supported the social democratic-led coalition government under Prime Minister Adrian Năstase.
- If at all, some journalists criticised other papers, but never the one they were currently working for. Újvári criticised Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap’s strongest competitor among the liberal papers, and Simona Popescu criticised Adevărul for sympathising with the Social Democratic Party.
- None of the journalists, who worked for different papers, e.g. Zoltán Tibori Szabó, József Szilvássy or Norbert Molnár, considered it to be a problem or to hinder their work. All three agreed that they could very well separate their activities from one another.

The interviews have granted me an insight which otherwise would have remained secret to me. This especially includes the background information concerning ethno corruption, which was mentioned by Rodica Ciobanu, Tibor Kis, Norbert Molnár and Zoltán Tibori Szabó. This means that three out of four papers had discussed the matter. Another background information referred to the network consisting of Zolt Németh from Hungary, Miklós Duray from Slovakia and László Tóké from Romania. Apparently, together with the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT), they are the people behind the Hungarian Status Law. The two prime ministers, Orbán and Năstase, started interacting after the Law was transferred from the administrative to the executive political level.

## 5. Final conclusions

Writing the closing stages to a thesis completes the circle of presentation, information, justification, research, argumentation and conclusion. In other words, the thesis' congruence of argumentation regarding theory and practice is examined. This congruence makes the thesis complete: a scientific study with the capacity to promote further investigation and research into its specific field. Or as a tool for epistemological research, as Foucault and Bourdieu/Wacquant once put it (Bourdieu – Wacquant 2006; Foucault 1976).

Analysing discourses involves a tedious search for meanings, both obvious and hidden ones. The search is only brought to a preliminary end when the researcher can make certain statements that he has concluded from studying the discourses in question. These statements include different perspectives within clearly defined frames of time and space. By taking a threefold perspective on the two intersecting discourses<sup>368</sup>, i.e. a diachronic analysis, a synchronic analysis and an interview analysis, I have visualised chosen sectors of the Hungarian and Romanian press in the years 2001-2003 regarding the discursive event of the Hungarian Status Law. The extensive results have shown specific characteristics in each and every newspaper. In this chapter I shall go one step beyond and interpret the obtained data, thereby answering two questions, one regarding the co-ethnics' ethnic construction and the other concerning the journalistic narratives' role in their respective discourses.

### 5.1 Ethnic denotations

In the preliminary remarks I set out to analyse how journalistic texts constructed the co-ethnics in the light of the Hungarian Status Law<sup>369</sup>. By constructed I meant the way in which journalists used ethnic denotations to create, define and re-position ethnic groups that can be subsumed as co-ethnics. As it turned out, the journalists' and thus their respective newspapers' concept of nation and ethnicity played a decisive role. In order to demonstrate this I have chosen to separate the two sets of results into two subchapters.

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<sup>368</sup> See Figure 3.

<sup>369</sup> See Chapter 0.

### 5.1.1 General features

Denoting groups of people on an ethnic basis is a common feature in all four newspapers and is therefore essential for this thesis. The ethnic denotations analysed in this work reveal the thoughts behind the text and enable a better understanding of the mechanism in each journalistic narrative. Combining Saussure's binary system of signifier and signified (Prechtl 1994) with Barth's concept of boundaries (Barth 1970), I thus conclude that each denotation represents a different ethnic group with specific boundaries. These boundaries are neither given nor natural; they are the result of an intended and contested debate in the field of ethnicity. Therefore, I consider competing ethnic denotations, i.e. various denotations that engulf more or less the same group of people, to be proof of the discursive construction of ethnicity.

In the following tables (Table 13 and 14) I have juxtaposed the sum of all Hungarian denotations with the Romanian ones. They are a statistical summary of Tables 10 and 11. It further allows a direct comparison between the representatives of the Hungarian discourse on the one hand, i.e. the newspapers *Magyar Hírlap* and *Népszabadság*, and those of the Romanian discourse on the other, i.e. *Adevărul* and *România Liberă*:

Table 13: Ethnic denotations by country/language

Country / Language	Number of denotations	Denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania	Ratio
Hungarian newspapers	125	22	5.7:1
Romanian newspapers	33	6	5.5:1

Although not extensive, the table above permits certain conclusions regarding the two discourses involved<sup>370</sup>:

1. Number of Hungarian denotations. There is a substantial numeric gap between the 125 Hungarian denotations and the 33 Romanian ones. It is a clear indicator for the intensity and diversity present in the Hungarian discourse regarding the Hungarians in the neighbouring states. Bearing in mind that the debate is almost 90 years old, the possibilities to talk about and denote Hungarians outside of Hungary has become very diversified. This diversity permits a very subtle and exact way of talking about the co-ethnics. Contrary to this abundance of denotations, the Romanian side has been more strict and rigid. Unlike the Hungarian discourse, which is strictly about Hungarians, the Romanian

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<sup>370</sup> See Chapter 1.

- discourse since Trianon (1920) took three major minorities in Romania into consideration: Hungarians, Germans and Jews. After World War II there were few Jews left in Romania and many Germans had also left or were deported to the Soviet Union. The German exodus at the beginning of the nineties completed this process. However, during the last years the aspect of denotation within the Romanian discourse shifted towards the Roma (Gypsies). The government ordered to change the orthography from Romi (plural form) to Rromi to make sure that the two stems Român (Romanian) and Rrom (Gypsy) are not confused.
2. Hungarian denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania. The number of denotations used for creating Hungarians in Romania is high. It is not reached by denotations regarding Hungarians from any other state, not even Slovakia or Serbia. Therefore, this number, 22, is clear evidence of the significant role Hungarians in Romania play in the Hungarian discourse. On the other hand, when comparing it to the other 103 denotations that do not have any geographical reference to Romania, this number seems quite small. Bearing in mind that the Hungarians of Romania make up about 60% of all co-ethnics, I conclude that the Hungarian discourse is focused on the co-ethnics as a whole and does not over-represent the Hungarians of Romania. Thus, the Hungarian discourse clearly shows its concern to all co-ethnics, which indicates its full awareness to all territories that used to be part of the defunct Hungarian kingdom and still inhabit co-ethnics, regardless of their numeric size.
  3. Number of Romanian denotations. When considering the Romanian results I subtracted the six denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania from the total sum of 33 Romanian denotations. As a result, I obtained 27 denotations that, with few exceptions, obviously regard Hungarians also in countries other than Romania. This result is not surprising when considering the geographical distribution of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. However, bearing in mind that the Romanian discourse is focused upon minorities within Romania, this number is striking. It shows the Romanian newspapers' awareness of the fact that there are co-ethnics also in other countries, not just in Romania. Consequently, these ethnic denotations show a break in the political borders of the Romanian discourse.
  4. Equal proportions. The ratios demonstrated in Table 13 show a striking similarity between the Romanian and the Hungarian denotations. Therefore, it is shown that the Romanian journalists are not just aware of the other Hungarian

minorities in the Carpathian Basin, but follow suit with their Hungarian colleagues in the importance they place on the two categories, i.e. Hungarians in Romania and Hungarians outside Hungary in general. Thus, I conclude, that Hungarian and Romanian journalists have a very similar sense of proportion regarding the Hungarian minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, language and political borders do *not* play a significant role in this respect.

The following table (Table 14) shows five different aspects, which represent some of the newspapers' general features in a transparent comparison. I chose the symbols plus (+) if the feature is available and minus (-) if the feature is not present in that newspaper's narrative.

Table 14: Ethnic denotations: General features

Feature	Magyar Hírlap	Népszabadság	Adevărul	România Liberă
Dominant denotation	+	+	-	-
Nation	+	+	-	-
Emic denotations	+	+	-	-
High variety of denotations in relation to amount of articles	+	+	+	+
Variety of ethnonyms	-	-	+	-

The table shows clearly specific differences between the Hungarian and the Romanian newspapers but also some differences between the two Romanian newspapers:

1. The most striking difference concerns a dominant denotation. Apparently present in the Hungarian articles it is completely missing in the Romanian ones. The Hungarian denotation *határon túli magyarok* (Magyars beyond the border), which is omnipresent in the Hungarian narratives and thus in the Hungarian public discourse, does not have a comparative denotation in the Romanian newspapers. This phenomenon bears evidence to the consensus among Hungarian journalists regarding the co-ethnics on the one side, and the plurality of thoughts on the other, i.e. the Romanian journalists' side. This could be explained by the length of time that has elapsed since the Treaty of Trianon (1920), in which the Hungarian public has been aware of the co-ethnics' situation, thus allowing a specific denotation to become so dominant in Hungary. Subsequently, the fact that the Romanian public has shown little

concern with the co-ethnics in the last eighty-five years could be an explanation for the lack of a comparable dominant ethnic denotation in Romania in general and in *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* in particular.

2. The next feature, nation, refers only to the usage of this word in connection with ethnic denotations<sup>371</sup>. Thus, again, it is only the Hungarian newspapers that use it. Using the term nation together with ethnic denotations gives minorities the esteem of being a nation and not “just” an ethnic group. Consequently, for the Hungarian journalists the co-ethnics can form nations within the states they live in, thus using the term nations for groups of people constituting that state and for groups within that frame. For the Romanian journalists it is impossible, since all ethnic groups in Romania form part of the Romanian nation. This opposed understanding and usage of the term nation is one of the main dividing elements between the Hungarian and the Romanian narrative.
3. *Magyar Hírlap* and *Népszabadság* are the two newspapers to use denotations that have an emic character<sup>372</sup>. The Hungarian journalists thus try to incorporate a more differentiated perspective upon ethnicity, which is more descriptive and less essentialist. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, by using those denotations journalists do *not* give up their position of power, which enables them to denote people. However, by using such ethnic denotations the Hungarian journalists display their awareness of the fact that ethnicity is not given, but rather chosen<sup>373</sup>. This is completely missing in the ethnic denotations used by their Romanian counterparts. This permits the conclusion that the Romanian journalists consider ethnicity as given and static, i.e. essentialist.
4. Although *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* have published much less articles regarding the Hungarian Status Law than the Hungarian newspapers at stake, the proportion between the number of articles published and the variety of ethnic denotations used is very close. Thus I conclude that each journalistic narrative, be it Romanian or Hungarian, is the result of a conglomerate of ideas that flows in a specific direction. By this I mean that the narrative’s direction in free newspapers is accidental and not planned. One of my interviewees told me that the newspaper he is writing for used to be a workshop of ideas back in the nineties and that the journalists still represent the entire spectrum of Hungarian

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<sup>371</sup> For a different aspect of nation see subchapter 5.1.4

<sup>372</sup> See also subchapters 4.1.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.1.2

<sup>373</sup> See denotations 63, 64, 76 and 104 in Table 10.

politics with slight tendencies towards the political left<sup>374</sup>. The variety of denotations bears evidence to this statement's validity in all four newspapers analysed for this thesis.

- As already mentioned in Chapter 4, *Adevărul* is the only newspaper that uses two ethnonyms for the co-ethnics: *ungur* (Hungarian) and *maghiar* (Magyar). The difference between the two lies in the way they were used in communist Romania during the seventies and eighties; *Unguri* (in plural) were the inhabitants of the Hungarian People's Republic while *maghiari* (in plural) were those citizens of Romania who were ethnically Hungarian. Hence there were two ethnic entities and the idea that there is a cultural or ethnic nation beyond any political boundaries, as many Hungarians propagated it, was linguistically smashed. The term *ungur* has lost ground significantly after 1990 and the fact that some of *Adevărul*'s journalists still use it is a reminiscence of the old communist narrative. The Hungarian journalists do not use two ethnonyms since the Hungarian language has only a single ethnonym for Hungarians, namely *magyarok* (Magyars). However, there are two ethnonyms for Romanians in Hungarian: *román* (Romanian) and *oláh* (Vlach). While the first one is the common of the two ethnonyms and is based on the Romanians' self chosen ethnonym from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the last one is much older and is used nowadays in an offensive, insulting manner (Mitu 2006; 269-280).

In the following table (Table 15) I have gone one step further and differentiated between all four newspapers.

Table 15: Ethnic denotations by newspaper.

Newspaper	Published	Number of denotations regarding all co-ethnics	Denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania	Ratio
Magyar Hírlap	Hungary	64	14	4.57:1
Népszabadság	Hungary	96	17	5.65:1
Adevărul	Romania	25	4	6.25:1
România Liberă	Romania	17	4	4.25:1

The table enables the following conclusions:

<sup>374</sup> Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

1. Denotations in the Romanian newspapers. Adevărul has more denotations than România Liberă. This difference between the two Romanian newspapers shows România Liberă's more restricted use of denotations. In other words, România Liberă's narrative displays a common line of denoting Hungarians, which is widely shared by that newspaper's journalists. On the other hand, it shows Adevărul's variety of different approaches regarding Hungarians both within and outside Romania. Consequently, this diversity of denotations used by Adevărul's journalists indicates that they do not share a common ethnic approach vis-à-vis the Hungarians in Central and Eastern Europe.
2. Denotations in the Hungarian newspapers. Magyar Hírlap, in comparison to Népszabadság, has a clear line and a stronger emphasis on Hungarians in Romania than on Hungarians in general. This has two reasons: firstly, Magyar Hírlap's emphasis on the Hungarians in Romania bears evidence of these people's numeric weight among all Hungarians living outside Hungary<sup>375</sup>. Secondly, as some of the articles analysed for this thesis have shown, Magyar Hírlap rather quotes the Hungarian-Transylvanian daily *Krónika*, which is Romania's best selling newspaper in Hungarian, than *Új Szó*, which is Slovakia's best selling daily in Hungarian. Consequently, the ties are apparently closer to the Hungarians of Romania than to those of Slovakia. This is especially evident in the following denotation, which is used only by Magyar Hírlap: *Persons, who live in Romania, consider themselves to be of Magyar nationality not Hungarian citizens*<sup>376</sup>. On the other hand, Népszabadság has more denotations than Magyar Hírlap, thus showing the diversity of views represented by its journalists. As one of my interviewees exclaimed<sup>377</sup>, the range of political views represented among the journalists working for Népszabadság is very wide. These political views in turn influence the usage of denotations, especially in the realm of ethnicity, which is of importance for this work.
3. Ratios. Considering all four newspapers, Adevărul has the highest proportion regarding the two categories of denoting, while România Libera has the lowest of all. Subsequently, the Hungarian newspapers show a smaller difference between their respective ratios. This difference in ratios can be explained through the difference of perspective between the Hungarian and the Romanian newspapers. For the two Hungarian dailies, regardless of narrative and political

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<sup>375</sup> See Table 5.

<sup>376</sup> See Table 10, Denotation 102.

<sup>377</sup> Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

views, all co-ethnics by definition are outside the borders of the Republic of Hungary. For the Romanian newspapers the co-ethnics are inside as well as outside Romania. Thus, the Romanian newspapers have the possibility to differentiate between *here*, i.e. in Romania, and *there*, i.e. in other regions of the Carpathian Basin, which the Hungarian newspapers do not.

### 5.1.2 Specific Hungarian features

The Hungarian newspapers have displayed a series of common features despite their distinct ways of constructing the Hungarians in Romania with different ethnic denotations. Subsequently, I will start with these common features and then move forward to each newspaper's characteristics.

The following features are common to both newspapers:

1. The complexity of the term nation. *Nemzet* [nation] has two important roles in the Hungarian newspapers: erasing the difference between majority and minority and showing the Hungarian state's ambiguous relation to the co-ethnics. The first role is an old one, reminiscent of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, dating back to the Hungarian Nationalities Law from 1868 (Vladár 1943: 156-165). That law guaranteed all nationalities, i.e. ethnic minorities, of the Kingdom of Hungary certain rights, but at the same time defined Hungary's population as the Hungarian Nation. Consequently, the law used the same substantive for two different meanings. This ambiguity has remained in both newspapers, since they refer to the co-ethnics often as nationals or national minorities, e.g. *Romániában élő nemzeti kisebbség* [National minority that lives in Romania] but also as part of the Hungarian nation, e.g. *nemzet külhoni fele* [The nation's part abroad]<sup>378</sup>. The second role, regarding the Hungarian state's ambiguous role vis-à-vis the co-ethnics, lies in the dual nature of this relationship: Hungary as a state is responsible for its citizens, e.g. *Külföldi állampolgárok* [Foreign citizens] but Hungary as a cultural-linguistic nation is responsible for all those who consider themselves to belong to this nation, e.g. *Kárpát medencei magyarok* [Magyars of the Carpathian Basin]<sup>379</sup>. Hence, the ethnic denotations bear evidence to Hungary's dual role when interpreting the meaning of the term nation.
2. A common semantic field. Both newspapers have used lexemes, which together form a specific semantic field with the leitmotif *abroad*: *Határ* [border], *külföld*

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<sup>378</sup> See Table 10.

<sup>379</sup> Idem.

- [abroad], *ott/ottani* [there/from there] and *szomszéd* [neighbour] transmit the image of the co-ethnics being somewhere else rather than in Hungary. These terms reflect again the ambiguity of the co-ethnics as part of the larger cultural-linguistic Hungarian nation but at the same time political citizens of other states.
3. The position of the speaker. Two of my interviewees, Zoltán Tibori-Szabó from Népszabadság and Tibor Bogdán from Magyar Hírlap have an indistinct position of speaking within each newspaper's narrative<sup>380</sup>. They both consider themselves as co-ethnics and write about the Hungarians in Romania from Romania for a Hungarian newspaper published in Hungary. Consequently, when they write about *határon túli magyarok* [Magyars beyond the border], whom do they mean? They practically talk in the third person of the group they identify with. According to my assessment, by writing in that specific way they perform *différance* by positioning themselves culturally, linguistically and geographically in the Hungarian nation although they write from Romania to which they belong politically.

The ethnic denotations used by Magyar Hírlap show the newspaper's specific pattern, whose features from Tables 10 and 10a can be summed up as thus:

1. Realistic political approach. Magyar Hírlap used Romania as a geographic point of reference more often than *Erdély* [Transylvania]. This demonstrates Magyar Hírlap's emphasis on the fact that Transylvania is a part of Romania and therefore the Hungarians that live there are part of the Romanian political system. This tendency is further demonstrated in Magyar Hírlap's use of the term *state* more frequently than *nation*, when describing the co-ethnics. Obviously, this emphasis bears evidence to Magyar Hírlap's view that citizenship and statehood are the primary means of identification while ethnicity and nationality are secondary. Furthermore, the frequent use of *határon túl* [beyond the border] strengthens the image of the co-ethnics as groups that live outside Hungary's borders and hence are not part of the nation-state.
2. Neutrality. Magyar Hírlap displays a politically more neutral attitude within the discourse concerning the relationship between the Hungarian state and the co-ethnics. The clearest evidence of this effort is the use of the Status Law's own

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<sup>380</sup> This is also the case for József Szilvássy from Népszabadság and Norbert Molnár from Magyar Hírlap, both writing from Bratislava, Slovakia.

definition as an ethnic denotation<sup>381</sup>. It is unique in all four newspapers. By using this specific denotation, Magyar Hírlap has tried to express its neutrality, since the denotation is laid down in the Status Law itself. Magyar Hírlap has also used denotations, which reflect an emic approach<sup>382</sup>. By using denotations that include a certain group's own definition, Magyar Hírlap suggests a neutral standpoint in the discourse<sup>383</sup>. Furthermore, Magyar Hírlap displays a balanced usage between *magyarok* [Magyars] and *magyarság* [Magyardom]. This underlines again the fact that the newspaper has a strict and specific interest only in the people the Status Law affects.

3. Professionalism. This facet of Magyar Hírlap's narrative contains two aspects: the number of denotations used and the emphasis on ethnicity rather than on nation. Magyar Hírlap has used far less denotations to describe the co-ethnic than Népszabadság. This means that there is a consensus among its journalists about the denotations to be used. It shows a common line of thought and a professional attitude towards the termini. Furthermore, in comparison to Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap used the adjective *ethnic* more often than *national*. By avoiding *national* and using *ethnic*, Magyar Hírlap tried to avoid the duality of the term *national* previously demonstrated. In addition, Magyar Hírlap showed its modern attitude and receptiveness, since using the adjective *ethnic* is a modern development after 1990.

These conclusions show Magyar Hírlap's strong emphasis on political correctness and modern terminology. Additionally, the newspaper is eager to represent a more balanced debate with less polemics and national pathos. Therefore, the co-ethnics are represented in Magyar Hírlap in a more consequential manner, as people who live outside Hungary's borders and perform Hungarian ethnicity. According to Magyar Hírlap, the co-ethnics are first citizens of other states and then a part of a larger cultural and/or linguistic Hungarian nation.

Népszabadság, unlike Magyar Hírlap, has a different conception regarding the co-ethnics. As Tables 10 and 10a reveal, Népszabadság has a distinct pattern that concentrates on three major points:

1. Nationalism. Népszabadság constructs the co-ethnics from a more national perspective, which is manifested in two specific facets of the ethnic denotations

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<sup>381</sup> See denotation 17 in Table 10a.

<sup>382</sup> See denotation 12 in Table 10a.

<sup>383</sup> See also subchapter 4.1.1.1.1.

the newspaper has used: *Erdély* [Transylvania] is used more often than *Románia* [Romania] when describing Hungarians in Romania and the term *nation* is used more often than the term *state*. By using Transylvania more often than Romania Népszabadság has made a clear statement: The Hungarians in Romania do not live in the state called Romania but rather in the area previously known as the Principality of Transylvania<sup>384</sup>. The different connotations *Erdély* [Transylvania] and *Románia* [Romania] have in Hungarian are used for this linguistic trick<sup>385</sup>. The political reality of the Romanian state and Transylvanian ethnic majority, i.e. the Romanians, are thus put aside. Furthermore, Népszabadság's journalists create the illusion that Transylvania is a remote place, which has nothing to do with Romania. The second facet regarding *nation* and *state* goes back to the ambiguous relationship between the Hungarian state and the co-ethnics regarding the question as to whether Hungary is a state or a cultural and linguistic nation, regardless of political boundaries. By using *nation* more often than *state* when discussing the co-ethnics, Népszabadság has clearly opted for the cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation and not for Hungary as a state.

2. Historic awareness. A close look at the ethnic denotations used in Népszabadság reveals the newspaper's historic awareness regarding the co-ethnics in general and the Hungarians in Romania in particular. This awareness is twofold: the connotation of the Treaty of Trianon and the frequent use of *magyarság* [Magyardom] instead of *magyarok* [Magyars]. From the Hungarian national point of view, Trianon represents an injustice and a heavy burden for Hungary as well as for the co-ethnics. Denotations such as *kisebbségi sorba jutott magyarság* [Magyardom that has become minority] or *Trianoni határokön kívül rekedt magyarság kisebbsége* [The minor part of Magyardom that remained outside the Trianon borders] bear evidence to this awareness of Trianon<sup>386</sup>. Talking of Trianon is also a way of remembering it. Thus, Népszabadság is trying to keep the memory of Trianon alive by using ethnic denotations that relate to that treaty. The second issue is less polemic and regards the minute difference between writing about Magyardom, as in *államon kívüli magyarság* [Magyardom outside the state], and Magyars, as in *Erdélyi magyarok* [Transylvanian Magyars]. While Magyars relates to physical persons, Magyardom relates to a wider context. Magyardom includes all that is related to

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<sup>384</sup> See also Table 4.

<sup>385</sup> See subchapter 4.1.1.1.2.

<sup>386</sup> See Table 10.

the Magyars, e.g. language, art, customs, religion etc. Therefore, Népszabadság's predominant use of Magyarodom connects the co-ethnics to the larger, history laden, cultural-linguistic Hungarian nation. To put it differently, by talking of Magyarodom Népszabadság leaves the political borders suggested by Magyars and enters a different realm, one of culture and language.

3. Inconsequentiality. The variety of ethnic denotations used by Népszabadság reveal the newspaper's inconsistency in regard of a clear line of representation. There are many denotations that practically contradict each other, e.g. *anyaországtól elszakadt honfitársaink* [Our compatriots who are separated from the homeland] and *magyar nemzetiségű román állampolgárok* [Romanian citizens of Magyar nationality]<sup>387</sup>. This bears evidence to the fact that the journalists at Népszabadság represent different parts of the political spectrum<sup>388</sup>. However, an interviewee told me that Népszabadság is trying to become a source of reference<sup>389</sup>. According to my understanding, a newspaper that wants to become a source of reference should have a clear-cut vocabulary in order to avoid ambiguity and to demonstrate a comprehensive terminology. The ethnic denotations used by Népszabadság do not fulfil such high standards. However, this contradictory situation clearly shows the freedom of writing practiced at Népszabadság but also the lack of terminological coordination.

In sum, Népszabadság's ethnic denotations are more to the political right than the first superficial impression might suggest. They show that Népszabadság has strong undercurrents towards historic-national talk, despite the diversity of the denotations, as was manifested in the denotations with connotation to the Treaty of Trianon. This means that the co-ethnics are discussed controversially in Népszabadság and that they form a national issue for the journalists who work for that newspaper.

### 5.1.3 Specific Romanian features

The co-ethnics play a different role in the Romanian newspapers. Unlike the Hungarian newspapers, the Romanian ones refer to ethnic groups, which are within as well as outside Romania. Although around 60% of all co-ethnics live in Romania, the Romanian newspapers do not fail to refer to the co-ethnics in general. This awareness is

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<sup>387</sup> Idem.

<sup>388</sup> Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

<sup>389</sup> Interview with Tibor Kis.

an indicator to the fact that the discourse about the minorities in Romania is taken by *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* beyond political boundaries.

There is an interesting numeric parallel between the Romanian and the Hungarian denotations: the ratios between general denotations referring to all co-ethnics and denotations referring to Romania and Transylvania alone are very close. In other words, *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* take the same consideration as the Hungarian newspapers in discussing the Hungarian co-ethnics in general as in discussing the largest group of co-ethnics, i.e. the Hungarians in Romania<sup>390</sup>. It is clear evidence to *Adevărul*'s and *România Liberă*'s awareness of the ethnic complexity in the Carpathian Basin. This result is contradictory to what the Romanian journalists have told me, since according to my interviewees the Hungarian Status Law has not played a significant role in Romania's press<sup>391</sup>.

Despite the differences between the two Romanian newspapers, there are some common facets in the ethnic denotations they use:

1. *Ethnic* instead of *national*. Both newspapers use denotations such as  *cetățeni români de etnie maghiară* [Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos] or *etnici maghiari* [Ethnic Magyars]<sup>392</sup> but never the term *national*. Accordingly, the co-ethnics are presented in *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* as people that are not entitled to be nations. Using the term *nation* could suggest a different political entity within the frame of the Romanian state. Therefore, both Romanian newspapers share a common political idea: the Hungarians in Romania are an ethnic phenomenon and the Hungarians are part of the Romanian nation.
2. Status Law. Neither *Adevărul* nor *România Liberă* mentions the Status Law a single time as reference for the ethnic denotations they use. This could be a hint at the Romanian newspapers' emphasis on other issues, such as territorial or political belonging, and less on juridical definitions of identity and ethnicity.
3. Abroad as a semantic field. In congruence with the Hungarian newspapers, *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* have used a wide range of expressions to demonstrate the co-ethnics' position outside Hungary's borders, e.g. *Etnici maghiari de peste hotare* [Ethnic Magyars beyond the boundaries], *maghiari din statele vecine Ungariei* [Magyars from Hungary's neighbouring states], *maghiari în afară granițelor Ungariei* [Magyars outside Hungary's borders] and

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<sup>390</sup> See also Table 5.

<sup>391</sup> Interviews with Rodica Ciobanu and Simona Popescu.

<sup>392</sup> See Table 11.

*maghiari în străinătate* [Magyars from abroad]<sup>393</sup>. This semantic field again demonstrates the Romanian newspapers' awareness of the co-ethnics' situation as people who consider themselves to be ethnically Hungarian and who live outside Hungary's political borders.

4. *Ardeal*. As already mentioned, the territory called Transylvania in English has two names in Romanian: *Transilvania* and *Ardeal*<sup>394</sup>. The latter is not mentioned a single time in the ethnic denotations used by the two Romanian newspapers. It is my assumption that this is aimed at a specific counter-balance: the existence of people who are not Romanians in *Ardeal* should be compensated by using only *Transilvania* with its connotation to the Roman and therefore Romanian claim to that territory.

On the other hand, there are obvious differences between *Adevărul* and *România Liberă*. *Adevărul*'s use of the ethnic denotations is twofold: avoiding *nation* in the denotations and still using the ethnonym *ungur* [Hungarian] as well as *maghiar* [Magyar]:

1. The first aspect becomes evident when analysing the ethnic denotations used by *Adevărul* in comparison to the ones used by the Hungarian newspapers. *Adevărul* uses other substantives to quantify the Hungarians in Romania, e.g. community or minority, e.g. *comunități maghiare* [Magyar communities] or minority *minorități maghiare* [Magyar minorities]<sup>395</sup>. Not using *nation* is a clear indicator to *Adevărul*'s concept of a single nation in Romania, the Romanian one.
2. The other aspect regarding the different ethnonyms, e.g. *etnici maghiari din țările vecine Ungariei* [Ethnic Magyars from Hungary's neighbouring countries] or *maghiari în afară granițelor Ungariei* [Magyars outside Hungary's borders]<sup>396</sup>, underlines the national stand *Adevărul* takes<sup>397</sup>. Hence, according to *Adevărul*, the Hungarians in Romania are an ethnic and not a national issue. On the whole, *Adevărul* has displayed a nationalistic attitude in its usage of ethnic denotations. *Adevărul* thus represents a sector of the Romanian press that still carries old animosities sparked off during the nationalist era of Romanian

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<sup>393</sup> Idem.

<sup>394</sup> See footnote to Table 3.

<sup>395</sup> See Table 11.

<sup>396</sup> Idem.

<sup>397</sup> See subchapter 4.1.2.1.

communism. These animosities are subtly presented, unlike the polemics of outright nationalistic newspapers, such as *România Mare*.

Additionally, *Adevărul* used 14 ethnic denotations exclusively while *România Liberă* used only six exclusively. This variety of ethnic denotations used by *Adevărul*, as with *Népszabadság*, reveals the newspaper's inconsistency in regard of a clear line of representation. Therefore it is difficult to assess what the co-ethnics mean to this newspaper. *Adevărul* displays certain characteristics that could be regarded as nationalistic. However, due to the large variety of denotations, this line is blurred and therefore inconsequent.

The term *minority* and political correctness are the two main features in *România Liberă* in respect of the ethnic denotations it used:

1. *România Liberă* uses the term *minority* to categorise the co-ethnics a single time: *Minoritate maghiară în România* [Magyar minority in Romania]. This shows that the newspaper tried to avoid quantification, which could be interpreted differently. By avoiding the term *minority* and referring only to geographical or political terms, *România Liberă* tried to avoid discussions regarding minority rights and therefore questions regarding national issues.
2. The other aspect, political correctness, derives from *România Liberă*'s constant use of the ethnonym *maghiar* [Magyar] and avoiding *ungur* [Hungarian]. The reference to the ethnonym used in the Hungarian language bears evidence to *România Liberă*'s liberal attitude and open mindedness. Consequently, *România Liberă*, unlike *Adevărul*, avoids polemics, which is in congruence with the information I have received from the interview<sup>398</sup>.

All in all, the ethnic denotations used in *România Liberă* have confirmed the information I have gained from the interview<sup>399</sup>. According to the interviewee, *România Liberă* lacks any interest in domestic ethnic issues and is more interested in the situation of Romanians abroad. Consequently, *România Liberă* is not concerned with or worried about what the Hungarian government might grant Hungarians in Romania. *România Liberă* is rather upset about the Romanian government's lack of action in favour of the Romanians in Romania's neighbouring states, e.g. Bulgaria. The few and consequential

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<sup>398</sup> Interview with Simona Popescu.

<sup>399</sup> Idem.

ethnic denotations support this line of thought. It demonstrates the journalists' professional attitude and rejection of polemics.

#### 5.1.4 Nation and ethnicity

In order to illustrate the newspapers' general idea of ethnicity and nationhood in the ethnic denotations they use, I chose their concept of the nation as the basis for a comparison among all four of them. For this purpose I shall use two simplified categories: the German concept of the nation and the French one. The first of the two categories refers to *Sprach- und Kulturnation*, i.e. linguistic and cultural nation. This 19<sup>th</sup> century concept has evolved from the situation the German speaking states were in: one language, many states. Those who spoke German and shared German culture were thus Germans and part of one nation, thereby ignoring citizenship. On the other hand, the French concept evolved from the ideas of the French Revolution (1789) and the thought that the state consisted of the sum of its citizens regardless of linguistic or cultural background (Sundhaussen 2003). Practically, modern nations include elements of both concepts, since every state has at least one official language and cultural or linguistic background is not the only criterion for obtaining citizenship. In the following segment I will show how journalists from all four newspapers used these two concepts when denoting the co-ethnics.

1. Adevărul. This newspaper's narrative corresponds to the French concept of a nation. Therefore, this newspaper's narrative, as represented in the ethnic denotations used, considers political borders to be identical with national ones. In other words, the concept that every state is also a nation, which was propagated during the socialist era, prevails in Adevărul's narrative. This specific narrative is manifested in two domains: using the attribute *ethnos* in the denotations and using two different ethnonyms. The attribute *ethnos* is used more frequently than in România Liberă. Practically this means that Adevărul differentiates between Magyars and ethnic Magyars, hence creating two different categories of Magyars, regardless of citizenship or geographic localisation<sup>400</sup>. The aspect of the two ethnonyms is manifested in the use of *unguri* (Hungarians) and *maghiari* (Magyars)<sup>401</sup>. This differentiation between Hungarians and Magyars goes back to socialist times when *unguri* (Hungarians) meant the Hungarians in Hungary proper while *maghiari* (Magyars) referred to

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<sup>400</sup> Compare Table 11, Denotations 8 and 10.

<sup>401</sup> Compare Table 11, Denotations 9 and 16.

the Hungarians living in Romania. Therefore, Magyars were part of the Romanian state/nation and Hungarians were not; they were part of the Hungarian state/nation.

2. Magyar Hírlap. This Hungarian newspaper also follows the French concept of *nation*. Magyar Hírlap's journalists have used the word *külföld* (abroad) more frequently in their denotations than their colleagues from Népszabadság. By using *abroad* frequently they emphasised the political reality that the co-ethnics live in other states than Hungary regardless of any nationalistic or anachronistic rhetoric. On the other hand, the term *nemzeti* (*national*) is used more rarely than in Népszabadság. This, again, bears evidence to a political realism, since using the attribute *national* could imply the status of statehood for the Hungarian minorities in Hungary's neighbouring states. Finally, considering geographic localisation, Magyar Hírlap's journalists preferred *Erdély* (Transylvania) upon *Románia* (Romania) in relation to the total amount of denotations used<sup>402</sup>. This means that Magyar Hírlap considers the co-ethnics to be an integral part of the states they live in, as the French concept of the nation suggests.
3. Népszabadság. The concluding analysis of this newspaper's ethnic denotations demonstrates clearly that this newspaper's journalists transmit a German image of the nation. This means, that the journalists writing for Népszabadság consider Hungary to be a cultural and linguistic nation and not necessarily a political one. This is manifested in the newspaper's frequent use of the word *szomszéd* (neighbour)<sup>403</sup>. Using *szomszéd* instead of *külföld* (abroad) suggests that the journalists neglect the political borders' importance thus accentuating the cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation and disregarding the geopolitical aspects. Furthermore, the frequent use of *szomszéd* together with *nemzet* (nation) or *nemzeti* (*national*) when denoting the co-ethnics emphasises this intention even further. The attribute *national* also promotes the co-ethnics' status by juxtaposing them to other ethnic groups in the neighbouring nations, e.g. Romanians or Slovaks. In other words, the German concept of the nation is consequently applied, i.e. also on the neighbouring nations. Finally, Népszabadság's journalists used the geographic localisation *Erdély* (Transylvania) more often than *Románia* (Romania). This preference indicates a certain anachronism among Népszabadság's journalists since Transylvania has a

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<sup>402</sup> Compare Table 11a, Denotation 8,9,22 and 23.

<sup>403</sup> Compare Table 10, Denotations 116, 118 and 120.

long history as a Hungarian principality and as an integral part of Hungarian culture and heritage. By using Transylvania, which is no longer a political entity, the political borders are ignored and the old Hungarian principality becomes a part of the cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation while at the same time the Romanian presence is neglected.

4. *România Liberă*. Just like its Hungarian counterpart *Népszabadság*, this newspaper follows the German concept of the nation. This is especially evident in the frequent use of the ethnonym *magyar* (Magyar) without any quantitative attributes such as *comunitate* (community) or *minoritate* (minority) to it<sup>404</sup>. Furthermore, by using short and general denotations such as *maghiari* (Magyars) or *etnici maghiari* (ethnic Magyars), *România Liberă*'s journalists show that they refer to Magyars in general without differing between Hungarians in Hungary proper or the co-ethnics. Consequently, *România Liberă* sustains the idea of a cultural and linguistic nation, which is not limited to any state boundaries. As my interviewee told me, Romania should offer to the Romanian in the neighbouring states the same opportunities as the Status Law provides for the co-ethnics<sup>405</sup>. This is also apparent in *România Liberă*'s ongoing interest in the Romanians who live in Romania's neighbouring states, e.g. Bulgaria or Serbia.

## 5.2 Motifs

For the objectives of this thesis I chose six motifs in order to have a common platform upon which I could conduct a comparative analysis among all four newspapers<sup>406</sup>. In the following table (Table 16) I have juxtaposed the six motifs and how they were manifested in each newspaper. I shall compare the Hungarian newspapers first and then continue with a comparison of the two Romanian ones. Each time I shall commence with the similarities between the two respective newspapers and then continue with the differences. Finally, I will show which features are common to Romanian as well as Hungarian newspapers.

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<sup>404</sup> Compare Table 11, Denotations 3 and 28.

<sup>405</sup> Interview with Simona Popescu.

<sup>406</sup> See subchapters 3.1.3.2 and 4.1.2.2

Table 16: Comparing the motifs

Motifs	Magyar Hírlap	Népszabadság	Adevărul	România Liberă
Europe	Judicial authority	Judicial authority	Goal/Aim	Judicial authority, side show
Comparison	Moldova	Croatia	European context	European context
Discrimination	Families	Employees	Status Law	Status Law
NATO	Supra authority	Support for Romania	Hungary's membership	Goal/Aim
History	Obligation, Trianon	Obligation, Trianon	Difficult common past	Little significance
Legal aspects	Legal bond	Extraterritoriality	Orbán-Năstase Memorandum	Extraterritoriality

### 5.2.1 Motifs in the Hungarian newspapers

The Hungarian newspapers showed common features in two of the motifs and differed substantially in the other four:

1. Common features: Europe and History. Europe plays the same role in Magyar Hírlap as it does in Népszabadság. The role of a judicial authority is in both newspapers the most dominant feature when discussing Europe. This bears evidence to the fact that both newspapers regard the Status Law as a judicial aspect to be discussed *and* decided on the European supra level. It also means that the journalists from both newspapers do not consider bilateral negotiations, e.g. a joint Hungarian-Romanian judicial commission, to be an option. Thus, according to Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság, judicial disputes are to be solved only through European mediation. The fact that the Orbán government in Hungary and the Năstase government in Romania addressed European institutions to discuss the Status Law remains to be analysed from a political perspective. It is the fact that the journalists took this attitude of both governments for granted that is disturbing. I assume that the journalists of Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság shared the same idea, i.e. that bilateral negotiations between Hungary and Romania would have remained futile and that both sides would have accepted only a European verdict. The other common aspect, i.e. history, with the two elements of obligation and the Treaty of Trianon, show the common concern in both newspapers regarding Hungary's relationship with the co-ethnics: the co-ethnics need help and Hungary is finally in the position to comply with the co-ethnics' needs. Politicians and journalists alike consider this as one of the corner stones of Hungarian foreign policy. This

obligation, which is also mentioned in the Hungarian Constitution<sup>407</sup>, has two aspects: firstly, it is a constant reminder of the Treaty of Trianon where Hungary's territory was substantially reduced and thus the co-ethnics became an issue and secondly, a constant reminder of the democratic and peaceful means Hungary applies when supporting the co-ethnics. This second aspect is important since it stands in perpendicular contrast to the politics of Revisionism practiced between 1920 (Treaty of Trianon) and 1945 (Paris Peace Treaty). This is a very delicate issue; it means on the one side that Hungary is willing to support the co-ethnics without any territorial demands against its neighbours, but on the other it has to mention Trianon as the reason behind this support. Finally, the fact that the constitutional obligation and the Treaty of Trianon occupy such an important position when discussing the motif of history in *Magyar Hírlap* and *Népszabadság* shows both newspapers' idea of the Hungarian nation: the Hungarian nation is spread across different political borders and the mother-state is obliged to support the other parts, i.e. the co-ethnics.

2. Comparison. *Magyar Hírlap* kept comparing the Hungarian Status Law with the Romanian laws regarding the citizenship and naturalisation of Moldavian citizens. The idea behind this comparison was to demonstrate that Romania grants Moldavian citizens much more than Hungary did for the co-ethnics, namely a full citizenship. This comparison should be understood as an answer to Romanian complaints regarding the Hungarian Status Law and the Hungarian government's intrusion in Romania's domestic affairs. Thus, the journalists at *Magyar Hírlap* are saying that Romania intruded Moldavian internal affairs in a much stronger way than Hungary ever did in Romania with its Status Law. On the other hand, *Népszabadság's* journalists compared the reaction in Romania to the Hungarian Status Law with the response to the Croatian one, which like the Romanian laws, grants Croatian citizenship to ethnic Croats in neighbouring states. Unlike the Hungarian Status Law, which caused serious political strife, the Croatian law went unnoticed. I assume that the significant numerical difference between the number of Hungarians in Romania (approximately 1.5 million) and the number Croats (approx. a few thousands) is the cause for this very different reaction. The journalists at *Népszabadság* tried to show that the Romanian public's reaction to the Hungarian Status Law was very biased and thus displayed anti-Hungarian sentiments still lurking in Romanian society.

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<sup>407</sup> See Appendix 6.

3. Discrimination. MH: Families, more bourgeois. NSZ: Employees, perhaps its left-wing orientation. Regarding the use of the term *discrimination* with regard to the Status Law, the two Hungarian newspapers displayed a different set of concerns. Népszabadság, which according to my interviewees has slight tendencies to the political left, showed significant concern in respect of the Status Law's impact on the Hungarian labour market. By doing so, Népszabadság positioned itself close to the working class and pretended to speak in their name. This positioning can also be understood in the light of the newly flared competition to another Hungarian daily, *Népszava*, which is more left-wing and pro working class than Népszabadság. Magyar Hírlap, on the other hand, is more concerned with the reduced benefits for the co-ethnics' families after the signing of the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM). At this point the Magyar Hírlap's journalists were concerned about the difficulties ethnically mixed families might face after the ONM came into effect. This concern with the co-ethnics is in contrast to the information I received from my interviewees, who said that Magyar Hírlap is mostly concerned with minorities *within* Hungary, e.g. homosexuals or Roma, and not outside the state's borders<sup>408</sup>. I assume that the comments made by Magyar Hírlap regarding discrimination by the Status Law and the ONM are an attempt to show that the newspaper is not unpatriotic and has an interest in the co-ethnics' well-being.
4. NATO. This motif shows clearly the difference between Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság. While the first recognises the politicians' attitude towards NATO as a common supra authority to solve regional problems between the member states, the latter focused its narrative on Hungary's effort to support Romania's endeavour to become a NATO member state. Thus, Magyar Hírlap considers NATO, as it did with Europe, as a sideshow for solving bilateral differences, instead of a direct dialogue between the respective states. Furthermore, Magyar Hírlap practically considers Romania as a full NATO member state, which it was not until 2004, thus placing Romania in a position of parity with NATO member Hungary. Népszabadság, on the other hand, by underlying Hungary's effort for Romania, is saying that for justified reasons Hungary is in a stronger political position (Hungary became a full member in 1999), which enables Hungary to support other states in the region that are not as advanced as Hungary itself. In other words, Hungary's NATO membership and Romania's

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<sup>408</sup> Interview with Norbert Molnár

lack of it is a display of Hungarian superiority over Romania. Concluding, both newspapers favour Romania's aspiration to become a member of NATO, because it would promote stability in the region and would stop any sabre-rattling by right-wing extremists from both sides.

5. Legal aspects. This last aspect amplifies the two Hungarian newspapers' different vision of a nation. Magyar Hírlap's main concern in this regard was the fact that the Hungarian Status Law is the first (and so far the last) legal bond between the Republic of Hungary and the co-ethnics. Thus, as already laid down in the Constitution of Hungary, the Hungarian state has recognised the fact that there are groups of people outside Hungary's political borders who consider themselves to be Hungarian by ethnic categories. The Status Law, from Magyar Hírlap's perspective, is a legal recognition of this political state of affairs and therefore proof of this newspaper's French concept of nation. Népszabadság, on the other hand, was concerned with the Romanian politicians' accusations of the Status Law's extraterritoriality. Népszabadság's journalists wrote protesting vehemently against these accusations, thus positioning themselves as champions of the German concept of the nation. According to Népszabadság, the Status Law does *not* have an extraterritorial character, since it is Hungary's obligation to support the co-ethnics and does not undermine Romanian law. Therefore, that Status Law is a logical consequence of the concept of a cultural-linguistic Hungarian nation.

#### 5.2.2 Motifs in the Romanian newspapers

The Romanian papers, like the Hungarian ones, had two motifs with common features and four with differing characteristics:

1. Common features: Comparison and Discrimination. Both România Liberă and Adevărul used the European context when they used the motif of comparison. The journalists have thus promoted Romanian-Hungarian issues to an international level. By doing so they have taken Romania and Hungary out of their specific regional context in exchange for a virtual one dominated by other actors, i.e. European institutions. Avoiding the specific regional context shows that the journalists conceded to the politicians' incapacity to resolve problematic issues on a bilateral level. Practically, this means that unlike the Hungarian newspapers, there is no comparison between the Hungarian Status Law and similar laws, e.g. the Croatian or Slovak ones. Furthermore, the Romanian laws

regarding the naturalisation of Moldavian citizens are not mentioned at all. Discrimination, the second common motif, refers solely to the discrimination of Romanian citizens who are ethnically Romanian. Neither of the two explains what they mean by discrimination, so I can only assume to what they are referring. Bearing in mind the main benefits of the Status Law, e.g. money for families who send their children to a Hungarian-speaking school, working permits for Hungary and other benefits within Hungary, the accusation of discrimination is very difficult to understand. Firstly, should Romanian families send their children to a non-Romanian school, they would most probably choose a German-, a French-or an English-speaking educational institution and *not* a Hungarian one. Secondly, without thorough knowledge of the Hungarian language, taking up a job in Hungary, which requires some minimum qualification, is highly unlikely. Finally, the benefits within Hungary, e.g. education and medical check-up, also depend on having a command of Hungarian. My conclusion is that the notion of discrimination used by the journalists from *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* can only concern illegal, unskilled, seasonal labour where knowledge of Hungarian is not essential and, perhaps, the assumed reaction of Romanian neighbours who might feel jealous.

2. Europe. *Adevărul*'s journalists consider Europe as a future goal to be achieved by Romania. This perspective is used to justify Romania's and Hungary's appeal to various European institutions, e.g. the Venice Commission or the Council of Europe. Thus *Adevărul*'s argumentation is if Romania wants to be a part of Europe, then it has to solve bilateral problems on the European level. I consider this line of thought to be a dazzlement. *Adevărul* follows the politicians' arguments blindly because like this any direct negotiation with the Hungarian side becomes obsolete: Why negotiate with Hungary when Europe (whatever may be understood by this term) can solve the problem for us? This escape from diplomatic responsibility demonstrates *Adevărul*'s image of a Romania that has to fight on its own in order to obtain favours from the political powers in Europe. This political mentality shared by *Adevărul* has certain parallels to 1940, when Hungary and Romania were wooing for Hitler's favour in Vienna<sup>409</sup>. On the other hand, *România Liberă* clearly realised that this whole debate between Romania and Hungary at the various European institutions is just a sideshow in European affairs and that it could hurt both states' prospects of

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<sup>409</sup> See Chapter 2

becoming members in the European Union (EU). The answers of the European institutions also supported this attitude and encouraged both sides to take up the dialogue. Furthermore, *România Liberă* recognised the fact that Hungarian and Romanian politicians use Europe as an image of judicial authority in order to justify their actions. This means that politicians from both states used Europe as an excuse whenever it suited them. The journalists with *România Liberă* have recognised this attitude and the politicians' incapacity to take up negotiations with the other side, but have failed to include any criticism of this behaviour.

3. NATO. This motif, together with the two motifs history and legal aspects, display *Adevărul*'s militancy in diametric contrast to *România Liberă*'s pacifism and *Adevărul*'s constant comparison between Romania's and Hungary's achievements. NATO, according to *Adevărul*'s narrative when using this motif, represents an indirect threat to Romania through Hungary's membership in that organisation. Hungary's membership is not a threat in itself, but the fact that Romania was not yet a member creates an imbalance of political and military power between the two states. *Adevărul* often followed a nationalistic standpoint and is more conscious of the military implications political actions have. Thus, in a political controversy between Romania and Hungary, e.g. the one regarding the Status Law, *Adevărul*'s journalists discussed the military situation both states were in, although not a single politician from Hungary or Romania ever discussed the use of military force to achieve political objectives as an alternative to diplomatic means. I assume this is reminiscent of the martial talk and the rhetoric of threat used in communist times, which aimed at creating an image of a Romania that stands alone and is constantly being threatened by external and internal enemies<sup>410</sup>. On the other hand, the journalists with *România Liberă* were more concerned with Romania's prospects of becoming a full member in NATO. This endeavour, according to my estimation, resulted from the same reason as with other former states in Eastern Europe: Soviet / Russian domination. By joining NATO, Romania would be definitely outside Russia's sphere of influence and thus its potential military threat. There is no reference to Hungary's membership or to any threat which could result from that membership. For *România Liberă* Romania's NATO membership is a goal to be

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<sup>410</sup> In 1990, during the incidents in Tîrgu Mures, the state ordered a partial mobilisation. Rumour had it that Hungary was trying to destabilise the Romanian state and would try to take back Transylvania by using military force. See also Andreescu 2001.

achieved for Romania's own security and political liberty without any implications for its immediate neighbours.

4. History. Adevărul's usage of this motif continues the national talk mentioned above regarding NATO. With Adevărul's journalists, history became a field of competition between Romania and Hungary. This competition focused mainly on the length of each side's history. The longer, the more glorious<sup>411</sup>. However, Adevărul juxtaposed both histories as equivalent in length and characterised the common past as difficult<sup>412</sup>. This notion of a common past is contradictory to Adevărul's narrative discussing the motif of comparison: There the geographic context was Europe; here it is the regional framework, one shared with Hungary. Placing both histories as equivalent solves this ambivalence. The comparison between the histories is also used to show Romania's strength vis-à-vis Hungary. If both histories are equivalent, then Romania should not be afraid or intimidated by Hungary's NATO membership. In other words, a glorious past is supposed to compensate the lack of military allies. The journalists at România Liberă displayed a completely different relationship to the motif of history, practically none. History hardly played a role in România Liberă's narrative. Consequently, the Status Law was not seen as a historic event, but rather as a Hungarian affair. This impression was enhanced by the information I obtained during my interviews<sup>413</sup>. România Liberă is more concerned with the present than with the past and, as previously shown in respect of nation and ethnicity, is more interested in the fate of Romanians in the neighbouring states rather than with the ethnic groups within Romania.
5. Legal aspects. Adevărul's journalists used the motif of legal aspects to demonstrate Romanian diplomacy's triumph over Hungary. Practically, Adevărul considered the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM) a symbol of this victory. Therefore, the ONM was taken out of its judicial context and transferred into Adevărul's national talk regarding the competition between the two states. This motif, then, fits into the pattern previously designed for Adevărul: there is an ongoing competition between Romania and Hungary and Romania should be vigilant when dealing with its neighbours, especially Hungary. The reality of the Status Law that has come into effect on Romanian territory is thoroughly ignored. România Liberă's usage of this motif is a very different one. The Status

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<sup>411</sup> See Chapter 2

<sup>412</sup> See subchapter 4.1.2.2

<sup>413</sup> Interview with Simona Popescu

Law is described as a judicial framework with several difficulties, especially regarding the problem of extraterritoriality, a term all four newspapers have failed to explain. Nevertheless, *România Liberă*'s journalists were concerned with the practical problems surrounding the Status Law and the ONM: How should Hungarians from Romania apply for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN)? Who is entitled to the CHN? Can the CHN be handed out in Romania or only in Hungary? Contrary to *Adevărul*, *România Liberă* did not see the political controversy between Romania and Hungary concerning the Status Law as a national fight against foreign intrusion. The legal aspects concerning the Status Law remained within the legal / judicial framework.

### 5.2.3 Common motifs

*România Liberă* (RL) shared three of the six motifs with either *Népszabadság* (NSZ) or with *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Hírlap* (MH). In this segment I will analyse these common motifs from either a dual or a triple perspective.

1. Europe: A judicial authority (RL, NSZ and MH). Journalists from all three newspapers realised that Hungarian and Romanian politicians are either unable or unwilling to start bilateral negotiations regarding the Status Law's implementation. Furthermore, they realised that Europe served as a substitute platform for this lack of neighbourly initiative. Europe, as a judicial authority, has thus become a supra entity, which it did not want to play in this Hungarian-Romanian dispute. Unfortunately, this evasive comportment, performed by politicians from both sides, was not criticised. Only after the various European institutions prevailed upon Hungary and Romania to solve their problem through bilateral talks that both prime ministers started negotiations that led to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum. According to my understanding of journalistic critique, the journalists from *Magyar Hírlap*, *Népszabadság* and *România Liberă* should have decried this behaviour and called for direct bilateral talks before the European institutions responded. The fact that the journalists did not criticise suggests that they agreed with the politicians' actions and shared their way of thinking.
2. NATO: Romania's membership as a goal (RL and NSZ). Both *România Liberă* and *Népszabadság* discuss Romania's endeavour for full NATO membership in their respective narrative although from a different perspective. While *Népszabadság* emphasised Hungary's support for Romania, *România Liberă*

mentioned this information in a manner of by the way in regard of Romania's political ambitions. Nevertheless, it was apparently important to journalists from both newspapers to mention it. Romania's future NATO membership, therefore, played an important role for both newspapers.

3. Legal aspects: The Status Law's extraterritorial aspects (RL and NSZ). As with NATO, both *România Liberă* and *Népszabadság* discussed the Status Law's extraterritorial aspects, however from opposite standpoints. While *Népszabadság* did not consider the Status Law to have any extraterritorial aspects, *România Liberă*'s journalists were busy thinking about the effects of the Status Law's extraterritorial features. Interestingly, it is these two newspapers that discuss extraterritoriality and not *Adevărul* and *Magyar Hírlap*, since *România Liberă* and *Népszabadság* both share the same concept regarding nation and ethnicity. According to that concept, *Advărul* and *Magyar Hírlap* should have criticised the Status Law while *România Liberă* and *Népszabadság* should have approved it. In this constellation, *Népszabadság*'s approval and *România Liberă*'s interest are present, both the other two newspapers' criticism is missing.

The remaining question is why does *Adevărul* not have anything in common with the Hungarian newspapers. Apparently, despite certain parallels in the concept of the nation between *Adevărul* and *Magyar Hírlap*, neither of the two Hungarian newspapers share *Adevărul*'s martial talk mixed with nationalistic elements. As my interviewee told me, a certain number of *Scîntea*'s former employees were still writing for *Adevărul* at the time of this investigation<sup>414</sup>. I assume that these employees were in higher positions which enabled them to exert a certain power over *Adevărul*'s narrative and thus continue one of the communist regime's main characteristics in its later years: socialism combined with nationalism.

### 5.3 Journalistic narratives

#### 5.3.1 Comparative analysis

Certain aspects of each newspaper's narrative have been discussed previously. The following segments accentuate the main differences between the newspapers thus amplifying each newspaper's specific characteristics. First I shall take a comparative

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<sup>414</sup> *Scîntea* was the Romanian Communist Party's (PCR) official newspaper. Considering that *Adevărul* was founded in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, *Scîntea* was *Adevărul*'s antecessor and successor at the same time. See also interview with Rodica Ciobanu.

look at the main aspects that have influenced the newspapers' narratives (Table 17 below) and then will continue by analysing each newspaper's specific features.

There are three features that are shared across linguistic and political borders: a clear political preference, a reference to Romanian journalistic sources and the element of competing prestige between Hungary and Romania.

Adevărul and the two Hungarian newspapers share the first feature, the clear political preference. The interviews with journalists from Adevărul and Magyar Hírlap have indicated certain tendencies<sup>415</sup>, the interviews with journalists who work for Népszabadság did not reveal any current preferences towards the MSZP. However, it was the text analysis that showed the newspapers' specific political preferences in its respective country: Adevărul supports the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), Magyar Hírlap the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and Népszabadság the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). România Liberă stands aside in this constellation. This could be due to the lack of interest that România Liberă showed towards the whole debate surrounding the Status Law. As my interviewee told me, România Liberă did not object to the idea of the Status Law and even demanded a similar law for Romanians in the neighbouring states, e.g. Hungary and Bulgaria, in order to improve their schooling and cultural self-assumption as Romanians<sup>416</sup>.

Table 17: Comparing narrative aspects

Aspect	Magyar Hírlap	Népszabadság	Adevărul	România Liberă
Procurement of the Status Law	Restrained, different standpoints	Positive and few standpoints	Confronting	Restrained, differentiating
Political preferences	SZDSZ	MSZP	PSD	Hardly political
Relation to other newspapers	<i>Krónika</i>	Romanian press	Népszabadság	Little or no relation
Relation to the other state <sup>417</sup>	Superiority	Superiority	Conflictual on equal footing	Result oriented
Variety of perspectives	Hungarian, Romanian and European	Hungarian and some Romanian	Romanian	Romanian, rarely Hungarian

The second common feature, the reference to Romanian journalistic sources, is shared by all four newspapers, although very differently. While the Romanian sources refer mainly to each other and perhaps to *Curentul* and *Jurnalul Național*,

<sup>415</sup> Interviews with Rodica Cioban, Miklós Újvári and Norbert Molnár.

<sup>416</sup> Interview with Simona Popescu.

<sup>417</sup> Romania for the Hungarian newspapers Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság and Hungary for the Romanian newspapers Adevărul and România Liberă.

Népszabadság refers to Romanian newspapers such as *Evenimentul Zilei* and *Libertatea*, which are closer to the tabloid scene than *Curentul* and *Journalul Național*. I assume that this is because of *Evenimentul Zilei*'s and *Libertatea*'s more polemic rhetoric which was used by Népszabadság to demonstrate how much Romanians oppose the Hungarian Status Law. In other words, Népszabadság wanted to demonstrate how difficult the situation for Hungarians in Romania is and how badly they need Hungary's protection and support, i.e. the Status Law. Magyar Hírlap, on the other hand, referred to and even quoted *Krónika*, Romania's best selling Hungarian newspaper and not the Romanian language newspapers from Romania. This is a fine but crucial difference. By quoting *Krónika* Magyar Hírlap allowed those affected directly by the Status Law to have their word heard in a newspaper, which is written and published for Hungary<sup>418</sup>. Again, contrary to declarations made by journalists from Magyar Hírlap<sup>419</sup>, this newspaper is more concerned about the co-ethnics than Népszabadság or the Romanian newspapers.

Adevărul and the Hungarian newspapers again share the third feature, the competing prestige between the two countries. While the Hungarian newspapers display a touch of superiority, Adevărul was conflictual and tried to show that Romania and Hungary are equal in respect of historic prestige and thus current political esteem. România Liberă did not share this competition and paid little attention to any remarks concerning competition. Apparently, the journalists at România Liberă were keener to find out how the differences regarding the Status Law would be resolved without comparing the two countries.

The newspapers from each country shared one common feature: Perspectives from their own country. This means that the Hungarian newspapers Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság referred mainly to political sources from Hungary and the Romanian newspapers Adevărul and România Liberă to Romanian political actors. However, there are differences between each linguistic group. On the Romanian side Adevărul referred a single time to politicians from Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (1998-2002), while România Liberă did so a few times. On the Hungarian side, Magyar Hírlap was also eager to quote politicians from the European level thus displaying the Status Law's international perspective. Népszabadság, when quoting foreign sources rarely mentioned European actors. Consequently, Magyar Hírlap tried to show the Status Law's four perspectives: the Hungarian, the Romanian, the European and the one of the co-ethnics.

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<sup>418</sup> The Romanians in Romania are affected only indirectly.

<sup>419</sup> Interviews with Norbert Molnár and Miklós Újvári.

### 5.3.2 Individual analysis

In this segment I will take an individual look at each of the four newspapers and subsume their respective characteristics.

#### 5.3.2.1 Adevărul

Adevărul has shown a specific tendency towards emphasising a national undertone in its articles. This is particularly apparent in the article chosen for the synchronic analysis and in the ethnic denotations regarding Romania and Transylvania. In the article mentioned <sup>420</sup>, the journalist has constantly insisted on a Romanian national pathos and on Romania's necessity to defend itself. Furthermore, the article is also in favour of the socialist-led government at that time (2000-2004). The author goes as far as to congratulate the Romanian government under Prime Minister Adrian Năstase on its success manifested in the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum<sup>421</sup>. This congratulation is unique in all 547 articles taken into consideration in this thesis. This combination of national, martial talk and emphasised support for the socialists, is reminiscent of the national-military way in which public events used to be represented in socialist times: Nationalism combined with support for socialism<sup>422</sup>. This talk has survived in Adevărul despite the changes in personnel<sup>423</sup>.

Further, Adevărul's narrative reveals a sense of competition between Romania and Hungary. The journalists convey the impression that the two states or nations are in constant competition: the schedule for joining the European Union, Romanian politicians' dissatisfaction with Hungary's rapid NATO membership or the discussions as to which side had the longer and more heroic past. However, according to my estimation, this competition is a result of the urge to position Romania on the same level of international acceptance and integration as Hungary, an equal footing with Hungary, so to speak. This is a result of Romania's presentation in the West: a country – that is constantly being compared with Bulgaria. According to Adevărul's narrative, it is more prestigious to be compared with Hungary, despite any historical animosities. Indirectly Adevărul considers Hungary to be economically, politically and historically more “worthy” of comparison.

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<sup>420</sup> See subchapter 4.2.1.1

<sup>421</sup> Idem.

<sup>422</sup> See also Verdery 1991.

<sup>423</sup> Interview with Rodica Ciobanu.

The remarks made by Rodica Ciobanu during the interview have included the statement that *Adevărul* is a neutral newspaper. She was referring to the fact that *Adevărul* does not represent a specific party from the Romanian political spectrum. This statement contradicts the article mentioned previously<sup>424</sup>, where the journalist clearly compliments the government for its achievement in diplomacy. However, this does not mean that *Adevărul* has constantly represented the Social Democratic Party's (PSD) views, especially since the PSD, with the exception of President Ion Iliescu, has avoided nationalist talk to prevent any frictions with its coalition partner, the liberal Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).

*Adevărul* represented almost exclusively Romanian opinions in its narrative. *Adevărul* depicts the Status Law expressing only negative opinions from within the Romanian political spectrum. Therefore, the journalists did not attack the Status Law directly, but rather indirectly. The only exceptions were comments made by Béla Markó, the chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and Hungarian politicians who were rarely mentioned. This also shows that *Adevărul* considered the debate to be a regional one, although both Romania and Hungary have appealed to European institutions. The reason for this could be Romanian journalists' lack of Hungarian, while those Hungarian journalists, who write about the co-ethnics, usually speak the relevant language, e.g. Romanian or Ukrainian. As my interview partner told me, her knowledge regarding Hungary stems from the translated information available, which is not very extensive<sup>425</sup>.

### 5.3.2.2 Magyar Hírlap

Magyar Hírlap, which according to some interviewees stands close to the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)<sup>426</sup>, reveals specific aspects that show the diversity of views represented in Hungarian politics. However, the diachronic analysis has exposed significant political diversity. While Magyar Hírlap's narrative has generally tried to represent both Hungarian and Romanian views, when discussing the element of comparison only Hungarian views were represented. Furthermore, considering historic motifs, there is an indirect attack on Iliescu's polemic expostulations concerning Hungarian character and attitude. Regarding legal aspects, Magyar Hírlap is the only newspaper of the four selected for this thesis to represent also the right-wing extremist Hungarian Justice and Life Party's (MIÉP) views.

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<sup>424</sup> See subchapter 4.2.1.1.

<sup>425</sup> Interview with Rodica Ciobanu.

<sup>426</sup> Interview with Norbert Molnár and Miklós Újvári.

Magyar Hírlap's journalists are very keen on presenting European perspectives concerning the Hungarian Status Law and the ongoing debate about it between Hungary and Romania. Whether it is the European Union, the Venice Council, the Council of Europe or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the debate is embedded in a European frame. I consider this to be a testimony to Magyar Hírlap's ambition to provide its readers with more than just the national perspective, which can be often very narrow-minded. It is Magyar Hírlap's ambition to position the debate in question and the Hungarian-Romanian relations in an international framework. Indirectly, Magyar Hírlap thus positions itself on a European level which it considers to contain an air of superiority<sup>427</sup>.

Criticism in Magyar Hírlap's narrative regarding the Status Law is very one-sided. Its focus is concentrated primarily on the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán and his party, the conservative Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ). It is common for newspapers that consider themselves not to support any political party, to criticise the government. However, there is hardly any negative comment regarding the major opposition parties, the socialist-democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). This striking lack of criticism against the opposition bears evidence to Magyar Hírlap's one-sided, strong stand against FIDESZ and its passive support for MSZP and SZDSZ.

According to the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum (ONM), which has enabled the application of the Status Law in Romania, the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) can be granted only to those who declare themselves as Hungarian. In ethnically mixed marriages this practically means that the spouse will not be entitled to the CHN and consequently will be denied the Status Law's benefits. Magyar Hírlap has placed a strong emphasis on this aspect and has considered it to be discriminating towards the non-Hungarian spouses. This emphasis shows Magyar Hírlap's awareness of the significant number of ethnical mixed marriages in Romania and to the necessity of granting family members similar benefits to the CHN-holder himself.

Prime Minister Orbán is quoted and presented more often than the representatives of any other party, even of the SZDSZ, to which Magyar Hírlap allegedly stands close. This strong representation of Orbán's comments is coupled with a similar, although weaker, emphasis on his counterpart, the Romanian prime minister, Adrian Năstase. This is apparently due to prime ministers' important role in politics, to lead the government and hence to be responsible for the governments activities. On the

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<sup>427</sup> See subchapter 3.1.3.2.1.

other hand, when considering all the politicians represented in Magyar Hírlap's narrative, there is a significant over-representation of SZDSZ politicians in comparison to all other parties. This fact reveals Magyar Hírlap's sympathy with positions represented by the SZDSZ<sup>428</sup>. In conclusion, Magyar Hírlap is not an SZDSZ' newspaper, but, as one of my interviewees said, it represents views which are close to those found in the SZDSZ<sup>429</sup>. This makes Magyar Hírlap a liberal newspaper with a moderate narrative and with a sense of political correctness.

### 5.3.2.3 Népszabadság

Repeated statements by various interviewees (journalists and others) have supported my presupposition that Népszabadság's ideas were close to those of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). However, Népszabadság's narrative has turned out to be more national than one would have expected. This is not surprising when bearing in mind that nationalism and socialism, or social democracy for that matter, are not unavoidably contradictory<sup>430</sup>.

There is a strong tendency in Népszabadság's narrative to represent both sides, i.e. the Hungarian and the Romanian side, although to a different extent, due to the emphasis on the Hungarian side. Nevertheless, there is a solid representation not only of different political views from Romania but also of different Romanian newspapers. It is an attempt to reflect the variety of different opinions within the Romanian discourse, which does not take place in Magyar Hírlap or in the Romanian newspapers. This reflection is evidence of the strong position one of Népszabadság's leading correspondents abroad, Zoltán Tibori Szabó, has. He wrote about half the articles concerning the Status Law, which is unparalleled in Magyar Hírlap. In his articles, Tibori Szabó often represents comments made by different Romanian newspapers thus breaking the classic representation of the newspaper's own views and those of leading politicians. However, Tibori Szabó often represents Romanian newspapers, which do not view the Status Law with favour. This leads to a one-sided representation of the Romanian press, since not all newspapers condemned the Status Law, e.g. *România Liberă*.

Bearing in mind the political constellation in the Hungarian legislative period 1998-2002, there is clear differentiation in Népszabadság's narrative regarding the three major parties represented in parliament: the ruling conservative Young Democrats'

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<sup>428</sup> Interview with Tibor Bogdán.

<sup>429</sup> Interview with Norbert Molnár.

<sup>430</sup> See also Verdery 1991.

Union (FIDESZ) and the main opposition parties, the social-democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). There is harsh critique against the conservatives while there is only mild protest against certain activities and statements made by social-democratic representatives. The liberals are rarely mentioned and the other smaller parties are hardly or not mentioned at all. Consequently, according to Népszabadság's narrative, the political struggle within Hungary concerning the Status Law is between the conservatives and the social democrats while neglecting other parties. This is contradictory to certain remarks from Magyar Hírlap's journalists who said that Népszabadság changed its course after the social democrats voted in favour of the Status Law: from criticising the Status Law to supporting it<sup>431</sup>. Except for one journalist's interview and published article<sup>432</sup>, I could not detect any such change in Népszabadság's narrative.

In congruence with the arguments presented in Magyar Hírlap, Népszabadság also emphasised the discrimination of spouses due to the regulations set for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) by the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum, i.e. granting the CHN to non-Hungarian spouses. This element is completely missing from both Romanian newspapers' narratives. In all, the Hungarian newspapers are concerned with the discrimination of non-Hungarian spouses while the Romanian newspapers are concerned with the discrimination of Romanian workers. This clearly manifests the basic difference between the two discourses: the Hungarian side's interest in the co-ethnics abroad while the Romanian side's interest is in Romanians only.

Two of the three journalists I interviewed from Népszabadság have emphasised the fact that the newspaper's direction depends upon its three editors<sup>433</sup>. Each of these editors is in charge for a week and then the next one takes over. Having considered a long period of time, I have thus concluded that there is little, if any, difference between the different editors. Motifs and ethnic denotations have not revealed any specific pattern, which could indicate editorial influence in this sense<sup>434</sup>.

Népszabadság, like Magyar Hírlap, transmits a specific image of Hungary, an image apparently taken for granted by most Hungarian journalists: life is better in Hungary than in Romania. Taking this for granted is particularly demonstrated in two fields: the health care system and the labour market. When reading Népszabadság's narrative there is no doubt in the journalists' assessment that the Hungarian health care

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<sup>431</sup> Interview with Miklós Újvári.

<sup>432</sup> Interview with Tibor Kis.

<sup>433</sup> Interviews with Tibor Kis and Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

<sup>434</sup> Clearly, the difference could be manifested in other domains, e.g. choosing topics or other discourses.

system is better than the Romanian one. While Magyar Hírlap went into detail describing how catastrophic the situation is in Romania, Népszabadság took it for granted that its readers know this already. Bearing in mind how corrupt the Romanian health care system is, there is no doubt about the Hungarian system's superior efficiency. However, it is this doubtlessness that is striking, especially when considering the serious problems facing the Hungarian health care system: increasing corruption and being on the verge of a financial collapse. The other element, regarding Hungary's labour market, suggests that Hungary is a magnet for skilled as well as unqualified labour from the entire region. This argument, which was put forward in the heat of debate about the Orbán-Năstase Memorandum's (ONM) labour market regulations, made the journalists' stand very clear: If the ONM is applied fully, millions of Romanian labour seekers would flood the Hungarian labour market<sup>435</sup>. I conclude from these comparisons a certain need in the Hungarian discourse to position Hungary in a superior status vis-à-vis Romania, which has more severe problems with its economy and infrastructure than Hungary. In other words, these complaints are actually compliments for Hungary and make the country "look good" in comparison to other states. Interestingly, from the same day that the Hungarian Status Law came into effect Romanian citizens no longer needed a visa for the states of the Schengen Treaty. This has given rise to an unprecedented emigration wave from Romania. However, the emigrants chose southern European states, e.g. Italy and Spain, and only a small number of agricultural seasonal workers still sought work in Hungary.

#### 5.3.2.4 România Liberă

As with Adevărul, România Liberă's narrative is very one-sided. This means that the newspaper has preferentially represented views from Romanian politicians while ignoring the Hungarian ones. According to my interview partner, the Hungarian Status Law is an issue that concerned only Hungarians, both in Romania and in Hungary. Therefore, since România Liberă is focused on matters that are important to all Romanians, there was no need to take foreign views into consideration<sup>436</sup>.

România Liberă's narrative regarding the role of the various European institutions is a very sober one. The articles reveal România Liberă's conception that the Romanian-Hungarian quarrel over the Hungarian Status Law, which has been fought out mainly in various European institutions, e.g. the Venice Commission, is a sideshow

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<sup>435</sup> See also subchapter 4.2.3.5.

<sup>436</sup> Interview with Simona Popescu.

of the actual debate. The endeavour of the two states' to show more "European-ness" by complaining about each other on the European meta-level, is considered futile and counter-productive. The urge for a bilateral dialogue is viewed as a far better solution. This conclusion, which is also my personal point of view, distinguishes *România Liberă* significantly from all three papers. *România Liberă*'s narrative might be one-sided, due to the lack of Hungarian representation, but it nevertheless shows a newspaper with the clear ambition of pursuing political neutrality.

The issue of the Romanians that live outside Romania's borders, i.e. the Romanian co-ethnics, has been brought up only during the interview<sup>437</sup>. According to my interviewee, Romania should support its own co-ethnics just like Hungary does for the Hungarians in the bordering states. Consequently, *România Liberă* had a more positive attitude towards the Hungarian Status Law. There was even frustration due to the various Romanian governments' lack of initiative in this sense. This positive aspect towards the Status Law was not represented in the Hungarian articles, especially those for *Népszabadság* by Zoltán Tibori Szabó, who quoted passages from different Romanian newspapers that objected to the Status Law. According to my estimation, there are two possible reasons for this: First, the Hungarian journalists ignored this aspect in order to show clear-cut frontiers between the Hungarian and the Romanian side: the Romanian press represents the national Romanian side while the Hungarian side tries to demonstrate various positions within the two discourses. Secondly, they have not read *România Liberă*.

Unlike the Hungarian newspapers, neither *Adevărul* nor *România Liberă* has referred to laws similar to the Hungarian Status Law, e.g. the Slovak or Croatian ones<sup>438</sup>. Whether because the Romanian newspapers regarded the issue to be a strictly Hungarian one (*România Liberă*) or because the national pathos considered other similar laws as incomparable to the Hungarian Status Law due to the specific Hungarian-Romanian context (*Adevărul*), remains unclear.

#### 5.4 Closing remarks

There is no such thing as *the* ethnic group. Groups are part of an ongoing social and cultural struggle between different actors in the discourse that are in a position to exert power. Journalists writing for newspapers that have a high circulation are actors in such a position. The ethnic denotations used by journalists from Hungary and Romania

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<sup>437</sup> Idem.

<sup>438</sup> Compare Halász – Majtényi 2002.

to discuss/create/re-define groups that can be counted as co-ethnics, are tools of power within the discourse in question. Furthermore, the people they refer to also use these tools for exerting ethnicity and, consequently, positioning themselves in the ethno-political struggle evolving around ethnic and minority issues. This aspect, however, requires other questions and another research into the field.

There is also no such thing as a neutral newspaper. Each and every newspaper shows distinct tendencies within its narrative. I have shown that the Hungarian newspapers, *Magyar Hírlap* and *Népszabadság*, rather emphasise Hungary's historic obligation towards the co-ethnics and thus refer to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). The Romanian dailies *Adevărul* and *România Liberă* on the other hand accentuate the legal and extraterritorial aspects affecting the Romanian state. Furthermore, *Adevărul* has revealed the possibility of combining national talk with supporting a socialist-led government. *Magyar Hírlap* has shown that there is more to the public discourse in Hungary concerning the co-ethnics than just polemics. *Népszabadság*, in congruence with *Adevărul*, demonstrated that left-wing papers can have a nationalistic undercurrent despite a neutral façade and *România Liberă*, like *Magyar Hírlap*, is an exception in the Romanian press by avoiding the usual nationalistic standpoints and trying to take a more moderate and less panic-stricken attitude.

Methodologically, discourse analysis is an efficient method to proceed with due to the segmentation it offers. In other words, the researcher can concentrate on specific topics within the discourse, which he can then emphasise by going into further detail and explaining the mechanism behind it. However, the method has three drawbacks: firstly, it cannot encompass *all* the aspects of a single discourse. Secondly, when using mainly an interpretative method, the results vary due to the researcher's previous knowledge and disposition. Thirdly, due to the context of this work, the specific aspect of language is crucial when comparing texts from two completely different languages, thinking in a third one and writing in a fourth. Increasing the number of researchers and extending the time available for a more extensive analysis can tackle the first two shortcomings and deliver more specified results. The third one can only be overcome by a mental trick: "... contradicting logic, we must learn to use and erase our language at the same time."<sup>439</sup> This constant switch is obviously tedious and unsatisfactory at times. Nevertheless, I do think that discourse analysis in different languages is still a useful method to reveal and comprehend mechanisms of power in social and cultural studies in order to obtain satisfactory results.

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<sup>439</sup> Spivak 1997, p. xviii.

The Status Law seems to be the last significant debate in the Hungarian-Romanian relationship for quite a while. Neither the bilateral agreement of 1996, nor the failed Hungarian referendum for a dual citizenship in 2004, nor the forthcoming Romanian Status Law seem to have stirred up so much attention as the Hungarian Status Law. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is the first specific Hungarian law dedicated to Hungary's relation with its co-ethnics and that it has come into effect at a very crucial time to both states. Bearing in mind Hungary's full NATO membership in 1999 and both states' aspirations to join the European Union as soon as possible, a European or, to use a common phrase from the articles, a *Euro-Atlantic* platform has opened up for both sides upon which they can put forward their arguments. Furthermore, mass media in Romania and Hungary after complete liberalisation in the mid-nineties has had the opportunity to carry the political debates into discourses. When considering the modest practical effect the Hungarian Status Law has had since 2002, I can only conclude that it was a missed historic opportunity for Hungary and Hungary's neighbouring states to co-operate together for the benefit of their respective citizens, thus including the co-ethnics. All in all, mainly four groups harvested the benefits of the Status Law: students who could study in Hungary, teachers who now had the opportunity of further qualification on Hungarian educational institutions, elderly co-ethnics who cherished the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality as a national symbol of their Hungarian-ness and families with children that attend Hungarian-speaking schools and are thus entitled to a certain children's allowance.

Regarding ethnicity in politics that concern the co-ethnics, political elites in the Carpathian Basin after 1990 have often abused ethnicity for either obtaining or maintaining positions of power within their respective political system. By elites I not only mean the Romanian and Slovak political classes, but also the local Hungarian politicians in those countries, who have performed their role as representatives of an ethnic minority in order to obtain a larger share of the national cake. Ethnicity, therefore, is more than the personal performance of an individual within the frame of his social possibilities; "it is an interpretative prism, a way of making sense of the social world. And it is one among many such interpretative frames."<sup>440</sup> Furthermore, ethnicity remains an instrument of battle in the struggle over financial and political resources.

When I applied for a fellowship to be able to finance my PhD, I was asked what the purpose of my work was, besides the academic challenge. I replied that this work should enhance understanding and mutual awareness between Hungarians and

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<sup>440</sup> Brubaker 2006, p.15.

Romanians. As I have said in the preliminary remarks by quoting Gábor Miklós from the Hungarian daily *Népszabadság*, the political situation is very difficult<sup>441</sup>. Signs of understanding are rare and organisations such as the Liga Pro Europa are exceptions<sup>442</sup>. It is small steps, such as academic work made available in a shared foreign language such as English or the first common session of both governments on 20<sup>th</sup> October 2005 in Bucharest, that give hope for a better understanding and tolerance in the near future. Therefore, this thesis is not just an academic research, but also an attempt to mediate between discourses, political views and ethnic perspectives in the region.

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<sup>441</sup> See Chapter 0.

<sup>442</sup> See also [www.proeuropa.ro](http://www.proeuropa.ro)

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## 7. Appendices

Appendix 1: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (1<sup>st</sup> version, 19.06.2001)

### Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries

#### Parliament

- In order to comply with its responsibilities for Hungarians living abroad and to promote the preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary prescribed in paragraph (3) of Article 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary,
- Considering the European integration endeavours of the Republic of Hungary and in-keeping with the basic principles espoused by international organisations, and in particular by the Council of Europe and by the European Union, regarding the respect of human rights and the protection of minority rights;
- Having regard to the generally recognised rules of international law, as well as to the obligations of the Republic of Hungary assumed under international law;
- Having regard to the development of bilateral and multilateral relations of good neighbourhood and regional co-operation in the Central European area and to the strengthening of the stabilising role of Hungary;
- In order to ensure that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole and to promote and preserve their well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country;
- Based on the initiative and proposals of the Hungarian Standing Conference, a co-ordinating body functioning in order to preserve and reinforce the awareness of national self-identity of Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries;
- Without prejudice to the benefits and assistance provided by law for persons of Hungarian nationality\*\* living outside the Hungarian borders in other parts of the world;

Herewith adopts the following Act:

#### CHAPTER I

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

#### Scope of the Act

#### Article 1

(1) This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine, and who

- a) have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary renunciation, and
- b) are not in possession of a permit for permanent stay in Hungary.

(2) This Act shall also apply to the spouse living together with the person identified in paragraph (1) and to the children of minor age being raised in their common household even if these persons are not of Hungarian nationality.

(3) This Act shall also apply to co-operation with, and assistance to organisations specified in Articles 13, 17, 18 and 25.

## Article 2

(1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled, under the conditions laid down in this Act, to benefits and assistance on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, as well as in their place of residence in the neighbouring countries on the basis of the Certificate specified in Article 19.

(2) The provisions of this Act shall be applied without prejudice to the obligations of the Republic of Hungary undertaken in international agreements.

(3) The benefits and assistance claimable under this Act shall not affect other existing benefits and assistance ensured by legislation in force for non-Hungarian citizens of Hungarian nationality living in other parts of the world.

## Article 3

The Republic of Hungary, in order to

- a) ensure the maintenance of permanent contacts,
- b) provide for the accessibility of benefits and assistance contained in this Act,
- c) ensure undisturbed cultural, economic and family relations,
- d) ensure the free movement of persons and the free flow of ideas,

and taking into account its international legal obligations, shall provide for the most favoured treatment possible with regard to the entry and stay on its territory for the persons falling within the scope of this Act.

## CHAPTER II

### BENEFITS AND ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FOR PERSONS FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS ACT

Education, Culture, Science

## Article 4

(1) In the field of culture, persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled in Hungary to rights identical to those of Hungarian citizens. Accordingly, the Republic of Hungary shall ensure for them in particular:

- a) the right to use public cultural institutions and the opportunity to use the services they offer,
- b) access to cultural goods for the public and for research,
- c) access to monuments of historic value and the related documentation,
- d) the research for scientific purposes of archive materials containing protected personal data, if the neighbouring state where the Hungarian individual living outside the borders has a permanent residence is a party to the international convention on the protection of personal data.\*

\* Act VI of 1998 on the promulgation of the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on 28 January 1981 in Strasbourg.

(2) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to use the services of any state-run public library, and to the free of charge use of the following basic services:

- a) visit of the library,
- b) on-the-spot use of certain collections determined by the library,
- c) use of stock-exploring instruments,
- d) information on the services of the library and of the library system,
- e) in the case of registration, borrowing of printed library material in accordance with the regulations of the library.

(3) Further benefits with respect to the availability of services offered by state-run museums and public cultural institutions to persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be laid down in a separate legal rule.

#### Article 5

Hungarian scientists falling within the scope of this Act may become external or regular members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

#### Distinctions and Scholarships

#### Article 6

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure that persons falling within the scope of this Act, in recognition of their outstanding activities in the service of the Hungarian nation as a whole and in enriching Hungarian and universal human values, may be awarded distinctions of the Republic of Hungary and may receive titles, prizes or honorary diplomas founded by its Ministers.

(2) In the process of determining conditions for state scholarships, the possibility to receive such scholarships shall be ensured for persons falling within the scope of this Act.

## Social Security Provisions and Health Services

### Article 7

(1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act who, under Article 15, work on the basis of any type of contract for employment in the territory of the Republic of Hungary shall pay, unless otherwise provided for by international agreements, health insurance and pension contribution of an amount equal to that laid down in the relevant Hungarian social security legislation to the authority designated for this purpose in a separate legal rule. Those contributions shall entitle such persons to health and pension provision specified by a separate legal rule.

(2) Persons falling within the scope of this Act who are not obliged to pay health insurance and pension contributions as stipulated in paragraph (1) shall have the right to apply for reimbursement of the costs of self-pay health care services in advance. Applications shall be submitted to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose.

(3) In cases requiring immediate medical assistance, persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to such assistance in Hungary according to the provisions of bilateral social security (social policy) agreements.

## Travel benefits

### Article 8

(1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to travel benefits in Hungary on scheduled internal local and long-distance lines of public transport. With regard to railways, such benefits shall apply to 2nd class fares.

(2) An unlimited number of journeys shall be provided free of charge for:

- a) children up to six years of age,
- b) persons over sixty-five years of age.

(3) A 90% travel discount shall be provided on means of internal long-distance public transport for:

- a) persons identified in paragraph (1) four times a year,
- b) a group of at least ten persons under eighteen years of age travelling as a group and falling within the scope of this Act, and two accompanying adults once a year.

(4) The detailed rules of travel benefits shall be laid down in a separate legal rule.

## Education

## Article 9

(1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education applicable to Hungarian citizens, shall be entitled to participate, according to the conditions specified in this Article, in the following programmes of higher education institutions in the Republic of Hungary:

- a) undergraduate level college or university education,
- b) supplementary undergraduate education,
- c) non-degree programmes,
- d) Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) or DLA programmes,
- e) general and specialised further training,
- f) accredited higher education level vocational training in a school-type system.

(2) Students participating in state-financed full-time training programmes specified in paragraph (1), shall be entitled to formula funding on the one hand, and financial and other benefits in kind on the other, both being part of the appropriations of budgetary expenditure for students, as well as to the reimbursement of detailed health insurance contributions provided by Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education. The detailed conditions of these forms of assistance and further benefits shall be regulated by the Minister of Education in a separate legal rule.

(3) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may pursue studies in the higher education institutions of the Republic of Hungary in the framework of state-financed training in a fixed number to be determined annually by the Minister of Education.

(4) Students from neighbouring countries participating in education programmes not financed by the state may apply for the partial or full reimbursement of their costs of stay and education in Hungary to the public benefit organisation established to this end.

## Student Benefits

### Article 10

(1) Registered students of a public education institution in a neighbouring country who are pursuing their studies in Hungarian language, or students of any higher education institution who are subject to this Act are entitled to benefits available under the relevant regulations to Hungarian citizens with student identification documents.

(2) Entitlement to benefits specified in paragraph (1) shall be recorded in the Appendix of the Certificate (Article 19) serving for this purpose. The detailed rules of access to these benefits shall be laid down in a separate legal rule.

## Further Training for Hungarian Teachers Living Abroad

### Article 11

(1) Hungarian teachers living abroad, teaching in Hungarian in neighbouring countries and falling within the scope of this Act (hereinafter referred to as "Hungarian teachers living abroad") shall be entitled to participate in regular further training in Hungary, as well as to receive the benefits specified in paragraph (2). Further training and the benefits shall be applicable to a fixed number of teachers determined annually by the Minister of Education.

(2) For the duration of further training and to the extent stipulated by a separate legal rule, persons identified in paragraph (1) shall be entitled to request the Hungarian educational institution providing further training to

- a) reimburse accommodation costs,
- b) reimburse travel expenses, and
- c) contribute to the costs of registration.

(3) The detailed rules of further training for Hungarian teachers living abroad shall be regulated by a separate legal rule.

#### Article 12

(1) Hungarian teachers living abroad, falling within the scope of this Act and those teaching in higher education institutions in neighbouring countries (hereinafter referred to as "Hungarian instructors living abroad") shall be entitled to special benefits.

(2) Benefits available to Hungarian teachers and instructors living abroad shall be identical with the benefits related to Teacher Identity Cards issued to teachers of Hungarian citizenship on the basis of legislation in force.

(3) Entitlement to benefits specified in paragraph (1) shall be recorded in the Appendix of the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" serving for this purpose. The detailed rules of access to these benefits shall be regulated in a separate legal rule.

#### Education Abroad in Affiliated Departments

#### Article 13

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall promote the preservation of the mother tongue, culture and national identity of Hungarians living abroad also by supporting the establishment, organisation and operation of affiliated Departments of accredited Hungarian higher education institutions in neighbouring countries.

The financial resources necessary for the realisation of these goals shall be set out as targeted appropriations in the budget of the Republic of Hungary. The Minister of Education shall decide on the allocation of the available resources according to a separate legal rule.

(2) The Republic of Hungary supports the establishment, operation and development of higher education institutions (faculties, study programmes, etc.) teaching in Hungarian and seeking accreditation in neighbouring countries. Financial resources required for the

realisation of these goals may be applied for at the public benefit organisation established for this purpose.

#### Educational Assistance Available in the Native Country

##### Article 14

(1) Parents falling within the scope of this Act and bringing up at least two children of minor age in their own household may apply for educational assistance for each of their children if:

a) the child attends an education institution according to his/her age and receives training or education in Hungarian, and

b) the education institution specified in point a) is in the neighbouring country of residence of the parents.

(2) Parents falling within the scope of this Act may receive assistance for books and learning materials (hereinafter referred to as "assistance for learning materials") if the child of minor age living in their own household attends an educational institution in the neighbouring country of residence of the parents and receives education in Hungarian.

(3) Applications for assistance for education and learning materials may be submitted to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose. In the process of evaluating the applications, the public benefit organisation shall request the position, formulated with the consent of the Hungarian Minister of Education, of the recommending body (Article 20) in the neighbouring country concerned whether instruction and education in Hungarian are ensured in the education institution in question.

(4) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may apply for assistance for their studies at the higher education institutions of neighbouring countries from the public benefit organisation established for this purpose.

#### Employment

##### Article 15

(1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may be employed in the territory of the Republic of Hungary on the basis of a permit. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorisation of employment of foreign nationals in Hungary, with the exception that the work permit can be issued for a maximum of three months per calendar year without the prior assessment of the situation in the labour market. A separate legal rule may allow for the issuing of work permits for longer periods of time under the same conditions.

##### Article 16

(1) The persons concerned may apply to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose for the reimbursement of expenses related to the fulfilment of the legal conditions for employment. These expenses include, in particular, the costs of proceedings for the prior certification of the necessary level of education, of specialised training and of compliance with occupational health requirements.

(2) The detailed rules of the proceedings for the issuing of work permits and the registration shall be regulated by a separate legal rule.

#### Duties of the Public Service Media

##### Article 17

(1) Public service media in Hungary shall provide, on a regular basis, for the gathering and transmission of information on Hungarians living abroad and shall transmit information on Hungary and the Hungarian nation to Hungarians living abroad. The purpose of this information shall be:

- a) the transmission of Hungarian and universal spiritual and cultural values,
- b) the forming of an unbiased picture of the world, of Hungary and of the Hungarian nation,
- c) the preservation of the awareness of national identity, of the mother tongue and culture of the Hungarian minority communities.

(2) The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the production and broadcasting of public service television programmes for the Hungarian communities living abroad through the establishment and operation of an organisation devoted to such purposes. The financial resources necessary for such programmes shall be provided by the state budget.

#### Assistance to Organisations Operating Abroad

##### Article 18

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall support organisations operating in neighbouring countries and promoting the goals of the Hungarian national communities living in neighbouring countries.

(2) The organisations specified in paragraph (1) may apply to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose and operating in a lawful manner if their goals include, in particular, the following:

- a) the preservation, furtherance and research of Hungarian national traditions,
- b) the preservation and fostering of the Hungarian language, literature, culture and folk arts,
- c) the promotion of higher education of Hungarians living abroad by facilitating the work of instructors from Hungary as visiting lecturers,
- d) the restoration and maintenance of monuments belonging to the Hungarian cultural heritage,

- e) the enhancement of the capacity of disadvantaged settlements in areas inhabited by Hungarian national communities living abroad to improve their ability to preserve their population and to develop rural tourism,
- f) the establishment and improvement of conditions of infrastructure for maintaining contacts with the Republic of Hungary,
- g) the pursuance of other activities promoting the goals specified in paragraph (1).

## CHAPTER III

### RULES OF PROCEDURE OF APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS AND ASSISTANCE

#### "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" and "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality"

##### Article 19

(1) Benefits and assistance specified in this Act may be received by presenting either the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" or the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality", both of which may be issued under the conditions specified in Article 20 at the request of persons of both Hungarian and non-Hungarian nationality.

(2) From the Hungarian central public administration body (hereinafter referred to as "the evaluating authority") designated by the Government of the Republic of Hungary for this purpose:

a) persons of Hungarian nationality falling within the scope of this Act may request a "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" with a photo,

b) a "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" with a photo may be requested by spouses of non-Hungarian nationality living together with persons specified in point a) and children of minor age being brought up in the same household, provided that:

the applicant meets the requirements set out in points a) and b) of paragraph (1) of Article 1 and the recommending authority specified in Article 20 has issued the recommendation; and neither an expulsion order nor a prohibition of entry or stay, issued by the competent Hungarian authorities on the basis of grounds determined in a separate Act, is in effect against the applicant in Hungary; and no criminal proceedings have been instituted against the applicant in Hungary for intentional criminal offence.

(3) In addition to the requirements specified in paragraph (2), the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality " shall also be conditional upon whether the person of Hungarian nationality entitling the dependants in question to submit an application for the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" is already in the possession of, or entitled to, a "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality". The withdrawal of the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" shall entail the withdrawal of the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality".

##### Article 20

(1) The evaluating authority shall issue the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" if the applicant is in the possession of a recommendation which has been issued by a recommending organisation representing the Hungarian national community in the neighbouring country concerned, and being recognised by the Government of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organisation, and which:

a) certifies, on the basis of a declaration made by the applicant (or in the case of a minor by his/her statutory agent), that the applicant is of Hungarian nationality,

b) certifies the authenticity of the signature of the applicant and

c) includes the following:

ca) the application, photo and address of the applicant,

cb) the personal data to be recorded in the Certificate (Article 21),

cc) the name and the print of the official seal of the recommending organisation, the name and signature of the person acting on behalf of the recommending organisation,

cd) place and date of issue of the recommendation.

(2) The recommendation required for the issuing of the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" shall certify, instead of the information specified in paragraph (1) point a), the family relationship between the applicant and the person of Hungarian nationality falling within the scope of this Act.

(3) The Government of the Republic of Hungary shall recognise an organisation representing the Hungarian community in the given neighbouring country as a recommending organisation if it is capable of:

a) representing the Hungarian community living in the given country in its entirety,

b) providing for the organisational and personnel conditions for receiving and evaluating applications for recommendation.

#### Article 21

(1) The period of validity of the Certificate

a) shall expire on the day of the eighteenth birthday in the case of minors,

b) shall be five years in the case of persons between 18 and 60 years of age,

c) shall be indefinite in the case of persons over 60 years of age.

(2) If the period of validity of the Certificate expires, the proceedings specified in Articles 19-20 shall be repeated upon request.

(3) The Certificate shall be withdrawn by the evaluating authority if

- a) the recommending organisation has withdrawn its recommendation due to the submission of false data by the bearer of the Certificate in the application process,
- b) its bearer has been granted an immigration or permanent residence permit,
- c) its bearer has acquired Hungarian citizenship,
- d) its bearer has been recognised as a refugee or temporarily protected person by the authorities responsible for refugee matters,
- e) its bearer has been expelled from the territory of the Republic of Hungary, or a prohibition of entry or stay has been issued against him/her,
- f) criminal proceedings have been instituted against the bearer in Hungary,
- g) the Certificate has been used in an unauthorised way or has been forged,
- h) the family relationship entitling the bearer to use the Certificate for Dependents has ceased to exist,
- i) upon request by the bearer of the Certificate.

(4) The recommending organisation shall also be notified of the final decision on the withdrawal of the Certificate.

(5) The Certificate shall contain the following data of the entitled person:

- a) family and given name (also the maiden family and given name in the case of women) as it is used officially in the neighbouring country of residence (in Latin script), and in the case of persons of Hungarian nationality in Hungarian as well,
- b) name of the place of birth as it is used officially in the neighbouring country and in Hungarian,
- c) date of birth and gender,
- d) mother's name as it is officially used in the neighbouring country of residence (in Latin script) and in the case of persons of Hungarian nationality in Hungarian as well,
- e) passport photo, citizenship or reference to stateless status,
- f) signature in the entitled person's own hand, and
- g) date of issue, period of validity and number of the document.

(6) Notes and certifications required for access to benefits and assistance available under this Act shall be recorded in the Appendix to the Certificate.

(7) In order to ensure the authenticity of the Certificate and to supervise the granting of benefits, the evaluating authority (for the purpose of the application of these provisions: the data handling organ) shall keep records of the data of the Certificates, the identification marks in the Appendices, the foreign address of the bearers, the family

relationship entitling the bearer to the document, the number and period of validity of the permit entitling to stay as well as the data specified in paragraph (3). The data contained in the records may be handled by the data handling organ until the withdrawal or the expiry of the period of validity of the Certificate. The data contained in the records may be forwarded to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) for statistical purposes. Bodies responsible for providing and keeping records of benefits and assistance may also receive those data for the purpose of verifying entitlement and preventing abuse, and so may Courts in charge of criminal proceedings, law enforcement bodies, national security services and the alien policing authority.

(8) For the purpose of evaluating applications and examining the existence of reasons for the withdrawal of the Certificate, the evaluating authority may request information from the following organs:

a) the Central Registry of Aliens on whether the applicant is subject to proceedings under the law on aliens, or on any order of expulsion or prohibition on entry to and stay in Hungary against the applicant, as well as on the details of the residence permit entitling the applicant to stay in Hungary,

b) organs responsible for naturalisation on issues related to the acquisition Hungarian citizenship,

c) the Central Registry of Refugees on recognition as a refugee or temporarily protected person,

d) the Criminal Records Office on criminal proceedings in process.

## Article 22

(1) Proceedings of the evaluating authority shall be governed by the provisions of Act IV of 1957 on the General Rules of Public Administration Procedures. The costs of public administration procedures shall be covered by the State.

(2) The applicant may institute proceedings in Court against a final administrative decision on the appeal against the first instance decision regarding the issue or withdrawal of a Certificate by the evaluating authority. The Court may alter the administrative decision and its proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3) The detailed rules of procedure of the evaluating authority and the order of registration of the issued Certificates, as well as the data content and form of the Certificates, shall be regulated by a separate legal rule.

## Use of Benefits on the Territory of the Republic of Hungary

### Article 23

(1) Hungarian persons living abroad shall be entitled to use the benefits set out in Article 4, paragraph (1) of Article 7, Article 8, Article 10, paragraph (2) of Article 11 and Article 12 — under the conditions determined in the aforementioned Articles — by presenting their Certificates (Article 19) during their lawful stay in the Republic of Hungary.

(2) The state-run organisations and institutions granting the benefits specified in paragraph (1) and economic organisations providing travel benefits shall receive the financial resources necessary for granting these benefits out of the central state budget.

#### Application Procedures for Assistance Available in the Republic of Hungary

##### Article 24

(1) The Government shall establish public benefit organisation(s) in order to evaluate the applications of and distribute assistance for persons (organisations) falling within the scope of this Act.

(2) The founding document of the public benefit organisation, taking into account the provisions of Act CLVI of 1997 on Public Benefit Organisations, shall contain the goals of the activities and the range of applications to be evaluated by it and shall determine its main decision-making body as well.

(3) Applications for publicly advertised assistance under this Act may be submitted to the respective public benefit organisation competent according to their subject matter.

(4) Data and documents required in the advertisement by the respective public benefit organisation shall be attached to the applications.

(5) In the case of a favourable decision, the applicant and the public benefit organisation shall conclude a civil law contract containing the conditions of assistance and the amount thereof, as well as determining the purpose of the use of assistance and the rules of rendering accounts thereof.

(6) The financial resources required for the activities of such public benefit organisation(s) shall be provided, on an annual basis, in a separate group of appropriations of the central state budget.

#### Application Procedures for Assistance Available in Neighbouring Countries

##### Article 25

(1) Requests (applications) for assistance regulated in this Act may be submitted by persons (organisations) falling within the scope of this Act to lawfully operating non-profit organisations established in the neighbouring country of their permanent residence (registered office) for this purpose (hereinafter referred to as "foreign public benefit organisations")

(2) The civil law contract concluded between the public benefit organisation established in Hungary and the foreign public benefit organisation established for the evaluation of applications and the granting of assistance shall contain the required range of data, which are to be supported by documents, declarations, planning or documentation, etc.

(3) The public benefit organisations operating in Hungary shall evaluate the application based on the data specified in the civil law contract as laid down in paragraph (2) and on the opinion of the foreign public benefit organisation.

(4) Assistance shall be granted to applicants by the Hungarian public benefit organisation on the basis of a civil law contract. This contract shall determine the conditions of the assistance and the amount thereof as well as the purpose of the use of such assistance and the rules of rendering accounts thereof.

#### Central Registration of Assistance

##### Article 26

(1) For the purpose of co-ordinating the entire system of assistance, a central registry of applications for assistance and the relevant decisions made by public benefit organisations established for their evaluation shall be set up.

(2) The Government shall designate the central public administration organ responsible for managing the records.

(3) The organ managing the records shall handle the following data:

a) name, permanent address (registered office) and document number of those submitting applications for assistance,

b) the type of assistance sought,

c) the amount of assistance granted.

(4) Data specified in paragraph (3) may be handled by the organ managing the records for ten years from the date of the granting of assistance.

(5) Data from the records shall be made available to public benefit organisations established in Hungary and in the neighbouring countries for the purpose of evaluating applications for assistance, as well as to the central public administration organs of Hungary responsible for providing the financial resources for assistance.

#### CHAPTER IV

##### FINAL PROVISIONS

##### Article 27

(1) This Act shall enter into force on 1 January 2002.

(2) From the date of accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, the provisions of this Act shall be applied in accordance with the treaty of accession of the Republic of Hungary and with the law of the European Communities.

##### Article 28

(1) The Government shall be empowered to regulate by decree:

a) the provisions on the assignment of the national public administration organ entitled to issue, withdraw and register the Certificates, as well as on the assignment of its

superior organ, on the definition of their competencies and on the rules of procedure of the issuing, replacement, withdrawal and registration of such Certificates,

b) the detailed rules of travel benefits for persons falling within the scope of this Act,

c) the detailed rules related to the provision and use of student benefits for persons specified in paragraph (1) of Article 10 of this Act.

(2) The Government shall ensure the establishment of Hungarian public benefit organisation(s) evaluating applications and allocating assistance under this Act. The Government shall also ensure the co-ordination of the activities of public benefit organisations already operating for this purpose, the appropriate modification of their founding documents and the reallocation of resources in this framework.

#### Article 29

(1) The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall determine in a joint decree, with respect to educational assistance with the consent of the Minister of Education, the detailed rules on registering the Certificates, as well as the requirements of the content and form of the Certificates.

(2) The Minister of Economic Affairs shall:

a) determine, in a joint decree with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the rules of procedure and registration related to work permits for Hungarians living abroad and designate the public administration organ responsible for carrying out these duties,

b) be empowered to regulate by decree the conditions for issuing work permits for a period longer than the one specified in Article 15 of this Act with regard to employees falling within the scope of this Act, or for a particular group of employees, in consensus with the Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs in cases involving professional sportspersons.

(3) The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall be empowered to substitute his own declaration for the recommendation specified in Article 20 of this Act in cases deserving exceptional treatment on grounds of equity in the course of proceedings of the evaluating authority designated in Article 19, and furthermore in cases where the proceedings specified in paragraph (1) of Article 20 are impeded, to ensure the smooth conduct of administrative proceedings.

(4) The Minister of National Cultural Heritage shall determine by decree the detailed rules of benefits available to Hungarians living abroad with respect to the use of the services provided by museums and public cultural institutions.

(5) The Minister of Education, with the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, shall determine by decree the detailed rules on further training for Hungarian teachers living abroad, as well as detailed rules on the benefits set out in Article 9, Article 11 and 12, paragraph (1) of Article 13 and Article 14 of this Act, including the extent of such assistance.

Source: [http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=03&news007\\_id=1149](http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=03&news007_id=1149)

Date: 22.05.2006

Appendix 2: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania (Orbán-Năstase-Memorandum)

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania (December 22, 2001)

The Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania, hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”,

Guided by a joint effort to strengthen their bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual understanding and good-neighbourly co-operation,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the European and international documents in the field of the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

Guided by the provisions of the Venice Commission’s report on the preferential treatment of national minorities by their kin States, setting forth the conditions in which the involvement of the kin State is legitimate, as the respect of the territorial sovereignty, pacta sunt servanda, the principle of good neighbourliness, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the principle of non-discrimination,

Taking into account the Statement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE and, also, the position of the European Commission concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries, who invited the States concerned to reach a bilateral understanding respectful of the current European standards,

In accordance with the Treaty on understanding, co-operation and good-neighbourliness between the Republic of Hungary and Romania, in particular the provisions concerning the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, acknowledging that providing effective equality in rights and chances for the national minorities living in their respective countries and creating conditions for them to prosper in their land of birth, constitute an indispensable contribution to the stability of the region and to the creation of a future Europe, based on values as cultural and linguistic diversity and tolerance,

Reiterating their strong will to maintain the rhythm of development of bilateral economic relations and decided to give stronger impetus for the increasing of commercial exchanges between their States,

With a view to the 2002 Prague Summit and welcoming the progress of Romania in meeting the accession criteria, the Republic of Hungary supports the decision for Romania to become a member of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation,

Reiterating their mutual permanent and substantial support for their integration with the European Union,

Determined to solve all open issues on their agenda and further their co-operation;

Have agreed as follows:

## I. Concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries:

1. The present Agreement sets forth conditions of implementing the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries with regard to the Romanian citizens.

2. All Romanian citizens, notwithstanding their ethnic origin, will enjoy the same conditions and treatment in the field of employment on the basis of a work permit on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorisation of employment of foreign citizens in Hungary. When work permits are issued for a maximum of three months per calendar year, there is the possibility of their prolongation and the Romanian citizens enjoy some facilities on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, which are the following:

Romanian citizens working on the territory of the Republic of Hungary on the basis of any type of contract of employment shall have the right to apply to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose for the reimbursement of the costs of self-pay health care services in advance.

By exchange of letters in the first week of January 2002, the Parties shall include amendments also in the Agreement on seasonal workers. These amendments shall concern supplementary advantages reciprocally granted in case the work permit is issued only for three months (and not for six months as provided in the Agreement on seasonal workers). A mutual obligation of non-discrimination on ethnic criteria during the implementation of the Agreement shall be also included.

3. The Romanian citizens of non-Hungarian ethnic identity shall not be granted any certificate and shall not be entitled to any benefits set forth by the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries.

4. The entire procedure of granting the certificate (receiving of applications, issue, forwarding) shall primarily take place on the territory of the Republic of Hungary in the county public administration established by the Hungarian authorities and respectively at the Office of the Ministry of Interior, and at the Hungarian diplomatic missions.

5. The Hungarian representative organisations or other entity on the territory of Romania shall not issue any recommendations concerning the ethnic origin or other criteria.

The organisations or other entities on the territory of Romania can provide with information with a legally non-binding character in the absence of formal supporting documents.

6. The administrative document which entitles to benefits, issued by the Hungarian authorities, shall be named "Hungarian Certificate".

7. The certificate shall contain only the strictly necessary personal data and the entitlement to benefits (name, forename, citizenship, country of residence etc.) and shall include no reference to the ethnic origin/identity.

8. The compulsory criteria on which certificates are granted shall be the following:

- Relevant application,
- Free declaration of the person of belonging to the Hungarian minority in the State of citizenship, founding on his/her Hungarian ethnic identity,
- Knowledge of the Hungarian language, or
- The person should have declared himself/herself in the State of citizenship to have Hungarian ethnic identity, or
- Optionally, the person should either belong to a Hungarian representative organisation (notably membership of the UDMR), or be registered as ethnic Hungarian in a church.

9. The Parties shall start the negotiations in the frame of the Committee on national minorities of the Intergovernmental Hungarian-Romanian Commission of an Agreement on the preferential treatment of the Romanian minority on the territory of the Republic of Hungary and of the Hungarian minority on the territory of Romania, in order to preserve their cultural identity in accordance with the provisions of the international documents, the Venice Commission's report, the guidelines of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

10. The Republic of Hungary shall not grant any kind of support to Hungarian political organisations of Romania unless previously informing the Romanian authorities and obtaining their consent.

11. On the basis of common experiences of the Parties, the Government of the Republic of Hungary shall initiate the review and the necessary amendments of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries in six months after the signature of this Memorandum of Understanding. By the 1st of January 2002, the authorities of the Republic of Hungary shall take the necessary measures in order to implement the provisions of the present Agreement by means of norms of application and shall further on take also into account the recommendations of the Committee on national minorities which shall further on examine the questions concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries.

## II. Concerning their bilateral relations:

1. On the occasion of the anniversary of 5 years of active partnership between Romania and the Republic of Hungary, the Parties shall convoke a special session of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission. In order to work out a plan to make concrete steps forward in their bilateral co-operation, Parties will, in the Committees of the Hungarian-Romanian Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Active Co-operation and Partnership and at its plenary session scheduled for the first quarter of 2002, survey the full range of the bilateral relations and make recommendations for measures to be taken.

2. In order to carry out the Recommendations made in the Protocol of the Committee on national minorities of the Hungarian-Romanian Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Active Co-operation and Partnership, signed at its 4th session on October 19, 2001, which will be approved by the two Governments, who will take the necessary measures for implementation.

3. The Parties give priority to the development of railway and road system connecting the two countries and to the enlargement of the border crossing infrastructure program linked to it.

4. The Parties will start talks with a view to elaborate the operational modalities of a future Joint Financial Fund designed to guarantee the investments of their small and medium size enterprises in the other country respectively.

5. In the field of the Euro-Atlantic integration process the Parties will share their relevant experiences.

6. The Parties express their interest to take all the necessary measures in order to modernise and develop their bilateral legal framework.

Done at Budapest, on the 22nd of December 2001, in two original copies, each of them in the English language.

Source:

[http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=06&country\\_id=Romania&id=209](http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=06&country_id=Romania&id=209)

Date: 22.05.2006

Appendix 3: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Law of Status, 2<sup>nd</sup> version, 23.06.2003)

Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries  
(23.06.2003)

- In order for the Republic of Hungary to meet its obligations to Hungarians living outside Hungary and to promote the preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary as provided for in Article 6 Paragraph 3 of the Constitution,
- With a view to the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union and in keeping with the fundamental principles espoused by international organisations, and in particular by the Council of Europe regarding respect for human rights and protection of the rights of minorities;
- With regard for the generally recognised rules of international law, as well as for the obligations of the Republic of Hungary assumed under international law;
- With regard for the development of bilateral and multilateral good-neighbourly relations and partnership and regional co-operation in the Central European region in particular with a view to bilateral treaties concluded by the Republic of Hungary with neighbouring countries to maintain good neighbourly relations and cooperation, and to guarantee the rights of minorities and for the need to strengthen the stabilising role of Hungary;
- In order to ensure the well being of Hungarians living in neighbouring states in their home-state, to promote their ties to Hungary, to support their Hungarian identity and their links to the Hungarian cultural heritage as expression of their belonging to the Hungarian nation;
- Upon the initiative and based on the proposals of the Hungarian Standing Conference, as the consultative body working to preserve and reinforce the identity of Hungarian communities living in neighbouring states;
- Without prejudice to the benefits and grants provided by law for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin living outside Hungary in other parts of the world;

Parliament has adopted this Act:

## Chapter I

### GENERAL PROVISIONS

#### Section 1.

(1) This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin who are not Hungarian citizens and who reside in the Republic of Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or Ukraine (hereafter referred to as neighbouring states).

(2) Unless otherwise provided for by treaties, this Act shall also apply to spouses living with persons identified in paragraph (1) and to minor children residing within a common household (hereafter collectively referred to as immediate family members) even if these persons do not declare themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin.

(3) The Act shall not apply to persons

a) who have lost their Hungarian citizenship due to a voluntary renunciation;

b) whose Hungarian citizenship has been revoked because it had been obtained under fraudulent circumstances;

c) who have been granted an immigration permit or a permanent residence permit on the territory of the Republic of Hungary or who have been granted refugee or temporarily protected person status.

## Section 2.

(1) The Republic of Hungary wishes to contribute to the well-being and prosperity of Hungarians living in neighbouring states and to the preservation of their cultural and linguistic identity by providing benefits and grants to persons covered by the scope of this Act and their organisations as laid down in this Act.

(2) The provisions of this Act shall be applied in conformity with the obligations of the Republic of Hungary assumed under treaties and in keeping with the generally recognised rules of international law, in particular the principles of the territorial sovereignty of states, *pacta sunt servanda*, friendly relations amongst states and the respect for human rights, including the prohibition of discrimination.

## Section 3.

(1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled, under the conditions laid down in this Act, to benefits and grants on the territory of the Republic of Hungary.

(2) Persons falling within the scope of this Act and declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin shall be entitled to cultural and educational grants at their place of residence in neighbouring states in order to assist them in preserving their cultural and linguistic identity. Unless otherwise provided for by treaties, this Act shall be applied to the awarding of grants claimable on the territory of neighbouring states.

(3) The benefits and grants provided for in this Act shall be without prejudice to the benefits and grants provided by legislation in force for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin but not of Hungarian citizenship living outside Hungary in other parts of the world.

## Chapter II

### BENEFITS AND GRANTS CLAIMABLE BY PERSONS FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS ACT

#### Culture and sciences

#### Section 4.

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure within its territory to persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2):

- a) access to public cultural institutions and services thereof,
- b) access to cultural goods for researchers and members of the public,
- c) access to historic monuments and related documentation,
- d) access for the purposes of scientific research to archive materials containing protected personal particulars, if the neighbouring state in which the ethnic Hungarian has his/her domicile is a party to the international convention on the protection of personal particulars 1/.

(2) Persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be entitled to have access to the services of any state-run public library, and the following basic services free of charge:

- a) visits to the library,
- b) on-site use of certain selected collections held by the library,
- c) use of cataloguing tools,
- d) information on the services of the library and of the library network,
- e) borrowing privileges for printed library materials upon registration and under the conditions laid down in the library regulations.

(3) Further benefits with respect to access of persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) to services offered by state-run museums and public cultural institutions shall be laid down in a separate law.

(4) The entitlement to benefits available under paragraph (1)-(3) shall be certified by the „Ethnic Hungarian card” or the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”.

#### Section 5.

(1) Hungarian scientists falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1) of this Act shall have the right to become external or regular members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

(2) Scientists identified in paragraph (1) are entitled to their research in Hungary to benefits as laid out in a separate law.

#### Distinctions and scholarships

#### Section 6.

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure that persons falling within the scope of this Act, in recognition of their outstanding and exemplary activities in the service of all Hungarians and in enriching Hungarian and universal human values, are entitled to distinctions bestowed by the Republic of Hungary and to titles, prizes or diplomas established by its Ministers.

(2) Eligibility criteria for state scholarships shall be set in a way that persons falling within the scope of this Act can receive such scholarships.

#### Social Security Benefits and Health Services

##### Section 7.

[Abrogated]

#### Travel benefits

##### Section 8.

(1) Persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) shall - in accordance with the purpose of this Act and to strengthen their attachment to the Hungarian culture - be entitled to travel benefits on scheduled domestic local or long-distance public transport on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. With regard to railways, such benefits shall apply to second-class fares.

(2) An unlimited number of journeys shall be provided free of charge for:

- a) children under six years of age and
- b) persons over sixty-five years of age.

(3) A ninety-percent travel discount shall be provided on domestic long-distance public transport for

- a) persons identified in paragraph (1) four times a year,
- b) groups of at least ten persons under eighteen years of age travelling as a group and falling within the scope of this Act, and two accompanying adults once a year.

(4) The detailed rules related to travel benefits shall be laid down in a separate law.

(5) The entitlement to benefits available under paragraph (1)-(3) shall be certified by the „Ethnic Hungarian card” or the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”.

#### Education

##### Section 9.

(1) Persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), in accordance with the provisions of a separate law, shall be entitled to take part in

- a) undergraduate-level college or university education,

- b) supplementary undergraduate education,
- c) non-degree programmes,
- d) doctoral (PhD) and Doctor of Liberal Arts (DLA) programmes,
- e) general and specialised further training,
- f) accredited institutional tertiary vocational training

in Hungarian language at institutions of higher education in the Republic of Hungary.

(2) Students falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) and participating in state-financed full-time training programmes specified in paragraph (1), shall be entitled to formula funding on the one hand, and in-cash and in-kind benefits on the other, both being part of the appropriations of budgetary expenditure for students, as well as to the reimbursement of detailed health insurance contributions. Types of grants and additional benefits shall be regulated by the Minister of Education in a separate law.

(3) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to pursue studies at institutions of higher education in the Republic of Hungary within the framework of state-financed training in a fixed number to be determined annually by the Minister of Education.

(4) Students falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) and participating in non-state-financed training shall be entitled to apply for the partial or full reimbursement of the costs of their stay and tuition in Hungary. The terms and conditions of reimbursement shall be regulated in a separate law.

#### Student benefits

##### Section 10.

Minors falling within the scope of Section paragraphs (1) and (2) pursuing their studies in institutions of primary, secondary and tertiary education are entitled to student benefits on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Entitlement to benefits shall be certified jointly by the “Ethnic Hungarian card” or the “Family of ethnic Hungarian card” and the special appendix (Student Pass) appended to it for this purpose. The Student Pass shall be issued by an agency laid down in a separate Law. The agency authorised to issue Student Passes shall maintain a record of the information supplied on the application form for „Ethnic Hungarian cards” and „Family of ethnic Hungarian cards” and entered into the Student Pass until the date of expiry. Detailed rules on access to these benefits shall be laid down in a separate law.

#### Grants to teachers and instructors

##### Section 11.

(1) Instructors teaching in an institution of primary and secondary education falling within the scope of Section paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be entitled to take part in regular further training in Hungary in a fixed number determined annually by the

Minister of Education. Furthermore, unless otherwise provided for by treaties, teachers and instructors falling within the scope of this Act shall also be entitled to take part in accredited and recognised regular training courses held by Hungarian institutions in a neighbouring country, and to receive the benefits specified in paragraph (2).

(2) For the duration of the further training and to the extent stipulated by a separate law, persons identified in paragraph (1) shall be entitled to request from the Hungarian educational institution providing the further training

- a) reimbursement of their accommodation costs,
- b) reimbursement of their travel expenses, and
- c) a contribution to their costs of enrolment.

(3) Detailed rules on the further training for teachers specified in paragraph (1) shall be laid down in a separate law.

#### Section 12.

Instructors and teachers teaching in an institution of primary, secondary and tertiary education falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) are entitled to teachers' benefits on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Their entitlement shall be certified jointly by the „Ethnic Hungarian card” or the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” and the special appendix to it (the Teacher/Instructor Pass) that serves this purpose. The agency authorised to issue such cards shall maintain a record of the information supplied on the application form for „Ethnic Hungarian cards” and „Family of ethnic Hungarian cards” and entered into the Teacher/Instructor Pass until the date of expiry. Detailed rules on access to these benefits shall be laid down in a separate law.

#### Affiliated training and education programmes in neighbouring states

#### Section 13.

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall promote the preservation of the mother tongue, culture and identity of ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states by facilitating the establishment and operation of departments affiliated with accredited Hungarian institutions of higher education in neighbouring states.

The financial resources necessary for the realisation of these goals shall be set out as targeted appropriations in the budget of the Republic of Hungary. The Minister of Education shall make a determination on the allocation of available resources pursuant to the provisions of a separate law.

(2) The Republic of Hungary shall support the establishment, operation and development of institutions of higher education (faculties and departments) using Hungarian as the language of instruction and seeking accreditation in neighbouring states. Applications for the financial resources necessary for the realisation of these goals may be submitted to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose.

#### Educational grants available in neighbouring states

#### Section 14.

(1) Minors pursuing their studies in the Hungarian language or in the subject of Hungarian culture in an institution of primary, secondary and tertiary education falling within the scope of Section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2) with the participation of a non-governmental organisation established in a neighbouring state with the purpose of maintaining Hungarian education and culture are entitled to educational grants as well as grants for the purchase of books and learning materials, and students of higher education, to study grants.

(2) On the basis of a bilateral agreement, recipients of such grants may also include parents' or instructors' association operating alongside the institution of education.

(3) The detailed rules related to awarding grants and disbursing funds specified in paragraphs (1) shall be laid down in a separate law.

#### Employment

#### Section 15.

Employment on the territory of the Republic of Hungary of persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be governed by the general rules concerning the issuance of work permits to foreigners in Hungary. Derogation from the general rules may be provided for by treaties.

#### Section 16.

[Abrogated]

#### Tasks of the public service media

#### Section 17.

(1) The Hungarian public service media shall ensure that information on ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states is collected and transmitted on a regular basis, and that information on Hungary and the Hungarian people is transmitted to ethnic Hungarians.

This information shall serve the following objectives:

- a) to transmit Hungarian and universal intellectual and cultural values,
- b) to form a balanced picture of the world, of Hungary and of the Hungarian people,
- c) to preserve the identity, mother tongue and culture of ethnic Hungarian communities.

(2) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure the production and broadcasting of public service television programmes for ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries through the establishment and operation of an organisation devoted to such purposes, in accordance with the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. The financial resources necessary to this end shall be made available by the central state budget.

## Grants to organisations in neighbouring states

### Section 18.

(1) The Republic of Hungary shall provide grants to organisations in neighbouring states working to facilitate the preservation of the identity, mother tongue and culture of Hungarian kin-minority communities.

(2) In order to obtain such grants, the organisations specified in paragraph (1) may submit applications to foreign organisations (Section 25 paragraph (1)) established for this purpose provided they promote in particular the following goals:

- a) the preservation, furtherance and research of Hungarian national traditions,
- b) the preservation and fostering of the Hungarian language, literature, culture and folk arts,
- c) support of higher education for Hungarians in neighbouring states by facilitating the availability of instructors from Hungary as visiting lecturers,
- d) the restoration and maintenance of monuments that form part of the Hungarian cultural heritage and preservation of the heritage of the countryside.

### Chapter III

#### RULES RELATED TO PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF BENEFITS AND GRANTS

The „Ethnic Hungarian card” and the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”

### Section 19.

(1) The entitlement of persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) to certain benefits available under this Act shall be certified by the „Ethnic Hungarian card” or the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”.

(2) From the Hungarian state agency (hereafter referred to as the evaluation authority) designated by the Government of the Republic of Hungary for this purpose

a) persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1) declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin, in the case of minors through their legal guardians, shall be entitled to apply for an „Ethnic Hungarian card”;

b) unless otherwise provided for by treaties, persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (2), in the case of minors through their legal guardian, shall be entitled to apply for a „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”.

(3) Persons specified in paragraph (2) subparagraph a) shall upon applying be entitled to an „Ethnic Hungarian card” provided that they

a) are proficient in the Hungarian language, or

b) are

ba) registered by their state of residence as persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin, or

bb) registered members of an organisation uniting persons of Hungarian ethnic origin and operating on the territory of their state of residence, or

bc) registered by a church operating on the territory of their state of residence as persons of Hungarian ethnic origin.

(4) Applicants are not entitled to an „Ethnic Hungarian card” if they

a) already hold a valid „Ethnic Hungarian card”, unless they have re-submitted their application due to changes in the information contained therein;

b) are subject to restrictions on their entry into or stay in, or to expulsion from, the territory of Hungary;

c) do not hold the certificate specified in Section 20 paragraph (2).

(5) Unless otherwise provided for by treaties, immediate family members shall upon applying be entitled to a „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” provided that they

a) certify with an official document their family relationship as specified in paragraph (2) subparagraph b) with a person of Hungarian ethnic origin as specified in paragraph (3), and

b) apply for the card on the basis of their family relationship with a person of Hungarian ethnic origin who holds or is entitled to hold an „Ethnic Hungarian card”.

(6) Applicants are not entitled to a „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” if they

a) already hold a valid „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”, unless they have re-submitted their application due to changes in the information contained therein;

b) are subject to restrictions on entry into or stay in, or to expulsion from, the territory of Hungary;

c) do not hold the certificate specified in Section 20 paragraph (3),

d) apply for the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” on the basis of their family relationship with a person of Hungarian ethnic origin

da) who does not hold the certificate specified in Section 20 paragraph (2);

db) whose application for an „Ethnic Hungarian card” has been rejected by the evaluation authority; or

dc) whose „Ethnic Hungarian card” is not valid.

## Section 20.

(1) Applications for an „Ethnic Hungarian card” or a „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” shall contain

- a) the applicants' application, passport-size photograph and address,
- b) personal particulars to be recorded on the card (Section 21 paragraph (5)),
- c) the designation of the Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate participating in the process,
- d) the place and date of the issuance of the certificate.

(2) The Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate operating in the state of residence of the applicant shall issue a certificate to the applicant once the conditions set forth in Section 19 paragraph (3) are satisfied.

(3) The Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate operating in the state of residence of the applicant shall issue a certificate to the applicant upon the presentation of evidence of the applicant's family relationship with a person falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1).

(4) Evidence that the conditions set forth in Section 19 paragraph (3) subparagraph b) and Section 19 paragraph (5) subparagraph a) are satisfied shall be supplied in the form of the relevant official documents. If evidence that the conditions set forth in Section 19 paragraph (3) subparagraph b) are satisfied cannot be supplied, the Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate shall be entitled to request information from non-governmental organisations established by ethnic Hungarian communities living in neighbouring states.

(5) If the fulfilment of conditions for the issuance of the certificate cannot be verified either by official documents or the information requested, the Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate shall not issue the certificate but shall forward the request to the evaluation authority in any case.

## Section 21.

(1) With regard to period of validity, the „Ethnic Hungarian card” and of the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”

- a) shall expire on the eighteenth birthday of minors holding such cards;
- b) shall be valid for five years for persons between eighteen and sixty years of age;
- c) shall be valid indefinitely for persons over sixty years of age.

(2) After the expiry of such cards the issuance process shall be repeated upon applying. If during the period of validity set forth in paragraph (1) subparagraphs a) and c), the Appendix to the card becomes unsuitable to certify entitlement to benefits as a result of

five years having passed after the issuance of the card, the card shall be replaced upon applying in order to ensure continued entitlement to benefits.

(3) The evaluation authority shall revoke the card

a) if the bearer has provided false information when applying for the certificate or the card;

b) if the bearer has been granted an immigration permit or a permanent residence permit;

c) if the bearer has been granted Hungarian citizenship;

d) if the bearer has been recognised as a refugee or temporarily protected person by the authorities charged with asylum matters;

e) if the bearer has been expelled from, or is subject to restrictions on entry into or stay on the territory of the Republic of Hungary;

f) if the card has been forged or used in an unauthorised manner;

g) if the family relationship entitling the bearer to a „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” has ceased to exist or if the „Ethnic Hungarian card” of the person with respect to whom the bearer applied for the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” has been revoked;

h) upon the bearer's request.

(4) [Abrogated]

(5) The „Ethnic Hungarian card” and the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card” shall contain the following information:

a) the bearer's surname and given name (as well as the maiden surname and given name in the case of women), as officially used in the neighbouring state of residence (written in Latin script), as well as in Hungarian for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin;

b) the bearer's place of birth in the official language of the neighbouring state of residence, as well as in Hungarian;

c) the bearer's date of birth and sex;

d) the bearer's mother's name as officially used in the neighbouring state of residence (written in Latin script), as well as in Hungarian for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin;

e) a passport-size photograph of the bearer, his/her citizenship or reference to stateless status;

f) the bearer's signature;

g) the date of issue and expiry and the document number, as well as

h) an explanatory note that the card does not serve as an official identification document or travel document and does not entitle the bearer to exit or enter a country.

(6) Entries and certifications required for access to benefits and grants available under this Act shall be recorded in the Appendix to the Card, as well as in the Appendices thereto (Student Pass, Teacher Pass and Instructor Pass) serving the purposes specified in Section 10 paragraph (2) and Section 12 paragraph (3). The document identification number and date of expiry of the independent Appendix shall be recorded in the heading of the Card Appendix.

(7) In order to ensure the authenticity of the Card and to supervise the granting of benefits, the evaluation authority (or the information processing agency for the purposes of the provisions of the Act) shall maintain records of the information contained in the Cards, the document identification number of the Appendix to the Card, the address of the bearer's residence in the home-state, the family relationship entitling him/her to the Card, the number and date of expiry of the permit authorising the stay [on the territory of Hungary], and the information specified in paragraph (3). The information contained in the records shall be processed by the information processing agency not later than the revocation or expiry of the Card. The information contained in the records may, in accordance with the international convention on the protection of personal particulars, be forwarded, for statistical purposes, to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), for the purposes of verifying entitlement and preventing abuse, to the bodies responsible for granting and maintaining records of the benefits and grants, to diplomatic missions and consulates, to Courts carrying out criminal proceedings, to law enforcement agencies and the alien policing authority. The information processing agency may release information in its records to the agency exercising official functions with regard to the issuance, replacement, revocation and record-keeping of Student Passes, Teacher Passes and Instructor Passes.

(8) For the purpose of evaluating applications and examining the existence of grounds for revoking the Card, the evaluation authority may request information from the following bodies:

a) the Central Alien Policing Registry, on whether the applicant is subject to alien policing proceedings, on any expulsion from or any restrictions on entry into or stay on the territory of Hungary, as well as on the details of the residence permit authorising the stay in Hungary;

b) bodies responsible for naturalisation, on issues related to the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship;

c) the Central Refugee Registry, on recognition of refugee or temporarily protected person status.

## Section 22.

(1) Proceedings of the evaluation authority shall be governed by the provisions of Act IV of 1957 on the General Rules related to Public Administration Procedures. The costs of public administration procedures shall be borne by the State.

(2) The applicant may institute proceedings in Court against a final administrative decision on appeal against the first instance decision regarding the issuance or

revocation of a Card by the evaluation authority. The Court may alter the administrative decision and its proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure

(3) Detailed rules related to procedure of the evaluation authority, and the order of registering the Cards issued, as well as the content and form of the information contained in the Cards, shall be laid down in a separate law.

Access to benefits on the territory of the Republic of Hungary

Section 23.

The financial resources necessary for providing these benefits shall be made available by the central state budget to the state-run organisations and institutions granting the benefits provided for in this Act as well as to the profit-oriented organisations granting travel benefits.

Application procedures for grants available in the Republic of Hungary

Section 24.

[Abrogated]

Application procedures for grants available in neighbouring states

Section 25.

(1) Applications for grants available under Section 13 paragraph (2) and Section 18 paragraph (2) shall be submitted to non-profit organisations established for this purpose in the neighbouring state of registered office, registered and operating in accordance with the legislation of that state (hereafter referred to as foreign organisations).

(2) The civil law contract concluded by and between the public benefit organisation established in Hungary and the foreign organisation for the purpose of evaluating applications and disbursing grant funding shall contain the information, supported by documents, declarations, project documentation, etc., necessary for the evaluation of applications.

(3) The public benefit organisations operating in Hungary shall evaluate the application on the basis of the information laid down in the civil law contract, as specified in paragraph (2), and of the opinion rendered by the foreign organisation.

(4) Grant funding shall be disbursed to applicants by the Hungarian public benefit organisation on the basis of a civil law contract. This contract shall contain the conditions of the grant and the amount thereof as well as the purpose of the use of such funding and the rules related to rendering accounts thereof.

Central registration of grants

Section 26.

(1) For the purposes of co-ordinating the entire system of grant funding, a central registry of applications for grants and the relevant decisions made by public benefit organisations established for their evaluation shall be set up.

(2) The central state agency charged with managing the registry shall be designated by the Government.

(3) The agency managing the registry shall process the following information:

a) name, permanent address (registered office) and Card number of the person (or organisation) submitting a grant application,

b) the type of grant sought and

c) the amount of funding provided.

(4) Information specified in paragraph (3) shall be handled by the agency managing the registry for a period not to exceed 10 years from the date on which the grant is awarded.

(5) Information from the registry may be made available, in accordance with the international convention on the protection of personal particulars, to public benefit organisations established in Hungary and in the neighbouring states for the purpose of evaluating grant applications, as well as, in a manner not suitable for the identification of specific individuals, to the state agencies of the Republic of Hungary charged with providing the financial resources for grants.

#### Chapter IV

#### FINAL PROVISIONS

#### Section 27.

(1) This Act shall enter into force on 1 January 2002 2/.

(2) From the date of entry into force of the Act on the promulgation of the international treaty on the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, the provisions of this Act shall be applied in accordance with the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union.

(3) Pursuant to international agreements, the provisions set forth in Section 10 and Section 14 shall also apply to pupils enrolled in primary and secondary educational institutions in a neighbouring country where the language of instruction is Hungarian as well as to students enrolled in an institution of higher education in a neighbouring country and pursuing studies in Hungarian language or in the area of Hungarian culture.

(4) Pursuant to international agreements, the provisions set forth in Sections 11-12 shall also apply to teachers of primary and secondary educational institutions of neighbouring states using Hungarian as the language of instruction or teaching Hungarian culture, as well as to instructors of Hungarian culture at an institution of higher education.

(5) Detailed rules related to awarding grants and disbursing funds specified in paragraphs (3)-(4) shall be laid down in a separate law.

## Section 28.

(1) The Government shall be empowered to regulate by Decree

a) the provisions on the designation of the state agency authorised to issue, revoke and register „Ethnic Hungarian cards” and „Family of ethnic Hungarian cards”, as well as on the assignment of the state agency under which it is located administratively, on the definition of their competencies and on the rules related to procedure for the issuance, replacement, revocation and registration of such Cards;

b) the detailed rules related to travel benefits as laid down in Section 8, paragraphs (1)-(3) for persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 8 paragraph(4);

c) the detailed rules related to student benefits and grants for persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 10;

d) the detailed rules related to of instructors’ further training benefits for persons falling within the scope of Section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2) on the basis Section 11 paragraphs (1)-(3) and of the instructors’ benefits provided on the basis of Section 12.

e) the detailed rules related to the disbursing funds for persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) as laid down in Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 14 paragraph (3).

f) the detailed rules related to application for grants available in the neighbouring countries, on the basis of Section 25.

g) the detailed rules related to benefits available in Hungary and assistance available in the neighbouring countries for nationals of Member States of the European Unions that do not fall within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 27, paragraph (2).

(2) The Government shall be empowered, on the basis of Section 3 paragraph (2), to conclude international agreements for the purpose of providing benefits in the neighbouring countries, as identified in Section 14 paragraphs (1) and (2), and for the purpose of implementing Section 27, paragraphs (3) and (4).

(3) The Government will provide for the establishment of Hungarian public benefit organisations to evaluate grant applications and award grants provided for in this Act. The Government shall also ensure the co-ordination of the activities of public benefit organisations already operating for this purpose, the appropriate changes to their founding documents and the reallocation of resources within this framework, as well as the maintenance of cooperation with non-governmental organisations established by ethnic Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries.

## Section 29.

(1) The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall lay down in a joint decree – with the consent of the Minister of Education in the case of educational

grants – detailed rules on the requirements as to content and form of the „Ethnic Hungarian card” and the „Family of ethnic Hungarian card”.

(2) The Minister for National Cultural Heritage shall lay down in a decree – with the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs – the availability of services of state-run museums and establishment of public education, and the detailed rules related to benefits entitled to on the basis of Section 4 paragraphs (1)-(3) and of further benefits as laid down in paragraph (3) for the persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2).

(3) The Minister for Education shall lay down – with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs – the detailed rules on the benefits falling within the scope of Section 5 paragraph (2) for research in Hungary for external members or members of the executive board of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1).

(4) The Minister of Education shall lay down – with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs – in a decree the detailed rules related to benefits for persons falling within the scope of Section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2) they are entitled to during their participation in higher education in Hungary, in accordance with Section 9.

(5) The Minister of Education shall lay down – with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs – in a decree the detailed rules related to the use of the framework amount of assistance as laid down in Section 13 paragraph (1).

(6) The Minister for National Cultural Heritage shall lay down – with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs – the detailed rules related to assistance for institutions operating in neighbouring countries with the purpose of promoting the self-awareness, mother tongue and culture of Hungarian ethnic communities living in neighbouring countries as laid down in Section 18 paragraph (1).

(7) The Minister for Education shall lay down – with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs – the detailed rules related to higher-level education on the subject of Hungarian culture and of instruction on the subject of Hungarian culture.

## Section 30

In the context of application of this Act, Hungarian culture shall be understood as to include the Hungarian language, literature, history, cultural history and Hungarian science.

1/ Act VI of 1998 on the promulgation of the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on 28 January 1981 in Strasbourg.

2/ The Act LVII of 2003 entered into force on 11 July 2003

Source: [http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=03&news007\\_id=1157](http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=03&news007_id=1157)

Date: 22.05.2006

Appendix 4: Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on implementation of the amended benefit law in Romania (23.09.2003)

Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on implementation of the amended benefit law in Romania (September 23, 2003)

The Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary, hereinafter referred to as „the Parties”,

Guided by a joint effort to strengthen their bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual understanding and good-neighbourly co-operation,

Bearing in mind the Treaty on understanding, co-operation and good-neighbourliness between Romania and the Republic of Hungary, signed in Timișoara, on the 16th of September 1996, in particular the provisions concerning the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, acknowledging that providing effective equality in rights and chances for the national minorities living in their respective countries and creating conditions for them to prosper in their land of birth, constitute an indispensable contribution to the stability of the region and to the creation of a future Europe, based on values as cultural and linguistic diversity and tolerance,

Led by the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary, signed in Budapest, on the 29th of November 2002,

Taking into account the prospective membership of the two countries in the European Union,

Willingful of promoting the European values and standards,

Guided by the willingness to promote the preservation and development of the cultural and linguistic identity of the persons belonging to Romanian and Hungarian national minorities living in the two countries, in order for the citizens to have better knowledge on the culture and language of the other State, in conformity with the international treaties on the matter, in force between the two States,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the European and international documents in the field of the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and the recommendations of the European institutions, in particular the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the European Commission,

Guided by the provisions of the Venice Commission’s report on the preferential treatment of national minorities by their kin States, setting forth the conditions in which the involvement of the kin State is legitimate, as the respect of the territorial sovereignty, pacta sunt servanda, the principle of good neighbourliness, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the principle of non-discrimination,

Have agreed upon conditions with regard to implementing the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries concerning Romanian citizens, as follows:

#### Article 1

The Romanian citizens of non-Hungarian ethnic origin shall not be granted any Certificate and, on this basis, shall not be entitled to apply for any benefits set forth by the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries.

#### Article 2

The Parties note that the entire procedure of granting the certificate (receiving of applications, issue, distribution) takes place on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, including the Hungarian diplomatic and consular missions as to the receiving of applications.

#### Article 3

The Parties acknowledge that non-governmental organisations established by the ethnic Hungarians on the territory of Romania shall not issue any recommendations concerning the ethnic origin or other criteria, as far as the procedure of granting the Certificate is concerned.

#### Article 4

The Romanian Party notes that Romanian citizens which are pupils in elementary schools and high-schools and learn in Hungarian language, as well as the students studying in Hungarian language in higher educational institutions or attend classes in the field of Hungarian culture may enjoy, on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, benefits for the support of their studies, on the basis of their pupil/student quality in Romania.

#### Article 5

The Romanian Party notes that Romanian citizens teaching in Hungarian language or in the field of Hungarian culture in elementary schools and high-schools or in higher educational institutions may enjoy, on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, benefits for teachers and professors for the support of their teaching activities, on the basis of their teacher/professor quality in Romania.

#### Article 6

The Parties convened that the „School” Foundation, in conformity with the Romanian legislation, distributes, by contest, on the basis of projects, educational benefits, for educational institutions or for individuals for the purpose of scholarships, on a non-discriminatory basis.

#### Article 7

The Hungarian Certificates for Romanian citizens shall be used only on the territory of the Republic of Hungary;

#### Article 8

The Government of the Republic of Hungary strives to take the necessary steps in order to bring the Certificates into conformity with the Recommendations of the European institutions, including those of the European Commission of December 2002.

#### Article 9

The Government of the Republic of Hungary agrees that the Hungarian citizens of Romanian ethnic origin living in the Republic of Hungary shall be granted, in accordance with the Romanian relevant legislation regarding the support for the Romanian minorities living abroad and on the basis of reciprocity, the same level of facilities as those granted to Romanian citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin living in Romania, in accordance with the legal framework in force between Romania and the Republic of Hungary on this matter.

#### Article 10

On the entry into force of this Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries and Issues of Bilateral Co-operation, signed in Budapest, on the 22nd of December 2001 shall terminate its validity.

#### Article 11

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the latter notification regarding the fulfilment of the domestic procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement.

Signed in Bucharest, on the 23 September 2003, in two original copies, each of them in the English language.

Source:

[http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=06&country\\_id=Romania&id=211](http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=06&country_id=Romania&id=211)

Date: 22.05.2006

Appendix 5: Excerpts from the Romanian Constitution.

Sovereignty ARTICLE 2

- (1) The national sovereignty shall reside within the Romanian people, that shall exercise it by means of their representative bodies, resulting from free, periodical and fair elections, as well as by referendum.

Unity of the people and equality among citizens ARTICLE 4

- (1) The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people and the solidarity of its citizens.
- (2) Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin.

Right to identity ARTICLE 6

- (1) The State recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.
- (2) The protection measures taken by the Romanian State for the preservation, development and expression of identity of the persons belonging to national minorities shall conform to the principles of equality and non-discrimination in relation to the other Romanian citizens.

Official language ARTICLE 13

In Romania, the official language is Romanian.

Source: <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339&par1=1&idl=2>  
Date: 23.05.2006

Equality of rights ARTICLE 16

- (1) Citizens are equal before the law and public authorities, without any privilege or discrimination.
- (2) No one is above the law.

Source: <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371&idl=2&par1=2>  
Date: 23.05.2006

## Appendix 6: Excerpts from the Hungarian Constitution

### **Article 6 [Peace]**

- (1) The Republic of Hungary renounces war as a means of solving disputes between nations and shall refrain from the use of force and the threat thereof against the independence or territorial integrity of other states
- (2) The Republic of Hungary shall endeavor to co-operate with all peoples and countries of the world.
- (3) The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary.
- (4) The Republic of Hungary shall take an active part in establishing a European unity in order to achieve freedom, well-being and security for the peoples of Europe.

### **Article 68**

- (1) The national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary participate in the sovereign power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the State.
- (2) The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities and ensure their collective participation in public affairs, the fostering of their cultures, the use of their native languages, education in their native languages and the use of names in their native languages.
- (3) The laws of the Republic of Hungary shall ensure representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the country.
- (4) National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to form local and national bodies for self-government.
- (5) A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present is required to pass the law on the rights of national and ethnic minorities.

### **Article 70A []**

- (1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect the human rights and civil rights of all persons in the country without discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origins, financial situation, birth or on any other grounds whatsoever.
- (2) The law shall provide for strict punishment of discrimination on the basis of Paragraph (1).
- (3) The Republic of Hungary shall endeavor to implement equal rights for everyone through measures that create fair opportunities for all.

Source: [http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000\\_.html](http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000_.html)

Date: 07.09.06

Appendix 7: Articles from Adevărul and România Liberă chosen for the synchronic analysis

- Adevărul (scanned copy): A24.12.01

Documentare 2000			
numărul	3584	pag	1
		data apariției	24-Dec-01
gen publicistic	Correspondență	Foto	
<b>Printr-un memorandum semnat la Budapesta de premierii Năstase și Orban</b> <b>Legea legitimației de maghiar - golită de conținut</b>			
<p>Sâmbătă, la Budapesta, prin semnarea unui memorandum de înțelegere, premierii României și Ungariei, Adrian Năstase și Viktor Orban, au consfințit moartea Legii statutului.</p> <p>Inventată pentru uzul electoral al naționalistului de dreapta Viktor Orban, Legea legitimației de maghiar introducea o discriminare economică, socială și culturală între cetățenii români de etnie română și maghiară. Conform acesteia, simpla apartenență la etnia maghiară conferea dreptul legal de muncă pe 3 luni în Ungaria, gratuitatea unor servicii medicale, gratuitatea unor transporturi și numeroase facilități culturale. Legea legitimației de maghiar, adoptată astă-vară în Parlamentul de la Budapesta, s-a făcut fără nici o consultare cu statele din jurul Ungariei unde trăiesc etnici maghiari. Legea încălca dreptul european universal acceptat. Ea introducea discriminarea între cetățeni pe criterii etnice și avea un caracter de extraterritorialitate. Prin efectele sale, legea reușea să introducă discriminări și între membrii familiilor mixte în care una din părți era de etnie maghiară. Ungaria a încercat să prezinte Europei această lege ca pe o modalitate de a proteja minoritatea maghiară din Europa de Est. Europa a privit însă la dreptul comunitar. Austria, țară membră a UE, a protestat pe tăcute, dar foarte eficient. Prin lege, au fost exceptați etnicii maghiari trăitori în această țară. În timp ce Ucraina și Serbia s-au declarat de acord cu legea, România și Slovacia, țări unde trăiesc importante comunități maghiare, au protestat vehement. Atât Ungaria, cât și România și Slovacia negociază admiterea în Uniunea Europeană. Or, această lege viola chiar principiile europene. Comisia de la Veneția asupra Drepturilor Omului, aparținând C.E., s-a pronunțat în mod ferm în favoarea modificării acestei legi și aducerii ei în conformitate cu spiritul european. Guvernul Orban nu putea însă să-și permită așa ceva decât dacă FIDESZ-ul, partidul premierului, nu s-ar mai fi prezentat în alegeri. Ca urmare, legea putea fi îndreptată doar prin normele sale de aplicare. Este ceea ce s-au hotărât să facă Budapesta și Bucureștiul.</p> <p>Cele două părți au convenit un memorandum de aplicare a legii, care, practic, anulează legitimația de maghiar, dând, în același timp, o portită de scăpare în fața propriului electorat premierului Orban. Astfel, memorandumul stipulează eliminarea discriminării în domeniul drepturilor economico-sociale - dreptul la muncă și drepturile conexe, prin extinderea tratamentului preferențial prevăzut în legea ungară asupra tuturor cetățenilor români, indiferent de originea etnică.</p> <p>(Urmare din pag. 1)</p> <p>Cu alte cuvinte, orice cetățean român va putea lucra legal în Ungaria, începând de la 1 ianuarie, timp de 3 luni pe an. Membrii de familie nemaghiari ai maghiarilor din România nu vor primi legitimații și nu vor avea drepturile culturale stipulate prin lege. Acordarea legitimației de maghiar nu se va mai face încălcând suveranitatea României. Întreaga procedură de acordare a legitimațiilor - transmiterea cererii, emiterea documentului și eliberarea acestuia - va avea loc numai pe teritoriul Ungariei, iar legitimația nu poate fi adusă cu sine pe teritoriul României și nici depozitată pe teritoriul țării noastre. Organizațiile maghiarilor din România sau alte entități - Biserica - vor putea da numai simple informații și aceasta doar în cazuri excepționale și atunci numai la cererea expresă a Consulatului. Nici UDMR, nici alte organizații maghiare din România nu vor putea să emită recomandări pe baza cărora autoritățile de la Budapesta să decidă dacă solicitantul primește sau nu beneficii. Memorandumul mai prevede faptul ca, în termen de 6 luni, partea ungară să inițieze modificarea legii, pentru a o aduce în conformitate cu aquis- ul comunitar.</p>			
Wednesday, January 28, 2004		Page 1 of 2	

De menționat că alegerile din Ungaria sunt prevăzute în luna aprilie. Dacă va câștiga, nu va mai avea importanță pentru Viktor Orban faptul că legea va trebui modificată. La conferința de presă ținută în Parlamentul Ungariei, în fața unei picturi imense ce înfățișează descălecatul hunilor în Transilvania - unde erau întâmpinați de localnicii deja sedentarizați - am adresat, pentru Adevărul, premierului ungar următoarea întrebare:

- Domnule prim-ministru, după îndepărtarea discriminării - economice și sociale pe criterii etnice - pe care o introducea Legea statutului, ce v-a mai rămas din această lege?

- Când am elaborat legea, noi nu am considerat că ea conține drepturi discriminatorii. A existat un dialog între cele două părți, în două etape. Am acceptat, în primul rând, poziția părții române înaintea adoptării legii, să nu se facă discriminare între întreprinzătorii cetățeni români pe criterii etnice. Am acceptat scrisoarea trimisă de dl. prim-ministru Adrian Năstase. După adoptarea legii, a mai rămas o chestiune: dacă vom face diferențe între etnii în privința dreptului la muncă. Acum, nu se mai fac aceste diferențe. Este bine de știut că valoarea unei case stă nu numai în materialele din care e construită, ci și în vecinii săi. Ungaria se bucură de succesele vecinilor săi, fiindcă astfel crește și valoarea Ungariei. Dacă va crește valoarea Bucureștiului, va crește și valoarea Budapestei.

Îndepărtarea prevederilor discriminatorii și a aplicării extrateritoriale din Legea statutului este, fără îndoială, un succes al diplomației românești și al guvernului Năstase. Atunci când se procedează profesionist, se aduc argumente valabile și se acționează perseverent, se obțin și rezultate. Deși cu un lobby mult mai puternic, deși Ungaria este fruntașa clasei între țările care negociază aderarea la UE, România a reușit să-și impună punctul de vedere. Acesta, împreună cu încheierea Tratatului de bază, fără efectele Recomandării 1201 a Consiliului Europei - în sensul neacceptării drepturilor colective pentru minorități și a autonomiei teritoriale pe criterii etnice - reprezintă singurele succese ale României în fața Ungariei, în plan diplomatic, în ultimii 12 ani. Acest lucru nu ar fi fost posibil, pe de o parte, fără acțiunea concentrată, la nivel diplomatic și politic, a Bucureștiului. Pe de altă parte, Europa nu ar fi intervenit, determinându-l pe Orban să revină la sentimente mai bune, dacă cele două state nu ar sta împreună la masa negocierilor cu UE. Aplicându-se aceleași principii și același sistem de valori, Europa nu-și poate permite să favorizeze nici un stat candidat, indiferent de interesele politice locale. O problemă care ar fi devenit explozivă și care îngrijora în mare măsură Bruxelles-ul - care, în spatele ușilor închise, a făcut importante presiuni asupra celor două părți să ajungă la o înțelegere - a fost dezamorsată pur și simplu fiindcă Europa a avut înțelepciunea să pună România și Ungaria de aceeași parte a baricadei. Numai în acest mod, două state, cu o istorie complicată, întinsă pe mai multe secole, pot privi în viitor, la Europa comună. Din nefericire, există, în continuare, un debalans în relația politică bilaterală. Faptul că, de 5 ani, Ungaria este membră NATO, iar România este privită cu destulă rețineră înaintea summit-ului Alianței de anul viitor, de la Praga, nu este de natură să continue mersul ascendent în relațiile politice româno-ungare. De altfel, cele două părți au hotărât, în memorandumul semnat la Budapesta, să se sprijine reciproc în integrarea euro-atlantică.

**Bogdan CHIRIEAC**

**codul** R:Ungaria/327

**codul** Ungaria/325:32

- România Liberă (online text received via email):

1. RL27.12.01

Depunerea cererii si eliberarea legitimatiei de maghiar se vor efectua numai pe teritoriul Ungariei

Primul ministru Adrian Nastase si premierul ungar Viktor Orban au semnat sambata, la Budapesta, un Memorandum de Intelegere privind aplicarea Legii statutului, care prevede ca legitimatiiile de maghiar sa nu poata fi acordate etnicilor romani care fac parte din familii maghiare.

Astfel a fost eliminata discriminarea intre cetatenii romani de origine etnica nemaghiara, care ar fi aparut daca membrii de familie ai persoanelor de etnie maghiara ar fi obtinut o legitimatie si ar fi beneficiat, in baza acestui act, de facilitatile acordate de lege pentru maghiari. Depunerea cererii si eliberarea legitimatiei de maghiar se vor efectua numai pe teritoriul Ungariei, acest document neputand fi adus sau depozitat in Romania. Organizatiile reprezentative ale maghiarilor din Romania sau alte entitati vor putea furniza doar simple informatii in scopul acordarii legitimatiei de maghiar, dar in cazuri exceptionale si numai la cererea expresa a consulatului. S-a exclus in totalitate posibilitatea ca organizatiile reprezentative ale maghiarilor din Romania sau alte entitati sa emita recomandari pe baza carora autoritatile de la Budapesta ar fi decis daca solicitantul beneficiaza de diferite avantaje. Ungaria nu va mai asigura nici un fel de sprijin organizatiilor politice maghiare din Romania, decat cu informarea prealabila a autoritatilor romane si dupa obtinerea consimtamantului din partea acestora.

Memorandumul semnat sambata isi propune sa elimine discriminările între cetatenii romani, in special in ceea ce priveste acordarea unor avantaje de natura sociala si economica, prin extinderea tratamentului preferential si oferirea posibilitatii pentru toti cetatenii romani de a-si prelungi permisul de munca sau de a beneficia de rambursarea cheltuielilor pentru plata serviciilor medicale etc. Documentul mai prevede modificarea, in perioada urmatoare, a Acordului privind muncitorii sezonieri, prin extinderea acestor avantaje in cazul in care perioada de munca de depaseste trei luni si demararea negocierilor pentru elaborarea unei Conventii privind acordarea unui tratament preferential minoritatii romane din Ungaria, precum si minoritatii maghiare din Romania, in special prin extinderea avantajelor in domeniul cultural-educational.

Partea romana considera ca aceasta solutie este conceputa in scopul detensionarii situatiei incepand cu 1 ianuarie 2002. "Necesitatea amendarii Legii statutului ramane insa in continuare o prioritate, pe care partea ungara trebuie sa o duca la indeplinire, cel mai probabil dupa depasirea contextului electoral din Ungaria", se arata intr-o Nota privind evaluarea intelegerii romano-ungare.

Primul ministru Adrian Nastase a apreciat, la finalul ceremoniei de semnare a Memorandumului, ca acest document exemplifica modul in care, prin exercitarea vointei politice, s-a solutionat o problema delicata in relatiile cu Ungaria. El a anuntat ca, impreuna cu Viktor Orban, a decis "sa relanseze ideea summit-ului anual la nivel de prim-ministri" si sa marcheze implinirea a cinci ani de la semnarea tratatului politic de baza dintre Romania si Ungaria prin dezvoltarea unor proiecte economice si culturale comune. "Memorandumul ne ajuta sa nu ajungem, la 1 ianuarie 2002, intr-o situatie care sa creeze tensiune si prevede ca, in termen de sase luni, sa aiba loc o modificare a legislatiei, inclusiv a legii aflate in discutie", a spus Nastase.

Premierul ungar Viktor Orban a afirmat ca partea ungara a acceptat obiectiile Executivului roman privind eliminarea diferentierilor pe criterii etnice între intreprinzatorii romani, dar a precizat ca persoanele aflate pe piata muncii din Ungaria trebuie sa-si rezolve problemele cu angajatorii. (C.P.)

Breviar

CRU al UDMR despre Legea statutului

Sambata, la Tg. Mures a avut loc Reuniunea Consiliului Consultativ al presedintilor teritoriale ai UDMR. Au fost prezenti 50 de reprezentanti din 16 judete. Pe ordinea de zi au figurat doua puncte: discutii pe marginea obtinerii legitimatilor de maghiari, ce vor fi eliberate in conformitate cu Legea statutului maghiarilor din afara granitelor Ungariei, si problema protocolului cu partidul de guvernament. S-a facut, de asemenea, o informare reciproca intre presedintii organizatiilor teritoriale ale UDMR in legatura cu Memorandumul de aplicare a Legii statutului maghiarilor din afara granitelor Ungariei semnat de cei doi prim-ministri ai Guvernelor Romaniei si Ungariei, Adrian Nastase si Viktor Orban, in luna decembrie 2001. Marko Bela a apreciat ca, "prin aceasta intelegere, pe de-o parte s-au eliminat piedicile in ceea ce priveste aplicarea Legii statutului in cazul maghiarilor din Romania si din acest punct de vedere suntem de acord cu continutul acestui acord si cu dispozitiile incluse in memorandum".

Marko Bela a mai spus ca aceasta intelegere ar putea sa contribuie nu numai la aplicarea Legii statutului intr-un climat pozitiv, dar si la dezvoltarea in general a relatiilor romano-ungare, atat la nivel politic, cat si in plan economic. In ceea ce priveste activitatea care ar putea fi desfasurata in cadrul UDMR privind aplicarea Legii statutului, conform intelegerii dintre cele doua guverne, aceasta activitate ar fi una de recomandare privind solicitarea legitimatiei de maghiar, o activitate de informare, de transmitere de informatii privind unele criterii de indeplinire a unor conditii de abordare a acestei legitimatii. (St. C.)

# CURRICULUM VITAE

## Mihai-Paul Márton

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## Qualifications

2002-2007 PhD at Bremen University, Germany. Title of PhD-thesis: „Ethnic Construction and Journalistic Narrative. A Discourse Analysis of Selected Hungarian and Romanian Newspapers in the Light of the Hungarian Status Law.”

2002 Graduation from Hamburg University, Germany: Magister Artium (M.A.). Title of M.A. thesis: „*Das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Minderheiten im heutigen Ungarn*“ [The Relation between State and Minorities in today's Hungary]

1994-2002 Student of Social Anthropology (main subject), Economics, Finno-Ugric and Uralic Studies (subsidiary subjects) and Constitutional Law at Hamburg University.

## Scholarships

2003-2006 PhD fellowship from the *Evangelisches Studienwerk* [Protestant Study Foundation]

2003 Residential scholarship at the Europe Institute, Budapest, Hungary.

## Publications

2005 Márton, Mihai

*Diskurs in der Presse. Ein ungarisch-rumänischer Vergleich.* In: Krüger, Paula – Meyer, Imke K. (eds.): *Transcultural Studies. Interdisziplinarität trifft Transkulturalität.* Bremen.

2004 Márton, Mihai

*Teaching Cultural Uniformity in Hungary.* Review of Joachim von Puttkamer's book: *Schulalltag und nationale Integration in Ungarn. Slowaken, Rumänen und Siebenbürger Sachsen in der Auseinandersetzung mit der ungarischen Staatsidee 1867-1914.*

<http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=59971075872134>

2003 Márton, Mihai

*Reflections of a stranger.* In: Adeleke, Kofo (ed.): *Nigeria: People, Environment & Development.* Lagos.

Bremen, 18<sup>th</sup> December 2007

## ERKLÄRUNG

Hiermit erkläre ich, Mihai-Paul Márton, geboren am 14.10.1972, dass,

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(Mihai-Paul Márton)

Bremen, den 18.12.2007