

Universität Bremen  
Fachbereich 08 Sozialwissenschaften  
Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS)

# Mapping Solidarity in Europe

Discourse Networks in the Euro Crisis and Europe's Migration Crisis

Dissertation

zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde

durch den Promotionsausschuss Dr. rer. pol.

der Universität Bremen

vorgelegt von

Stefan Wallaschek

Bremen, den 16. April 2019

GutachterInnen:

Prof. Dr. Ulrike Liebert (Universität Bremen)

Prof. Dr. Sebastian Haunss (Universität Bremen)



*'Vorwärts und nicht vergessen*

*worin unsere Stärke besteht!*

*Beim Hungern und beim Essen,*

*vorwärts und nie vergessen:*

*die Solidarität!'*

Bertolt Brecht 'Das Solidaritätslied' (1931)

*'Women must take the initiative and demonstrate the power of solidarity.'*

bell hooks 'Sisterhood: Political Solidarity between Women' (1986)

*'A true European refugee and asylum policy requires solidarity*

*to be permanently anchored in our policy approach and our rules.'*

President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker,

State of the Union Address (2015)

*'Make Solidarity Great Again'*

campaign slogan of the Danish NGO Mellempøkeligt Samvirke

and the electoral campaign slogan of the German leftist

youth organisation Linksjugend.Sachsen (2017)



## Acknowledgements

I could not have realised the dissertation without the social environment and people that surrounded me over the last years. My supervisors Ulrike Liebert and Sebastian Haunss were always engaged in my topic, supported me in this challenge, and thereby gave me the chance to pursue my dissertation.

BIGSSS, the University of Bremen and Jacobs University offered a great environment to carry out my dissertation project. The Field A colloquium as well as the joint BIGSSS/InIIS-colloquium provided a supportive academic space to present research and get constructive feedback. Together with other colleagues, I initiated the working group on 'migration and refugee studies' at BIGSSS. I learnt a lot from this interdisciplinary study group and enjoyed participating in it. Field A, 'Global Governance and Regional Integration', was a friendly and open environment for me. Field Coordinator Arndt Wonka literally had an 'open-door policy', was always supportive and an academic mentor. I am indebted to Nora Waitkus, Regina Becker, Michelle Hollman, Simon Tunderman and Anna Wolkenhauer for their support. Thank you for sharing the experience of writing a doctoral thesis. Moreover, I would like to thank my cohort fellows from Field A Marufa Akter, John Berten and Janosch Kullenberg as well as Lara Minkus, Leslie Gauditz, Arline Rave, Stephan Dochow, Theresa Büchler, Jean-Yves Gerlitz, Eloisa Harris, Jennie Auffenberg, Marcus Wolf, Katharina Bürkin, Florian Wittmann, Nepomuk Hurch, and Sebastian Möller for being great colleagues and friends.

I had many opportunities to present my work at conferences, workshops and to attend method schools and therefore, I am very grateful for the generous financial support by BIGSSS. Moreover, thank you Wolfgang Banasiewicz for the financial-administrative help. In particular, BIGSSS financially supported the international workshop 'Understanding solidarity', which I co-organised (with Andreas Busen) and that took place at the University of Hamburg in January 2019. Also due to BIGSSS financial assistance, the professional proofreader Simon Musell edited most of my dissertation and I would like to thank Simon for his fast and thorough reading of my texts. My gratitude also goes to the editors of the journals, I submitted my texts to, to the anonymous reviewers as well as to the numerous discussants and colleagues at conferences and workshops who provided constructive comments and feedback on my PhD project.

Due to scholarships from the DAAD and BremenIDEA and the invitation by Aidan Regan, I visited the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin for 5 months in 2017. I enjoyed the stay and learnt more about Irish politics and society while I was there. Aidan, Johan Elkind, David Farrell, Niamh Hardiman, Louise Fitzgerald and Vincenzo Maccarone provided a kind and intellectually stimulating environment to me.

Beyond the academic bubble, there are very important people who helped me pursue this dissertation and I am heavily indebted to them. My parents, Silva and Michael Wallaschek, created a loving atmosphere which encouraged my interest for social and political issues. My partner Sandra Reinecke always, always supported me on this journey from the very first moment and encouraged me when I was demotivated or frustrated. Sandra was most often the first person with whom I shared new ideas or drafts of my texts and thereby she read my work critically but in a highly constructive manner. I am deeply thankful for her patience and sympathy towards my work. Moreover, she was hardly ever annoyed when I talked about my dissertation and kept on going for a while and I am very grateful for that.

Retrospectively, the year 2017 was a turning point in my dissertation and my private life. While I got scholarships for my research stay in Ireland and finally finished the coding of my data material, we got pregnant, Sandra and I got married in October and our daughter Hannah Frida was born on December 19<sup>th</sup>. Spending time with Sandra and Hannah is the best distraction from the dissertation that I can imagine. Being and playing with Hannah, seeing her grow up and how she explores the world is amazing and helped me to be less stressed about my work.

I am very thankful for the collegial and family support, if not to say solidarity, I have experienced. Sandra and Hannah are my 'superwomen' and I dedicate the dissertation to both of them.

*Bremen, April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2019*

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	i
List of abbreviations.....	vii
List of figures .....	ix
List of tables .....	xi
1 Introduction .....	1
1.1 Why study solidarity?.....	1
1.2 The EU in times of crisis: The Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis .....	5
1.2.1 From the global recession to the Euro crisis .....	5
1.2.2 Contested migration and asylum policies in the EU .....	8
1.2.3 How to study solidarity in times of crisis .....	13
1.3 Mapping solidarity .....	15
1.3.1 The philosophical roots of solidarity .....	15
1.3.2 The macro-structural perspective on solidarity .....	19
1.3.3 The micro-behavioural perspective on solidarity .....	22
1.3.4 A new avenue: The meso-discursive perspective on solidarity .....	24
1.4 Studying ideas in institutionalist settings .....	27
1.4.1 The role of ideas in institutionalism.....	27
1.4.2 Discursive institutionalism.....	29
1.4.3 Discourse coalitions, ideational leaders and coalition magnets.....	31
1.5 Political claims and discourse networks .....	35
1.6 Outline of the dissertation .....	39
Prelude: Solidarity in Europe in times of crisis.....	45
Conditional solidarity in Europe .....	46
Transnational solidarity in practice .....	47
The implicit institutionalisation of monetary solidarity .....	49
Social solidarity in everyday Europe.....	50
Constructing solidarity in times of crisis .....	52
2 The Discursive construction of solidarity. Analysing public claims in Europe’s migration crisis.....	55
2.1 Introduction.....	56
2.2 Solidarity research: Adding the meso approach to macro and micro approaches .....	58
2.2.1 Macro-structural approach: Institutional solidarity .....	59

2.2.2	Micro-behavioural approach: Solidarity as attitude.....	60
2.2.3	Meso-discursive approach: The discursive construction of solidarity .....	61
2.3	Research design and methods .....	66
2.4	Discourse networks in Europe's migration crisis.....	68
2.4.1	Intergovernmental political solidarity and transnational cultural solidarity (2010–14).....	69
2.4.2	The salience of intergovernmental political solidarity (2015) .....	72
2.5	Conclusion .....	75
2.6	Appendix .....	79
2.6.1	Political claims analysis .....	79
2.6.2	Discourse network analysis.....	83
3	The politics of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis: Media discourses in Germany and Ireland in 2015.....	87
3.1	Introduction.....	87
3.2	An ideational-discursive approach to solidarity.....	88
3.3	Case selection, method and data .....	89
3.4	Solidarity in Europe's migration crisis.....	91
3.4.1	Three notions of solidarity .....	92
3.4.2	Unmaking solidarity: Demarcation and security.....	95
3.5	Conclusion.....	96
4	Framing solidarity in the Euro crisis: A comparison of the German and Irish media discourse.....	99
4.1	Introduction.....	100
4.2	Agency and ideas in discursive institutionalism .....	102
4.2.1	Ideational leaders in the Euro crisis: Political parties, European actors, civil society groups .....	103
4.2.2	Coalition magnet patterns in the Euro crisis: Meanings of solidarity.....	105
4.3	Research design and methods .....	108
4.4	Ireland and Germany in the Euro crisis .....	111
4.5	Results .....	113
4.5.1	Solidity and solidarity in the German discourse.....	113
4.5.2	Responsibility, conditionality and solidarity in the Irish discourse.....	116
4.6	Discussion.....	120
4.7	Appendix .....	124
4.7.1	Government constellation in Germany and Ireland.....	124
4.7.2	Method: Political claims analysis .....	124
4.7.3	From the PCA to the discourse network analysis.....	128

5	Contested solidarity in the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis: A discourse network analysis .....	133
5.1	Introduction.....	134
5.2	Ideational research: Discourse coalitions and coalition magnets .....	136
5.2.1	Discourse coalitions and actors in times of crisis .....	136
5.2.2	Coalition magnets and frames in times of crisis .....	138
5.2.3	The discursive construction of solidarity .....	140
5.3	Data and Methods .....	142
5.4	Results .....	145
5.4.1	Coalition magnets: The dominance of austerity and contested political solidarity .....	146
5.4.2	Discourse coalitions: The omnipresence of conservative politicians .....	151
5.5	Conclusion .....	157
5.6	Appendix .....	160
5.6.1	Political claims analysis .....	160
5.6.2	Identifying solidarity claims .....	162
6	Conclusion.....	167
6.1	Contributions .....	171
6.2	Limitations.....	175
6.3	Outlook .....	178
7	Bibliography.....	183
8	Appendix: Codebook.....	197
8.1	The method: Political claims analysis.....	197
8.2	Keyword search string.....	199
8.3	Categories of the PCA.....	201
8.3.1	Time and source.....	201
8.3.2	Claimant.....	202
8.3.3	Action .....	212
8.3.4	Issue .....	213
8.3.5	Addressee .....	214
8.3.6	Framing.....	223
	Declaration .....	229



## List of abbreviations

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
AIB	Anglo Irish Bank
BDI	Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
DAAD	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DI	Discursive Institutionalism
DM	Deutsche Mark
DNA	Discourse Network Analysis
DWE	Die Welt
EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EFSF	European Financial Stability Facility
EFSM	European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
EP	European Parliament
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIIPS	Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
GIPS	Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain
HI	Historical Institutionalism

IInd	Irish Independent
IO	International Organisation
IT	Irish Times
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMT	Outright Monetary Transactions
PCA	Political Claims Analysis
RN	Rassemblement National
RQDA	R-based Qualitative Data Analysis
SAP	Swedish Social Democratic Party
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SZ	Süddeutsche Zeitung
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WTO	World Trade Organisation

# List of figures

- Figure 1: General national level of debt in per cent of GDP (2007-17)..... 6
- Figure 2: General government deficit, per cent of GDP (2007-17)..... 7
- Figure 3: Asylum applications of non-EU citizens in selected EU member states (2010-17)..... 9
- Figure 4: Refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe (2014-18)..... 12
- Figure 5: Number of texts on solidarity (1928-2018) ..... 17
- Figure 6: Models of discourse networks ..... 37
- Figure 7: Number of claims in German newspapers on solidarity in Europe's migration crisis (2010-15)..... 67
- Figure 8: Meaning-scale network in Germany (2010-14) ..... 70
- Figure 9: Meaning-scale network in Germany (2015) ..... 73
- Figure 10: Salience of claims in German and Irish newspapers ..... 110
- Figure 11: Affiliation network of the German discourse (2010-15) ..... 115
- Figure 12: Affiliation network of the Irish discourse (2010-15)..... 118
- Figure 13: Number of claims in Europe's migration crisis and in the Euro crisis..... 144
- Figure 14: Solidarity discourse networks in the Euro crisis (2010-15) ..... 152
- Figure 15: Solidarity discourse networks in Europe's migration crisis (2010-15)..... 155



## List of tables

Table 1: Asylum applications of non-EU citizens in selected EU member states (2010-17).....	10
Table 2: Seven meanings of Solidarity .....	25
Table 3: The structure of the dissertation .....	40
Table 4: Meanings of solidarity.....	63
Table 5: Scales of solidarity .....	65
Table 6: Codes and sub-codes in the Political Claims Analysis (Appendix Chapter 2).....	80
Table 7: Percentage of pro-solidarity claims in German newspapers per year (Appendix Chapter 2) .....	82
Table 8: Comparison of community detection algorithms (Appendix Chapter 2).....	84
Table 9: Centrality values in German discourse networks (2010-14 and 2015) (Appendix Chapter 2) .....	85
Table 10: Amount of claims and articles in four newspapers.....	91
Table 11: Government constellations in Germany and Ireland (Appendix Chapter 4).....	124
Table 12: Codes in the Political Claims Analysis (Appendix Chapter 4).....	126
Table 13: Comparison of the network modularity and the number of communities (Appendix Chapter 4) .....	129
Table 14: Eigenvector centrality in the German and Irish discourse (2010-15) (Appendix Chapter 4) .....	130
Table 15: Number of claims in the German and Irish newspapers (Appendix Chapter 4)....	131
Table 16: Number of articles in the German and Irish newspapers (Appendix Chapter 4) ..	132
Table 17: Meanings of solidarity in the German discourse during both crises (2010-15).....	141
Table 18: Overview about the two crisis discourse networks .....	146
Table 19: Coalition magnets in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis .....	148
Table 20: Codes and sub-codes in the PCA (Appendix Chapter 5) .....	160
Table 21: Meanings of solidarity in the two crises discourses (Appendix Chapter 5).....	162
Table 22: Number of claims and articles in German newspapers in the Euro crisis (Appendix Chapter 5) .....	164

Table 23: Number of claims and articles in German newspapers in Europe's migration crisis (Appendix Chapter 5)..... 164

Table 24: Eigenvector centrality in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis (Appendix Chapter 5) ..... 164

Table 25: Number of meanings and scales of solidarity in the Euro crisis ..... 168

Table 26: Number of meanings and scales of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis ..... 169

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Why study solidarity?

Solidarity is simultaneously omnipresent and absent. It is omnipresent in research articles and public debates. Solidarity is a key concept in political and social theory as well as in contemporary politics and societies. One of the major debates concerns whether solidarity is needed or in danger, and we can trace the idea back to the transformation from feudal to modern societies. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim (2012) explored the transformation of social relations from mechanic to organic solidarity in modern societies. Solidarity was part of the slogan of the French Revolution – ‘Egalité, Liberté, Fraternité’ – to demand human and civil rights as well as the self-determination of the people. Solidarity proved to be a central term in the labour movement to ground the necessity of a social bond between workers to fight against capitalism. Calls to solidarity were also widespread in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in respect of anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as well as in the formation of (new) social movements regarding civil rights, women’s equality, and anti-nuclear and anti-war issues. A prominent example that even semantically subscribes to the concept of solidarity is the Polish trade union *Solidarność*. It challenged the Polish communist state at its foundations and through industrial actions and protest, *Solidarność* triggered major political and social transformations in the country in the 1980s.

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, solidarity is often discussed in relation to the impact of globalisation on the solidary bond between citizens and on the transformation of the national welfare state. The European integration project has also focused on solidarity among nation-states and the potential for social cohesion at the international level. Claiming solidarity has a long historical tradition and legacy, but most often it refers to claims on transformations, moments of crises, and rapid changes or even threats to the current state of affairs. Consequently, it seems that solidarity is ubiquitous within the social and political spheres.

At the same time, however, one could say that solidarity is absent. There is hardly any in-depth discussion and close analysis of what solidarity means, what it encompasses, and what constitute its limits and opportunities. Nonetheless, solidarity remains a buzzword in public debates and research articles. In this way, the word solidarity often serves as a placeholder that stands for multiple different things in various disciplines, which produces a vast amount of research and findings that hardly take each other into account. The same is true of the public debate. Solidarity is hardly spelled out regarding what actors mean, demand, and claim in response to others, or in terms of what they demand from others.<sup>1</sup> Hence my claim is that solidarity is both omnipresent and absent at the same time.

The aim of the present thesis is to shed light on this phenomenon and further explore the idea of solidarity. What does it mean, what kind of solidarity is discussed in public debates? Can we identify a single understanding of solidarity that is predominant in the public sphere, or is there a plethora of meanings that confuses rather than differentiates the idea of solidarity? Or is the idea itself devoid of any concrete content, meaning that solidarity has no (more) actual meaning, serving more as a rhetorical phrase than a meaningful concept in public discussions?

Furthermore, the thesis investigates the actor dimension in solidarity debates. Who is publicly claiming solidarity? Is it still a leftist concept that is used by social democratic, green, and socialist actors to fight capitalism while uniting the labour movement in their industrial actions and demonstration? Or do we identify not only a widening of the concept, but also an expansion of the constellation of actors to include religious groups, civil society groups, activists who call for solidarity and use solidarity as a central theme in their protests and (single-issue) mobilisations? What roles do national executives, government actors, and other formal institutional actors (in the nation-state and beyond) play in claiming solidarity? Are these actors absent from the debate? Does solidarity only feature in a certain political spectrum? And finally, how can we understand the observation that calls for solidarity and times of great transformation seem to intersect? Are times of crisis times of solidarity claims? Does it

---

<sup>1</sup> For instance, in the latest coalition agreement between the CDU, the CSU and the SPD from March 2018, solidarity is mentioned 19 times in various policy areas (Bundesregierung 2018).

matter what crisis prompts the call for solidarity, or are only specific types of solidarity relevant in times of crisis?

Without seeking to exhaustively answer such questions, this thesis aims to provide some responses to these and more general queries. The main objective is to illuminate aspects in the research on solidarity that have been largely neglected until now and to show what a close study of solidarity in public debates can contribute to the understanding of contemporary politics and society. My central argument is that solidarity has been hardly analysed in its discursive construction in the public sphere. Previous research has focused on macro-structural aspects or on micro-behavioural characteristics of solidarity. By focusing on the public claims on solidarity, I will dissect the various meanings of solidarity used in public debates in Europe during times of crisis. How solidarity is framed and justified by actors is a major building block of the thesis. The dissertation will also look at the actor constellation and thereby examine who is claiming solidarity with and for whom. Hence, I analyse the framing and actor visibility in public solidarity discourses in times of crisis. For this purpose, the study focuses on the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis discourse in the European Union (EU) member states Germany and Ireland.

Solidarity is often investigated in (perceived) times of crisis. In general, times of crisis are understood as an 'unstable situation of extreme danger or difficulty' (Kahler and Lake 2013: 10). Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger (1992) state that if a danger lies ahead of us, we call for mutual support. We demand help and want to support others who are struggling. Solidary actions are often related to struggles, acts of resistance, and fights for a shared goal which create a shared value-horizon (Honneth 1992: 208). Furthermore, Bayertz (1998: 40–41) indicates that standing together to fight for shared interests creates solidarity. He calls such an understanding of solidarity a term of political struggle (*Kampfbegriff*) – people are united by fighting together. In this sense, solidarity is constantly rearticulated by its 'users' in hard times. In times of crisis, people are mobilised to act in solidarity among the members of a group. Consequently, if we want to study the concept of solidarity more closely, the focus should be on times of crisis.

With the Euro crisis and migration crisis, the EU faced two fundamental crises that were distinct in their political, social, and economic constellations. However, both crises share the public appeal to solidarity. Various actors invoked solidarity and demanded solidarity from others in order to deal with and solve the respective crisis. The two crisis trajectories also exhibit quite different challenges and different levels of country involvement and exposure. Previous research has shown that a lack of state power and an (un-)willingness to undertake substantial institutional reforms in the EU are both observable in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis (Biermann *et al.* 2019; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018). Regarding solidarity, the debtor countries demanded solidarity from the creditor countries in the Euro crisis and solidarity was often depicted as an anti-austerity claim. In the migration crisis, solidarity was one of the buzzwords in the public debate. It featured very prominently and was taken up by NGOs, politicians and journalists. Nonetheless, the debate about solidarity in the EU migration and refugee policy started before the summer of 2015 and only reached its peak in the so-called 'long summer of migration' (Kasperek and Speer 2015).

Hence, while a lack of solidarity is often noted by scholars, the call to solidarity still resonated in the public discourse in both crises. In this light, the dissertation will analyse the solidarity discourse in the German and Irish media in times of crisis. Concretely, the present thesis suggests a new conceptual perspective on solidarity by investigating the discursive construction of solidarity in the mass media in hard times. I argue in [Chapter 2](#) that solidarity is discursively constructed in public claims. Solidarity consists of two dimensions – meaning and scale – and both dimensions constitute several concepts of solidarity. While solidarity is mostly researched in social policy studies or investigated in surveys, the two dimensions of meaning and scale, as well as the meaning-making process itself, are hardly considered in these studies. The newly suggested meso-discursive perspective affords us the opportunity to analyse solidarity claims, to differentiate between meanings and scopes of solidarity, and to empirically assess which meanings and scales of solidarity are used in Europe's migration crisis and the Euro crisis. These empirical tasks are undertaken in chapters 3-5 of the dissertation.

The introduction of the thesis is structured as follows. The next section (1.2) sheds light on the two crises – the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis – and briefly reconstructs the crises’ trajectories. This is crucial in order to highlight their differences and to draw out their shared public appeal to solidarity. It also explains the rationale for choosing Germany and Ireland as cases for the subsequent empirical analysis. The third section (1.3) focuses on the philosophical roots of solidarity and maps the research programme on solidarity. It is divided into three perspectives on solidarity with the third one being the above-mentioned new perspective on the discursive construction of solidarity (see also [Chapter 2](#)). The following section (1.4) lays out the institutional and ideational dimension of the thesis. It describes two approaches (discourse coalition approach and ideational leadership approach) to study actors in ideational politics and discusses an approach (coalition magnet approach) with which to study the influence of ideas in politics. Section 1.5 outlines the methodological pathway of the thesis and shows the advantage of using political claims analysis and discourse network analysis. The last section (1.6) offers an overview of the remaining chapters of the dissertation as a whole.


## **1.2 The EU in times of crisis: The Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis**

### **1.2.1 From the global recession to the Euro crisis**

The origins of the Euro crisis can be traced back to the financial and housing crisis in the US. The near meltdown of the financial system in the US can be related to the collapse of the bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the severe financial problems of the investment bank Bear Stearns and the public mortgage service company Fannie Mae. These developments had a strong impact on the banking and financial sector in Europe, because European and US banks have been heavily entangled in their banking activities (Jones *et al.* 2016; Tooze 2018). Ireland especially suffered a severe banking crisis. The Irish government had to bailout the six biggest Irish banks in 2008. Otherwise, the Irish banking system would have collapsed which would have had profound consequences on the European banking sector. Jones *et al.* (2016: 1023) summarise the Irish situation as follows: ‘The Irish bank bailout eventually

shifted more than €62 billion bank liabilities onto the shoulders of Irish taxpayers, turning a state that had been a model of fiscal rectitude into a massive debtor that had to turn to the EU and IMF for a bailout'. Consequently, and as Figure 1 shows, the Irish debt level increased dramatically from a low level of 25 per cent of GDP in 2007 to around 130 per cent in 2012/13 (Hardiman and Regan 2013; Roche *et al.* 2017).

**Figure 1: General national level of debt in per cent of GDP (2007-17)**




Source: OECD (2018a), own illustration (no data for Ireland in 2017).

German, Dutch, French, and British banks also traded with the affected Irish banks. The political answer to the increasing level of national debt was a strict austerity programme in Ireland, introduced by the ruling government coalition of Fianna Fáil and the Irish Green Party (Roche *et al.* 2017). However, it did not insulate Ireland from a severe economic and social shock with rising levels of unemployment and cuts in the public sector and in social spending. While the level of national debts rose, the deficits in the crisis countries grew too. As we see in Figure 2, the government deficit especially

increased in Greece, Portugal, and even more dramatically in Ireland between 2009 and 2011. Germany and the Netherlands experienced very moderate deficit increases and made a surplus again from 2014 and 2015. Accordingly, while Ireland was hit hard, Germany hardly experienced a crisis and established itself as a (new) economic powerhouse in the EU. Moreover, it used its economic strength to increase its political influence in the EU on monetary and economic issues.

**Figure 2: General government deficit, per cent of GDP (2007-17)**



Source: OECD (2018b), own illustration.

While Jones et al. (2016) argue that the EU managed the Euro crisis in a series of ‘failing forward’ reforms – that is, incremental reforms that help to contain the crisis in the short term, but which create further obstacles that are again dealt with on a short-term basis, and so on – other scholars argue that these austerity reforms were implemented by the wrong means and had hardly a positive effect on the debtor countries (Blyth 2015; Matthijs 2016). In particular, Ireland’s recovery is rather initiated by FDI-led

growth than the adjustments programme by the Troika as studies demonstrate (Brazys and Regan 2017; Regan and Brazys 2018).


Nonetheless, the EU established new institutional structures during the Euro crisis. In 2010, the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) were created to provide loans to the debtor states and finance the bailouts up to 500 billion Euros. The later European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is an intergovernmental organisation, based on international public law and a treaty among the EU member states, that the Eurozone member states established in 2012 so as to create a lasting mechanism for dealing with the bailouts and financial assistance to the debtor states (Schelkle 2017). Moreover, the so-called Troika/Institutions (European Central Bank, European Commission, and International Monetary Fund) have far-reaching competencies in the debtor states with regard to budget surveillance and supervision of the bailout programmes in the respective countries. On the one hand, this has created a lot of criticism about the democratic deficit and weak legitimacy of the Troika, and on the other, it has highlighted the decreasing national sovereignty and limited budget autonomy of national parliaments (Crum 2013; Jones and Matthijs 2017). Besides the ESM, the member states agreed to establish a banking union and create supervisory rights for the ECB to avoid another banking collapse. However, this banking union is still unfinished; it also lacks transparency and a political instrument to prevent the 'too big to fail' logic recurring in the next crisis (Tesche 2017). To sum up, the Euro crisis has yet to be resolved, the future of the monetary union is still pending, and the crisis has deeply affected the domestic politics in the debtor and creditor states of the EU (Copelovitch *et al.* 2016)

### **1.2.2 Contested migration and asylum policies in the EU**

The migration crisis in 2015 marked another significant crisis for the EU. The European border countries have had to deal with immigration for a long time and harmonising national migration policies across EU member states has been on the agenda of EU policymaking since the 1990s (Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa 2014; Geddes 2010). Since 2010, the number of incoming asylum seekers is reflected in the trend of increasing numbers of asylum applications for the EU in total and for Germany in

particular (Figure 3). The delayed peak of the numbers of asylum applications in 2016 is due to the bureaucratic difficulties in the German and other national migration offices dealing with a high number of applications in a short period of time. Hence, many applications were dealt with in 2016. Ireland experienced a relative increase in asylum applications, but as Table 1 and Figure 3 show, it hardly had any substantial increase in absolute numbers in comparison to Germany, Italy, Greece or Hungary.

**Figure 3: Asylum applications of non-EU citizens in selected EU member states (2010-17)**



Source: Eurostat (2018), own illustration.

**Table 1: Asylum applications of non-EU citizens in selected EU member states (2010-17)**

	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Ireland</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Spain</b>	<b>Hungary</b>	<b>Total (EU-28)</b>
<b>2010</b>	48,475	1,935	10,000	10,275	2,740	2,095	259,400
<b>2011</b>	53,235	1,290	40,315	9,310	3,420	1,690	309,000
<b>2012</b>	77,485	955	17,335	9,575	2,565	2,155	335,400
<b>2013</b>	126,705	945	26,620	8,225	4,485	18,895	431,100
<b>2014</b>	202,645	1,450	64,625	9,430	5,615	42,775	627,000
<b>2015</b>	476,510	3,275	83,540	13,205	14,780	177,135	1,322,800
<b>2016</b>	745,155	2,245	122,960	51,110	15,755	29,430	1,260,900
<b>2017</b>	222,560	2,930	128,850	58,650	36,605	3,390	704,600

Source: Eurostat (2018).

Claims on reforming the Dublin system were raised before the crisis in 2015, but instead of following the demands from the Southern European countries, Northern and Western European countries shaped the EU migration and asylum policies and applied their own regulation and norms to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Zaun 2016). Additionally, with recent migration movements following the 'Arab Spring' in 2011 and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, North and Central Africa, the number of people trying to cross the Mediterranean has increased continuously. The situation in Syria, in particular, became more precarious: The Syrian civil war intensified from 2012 onward, the refugee camp capacities in the neighbouring countries Jordan and Lebanon were becoming overstretched and the UNHCR refugee camps in the region suffered from a financial shortage. This triggered a new immigration dynamic in this region and more and more people fled to other countries and to regions further away, namely the EU.


The border countries, especially Greece and Italy, had been hit by the Euro crisis and faced comprehensive austerity programmes that had limited the already weak bureaucratic administration even further. Thus, the Euro crisis influenced the impact of the upcoming migration crisis to some extent and created the political-institutionalist context in which the incoming asylum seekers brought another challenge to the EU and

the incomplete EU Home and Justice Affairs. While police jurisdiction, law enforcement, and the Schengen agreement were continuously developed and improved over the years, the Dublin Regulations are still seen as incomplete and asymmetrically developed in comparison to the other policy areas (Monar 2014).

The biggest obstacle is that the Dublin Regulations predominantly focus on harmonising asylum procedures throughout the EU and avoiding any type of individual abuse of claiming asylum in different countries (whether at the same time or consecutively after one procedure has failed). At the same time, the so-called Dublin III Regulations, introduced in 2013, state that the country in which an asylum seeker first enters EU territory must deal with the asylum application. Moreover, the establishment of Frontex as the European border and coast guard police puts a strong emphasis on border patrol and border surveillance. These developments have meant that it is almost impossible to claim asylum in countries that do not have an external EU border (e. g. Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden). The migration movements in the summer of 2015 have shown this imbalance and asymmetric responsibility mechanism, and this vividly demonstrated the weaknesses of the current CEAS. The movements through Southeast European countries ended in Hungary, but then went further to Austria, Germany, Sweden, and other countries. This shows that a solidarity mechanism and a change of the Dublin regulations are needed that shifts the burden from the border countries to all EU member states and creates a fair relocation of refugees across the EU.

In reaction to increasing numbers of sea and/or land arrivals in the EU (Figure 4), the European Commission introduced a mandatory solidarity mechanism to relocate refugees among the EU member states to share responsibility and disburden Italy and Greece in September 2015 (European Commission 2015). These are the two states that have been affected the most by the high influx of refugees in 2015.

Figure 4: Refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe (2014-18)



Source: UNHCR (2019), own illustration. It shows the number of sea and/or land arrivals in the three countries and is not identical to the number of asylum applications in these countries.

Accordingly, suggesting an EU-wide solidarity mechanism to relocate refugees among the member states seemed like a good idea, because not only was it publicly embraced by various key actors ([Chapter 2](#) and [Chapter 5](#)), but it was also established on the supranational level of the EU. Still, the national implementation and compliance of this EU-wide mechanism was unsuccessful, and it is far from any transition period to reach the necessary relocation of 160,000 refugees in total. Hungary and Slovakia even went to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to sue the EU for introducing the mechanism, because they were outvoted by a qualified majority voting procedure in the European Council (European Council 2015). The ECJ rejected their complaint and forced them to accept the decision (Byrne 2017). Despite this legal conflict, almost every EU member state is far from fulfilling their agreed quota (European Commission 2017b). Moreover,

a blame game has started between the receiver states and the affected states Italy and Greece over whether the receiving states are not willing to take in refugees or Italy and Greece have severe bureaucratic and administrative problems dealing with the relocation requests from other member states.

Hence, studying solidarity in Europe's migration crisis gives us the opportunity to analyse an idea that has been quite dominant, put on the institutional-policy agenda of the EU, and even voted for by the majority in the European Council but then failed in the concrete institutionalisation and implementation in the EU member states in the aftermath of the long summer of migration in 2015 ([Chapter 5](#)).

### **1.2.3 How to study solidarity in times of crisis**

In order to study solidarity as an idea in the two crises, I build upon research that has examined successfully implemented ideas such as austerity in the Euro crisis (Blyth 2015). Looking at solidarity does not mean that I will examine either the winning side of the ideational battle or the losing side. Nonetheless, both crises manifest some sort of Pyrrhic victory of solidarity. Regarding the Euro crisis, the transfer union was not established, the banking union remains incomplete, an EU Marshall Plan as a public investment programme has not been realised, and substantial and sustainable debt cuts for Greece or Ireland were not accomplished (Jones *et al.* 2016). Otherwise, scholars have argued that solidarity was institutionalised as a by-product of the general Euro crisis management (Schelkle 2017), and that the crisis showed the resilience of inner-European solidarity. In this regard, Schelkle argues that the institutionalisation of the ESM led to a solidarity mechanism between the EU member states.

The same holds true for the migration crisis. Many reform ideas have been publicly discussed and the member states are aware of the limitations of the Dublin Regulations. A voluntary relocation plan as a European solidarity mechanism was established in the migration crisis. Still, any kind of obligatory relocation scheme and sharing of responsibility ultimately failed due to resistance from EU member states and partisan conflicts within the member states (Zaun 2018). All actions, in one way or another, were presented as solidary actions, but they were often linked to other concepts that are less solidarity-oriented.

In [Chapter 5](#), I will demonstrate that the Euro crisis discourse on solidarity in Germany shows a strong entanglement of solidarity and austerity claims, while the migration crisis shows the weakening of the pro-solidarity discourse by an increasing presence of security and demarcation claims in the wake of the crisis. In this regard, solidarity is analysed in its ideational context to show that solidarity is closely linked to other concepts.

Accordingly, solidarity is studied in the two specific cases of Germany and Ireland. I have selected these two countries for two reasons: their involvement in the crises, and the relational aspect of solidarity. Ireland was strongly impacted by the Euro crisis and had to agree to the bailout programme and austerity measures of the Troika. As such, Ireland is understood as a debtor state in the Euro crisis. Germany, on the other hand, is perceived as the political and economic winner of the Euro crisis, because it gained influence in the European Council by its strict political agenda and highest amount of credit-giving to the ESM. Germany also did well economically, because of its strong export-driven growth and comparatively low wages. So, Germany is understood as a creditor state in the Euro crisis. Therefore, Ireland and Germany stand for the two main country types in the Euro crisis (Frieden and Walter 2017). With regard to solidarity, I conceptualise this relation as receiver and giver of solidarity. In times of crisis, actors call for solidarity and need support to deal with the crisis. Ireland is understood as a receiver of solidarity from other countries, the EU and international organisations. Consequently, calls for solidarity might feature more prominently in the Irish case than in German case. Germany, on the other side, is conceptualised as a giver of solidarity, because, due to it being less affected by the Euro crisis, Germany is expected to support crisis countries and prevent the collapse of the Eurozone.

The migration crisis shows a different constellation. Ireland was hardly affected by any migration movement in Europe in recent years due to its geographical location and its opt-out of the Schengen agreement. Asylum seekers have little chance of claiming asylum at an Irish border. By contrast, Ireland was one of the main destinations for EU citizens during the 'Celtic Tiger era' (2000-07), especially in terms of the construction industry and for high-skilled tech workers from within the EU. During the crisis, the immigration numbers decreased strongly while the emigration

numbers rose to a new high (Glynn and O'Connell 2017). Additionally, Ireland defines itself as a migration country in which phases of emigration as well as immigration are rather normal (Gilmartin 2015), while Germany still struggles to recognise its migration past and present. However, Germany has been more strongly affected by migration dynamics in recent years, reaching a peak in 2015. Therefore, migration and integration policies are strongly contested in the German public (Green 2004). With respect to solidarity, Germany is conceptualised as a receiver of solidarity, because it is strongly affected by Europe's migration crisis and demands support and help from others. Ireland, on the other side, is understood as a giver of solidarity, because it does not have to deal with a high number of refugees, but is expected to help and act in solidarity with others. Thus, we find altered case constellations in Europe's migration crisis and the Euro crisis, respectively.

The present study considers these different constellations for the conceptualisation and analysis of the cases and empirical material by taking into account the affectedness of the country and the specific position they occupy in the solidary relation between Ireland and Germany, and whether these aspects make a difference for the discursive construction of solidarity and its related framing strategies. These starting descriptions and claims require further clarification and in-depth discussion with regard to two main aspects: first, I elaborate on the understandings of solidarity, and second, I highlight the role of agency and ideas in political processes. These two aspects guide the dissertation project as a whole and are discussed in the following two sections of the introduction.

## **1.3 Mapping solidarity**

### **1.3.1 The philosophical roots of solidarity**

The term 'solidarity' is widely used in everyday language, policy papers, as well as in academic texts. It is a broadly shared concept in European societies and languages (Schmale 2017). The origins of the word can be traced back to the Roman legal phrase 'obligatio in solidum' in Ancient times, which is a liability statement: a member of a group is responsible for its debts, and the group is responsible for the single member (Bayertz 1998). In this regard, solidarity has its semantic roots in the law (Brunkhorst

2002). However, solidarity could have had another Latin origin, namely 'solidus', which means dense or firm (Brunkhorst 2002: 10–12; Wildt 1998: 210). This might explain why solidarity often stands for the social cohesion of a group or a society in modern times ([Section 1.3.3](#)). Only if the social bond between the members of the group is solid can they support and help each other.<sup>2</sup>

Despite these semantic origins, the meaning of solidarity has gradually mutated and evolved as a result of historical, social, and political circumstances (Bayertz 1998; Brunkhorst 2002; Münkler 2004; Schieder 1972). For this study, the different historical pathways and changes in the meaning of solidarity are less important than the fact that solidarity has no universal and uncontested meaning. Rather, the contestation of solidarity is taken into account, highlighting that actors make sense of concepts and ideas in their own way and can disagree with one another. Considering concepts as contested (Gallie 1956) underlines the fact that actors argue about the proper use and criticise and defend their understanding. Or, as Gallie (1956: 172) points out: 'More simply, to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to recognise that one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses'. Consequently, what solidarity means is deeply contested and a matter of discursive struggles, specific actor constellations, and historical and social circumstances.

While solidarity has recently become a commonly used term in empirical research, it is philosophically not as relevant and well theorised as justice or freedom. As Frankfurt (1987: 24) claims in an early observation:

In the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University (which houses 8.5 million volumes), there are 1,159 entries in the card catalog under the subject heading 'liberty' and 326 under 'equality.' Under 'fraternity,' there are none. This is because the catalog refers to the social ideal in question as 'brotherliness.' Under that heading there are four entries! Why does fraternity (or brotherliness) have so much less salience than liberty and equality? Perhaps the explanation is that, in virtue of our fundamental commitment to individualism, the political ideals to which we are most deeply and actively attracted have to do with what we supposed to be the rights of individuals, and no one claims a right to fraternity. It is also possible that liberty and equality get more attention in certain quarters because, unlike fraternity, they are considered to be susceptible to more or less formal treatment. In any event, the fact is that there has been very little serious


---

<sup>2</sup> Brunkhorst (2002: 30–33) claims that the idea of solidarity can even be traced back to the Greek term friendship – a personal bond in the Greek polis and a relation to support each other on an equal level.

investigation into just what fraternity is, what it entails, or why it should be regarded as especially desirable.

Frankfurt's claim remains valid to some extent, even today. In contrast to the aforementioned terms, solidarity is not part of the canonical readings in political theory and philosophy. In recent handbooks on the subject, entries on solidarity (or close synonyms such as 'fraternity' or 'brotherhood') are missing (Dryzek *et al.* 2006; Estlund 2012; Göhler *et al.* 2011), which gives support to my opening argument that solidarity is rather absent in the scholarly debate. Nevertheless, this research gap has been filled in recent years in the sense that solidarity is mentioned more often in research articles. Figure 5 provides an overview of the recent trend on solidarity research. In this regard, Frankfurt's claim on the almost complete absence of solidarity research is corroborated until the 1990s. Afterwards, there has been a growing interest in the concept and related political and social phenomena.

Figure 5: Number of texts on solidarity (1928-2018)



Note: It shows the number of texts (n=3626) in the Scopus database that entail 'solidarity' in the title. Research article, book chapters and books are included in Scopus.

With regard to the more recent conceptual development of solidarity, Schieder (1972: 563) argues that solidarity is a rather modern term, which was invented after the French Revolution<sup>3</sup> and the European Enlightenment. It refers to the first tendencies of secularisation, (liberal) humanism, and the differentiation of modern societies. Solidarity became a common societal term in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Schieder 1972). For instance, in the French case, the solidarism approach was relatively prominent in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which sought to reconcile socialist and liberal ideas (Béland 2009; Große Kracht 2015; Hayward 1959). While some authors argue that solidarity contains a universal tendency based on the aforementioned developments (Brunkhorst 2002; Habermas 1990; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992), others have questioned this by emphasising the particularism of solidarity.

The latter argue that it refers to a limited group, because of its relational and reciprocal nature. To act in solidarity, so the critics claim, means to establish a concrete relationship between the giver and receiver of solidarity wherein an interaction takes place that cannot be universalised. Showing solidarity requires a concrete other and this is necessarily a limited group. As Richard Rorty notes, 'feelings of solidarity are necessarily a matter of which similarities and dissimilarities strike us as salient, and that such salience is a function of a historically contingent final vocabulary' (2007: 192). In this respect, the critics claim that the universal solidarity theorists set solidarity on a par with justice, which is a universal and moral principle (Beckert *et al.* 2004; Kersting 1998: 413–415).<sup>4</sup> If we follow the conceptual path that solidarity is a particularistic concept, then the different semantics and varying scopes of solidarity have to be

---

<sup>3</sup> There is an argument about the appearance of fraternity in the declaration of the French Revolution in 1789 (besides liberty and equality). Schieder (1972: 565–566) and Brunkhorst (2002) refer to that date as important for the fraternity term, while Munoz-Dardé (1998: 148) claims that fraternity was missing in the original text of the French Declaration of 1789. She claims that its first mention was not until the constitution of 1848. In the original text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, approved by the National Assembly of France on 26<sup>th</sup> August 1789, solidarity is in fact not mentioned (National Assembly of France 1789). Still, the phrase 'égalité, liberté, fraternité' was one of the main slogans amid the tumultuous days of the French Revolution.

<sup>4</sup> Contrary to his former claims on the equivalence and morality of solidarity and justice (Habermas 1990), Habermas indicates in a recent text that justice and solidarity are not the same, but they can refer to each other. He recognises that his first statement on the matter focuses too strongly on moral (universal) standards and bears the tendency to depoliticise solidarity. Accordingly, Habermas (2013) conceptualises solidarity as supererogatory right.

empirically investigated more carefully. Moreover, solidarity should then be empirically examined in different contexts in order to scrutinise the former claim and assess the variance and boundedness of solidarity.

I show that there are two main paradigms in solidarity research. I call them the macro-structural and the micro-behavioural perspective on solidarity. While the first looks at welfare state institutions and social policies as a form of institutionalised solidarity, the latter is concerned with individual agents and collective actors who have specific attitudes and behaviour. Both research perspectives yield valuable insights into solidarity and are not criticised per se for their particular viewpoint on solidarity. The contribution of this dissertation is to complement these two paradigms with a third approach that looks at the meso-discursive side of solidarity. More concretely, the discursive construction of solidarity should be considered as a third perspective on solidarity. It offers a unique way of studying the construction of solidarity via communication and, as such, it is able to capture debates about the institutionalisation of solidarity in the nation-state or regional integration projects as well as discussions about a weakening or strengthening of (solidary) attitudes and the social bond among citizens. Before we examine this new perspective in greater detail (see also [Chapter 2](#)), let us focus on the macro-structural and micro-behavioural perspectives in the following. In doing so, we can clarify the main aspects of both research streams, identify what is missing in both approaches, and set out why it is necessary to develop the meso-discursive approach.

### **1.3.2 The macro-structural perspective on solidarity**

The research on solidarity of the first perspective deals with welfare state institutions and social policies in OECD countries. The welfare state is understood as 'institutionalised solidarity' (Gelissen 2000). The focus, then, is on how structural solidarity decreases or increases due to changes in the environment, whether a transformation of the welfare state is observable and what effects this has for the solidarity project of the welfare state (Béland 2009; Berger 2005; Boräng 2015).<sup>5</sup> As Arts

---

<sup>5</sup> A similar approach is taken by Brunkhorst (2002) and recently by Jones and Matthijs (2017) by linking solidarity with democracy and democratic legitimacy. As Jones and Matthijs (2017: 185) put it: 'Why do democratic institutions struggle to maintain their vitality and legitimacy in hard

and Gelissen (2001: 283) reframe a central claim by Esping-Anderson, the ‘welfare states [...] have always promised social “solidarity of the people”’. Understanding the welfare state as a solidarity mechanism shows the social integration function of this institution. It is ‘a matter of altruistic, one-sided transactions, of helping those incapable of helping themselves’ (Leitner and Lessenich 2003: 329).

It underlines the structural aspect of solidarity that creates relations between actors and the welfare state. The social insurance scheme is just such an institutional arrangement, which provides an exchange and can be seen as a cornerstone of welfare state politics. It is depersonalised, because the exchange mechanism works for every contributor and recipient of the insurance scheme. As long as an individual is a member of the social insurance programme, they benefit from it (and pay for it too). Nevertheless, the solidarity welfare mechanism also covers the costs for specific groups that have hardly contributed to some insurance schemes such as unemployment payment for people who have not had a job. Here the idea of reciprocity comes in and there is an expectation that these people will contribute to the welfare state later when they do have a job.<sup>6</sup>

Although solidarity has often been invoked in previous studies, scholars have seldom engaged in a discussion of the meaning of solidarity. If solidarity is specified, its attribute is often ‘social’. In this regard, social solidarity has a double or mixed meaning. On the one hand, it stands for the welfare state and that the welfare state provides social solidarity (Baldwin 1990). On the other, social solidarity is a substitute for terms like ‘social bond’ or ‘social glue’ between the members of a society ([section 1.3.3](#)).

The research on welfare solidarity was challenged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, because the national boundedness of social solidarity was reconsidered (Börner

---

times? [...] [W]e identify a loss of solidarity as the root cause of Western political dysfunction over the past decade’. This perspective shares the macro-structural approach and the emphasis on the strength or weakness of a (national) social bond for societies (and democracy).

<sup>6</sup> This reciprocity is challenged in the European Union, because recent legal decisions establish new restriction for the access to welfare benefits to EU citizens in EU member states (Farahat 2015). Certain rules of exclusion also apply in the national welfare state in which refugees or disabled persons are partially seen as ‘undeserving’ of social benefits (Sales 2002; Trenz and Grasso 2018).

2013; Ferrera 2006; Mau 2005b). Social solidarity was investigated in the context of the nation-state and this was often the limit of the investigation. One reason for this is that social policies are predominantly shaped in the national territory, while no EU social policy has existed to date (Martinsen and Vollaard 2014). Accordingly, there was said to be an absence of solidarity in the European Union. This was challenged by several academics who claimed that scholars have to take off their national solidarity glasses and consider the European context if they want to examine European solidarity (Börner 2013; Mau 2005b). Mau explicitly refers to other institutional arrangements that can be understood as solidarity mechanisms. For instance, the union citizenship can be conceptualised as a social bond among European citizens. Being a European citizen gives duties and rights and thus a certain belonging that can create a kind of transnational European solidarity. Moreover, the cohesion, investment, and structural funds of the EU are understood as solidary mechanisms redistributing money and resources among the European member states and decreasing the inequality among the countries and within the regions of a country (Copsey 2015).

To sum up, the macro-structural perspective on solidarity is chiefly concerned with social solidarity in the national welfare state. Sometimes the scope of this perspective is extended to include European solidarity. However, this conceptualisation of national or European social solidarity is too vague. Therefore, I suggest further broadening the scope and considering various scales of (social) solidarity. If solidarity is analysed in its structural and institutional manifestations, then, first, it is worth distinguishing between local, national, supranational, and intergovernmental scales of solidarity. Second, the macro-structural perspective on solidarity is still focused on institutions and structural arrangements. The interplay of institutions and procedures is investigated in terms of whether they provide the ground for solidarity or are the result of social solidarity acts. Hence, the public appeal to solidarity, the claim to act in solidarity hardly enters into the macro-structural perspective. It is rather assumed that certain social policy instruments create solidarity and that the European treaties are calls for the same European solidarity. This implicit focus on the output legitimation of solidarity could be complemented by also looking at the input legitimation strategies by actors. It is worth exploring how actors promote

and justify their understanding of solidarity in the public sphere in order to show how actors make sense of the call to solidarity. We will come back to this in [section 1.3.4](#) of the introduction.

### **1.3.3 The micro-behavioural perspective on solidarity**

Solidarity from the second perspective is primarily an attitude or a behaviour that actors express (Berger 2005: 14–15; Kaufmann 2005). Specific interests and preferences, as well as norms and values, are taken into account to explain the (non-)solidary actions of individuals and groups. The focus is on the active engagement of the people in the welfare state that produces solidarity. This national identification is then understood as a social bond, that is, solidarity among the people (Mau 2005b; Offe 1998).

Attitudes towards the welfare state or immigration are considered to measure solidarity in the national population. Are social benefits for all social groups more accepted in homogenous or heterogeneous populations, and do we find stronger in-group solidarity than solidarity with strangers in the welfare state? Van Oorschot (2000) demonstrates that, in the Dutch case, the deservingness of financial support depends largely on one's status and belonging to a social group. Elder people or people who are not able to work (physically and/or psychically) are more openly granted social benefits than people who are not willing to work. On the 'giver side', higher educated people with a higher socio-economic status are more willing to give benefits to this group than less educated people with a lower socio-economic status. The results underline that people do not give solidarity in a universal manner, but rather selectively and conditionally. In a similar way, Scheepers and Grotenhuis (2005) argue about donating money to the poor. They argue that this is understood as a solidary action and that people who have a higher income, a higher educational level, and are politically left-leaning are more likely to donate than others. In this regard, solidarity stands for social cohesion and the thickness of the social bond among the people, but as demonstrated, the strength of the social bond depends on the concrete relation between social groups.

While some scholars have argued that national and European identity are exclusive, other studies have demonstrated that they form multiple layers in a complex

identification process (Jones 2014; Liebert 2016; Risse 2010). In fact, the stronger identification with the EU increases the likelihood of supporting EU social policy competencies. Furthermore, cultural openness, appreciating diversity and cultural tolerance increases the support of European transnational redistribution among EU citizens (Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Gerhards *et al.* 2018; Kuhn *et al.* 2018; Mau 2005a). This supports the previous claim that solidarity is socially bounded. People are asked to act in solidarity with humans in need or should go on strike to support the other workers and labour negotiations (Manatschal and Freitag 2014; Pernicka and Hofmann 2015). It is a context in which people are mobilised to act in solidarity or are requested to think about their solidarity attitudes.

Here again, we find a Europeanisation of this perspective by focusing not only on types of national welfare states, but also on the European level and attitudes towards a European welfare state (Gerhards *et al.* 2016; Mau 2005a). These attitudes are, nonetheless, dependent on the national welfare state and how much national solidarity people know from their familiar social policies. As Mau argues, there is either the hope of an upgrade towards more social benefits and a better safety net, or the fear of a downgrade because the current national institutions already provide all the important solidary mechanisms. Still, the nation-state is very important as the context for belonging to the in-group. This then feeds back into the sharing or redistribution of resources among the in-group, or indeed the refusal to share and redistribute resources with the out-group (Mau 2005a; Mewes and Mau 2013; Thomann and Rapp 2018). Moreover, researchers have also found that (German) citizens were critical of the bailout programme during the Euro crisis and would have preferred to give less money to the crisis countries due to their fear that the economic and financial burden for Germany might become too high. Besides having a left-leaning political orientation, having altruistic (and cosmopolitan) attitudes does, in fact, increase the individual support for the bailout programme and the redistribution of resources among EU citizens (Bechtel *et al.* 2014; Kuhn *et al.* 2018). This goes hand in hand with the above-mentioned idea that solidarity is bound and conditionally given to others.

Besides the type of welfare states, Ciornei and Recchi (2017) have demonstrated that cross-border interactions of Europeans foster European solidarity in times of crisis.

By dividing solidarity into its international (among member states) and transnational (among individuals) forms, they show that supporting equality principles and having a cosmopolitan attitude increases one's support for transnational and international solidarity. As they state: 'political beliefs in equality and cultural openness are the pillars of transnational solidarity' (Ciornei and Recchi 2017: 15). Nevertheless, having transnational experiences and interactions does not automatically lead to European solidarity, as their results indicate (see also Calhoun 2002; Deutschmann et al. 2018).

The micro-behavioural approach considers solidarity on the individual level. It investigates the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of people and collective actors. It mainly focuses on social solidarity as a proxy for (expected) redistributive behaviour, as well as on cultural solidarity as favouring certain norms and sets of beliefs. Hence, it investigates two meanings of solidarity with the predominant scale being the national scale, even though the European scale has been taken into account in more recent studies. Conceptually, meaning and scale are often conflated in these studies with less attention given to how meaning and scale overlap, differentiate or conflate.

#### **1.3.4 A new avenue: The meso-discursive perspective on solidarity**

After discussing the macro and micro approach to solidarity and showing their limitations with regard to the dimensions of meaning and scale, I sketch out the meso-discursive approach to solidarity. This approach conceptualises solidarity as a contested concept (Gallie 1956). Actors interpret and frame the concept and disagree about its understanding. These framing processes and discursive constructions of solidarity are the conceptual building blocks of the meso approach. Framing theory informs the meso approach by highlighting the selection and salience processes that underpin framing (Entman 1993). While some frames appear more often in the debate, others are left out entirely. Actors select frames in their public claims in order to legitimise their actions and mobilise the public. By doing so, the public debate is structured through the selection of frames, making them more salient than other frames in public debates. With regard to the meso-discursive approach, this entails that meanings and scales of solidarity might be more or less visible in public discourses and actors might more frequently evoke a certain meaning or refrain from using a certain understanding of solidarity.

In order to discern the discursive construction process of solidarity, I suggest examining the dimensions of meaning and scale. These two dimensions constitute the concepts of solidarity. While the meaning of solidarity focuses on the content of a solidarity claim, the scale of solidarity refers to the social boundedness of the claim (whether it is linked to local, national or global groups/contexts).

The aim of the meso approach is thereby to delineate the numerous concepts of solidarity used in public and academic debates, and to offer a new perspective on what solidarity means. Solidarity is differentiated into six meanings, with a seventh meaning that refers to solidarity in an *ex negativo* manner. The seventh meaning is named misuse of solidarity and refers to claims that directly contest the call to solidarity in the first place. The solidarity action is rejected and delegitimised by arguing that it is not a valid reference point. The seven meanings of solidarity are listed below in Table 2.

**Table 2: Seven meanings of Solidarity**

<b>Meanings</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Political solidarity</b>	Setting up new political mechanisms and instruments in a cooperative way
<b>Social solidarity</b>	Redistributing resources and people and groups volunteering
<b>Cultural solidarity</b>	Arguing for a shared identity and norms
<b>Legal solidarity</b>	Liability of members based on the signing of treaties and agreements
<b>Economic solidarity</b>	Support in the form of public investments and growth of the economy
<b>Monetary solidarity</b>	Risk-sharing and the reduction or share of sovereign debts to help others
<b>Misuse of solidarity</b>	Questioning the legitimacy of the call to solidarity

Note: The same table is included in [Chapter 2.2.5](#).

Besides the meaning dimension of solidarity, the second dimension of the meso-discursive approach to solidarity is that of scale. The scale is hardly considered as a unique dimension in the research on solidarity. It is either not mentioned in the solidarity research on welfare states and social policies, indirectly presupposing that solidarity can only be investigated on the national scale; or the scale becomes the only attribute of solidarity which in turn blurs the meaning dimension. Then, the debate

shifts to whether or not European solidarity is achievable and under what conditions. However, calling every solidarity beyond the nation-state (in the EU) European hardly helps to locate post-national solidarity claims and it is then less clear in terms of which meaning of solidarity is deployed. Since the research is then still concerned with kinds of social solidarity, the potential conceptual opening of solidarity does not hold true. Consequently, I suggest to take into account various scales of solidarity and then openly investigate on which scale solidarity is claimed. The following bullet points give an overview about the scales of solidarity:

- local
- national
- international
- transnational
- global

This gives a first insight into what kind of scales are suggested for the meso-discursive approach. A more detailed overview of scales and sub-scales of solidarity, which is also linked to the empirical basis of the thesis, is presented in [Chapter 2](#). As I demonstrate, there are previous accounts on the framing of solidarity. Most often, solidarity is one frame among others in studies on the content and structure of parliamentary debates and media debates. Especially with regard to the recent Euro crisis, solidarity featured prominently in framing studies (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Galpin 2017; Wonka 2016). However, the conceptualisation of solidarity is rather generic in these studies. It mixes cultural and social meanings of solidarity and hardly discusses the different scales that solidarity can encompass. For example, Wonka operationalises solidarity on the transnational scale among citizens in different EU member states, while Closa and Maatsch understand solidarity as a means to redistributive justice among EU member states. Either reducing solidarity to one of the meanings, or subsuming solidarity claims under one of the concepts, fails to consider the various meanings and scales of solidarity. It also does not reflect the different implications of such a narrow understanding.

If only the redistribution of resources is considered as solidarity, then struggles of recognition, rights, and identity are failed to be acknowledged as solidarity struggles. Access to resources might be related to having certain rights or belonging to a certain social group and this in turn will affect who can claim or demand solidarity from others. Moreover, solely focusing on cultural aspects of solidarity struggles does not reflect the concrete material gains and losses in solidarity conflicts. Acting in solidarity can mean that distributional conflicts around the outcome of certain political processes arise. Whether insurance or welfare programmes work and support people in need does not just rely on certain rights or identities; it also relies on the resources, goods, and money that is distributed/allocated in order to compensate and equalise negative effects (e. g. unemployment).

The meso-discursive approach to solidarity is applied in Chapters 3–5 with varying points of focus. The strongest emphasis is on the meaning dimension, demonstrating that actors use different understandings of solidarity in the respective discourses on the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis. To a lesser degree, the scale dimension is also taken into account. For instance, Chapters [4](#) and [5](#) note that not only members of government are strongly present in both crises discourses, but that they also refer most to the intergovernmental scale of political solidarity. Consequently, other accounts of solidarity – such as a transnational cultural solidarity – become less visible in the discourse on Europe’s migration crisis ([Chapter 2](#)).

## **1.4 Studying ideas in institutionalist settings**

### **1.4.1 The role of ideas in institutionalism**

Politics works within institutional settings. Institutional approaches focus on the role of institutions – especially intermediate/intermediary institutions such as trade unions, parties or interest groups – in politics and their influence on the political decision-making process. The three main institutionalist approaches are rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, discursive institutionalism (DI) has been developed as a fourth institutionalist approach by scholars in the field of comparative political economy. Mostly, the historical institutionalism (HI) approach was taken as the starting point and

main reference point for criticism in order to develop an ideational research programme (Blyth 2002; Hay 2006; Schmidt 2008).

Two main aspects regarding historical institutionalism are often criticised (Blyth 2002; Blyth 2003; Hay 2011; Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2011; Schmidt 2012). First, HI is criticised for being too static. It focuses on continuity rather than change, and contains a bias towards a status of institutional equilibrium. HI mainly emphasises institutional constraints that determine what is (im-)possible. This results in a 'rule-following logic' (Schmidt 2008: 314) and a strong focus on path dependency. Institutions are most often seen as thresholds and obstacles demonstrating why agents could not change the historically evolved institutions and why new ideas could not be successful in institutional settings. Second, ideas are not seen to be relevant; rather, the institutional rules and conventions are prioritised. The HI approach considers ideas as powerful if key actors and major gatekeepers push for new ideas. As a result, HI studies mainly follow an interest-based and actor-centred approach and give less room to ideational explanations.<sup>7</sup>

That said, HI scholars already argued in the 1990s that ideas – besides interests and institutions – should play a bigger role in the analysis of the political process (Hall 1997; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). For instance, specific economic ideas might influence the bargaining process of the employer's associations with trade unions, while new scientific findings might prompt a re-assessment of policy recommendations. One might also think of national cultures and historical heritage, which influence the actions and knowledge of actors. Historical institutionalists have focused on the interaction of ideas and material interests in institutional settings and how institutions are shaped by ideas since the mid-1980s (Checkel *et al.* 2016: 6–8; Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 22–25; Weir 1992).

In a seminal case study, Hall demonstrates that policymakers use certain ideas to promote their policies. Hall calls this ideational framework a policy paradigm (Hall 1993; Schellinger 2016). Policy change occurs with respect to the political constellation of the involved policymakers, their concrete positional influence in the process, and

---

<sup>7</sup> HI scholars are well aware of these limitations and have reflected on the prospects of historical institutionalism (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 13–15).

levels of uncertainty due to external factors. These three conditions influence the establishment, stability, and change of policy paradigms. Hall shows how Keynesianism, monetarism, and the related ideas behind these macroeconomic paradigms change in the economic policymaking process in the UK. Another important study of ideas in the historical institutionalism framework is provided by Sheri Berman (1998). She looks at the German social democratic party (SPD) and the Swedish social democratic party (SAP) in the interwar period of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and explains the different paths that both parties have taken: the SAP as the most dominant social democratic party after the Second World War in Europe, while the SPD struggled to find its political agenda until the 1960s. Berman takes an ideational approach to demonstrate that different perceptions, belief systems, and key ideas have shaped the parties' preferences and have set the agenda to be either more (SAP) or less (SPD) successful in their development and electoral turnout.

Accordingly, Hall (1997) claims that the combination of an institutional-based and ideas-oriented approach is one of the future paths to be taken (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 27–28). In particular, the question of representation has been neglected so far (Hall 1997: 193–196). Who is represented in the decision-making process, and how? And what does it tell us about the economic preferences and policy output? How are political decisions interpreted differently and what does it tell us about the dynamics of politics? The discursive institutionalism seems to be a response to Hall's claim on the future of institutionalist analyses.<sup>8</sup>

### **1.4.2 Discursive institutionalism**

The basic premise of discursive institutionalism (Hay 2006; Schmidt 2008) is that the distinct role of ideas in political processes should be investigated more carefully. Hence, what Vivien Schmidt calls discursive institutionalism can be understood as 'an umbrella concept for the vast range of methodological approaches that take ideas and discourse seriously' (Schmidt 2009: 404). Ideas help us to understand our environment,

---

<sup>8</sup> In a recent study, Blyth et al. (2016) demonstrate that ideational researchers strongly engage with historical institutionalist accounts (by citing them), while historical institutionalist scholars mainly focus on HI itself or towards rational choice institutionalism (by citing them). This means that the exchange, combination, and learning process between ideational and historical institutionalist research is rather one-sided.

guide our actions, and 'help us to think about ways to address problems and challenges that we face and therefore are the cause of our actions' (Béland and Cox 2011b: 4; Blyth 2003). Recent ideational research goes beyond the initial claim that 'ideas matter' and investigates how ideas matter so as to understand and explain policy decisions and power structures in discourses (Béland *et al.* 2016; Mehta 2011). Thus, discursive institutionalism is rather 'concerned with the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse and policy argumentation in institutional context' (Schmidt 2012: 85). Institutions are seen as spaces for (contingent) political struggle about ideas that are not static 'but constantly re-presented by proponents and opponents of change' (Boswell and Hampshire 2017: 147).

If we understand politics as a (non-violent) struggle between (collective) actors about various interpretations of political problems and their solution, the (re)construction of meaning is crucial. The discursive interactions between actors and ideas have to be considered for understanding and explaining political practices in institutional settings (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 32; Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Hay 2011). Actors construct their own rationale by dealing with problems, which cannot just be deduced from material factors or self-interest. As Maarten Hajer (1995: 43) points out:

The political conflict is hidden in the question of what definition is given to the problem, which aspects of social reality are included and which are left undiscussed. In this respect social constructivists have shown that various actors are likely to hold different perceptions of what the problem 'really' is.

The discursive institutionalist approach does not assume that there are pre-defined interests that are fixed and can only be reversed through 'external shocks'. Instead, communicative exchange in institutional settings enables and constrains actors' interests and might stand in contradiction to previous claims. The process of deliberation and using various justifications can be understood and explained by looking at different interpretations by political actors. Such change in ideas and public discourses can be an indicator of incremental change in institutions, as well as changes in the background philosophy of actors (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2012).

To sum up, discursive institutionalism provides a framework to analyse ideas in political processes. Even though Schmidt claims that including a discourse perspective in discursive institutionalism brings agency in to the picture (Schmidt 2008: 309) – defined as the communicative actions of agents – others have criticised the conceptual lack of actors and the minor relevance of agency within discursive institutionalist settings (Boswell and Hampshire 2017). To this end, further conceptual clarification is provided by extending the discursive institutionalism approach. Regarding the relevance of actors, Maarten Hajer’s (1995) discourse coalition approach and Stiller’s (2010) ideational leadership concept are applied to the ideational research framework in this dissertation. With regard to ideas, the coalition magnet concept by Béland and Cox (2016) is integrated into and partially extended for the dissertation. This recent contribution not only helps to theorise the role of ideas in discursive politics, but also provides conceptual leverage to translate the theoretical approaches into measurable concepts for the empirical analysis.

#### **1.4.3 Discourse coalitions, ideational leaders and coalition magnets**

Recent studies have called for greater recognition of the relevance of agency and how actors shape and reformulate ideas in discursive institutionalist approaches (Carstensen 2011; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Stiller 2010). Actors have a relative autonomy to articulate ideas that might even conflict with their basic political ideology for a certain time period (with the goal of accomplishing a certain policy outcome). Such ideational autonomy could lead to a new combination of ideas that are selected and formulated by actors in order to convince other actors. Boswell and Hampshire (2017) demonstrate how German and British politicians used their ideational autonomy to change the national immigration policy at the beginning of the 2000s. Thus, ideational research is not only about the relevance of ideas; it is also about actors, their conflicts and cooperative behaviour in discursive processes. Patterns of conflict and cooperation in politics emphasise the role of actors and the relations of actors to each other. In the following, two complementary approaches are presented and discussed with respect to the relevance of actors in discursive institutionalism. The discourse coalition approach (Hajer 1995) and the ideational leadership concept (Stiller 2010)

stress the agency dimension in discursive structures and provide lenses that are later applied to the empirical material (Chapters [4](#) and [5](#)).

Maarten Hajer (1995) points out that actors' interests are not given per se, but are constituted, transformed, and adjusted in relation to those of other actors. Moreover, actors' preferences are constrained and enabled by institutional settings. In this discursive web, actors use ideas and concepts, position themselves with or against others and thus establish their preferences in a constant flux of re-production and adjustment. Within such meaning-making processes actors can form (discourse) coalitions to push for their shared interests or preferred options through (strategic) interactions in discourses. A discourse coalition is 'a group of actors who share a social construct' (Hajer 1993: 45). Social constructs are embedded in historical, social, and political processes and rely on prior knowledge about the issue being debated (e. g. meanings of solidarity in times of crisis). Communicative actions relate to each other if actors refer to the same concept and create a discursive bond upon which a discourse coalition is established. This means that it is not shared interests that form the fundament of the coalition, but rather the shared use of concepts. The processes and prior knowledge differ among actors and result in different perceptions of existing problems (e. g. whether it a banking crisis or a sovereign debt crisis in the EU) and how they should be handled. Public discourses are characterised by the polysemic structure of concepts that give actors the opportunity to use and interpret concepts in their own way. This assumes a rather dynamic formation of ideas and interests in political processes in which potentially 'new discursive relationships and positionings are created' (Hajer 1995: 60). Such discursive elements connect actors and provide an ideational ground on which to deliberate. Hajer (1995: 67) refers to the various concepts' in discourses as 'discursive affinity'. These structure the discourse and give rise to new problem perceptions and create the discursive paths through which actors come to understand the problem and present their solution.

In her book on institutional change in the German welfare state, Stiller argues that recent social policy reforms (the Riester pension reform and the Hartz unemployment reform) were possible, because key policymakers pushed for it and influenced the policy agenda. She demonstrates that in addition to discourse coalitions

gaining traction, single actors can also substantially change the public discourse. Stiller argues that national executives have the capacity to work with ideas. Ideas are seen as resources that give actors a chance to overcome resistance by adversaries, propose alternative policy ideas or mobilise their peers for matters of consensus (Stiller 2010: 26).

Stiller (2010: 33) defines ideational leaders as 'key policy-makers who use strategies that are idea-based ("ideational"), and purposively aim for the achievement of change, even in view of reform resistance ("leadership")'. Her definition is extended for my dissertation, because her understanding of who can be an ideational leader is too narrow. Giving only national executives the capacity for ideational leadership might be reasonable in Stiller's empirical study, but the public discourse can be influenced by a broad range of actors, as Kingdon (1995) has pointed out. Policy entrepreneurs fulfil a vital function in policy processes, because their main actions are to identify problems and provide solutions. The motives behind such entrepreneurship might be personal interests, future career prospects or a high degree of public recognition in this area and promoting this publicly (Kingdon 1995). Accordingly, being a public entrepreneur for a certain concept might increase your reputation for future debates, legitimise your work as an interest group or academic scholar. This can also be an opportunity for the parliamentary opposition to set an alternative agenda to that of the government, or for a single politician to associate his or her name with a specific issue and gain public attention. Government ministers can act as public entrepreneurs to support their staff and ministries in turf battles against other ministries or to create a sharp profile as a smaller partner in a coalition government. In general, various actors might legitimise their new policy proposals and utilise the media arena to promote these.

The media arena is the main sphere in which a variety of actors come together and articulate their position and their ideas. As Ferree et al. (2002) convincingly argue, there are many sub-arenas, specialised forums and limited public spheres, but the mass media arena remains the centre of public attention and every group tries to be as visible as possible. Politicians seek out the public to present their ideas and plans and justify their actions (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Wessler *et al.* 2008). Especially in

relation to such a contested concept as solidarity, actors have to argue why they are for or against solidarity and provide reasons to the audience. Political rivals might challenge the articulated ideas and propose their own version of the necessary actions that have to be undertaken. This constant discursive struggle about the most dominant idea has to be closely studied to identify ideational leadership with respect to public legitimisation strategies. Reframing the ideational leadership approach beyond the focus on government actors helps to assess which actor has the capacity for ideational leadership, how it is exercised, and whether a competing ideational leadership during the analysed time can be observed.

After focusing on the actor side of discursive institutionalist research, I turn to the ideational part. Over the past two decades, the scholarly perspective has changed from whether ideas matter to how ideas matter (Mehta 2011). Although this is a concrete step forward, it is still relatively unknown how idea X and not idea Y has gained attraction. Ideas do not simply gain traction through their use by actors; as discourse studies show, ideas are anchored in various ways in discourse structures and they unfold effects on discourses (Foucault 2012; Laclau/Mouffe 2014/1985). Or as Hajer argues in respect of the duality of structure and agency: '[S]ocial action originates in human agency of clever, creative human beings but in a context of social structures of various sorts that both enable and constrain their agency' (Hajer 1995: 58). Thus, I investigate the ideational side of discursive politics in order to scrutinise the attention that some ideas receive and to explore why and how some ideas are linked while others remain neglected and isolated in the discourse. The following subsection sheds some light on this by using the recently suggested 'coalition magnet' approach (Béland and Cox 2016).

Béland and Cox (2016) suggest to examine influential ideas as 'coalition magnets'. Such an understanding is close to Hajer's (1995: 67) 'discursive affinity', but has two distinct advantages: on the one hand, their term is more specific in terms of how ideas become relevant. On the other, it leaves room for the strategic use of ideas by actors. The magnet metaphor indicates that an idea attracts actors and binds them together. The authors name three criteria for an idea to become a coalition magnet. First, they can be broadly interpreted and 'effectively manipulated' (Béland and Cox

2016: 429). This assumes that they are ‘ambiguous or polysemic’ ideas (Béland and Cox 2016: 431; Jenson 2010). Such polysemic ideas are predestined to act as coalition magnets, because they combine varying ideas ([Chapter 5](#)). Second, key actors pick up such an idea and promote it. These actors can be in the formal decision-making process or veto players or perceived as central actors due to their policy-specific position (e. g. trade unions or employers’ association). Lastly, ideas have to bring together a variety of actors in order to promote such an idea.<sup>9</sup> The coalition magnet concept can be extended. Instead of understanding one particular idea as a coalition magnet, in [Chapter 4](#), I conceptualise the linking of ideas in the discourse as an act of creating coalition magnet patterns. Thus, coalition magnets respectively coalition magnet patterns are the structural results of actions of ideational bricolage, linking together different concepts within the discourse ([Chapter 5](#)).

Summing up, the discourse coalition approach underlines the cooperative aspect of communication, highlighting that several actors argue for similar concepts and try to create the most convincing narrative. Stiller’s ideational leadership approach has focused on the capacity of single actors to push for change. Thus, the actor constellation in both crises can be studied with regard to the formation of discourse coalitions as well as single leaders who have the ability to influence the discourse. The coalition magnet approach highlights how ideas become influential in discursive struggles

## **1.5 Political claims and discourse networks**

So far, I have argued in favour of studying solidarity in public debates and how actors make sense of calls to solidarity in times of crisis. Hence, solidarity is investigated in texts. In light of this, we need a methodology for textual analysis that takes both the agency and the ideational dimension into account. The political claims analysis (PCA) and the discourse network analysis (DNA) are selected for this purpose. The political claims analysis focuses on specific statements – claims – in public documents such as

---

<sup>9</sup> The coalition magnet approach is similar to the master frame approach (Benford 2013). However, the main difference is that in a master frame, a core meaning connects the different interpretations. Thus, actors are linked to a single master frame such as a coalition magnet, but the latter does not assume that there is an original and stable meaning of the master frame itself.

parliamentary debates, newspaper articles or online media, and has been developed from protest event analysis and social movement studies (de Wilde 2013; de Wilde *et al.* 2014; Koopmans and Statham 1999). Each claim is articulated by a specific actor and the link between speaker and statement is analysed. Thus, the PCA bridges the gap between content-oriented approaches and actor-centred approaches to analyse public debates. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. A claim is defined as:

a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls of action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors (Statham *et al.* 2005: 436).


A claim represents the plurality of actions and demands made by actors in the public. The components of a claim are differentiated by following a logic of questions regarding each claim as Pieter de Wilde (2014: 52) exemplifies: 'WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY'. These questions are the grammar of claims and help to identify the claim and make the coding process both transparent and comprehensible. Accordingly, the newspaper articles selected for the dissertation have been coded with the PCA. I use different categories of the coded claims in order to analyse the public debates on solidarity in both crises. Chapters 2 and 3 mainly focus on the justification in claims (the Why question) and shed light on how solidarity is justified or challenged in the migration crisis discourse. Additionally, Chapter 2 also investigates a part of the claim that has not been considered in previous studies. It is the justification scope that contains who is included by the justification. Based on this code category, the scale of solidarity is analysed. Chapters 4 and 5 not only use the justification category, but also focus on 'who makes the claim'. While Chapter 4 illuminates the presence of individuals in public discourse, e. g. claims by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Pope Francis or SZ-journalist Heribert Prantl, Chapter 5 looks at the partisan conflicts in the German media. Hence, only claims by political parties and politicians are taken into account for the analysis.

The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the DNA (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56). Since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into relational network data. The

DNA brings together discourse analysis and social network analysis by focusing on the interconnectedness of concepts and actor appearances in discourses (Janning *et al.* 2009; Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). In general, discourse networks are two-mode or affiliation networks, because actors and concepts are the two types of nodes in the network. These networks have two types of nodes and links exist only between different types of nodes – for instance, actors are linked to concepts. Affiliation networks can be transformed into one-mode networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011).

Actors use particular concepts and this communicative action can be understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. Other actors might use the same concept in the debate and build up a relation to the concept too (see, for instance, in Figure 6, actors a1 and a2). Since different actors have different mindsets, we assume that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors (again, see the different relations from actors a1, a2 and a3 to concepts f1, f2 and f3 in Figure 6). Based on shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network analysis can detect specific actor networks or concept networks to examine which actors are relatively close to or distant from each other (Leifeld 2016b: 64–71).

**Figure 6: Models of discourse networks**



Source: Rennkamp et al. (2017: 216)

The discourse network methodology is deployed in three out of four articles. While the article on the Euro crisis in the German and Irish discourse ([Chapter 4](#)) as well as the comparison of the Euro crisis and migration crisis in the German discourse ([Chapter 5](#)) analyse the affiliation networks of actors and concepts, the more theoretical article on the migration crisis in Germany ([Chapter 2](#)) uses the affiliation network of meanings

and scales of solidarity (and leaves out the actor dimension). Moreover, different network techniques are used in order to shed light on the actor visibility and the dominant concepts that have been used in the crisis debates. Specifically, centrality measures, community detection algorithms have been deployed and the discourse networks have been visualised to graphically underline the relation between actors and concepts in public debates.

On the micro level of network analyses, the centrality of nodes is examined. Centrality indicates how important or influential a node is in a network, depending on how centrality is defined (Hanneman and Riddle 2011). In Chapters [2](#), [4](#) and [5](#), eigenvector centrality is calculated. Eigenvector centrality is defined as the number of edges a node has as well as how strongly linked the node is to other central nodes in the network. Hence, eigenvector centrality not only considers the specific network position of the node, but also considers the close network environment of the node in order to measure the centrality. The scale of centrality is from 0 to 1. The higher the score, the more central the node is in the network (Bonacich 1987).

On the meso level of network analyses, subgroups within the network are identified by deploying community detection algorithms. Based on various specifications, these algorithms try to detect groups of nodes that are closely connected and thereby form subgroups within the large network. With regard to discourse networks, such subgroups could contain actors and concepts that are closely linked and often used in order to influence the public discourse. I used the Fast Greedy community detection algorithm in [Chapter 2](#) and the walktrap community detection algorithm in [Chapter 4](#). The former algorithm tries to optimise the modularity score of the network by removing edges to detect closely linked nodes.<sup>10</sup> This shall reveal subgroups within the network (Clauset *et al.* 2004; Newman 2004). The latter algorithm is based on the assumption that random walks on the edges in a network will stay within a certain subgroup of nodes. Based on a certain length of steps, the detection algorithm moves along the edges and identifies nodes that are reached. The more often

---

<sup>10</sup> The modularity score of a network indicates how weakly or strongly clustered a network is. It ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value, the clearer the network is clustered into separate subgroups (Newman 2006).

the same nodes are randomly reached, the higher the chance that the algorithm clusters these nodes within a subgroup (Pons and Latapy 2005).

## **1.6 Outline of the dissertation**

The dissertation is structured into a prelude and four main chapters that are based on research articles with a final conclusion that summarises the findings and reflects on the limitations and future paths of the thesis. Table 3 offers an overview of the structure of the thesis and the central aspects that are focused on and investigated in the thesis.

**Table 3: The structure of the dissertation**

	<b>Prelude</b>	<b>Chapter 2</b>	<b>Chapter 3</b>	<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>Chapter 5</b>
<b>Main title</b>	Solidarity in Europe in times of crisis	The discursive construction of solidarity	The politics of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis	Framing solidarity in the Euro crisis	Contested solidarity in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis
<b>Goal</b>	Reviewing recent studies on solidarity	Theorising solidarity from a discourse perspective (meso level)	Mapping public debate in Germany and Ireland during the migration crisis in 2015	Identifying central actors and ideas in Germany & Ireland in the Euro crisis from 2010-2015	Analysing framing of solidarity by party actors in both crises
<b>Analytical framework</b>	-	- macro and micro approaches to solidarity - Introducing the new meso approach with the dimensions meanings and scales of solidarity	- discursive institutionalism	- ideational leadership approach - coalition magnet (patterns) approach	- discourse coalitions approach - coalition magnet approach
<b>Which crisis?</b>	-	Migration crisis	Migration crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis and Migration Crisis
<b>Which countries?</b>	-	Germany	Germany and Ireland	Germany and Ireland	Germany
<b>Publication status</b>	Published online December 20 <sup>th</sup> 2018	Published online March 22 <sup>nd</sup> 2019	Forthcoming as chapter in an edited volume	Published online March 5 <sup>th</sup> 2019	R&R (2. Round)

Before we begin with the theoretical and empirical exploration of solidarity, we make a small detour and look briefly at the current state of solidarity in Europe in times of crisis in the following [Prelude](#). It reviews four recent contributions to the research on solidarity in Europe in times of crisis. While one book looks at Europe's migration crisis and how solidarity is organised by pro-refugee activists across Europe (Della Porta 2018), another focuses on the Euro crisis and how institutional mechanisms have been established to act as safeguards and create solidarity as a by-product of a broader, more encompassing crisis management (Schelkle 2017). The third contribution examines citizens' attitudes and motives in reaction to the multiple crises that the EU faces and thus illuminates the state of social solidarity in the EU (Lahusen and Grasso 2018a). Lastly, the legitimacy of the EU is deeply contested and the question then turns to how the EU has developed and sustained its legitimacy. By looking at the cultural transformation of Europe and the justifications of legitimation, the fourth book highlights symbols, norms, and practices of the EU's authority (McNamara 2017). This review essay will help us to make the study of solidarity more concrete and shall give an initial impression of how solidarity is studied in the two crises and what constitute the advantages and potential challenges. The [Prelude](#) also provides a conceptual bridge to my own research and prepares the subsequent empirical studies.

In the [second chapter](#), solidarity is theorised from a discursive perspective. The research programme on solidarity is differentiated in three strands: Macro-structural, micro-behavioural, meso-discursive. By focusing on the last strand, I argue that the discursive construction of solidarity should be studied. Therein, solidarity is composed of the two dimensions of meaning and scale and I point out why it makes sense to consider both dimensions in future studies on solidarity. I illustrate the applicability of the new approach by examining a small subset of solidarity claims in German newspapers during Europe's migration crisis. While many studies subsume claims on solidarity under the term European solidarity, I demonstrate that the meaning of political solidarity is strongly linked to the intergovernmental scale, while cultural solidarity refers to the transnational scale. This differentiation helps to understand what kind of solidarity actors claim and that a shift from transnational cultural solidarity to intergovernmental political solidarity shaped the recent migration crisis discourse. It highlights the political nature of the

migration crisis and the institutional asymmetries and reform potential in the Common European Asylum System that make the call to solidarity crucial.

The [third chapter](#) provides an in-depth look into the debate on solidarity in Europe's migration crisis in 2015 in the German and Irish quality newspapers. Focusing on the climax of the migration crisis in 2015, I investigate the framing of pro- and contra-solidarity meanings. While the meanings of political, cultural, and social solidarity prevail on the pro-side of solidarity, security and demarcation claims are also featured in the public debate. It demonstrates that calling for solidarity is not an uncontested claim, but is challenged by demands to increase border surveillance in the Mediterranean or even by xenophobic agitation and racist attacks on refugees and volunteers.

The [fourth chapter](#) turns to the Euro crisis and analyses the framing of solidarity in the German and Irish media debate. Based on the discursive institutionalism framework, I look at ideational leadership and coalition magnet patterns to investigate who is claiming solidarity, how it is framed, and whether there are differences between Germany as an expected giver of solidarity and Ireland as an expected receiver of solidarity in the Euro crisis (2010–15). Covering the whole crisis period and examining the public debate with the discourse network analysis yields novel insights. While the German discourse is strongly influenced by a 'solidarity-austerity' pattern, the Irish discourse focuses on the links between responsibility, conditionality, and solidarity. Despite these framing differences, I show that German (conservative) politicians and members of government dominate the public debate in both national discourses. This underlines the strong influence and agenda-setting capacity of Germany in the Euro crisis.

The [last chapter](#) brings both crisis discourses together by comparing the German solidarity debate on the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis. Given the different expected positions on solidarity – Germany expected to receive solidarity in the migration crisis and was expected to give solidarity in the Euro crisis – I demonstrate that the crisis involvement/affectedness plays a role in how the public debate frames solidarity. By applying a discursive institutionalist framework that highlights the role of discourse coalitions, as well as specific coalition magnets in public debates, I show that austerity claims prevail in the Euro crisis and fundamentally challenge calls to solidarity. The migration crisis debate is influenced by political solidarity claims which are challenged by

security frames. The common factor in both discourses is the strong presence of government actors who establish discourse coalitions to push for their preferred understanding of 'austerity-as-solidarity' and 'political solidarity versus security'. These findings underpin the 'structural bias' of media outlets towards the visibility of government actors in public debates, as well as the contested nature of solidarity claims in public discourses.

I conclude the thesis in [chapter 6](#) by summarising the main findings of the prelude and the four chapters, discussing the limitations of particular areas of the thesis, and signalling new paths for future studies on solidarity.



## Prelude: Solidarity in Europe in times of crisis<sup>11</sup>

*'But where danger threatens, that which saves from it also grows.'*

*('Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch.')*

Friedrich Hölderlin

The Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis have deeply shaken the European project in its institutional design as well as its normative grounds. Established as an economic cooperation among Western European countries, the European integration process has always inhibited normative principles and values. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman declared that Europe "will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity" (Schuman 1950). Proposing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1957 as one of the key steps towards the current European Union, Schuman emphasised that by cooperating for the mutual benefit, the European countries will create a European social bond (and prevent another horrifying world war on the European continent). Almost 40 years later, Jacques Delors (1989) famously stated that "you cannot fall in love with the single market", and pointed out that the European Community has to create a shared identity in order to sustain its legitimacy. Both claims highlight two things: On the one hand, if the EU wants to survive, it needs legitimacy beyond the establishment of a single market and should create institutions for the mutual benefit of the people. On the other hand, Europe is not only an institutional structure, but it also needs the support of the European citizens in order to mean something and provide levels of identification and trust.

---

<sup>11</sup> The prelude is a revised version of the review essay "Solidarity in Europe in Times of Crisis", published online in the *Journal of European Integration*, December 20<sup>th</sup> 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1546980>. The following books are reviewed: Lahusen, C. and Grasso, M. (eds) (2018a) *Solidarity in Europe: citizens' responses in times of crisis*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan; Della Porta, D. (ed.) (2018) *Solidarity mobilizations in the 'refugee crisis': contentious moves*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan; Schelkle, W. (2017) *The political economy of monetary solidarity: Understanding the euro experiment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; McNamara, K. R. (2017) *The politics of everyday Europe: constructing authority in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

When we look at the Euro crisis, the dominant austerity paradigm combined with an increase of technocratic power on the supranational level as well as moral attacks on both sides of the debtor-creditor constellations (e. g. lazy Greeks versus Nazi-Germany) have fundamentally questioned the cooperative mode of the EU as well as the equal status of the member states (Matthijs and McNamara 2015; Sánchez-Cuenca 2017). The EU established new institutional structures such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact with far-reaching supervision rights for the European Commission. Europe's migration crisis has questioned the values and principles of the European project even more. Even though incoming migration dynamics are not new to the Southern European countries and the Dublin regulations were installed before 2015, the large influx of asylum seekers from the Middle East and Northern Africa in a short time period have further pressured the Euro crisis countries Greece and Italy. Any attempt to establish a voluntary mechanism to share responsibility and coordinate relocations of migrants and refugees across the EU failed (Zaun 2018).

Hence, European affairs do not seem to be in good shape when it comes to the question of solidarity. The current political crises of the EU can be understood as conflicts about solidarity – who is cooperating with whom for mutual benefits (Hutter *et al.* 2016). The four reviewed studies address the crises as well as related questions on the politics of solidarity in different ways. All four books illuminate types of solidarity in times of crisis and stress the multifaceted characteristics of the concept of solidarity. However, the contributions miss a clear understanding of the relation of solidarity and crisis as well as pay little attention to the meaning making process that is underpinning the attitudes (Lahusen/Grasso), practices and motifs (della Porta) and institutions (Schelkle) of solidarity. In this regard, the study by McNamara is crucial, because she focuses more on the meaning making process and the construction of 'everyday Europe'. The disadvantage of her book is, however, a rather vague understanding of solidarity as a shared identity that the EU is lacking.

## **Conditional solidarity in Europe**

The edited volume by Christian Lahusen and Maria Grasso is based on the EU Horizon2020 project TransSOL 'Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crisis' and is about

the state of European/transnational solidarity in times of crisis. Using an original survey that was conducted in the winter 2016/17 in eight European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland), the authors of the edited volume present findings for each country and bring the different crises (Euro crisis, migration crisis, Brexit) into the interpretation of the results. The researchers focus on different solidarity activities (e. g. donating money, demonstrating) and on six target groups (e. g. disabled persons, refugees) within and outside Europe. They consider behavioural, motivational and resource aspects in order to explain solidarity attitudes and behaviour in recent hard times.

Three findings emerge in almost every country study: Firstly, they demonstrate a hierarchy of solidarity actions and underline that solidarity is rather a particular than a universal concept. People are willing to take actions for disabled persons and to a lesser extent also for refugees. Unemployed persons, however, are less likely to get solidarity support from their fellow citizens. This corroborates previous findings that unemployed persons or refugees are often seen as less deserving (Sales 2002; van Oorschot 2006). Secondly, although they show that every second respondent has acted in solidarity, the rather passive solidarity actions such as donating money are more likely than active solidarity actions such as demonstrating or being a member in a solidarity organization. Thus, acting in solidarity depends on resources, but also demonstrates different levels of activism. Thirdly, European solidarity is relatively modest when it comes to burden-sharing issues and redistribution. With regard to financial risk sharing and incoming asylum seekers, solidarity is supported but mostly under strict conditionality and the expectation of reciprocal behaviour. If respondents have a positive attachment to the EU and feel that they benefit from the EU membership of their country, then they are also more likely to support EU-wide redistributive matters.

### **Transnational solidarity in practice**

The second edited volume is based on a conference in 2017 which highlighted the intersection of social movement, citizenship and migration studies in order to investigate the solidarity practices in Europe's refugee crisis. The concise introduction by Donatella della Porta sketches out the migration crisis in Europe, relates it to other protest situations

of precarious workers and migrants in the 1990s as well as social movement mobilisations against neoliberalism and global capitalism. Four interrelated topics are presented that guide the empirical chapters: political opportunity structures, movements as networks of individuals and organisations, repertoires and acts of citizenships and framing processes.

Ten chapters investigate activities and mobilisation actions in cities (Calais, Istanbul, Barcelona), border areas (Lesbos, Lampedusa, Spain's enclaves Ceuta and Melilla) and the Western Balkan route. They deploy mostly qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews and (participatory) observations. Apart from the study on anti-refugee protests in France and Italy by Pietro Castelli Gattinara, the contributions focus on pro-refugee mobilisation and protest actions in Europe in order to understand the motivations and related emotions of the activists as well as the structural opportunities and constraints in these cases.

Three important findings can be highlighted. Firstly, authors show that most of the activists were not involved in any previous actions for refugees. The sheer presence and urgency of doing something in these moments of turmoil triggered their motivation to help. While some of them were politicised by their actions supporting refugees and their contact with state authorities, most of them felt a rather moral duty and humanitarian obligation to show solidarity with people in need in their local or national context. Secondly, the more established political groups such as the 'no border network' experienced the institutionalisation and professionalisation of the crisis management by NGOs that have more resources, personal and close contact with state authorities in order to get access to camps and shelter areas. This led to conflicts about the supposedly depoliticising work of larger NGOs and the longer impact of the volunteering actions in Greece or Italy. Thirdly, most of the chapters demonstrate that the political opportunity structures strongly shape pro-refugee solidarity actions. Various spatial contexts – from 'the jungle' in Calais, the Western Balkan route, the Greek island Lesbos to Spanish regions – are interrelated in the formation and mobilisation of protest. While pro-refugee protests in the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla are difficult to organise, a more refugee-friendly executive in Barcelona enables actions and cooperation between the different actors and levels. When activists try to bridge the transnational spatial gap – as one study demonstrate by looking at solidarity mobilisations in Calais and Brussels –

different structures and organisational experiences show the opportunities and limitations of transnational protest actions.

## **The implicit institutionalisation of monetary solidarity**

Waltraud Schelkle addresses the Euro crisis. Following a rationalist-institutionalist approach, she emphasises the cooperative aspect of monetary solidarity actions during the crisis. Monetary solidarity, understood as “deliberate or at least consciously tolerated risk sharing between members of a currency union” (Schelkle 2017: 1), is most often the outcome of an institutional evolution and thus a ‘by-product of collective actions’. In her book, Schelkle argues against three strands of literature: Firstly, ideational approaches that highlight austerity as a dominant paradigm across Europe (Blyth 2015; Matthijs 2016).<sup>12</sup> Secondly, economists trying to explain the Euro crisis with the ‘optimal currency area’-theory. Thirdly, comparative political economists who make the economic and political diversity among the EU member states responsible for the tractions and non-solvable crisis of the EU (Hall 2012; Johnston and Regan 2016). In contrast to these approaches, Schelkle argues that collective action problems are at the core of the crisis. Having diverse members in the EU can constrain the European decision making process, but it can also be an opportunity to share risks respectively diversify risks in order to deal with uncertainties a single country cannot deal with. Schelkle understands the bailouts and the creation of the European Stability Mechanism as “monetary solidarity, in the sense of creating for the first time a permanent capacity for fiscal risk sharing if a member state government is in distress” (Schelkle 2017: 18). By comparing the EU with the political development of the US, she demonstrates in chapter 4 the long process of creating a single currency for such a heterogeneous political formation. It took the US 150 years to install a stable monetary system from the first plan by Hamilton in the 1780s until the instalment of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913 and new banking supervision and insurance regulation after the Great Depression of 1929.

---

<sup>12</sup> Schelkle also sees McNamara work on the evolution of the European monetary union as mainly driven by German ordoliberalism (1999) rather critical and emphasizes instead the diverse interests of EU member states favoring the single currency (Schelkle 2017: 131–135).

Schelkle also looks at economic EU migrants and whether their migration movements are a form of individual risk sharing because they move to other regions and countries in order to avoid unemployment and deprivation. The free movement of EU citizens and labour mobility within the EU is a social right that should not be restricted, but the risk sharing mechanism creates a dual labour market structure of domestic and foreign workers. Moreover, the regions and countries of origin which are already hit by the crisis, such as Greece, also lose workers who pay into the social system and cannot compensate the brain drain. While this insurance approach works well individually, it is less suited for states or regions. Schelkle also analyses the unified payment system in the EU (TARGET) and demonstrates how this has stabilised the Euro. By sticking together in one currency, pooling and spreading the risk across diverse members, uncertainty could be dealt with and the potential threat of an interbank lending collapse was prevented. Thus, monetary solidarity was created as a by-product of the TARGET system. At the end of the monography, Schelkle raises concerns about an 'even closer union' and sees ideas such as a European social security scheme rather sceptical (Schelkle 2017: 311–324). Interestingly, exactly this policy idea is put forward by Lahusen and Grasso who perceive it as a strong instrument of redistributing resources on the EU level to create a positive integration instrument and to foster solidarity among EU citizens (Lahusen and Grasso 2018b: 276–277).

## **Social solidarity in everyday Europe**

In contrast to the three books reviewed before, the latest book by Kathleen McNamara is interested in the daily, even banal, cultural symbols and practices of the European integration project and hence, she deals with solidarity more indirectly. She claims that 'Europeanness' is not a substitute for the national, but is 'nesting' in national and local norms and traditions (McNamara 2017: 77–78). Since every political formation needs legitimation in order to survive and to provide identification for its subjects, the question of becoming accepted as 'taken for granted' is even more crucial in hard times. Similar to earlier accounts stressing symbols like the Euro as an object of identification for a 'marble cake' type of European identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010), McNamara gives a broad account of the cultural transformation in the EU. She tries to show what a

cultural analysis of political processes can highlight and how 'everyday Europe' is (re)constructed and shaped by 'labelling, mapping and narrating' (chap. 3) the EU as legitimate political order.

Using the literature on state formation and comparative political development, she shows that the legitimation and development of the EU is most often studied from the perspective of material interests (security and economic interests), but hardly from the cultural and social logic of shared cultural codes and symbols. The author focuses on different areas in which EU symbols, narratives and practices take place (e. g. EU institutions and architecture, EU citizenship and mobility, monetary and foreign policy). For instance, instead of building one central EU capital with all institutions in one place, the EU spreads across Europe with the main institutions in the founding West European member states (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg), but also with its various EU agencies, resembling a rather federalist understanding. McNamara demonstrates the 'localising Europe' technique that situates the EU in different communities as well as tries to integrate the EU in the local and national communities in Warsaw/Poland (Frontex), Copenhagen/Denmark (European Environmental Agency) or in Parma/Italy (European Food Safety Authority Agency). Another example of this 'banal authority' is the Euro as a single currency. The fact that people can travel across the European Union and can pay with the same coins in 19 countries materialises the EU for every citizen and for tourists. Moreover, these coins still show national images on one side and an abstract map of Europe without national borders on the other side. This highlights how Europe 'localises' and 'deracinates' at the same time. Furthermore, the Euro is an important currency for the foreign exchange market, it presents the EU on financial markets and is relevant for foreign trade affairs.<sup>13</sup>

Relevant for this review essay is that underlying McNamara's reconstruction of 'everyday Europe' is a notion of social solidarity. She points to the lack of it in the EU which threatens the EU's future. As McNamara states: "While the culture generated by

---

<sup>13</sup> Another anecdotal evidence of how influential the cultural perception and symbolic power of the Euro as strong currency before the Euro crisis was, is the video 'Blue Magic' by the US-rapper Jay-Z. Released in 2007 and inspired by the movie 'American Gangster', several short scenes show bundles of banknotes that seem to be counted or stored in suitcases. While most often in the US context, US dollar banknotes are shown, in this case, bundles of 500 Euro banknotes are seen (Jay-Z 2007).

everyday life under EU governance has made the shift in political authority to the EU level palatable over the past five decades, and underpinned an astonishing degree of governance building in the EU, it has for the most part not resulted in a strong sense of solidarity or an impassioned, single European identity, but rather, by design, a much less contested, banal ‘imagined community’ of Europe” (McNamara 2017: ix). Thus, creating common symbols and an image to identify oneself and legitimise authority is at the bottom of any solidarity project. McNamara highlights that solidarity is not only created by institutional mechanisms, redistributing resources or collective practices, but also by more banal symbols underpinning social relations and political structures. However, McNamara still calls it social solidarity instead of cultural solidarity in order to stress the symbolic and social construction of a shared identity.

### **Constructing solidarity in times of crisis**

All four works illuminate the state of solidarity in Europe in times of crisis and point to the contestation around the politics of solidarity on different levels (citizen's perceptions, activism, institutions, and symbols). Moreover, the two edited volumes demonstrate the value of a comparative perspective on solidarity in different countries which was mostly missing in previous research (Wallaschek 2016a). I want to stress two aspects that are less discussed in the four books. *Firstly*, the works do not theorise the conceptual relation of solidarity and crisis. The implicit understanding of all four books is that a crisis is a critical juncture that provides a threat to societies and political institutions, endangers solidarity and to this end, solidarity should be studied in order to scrutinise the effect of the crisis on (existing) solidarities. Thus, it seems that studying solidarity requires a crisis situation, because a perceived threat or danger might influence claims and attitudes towards solidarity. However, it is less clear whether this is a necessary or sufficient condition for analysing solidarity. What is the state of solidarity in non-crisis periods and how do solidary practices, attitudes and claims change before, in and after such a crisis? Moreover, when is crisis considered as a crisis that also affects the solidarity of political institutions and societies? These questions are not addressed in the four contributions. For instance, in the edited volume by Lahusen and Grasso, the authors expect that due to the crisis, solidarity is under pressure. However, the disadvantage of a cross-country survey

at only one point of time is that it is less clear what effect the multiple crises had, whether they increase the solidarity bond and how they intersect. Hence, how can we assume that solidarity is under pressure in times of crisis if there is no direct ex ante and ex post comparison possible? The relation of solidarity and moments of crisis should be considered in further research in order to shed light on the mechanisms behind calls to solidarity and crisis perceptions.

*Secondly*, the construction process how actors attribute meaning to solidarity is hardly reflected in the contributions. Since solidarity can be understood as contested concept (Gallie 1956), actors have different understandings of the concept which might create conflicts about the proper meaning of solidarity. The TransSOL project adheres to the idea of social solidarity and differentiates between redistributive acts of solidarity, issues of belonging and identity as solidarity as well as investigates various contexts of solidarity. The authors in the edited volume on ‘Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’’ most often see solidarity as support and concrete practice. In her contributions, della Porta stresses the difference of solidarity and resistance without justifying this, although other scholars have conceptualised solidarity as acts of emancipatory resistance (Bayertz 1999; Scholz 2008). Schelkle has the most minimalist understanding of solidarity which in turn leaves the question to what extent, conceptually, monetary solidarity differs from cooperation, reciprocity or enlightened self-interest? If solidarity is most often the ‘by-product’ of solving collective action problems, then what about the intentionality and ‘solidarity as joint action’ (Sangiovanni 2015) with others and sharing their perspective and engaging in solidarity actions to reduce injustices and inequalities?

The discussed studies provide excellent insights into the multifaceted concept of solidarity and also demonstrate that the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis have sparked debates about the state of solidarity in Europe. Since there seems to be no sustainable and profound solution to one of the crises, the discussion on solidarity in Europe is likely to continue.



## 2 The Discursive construction of solidarity. Analysing public claims in Europe's migration crisis<sup>14</sup>

The article proposes a new approach to solidarity. Previous research has focused on macro-structural and micro-behavioural aspects of solidarity, overlooking that solidarity is discursively constructed by actors on the meso-level. The meso approach to solidarity consists of two key dimensions: meaning and scale. The meaning of solidarity characterises its content. The scale of solidarity indicates who is encompassed by solidarity. This approach is applied by analysing meanings and scales of solidarity in the German media discourse on Europe's migration crisis from 2010 to 2015. The discourse network analysis is deployed to study the co-occurrence of meanings and scales of solidarity. The results indicate that political and cultural solidarity are the most dominant meanings and they are mostly linked to the intergovernmental and transnational scale of solidarity. The number of claims to political solidarity on the intergovernmental level of the EU increases in 2015, signalling the greater relevance of creating a solidary institutional mechanism in the migration crisis. The article contributes to recent discussions on solidarity as well as the public framing of Europe's migration crisis.

Keywords: discursive construction of solidarity; discourse network analysis; Europe's migration crisis; Germany; Solidarity

---

<sup>14</sup> Chapter 2 has been published online in *Political Studies* on March 22<sup>nd</sup> 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719831585>. I would like to thank Sebastian Haunss, Michelle Hollman, Ulrike Liebert, Sandra Reinecke as well as the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the article. Moreover, I received very helpful feedback from the participants of the BIGSSS working group 'migration and refugee studies' as well as from the panel audiences at the 2018 ECPR General Conference at the University of Hamburg and the Refugees, Borders and Membership Conference at Malmö University.

## 2.1 Introduction

Solidarity is a central concept in political and social theory. It has also featured prominently in recent discussions on the multiple crises of the European Union (EU) as well as in debates about the social cohesion of contemporary societies. It is a crucial idea in social-democratic and conservative party manifestos (Stjernø 2009), and in trade union activities (Gajewska 2009), while social movements engage in solidarity actions as part of their protest mobilisations (Della Porta 2018). Research on welfare states examines the institutional and behavioural aspects of (social) solidarity (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Baldwin 1990). In times of crises, the question of the weakness or strength of solidarity among individuals and groups gains increased scholarly attention (Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Lahusen and Grasso 2018b).

However, previous research on solidarity has two conceptual shortcomings. *First*, it does not consider the various meanings of solidarity. In this regard, existing studies mainly investigate solidarity with respect to redistributive politics and, thus, refer to the meaning of social solidarity. Yet, if we understand solidarity as a contested concept (Gallie 1956), meaning that its proper understanding is debated by actors without arriving at a shared understanding of the term, then the discursive, meaning-making process of solidarity in itself should be a key focal point. *Second*, the scale of solidarity – that is, defining who is included in the claims for solidarity – plays an ambiguous role in the literature. The issue of scale is either not reflected by research on welfare states, which largely pursue a methodological nationalism, or it is semantically invoked by investigating European or transnational solidarity without indicating the underlying meaning of solidarity actions and attitudes.

Accordingly, the present study will suggest a new research approach to solidarity that is situated on the meso-level and based on the two dimensions of meaning and scale. Taken together, the dimensions of meaning and scale underpin various concepts of solidarity. I conceptualise the meaning of solidarity as its content. Meanwhile, the scale of solidarity is understood to be the extent of its reach, and emphasises the boundedness of solidarity as it is expressed in specific social contexts. Hence, both dimensions form the new meso-discursive approach to solidarity, which I call the discursive construction of

solidarity. With the latter phrase, I refer to the framing of the concept of solidarity in public debates<sup>15</sup>. Solidarity has to be constructed and appealed to in order to legitimise political actions and mobilise public opinion.

The approach is engaged empirically by analysing the meanings and scales of solidarity in the public discourse on Europe's migration crisis in an explorative manner. To this end, I examine the meanings of solidarity that are deployed and the scales to which solidarity claims are linked, before identifying which of the meanings and scales of solidarity are most prominent in the discourse. In particular, I analyse German daily newspapers from 2010 to 2015. Germany was at the centre of the European migration crisis in 2015, creating a high degree of public awareness of the issue. Furthermore, Germany strongly shapes the European migration and refugee policies with its national norms and regulations (Zaun 2016). The migration crisis has challenged the political-institutional order, normative guidelines, and the social integration of the EU (Geddes 2018; Wallaschek 2018b). Previous research on the crisis has demonstrated how member states disagree about how best to resolve the migration crisis, how the EU lacks supranational authority to establish a mandatory relocation mechanism, and how security frames prevailed during the crisis in 2015 (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Zaun 2018). Although previous studies have acknowledged the lack of solidarity, they have yet to consider how this corresponds to the claiming of solidarity within public discourse. Moreover, by looking at the state of public debate both before and during the crisis, we can trace the trajectory and changes in the crisis discourse with a view to explaining why the EU solidarity mechanism to relocate refugees among EU member states was so strongly contested at the end.

The study utilises the discourse network methodology which has demonstrated the co-constitutive construction process of actor appearances and meaning formation in public discourses (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). Analysing the relation between the meaning and scale of solidarity helps to identify which meanings and scales are more or less linked to each other. Hence, I examine the meanings and scales of solidarity as two different and distinct nodes within the discourse network.

---

<sup>15</sup>In the following, 'discourse' and 'debate' are used synonymously.

The two main contributions of the present article are as follows: Conceptually, this study introduces the new meso approach to solidarity and outlines its two major dimensions – namely, meaning and scale. Empirically, the article demonstrates the relevance of political solidarity during the crisis. While the pre-crisis discourse is divided by intergovernmental and transnational claims on political solidarity, the crisis discourse focuses predominantly on intergovernmental political solidarity.

The article proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on solidarity by dividing the field into macro-structural and micro-behavioural approaches, before proposing the new meso-level perspective on solidarity, and what I call the discursive construction of solidarity. After describing the data and the discourse network methodology used, I present and discuss the main findings.

## **2.2 Solidarity research: Adding the meso approach to macro and micro approaches**

There has been a recent upsurge in research on the topic of solidarity, provoking debates about the state of solidarity within European politics (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; Habermas 2013; Sangiovanni 2013; Wallaschek 2018a). The semantic origins of the term “solidarity” can be traced back to Roman law and to the phrase “obligatio in solidum” which is a liability statement among members of a community, while the contemporary usage of the term has its origins in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Bayertz 1998; Brunkhorst 2002). In broad terms, solidarity can be defined in one of two ways: either as “the preparedness to share resources with others by personal contribution to those in struggle or need and through taxation and redistribution organised by the state” (Stjernø 2009: 2), or as “a type of action: working with others for common political aims, paradigmatically in a context of incompletely shared interest” (Kolars 2012: 367).

The empirical research on solidarity can be divided into three approaches. The first approach considers solidarity from a structural perspective, conceptualising mechanisms and institutions as providers of solidarity for its members. The second approach attributes certain attitudes and perceptions of individuals as solidary behaviour. Accordingly, as

Stjernø and Kolars theorise, the focus on redistribution, shared resources, and individual actions towards solidarity is reflected in macro and micro approaches.

The third approach, however, conceptualises solidarity on the meso-level by looking at its discursive construction. Solidarity is framed differently by (collective) actors and it refers to various scales. Thus, solidarity contains two distinct yet crucial dimensions: meaning and scale. In what follows, I utilise both dimensions in order to discuss the three approaches. I argue that meaning(s) and scale(s) of solidarity are only partially reflected in the macro and micro approaches, which constitutes their conceptual shortcomings. I then present the meso-discursive approach to solidarity, before introducing the dimensions of meaning and scale, and applying these in the empirical part of the paper.

### **2.2.1 Macro-structural approach: Institutional solidarity**

The macro approach focuses on the meaning of social solidarity at the national scale of the welfare state. Solidarity is understood as redistributive politics (Baldwin 1990). These solidarity policies can be inclusionary or exclusionary (Ferrera 2006). Institutional provisions – such as social security or unemployment insurance – are available to all members of the (national) community, and are, thus, inclusionary. This “institutionalised solidarity” (Gelissen 2000) is based on a reciprocal understanding whereby individuals pay for a common institutional scheme and in the case of negative experiences or consequences (e. g. unemployment), support is provided. The collective solidarity of the welfare state tends more towards a universal solidarity mechanism, since it is based on an impersonal and often mandatory redistributive process (Baldwin 1990; Boräng 2015). Solidarity policies are exclusionary when resources are not provided for “perceived outsiders” – such as the unemployed, the disabled or migrants. Such policies treat social groups differently, establish forms of conditional solidarity, and have exclusionary effects. This influences access to social benefits or questions the deservingness of particular social groups (Thomann and Rapp 2018; Trenz and Grasso 2018).

With regard to scale, recent studies have “uploaded” the meaning of social solidarity to the European level by investigating the Europeanisation of national social policies and debating the idea and establishment of a Social Europe (Börner 2013; Martinsen and Vollaard 2014). Scholars have considered the union citizenship as a

solidary institutional arrangement. Having the same duties and rights across the EU – such as free movement within the Schengen area or voting for members of the European Parliament – creates a social bond among European citizens. This macro structure establishes a certain sense of belonging, which can be interpreted as a weak form of transnational European solidarity (Mau 2005b).

To sum up the macro approach, it chiefly focuses on the meaning of (social) solidarity as a redistributive mechanism within institutional structures. In turn, motivational or ideological aspects, as well as agent-oriented factors, are seldom taken into account. Although the notion of scale has recently been explored in some studies on social solidarity, framing social solidarity as European solidarity blurs the conceptual difference between an international social solidarity among nation states and a transnational social solidarity among individuals and groups.

### **2.2.2 Micro-behavioural approach: Solidarity as attitude**

The second approach deals with individual behaviour and attitudes towards foreigners or other vulnerable social groups as a type of social solidarity (van Oorschot 2006). Solidarity is seen as a shared value with regard to identification, trust or social cohesion among or within social groups (Breidahl *et al.* 2018). As in the macro approach, micro studies also examine national welfare states in order to identify increases or decreases in the degree of social bonds (Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005; van Oorschot 2000). In this regard, the issue of deservingness is most central, because studies have shown that solidarity actions largely depend on one's status within, and belonging to, a social group. For instance, the elderly, those unable to work (physically and/or psychically), the disabled and refugees are more openly granted social benefits than people who are not willing to work (Lahusen and Grasso 2018b; van Oorschot 2000; van Oorschot 2006). Accordingly, the micro approach primarily considers the meaning of social solidarity for specific target groups within national welfare states.

However, this focus has undergone something of a change in recent times, which has opened up the research so as to incorporate various scales of (social) solidarity. Solidary attitudes are also examined on the European scale, in an attempt to assess the preferences for a Social Europe (Mau 2005a). Scholars engage in the “no demos thesis” in the EU by investigating different types of belonging and levels of commitment (Liebert

2016; Risse 2010) and, as Erik Jones (2014: 691) emphatically states: “Issues of identity and solidarity lie at the heart of our understanding of European integration as a process, they hold the key to its legitimation, and they undergird its stability”.

Based on survey and experimental data, scholars demonstrate levels of European or cosmopolitan solidarity based on transnational activities, international experiences of young people, cultural openness, and a high level of education (Bechtel *et al.* 2014; Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Kuhn *et al.* 2018; Lahusen and Grasso 2018b). Ciornei and Recchi distinguish between solidarity among nation states (international solidarity) and solidarity among EU citizens (transnational solidarity). However, the terminological focus on the scale of solidarity in recent studies results in a rather vague understanding of what solidarity means. Hence, while these studies offer more detail in terms of the dimension of scale, they have less to offer with regard to the dimension of meaning.

In sum, the micro approach considers multiple scales of solidarity, but mainly operationalises solidarity in respect of social solidarity as an attitude towards the redistribution of goods. This understanding of solidarity is then subsumed under the different scales of European or cosmopolitan solidarity.<sup>16</sup>

### **2.2.3 Meso-discursive approach: The discursive construction of solidarity**

The meso-discursive approach to solidarity proposed here considers the communicative practices, meaning-making processes, and the interactions of actors in the public sphere as situated at the meso-level – that is, between individual attitudes and state structures. The meso-discursive approach to solidarity builds on framing approaches. Frames draw out certain aspects while omitting others; as such, they exercise communicative power and serve to construct a certain public discourse. Scholars have demonstrated how frames influence not only actors’ behaviour, but also how actors understand issues and try to solve problems (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2007). As Entman (1993: 52) puts it: “framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as

---

<sup>16</sup> In contrast, Teney and Helbling (2017) differentiate solidarity via two dimensions. While civic solidarity stands for openness towards foreigners and cultural diversity, redistributive solidarity refers to the redistribution of goods for poor and other vulnerable groups. For the present study, civic solidarity is integrated in cultural solidarity and redistributive solidarity is considered to be covered by social solidarity as Table 2 shows.

to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". Previous studies have shown that the construction of political issues and policy reforms heavily relies on the framing of an issue, as well as which frames are selected by the actors and are deemed most salient within public discourse (Leifeld and Haunss 2012; Steensland 2008). These sense-making processes are rarely considered in the previous macro- and micro-approaches to solidarity. The meaning of social solidarity is mostly presupposed, while the scale of solidarity is often neglected. Distinguishing the meaning and scale of solidarity and thereby focusing on both aspects more coherently via the meso-discursive approach will help to explicate the concept of solidarity and show how it is framed in public discourses.

Accordingly, the discursive construction of solidarity points to the framing and interpretation of solidarity by actors. Actors deliberately use the term solidarity to argue for a certain policy position or to demand an opposing proposal. By using the term in a specific context (e. g. nation state or EU solidarity) and justifying its use in public statements, actors (re-)construct the meaning of solidarity and refer to it in relation to a certain scale. Accordingly, the approach differentiates between the meaning of solidarity and the scale of solidarity. Both dimensions, taken together, create concepts of solidarity.

Previous research has investigated the framing of solidarity in policymaking processes and public debates (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Galpin 2017; Wonka 2016). However, most empirical studies in this area do not focus exclusively on solidarity, and instead adopt a more generic perspective. For instance, in his analysis of parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag, Wonka (2016) conceptualises solidarity as support for people in other countries. Thus, as in the micro approach, Wonka (2016) frames solidarity as social solidarity and refers to its transnational scale. Closa and Maatsch (2014), by contrast, in their analysis of parliamentary debates about the Euro crisis, understand solidarity as an argumentative reference point for justice and human rights among EU member states. They refer to social and cultural meanings of solidarity and connect the meaning of solidarity to the international scale. These two contributions reveal the polysemy of the concept of solidarity and indicate the need to differentiate the concept of solidarity into dimensions of meaning and scale.

The meso approach does not presuppose a substantial definition of the concept of solidarity, but rather understands it as a contested concept with various meanings and scales (Gallie 1956). Actors argue about the proper meaning of solidarity, but do not (necessarily) come to a shared understanding. Therefore, differentiating solidarity into the spheres of meaning and scale helps to illuminate the various understandings and demonstrate the possible conceptual combinations entailed by its meaning(s) and scale(s). Based on the existing literature, seven *meanings of solidarity* have been proposed.

**Table 4: Meanings of solidarity**

<b>Meanings</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Political solidarity</b>	Setting up new political mechanisms and instruments in a cooperative way
<b>Social solidarity</b>	Redistributing resources and people and groups volunteering
<b>Cultural solidarity</b>	Arguing for a shared identity and norms
<b>Legal solidarity</b>	Liability of members based on the signing of treaties and agreements
<b>Economic solidarity</b>	Support in the form of public investments and growth of the economy
<b>Monetary solidarity</b>	Risk-sharing and the reduction or share of sovereign debts to help others
<b>Misuse of solidarity</b>	Questioning the legitimacy of the call to solidarity

Political solidarity is based on the idea that a certain group (“we”) should cooperate in a political context in order to create solidary political institutions and policies (Kneuer and Masala 2015).<sup>17</sup> Cultural solidarity emphasises shared norms or values to which actors refer in order to justify solidarity actions (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; Jones 2014). Social solidarity refers to welfare and social policy institutions as a form of redistributive politics, in addition to helping in the neighbourhood, with volunteers, local communities or organisations supporting the homeless or unemployed (Baldwin 1990; Manatschal and Freitag 2014). Legal solidarity is based on any legal agreement signed by actors and from which obligations and rights arise. The legal phrase “*pacta sunt servanda*” (agreements

---

<sup>17</sup> This understanding of political solidarity differs from that of Sally Scholz (2008) who argues for a more normative and critical-emancipatory definition of political solidarity.

must be kept) can be interpreted as a solidary procedure in which one has to act accordingly or risk breaking the agreement. Economic solidarity refers to supportive actions in economic terms – for instance, public investments and expansive growth strategies (Sommer 2013). Monetary solidarity is understood as risk-sharing and lending creditability and liability to other member states within a regional integration project. By acting together beyond the limitations of self-interest, monetary solidarity is expressed (Schelkle 2017). Lastly, misuse of solidarity bears solidarity, but in contrast to the other meanings, the (legitimate) call for solidarity is questioned fundamentally. Thus, actors claim that the appeal to solidarity is misused by others.

The second dimension of the approach is *scale*, which refers to the spatial range of any call to solidarity. Solidarity encompasses various groups, from social groups in a local context right up to the entirety of humankind across the globe. For instance, social solidarity might largely refer to a national population (Baldwin 1990), whilst recent studies attribute the European, cosmopolitan or transnational scale to social solidarity (Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Kuhn *et al.* 2018). The “European” scale is rather general and does not differentiate between solidarity among nation states and solidarity among individuals or groups, as advocated by Ciornei and Recchi (2017). The meaning of cosmopolitan solidarity is not applied here, because the term entails various substantial (universalist) claims on cultural diversity, multi-level governance, and free border crossing (of goods, capital, services, and people) (Teney *et al.* 2014). Thus, cosmopolitan solidarity conflates scale and meaning. Consequently, a more fine-grained typology of different scales is presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Scales of solidarity

Scales	Sub-scales
<b>Local</b>	/
<b>National</b>	- national (exclusionary) - diverse population (inclusionary)
<b>International</b>	- intergovernmental EU-related - countries of origin - conflict zone countries - North Africa
<b>Transnational</b>	- EU citizens - specific group (non-EU citizens), e. g. Christians in the Middle East - migrants/refugees
<b>Global</b>	/

The strengths of the newly introduced meso-discursive approach are as follows. *First*, it combines various scales and meanings of solidarity, and as such reflects the contested nature of solidarity. *Secondly*, it attributes agency to the actors in the framing of solidarity in public discourse. Even though political actors' mindsets are shaped by institutional contexts and public philosophies (Boswell and Hampshire 2017), actors can reinterpret existing concepts or use "windows of opportunities" throughout the policy process in order to introduce new concepts or bring different ideas together. *Thirdly*, in opting to not postulate a fixed relation of a certain meaning with a specific scale, the meso-discursive approach has the advantage that every discursive combination of scale and meaning can be considered in respect of the empirical analysis of the discursive construction of solidarity. These varied combinations of both dimensions give rise to a diverse set of concepts of solidarity. As Entman (1993) has noted, framing processes are based on selection and salience. Hence, the meso approach enables us to study which meanings and scales of solidarity are selected, and how they become salient in the discourse. For instance, an actor could argue for a transnational social solidarity for all EU citizens, while another might claim a nationally oriented social solidarity that prefers a welfare chauvinist understanding of social benefits for the host population (against incoming foreigners). Investigating such discursive processes can reveal which of the meanings and

scales of solidarity are dominant, and whether and how they are connected. In the end, it will be possible to investigate the presence or absence of concepts of solidarity.

## 2.3 Research design and methods


The study analyses newspaper articles from two leading German daily quality newspapers from the period of 2010 to 2015. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and *Die Welt* have been selected on account of their broad readership and large circulation. Choosing a centre-left (SZ) and a centre-right (Welt) newspaper controls for different political ideologies and ensures that different positions and actors in the media arena are represented. Previous studies have shown that quality newspapers still serve as major gatekeepers in Western European countries and report more on political events than tabloids (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Nossek *et al.* 2015; Reinemann *et al.* 2012). Moreover, printed newspapers are crucial, because “thresholds for audience members are particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large” (Wessler *et al.* 2008: 5).

Based on a keyword search in the database Factiva, 1,155 articles on solidarity in the migration crisis have been selected. Afterwards, the political claims analysis (PCA) was deployed (Koopmans and Statham 1999), which examined the different claims made by actors in the selected newspaper articles. The main idea of the PCA is that newspaper articles contain various statements by different actors that can be analysed separately from the whole newspaper text. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Koopmans and Statham (2010: 55) define claims as “public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors”. In total, 344 solidarity claims were coded in the R package RQDA (Huang 2016). 176 claims in the SZ and 168 claims in *Die Welt* have been identified (more information on the selection of articles and the coding process are presented in the [appendix of Chapter 2](#)).

Figure 7 provides an overview of the annual media coverage in relation to solidarity. Until 2012, and in comparison to the crisis in 2015, the discourse on migration and solidarity was relatively minor in both periodicals. From 2013 onwards, coverage increases, culminating in 2015 with the climax of the migration crisis. It marks Germany’s direct involvement whereby it gave access to thousands of asylum seekers coming via

Hungary and Southeast Europe in the summer of 2015. These total numbers indicate the importance of the topic and signal that the idea of solidarity became more relevant from 2013 on.

Figure 7: Number of claims in German newspapers on solidarity in Europe's migration crisis (2010-15)



Note: The dotted black graph shows the number of claims in the centre-right newspaper Die Welt, the solid black graph displays the number of claims in the centre-left newspaper SZ.

The discourse network methodology is deployed to the claims analysis. It is a novel approach to study the co-evolution of actors and ideas in public discourses from a relational perspective (Leifeld 2016b). An actor using a concept is understood as a relation between this actor and the concept. Instead of examining the co-occurrence of actors and concepts in affiliation networks (Leifeld and Haunss 2012), the affiliation networks of meanings of solidarity and scales of solidarity are investigated in an explorative way so as to scrutinise the suggested meso approach to solidarity. The meaning-scale networks are undirected. The node size of the meaning-scale network is based on eigenvector centrality, which is based on the number of ties a node has, in addition to whether it is tied to other

central nodes in the network. The scale of the eigenvector centrality is from 0 to 1. The closer the value of a node is to 1, the more central it is in the network (Bonacich 1987). The thickness of an edge shows the number of times a concept is linked to a specific scale. Salient meanings and scales of solidarity can be identified, as well as how certain meanings and scales are closely linked to each other within the migration crisis discourse. The links of scales and meanings are studied by deploying the Fast Greedy community detection algorithm, which identifies subgroups within the network. The algorithm tries to optimise the modularity score of the network by removing edges in order to detect closely linked nodes. By doing so, subgroups within the network are discovered (Clauset *et al.* 2004; Newman 2004).<sup>18</sup> The aim is to detect meanings and scales of solidarity that are so closely tied that they can be understood to constitute the conceptual glue that establishes (dominant) concepts of solidarity in the public discourse.

## **2.4 Discourse networks in Europe's migration crisis**

The EU's migration and refugee policy has received more public attention since the launch of the Stockholm programme in 2009, which seeks to harmonise national migration policies and create a common European asylum system (CEAS). The Lisbon Treaty also focused more strongly on a common EU migration policy, but national regulators are still the principal actors in the EU migration policy and decision-making process (Zaun 2016).

One of the first public debates on solidarity related to migration movements in the selected time period followed the so-called "Arab Spring" in 2011. A minor debate started on increasing numbers of migrants coming to Italy. Representatives of the Italian government demanded a European solidarity plan in order to deal with the situation, while other EU member states declined such actions and evaluated the situation as not severe enough to share responsibilities. Further migration movements to Europe were covered in the media, as the shipwreck incidents in the Mediterranean increased in 2013 and 2014. The media discourse in 2015 was highly dominated by the "summer of migration" narrative in which hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers passed Southeast

---

<sup>18</sup> The Fast Greedy algorithm was compared to other community detection algorithms that are implemented in the igraph package and it performed best. This is documented in table 8 of the appendix of chapter 2.

Europe and the Mediterranean in an attempt to reach Western and Northern Europe (Vollmer and Karakayali 2018). The German discourse in 2015 was centred around three events: The death of several dozen migrants locked in a lorry on a highway in Austria at the end of August; German Chancellor Angela Merkel's statement that "we can do it", which became a key slogan at that time; and the photograph of three-year-old Alan Kurdi, lying dead on a Turkish beach at the beginning of September 2015.

To account for discursive changes, the period of 2010 to 2015 is split into two phases: The pre-crisis phase from 2010 to 2014, and the climax of the migration crisis in 2015. In doing so, the differences in the framing of solidarity are assessed with regard to the meanings and scales both before and during times of crisis.

#### **2.4.1 Intergovernmental political solidarity and transnational cultural solidarity (2010–14)**


In the pre-crisis phase, political solidarity is the most prominent meaning of solidarity in the discourse. Cultural and social solidarity are also quite visible in the discourse (Table 9 in the [appendix of chapter 2](#)). Political, cultural, and social solidarity are strongly linked to the transnational scale. However, political solidarity is also strongly attached to the intergovernmental scale of the EU (as shown in Figure 8).

After the "Arab Spring" in 2011, Italy experienced an increasing migration movement, and Italian politicians such as Roberto Maroni (Lega Nord, Minister of the Interior) urged the EU (member states) to act in solidarity. He argued for a fair relocation of newly arrived asylum seekers across the European Union. Moreover, other international actors – such as Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs – argued for more solidarity-oriented European policies. The following statements by a CSU-MEP and the European Commissioner Malmström underline the demand to establish an intergovernmental solidarity scheme in the EU, whilst non-affected member states hardly show any solidarity with the South European border countries. Hence, political actors criticise these countries and demand that the member states cooperate to resolve the issue:

*"'Border controls are no solution', criticised the CSU-MEP Bernd Posselt. Germany and Italy have to jointly deal with the influx of immigrants. Posselt demanded an 'improved European solidarity and burden-sharing among the EU member states of short-term influxes of immigrants'." (Welt, April 2011)*

“Malmstöm affirmed her claim about a ‘common European asylum system until 2013’. [...] Furthermore, Malmström demanded more solidarity from the EU member states with those countries in the EU that are particularly affected by illegal immigration.” (Welt, May 2011)

**Figure 8: Meaning-scale network in Germany (2010-14)**



Note: The bipartite network consists of meanings represented as circles and scales displayed as squares. The network has 15 nodes (7 meanings of solidarity and 8 scales) and 207 edges, 3 subgroups are identified and the network modularity is 0.32. The size of the nodes is based on eigenvector centrality. The bigger the size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. The edge thickness and the edge labels indicate how often a meaning and a scale are linked. The subgroups are identified by the Fast Greedy community detection algorithm.

The debate about a political solidarity mechanism to deal with the high number of incoming asylum seekers to the EU was reiterated over the pre-crisis period in various

contexts. For instance, the Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg (Winfried Kretschmann, Green party) engaged in the public discourse. In 2014, he stressed that the local capacities to host a large number of new asylum seekers are very limited. Kretschmann demanded a fair distribution of asylum seekers among the German states (Länder), as well as a solidary political solution at the EU level. Thus, linking political solidarity to the intergovernmental scale resonated quite strongly in the public debate. However, the public discourse on a new European solidarity scheme has not led to any substantial reform or new European decision-making process in the pre-crisis period.

The relevance of norms and values as underlying principles of a refugee and asylum policy is expressed by the network centrality of cultural solidarity. The transnational scope of this meaning of solidarity is particularly highlighted (Figure 8). Acting on a shared understanding of norms – such as Human Rights for refugees – is demanded in the public discourse. Moreover, the values of the European enlightenment are stressed, arguing for a moral imperative to act on behalf of refugees. For instance, the President of Germany, Joachim Gauck, emphasised the importance of a shared identity and the values of the Enlightenment, while Pope Francis highlighted the Christian tradition of charity to show solidarity with foreigners.

Three subgroups have been discovered by the community detection algorithm in the discourse network. The smallest but most visible subgroup is centred on the intergovernmental scale. This underlines the intergovernmentalist approach and the central role of the EU member states in the policymaking process around migration and asylum issues. The coastguard mission “Mare Nostrum” of the Italian Navy in 2013–14 and the following Frontex-led EU mission “Triton” exhibited some efforts to deal with migration movements in a cooperative manner, but as the upcoming migration crisis in 2015 revealed, these actions were neither sustainable nor sufficient. The second subgroup has the transnational scale at its core. It includes the rather central meanings of cultural solidarity and social solidarity. These meanings of solidarity refer to Human Rights and global norms that should guide solidarity actions, as well as the voluntary actions of NGOs and activists who support refugees and asylum seekers.

The third subgroup is rather marginal and less coherent in its network structure. It contains claims on financial help (monetary solidarity) for countries in conflict zones and


economic development programmes (economic solidarity) for countries of origin of asylum seekers with demands to stop any solidarity actions in the EU, because these solidarity claims are perceived as false (misuse of solidarity).

#### **2.4.2 The salience of intergovernmental political solidarity (2015)**

The meaning-scale network in 2015 (Figure 9) shows the peak of the discussion in the German media. Political solidarity remains the most salient meaning of solidarity. The most prevalent scale is, again, the intergovernmental scale of the EU. Cultural solidarity and the transnational scale have a lower centrality value, but are still visible. These two closely linked meanings and scales of solidarity are also at the centre of their respective subgroups.

The debate about reform to EU migration policies continued and intensified during the “summer of migration” in 2015. This is underlined by the thick edge between political solidarity and the intergovernmental scale as one subgroup in the network. EU Commissioners and German domestic party actors claimed that the EU migration crisis should be solved in a solidary way by developing a political mechanism by which to fairly share the responsibility for the incoming asylum seekers. Claims on political solidarity noted the pressures experienced first by Greece, as a European border country, and then by other Southeast European countries in dealing with hundreds of thousands of refugees seeking shelter or passing through to reach destination countries in Western and Northern Europe (Sweden, Germany, Netherlands).

Figure 9: Meaning-scale network in Germany (2015)



Note: The bipartite network consists of meanings represented as circles and scales displayed as squares. The network has 10 nodes (4 meanings of solidarity and 6 scales) and 114 edges, 3 subgroups are identified and the network modularity is 0.33. The size of the nodes is based on eigenvector centrality. The bigger the size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. The edge thickness and the edge labels indicate how often a meaning and a scale are linked. The subgroups are identified by the Fast Greedy community detection algorithm.

Political solidarity is also emphasised as a way of criticising other actors who want to build up national border control and pause the EU's internal open border policy (the Schengen agreement). As German Chancellor Angela Merkel highlights in her statement, the existence of Schengen and solidary relocations are two sides of the same coin:

“So far, the EU has not agreed on ‘how solidarity is shown in times in which the Schengen area is tested’. Thus, the question on the solidary relocation of refugees and the ‘willingness

to a permanent relocation mechanism is not a minor detail, but crucial to whether Schengen can be maintained sustainably', claimed Merkel." (SZ, November 2015)

A second subgroup is formed around cultural and social solidarity with the transnational scale. These claims refer to a just treatment of asylum seekers and welcome the voluntary efforts of citizens and NGOs toward assisting incoming refugees. Dimitris Avramopoulos, the EU Commissioner for Migration since 2015, states that the EU is based on values that shall guide its actions:

"'We are a family in Europe. We have values that connect all of us.' This might sound pathetic, but this is exactly the issue at stake in Brussels this Wednesday: whether the EU member states act in solidarity with those who had to leave their home and are seeking refuge in Europe. Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for Migration, claims the following: 'We have to face the responsibility. Solidarity has to be translated into actual politics.'" (SZ, May 2015)

The third subgroup is rather marginal and hardly influences the public solidarity discourse. More financial assistance (monetary solidarity) is claimed, either from other member states (intergovernmental scale) or within the nation state (national scale) in federal countries such as Germany in order to help and integrate the incoming refugees.

The findings of the discourse in 2015 demonstrate that the meanings and scales of solidarity are quite stable over time. Claims on political and cultural solidarity were already made before the crisis and were primarily linked to the intergovernmental and transnational scale, respectively. The intergovernmental scale of potential solidarity actions in the EU has been addressed in the pre-crisis discourse. On the one hand, this underscores the fact that claiming solidarity in Europe's migration crisis became more salient in 2015 and drew out certain political conflicts in the reforming of the EU Justice and Home Affairs. The focus on the intergovernmental scale still underlines the fact that claims on solidarity are linked to political reforms such as new institutional settings. Calls to solidarity were not just rhetorical, but rather formed part of the political struggle over how to solve the migration crisis and reform the Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. On the other hand, these issues were previously discussed in the pre-crisis period, which demonstrates that the call for solidarity in times of crisis rests upon extant ideas and policy proposals.

## 2.5 Conclusion

In this article, I have proposed a new meso-discursive approach to solidarity. I have argued that the discursive construction of solidarity is overlooked by macro-institutional and micro-behavioural approaches to solidarity. I have suggested two dimensions for the analysis of solidarity: the first concerns how solidarity is framed and thus how actors attribute meaning to solidarity, while the second relates to the scale to which claims on solidarity refer. Both dimensions create concepts of solidarity. In order to scrutinise the new meso approach, I studied the discourse on solidarity amid Europe's migration crisis.

Solidarity was one of the crucial ideas in the crisis in 2015, but as the study has demonstrated, calls for solidarity extend back to before the solidarity-crisis nexus and indeed were already debated in previous years. The discourse network methodology was deployed so as to examine the meaning(s) and scale(s) of solidarity, and to show how these are linked to one another in the German media discourse. The new meso approach to solidarity demonstrated that differentiating between the meaning and the scale of solidarity can help us to better understand how actors make sense of a contested concept such as solidarity. It also shows that solidarity is not only inscribed in institutional settings or individual attitude, but emphasises the meaning making process underlying solidarity actions and beliefs. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the meaning of solidarity is malleable and not restricted to any particular scale, even if one can identify some closer connections between specific scales and meanings. Considering the scale dimension for the analysis of solidarity in particular provides a new perspective on how solidarity is bounded, and that it is a rather particularistic concept that refers to specific social contexts and social groups.

The results provide novel insights into the research on solidarity and Europe's migration crisis. *First*, a broad range of solidarity understandings are used in public discourse. Nonetheless, the meaning of political solidarity was shown to be highly salient in both time periods of the migration crisis discourse. This also holds true, to some extent, for the meaning of cultural solidarity. The discursive relevance of cultural solidarity corroborates earlier accounts, which suggest that solidarity refers to shared values and

norms. These create a sense of belonging and identification in the public, which is crucial in establishing political legitimacy in times of crisis (Jones 2014).

The salience of political solidarity demonstrates the political nature of Europe's migration crisis. Due to a lack of cooperation and shared responsibility in the EU migration and asylum policy based on one-sided obligations of border countries like Italy and Greece (and, to a lesser extent, Spain) in the Dublin Regulations, the political solidarity gap was debated by many actors in the German discourse. The establishment of the EU solidarity mechanism in September 2015 – which relocated 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to other EU member states through a certain quota (European Commission 2015) – was a consequence of increased pressure at the EU level, and could be seen as an effective example of political solidarity. However, the Visegrád group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) strongly argued against this mandatory mechanism, which was decided by a majoritarian decision in the European Council (European Council 2015). Moreover, the Hungarian and Slovakian governments went to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to repeal the decision. However, the ECJ ruled against the complaints by Hungary and Slovakia in September 2017 (Byrne 2017).

The rising nationalistic and xenophobic claims for tighter border controls, the temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement by the German and Austrian governments, and the enhancement of security surveillance have weakened the establishment and implementation of the solidarity mechanism at the national level. The recent numbers of relocated immigrants from Greece and Italy to the other member states show that hardly any country has fulfilled its obligations. For instance, Germany agreed to relocate approximately 27,000 refugees from Italy and Greece, whilst around 9,200 people have arrived so far in Germany (up to November 2017). Similar levels of *de jure* commitments to relocate and *de facto* relocations are documented for almost every EU member state (European Commission 2017b). Previous studies, based on a liberal intergovernmentalism perspective, explained the failure of the European solidarity mechanism with asymmetrical involvement of the EU member states, the rising of right-wing populist parties and a lack of core state powers (Biermann *et al.* 2019; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018; Zaun 2018) The present study highlights the positive framing of solidarity in the German discourse 2015 and Germany's direct involvement in the

migration crisis. This enhanced the political pressure by Germany to vote for a solidarity mechanism in the European Council. Hence, Germany's discursive and political influence in the EU might have contributed to the opposition by least affected member states and national delays in the implementation of the relocation mechanism. Moreover, the present study demonstrates that the salience of political solidarity between EU member states puts the fundamental question of EU Affairs back on the political agenda: namely, who cooperates with whom, and is it for European or national (or mutual) benefit? Conceptually, this is the first study to investigate political solidarity in greater detail, and it shows how essential it is for the European integration process in hard times.

*Second*, meanings of solidarity are linked to various scales. Investigating the scale of solidarity offered a more nuanced understanding of what solidarity means in public discourses. When addressing issues around migration, the most dominant scale was that of the intergovernmental, although the transnational scale was also particularly visible in 2010–14. The discourse networks have shown that the intergovernmental scale was predominantly linked to political solidarity, while the transnational scale was often addressed in claims of cultural solidarity. Following the meso approach that the meaning(s) and scale(s) of solidarity constitute concepts of solidarity, two dominant concepts of solidarity have been identified. On the one hand, intergovernmental political solidarity refers to structural and institutional aspects of cooperation and support among EU member states. On the other hand, transnational cultural solidarity is based on motivational and ideational characteristics. People and countries should show solidarity with others, because their actions are guided by shared norms and values.

The present study bears some limitations. The findings of the German public debate are not representative for public discourses in other EU member states. Germany is the most powerful EU member state and its role in the migration crisis in 2015 was exceptionally important. Merkel's slogan "we can do it" and the popular statement "refugees welcome" served to create a rather atypical public discourse on migration and refugee issues, since it was mainly framed in a positive manner, while Germany received a high number of asylum seekers in a short period of time. This provided an important context in which claims about solidarity became very prominent within the German discourse. Since Germany was strongly affected by the migration crisis, the public

discourse reflects the expectation that other EU member states are obliged to show solidarity with Germany and other countries dealing with incoming asylum seekers. That said, this study does not focus on the refusal of solidarity in other EU member states. But given that solidarity was so present in the German discourse, it was a crucial case to consider in analysing the applicability of the meso-level approach. Further studies should apply the new meso approach to solidarity in other countries (both EU and non-European), as well as to other policy areas so as to test the present findings in other contexts.

The study has also not investigated the actor constellation in the discourse that is done in most discourse network studies (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). The focus was on outlining the meso approach to solidarity and conceptualising the meaning and scale dimension. Nonetheless, future studies should investigate more systematically who is calling for solidarity and who is addressed by whom in public debates on solidarity.

In addition, looking at quality media outlets with the discourse network analysis favours a selection process of opinions and actors with regard to national executives (Koopmans and Statham 2010). Even though daily quality newspapers are still important for the public discourse, insofar as they set the agenda and mobilise the public, future studies should consider online media outlets or parliamentary debates to scrutinise the discursive construction of solidarity. Instead of deploying an extensive manual coding of newspaper articles and a quantitative analysis of the claims, a qualitative approach to investigate the discursive side of solidarity might be another future venue. Furthermore, it might be worthwhile looking at solidarity beyond times of crisis, investigating long-term trends and conceptual changes that might influence the understanding of what solidarity means and how actors draw upon it in hard times.

## 2.6 Appendix

### 2.6.1 Political claims analysis

The coding of the newspaper articles follows the political claims analysis (PCA) by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; Koopmans and Statham 2010) and used the package RQDA in the R environment (Huang 2016). The main idea of the PCA is that newspaper texts contain many statements by different actors. Instead of focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis or almost only on the content, the link between a statement and the speaker is stressed. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Koopmans and Statham (2010: 55) define claims as ‘public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors’. Therefore, claims represent the plurality of actions and demands made by actors in the public. The components of a claim can be differentiated by following a logic of questions regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY’ (de Wilde 2014: 52). These questions are the grammar of the claims-making method, help the coder to identify claims as well as make the coding transparent and comprehensible.

In my project, four core codes are necessary in order to constitute a claim: 1) the speaker, 2) the act, 3) the issue and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all of these four codes in a statement, the claim is not coded. The other mentioned components by de Wilde are coded if detectable. The codes are differentiated into sub-codes to allow for a fine-grained coding and analysis (Table 6). Following the claims-making logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims, but also no claims at all. There are two limitations for the coding processes: First, I do not code claims that refer to events of migration that are older than 6 months from the date that it is reported in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration processes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in each newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each article. Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes the claim is seen as a new one.

**Table 6: Codes and sub-codes in the Political Claims Analysis (Appendix Chapter 2)**

<b>codes</b>	<b>sub-codes</b>
<b>time &amp; source</b>	A_year, B_source
<b>claimant</b>	C_claimant_type, D_claimant_scope, E_claimant_function, F_claimant_party, G_claimant_nationality, X_special_claimant, XX_person
<b>action</b>	H_action
<b>issue</b>	I_issue, J_issue scope
<b>addressee</b>	K_addressee_type, L_addressee_scope, M_addressee_function, N_addressee_nationality, P_addressee_party, Q_addressee_evaluation
<b>frame</b>	R_position, S_justification, T_justification_scope

For the present study, the sub-codes “S\_justification” and “T\_justification\_scope” are most relevant. Although optional in the sense of only coded when a justification and a concrete scope could be identified, both sub-codes are in the focus of the meso-relational approach to solidarity. Both, the reason why an actor claims something as well the concrete scope to which s/he refers to and justifies the claim is of interest in order to study the discursive construction of solidarity more closely.

For instance, an article reports about a speech by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the beginning of the article, she is quoted demanding financial assistance (monetary solidarity) for Greece and demands a European solution. In the middle of the text, Merkel is cited again, but here, she calls for liberalising the public health sector in Greece in order to reduce the sovereign debt. Thus, the speaker is the same (Merkel), the act is the same (verbal statement), the issue is also the same (Euro crisis), but the position is different. While the first statement is about monetary solidarity and a pro-solidarity statement, the second statement refers to structural reforms and austerity actions in Greece. That is why both claims can be coded in the same article.

No inter-coder reliability test could be obtained, because I had no financial capacity to fund other researchers to code with me. Thus, the coding was only done by the author. Extensive coder training, previous own experiences and applications of the method as well as the guidance by the codebook of de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn (2014) shall try to compensate the lack of the inter-coder reliability test.

Regarding the coding of the selected 'solidarity statements', I applied a nominalistic approach. This means that I have only coded claims with the mentioned term 'solidarity'. This strengthens the validity and the reliability of the coding procedure for such a polysemic concept. The results are based on the following keyword lists in the database Factiva. The keyword string is: (Flüchtling\* or Flucht\* or Migrant\* or Einwander\* or Zuwander\* or Asyl\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*). An Asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. Duplicates of articles were excluded from the article population.

Using 'Solidar\*' in the keyword search has the disadvantage that the threshold for selecting articles is rather high. By applying the nominalistic approach, the meanings of solidarity can be grasped from the actor's claims. In a deductive-inductive coding process, it was possible to start with preliminary understandings of solidarity, based on previous studies, and then during the coding process, include new, join similar as well as reconsider existing meaning categories during the coding procedure. This helped to grasp the various meanings of the contested concept of solidarity. However, looking at the concrete term 'solidarity' might create a 'nominalistic fallacy'. Two reasons justify this decision and minimise the concerns: First, since the focus of this study is on solidarity, the study makes a more valid contribution by setting a rather strict threshold for the selection of articles and claims. Second, the high threshold positively influences the coding procedure, because the coding decision whether the coded claim is about solidarity is already made. Consequently, the coding concentrates on the meaning and scale of the solidarity claims. This increases the validity and reliability of the coding. Moreover, I had an previous extensive coder training on the political claims analysis and the coding of claims follows the published codebook by de Wilde et al. (2014) who have coded newspaper articles and parliamentary debates in a similar way. The following claim is an example from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*:

*"We need more solidarity. We need more humanity", claimed Michael Roth, the German Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. "We are very, very open to develop a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before", he emphasised (Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 2015).*

The speaker is Michael Roth and coded as SPD politician, he makes a verbal statement in the public, talks about the migration crisis and his position is pro-solidarity. Thus, the

statement is a claim. Additionally, the justification of the claim is coded. Since Roth talks about new European political mechanism that should foster cooperation among the EU member states, the justification of the claim is coded as ‘political solidarity’. The justification scope is then international with the focus on the EU.

Based on previous studies (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Statham *et al.* 2005), the initial expectation was that solidarity is often expressed on demonstrations/protest events and related written statements by actors that are covered in the news. Thus, it would have been interesting to distinguish between different ‘acts of solidarity’ in the media coverage. However, verbal and written statements by institutionalised actors are the most common act of claiming solidarity. 59 per cent of all claims are made verbally while 28 per cent of the claims are written statements. Since the ‘act’ dimension is also not in the focus of this study, because the main interest is the analysis of meanings and scales of solidarity, the ‘act’ dimension is not reported in this study.

Due to the coding of the ‘position’ category, every claim was coded whether it expresses a pro or contra solidarity position (e. g. ‘solidarity is needed, because ...’ as pro-position or ‘solidarity is not necessary, because...’ as contra-position). I expected a polarised discourse on solidarity and the aim was to analyse ‘conflict networks’ (Leifeld 2016b). However, the findings show that 96 per cent of all claims (344 claims in total) are pro-solidarity on the position dimension. Dividing the time period as performed in the study, it shows that there is hardly any polarisation at any time.

**Table 7: Percentage of pro-solidarity claims in German newspapers per year (Appendix Chapter 2)**

Country\year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Germany</b>	100 per cent	90,3 per cent	100 per cent	91,8 per cent	100 per cent	99,2 per cent

If actors claim meanings of solidarity, then they refer to it in a positive pro-solidarity manner. This leads to the conclusion that focusing on polarisation is less interesting than expected from previous research (Leifeld 2016a; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). Thus, the ‘position’ dimension is left out for this study. The non-polarisation of solidarity in this study cannot be analysed in greater detail, but two aspects are reflected here. On the one

hand, solidarity seems to be having a very positive connotation in the everyday language. Even though, it is rather unclear what solidarity might mean, opposing solidarity in public discourses seems rather uncommon. This raises further considerations how to study a concept that actors hardly oppose although the consequence is not necessarily solidary politics. ON the other hand, the missing articulated opposition to solidarity might be an artefact of the structure of the data. Instead of confronting calls to solidarity, actors might not talk about solidarity at all. They use different frames and concepts in order to legitimise their (on-solidary) politics. Since the data gathering and coding relies on a nominalistic approach to solidarity, such public claims on non-solidarity are seldom captured in this study.

### **2.6.2 Discourse network analysis**

The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the discourse network analysis (DNA) (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56) and since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into network data. The DNA brings together discourse analysis and social network analysis by focusing on the interconnectedness of concepts and actor appearances in discourses (Leifeld 2013; Leifeld 2016a; Leifeld and Haunss 2012).

Actors argue with particular concepts and this communicative action can be understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. By referring either more or less to one concept, this could be understood as a repetitive account on arguing for a specific policy solution. Other actors might use the same concept in the debate and build up a relation to the concept too. Since different actors have different interests we could assume that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors. Based on shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network analysis can detect specific actor networks or concept networks to examine which actors are relatively close or distant to each other. Lastly, actors and concepts can be studied in affiliation networks, showing two types of networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). The discourse network graphs 2 and 3 as well as the eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987; Hanneman and Riddle 2011) are computed and visualised with the R package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006). The Fast Greedy algorithm works as bottom-up approach. It is assumed that closely connected nodes form subgroups. To identify these, the algorithm

tries to improve the modularity score in order to detect closely linked nodes (Clauset *et al.* 2004). Hence, subgroups are revealed. The modularity score of each network controls for the subdivision of the network. The scale goes from 0 to 1. The closer the value is to 1, the more densely connected subgroups are within and less linked to nodes in other subgroups. The modularity value is an indicator to scrutinise how well the division of the network by the community detection algorithm works (Newman 2006). However, there is no specific threshold for the modularity score to be more or less accurate. The higher the score, the better it is, but it should also be validated by the applied data. For this purpose, the label propagation community detection algorithm (Raghavan *et al.* 2007) and the walktrap community detection algorithm (Pons and Latapy 2005) have been also computed and the results are shown in Table 8. It lists the modularity score and the number of identified communities by the three different community detection algorithms. Although the differences are small, the Fast Greedy algorithm performed best in both discourse networks.

**Table 8: Comparison of community detection algorithms (Appendix Chapter 2)**

	<b>Fast Greedy algorithm (Modularity/length)</b>	<b>Walktrap algorithm (Modularity/length)</b>	<b>Label propagation algorithm (Modularity/length)</b>
<b>Discourse network 2010-2014</b>	0.32 / 3	0.29 / 3	0.29 / 3
<b>Discourse network 2015</b>	0.33 / 3	0.32 / 2	0.32 / 2

Table 9 lists all nodes in the meaning-scale networks based on their eigenvector centrality values in two time periods 2010-2014 and 2015.

Table 9: Centrality values in German discourse networks (2010-14 and 2015) (Appendix Chapter 2)

2010-2014		2015	
<i>meanings and scales</i>	value	<i>meanings and scales</i>	value
political solidarity	1,000	intergovernmental_EU	1,000
intergovernmental_EU	0,789	political solidarity	0,977
transnational migrants/refugees	0,761	cultural solidarity	0,242
cultural solidarity	0,363	transnational migrants/refugees	0,123
social solidarity	0,261	monetary solidarity	0,071
monetary solidarity	0,089	national	0,037
transnational_with specific group	0,080	transnational_with specific group	0,034
legal solidarity	0,052	social solidarity	0,025
international_conflict zone countries	0,047	national_diverse population	0,008
misuse of solidarity	0,044	Other	0,001
national_diverse population	0,025		
national	0,016		
transnational_EU citizens	0,007		
international_countries of origin	0,002		
economic solidarity	0,000		

Note: The scales are in italics in order to identify them easier in the table. The centrality value of the meaning-scale network is the eigenvector centrality. It is based on the number of edges a concept and a scale share and how the node (meaning or scale) is linked to other central nodes in the network. The scale of eigenvector centrality is from 0 to 1. The closer the value of the node to 1 is, the more influential is the node in the network.



### 3 The politics of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis: Media discourses in Germany and Ireland in 2015<sup>19</sup>

#### 3.1 Introduction

More than one million refugees and migrants came to Europe in 2015. This situation triggered a public debate about the role of solidarity in refugee issues. The former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon spoke about Europe's migration crisis as a "crisis of solidarity" (Ban 2016). Solidarity was one of the central concepts in Europe's migration crisis and the related media debate. How can we make sense of these public references to solidarity? Even though part of the answer might be that the naming of solidarity is window dressing, this might underestimate the relevance of ideas in political and societal debates. Instead of dismissing a closer examination of solidarity or focusing on traditional analyses of solidarity<sup>20</sup>, I will take a closer look at the *discursive construction of solidarity* in the media (Wallaschek 2019c).

I argue that solidarity has multiple meanings and by reconstructing these from the discourses, I demonstrate the conceptual plurality of solidarity. I assume that solidarity is a "contested concept" (Gallie 1956). Various concepts are raised by actors to argue for or against solidarity. These discursive struggles about solidarity have been barely considered in recent studies (Stjernø 2009; Wallaschek 2016a). I will show that political, cultural and social solidarity are the most salient types of solidarity while security and demarcation are the strongest counter-concepts to solidarity in the media debate in 2015. Focusing on this year gives a crucial insight into the climax of media coverage of migration and refugee issues during the crisis.

The chapter proceeds as following: First, the theoretical framework of my ideational research is briefly outlined and concepts of solidarity are described. After that,

---

<sup>19</sup> Chapter 3 will be published in the edited volume '*Europeanisation and Renationalisation. Learning from Crises for Innovation and Development*', edited by Ulrike Liebert and Anne Jenichen at Budrich Academic Publishers in 2019. I would like to thank Anne Jenichen, Ulrike Liebert, Sandra Reinecke and the reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this text.

<sup>20</sup> Traditional studies on solidarity either investigate social policy and welfare state issues or examine opinions and attitudes of individuals on solidarity (e. g. Boräng 2015; Ciornei/Reechi 2017; Oorschot 2000).

the method, case selection and data are presented, before the results of my analysis are shown. The final section reflects on the findings and future research perspectives.

### **3.2 An ideational-discursive approach to solidarity**

An ideational-discursive framework focuses on the ideational foundations of politics and locates ideas in a broader discursive-institutional framework (Béland/Cox 2011; Schmidt 2012). In general, "interpretive approaches to political science focus on the meanings that shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which they do so" (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 17). Depending on certain beliefs and ideas, arguments can change. Politicians adjust their reasoning or propose new ideas. Different interpretations of a political problem are reconstructed by analysing the claims and justifications of actors. Investigating the different rationales helps understand what actors perceive as a problem and how they deal with it (Hajer 1995: 42–45).

While previous studies have shown the relevance of ideas and frames in political decision making processes (e. g. Blyth 2015; Wonka 2016), solidarity as a specific concept is less investigated. Closa and Maatsch (2014) have demonstrated that solidarity is used as a justification in parliamentary debates about the Euro crisis. Based on this, it is assumed that solidarity is also a relevant concept in Europe's migration crisis. However, solidarity might have different meanings and actors deploy their own understanding of solidarity. Based on this and according to the theoretical work on solidarity, solidarity is distinguished into different concepts of solidarity.<sup>21</sup> In the following, political, cultural and social solidarity are briefly described due to their high salience in the German and Irish media discourse.

*Political solidarity* is based on claiming that a certain we should work together in a political context to deal with an issue. This could include new legislative actions, creating political instruments or changing politics in general. Many actors reflect about the political context and conclude that in order to create solidary relations, political institutions and policies have to be changed (Kneuer/Masala 2015).

---

<sup>21</sup> On the theoretical foundations of solidarity, see Bayertz (1998), Brunkhorst (2002) and Wallaschek (2016b).

*Cultural solidarity* emphasises shared norms or traditions between the giver(s) and taker(s) of solidarity, such as the European enlightenment, religious roots or speaking the same language. To share a common cultural background or to belong to the same cultural group is a crucial aspect for acting in solidarity within this justification (Walzer 2006). This cultural framing is used to highlight the values on which the EU is built upon, or it is used to criticise others who seem to ignore these.

*Social solidarity* refers to welfare and social policy issues as well as to helping in the neighbourhood, supporting integration of refugees and migrants by local communities and organisations (Ferrara 2014; Hamann/Karakayali 2016). Social solidarity can be seen as the ideational base for volunteers and citizens. This justification is related to helping migrants and refugees who are settled in the local context.

It has to be noted that each concept of solidarity can have a different geographical scope. Solidarity can refer, as Ciornei and Recchi (2017) have shown, to the international or transnational level, but also to the national or even sub-national level. This differentiation is taken into account for the following analysis to encounter solidarity in its plurality.

### **3.3 Case selection, method and data**

This chapter investigates notions of solidarity in the German and Irish media arena in 2015. Political actors such as national governments present their politics to the general public. By articulating their positions to a broader audience, they legitimise their political actions (Koopmans and Statham 2010). Despite the existence of unequal power structures and resource disparities (Kriesi *et al.* 2007; Van Dalen 2012), the media arena is a place where numerous actors with different political positions appear. Although readership is declining, printed newspapers are crucial, because “thresholds for audience members are particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large” (Wessler *et al.* 2008: 5). By focusing on newspapers, I identify and reconstruct concepts of solidarity in the debate on the migration crisis. I examine the media coverage in 2015 in the Irish Times (IT) and Irish Independent (IInd) for Ireland as well as the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Die Welt (DWe) for Germany. These selected quality daily newspapers are among the most

important ones in their respective country, have a large circulation and represent the political cleavage of centre-left and centre-right positions.

It can be expected that the German debate was more politicised due to the high influx of refugees, and that German actors might refer to the idea of solidarity more often. Ireland was – at least partly due to its geographical location - not in the centre of taking in refugees and thus the Irish debate might have been less intense. I will illustrate these expected differences by examples from the newspaper material.

The selection of newspaper articles is based on a keyword search in the database Factiva. I selected 767 articles from four quality newspapers and coded 551 claims with the RQDA package in R (Huang 2016). The coding is based on the Political Claims Analysis, developed by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; 2010) and further elaborated by Pieter de Wilde (2013). A claim contains four elements: Actors (claimants) speak (action) about something (issue) and express an opinion (position) about it. Additionally, I emphasise the category of justification, because I am interested in the reasons why actors argue for or against solidarity and in the geographical scope actors refer to in their justification. Regarding the manual coding of the claims, I applied a nominalistic approach. This means that I have only coded claims with the term solidarity or close synonyms in it. This strengthens the validity and the reliability of the coding procedure of such a contested term like solidarity, but decreases the number of identifiable claims in newspapers. The following Table 10 presents an overview of the amount of claims and articles in the four selected newspapers.

Table 10: Amount of claims and articles in four newspapers

source/time period	Claims in 2015	Articles in 2015
<b>Süddeutsche Zeitung</b>	218 (39 %)	394 (51 %)
<b>Die Welt</b>	198 (36 %)	223 (29 %)
<b>Irish Times</b>	86 (16 %)	95 (13 %)
<b>Irish Independent</b>	49 (9 %)	55 (7 %)
<b>Total</b>	551 (100 %)	767 (100 %)

Note: The results are based on a keyword search. For Germany: "(Flüchtling\* or Flucht\* or Migrant\* or Einwander\* or Zuwander\* or Asyl\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*)". For Ireland: "(Refugee or escape or Migrant\* or Migration\* or Immigrant or Immigration\* or Asyl\*) and (solidar\* or mutual w/1 support\* or cooperat\*) and (EU or Europ\*)". An Asterisk controls for multiple word endings. Duplicates of articles were excluded.

In comparison, the German discourse is denser and includes more articles and claims than the Irish discourse. Furthermore, the centre-left newspapers SZ and IT contain more articles and claims than the centre-right newspapers. The next section gives a brief overview about Europe's migration crisis in 2015 and after that the most frequently used concepts of solidarity – political, cultural and social solidarity – will be analysed. Then, the anti-solidarity justifications demarcation and security are examined.

### **3.4 Solidarity in Europe's migration crisis**

2015 was a turbulent year in terms of immigration and asylum seeking. Migrants and refugees<sup>22</sup> coming from conflict zones in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia challenged the EU border regime, the Dublin agreements and revealed the "asymmetric way", in which the EU migration and asylum policy was developed (Monar 2014: 620).

The public attention on migration issues and solidarity was very high in the long summer of migration, starting from August until the beginning of October 2015.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons have different legal statuses and rights. I describe these people as "refugees and migrants" if both groups could be meant in a statement, following a suggestion by the UNHCR (2015).

<sup>23</sup> The long summer of migration is a depiction of the events in 2015 from pro-movement activists (Kasperek and Speer 2015).

Especially three distinct events created a lot of media coverage. On August 28<sup>th</sup>, a lorry with several dozen dead migrants was found at a highway in Austria inducing a public outburst. Shortly after, on August 31<sup>st</sup>, and as a reaction to the increasing amount of refugees, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said what later became a key slogan: "We can do it and where something hinders us, it must be overcome" (2015).<sup>24</sup> Lastly, on September 3<sup>rd</sup>, a picture from the three-year-old boy Alan Kurdi, lying dead on a beach at the Turkish coast, received a lot of media attention and produced public reactions about the deadly journey of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean.

The following analysis includes the whole year 2015 demonstrating that even before these incidents, solidarity was discussed in the media and among the main political stakeholders. Looking at the specific justifications for pro- or contra solidarity claims helps to understand how solidarity is framed.

### **3.4.1 Three notions of solidarity**

The most prevalent concepts of solidarity in 2015 are political, cultural and social solidarity. From a total number of 551 claims, 112 claims (20 per cent) contained the justification political solidarity while in 52 claims (10 per cent) cultural solidarity was used as a justification for political actions in times of crisis. Social solidarity was deployed 30 times (5 per cent) in 2015.<sup>25</sup>

Political solidarity refers mainly to the scope of the EU, for example improving the European asylum policies. For instance, the journalist Martin Wolf argues for active solidarity with border states such as Greece, and the German politician Michael Roth demands a European solidarity mechanism.

Solidarity is also needed to help overstretched countries on the frontiers, notably Greece and Italy. It is hard to see how the border-free Europe of today will be maintained without a well-resourced border protection and immigration service (IT, September 23<sup>rd</sup>).

"We need more solidarity. We need more humanity", claimed Michael Roth, the German Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. "We are very, very open to develop a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before", he emphasised (SZ, June 24<sup>th</sup>).

---

<sup>24</sup> The translations of all German statements in the text are my own.

<sup>25</sup> The rest of the claims either contained no justification which is the case in 19 per cent of all claims or referred to other justifications. The salience of the solidarity justifications, first political then cultural and third social solidarity holds true for the German and Irish case.

By focusing on solidarity among EU member states, the statements create a new dimension of exclusion, because migrants and refugees are not an active part in this claim and justification. European solidarity is addressed and frames migrants either as passive or even as a threat to the EU (member states), as Wolf states when he is arguing for more border protection. Solidarity here strengthens the social bonds among the member states and marks the exclusion of refugees. These examples underline the relevance of political solidarity as a crucial frame of how to engage politically in the migration crisis. Across the newspapers and among the actors, establishing solidary mechanisms seems to be perceived as the most important way to deal with the crisis and create co-operation among the EU member states.

The cultural framing of solidarity is used to highlight the values on which the EU is built upon, or criticism is raised why other actors disregard this fundamental principle. The following example shows not only the cultural framing of solidarity, but also the partly exchange of ideas and opinions via national newspapers. In this case, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Sigmar Gabriel, both German social democrats (SPD), wrote an opinion piece together in which they emphasised solidarity as a common ground for cooperation among EU member states, which was published in several European newspapers, including the Irish Times:

Europe is facing a great challenge for our generation. Never before have so many people fled political persecution and war as today, many seeking refuge with us in Europe. [...] As Europeans, we owe it to ourselves and to the world to rise to the great challenge posed by these people looking for help. The response so far does not meet the standards that Europe must set for itself. [...] We need a European asylum, refugee and migration policy founded on the principle of solidarity and our shared values of humanity (IT, August 27<sup>th</sup>).

This sort of claim can be found among different actors. The president of the German Employers' Associations, Ingo Kramer, argued similarly in the discussion on a common solidarity mechanism among EU member states that the EU is foremost a community of solidary values:

Ingo Kramer said, the EU is "a community of solidary values, not a community of benefits". And whoever does not accept refugees could not demand solidarity from other countries [in other circumstances] [...] (SZ, November 25<sup>th</sup>).

Referring to cultural solidarity emphasises the ideational foundations of the EU and demands a value-driven account of politics in the migration crisis. In 2015, it was

especially used to criticise others who oppose solidarity actions and to demand more solidarity.

Lastly, social solidarity refers to welfare and social policy issues as well as to helping in the neighbourhood and supporting the integration of refugees by volunteers. Social solidarity is related to the transnational level by working as the base of voluntary actions for refugees. It is also related to local contexts in which migrants and refugees settled in.

Many Irish people want to help directly. [...] I suggest that a website based on the likes of Daft.ie or Airbnb could be set up through funding from the Department of the Environment. [...] We could call it RAFT.ie (Refugee Accommodation, Food and Transport), where families with spare rooms could offer a safe 'life-raft' to bring refugees closer to safety. Householders can upload photos of the rooms, the numbers they can take and the period of time they can host one refugee, a family or a couple. You might be able to give English lessons, help with form-filling, introduce people into the community, help children with school integration - or just provide warmth, clothing and food, and help them find work. Simply make them feel safe (IInd, October 31<sup>st</sup>).

Citizens are also quite visible in the debate on social solidarity due to their letters to the editor or reports about their local activities.

The [...] solidarity is needed for another task: helping refugees integrate successfully. This is going to be difficult and costly. They will need assistance with learning the language and housing. Richer countries will have to assist the less-well-off ones. A revitalised European economy would also help (IT, September 23<sup>rd</sup>).

This demonstrates that solidarity is not only an elitist concept or is not just used in headlines for newspaper articles. The coverage of concrete solidarity actions by ordinary citizens or the public demand to act in solidarity with refugees shows the variety of solidarity in the discourse. Not only political actions on the European level are discussed, but also the social activities that happened in 2015 (Hamann and Karakayali 2016).

The use of one of these justifications in the media debate is not exclusionary. For instance, actors refer to political as well as cultural solidarity depending on the actual debate or event. So, the identification of different notions of solidarity underlines the need to carefully investigate public debates on solidarity in Europe's migration crisis. There is not necessarily a fixed actor preference towards one notion of solidarity over another type of solidarity. Moreover, there are also justifications in opposition to solidarity and I will present two of them – demarcation and security – in the following section.

### 3.4.2 Unmaking solidarity: Demarcation and security

The most dominant justifications for opposing solidarity are demarcation and security. In 551 claims in 2015, demarcation and security were used each 43 times (taken together 16 per cent of all claims) and most often in the German discourse. Demarcation is the strongest reason for non-solidarity and is against the border crossing of migrants. As the following report in the Irish Times shows, setting up fences and creating special police forces shall demonstrate the sovereign national power.

An additional steel border fence is now being erected [at the Hungarian border], and more than 2,100 police officers and cadets will form fast-reaction "hunting" units, equipped with four-wheel-drives, helicopters and dogs, to respond to incidents. Hungary's parliament is expected to debate the deployment of soldiers to the border (IT, August 31<sup>st</sup>).

Demarcation frames in their extremist versions are physical attacks and hate speeches against incoming refugees and are linked to racist and nationalist arguments (Jäckle and König 2017). The next media report on a radical right-wing protest in Italy shows that such anti-refugee protests were already happening before the long summer of migration.

Members of Casa Pound, a neo-fascist organisation, appeared in Rome. As soon as the bus with 19 African refugees arrived who were to be accommodated at the Casale San Nicola, right-wing extremists waved the Italian flag, shouted hate slogans, raised their right arm for the fascist salute and blocked the entrance (SZ, July 22<sup>nd</sup>).

The demarcation justification can be seen in protest and demonstrations against a so called abuse of asylum or in claims for the deportation of irregular refugees. Claims for demarcation fundamentally contest the need for solidarity.

The justification for security shifts the statement from solidary actions to issues of border control and safety. Instead of helping refugees, border control and surveillance of the Mediterranean by Frontex should be enhanced to stop irregular migration and prosecute human traffickers. The refugee disappears in this justification. This re-shaping of the migration crisis by focusing on smugglers and human trafficking can be observed at the European level as well. In April 2015, a 10-point action plan to deal with the increasing numbers of refugees was presented at a European Council meeting which focused on security issues.

A 10-point action plan on migration was outlined at a joint foreign and home affairs European Council meeting on April 20<sup>th</sup>. The action plan focuses primarily on military action

against smugglers and refers, for example, to “systematic efforts to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers” (IT, April 23<sup>rd</sup>).

Besides setting up national fences and border control, migration processes are seen as threats to national societies as well as the European community. Instead of showing solidarity with refugees who come to Europe, the claim for solidarity is reversed and used to justify security measures at the national and European borders.

Warsaw wants to prevent a revision of asylum law based on the population of the EU member states. Until now Poland receives only few refugees in relation to its population size – in 2014 only 114 Syrians have applied for asylum. It is not surprising that the head of government Ewa Kopacz primarily insists on better border security in the Mediterranean at the EU summit in Brussels. “Our solidarity primarily rests upon strongly supporting Frontex. We will send our border police officers” (DWe, April 25<sup>th</sup>).

The security justification is mostly facilitated by far right and conservative politicians, but also by politicians from the so called Visegrád Group (Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary) as the claim by the former Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz illustrates. The justification is used to either prevent further European cooperation or to focus on smuggling and human trafficking; instead of helping refugees or establishing legal routes for them.

The contrasting justifications to solidarity demonstrate that even though claims for solidarity are the most frequent ones, the contestation of solidarity is an essential part of the discourse as well. Proposing political solidarity as a European mechanism to take in refugees or relocate refugees among EU member states is one side. The other side is giving up the Schengen Agreement and renationalising border control and refugee policies.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

Solidarity became a crucial concept in the public debate in Europe in 2015. This chapter aimed at revealing the different meanings of solidarity and the discursive counterparts to solidarity. Solidarity is not a concept with one uncontested meaning, but has a variety of understandings. The three most salient meanings – political, social and cultural solidarity – were examined in the debate on Europe’s migration crisis. The reconstructed notions of solidarity in the discourses emphasise the careful assessment of solidarity claims. Solidarity can contain different notions which refer to various perceptions of the

migration crisis. Looking more precisely at these constructions helps us to understand how actors understand and make sense of crisis situations by referring to solidarity.

The use of political solidarity in both national discourses demonstrates that the media debate goes beyond the framing of renationalisation or Europeanisation in times of crisis. Both processes are captured in the discussion on solidarity which underlines the relevance of both national solidarity and European solidarity in the debate on the migration crisis. The framing of cultural solidarity in 2015 was almost always related to common European values and norms, respectively the lack of these by the criticised actors. This cultural Europeanisation of solidarity is a hint towards the high importance of solidarity as a fundamental idea in European societies and the European treaties. Social solidarity is used as a justification in the debate in regard to voluntary work and support for refugees. It has an explicit transnational dimension in the German and Irish context by showing solidarity with foreigners in need.

The demarcation and security justifications in the debate were often put forward as a renationalisation of politics and sovereignty. European cooperation and co-ordination were addressed as the demand to strengthen border control and surveillance measures in the Mediterranean. Extreme forms of these claims were expressed as physical attacks and right-wing radical speeches against refugees and volunteers in the migration sector. Even though pro-solidarity claims were far more frequent than anti-solidarity claims, the discourse has shifted in 2015 from more pro-solidarity at the climax of the long summer of migration to more anti-solidarity discourses in the winter. This underlines the contestation of solidarity in the discourse and that the call for solidary actions is not a given consensus.

The debate about the refugee situation in Europe is about refugees, not with refugees. I have identified some claims made by migrants, but in general these voices have been invisible and silenced as previous studies demonstrated (KhosraviNik *et al.* 2012; Lünenborg *et al.* 2011). If public discourses include more migrants and refugees voices in the future, they would be less paternalistic and contain more accounts on what refugees need and say how a solidary relationship in Europe should look like.

Europe's migration crisis is seen as a European issue in German and Irish newspapers. The used geographical scopes in the justification corroborate this finding.

Political solidarity mostly refers to the international level within the EU and suggests that solidary actions should happen among the EU member states. Social and cultural solidarity bear a strong transnational dimension by claiming voluntary actions with refugees and migrants. Security claims contain either a more national or a more international dimension. Border control and surveillance are proposed as measures in the nation-state but also as joint actions at the Southern European borders. Only demarcation contains this explicit national(istic) framing in Germany and Ireland.

This discourse similarity in the geographical scope of concepts can be seen as a first hint towards a shared understanding of solidary problem solving. National solidarity is neither in Germany nor in Ireland the dominant notion while claims for types of international and transnational solidarity are made in Europe's migration crisis. Even if security measures are often not in line with international solidarity obligations, the claims for joint security actions still demonstrate the political will to cooperate within the EU. In times of renationalisation and Euroscepticism, European cooperation is more than ever necessary. In 1950, Robert Schuman declared that Europe "will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity" (Schuman 1950). Nowadays, the concrete achievements as well as solidarity are at stake. It should be in the interest of the political elites and national populations to strengthen the idea of solidarity as a crucial value and a guiding principle for political actions in the European Union.

Future research should investigate the (changing) actor constellation in Europe more concretely to account for different party positions on migration and asylum policies. Analysing public discourses in Central and Eastern European countries might also reveal different actor constellation due to their sceptical view on European solidarity in the migration crisis. Moreover, future studies could examine the influence of different media systems on the coverage of such a European issue and the role of social media for the discussion on solidarity in Europe's migration crisis.

## 4 Framing solidarity in the Euro crisis: A comparison of the German and Irish media discourse<sup>26</sup>

The article analyses the framing of solidarity in the Euro crisis discourse. Previous research has argued that the Euro crisis and the debtor-creditor constellation highlights the political conflict around solidarity in the EU. Based on a discursive institutionalist framework, the article investigates the different meanings of solidarity as well as the constellation of actors in Germany and Ireland from 2010 to 2015. Whilst Germany as the biggest creditor country is understood as a potential giver of solidarity, Ireland as a debtor country is conceptualised as a potential receiver of solidarity. The discourse network methodology is applied to study the relation of framing and actor presence. The findings show that the ideational structure of both discourses is different, but the actor constellation is rather similar. In particular, solidarity and austerity are linked in the German discourse, while the Irish discourse focuses predominantly on responsibility and solidarity, and less so on austerity. The actor constellation shows a dominance of German actors in both countries, highlighting the central position of Germany within the Eurozone. The article is the first study to analyse the construction of solidarity in the Euro crisis and contributes to the study of solidarity in hard times.

Keywords: discursive institutionalism; solidarity; Euro crisis, discourse network analysis; Germany; Ireland

---

<sup>26</sup> Chapter 4 is published online in *New Political Economy* on March 5<sup>th</sup> 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2019.1586864>. I would like to thank the participants of the joint BIGSSS/InIIS colloquium, the UCD SPIRe Seminar Series and the panel audiences at the ECPR general conference 2017 and DVPW section conference 'Internationale Politik' in 2017 for their helpful comments and suggestions. In particular, I appreciate the feedback by Sebastian Haunss, Aidan Regan, Sandra Reinecke, Marcus Wolf and Arndt Wonka. Moreover, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the article.

## 4.1 Introduction

The Euro crisis was dominated by the austerity paradigm, which gave rise to new financial institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the form of intergovernmental treaties and a new supranational supervisory institution referred to as the 'Troika' (from 2015 on, 'the institutions'). Formed by the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it supervised the bailout programmes in the 'GIPS' countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) (Blyth 2015; Schmidt 2016; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013).

Nonetheless, claims on solidarity were also articulated in the Euro crisis. The demand to help the crisis countries emphasised the crucial value of solidarity in the EU integration process and called for a European and democratic solution to the crisis (Lahusen and Grasso 2018a; Sangiovanni 2013). In times of crisis, calls for solidarity are often articulated to deal with uncertainty and perceived threats. Solidarity claims are then an appeal to cooperate and strengthen the social bonds between members of a community. With regard to the EU, the creditor and debtor state constellation in the Euro crisis can be understood as a question of solidarity in terms of who is cooperating with whom and on what grounds (Hutter *et al.* 2016). The 'GIPS countries' are understood as *potential receivers of solidarity*, because they demand that other member states help them to recover and share the economic and financial burden. Other EU member states who have not been negatively affected by the crisis, such as Finland, Austria or Germany, are expected to show solidarity with the crisis countries and could be conceptualised as *potential givers of solidarity*. Therefore, we would expect that actors from the debtor countries predominantly claim solidarity, criticise Germany as the main creditor state for its ordoliberal policies, and attack the 'Troika' for its strict conditionality. Hence, solidarity is understood as oppositional to austerity and as a strategic idea deployed by the political opposition in parliamentary debates (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Wonka 2016).

However, based on an analysis of solidarity in the Euro crisis discourse in Germany and Ireland from 2010 to 2015, I will demonstrate that solidarity is a 'polysemic idea' that is strategically used by national executives and is connected to other ideas in the debtor and creditor discourse in 'coalition magnet patterns' (Béland and Cox 2016). The

German discourse is structured by the 'austerity-solidarity' pattern, linking the two ideas that are seen as necessary to resolve the Euro crisis. The Irish discourse, by contrast, is shaped by the 'responsibility-conditionality-solidarity' pattern. Regarding the actor constellation, I demonstrate that German government actors dominate the public discourse and act as 'ideational leaders' (Stiller 2010). This emphasises the crucial position of Germany and German actors in influencing the crisis discourse of the debtor country Ireland.

Germany and Ireland represent the creditor-debtor divide which has impacted both the EU and the public debate around the Euro crisis (Frieden and Walter 2017). Germany is the largest EU economy, the biggest creditor in the Eurozone, and a highly influential EU member state. Ireland is a small open economy that was named the 'Celtic Tiger' with a low debt rate and booming (FDI-oriented) economy just before the outbreak of the crisis. In 2011, it requested financial aid from the EU and was part of the bailout programme until the end of 2013 (Roche *et al.* 2017). Many scholars have investigated Germany's hegemonic role in the Euro crisis (Bulmer 2014; Matthijs 2016), but Ireland remains somewhat under-researched. The division of Southern European states with a demand-led growth strategy and Northern European countries with an export-led growth strategy (Hall 2014), or Matthijs and McNamara's (2015) framing of 'Northern Saints and Southern Sinners', ignores the political, economic, and socio-cultural circumstances that have brought each crisis state (and in particular Ireland) to its specific position. In fact, previous research has shown that Ireland does not fit into any of these groups (Hardiman *et al.* 2017; Regan and Brazys 2018).

Focusing on the mass media highlights that political actors present their ideas to a broader audience in order to legitimise their political decision-making and influence and mobilise public opinion (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Statham and Trenz 2013). Printed quality newspapers are crucial, because 'thresholds for audience members are particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large' (Wessler *et al.* 2008: 5). Discourse network analysis (DNA) is applied to investigate the framing and actor constellation in both national discourses. The DNA bridges the gap between content-oriented and actor-centred methods by focusing on the interconnectedness of speakers and statements in public debates (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012).

The article makes three main contributions. *First*, it sheds light on the multiple meanings of solidarity and how ideas are linked by actors in public discourses in the Euro crisis. *Second*, it compares the sub-discourse on solidarity in a creditor and a debtor state, and by doing so reveals the main differences (i.e. in the ideational structure) and similarities (i.e. in the actor constellation). While austerity and solidarity are closely linked in the German discourse, the Irish discourse draws together solidarity and responsibility. *Third*, the article demonstrates the dominance of (German) government actors in both discourses.

The text proceeds as follows. After introducing the general theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism, I discuss the literature on actor visibility and framing. The third section presents the data and the network methods. Then, the context of the Euro crisis is briefly described, before the results are presented. The last section summarises and discusses the findings.

## **4.2 Agency and ideas in discursive institutionalism**

Discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008) emphasises the role and relevance of ideas in political processes. It is 'concerned with the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse and policy argumentation in institutional context' (Schmidt 2012: 85). Ideas guide actions; they 'help us to think about ways to address problems and challenges that we face and therefore are the cause of our actions' (Béland and Cox 2011b: 4). The discursive-institutionalist approach does not assume that there are predefined interests that are fixed and can only be reversed through 'external shocks'. Instead, communicative exchanges in institutional settings enable and constrain actors' perceptions and interests (Blyth 2002). Recently, the relevance of agency in a discursive institutionalist framework has been stressed. Ideas are put forward by actors or are articulated to confirm or challenge existing ideas (Boswell and Hampshire 2017). To this end, Sabina Stiller's ideational leadership approach is included to account for the agency dimension in discursive institutionalism.

#### **4.2.1 Ideational leaders in the Euro crisis: Political parties, European actors, civil society groups**

In her book on institutional change in the German welfare state, Stiller (2010) argues that recent social policy reforms (Riester pension reform, Hartz unemployment reform) have been made possible because key policy-makers pushed for them and influenced the agenda to realise the reforms. Stiller demonstrates that both individual and collective actors can substantially change the public discourse. She argues that political agents and especially members of government have the capacity to work with ideas. Ideas are seen as resources which allow actors to overcome others' resistance, propose alternative policies or mobilise their peers for matters of consensus (Stiller 2010: 26). The last aspect can lead to the establishment of a discourse coalition (Hajer 1995). Stiller (2010: 33) defines ideational leadership as 'key policy-makers who use strategies that are idea-based ("ideational"), and purposively aim for the achievement of change, even in view of reform resistance ("leadership")'.

The ultimate goal of actors in public discourses is to exercise discursive power in the form of agreement with others or by dominating the public agenda with their specific framing (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Being a public entrepreneur for a certain idea increases your reputation for future agenda-setting processes and legitimises your work as an interest group or scholar on a policy reform (Kingdon 1995; Seeleib-Kaiser 2016). The parliamentary opposition or the smaller coalition partner could use the public forum to set an alternative agenda and gain more public attention. Ministers of government can also act as ideational leaders to support their staff and ministries in turf battles against other ministries or in dealing with different competences in the EU and national arena (Stiller and van Gerven 2012; Wenzelburger 2011). To sum up, ideational leadership can be exercised by different interest groups (trade unions, employers' associations, religious groups), journalists, public intellectuals, experts or NGOs, and is not limited to government actors as Stiller suggests.

In order to specify the actor dimension, three main research strands on political parties, European actors, and civil society organisations in the Euro crisis are considered. *First*, scholars have shown that political parties strongly shape national public discourses on European integration (Hutter *et al.* 2016; Koopmans 2007; Senninger and Wagner 2015).

Parties justify their political actions and politicians legitimise their decisions in public. In particular, national executives receive media attention and thereby influence public opinion and the public understanding of the causes and consequences of the Euro crisis. Kriesi and Grande (2015) corroborate that national executives dominate the public debate on the Euro crisis. The regular intergovernmental meetings of the European Council ('crisis summits'), the meetings of the Euro group as well as the temporary Franco-German 'Merkozy' tandem (Crespy and Schmidt 2014) emphasise the importance of intergovernmental decision-making processes in the Euro crisis. Nonetheless, the conflict between government and opposition on European issues seems to be crucial, revealing different positions on austerity and solidarity (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Maatsch 2014).

I expect that national political parties in general and national executives in particular act as ideational leaders and dominate the discourse in the creditor state Germany as well as in the debtor state Ireland. German actors, especially Chancellor Angela Merkel and Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble, might shape the discourse with their statements. Germany's hegemonic position – although contested and domestically constrained (Bulmer 2014) – as the most influential EU member state (economically and politically) and the largest creditor state in the Euro crisis, favours their public leadership in the Irish newspapers.

*Second*, previous research has demonstrated the increasing relevance of international and European actors in hard times. Bauer and Becker (2014) argue that the European Commission (EC) is the 'unexpected winner' of the Euro crisis due to its involvement in the Troika, its regular appearances in public debate as well as its agenda-setting role in European affairs. Schmidt (2016) has stressed the role of the EC but also the position of the ECB, claiming that both supranational institutions 'rule by stealth' in the Euro crisis. Their democratic legitimacy is weak (EC) or non-existent (ECB), but both have far-reaching influence on national legislation, for instance on the budgetary right of the national parliaments via the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, they initiate crisis solutions such as the announcement of 'whatever it takes' by ECB president Draghi in the summer of 2012 and the declaration to buy bonds – outright monetary transactions (OMTs) – from the crisis countries if they commit to certain conditions.

Thus, I expect that supranational EU institutions play a role in the solidarity debate in the Euro crisis. The presidents of these institutions (EC – Barroso, then Juncker; ECB – Trichet, then Draghi; European Parliament – Schulz) might claim ideational leadership in the public debate. While the German discourse is more dominated by domestic actors (Bulmer 2014; Kriesi and Grande 2015), European and international actors might be more central in Ireland due to its debtor status and the direct involvement of the Troika in the Irish bailout programme (2011–13). Troika representatives and Irish government officials might justify austerity measures as ‘alternativlos’ (without any alternative). This might trigger more political conflict and give the political party opposition the momentum to mobilise against the austerity policies of the national government and the Troika, and to propose more solidarity-oriented policies.

*Third*, Statham and Trenz (2013) have argued that the politicisation of the public sphere could open up the discourse for other actors and give a voice to less powerful actors such as NGOs or social movements. Consequently, the expected actor expansion and intensity of the debate might enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy. However, scholars have shown that the public space for protest movements and non-party actors on European issues is rather limited (Dolezal *et al.* 2016; Koopmans 2007). Furthermore, Serreccino *et al.* (2013) demonstrate that Ireland has not experienced a large anti-austerity movement which could have pushed for a solidary solution to the crisis.<sup>27</sup> Still, the focus on solidarity claims in this study might favour the aforementioned presence, because protest movements and critical NGOs such as Attac or trade unions view austerity policies rather critically. Thus, I expect that they act as ideational leaders by demanding a transfer union or Eurobonds in the Euro crisis, or by claiming solidarity with Greece or Ireland.

#### **4.2.2 Coalition magnet patterns in the Euro crisis: Meanings of solidarity**

Besides the perspective on agency, the role of ideas is further elaborated. Béland and Cox (2016) have theorised ideas and identify three criteria for an idea to become a ‘coalition magnet’. First, the idea can be ‘effectively manipulated’ (Béland and Cox 2016: 429) and is

---

<sup>27</sup> Scholars have argued that the protest about austerity in Ireland was channelled by the ballot box in the ‘earthquake elections’ of 2011 in which the ruling coalition (Fianna Fáil and the Green Party) was fundamentally out-voted by the people (Allen and O’Boyle 2013: 109–125).

rather 'ambiguous or polysemic' (Béland and Cox 2016: 431). Second, key actors promote the idea. These can be actors in the formal decision-making process or crucial veto players. Lastly, the idea brings together actors with varying belief systems. Additionally, the idea might serve as a coalition magnet if it is new in the discourse or is re-interpreted by certain actors and thus bears a new meaning which is then articulated in times of crisis (Béland and Cox 2016; Blyth 2002).

Coalition magnets mostly consist of particular ideas such as 'sustainability' that strongly resonate in the public discourse and are articulated in a 'policy window' (Kingdon 1995). In the case of sustainability, the concept is linked to broader issues of population and global health policies to attract various policy-makers and policy entrepreneurs (Béland and Katapally 2018; Khayat-zadeh-Mahani *et al.* 2019). I adapt the understanding of coalition magnets for the present study. Instead of defining one particular idea as a coalition magnet, it is likely that in order to influence the discourse and attract key policy actors, various ideas are linked in the discourse and form ideational patterns. These 'coalition magnet patterns' structure the discourse. To this end, the present study looks at *coalition magnet patterns* that shape the public solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis.

Previous research on the Euro crisis has emphasised the dominant role of austerity in the crisis management. Blyth (2015) has reconstructed the emergence of the idea of austerity in history and in particular in the Euro crisis. It has also been demonstrated that economic ideas, especially austerity and ordoliberalism, have strongly shaped the public debate on the Euro crisis in the EU (Lovering 2017; Ojala and Harjuniemi 2016; Schmidt 2016). In contrast, cultural frames have not played a crucial role in debates on the European integration project. If these are used, then it is not necessarily by Eurosceptic parties, but rather by mainstream parties and particularly conservative parties in the Euro crisis debate (Grande *et al.* 2016; Wonka 2016).

Another central issue is redistribution in hard times. It has been demonstrated that (German) voters were critical of the bailout programme in the Euro crisis and would have given less money to the crisis countries due to their fear that the economic and financial burden might be too high (Bechtel *et al.* 2014). Nonetheless, having a more left-leaning

political orientation and preferring cultural openness and tolerance increases support for redistributing resources among EU citizens (Kuhn *et al.* 2018; Lahusen and Grasso 2018a).

On solidarity and distributional politics in the Euro crisis, Closa and Maatsch (2014) investigate the framing of solidarity in the parliamentary debates on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in several EU countries. The members of the national parliaments had to decide and justify their position on the EFSF. The authors identified solidarity as one of the key frames in the debate and operationalised solidarity as referring to human rights and social justice. They demonstrate a strong divide between government and opposition actors in using claims on solidarity in parliamentary speeches. While government representatives used mostly utilitarian and economic frames to justify their vote for the EFSF, the left parliamentary opposition called for solidarity and criticised the EFSF fundamentally.

The problem of understanding solidarity in terms of human rights and social justice is not just that it conflates cultural (based on shared norms) and social (based on redistribution) framings of solidarity. It also misses the fact that solidarity contains further meanings, too. In fact, solidarity might be a 'polysemic' idea (Béland and Cox 2016) that attracts many actors, but remains ambiguous. Hence, I examine the multiple meanings of solidarity and how actors deliberately claim solidarity in public debates. Drawing on previous research, I identify seven meanings of solidarity.

The most prominent concept is *social solidarity* which is used in research on welfare states. It refers to institutions that create redistribution mechanisms (Baldwin 1990). Schelkle (2017) has pointed to risk-sharing as monetary solidarity in her analysis of the economic and financial structure of the EU in the Euro crisis. *Monetary solidarity* is then a liability statement for all members of the Eurozone supporting each other in case of hardship. *Cultural solidarity* emphasises that shared norms and a shared identity form the basis of acting in solidarity (Jones 2014). *Political solidarity* refers to institutions and mechanisms which enable cooperation among political entities to deal with problems and challenges in a burden-sharing manner (Kneuer and Masala 2015). Solidarity is one of the guiding (legal) principles in the EU treaties (Sangiovanni 2013). The legal phrase 'pacta sunt servanda' (agreements must be kept) can be understood as a *legal solidarity* procedure in which actors, who have signed an agreement, have to comply with it, including the

obligations and rights that result from it. *Economic solidarity* considers public investments and coordinated strategies to support growth and employment as actions of mutual aid (Sommer 2013). Lastly, *misuse of solidarity* contains the term solidarity, but actors question the legitimacy of another's initial call to solidarity.

I expect four of these definitions to act as nodal points in the respective coalition magnet patterns. *Monetary* and *economic solidarity* might prominently feature in both discourses and form a solidarity pattern, because both meanings are directly linked to the causes and consequences of the Euro crisis as well as to the conflict around new institutional structures like the ESM. Moreover, *cultural* and *social solidarity* might create another solidarity pattern, because solidarity is a crucial value in the EU treaties, and the increase in the unemployment rate alongside cuts in the welfare sector in the crisis countries might prompt actors to promote and claim solidarity as important ideational resources to overcome the crisis situation.

### **4.3 Research design and methods**

The study analyses newspaper articles from two German and two Irish daily quality newspapers from 2010 until 2015. While Germany and Ireland represent ideal cases of the creditor and debtor constellation in the Euro crisis (Frieden and Walter 2017), the four newspapers are chosen because of their broad readership and large circulation. Choosing a centre-left (*Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)* and *Irish Times*) and a centre-right (*Die Welt* and *Irish Independent*) newspaper in each country controls for left/right political ideologies in the media arena and assures that different positions and actors in the media are covered. Previous studies have shown that quality newspapers are still the main gatekeepers in Western European countries and report more on political events than tabloids (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Reinemann *et al.* 2012). However, printed quality newspapers are elite-centred, and less institutionalised actors are less represented than government and political party actors (Koopmans 2007).


Based on a keyword search string in the database Factiva that includes the term 'solidarity', increasing the likelihood of coding relevant articles on solidarity in the Euro crisis, I selected in total 1,606 articles and identified 619 solidarity related claims in the four newspapers. The coding procedure follows that of the political claims analysis (PCA)

(Koopmans and Statham 1999) and was adapted from the codebook by de Wilde et al. (2014). The claims-making method focuses on the relation between an actor and their public statements. Claims are therefore defined as ‘public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors’ (Koopmans and Statham 2010: 55). Following the grammar of the PCA, information on the claimant, the action, the issue, the position, and the justification have been coded. The following excerpt from the SZ illustrates the coding:

Before the start of the EU summit in Brussels, Merkel suggested the establishment of a new European Investment fund. This shall support countries which consolidate their budgets and simultaneously have to finance reforms to foster growth and employment. Germany proposes ‘a new form of solidarity’ in the public discussion, claims Merkel in the Bundestag (Angela Merkel, SZ, October 2012).

The claimant is Chancellor Merkel, who makes a verbal statement (action) in the German Bundestag on the Euro crisis (issue), favours a solidarity instrument (position) in the form of a European Investment Fund to foster growth and employment in the crisis countries (justification). German newspapers contained 368 claims while 251 claims were identified in the Irish newspaper articles from 2010 to 2015 (see also the [appendix of chapter 4](#)). Figure 10 shows the salience of solidarity claims in the newspapers. Salience is calculated by dividing the total number of claims by the selected number of articles per newspaper in each year.

Figure 10: Saliency of claims in German and Irish newspapers



Note: The black lines are the German newspapers, the grey ones are the Irish newspapers. The dotted lines are for centre-right newspapers, while solid lines show the centre-left newspapers.

The saliency of solidarity claims differs between Germany and Ireland and the newspapers. The Irish newspapers, the Irish Times in particular, cover relatively many solidarity claims per article. This underlines the relevance and direct impact of the Euro crisis in Ireland. German newspapers have a rather low saliency compared to the Irish newspapers. The four newspapers cover solidarity claims most similarly in 2012 and 2013 which are the crucial years of the Euro crisis. For Ireland in particular, 2013 marks the end of the austerity programme. The rise of solidarity claims in 2015 can be explained by the intense debate on the future of the Euro after the electoral victory of the leftist party Syriza in Greece and the heated discussion about a third bailout programme for Greece.

The discourse network methodology is applied to investigate the actor constellation and the framing process in an interdependent manner (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). Discourse networks are affiliated networks, because they contain two types of nodes (actors and meanings) that are connected. For instance, if two actors refer

to the same concept, they are linked via the concept that they have used in separate claims. By studying the relations between ideas and actors, we can examine ideational leaders and their use of various ideas in public discourse. By doing so, the potential coalition magnet patterns and ideational leaders can be studied simultaneously.

The discourse networks are examined by applying the *eigenvector centrality* as well as the *walktrap community detection algorithm*. Eigenvector centrality is calculated by the number of edges a node has to other nodes, and also considers the centrality of the tied nodes. The centrality shows whether the node is linked to central nodes in the network (Bonacich 1987). Thus, identifying ideational leaders and the nodal points in the coalition magnet patterns relies not only on the number of claims an actor makes in the public discourse or how often an idea is mentioned, but also on whether key actors refer to these ideas and connect central ideas and ideational leaders. The basic assumption of the walktrap community detection algorithm is that random walks on the edges in a network will stay within a certain community. Based on a certain length of steps, the detection algorithm identifies nodes that are reached (Pons and Latapy 2005). This reveals sub-structures within large network structures and helps to analyse which ideas are closely connected and form the suggested ideational patterns.

#### **4.4 Ireland and Germany in the Euro crisis<sup>28</sup>**

In December 2009, the Greek government admitted that its national finances were incorrect and less sustainable than originally reported. This triggered a European-wide debate about debt, economic growth, and financial help in the EU. After the first Greek bailout programme, the new institutional intergovernmental treaties – European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) – were created.

In 2011, Ireland requested financial help from the EU. Before the crisis, Ireland was the poster child of the EU as a small, open, and prosperous economy. Unlike Germany (and France), Ireland had never violated the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact in the

---

<sup>28</sup> Table 11 in the appendix of chapter 4 includes an overview of the government and party constellation in Germany and Ireland, showing who was in government, the party affiliations of key politicians, and how these changed during the analysed time period.

Eurozone. Due to the global financial crisis of 2008 and the entanglement of Irish banks with US, German, and French banks, the Irish government had to bailout six Irish banks (with 64 billion Euros) in order to avoid the collapse of the Irish banking system, a further contagion effect on other banks and to prevent moral hazard. Accordingly, the Irish sovereign debt rate increased dramatically from 25 per cent of GDP in 2007 to nearly 120 per cent in 2012. At the end of 2009, 348 billion Euros of Irish debt were held by German, French, Austrian, Belgian, and Dutch banks. As Hall sums up, with the bailout situation and the creation of the EFSF and EFSM for the Eurozone, '[t]he countries of Northern Europe were essentially bailing out their own banks' (Hall 2012: 364).

The EU's political response to the crisis was strict austerity. In this regard, the Irish case is exceptional, because, as Roche et al. (2017) show, the Irish government opted for an austerity programme (debt reduction, financial consolidation, cuts in social spending, etc.) before the Troika came in. The 'auto-austerity' of Ireland, as Roche et al. call it, prepared the ground for the Troika's austerity programme, which was less strict than the one in Greece (Hardiman *et al.* 2017). Moreover, others have argued that Ireland is hardly comparable to the other crisis countries, because of its different political, social, and economic factors. Ireland follows a different growth regime, driven by FDI (foreign direct investments) and an export-oriented liberal market economy. These aspects were the reason for the relatively fast economic recovery rather than the austerity programme as proclaimed by the Troika and the EC (Regan and Brazys 2018).

In contrast to the Irish case, Germany was hardly affected by the Euro crisis. The German economy faced a recession after the global financial crisis, but its export-oriented growth strategy and Keynesian economic policy helped it to recover quickly. Politically, Germany was stuck 'between hegemony and domestic politics' (Bulmer 2014) in the Euro crisis. On the one hand, European actors demanded that the German government take the lead and show its European orientation in practice. German politicians often referred to the normative and economic advantages of the European integration project (Wendler 2014). On the other hand, Germany only insisted on bailing out crisis countries under strict conditionality and if they adopted austerity measures. It has been argued that this in turn worsened the Euro crisis in 2012–13 and led to further bailout programmes in Greece,

as well as giving more political authority to supranational institutions (Blyth 2015; Matthijs 2016).

Beyond the Irish and German cases, the trajectory of the Euro crisis further unfolded in 2011 when Portugal as a third country (after Greece and Ireland) requested a bailout programme. Moreover, a European-wide discussion on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was initiated. In 2012, a second bailout package for Greece was agreed, and Spain and Cyprus had to ask for financial help. At the same time, the Fiscal Compact as well as the ESM were established, and in the summer of 2012 the ECB president Draghi (2012) declared that the ECB 'is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough'. In 2013, the Irish government tried to improve market confidence by announcing it would leave the bailout programme in the same year, which happened in December 2013. There were huge protests in Greece against the Troika, while Cyprus was the next country to be bailed out. Portugal left the bailout programme in 2014 and the ECB's newly established 'stress test' for national banks showed that several banks were still short in liquidity and would face severe problems in an upcoming crisis. At the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, the breakdown of the Greek government and Syriza's electoral victory shaped the Euro crisis debate as well as the subsequent negotiations on the third bailout programme with adjusted conditions for Greece. The Greek referendum on new austerity measures in July 2015 dominated coverage of the Euro crisis until summer 2015. After that point, Europe's migration crisis dominated the media agenda on solidarity, and discussion around the Euro crisis almost 'disappeared' in the last few months of 2015.

## **4.5 Results**

### **4.5.1 Solidity and solidarity in the German discourse**

The German discourse is strongly shaped by the understanding of *financial solidity* and the meaning of *monetary solidarity*, and each forms a dominant coalition magnet pattern. In terms of ideational leadership, German Chancellor Merkel, former EC president Barroso as well as the German conservative parties CDU and CSU are the most central actors in the discourse (Table 14 on the eigenvector centrality values of the actors and meanings in the [appendix of chapter 4](#)). The focus on financial solidity (or fiscal consolidation)

demonstrates that the solidarity discourse is strongly influenced by the leading ‘austerity paradigm’ in the Euro crisis and is claimed by government actors. Solidarity can only be shown with crisis countries if sovereign debts are reduced and a balanced budget is reached (*Schwarze Null*). As Merkel put it in her speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2011:

‘The level of debt is the biggest threat to the prosperity of our continent’, said Merkel in a fierce speech in front of more than 1,000 participants. There has been great solidarity for some countries in the last months, but this is just one side of the coin. ‘Solidarity has to be coupled with solidity and stability’, claimed Merkel. It’s the only way to save the Euro. (Angela Merkel, SZ, January 2011)

This viewpoint is shared by many actors (Figure 11). Journalists (Hagelücken, Siems), the presidents of the EC (Barroso, Juncker) and the German governing parties and politicians (CDU, CSU, Westerwelle<sup>29</sup>, Merkel) refer to the concept of financial solidity and defend it against other policy proposals such as Eurobonds or a banking union. This strong link of solidarity and financial solidity is underlined by the meaning of the German word *Schuld* which has two meanings: ‘debt’ and ‘guilt’. The paternalistic narrative was that the Euro crisis happened because of wrongdoings in the ‘GIPS’ countries (‘lazy Greeks’), and, therefore, they have to demonstrate that they can do better before the other EU member states can help (act in solidarity).


In line with recommendations from the IMF and others, a haircut for Greece is discussed in the German media. It is argued that the Greek sovereign debt is too big to be potentially repaid to the creditors. By paying horrendous interest rates for the loans, this creates more budget imbalances. As the journalist Siems argues, a debt reduction would be a sign of solidarity among the EU member states and could stabilise the fragile Eurozone.

Greece deserves a fair chance. Thus, it is right to foot the bill together. Solidarity, however, does not mean that the Greeks have to be saved from insolvency at all costs. Only a haircut gives a chance for a fresh start. If the country gets deeper into levels of debt despite more and more cutbacks, it should be clear to everybody that the previous way is dangerous and wrong. (Dorothea Siems, Welt, September 2011)

---

<sup>29</sup> Guido Westerwelle (FDP) was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition between 2009 and 2013. His network visibility only results from this time period.

Figure 11: Affiliation network of the German discourse (2010-15)



Note: The affiliation network contains 39 nodes (14 meanings and 25 actors), 104 edges and 8 sub-groups. The network density is 5.2 (mean degree centrality) and the modularity is 0.41. Nodes with fewer than three edges as well as the code 'no justification' have been excluded from the graph. The size of the nodes is based on eigenvector centrality. The thickness of the edges represents the amount of claims that an actor made to a meaning of a concept. Dark grey labels represent ideas, light grey labels are for actors. The sub-groups that the walktrap community detection algorithm identified are framed in the network. The arrows indicate the directed network structure.

Further meanings of solidarity occupy a less central position and form a smaller coalition magnet pattern which had less impact on the trajectory of the Euro crisis in the German discourse. For instance, the SZ journalist Prantl and the German Green Party stress European values on which agents should act (*cultural solidarity*), while the French politicians Macron and Hollande argue for new European institutions such as Eurobonds in order to share the crisis burden (*political solidarity*) or demand a coordinated economic policy to make large public investments in the crisis countries (*economic solidarity*).

With regard to the representation of other actors in the German discourse, the party opposition is almost out of the picture. The former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is the only social democrat to appear, while *Die Linke* is completely absent. *Die Grünen* party is marginally connected to the main coalition magnet patterns and the AfD rejects any solidarity actions in the Euro crisis. Thus, the discourse network predominantly consists of politicians in government. Moreover, journalists, European actors and those from private finance contribute to the debate. Accordingly, the first two formulated expectations on ideational leadership are mainly corroborated: First, political parties dominate the discourse. However, Closa and Maatsch's (2014) finding that the opposition predominantly makes solidarity claims is not confirmed. In fact, the opposite is shown. Second, government actors are the most central actors in the solidarity discourse, which supports the expectation on the dominance of national executives. Third, the expectation that the solidarity discourse gives rise to NGOs and civil society groups is rejected. This actor group is not present in the German discourse on solidarity in the Euro crisis. This underpins previous research findings that national executives are the 'winners of Europeanised public debates' (Koopmans 2007). Moreover, government actors use solidarity in a strategic manner by framing and linking this concept to others in the public discourse.

To sum up the network structure of the German solidarity discourse, the ideational struggle is mostly about what comes first: austerity or solidarity. And as we have seen during the course of the Euro crisis, austerity trumped solidarity. Thus, financial solidity is the central idea in the main coalition magnet pattern and for the German conservative politicians in government. Monetary solidarity is the opposing centre of the pro-solidarity coalition magnet pattern for some oppositional actors who challenge austerity. Claims on economic solidarity are rather marginal and do not play a central role in the discourse.

#### **4.5.2 Responsibility, conditionality and solidarity in the Irish discourse**

The Irish discourse is strongly shaped by the meanings of *responsibility*, *conditionality*, and *monetary solidarity*. Each is part of a coalition magnet pattern. The ideational leaders are Merkel and Schäuble, the two Irish newspapers, former EC president Barroso, and the Irish politicians Cowen and Gilmore (see Table 14 on the eigenvector centrality values of the actors and meanings in the [appendix of chapter 4](#)).

Arguing for responsibility is the most dominant claim in the debate (Figure 12) and constitutes a central coalition magnet pattern. The Irish discourse focuses on the misbehaviour of bankers and top managers and their greed during the banking crisis.<sup>30</sup> Irish politicians claim that bankers should now act in solidarity with the Irish people and show public responsibility for their wrong actions. European actors also referred to this understanding as demonstrated in this statement by the former EC president Barroso:

Mr Barroso said the financial sector must make a 'fair contribution' to cover the costs that financiers have shifted on to taxpayers. [...] 'The financial sector has benefited from a lot of solidarity, and it is time to return the favour by showing great responsibility.' (José Manuel Barroso, Irish Times, September 2010)

Another understanding of the term in the Irish case is the responsibility of the less affected countries in the Euro crisis to help those that need support. In particular, Irish politicians claim that because they have implemented the austerity measures and reduced public spending and debts, Germany and others have to act responsibly, ease the conditionality of the Troika agreement, and support Ireland in its economic recovery. From the Irish perspective, these claims are also a reminder to the French and German governments that the Irish state has bailed out not only its own banks, but also, due to financial interdependencies, German and French banks. The Irish Independent reports the statement of the prime minister of Ireland, Enda Kenny, on Ireland leaving the bailout programme:

Mr Kenny emphasised the need for a deal on Ireland's legacy bank debt of 64bn [Euros] to help exit the bailout programme and return to borrowing on the markets. 'Solidarity is not a one-way street and the funding countries giving assistance to Ireland are not doing so in vain. But as it is a two-way street, the support that has been committed to by Europe needs to be followed through to ease our exit from the programme,' he said. (Enda Kenny, Irish Independent, January 2013)


A third understanding of responsibility is especially linked to German claimants in the Irish discourse. Those actors address the crisis countries and in particular Ireland in acting responsibly, avoiding moral hazard and preventing any contagion for other Eurozone members. Hence, the potential giver of solidarity reverses the solidarity relation,

---

<sup>30</sup> During the global financial crisis, Ireland had a severe banking crisis in which six Irish banks faced insolvency and the state had to bail them out. In 2013, journalists from the Irish Independent obtained audio material from meetings of top managers at the Anglo-Irish Bank (AIB) – one of the banks that was rescued – revealing how fraudulent and risky bankers had speculated and that they were well aware that the Irish state would bail them out in any case.

expecting crisis countries to bear the burden (act responsibly) of bailing out their banks resulting in rising levels of debt and higher interest rates.

**Figure 12: Affiliation network of the Irish discourse (2010-15)**



Note: The affiliation network contains 43 nodes (15 meanings and 28 actors), 103 edges and 7 sub-groups. The network density is 4.68 (mean degree centrality) and the modularity is 0.47. All nodes that had fewer than two edges as well as the code 'no justification' have been excluded from the graph. The size of the nodes is based on eigenvector centrality. The thickness of the edges represents the amount of claims that an actor made to a meaning of a concept. Dark grey labels represent ideas, light grey labels are for actors. The sub-groups that the walktrap community detection algorithm identified are framed in the network. The arrows indicate the directed network structure.

The Irish discourse (like the German one) also reports on the Euro crisis in other countries, most prominently the Greek crisis. The following statement by a representative of the German government is a good example of the claimed conditionality in the Euro

crisis discourse that forms its own coalition magnet pattern with German politicians referring to it.

Steffen Seibert, a spokesman for Chancellor Angel Merkel, said Greek 'obligations aren't erased by election day', restating that EU 'solidarity' depended on Greek 'reform readiness'. (German government, Irish Times, January 2015)

By talking about obligations, reforms, and solidarity, the potential giver of solidarity (Germany) determines the conditions for the receiver of solidarity. Arguing for 'reform readiness' and 'obligations' indicates that solidarity is not impossible and can be given, but only under specific conditions. In contrast to the demand of financial solidity, structural reforms, and cutbacks in the public sector, the claiming of 'conditionality' is more vague, but no less powerful. By linking it to solidary actions in the future, these claims resonate in the public and find many supporters.

The actor constellation in the Irish solidarity discourse is more diverse than in the German one. Nonetheless, national executives are the most dominant actors in the solidarity discourse in Ireland. In this regard, political parties (particularly German ones) act as ideational leaders in the discourse. It is no surprise that the Irish Prime Ministers (Taoiseach) Cowen and Kenny as well as the Labour politicians Gilmore and Burton are present in the Irish discourse, even though they are not visible in the German discourse at all. However, it is intriguing that German party actors feature prominently and inhabit leading positions in the discourse (Merkel, Schäuble, Steinbrück, Gabriel). The appearance of SPD politicians Gabriel and Steinbrück is notable, as they had not been visible in the German discourse network.<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, other national executives – such as the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras or the former French president Sarkozy – are also represented in the Irish debate. European actors are present in the Irish discourse. Barroso has a leadership position in the discourse; Juncker as president of the EC and Rehn as European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro also appear in the Irish discourse, but do not have a leading position due to their fewer claims in the Irish discourse. The third expectation that civil society organisations might profit from the solidarity discourse is

---

<sup>31</sup> In this regard, it is also interesting that Macron and Hollande are present in the German discourse and yet not visible in the Irish one, while the opposite is the case with Sarkozy.

hardly supported. But, in contrast to the German discourse, civil society actors are at least marginally present, and Noel Ward, as representative of an Irish trade union, is visible.

Another divergence from the German network is that individual journalists are less central in the Irish solidarity discourse than the newspapers themselves (Irish Times and Irish Independent). This is mainly an artefact of the data material, because many articles in the Irish newspapers do not name an author and, thus, the respective newspaper was coded as the statement giver.

To sum up the network structure of the Irish discourse, responsibility and conditionality act as key ideas and form large coalition magnet patterns, with German and Irish national executives as the ideational leaders. Monetary solidarity attracts Irish politicians, Irish newspapers, and EU officials who form a pro-solidarity pattern. Like the German case, several minor coalition magnet patterns that include less central actors exist, but are rather marginal.

## **4.6 Discussion**

The article has investigated the framing of solidarity in the Euro crisis in the German and Irish media discourse. It is the first empirical study to highlight the different meanings of solidarity and to show how ideas are linked and form coalition magnet patterns in the discourses of creditor and debtor countries. Moreover, the actor dimension has been analysed by applying the ideational leadership concept, focusing on the role of political parties, European actors, and civil society actors in the Euro crisis discourse.

The study yields novel insights into the Euro crisis discourse. *First*, various meanings of solidarity are deployed by actors in their public statements. In particular, monetary solidarity is one of the most dominant meanings in both discourses and has formed a pro-solidarity coalition magnet pattern in each country. This underlines that the Euro crisis was a crisis of the common currency and due to the lack of a common monetary policy besides the ECB's focus on price stability and inflation. Any European cooperative scheme in this area was hindered by the 'no bailout' clause of the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 125) which in the aftermath of saving bad banks led to higher levels of national debts. Besides, a new European financial architecture was established with the

ESM and the Fiscal Compact. Nonetheless, conditionality and a focus on budgetary balance (*Schuldenbremse*) are inscribed in these institutions.

Claims on monetary solidarity suggest policy proposals such as a banking union or a haircut for crisis countries in order to support them and establish a sustainable recovery. These proposals had in fact less influence on the intergovernmental decision-making process. The banking union was established in 2012, but with a rather vague supervisory mandate for the ECB. A haircut was agreed for Greece, but it was limited and had little impact on the Greek recovery. In the case of Ireland, a haircut was rejected by the ECB and EC although the Irish government (and the IMF) argued for this to precipitate the economic recovery. Thus, monetary solidarity was debated among the key actors, but in the end financial solidity won the ideational battle.

Accordingly, even though ‘solidar\*’ was included in the keyword string to select articles, *financial solidity* remains the central idea of the dominant coalition magnet pattern in the German discourse on solidarity and among the more central meanings in the Irish case. This demonstrates the strong link between solidarity and financial solidity, because the latter is framed as a solidary action for the crisis countries. This corroborates the findings of Galpin’s qualitative media analysis (2017) on the beginning of the Euro crisis debate.

*Second*, the actor constellation in the German and Irish discourse resembles the actor visibility in previous studies on the Euro crisis. Political parties and national executives are the ideational leaders of the solidarity discourse, European actors inhabit a limited leadership position in the Irish discourse, and the (hoped-for) emerging civil society participation in public debates is not corroborated (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Statham and Trenz 2013). However, not only are political parties strongly present in both discourses, but German actors especially acted as ideational leaders in the public debate in Germany and Ireland. While no Irish actor is present in the German discourse, Chancellor Merkel and Minister of Finance Schäuble occupy central discourse network positions. Additionally, other German actors – such as the SPD politicians Gabriel and Steinbrück or the state secretary in the Ministry of Finance Kampeter – are featured with their claims in the Irish media. This underlines the central position of Germany in the EU and Eurozone as well as the agenda-setting power of German government actors in public

debates. In contrast to Closa and Maatsch's (2014) finding that the opposition make most claims to solidarity, the study shows that governmental actors are the ones who invoke solidarity in the media. One reason for this strong focus on solidarity in their public claims might be the conceptual ambiguity of solidarity as well as its general positive framing. Solidarity seems to be almost unopposable. Hence, instead of arguing against solidarity directly, government actors link solidarity to other concepts such as financial consolidation so as to justify their decisions and mobilise the public. In turn, civil society actors are largely absent, which might be explained by their less institutionalised role in politics, the role of the media as gatekeeper to focus on certain political actors, and the scarcity of NGOs – besides *Attac* and *FinanceWatch* – who have expertise on financial and monetary issues in the EU.

If, following Hutter et al. (2016), we understand the Euro crisis discourse as a debate about solidarity, then the article demonstrates that the framing of solidarity in the Euro crisis is far from conclusive in respect of who should act in solidarity with whom and on what grounds. Solidarity is strategically used in order to legitimise political decisions on austerity and mobilise public opinion to present structural reforms and budgetary cuts as necessary first steps before solidarity can be claimed and received. The framing in the debtor context revealed ideational differences with respect to the centrality of responsibility and the vague demand for 'conditionality' in the Euro crisis. Nevertheless, the discourse structures and the quoted statements demonstrate that in 'acting responsibly' or demanding 'reforms', one is mainly referring to austerity.

The study has some limitations. The focus on daily quality newspapers betrays a selection bias as to which actors are represented in the media. Moreover, looking at actors' public statements is rather elite-centred. Since the study is interested in how actors frame solidarity in the Euro crisis and how their claims resonate with others, it makes sense to focus on elites' public claims. Future research could look at online media outlets or social media platforms. The comparison of Germany and Ireland has emphasised the unique positions of both countries within the spectrum of creditor and debtor countries in the Eurozone. However, generalisable conclusions from the discourse network analysis cannot really be drawn for other debtor or creditor states. Future comparative studies

should examine other affected Euro crisis states to assess the idea of, and the political conflict over, solidarity in the EU.

## 4.7 Appendix

### 4.7.1 Government constellation in Germany and Ireland

The following information is on the German and Irish government during the analysed time period. Table 11 summarises the government constellation and party affiliation of the Chancellor and Taoiseach respectively, and the Minister of Finance, as well as which party was the major opposition party in the country. It shows that the conservative CDU/CSU was in government for the whole time period and also the central government members – Chancellor and Minister of Finance – did not change. The political situation in Ireland was different, because in the midst of the Euro crisis, an ‘earthquake election result’ changed the coalition government (Allen and O’Boyle 2013: 109–125).

**Table 11: Government constellations in Germany and Ireland (Appendix Chapter 4)**

Time period	German government	Irish government	Time period
2009–13	CDU/CSU, FDP Chancellor: Angela Merkel Minister of Finance: Wolfgang Schäuble (both CDU)	Fianna Fáil, Green Party Taoiseach: Brian Cowen Minister of Finance: Brian Lenihan (both Fianna Fáil)	2007–11
	Biggest opposition party: SPD	Biggest opposition party: Fine Gael	
	CDU/CSU, SPD Chancellor: Angela Merkel Minister of Finance: Wolfgang Schäuble (both CDU)	Fine Gael, Labour Party Taoiseach: Enda Kenny Minister of Finance: Michael Noonan (both Fine Gael)	
Biggest opposition party: Die Linke	Biggest opposition party: Fianna Fáil		

Note: CDU – Christian Democratic Union of Germany; CSU – Christian Social Union in Bavaria; FDP – Free Democratic Party; SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany; Die Linke – The Left.

### 4.7.2 Method: Political claims analysis

The coding of the newspaper articles follows the political claims analysis (PCA) of Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; Koopmans and Statham 2010), and used the package RQDA in the R environment (Huang 2016). The main idea of the PCA is that articles and reports in newspapers contain many different statements by different actors. Instead of

focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis, or the content, the link between a statement and the speaker is emphasised. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Claims are defined as ‘the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors’ (Koopmans 2007: 189). The components of a claim can be differentiated by following a logic of questions regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY’ (de Wilde 2014: 52). These questions are the grammar of claims and help the coder to identify the claim, making the coding transparent and comprehensible.

Regarding the coding procedure, no inter-coder reliability test could be obtained, because I had no financial capacity to fund other researchers to code with me. This gap should be addressed by extensive coder training (Krippendorff 2004), my own previous experiences and applications of the method, as well as the guidance offered by the codebook of de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn (2014), who have coded newspaper articles and parliamentary debates in a similar manner.

In my project, I focus on four core codes in a claim: 1) the speaker; 2) the action; 3) the issue; and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all four codes in a statement, the potential claim is not coded. The other components that de Wilde mentions are coded if detectable. The codes are differentiated into sub-codes to allow for a fine-grained coding and analysis (Table 12). The following statement by German Chancellor Angela Merkel illustrates the coding of a claim:

Merkel also briefly talked about the Greek debt crisis. The long-lasting infringement of the stability pact has brought Greece into this situation and not the [financial – author] speculation. Therefore, short-term solidarity was not the solution. There is no alternative to a rigorous austerity programme. (Angela Merkel, Welt, March 2010).

Merkel is the speaker (claimant), even though she is indirectly quoted in the centre-right newspaper in 2010 (source and time). She makes a verbal statement (action) about the Euro crisis (issue) and expresses her opinion that austerity measures are unavoidable in Greece (position is coded as contra-solidarity with the justification ‘financial solidity’).

**Table 12: Codes in the Political Claims Analysis (Appendix Chapter 4)**

<b>codes</b>	<b>sub-codes</b>
<b>time &amp; source</b>	A_year, B_source
<b>claimant</b>	C_claimant_type, D_claimant_scope, E_claimant_function, F_claimant_party, G_claimant_nationality, X_special_claimant, XX_person
<b>action</b>	H_action
<b>issue</b>	I_issue, J_issue scope
<b>addressee</b>	K_addressee_type, L_addressee_scope, M_addressee_function, N_addressee_nationality, P_addressee_party, Q_addressee_evaluation
<b>frame</b>	R_position, S_justification, T_justification_scope

The reported results in the study are based on the following keyword lists in the database Factiva. For Germany: '(Eurozone\* or finanz\* or Wahrung\* or Schuld\* or Kredit\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*)'. For Ireland: '(Eurozone\* or financ\* or currency\* or \*debt\* or \*credit\*) and (solidar\* or mutual w/1 support\* or cooperat\*) and (EU or Europ\*)'. An asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. Duplicates of articles were excluded from the article population.

Accordingly, I applied a nominalistic approach in the selection and coding 'solidarity statements'. This means that I have only coded claims with the mentioned term 'solidarity' or close synonyms. Using 'Solidar\*' in the keyword search has the disadvantage that the threshold for selecting articles is rather high. By applying the nominalistic approach, the meanings of solidarity can be grasped from the actor's claims. In a deductive-inductive coding process, it was possible to start with preliminary understandings of solidarity, based on previous studies, and then include new, join similar, and reconsider existing meaning categories during the coding procedure. This helped to grasp the various meanings of the contested concept of solidarity. However, looking at the concrete term 'solidarity' might create a 'nominalistic fallacy'. Two reasons justify this decision and minimise the concerns: First, since the focus of this study is on solidarity, the study makes a more valid contribution by setting a rather strict threshold for the selection of articles and claims. Second, the high threshold positively influences the coding procedure, because the coding decision about whether the coded claim is about solidarity is already made. Consequently, the coding concentrates on the framing of the

solidarity. This increases the validity and reliability of the coding procedure for such a polysemic concept.

Following the PCA logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims, but also no claims at all. There are two limitations for the coding processes: First, I do not code claims that refer to events of migration that are older than six months from the date when it is reported in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration processes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in each newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each article. Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes, the claim is seen as a new one.

For instance, an article reports a speech by Angela Merkel. At the beginning of the article, she is quoted demanding financial assistance (monetary solidarity) for Greece and demands a European solution. In the middle of the text, Merkel is cited again, but here she calls for liberalising the public health sector in Greece in order to reduce the sovereign debt. Thus, the speaker is the same (Merkel), the act is the same (verbal statement), the issue is also the same (Euro crisis), but the position is different. While the first statement is about monetary solidarity and a pro-solidarity statement, the second refers to structural reforms and austerity actions in Greece. That is why both claims can be coded in the same article.

In this study, the codes 'XX\_person' and 'S\_Justification' are selected to analyse the affiliation networks of actors and meanings in the solidarity discourse. Although the justification code is optional in the sense of only being coded when a justification could be identified, the central sub-codes identify why actors argue for solidarity. Thus, every claim that does not entail a justification is not included in the empirical analysis. Both the reason why an actor claims something and the actor itself are of interest in order to study the framing of solidarity and the actor constellation from a relational perspective.

Besides the multiple meanings of solidarity that have been coded, I also coded other frames as long as they are linked to solidarity in the specific claim. By doing so, the coding accounts for not only the various meanings of solidarity, but also how actors use other frames in their statements on solidarity. For instance, an actor claims solidarity with a crisis country, but not for any solidary reason; rather, it is a matter of justice with people in need. Then, the claim is coded with the frame 'justice'. Another example is the frame of

'financial solidity'. This is an in-vivo frame, taken from the coding material, because actors often used this frame instead of claiming austerity, structural reforms or financial consolidation. Actors claim that solidarity is important in the crisis and will be shown, but only if financial solidity is implemented and demonstrated by the crisis countries. Therefore, the claim is coded as solidarity related, but the frame that is used in order to justify the claim is 'financial solidity' (see the claim by Merkel above).

#### **4.7.3 From the PCA to the discourse network analysis**

The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the discourse network analysis (DNA) (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56), and since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into network data. The DNA brings together discourse analysis and social network analysis by focusing on the interconnectedness of concepts and actor appearances in discourses (Leifeld 2013; Leifeld and Haunss 2012).

Actors argue with particular concepts and this communicative action can be understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. By referring more or less to one concept, this could be understood as a repetitive account, arguing for a specific policy solution. Other actors might use the same concept in the debate and build up a relation to the concept too. Since different actors have different interests, we could assume that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors. Based on shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network analysis can detect specific actor networks or concept networks to examine which actors are relatively close or distant to each other. Lastly, actors and concepts can be studied in affiliation networks, showing two types of networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). The discourse network Figures 11 and 12 as well as the network statistics regarding the eigenvector centrality of the nodes and the community detection algorithm in the text are computed and visualised with the R package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006). The eigenvector centrality is defined as the number of edges a node has; it also considers the edges to other central nodes in the network. Thus, eigenvector centrality does not just count the number of edges as in degree centrality in order to measure how central a node is; it also considers the close environment of the node in the network. The scale is from 0 to 1 and the closer the value is to 1, the more central the node is in the network (Bonacich 1987).

The Walktrap community detection algorithm was developed by Pons and Latapy (2005). The main assumption is that by performing random walks on the edges of a network, closely connected nodes could be identified that form a sub-group within the network. A certain parameter about the length of such random walks has to be defined to detect sub-groups. I followed the default option in igraph and used four steps for the random walk. The recommendation is to use between three and five steps in the algorithm. An advantage of the Walktrap algorithm is that it works as a bottom-up detection algorithm. Instead of forcing the network into a predefined number of communities, the algorithm identifies communities based on the network structure.

Other community detection algorithms, proposed by Girvan and Newman (2002) or Clauset et al. (2004) do not perform well on the discourse networks (Table 13) and are not suitable for discourse networks. The analysis of actors and meanings in public discourses suggests that the respective networks are directed, because actors strategically use meanings in their statements to persuade others and mobilise the public. The algorithm by Girvan and Newman assumes non-weighted edges. However, using only the information about whether or not an actor refers to a concept would miss crucial information on the discourse structure. The algorithm suggested by Clauset et al. assumes an undirected network structure, as in friendship networks (both persons indicated as friends). Hence, this algorithm, which is integrated in the igraph package as Fast Greedy community algorithm, is not really suitable.

Table 13: Comparison of the network modularity and the number of communities (Appendix Chapter 4)

	<b>Walktrap community algorithm (Pons and Latapy 2005)</b>	<b>Edge Betweenness community algorithm (Girvan and Newman 2002)</b>	<b>Fast Greedy community algorithm (Clauset <i>et al.</i> 2004)</b>
<b>German discourse</b>	0.41, 8 communities	0.1, 26 communities	-
<b>Irish discourse</b>	0.47, 7 communities	0.13, 28 communities	-

**Table 14: Eigenvector centrality in the German and Irish discourse (2010-15) (Appendix Chapter 4)**

<b>German discourse</b>		<b>Irish discourse</b>	
Actors and Meanings	Value	Actors and Meanings	Value
financial solidity	1,000	A. Merkel	1,000
A. Merkel	0,844	responsibility	0,899
J. M. Barroso	0,298	conditionality	0,887
CSU	0,225	monetary solidarity	0,684
R. Brüderle	0,221	Irish Independent	0,648
D. Siems	0,185	J. M. Barroso	0,521
CDU	0,158	W. Schäuble	0,518
G. Westerwelle	0,158	financial solidity	0,463
European Commission	0,149	social solidarity	0,435
monetary solidarity	0,147	Irish Times	0,351
Conditionality	0,127	B. Cowen	0,345
private finance	0,086	E. Gilmore	0,309
A. Hagelüken	0,085	B. Lenihan	0,279
Die Grünen	0,081	misuse of solidarity	0,249
C. Hulverscheidt	0,078	J. Burton	0,244
J.-C. Juncker	0,076	J.-C. Juncker	0,23
SZ	0,076	S. Kampeter	0,216
Responsibility	0,075	self interest	0,212
misuse of solidarity	0,060	political solidarity	0,210
Necessity	0,049	justice	0,200
Cypriot government	0,043	German government	0,152
Business	0,036	legal solidarity	0,148
C. Gammelin	0,034	EU	0,139
self interest	0,027	C. Day	0,136
cultural solidarity	0,026	E. Kenny	0,120
N. Piper	0,024	P. Steinbrück	0,113
political solidarity	0,022	N. Sarkozy	0,112
H. Schmidt	0,015	Fine Gael	0,109
H. Prantl	0,015	S. Collins	0,106

legal regulations	0,014	civil society	0,106
E. Macron	0,014	Société Générale	0,087
F. Hollande	0,014	O. Rehn	0,074
economic prosperity	0,014	necessity	0,072
R. Sikorski	0,012	CDU	0,057
economic solidarity	0,010	N. Ward	0,055
AfD	0,009	M. Higgins	0,055
F. Eder	0,009	S. Gabriel	0,039
legal solidarity	0,008	cultural solidarity	0,023
Justice	0,001	economic solidarity	0,016
		M. Wolf	0,013
		other justification	0,011
		legal regulations	0,007
		A. Tsipras	0,006

Note: The eigenvector centrality value goes from 0 to 1. The closer the value of a node is to 1, the more central the node. The words in *italics* are the meanings in the Figures 11 and 12 and shall increase the readability of the table.

**Table 15: Number of claims in the German and Irish newspapers (Appendix Chapter 4)**

Time period	SZ	Welt	Irish Times	Irish Independent	Total	Germany	Ireland
2010	27	19	38	14	98	46	52
2011	47	30	46	6	129	77	52
2012	63	30	28	13	134	93	41
2013	38	24	23	14	99	62	37
2014	10	8	11	9	38	18	20
2015	40	32	33	16	121	72	49
2010–15	225	143	179	72	619	368	251

**Table 16: Number of articles in the German and Irish newspapers (Appendix Chapter 4)**

<b>Time period</b>	<b>SZ</b>	<b>Welt</b>	<b>Irish Times</b>	<b>Irish Independent</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Ireland</b>
<b>2010</b>	73	49	56	21	199	122	77
<b>2011</b>	122	75	66	20	283	197	86
<b>2012</b>	136	71	60	24	291	207	84
<b>2013</b>	98	84	44	31	257	182	75
<b>2014</b>	84	62	46	28	220	146	74
<b>2015</b>	144	110	58	44	356	254	102
<b>2010–15</b>	657	451	330	168	1606	1108	498

## 5 Contested solidarity in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis: A discourse network analysis<sup>32</sup>

The article analyses the solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis and examines which, and how, meanings of solidarity are put forward and which political parties participate in these debates. The discourse coalition and coalition magnet approaches are combined to examine the two different discourse dynamics of demanding solidarity (migration crisis) or being criticised for not showing solidarity (Euro crisis) in the German media discourse (2010–2015). By applying the discourse network methodology, the interdependence of framing and actor visibility is analysed. It is demonstrated that solidarity is linked to austerity and thereby solidarity claims are reinterpreted by an influential party conservative discourse coalition in the Euro crisis. The migration crisis discourse is shaped by one large discourse coalition, including all mainstream parties arguing for political solidarity. In 2015, political solidarity becomes contested by security and demarcation claims in the migration crisis. The study contributes to the development of the ideational research framework and demonstrates the different trajectories of solidarity in Europe in hard times.

Keywords: Coalition magnets; discourse coalition; discourse network analysis; Euro crisis; Europe's migration crisis; solidarity

---

<sup>32</sup> Chapter 5 is under review after being re-submitted (2. round) at the *Journal of European Public Policy*. I would like to thank Sebastian Haunss, Raphael Heiberger, Ulrike Liebert, Sandra Reinecke, Aidan Regan, Arndt Wonka as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on this article. I also want to express my gratitude to the participants of the joint BIGSSS/InIIS colloquium and the panel audience at the ECPR General Conference in 2018 for their feedback.

## 5.1 Introduction

The Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis have had a substantial impact on European politics. The Euro crisis has drastically demonstrated that the European integration process was mainly driven by market integration and the prospects of a common currency union, ignoring different national economic growth models (Johnston and Regan 2016; Scharpf 2002). The crisis was predominantly addressed by austerity measures and strict debt conditionality (Blyth 2015) and thereby neglected necessary steps of social and political integration (Offe 2016).

The migration crisis has shown that the Common European Asylum system (CEAS) is not a burden-sharing system, because the Southern European countries are mainly responsible for external border control and assessing asylum procedures. The aim of harmonising national migration and refugee policies was therefore not completed and lacks supranational authority by the EU institutions. The tension between external border enforcement by the Dublin Regulations and the internal open borders Schengen agreement is inscribed in EU migration policies (Bauböck 2018; Thielemann 2014).

The common aspect in both crises is the public appeal to solidarity. Claiming solidarity or criticising the lack of solidarity in times of crisis is a crucial site of conflict in respect of how the two crises should be solved and who should act in solidarity with whom and on what grounds (Hutter *et al.* 2016). Beyond the empirical observation of calls to solidarity in hard times, the concept of solidarity has recently sparked theoretical discussions (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; Habermas 2013; Sangiovanni 2013; Wallaschek 2018a). Solidarity touches upon central issues in political and social sciences with regard to collective actions under stress, modes of cooperation and conflict in politics, and the normative principles to which actors refer. This raises the question of what the public appeal to solidarity means and how political actors frame the idea of solidarity in times of crisis.

Accordingly, the article asks how the solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis is framed and which political party actors are most active in the public solidarity discourse in times of crisis. In particular, I examine which meanings of solidarity are debated and most salient in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis

and to what extent these meanings are present in both crises. Germany's double involvement in these two severe crises, as well as the country's leadership position in the EU, makes the German public discourse an interesting case to study.

An ideational research framework is applied to account for the agency and ideas dimension. Hajer's (1995) discourse coalition approach is adopted, investigating agents' cooperation and conflicts in discursive struggles on solidarity, in addition to the coalition magnet approach proposed by Béland and Cox (2016) accounting for when and how an idea becomes influential (or not). Hence, the present study is concerned with how politicians and parties propose to resolve the crises rather than why the crises evolved and which integration theory best explains the crises trajectories.

The German mass media arena is selected from 2010 to 2015 to analyse the use and contestation of solidarity. Political parties strongly shape the debate on European issues and are the key decision-makers, and as such it is crucial to observe how political parties and politicians frame solidarity and link these claims to the trajectories of the two crises (Helbling *et al.* 2010; Koopmans and Statham 2010). The discourse network methodology is adopted to study the interdependence of actor and concept formation in the public solidarity discourse (Leifeld 2016b).

I demonstrate that meanings of solidarity in the Euro crisis have been reinterpreted by austerity frames. Solidarity and austerity claims are linked and thus create a unique framing strategy, justifying the Euro crisis management in the German discourse. In the migration crisis, I show that political solidarity is the predominant meaning in the discourse, but it is strongly contested by a security-oriented framing of migration. This has hindered the establishment of a solidary framework and contributed to the failure of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis.

The article contributes to the existing literature in two ways: Conceptually, it elaborates the ideational research framework by combining the discourse coalition and coalition magnet approach. Empirically, it expands our understanding of solidarity by separating the idea into its various meanings and showing which parties frame solidarity in the respective crises.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the approaches discourse coalition and coalition magnet patterns are introduced and linked to the literature on

actors and issue framing in the public sphere. The research design section lays out the data selection and the discourse network methodology. Finally, the findings are presented and further implications are discussed.

## **5.2 Ideational research: Discourse coalitions and coalition magnets**

Discursive institutionalism has been established as a fourth institutionalism in the field of comparative political economy (Schmidt 2008). Starting from criticising historical institutionalist accounts for not taking ideas seriously, discursive institutionalism is 'concerned with the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse and policy argumentation in institutional context' (Schmidt 2012: 85). Although recent ideational research goes beyond the initial claim that 'ideas matter' and investigates how ideas actually come to matter, scholars still criticise the unclear agency dimension and argue that ideas can evolve and disperse across other policy areas (Ban 2016; Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Carstensen 2011; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). In view of this, some key questions arise: Which actors play a role in the promotion of ideas, and how do certain ideas become powerful while others do not? To this end, the discursive institutionalism framework is extended via the discourse coalition approach of Hajer (1995) and the coalition magnet approach of Béland and Cox (2016).

### **5.2.1 Discourse coalitions and actors in times of crisis**

The ideas that actors prefer depends largely on their perceptions of the world and how they make sense of political problems. Actors can establish discourse coalitions to push for their preferred options through strategic interactions (Hajer 1995). A discourse coalition is 'a group of actors who share a social construct' (Hajer 1993: 45). Hajer analyses the social construct of acid rain in Great Britain, showing how different discourse coalitions make sense of it through various problem definitions and solutions. These framing strategies highlight that it is not shared interests that constitute the basis of the discourse coalition, but rather the shared use of ideas. The discourse coalition approach has been used in policy studies, focusing on the framing of policy processes and how discourse coalitions influence the decision-making process. Moreover, it has emphasised

the role of agency in the research on public deliberations and discourses, as well as the cooperative aspect of forming argumentative clusters by actors in the pursuit of political goals and in seeking to influence policy decisions (Hajer 2002; Haunss 2017; Leifeld 2013; Rennkamp *et al.* 2017).<sup>33</sup>

To substantiate the discourse coalition approach, previous research on actor constellations in national public spheres with regard to European issues is considered. *First*, national political parties dominate the public debate, legitimising their position and arguing against their opponents so as to influence public opinion (Koopmans 2007; Koopmans and Statham 2010). Mainstream parties might then be the most present actors while radical left or right parties are less influential in public debates (Hutter *et al.* 2016; Senninger and Wagner 2015). However, it has been demonstrated that the party opposition uses solidarity claims in parliamentary debates during the Euro crisis to criticise the government and its lack of solidarity with other crisis countries (Closa and Maatsch 2014). Hence, I expect the formation of two discourse coalitions: a governing party discourse coalition, and a party opposition coalition. The first might be more present in the discourse.

*Second*, government representatives account for the largest quantity of statements in the public discourse (Kriesi and Grande 2015; Van Dalen 2012). The Euro crisis and the migration crisis were mainly approached at the intergovernmental level of the European Council meetings (Schimmelfennig 2015; Zaun 2018). Therefore, the public dominance of national executives is expected. In particular, I expect that Chancellor Merkel as well as the federal ministers for the policy areas (Finances, Foreign Affairs, Interior) are most visible in the governing discourse coalition.

*Third*, scholars have pointed out that supranational institutions have increased their political power during the Euro crisis (Bauer and Becker 2014; Schmidt 2016). Despite the international and supranational character of the European Commission or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), individual representatives are most often affiliated with political parties. Since it has been argued that supranational bodies such as the

---

<sup>33</sup> Hajer also analyses metaphors and story-lines in his study. These conceptual tools are not deployed because analysing metaphors needs a different focus and methodological tool than analysing solidarity claims. Story-lines are also not investigated because this would suggest a stronger focus on individual motives and behaviour to reconstruct story-lines.

European Commission are structured by partisan ideologies (Hartlapp *et al.* 2014; Hix 2008), individual international actors such as European Commissioners are included in the study. The presidents of the European Commission (Barroso, Juncker) as well as the respective Commissioners for Home Affairs (Malmström, Avramopoulos) and Monetary Affairs (Rehn, Moscovici) are expected to form a distinct EU discourse coalition with individual ties to the respective partisan discourse coalition in both crises.

### **5.2.2 Coalition magnets and frames in times of crisis**

The discourse coalition approach focuses on actors in discourses and how they are bound together by a social construct. However, Hajer does not elaborate on the term 'social construct'. How and under what circumstances social constructs are the ideational glue for discourse coalitions is not theorised by Hajer. In order to fill this conceptual gap, the coalition magnet approach by Béland and Cox (2016) is adopted. It conceptualises an influential idea as a 'coalition magnet' and thereby sheds light on the ideational basis of discourse coalitions.

Béland and Cox name three criteria for an idea to become a coalition magnet. First, an idea is broadly interpretable by different actors which means it is rather 'ambiguous or polysemic' (Béland and Cox 2016: 431). Second, key actors pick up the idea and promote it. Finally, an idea has to bring various actors together. An additional criterion might be a crisis situation. Blyth argues that crises are constructed to some extent, because actors debate about the origins, content, and range of a crisis. Due to the conflicts that arise out of the disagreement on how to understand and solve the crisis, uncertainty is created and spread (Blyth 2002). The Euro crisis and the migration crisis created institutional uncertainty in the EU in relation to how to deal with crisis countries or a large number of incoming asylum seekers. In such times, ideas matter most and account for ideational-institutional change.

Recent studies on coalition magnets demonstrate how they bear a certain ambiguity to which multiple actors can connect their policy beliefs and expectations (Khayat-zadeh-Mahani *et al.* 2019). Moreover, coalition magnets appeal to the public as strong positive ideas that can hardly be discredited. For instance, Kiess *et al.* (2017) show how the idea of the 'social market economy' worked as a 'coalition magnet' in the German

discourse on labour market reforms during the global financial crisis in 2007/08. Thus, a coalition magnet also mobilises political power and helps actors to reach their goals.

Linking the coalition magnet approach with previous studies on framing in times of crisis helps to contextualise which ideas become influential. From a post-functionalist perspective, it has been argued that current political conflicts are driven by either economic or cultural issues, expecting that cultural conflicts become more important than economic conflicts. This might lead to a nationalistic backlash (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi *et al.* 2012; Teney *et al.* 2014). However, the Euro crisis is mostly debated in economic terms. The focus on sovereign debt, a banking crisis or the loss of trust in the capitalist market are the main frames in the public debate (Grande *et al.* 2016; Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2017). The parliamentary debates on the bailout programmes also emphasise the economic conflict among the political parties, demonstrating a divide between left parties with a more Keynesian philosophy and conservative-right political parties who favour a neoclassical economic approach (Maatsch 2014). To some extent, cultural frames play a role for political actors in the public debate. Galpin (2017) has shown, in her qualitative frame analysis on the German Euro crisis discourse, that the austerity frame was linked to the cultural framing of solidarity. Only if crisis countries followed the austerity paradigm and made the necessary 'reforms' could they expect solidarity in return.

With regard to the framing in the migration crisis, scholars have demonstrated the crucial role of security frames in the migration crisis which underpin the policy orientation towards a securitisation of migration policies in Europe. In turn, humanitarian claims in the discourse on Europe's migration crisis have been less identified (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Musarò and Parmiggiani 2017; Vollmer 2014).

While the cited studies have focused on the general framing of the crises and partially included solidarity as one frame among others, the present study focuses on solidarity claims for two reasons. *First*, in the discourse on the crises, scholars agree that solidarity is lacking, but attribute different meanings to it. Hall (2012: 367–368) states that social solidarity is eroding in the Euro crisis, while Biermann *et al.* (2019: 258) speak of 'temporary solidarity' and Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018: 192) of 'multilateral solidarity' as missing types of voluntary burden-sharing in the migration crisis. Börzel

and Risse (2018) attribute cultural, political, and economic issues to solidarity by stating that solidarity is about who is part of the European community and how resources are redistributed in the wake of the crisis. Therefore, the present study differentiates solidarity by suggesting several meanings that are discursively constructed by actors in the public. By considering coalition magnet patterns for the analysis of meanings of solidarity, the interconnectedness of these meanings can be studied. *Second*, analysing the use of solidarity identifies which of these meanings is most dominant, how they are linked, and which political parties refer to similar meanings of solidarity during the crises discourses.

### **5.2.3 The discursive construction of solidarity**

By discursive construction of solidarity, I mean the articulation and framing of solidarity by actors. Solidarity does not just exist; it has to be appealed to and argued for by actors so as to resonate in discourses and mobilise the public on how the Euro crisis or the migration crisis should be solved (Wallaschek 2019c; Wallaschek 2019a). Assuming that solidarity is contested (Gallie 1956), which means that actors argue about the proper meaning of the term without coming to an agreement, the study analyses meanings of solidarity and identifies which one is dominant in the mass media. I highlight five meanings of solidarity for the present study: cultural, social, political, economic, and monetary solidarity. Table 17 summarises the meanings of solidarity that have been identified from the solidarity literature.

Table 17: Meanings of solidarity in the German discourse during both crises (2010-15)

<b>Meanings of solidarity</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Cultural solidarity</b>	Promoting shared norms, rights, and identity to act in solidarity
<b>Social solidarity</b>	Referring to redistributive policies as well as volunteering of people
<b>Political solidarity</b>	Setting up new legislative actions and new political instruments in a solidary way
<b>Economic solidarity</b>	Supportive actions for member states in economic terms
<b>Monetary solidarity</b>	Risk-sharing and establishing financial creditability and liability among members of a currency union

Note: Further meanings of solidarity and other concepts have been coded, but are not displayed in the table. An overview of the meanings of solidarity is included in Table 20 of the [appendix of Chapter 5](#).

Cultural solidarity refers to promoting shared norms, rights or a common identity to undertake solidary actions. Closa and Maatsch (2014: 833) understand solidarity as supporting universal justice and human rights in their frame analysis of parliamentary debates on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Others have highlighted the transnational support of citizens in other countries in the Euro crisis (Wonka 2016) or emphasised a shared European identity and belonging to the EU community as constitutive of cultural solidarity (Galpin 2017). I expect that cultural solidarity is salient in the migration discourse, because it touches upon humanitarian values that are inscribed in the EU treaties as guiding principles.

Social solidarity focuses on the distributional politics behind solidarity actions. In particular, welfare policies are considered as solidary, because they redistribute resources and create mutual social relations via institutional mechanisms. Citizens might support redistribution for people in need and show solidary attitudes (Baldwin 1990; Gelissen 2000). I expect that social solidarity is prevailing in the Euro crisis discourse due to high unemployment rates and cuts in social spending in the crisis countries, highlighting the need to redistributive resources to people in need.

Political solidarity is about creating new political-institutional settings that foster cooperation and support among political actors. It is a source of legitimacy for political

actions – especially in times of crisis (Kneuer and Masala 2015). Since the EU lacks the supranational authority in migration policies, I expect that political solidarity is most prominent in the migration discourse.

Economic solidarity is about supportive actions for economies. These are related to public investment plans and coordinated strategies to support growth and employment. It is often related to Keynesian understandings of macroeconomics (Sommer 2013). I expect that economic solidarity is hardly visible in the Euro crisis discourse due to the prevailing austerity paradigm.

Monetary solidarity refers to financial liability created among members of a community. It is a risk-sharing mechanism dealing with uncertainty and diversity among member states in monetary and financial issues. The newly established ESM is seen as a mechanism that provides monetary solidarity in time of crisis (Schelkle 2017). I expect that monetary solidarity is crucial in the German Euro crisis discourse.

To sum up, social solidarity and monetary solidarity are expected to be most relevant in the Euro crisis and might act as distinct coalition magnets. Economic solidarity might be demanded too, but it might be less central than the other two meanings of solidarity. In the migration crisis discourse, cultural and political solidarity might be predominately used and are expected to be coalition magnets. Beyond the use of solidarity, I also expect that actors refer to other frames in the solidarity discourse. Specifically, I expect austerity frames in the Euro crisis, as Galpin (2017) has highlighted in her qualitative analysis of the German crisis discourse. Furthermore, I expect security and demarcation claims in the migration crisis due to the prevalence of border control issues and the contestation of the Dublin Regulations and the Schengen agreement (Börzel and Risse 2018; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017).

### **5.3 Data and Methods**

The German mass media arena is selected for both crises from 2010 to 2015. Analysing the German discourse considers Germany's position in the two crises and the different expectations of receiving or giving solidarity. Claus Offe (2016: 139–151) points out that Germany was criticised for its lack of solidarity with the 'GIIPS countries' (Greece,

Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain), insisting on ordoliberal austerity policies in the Euro crisis (Blyth 2015; Matthijs 2016). In the migration crisis, however, Germany criticised other member states, in particular the Visegrád countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia), for their lack of solidarity in establishing new European cooperative mechanisms. These different perceptions – in terms of who should act in solidarity with whom and how actors justify these decisions – makes comparing the German media discourse in both crises an intriguing case study.

The two German daily quality newspapers *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and *Die Welt* (Welt) have been selected from 2010 to 2015. SZ and Welt have a high circulation and readership and represent the political cleavage of ‘centre-left’ and ‘centre-right’.<sup>34</sup> A broad representation of opinions, news, and actors can be studied in these media outlets. Printed quality newspapers are still the main gatekeepers in the public debate in European countries and previous research has demonstrated that tabloids cover less politically relevant information (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Nossek *et al.* 2015; Reinemann *et al.* 2012).

The newspaper articles were coded in the R package RQDA (Huang 2016) by applying the claims-making method (Koopmans and Statham 1999). Claims are defined as

public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors (Koopmans and Statham 2010: 55).

Four core codes constitute a claim: the speaker, the act, the issue, and the position. If one of these four codes cannot be identified, the claim is not coded. The coding of the selected newspaper articles was adapted from the codebook by de Wilde *et al.* (2014) (more information on the coding process is included in the [appendix of chapter 5](#)).

Based on a keyword search in the database Factiva 1,155 articles on solidarity in the migration crisis and 1,108 articles on solidarity in the Euro crisis have been selected.<sup>35</sup> In sum, 673 claims were coded for the migration crisis and 367 claims were coded for the


---

<sup>34</sup> The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) is often selected as a ‘center-right’ newspaper in Germany. However, the FAZ is only available in the Factiva database from August 2013 on. Selecting the FAZ would have severely limited the data material and the scope of the analysis.

<sup>35</sup> Regarding the selection of ‘solidarity claims’, I applied a nominalistic approach. This means that I only coded claims if the word stem ‘solidar\*’ was mentioned ([appendix of chapter 5](#) on the keyword search string).

Euro crisis.<sup>36</sup> Figure 13 gives an overview on the frequency of claims, differentiating between the centre-left newspaper SZ and the centre-right newspaper Welt as well as both crises.

**Figure 13: Number of claims in Europe's migration crisis and in the Euro crisis**



Note: The dotted graphs show the number of claims in centre-right newspaper Welt and the solid graphs display the number of claims in the centre-right newspaper SZ. The grey lines show the number of claims in the Euro crisis while the black lines are for Europe's migration crisis.

The frequency of claims in the two newspapers follow similar paths in Europe's migration crisis and the Euro crisis debate. While SZ and Welt show two rather uniform graphs from 2010 to 2013, the number of claims is higher in the SZ than in the Welt. In 2015, the SZ covers solidarity claims almost twice as much as the Welt. In the Euro crisis, the SZ

<sup>36</sup> Within this amount of claims, it is possible that the same claim appears in both newspapers which is then counted twice. A 'double claim' can be understood as a crucial reference point for the public debate which thereby created public attention. Hence, both claims were coded.

features more claims on solidarity with a peak in 2012. From 2012 to 2014, the coverage in both newspapers decreases, but then rises again in 2015.

In order to explain these discourse dynamics, the co-evolution of articulating ideas and actor constellations is studied from a discourse network perspective (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld 2016a; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). The communicative action of an actor using a concept is defined as a relation between an actor and a concept. Discourse networks are affiliation networks that consist of two types of nodes which are connected via edges. These only exist between different types of nodes in affiliation networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011).

To translate the discourse coalition and the coalition magnet approach into the network methodology, the eigenvector centrality is computed (Bonacich 1987). It takes into account the number of edges of each node and the edges to other central nodes. The higher the value (from 0 to 1), the more likely it is that the node acts as a coalition magnet or key actor in a discourse coalition. To strengthen the perspective on influential ideas and actors, the edge weight has to be at least two in the Euro crisis discourse network. In Europe's migration crisis, a threshold of an edge weight of at least three is applied to account for the higher number of claims in this crisis debate. This means that an actor has to refer to a concept at least two (respectively three) times to be included in the discourse network. This helps to focus on the central actors and ideas. Moreover, it is based on the expectation that referring to a concept only once can be seen as a rather random connection, but claiming an idea more often stresses its importance for the actor and the whole discourse over time.

## **5.4 Results**

The findings are presented in two steps, by first looking at the coalition magnets in the Euro crisis discourse and the migration crisis discourse. I then present the discourse networks for the specific discourse coalitions. The following Table 18 summarises the main characteristics of the two discourse networks.

Table 18: Overview about the two crisis discourse networks

Network statistics	Euro crisis discourse	Europe's migration crisis discourse
Number of nodes (actors/concepts)	25( 16/9)	30 (19/11)
Number of edges	70	152
Strongest edge	11 (A. Merkel to financial solidarity)	11 (Grünen to political solidarity)
Network density (mean degree centrality (Nooy <i>et al.</i> 2011))	2.08	2.2
Network centralisation	0.79	0.83
most central actors	0.80 (A. Merkel)	0.49 (Grünen)
least central actor	0.00 (AfD)	0.00 (G. Müller)
Most central concept	1.00 (financial solidarity)	1.00 (political solidarity)
Least central concept	0.00 (misuse of solidarity)	0.00 (justice)

The Euro crisis started in Greece in December 2009 at which point the Greek government admitted to having reported false numbers of debt and economic growth. The following political and financial developments into the most severe crisis of the EU peaked with the Greek referendum in July 2015 concerning the third bailout programme (or 'Memorandum of Understanding'). The subsequent defeat in the European Council and an even stricter agreement on the bailout terms has marked the end of an intense debate on the Euro crisis. In the same year, the migration topic came to public attention and dominated the media coverage from summer 2015 onwards. Nonetheless, after the 'Arab Spring' of 2011 and an increase in the number of migrant shipwrecks in the Mediterranean in 2013 and 2014, solidarity was already debated (Wallaschek 2018b). The asymmetries of the EU asylum policies and under-development of the EU Justice and Home Affairs in this policy gained public attention.

#### **5.4.1 Coalition magnets: The dominance of austerity and contested political solidarity**

The discourse on solidarity in the Euro crisis is reinterpreted by claims on financial solidarity. Financial solidarity is the uncontested coalition magnet in the public discourse. Claims on solidarity and financial solidarity are linked in the German public discourse. The

solidarity discourse in Europe's migration crisis is shaped by the coalition magnet political solidarity. However, this meaning of solidarity is contested by other concepts such as demarcation or legal regulations.

Table 19 provides an overview of the concepts used in both discourses. To control for different centrality measures, the eigenvector centrality and the normalised degree centrality are shown. In both centrality measures, financial solidity and political solidarity are on the first position in their discourse network. The gap between the first and the following positions is very wide and indicates how crucial both concepts are in their discourses. The following second and third positions in Table 19 are the same concepts in each centrality score.

**Table 19: Coalition magnets in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis**

Concepts	Euro crisis		Migration crisis	
	Eigenvector centrality	Normalised degree centrality	Eigenvector centrality	Normalised degree centrality
<b>conditionality</b>	0,113	0,042	-	-
<b>cultural solidarity</b>	0,024	0,083	0,154	0,069
<b>demarcation</b>	-	-	0,227	0,172
<b>economic solidarity</b>	0,070	0,167	-	-
<b>financial solidity</b>	1,000	0,375	-	-
<b>justice</b>	-	-	0,000	0,034
<b>legal regulations</b>	-	-	0,157	0,103
<b>misuse of solidarity</b>	0,000	0,042	0,000	0,034
<b>monetary solidarity</b>	0,026	0,125	0,000	0,069
<b>necessity</b>	0,024	0,042	-	-
<b>political solidarity</b>	0,048	0,125	1,000	0,414
<b>responsibility</b>	0,023	0,083	-	-
<b>security</b>	-	-	0,100	0,069
<b>social cohesion</b>	-	-	0,000	0,034
<b>social solidarity</b>	-	-	0,123	0,069
<b>sovereignty</b>	-	-	0,017	0,069

Note: The eigenvector centrality scale is from 0 to 1. The closer the value is to 1, the more central the concept. The degree centrality is normalised by dividing the number of edges a node has and the total number of edges in the respective network. The higher the value, the more central the concept. The underlined values indicate the three highest centrality values, increasing the readability of the table. The hyphen indicates that the concept has not appeared in the network discourse, while the value 0 shows that the concept appeared but is not central in the network.

Both discourses have a rather different ideational structure. Some understandings of solidarity are only deployed in one of the crisis discourses (including social solidarity in the migration crisis, economic solidarity in the Euro crisis, among others). Besides meanings of solidarity, other concepts such as sovereignty, responsibility or, most prominently, financial solidity do not feature in both discourses. Hence, discourses are structured along coalition magnets that attract actors and offer a way to frame the crisis in a specific way.

The following statements from the beginning of the Euro crisis illustrate the ideational reinterpretation of solidarity by referring to 'financial solidity' as a necessary component of any solidarity action. Thus, solidarity is demanded, but only if the austerity regime persists:

Merkel also briefly talked about the Greek debts crisis. The long lasting infringement of the stability pact has brought Greece into this situation and not the [financial, author] speculation. Therefore, short-term solidarity was not the solution. There is no alternative to a rigorous austerity programme. (Welt, March 18<sup>th</sup> 2010).

President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso proclaimed: 'Without solidarity, there is no stability.' (Welt, April 28<sup>th</sup> 2010).

Merkel's position is indirectly quoted in the centre-right newspaper saying that austerity measurements are unavoidable in Greece. She blames Greece for its precarious situation and argues that there is no other way than austerity. Barroso stresses that solidarity has to be shown in order to save the Eurozone in his comment on the first Greek bailout programme.

The EU established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010, the intergovernmental treaty ESM and the Fiscal Compact in 2012 and stressed that solidarity is given, but only under certain circumstances, including austerity measures. The following debates on bailout programmes<sup>37</sup> for Greece or even a potential 'Grexit', financial turmoil in Spain and Cyprus, as well as the establishment of the ESM underpin

---

<sup>37</sup> In the German debate, bailout programs are semantically redefined as 'Rettungspakete' or 'Rettungsschirme' (rescue packages or rescue umbrellas). This underlines the discursive link of austerity and solidarity: Together with other EU member states, Germany is spanning his umbrella and sends a package to rescue crisis countries from its sovereign debt with its credits. Because of that, certain conditions can be requested such as structural reforms and austerity policies. That the bailout programs have also recapitalised German, Dutch and French banks who gave risky loans to these countries were hardly debated.

the ideational focus on austerity. Claims on linking solidarity and austerity prevailed over the whole time period.

Examining the migration crisis, the debate about reforming the European asylum and migration policies started before 2015. Several ship incidents in the Mediterranean (e. g. at the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013), as well as an increasing number of asylum seekers coming to Italy and Greece from Syria in 2012 to 2014, induced a lasting debate about reform. In particular, a European solution and new political instruments were put forward to deal solidarily with the migration movements:

‘Calling for an active admission of Syrian civil war refugees and the “protection in the region” approach do not contradict each other, but are interdependent’, said [Vice chairman of the Greens in the Bundestag Josef, author] Winkler with regard to the government’s position. His party demands that Germany takes in refugees unbureaucratically. ‘We also see this as an act of solidarity with the European border countries which have provided a lot of assistance in the refugee admission.’ (Welt, September 4<sup>th</sup> 2012).

In 2015, such claims have been reformulated and demanded from a wide range of party actors. Although political solidarity is the most salient concept in the migration crisis discourse, ‘demarcation’, ‘legal regulations’ or ‘security’ also gained public attention before and during the crisis. Security measures against migrants are justified, a re-nationalisation of border control is suggested or cooperation among EU member states is refused. Since the establishment of the Dublin Regulations, the country which an asylum seeker first enters has to deal with its asylum procedure, while other EU member states are not obliged to do anything. Additionally, these claims stress that the existing legal regulations should not be altered.

Germany is protesting against Italy’s refugee politics which is claiming to give visas to thousands of Tunisian immigrants, to let them pass to other EU member states. ‘Italy has to deal with its refugee problem on its own’, said the [German, author] Federal Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich to the ‘Welt’. (Welt, April 11th 2011).

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) harshly rejected those ideas which were also presented by her Austrian counterpart Werner Feymann in Brussels. Relocating asylum seekers among the EU member states is demanded again and again, said the Chancellor. She thinks, however, that the discussion on refugee policy should be based on the existing legal regulations (SZ, October 26<sup>th</sup> 2013).


Hence, the rise of xenophobic and nationalistic claims and the contestation of the Schengen agreement in 2015 have a pre-story that rests on previous claims with a similar framing. The constancy of both coalition magnets demonstrates that even in times of crisis, actors use similar ideas in public debates.

#### **5.4.2 Discourse coalitions: The omnipresence of conservative politicians**

The most central actors are (German) conservative party politicians in the Euro crisis. German Chancellor Merkel and the two German parties CDU and CSU, as well as the President of the European Commission Barroso (2004–14), are most visible and form a discourse coalition. Regarding the migration crisis, the key actors in the debate are the German parties Die Grünen, SPD, and CSU, as well as German Chancellor Merkel. They form one large and encompassing discourse coalition. The expectation about a governing party and party opposition discourse coalition is not confirmed (Figure 14).

In the Euro crisis discourse, the central role of conservative parties and politicians during the Euro crisis underlines their influence in shaping the solidarity discourse. They are supported by claims from the German liberal party (FDP) politicians Westerwelle (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009–13) and Brüderle (Minister of Economics, 2009–11). Hence, the German government coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP between 2009 and 2013, that is, amid the main phase of the Euro crisis, engaged in the public discourse by linking the solidarity discourse with claims on financial solidity.

Figure 14: Solidarity discourse networks in the Euro crisis (2010-15)



Note: The bipartite network consists of actors that are shown as circles and concepts displayed as squares. The size of the nodes and labels is based on the eigenvector centrality. The bigger the size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. The thickness of the edges as well as the edge labels indicate how strong actors and concepts are linked. The discourse network only shows edges with an edge weight of at least 2, focusing on the most prevalent links between actors and concepts. The codes 'no party affiliation' and 'no justification' have been deleted from the network.

The reinterpretation and linking of solidarity and austerity became an important topic during the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2014. As the CDU frontrunner David McAllister highlighted in an interview:

The CDU wants to keep the Euro stable and ensure that Europe emerges strengthened from the crisis. Solidarity and solidity belong together. Therefore, we are against a systemic

communitarisation of national debts. We will not support Eurobonds or debt repayment funds. On this issue, we have the support of a very large majority of German citizens, said David McAllister, the frontrunner of the CDU in the EP elections in 2014 (Welt, February 8<sup>th</sup> 2014).<sup>38</sup>

The debate on solidarity and solidity continued in 2014/15. It was then linked to the electoral victory of the left party alliance Syriza in Greece in January 2015, as well as to the following negotiations about a third bailout programme between the Greek government, the Troika, and the Eurozone members. The pressure on the Greek government after the referendum in July 2015 to accept new (and even stricter) conditions and supervision by the Troika supports the central role of austerity in the Euro crisis. Thus, financial solidity acts as a coalition magnet for the biggest discourse coalition that consists of the mentioned German party actors and Barroso. With the highest number of claims, Merkel stands out as the most central actor in the discourse network.

Social democratic parties, in particular the German SPD, refer to both austerity and meanings of solidarity. They are rather undecided when it comes to how to solve the Euro crisis. They argue that solidarity should be shown with the crisis countries based on shared values such as human dignity and equality (cultural solidarity), that EU member states should cooperate and form an 'ever closer union' (political solidarity) or should establish a European public investment plan or a transfer union (economic solidarity) in order to solve the Euro crisis. Yet, none of these solidarity claims became salient in the discourse. Moreover, social democrats demanded austerity measures as necessary to reduce the level of national debts (financial solidity). This argumentative support contributed to the strength of financial solidity as a coalition magnet in the Euro crisis.

Other actors and concepts were rather marginal in the discourse on the Euro crisis from 2010 to 2015. The German green party focused on cultural solidarity claims, while the appearance of the radical right party AfD at the beginning of its establishment is based on its Eurosceptic focus. AfD politicians demand that Germany should leave the Eurozone, reintroduce the Deutsche Mark (DM) and that any solidarity actions are illegitimate. Non-German actors such as the French President François Hollande (2012–


---

<sup>38</sup> In figure 14, David McAllister is not present as a single node, because his claim is subsumed under the party label 'CDU'. Only actors with more than two claims and a crucial public or political position were coded by name. This coding strategy is adapted from other discourse network studies (Fisher *et al.* 2013; Haunss 2017).

17), the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski (2007–14) or the European Commissioner Olli Rehn (2009–14) are less central in the discourse, which emphasises the strong domestic focus of the German solidarity debate on the Euro crisis. Accordingly, other coalition magnets or discourse coalitions are not identified.

Regarding the migration crisis, the party opposition receives public attention and influences the solidarity debate (Figure 15). The German green party (Die Grünen) and the social democrats (SPD) argue for a European solution and new political instruments to deal solidarily with the migration movements (political solidarity). Nonetheless, Chancellor Merkel and the CSU are also strongly represented in the discourse. The European Commissioners for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström (2010–14) and Dimitris Avramopoulos (since 2014) are also quite visible in the discourse and demand a European solution that fosters cooperation between EU member states and reforms to the existing CEAS.

Figure 15: Solidarity discourse networks in Europe's migration crisis (2010-15)



Note: The bipartite network consists of actors that are shown as circles and concepts displayed as squares. The size of the nodes and labels is based on the eigenvector centrality. The bigger the size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. The thickness of the edges as well as the edge labels indicate how strong actors and concepts are linked. The discourse network only shows edges with an edge weight of at least 3, focusing on the most prevalent links between actors and concepts. The codes 'no party affiliation' and 'no justification' have been deleted from the network.

The concern that the Southern European countries are left with the incoming asylum seekers and are over-burdened is shared by many European, as well as social democratic, green, and left actors. For instance, the German SPD politician Michael Roth demands a European solidarity mechanism and justifies this with political solidarity in the centre-left newspaper:

'We need more solidarity. We need more humanity', claimed Michael Roth, the German Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. 'We are very, very open to develop a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before', he emphasised (SZ, June 24<sup>th</sup> 2015).

He refers positively to solidarity at the beginning of his statement and becomes more concrete at the end by suggesting a solidary scheme in which EU member states participate in the future. The responsibility to act in solidarity is predominately attributed to the EU member states instead of addressing refugees and migrants.

In 2015, radical right parties such as the AfD and right-conservative politicians like the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (since 2010) demand national border control, claim to re-establish national sovereignty, and refuse a fair sharing of burdens among the EU member states. The prevalence of the call to solidarity in 2015 and evidence of how party actors seek to reinterpret the term are provided in the following statement by the Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (2014–15) in 2015:

Warsaw wants to prevent a revision of asylum law based on the population of the EU member states. Until now Poland receives only few refugees in relation to its population size – in 2014 only 114 Syrians have applied for asylum. It is not surprising that the head of government Ewa Kopacz primarily insists on better border security in the Mediterranean at the EU summit in Brussels. 'Our solidarity primarily rests upon strongly supporting Frontex. We will send our border police officer' (Welt, April 25<sup>th</sup> 2015).

Although showing solidarity is contested among the political actors, the European Commission proposed several 'institutional packages' in 2015. Among these was the relocation of 160,000 refugees who had already been registered in Greece, Hungary, and Italy across the other EU member states, following a certain quota for each country in September 2015 (European Commission 2015). The European Council approved it by a majority vote two weeks later. This led to conflicts among the member states, because the Visegrád countries voted against it and brought it to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to repeal the decision. However, the ECJ ruled against it in September 2017 (Byrne 2017). Nonetheless, other countries such as Belgium or Austria have also delayed or slowed down the relocation of refugees from Greece and Italy (European Commission 2017a). This means that though the particular meaning of political solidarity was established in the European solidarity mechanism and approved by the member states, the resistance of several EU member states has brought down the idea of political solidarity (Zaun 2018).

## 5.5 Conclusion

The article analysed the German media discourse on solidarity in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis. The aim was to analyse meanings of solidarity and the specific party constellation in both crises discourses from a network perspective. Since Germany was criticised for its lack of showing solidarity in the Euro crisis, but demanded solidarity from other EU member states in the migration crisis, it was expected that solidarity is differently framed in the respective crisis discourses.

To conceptualise the agency and ideational dimension in the discursive institutionalist framework, the discourse coalition and coalition magnet approach were combined. Understanding influential ideas as coalition magnets, which attract various and key actors and can be widely interpreted, sheds light on how discourse coalitions are established. As Béland and Cox note, the polysemic nature of concepts might matter for creating a coalition magnet, but it might also prevent ideas from becoming influential. Hence, deploying rather ambiguous ideas might lead to unexpected outcomes and in turn create uncertainty in terms of how actors can frame ideas. As shown in the Euro crisis discourse, actors strategically reinterpreted solidarity and combined it with financial solidity so as to legitimise their decisions. These conceptual questions, as well as the suggested combination of both approaches, provide a fruitful perspective for future discursive institutionalist analysis.

The two main findings of the discourse network analysis are as follows. *First*, the framing of solidarity differs in the two crises, which corroborates the formulated expectation on the perceived solidary obligations in Germany. In the case of the Euro crisis, austerity claims were prevalent, while meanings of solidarity were too contested among the actors. Solidarity was reinterpreted by way of the 'financial solidity' concept. This prevented economic and monetary solidarity from becoming powerful coalition magnets in the discourse on the Euro crisis. Social solidarity was completely absent in the discourse. This ideational interlocking confirms Galpin's (2017) qualitative account and supports the expectation that German actors frame the lack of giving solidarity mainly with regard to a necessary austerity regime in order to guarantee the survival of the Eurozone. The focus on national budget surveillance via the Fiscal Compact and the

remaining relevance of austerity policies in the EU underline the dominance of economic issues as previous studies have shown (Grande *et al.* 2016).

The analysis of coalition magnets in Europe's migration crisis has demonstrated an increasingly polarised discourse between a solidarity-oriented understanding in which political solidarity is closely linked to other meanings of solidarity, such as cultural solidarity, and a contra-solidarity perspective stressing security issues. The limitations of the CEAS in responding to the high influx of asylum seekers and a fair burden-sharing have opened a discursive opportunity to debate new cooperative institutional settings or to contest the Schengen agreement. Even though the implementation of these institutional reforms predominantly failed in the end (Biermann *et al.* 2019; Zaun 2018), such public discussions on reforming the CEAS were hardly imaginable before 2015. The solidarity debate underpins the high degree of potential conflict around the migration issue in the EU.

*Second*, conservative parties and politicians are the most present party actors in both crises discourses. While they strongly dominate the Euro crisis discourse, the migration crisis discourse shows a broader discourse coalition that includes not just conservative actors, but also members of the Green party, SPD, and German Left party. Hence, the debate on solidarity in the Euro crisis is driven more by a left versus right cleavage, and a government versus party opposition conflict, than the migration crisis discourse.

Closa and Maatsch's (2014) finding that the party opposition mainly focuses on claiming solidarity in plenary debates is not corroborated for the media arena. Government and opposition actors use solidarity claims, and the former is more visible in both crisis discourses. Supranational actors such as members of the European Commission (e. g. Barroso, Malmström or Avramopoulos) have influenced the German public debates to some extent, which underscores their increased relevance in national media debates on European affairs.

While liberal intergovernmentalism assumes rather fixed national preferences and complete information about the issue, the ideational approach has demonstrated that actors adapt their understanding of solidarity to the crisis situation. While economic and monetary solidarity have played a role in the Euro crisis, political and cultural solidarity

featured in the migration crisis. Despite the high rates of unemployment and strong cuts in the social sector, social solidarity has not received significant attention in the Euro crisis. While the first mentioned meanings have been linked to the reform process of the EMU and the understanding that the Eurozone, in order to survive, has to establish new institutional mechanisms (ESM, Fiscal Compact), claims on political solidarity in particular have substantially questioned the status quo of the CEAS. However, the reform process of establishing solidary institutions on the European level has been blocked by several EU member states. While Germany has hesitated to support such institutional reforms before 2015, it has changed its position due to the large number of incoming asylum seekers and supported a European framework in the wake of the migration crisis.

These results bear some limitations and open the agenda for future inquiries. First and foremost, applying a nominalistic approach to solidarity presupposes that actors intentionally use the concept, and this also limits the data material. Moreover, it does not cover claims that use the idea of solidarity without mentioning the term. While this approach was useful to explore the meanings of solidarity in two different crises, future studies should extend the terminological scope of the study and utilise a broad conceptualisation of solidarity so as to capture further aspects of and debates on solidarity. The focus on quality newspapers leads to a selection bias towards statements by 'elite' actors and a 'structural bias' of the media towards government actors (Koopmans 2007; Van Dalen 2012). However, the study was interested in how political parties frame solidarity and mobilise the public, and as such studying quality newspapers proved to be most apt. Nonetheless, meanings of solidarity can be analysed in other argumentative arenas such as parliaments, online media outlets or policy discourses. The claim on solidarity can also be related to historical crisis events, accounting for long-term ideational changes.

The public appeal to solidarity strongly resonated in Germany during both European crises. Furthermore, the call to solidarity is far from being uncontested in the public sphere. In this regard, the present study has demonstrated how actors deal with crisis situations and how they frame and reinterpret solidarity as a potential solution when experiencing crises.

## 5.6 Appendix

### 5.6.1 Political claims analysis

The coding of the newspaper articles follows the framework of political claims analysis (PCA). PCA was developed by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; 2010). The main idea of PCA is that newspaper articles contain many different statements by different actors. Instead of focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis or almost exclusively on the content, the link between a statement and the speaker is emphasised. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. A claim can include several actions, articulated or reported in the public sphere and, thus, represents the plurality of actions and demands made by actors. The components of a claim can be differentiated by following a logic of questions regarding each claim: 'WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY' (de Wilde 2014: 52). These questions are the grammar of claims and help the coder to identify the claim, making the coding transparent and comprehensible. In my project, I focus on four core codes of a claim: 1) the speaker; 2) the act; 3) the issue; and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all of these four codes in a statement, the potential claim is not coded. The other mentioned components by de Wilde are coded if detectable. The codes are differentiated into sub-codes to allow for a fine-grained coding and analysis (Table 20) and follows the published codebook by de Wilde et al. (2014) who have coded newspaper articles and parliamentary debates in a similar way.

Table 20: Codes and sub-codes in the PCA (Appendix Chapter 5)

Codes	Sub-codes
<b>Time &amp; source</b>	A_year, B_source
<b>Claimant</b>	C_claimant_type, D_claimant_scope, E_claimant_function, F_claimant_party, G_claimant_nationality, X_special_claimant, XXX_parties
<b>Action</b>	H_action
<b>Issue</b>	I_issue, J_issue scope
<b>Addressee</b>	K_addressee_type, L_addressee_scope, M_addressee_function, N_addressee_nationality, P_addressee_party, Q_addressee_evaluation
<b>Frame</b>	R_position, S_justification, T_justification_scope

The claimant gives the statement and has different forms: It could be a politician who states something in an interview or a journalist who writes an opinion piece. Collective actors such as the national government could be the claimant too. It is crucial that the subject of the statement is clearly identifiable. The claimant has further sub-categories: claimant type, claimant scope, then claimant function, claimant nationality, and finally the claimant party. Moreover, the sub-category 'X\_special claimant' names any claimant with a full name while the sub-category 'XXX\_parties' combines party organisation names and full names of politicians. For instance, German Chancellor and CDU politician Angela Merkel is named with a full name, while other CDU politicians who are less visible in the public sphere – i.e. fewer than two claims in the dataset – are subsumed under the overarching organisation (CDU). The action of the claimant must also be reported or stated in the text. That could be a verbal statement, passing a bill in parliament, demonstrating or even violently attacking someone. The action happens in a specific context – this is the issue. The issue is integration or migration for the migration crisis, and economy or finance for the Euro crisis. The claim has to refer to the crisis situation in Europe. Issues relevant to other regions in the world are not coded; with the exception if they affect Europe or are situated in a European context, e. g. a claim that Syrian refugees should be granted asylum in EU countries. The last core code is position which is important in order to see what the claimant thinks about the issue and what they demand. This means that the claim should be related to either pro- or contra-solidarity. The claim is coded as neutral if the claimant either argues for both positions or no positions.

Following this logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims or no claims at all. There are two limitations for the coding procedure: First, I do not code claims that refer to events of migration that are older than six months from the date it is published in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration processes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in each newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each article. Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes, the claim is seen as a new one.

For instance, an article reports a speech by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the beginning of the article, she is quoted demanding financial assistance (monetary solidarity) for Greece and a European solution. In the middle of the text, Merkel is cited

again, but this time, she calls for liberalising the public health sector in Greece in order to reduce the sovereign debt. Thus, the speaker is the same (Merkel), the act is the same (verbal statement), the issue is also the same (Euro crisis), but the position is different. While the first statement is about monetary solidarity and a pro-solidarity statement, the second statement refers to structural reforms and austerity actions in Greece. Hence, both claims can be coded in the same article.

### 5.6.2 Identifying solidarity claims

Regarding the coding of the selected ‘solidarity statements’, I applied a nominalistic approach. This means that I have only coded claims with the mentioned term ‘solidarity’ in the newspaper article. This strengthens the validity and the reliability of the coding procedure for such a polysemic concept. The results are based on the following keyword lists in the database Factiva. For the Euro crisis: ‘(Eurozone\* or finanz\* or Wahrung\* or Schuld\* or Kredit\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*)’. For the migration crisis: ‘(Fluchtlings\* or Flucht\* or Migrant\* or Einwander\* or Zuwander\* or Asyl\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*)’. An asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. Duplicates of articles were excluded from the article population.

The focus of the study is on the meanings of solidarity that are deployed in the discourse on the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis. Table 21 provides an overview of the various meanings of solidarity.

Table 21: Meanings of solidarity in the two crises discourses (Appendix Chapter 5)

Meanings	Description
<b>Political solidarity</b>	Setting up new political mechanisms and instruments in a cooperative way
<b>Social solidarity</b>	Redistributing resources and people and groups volunteering
<b>Cultural solidarity</b>	Arguing for a shared identity and norms
<b>Legal solidarity</b>	Liability of members based on the signing of treaties and agreements
<b>Economic solidarity</b>	Support in the form of public investments and growth of the economy
<b>Monetary solidarity</b>	Risk-sharing and the reduction or share of sovereign debts to help others
<b>Misuse of solidarity</b>	Questioning the legitimacy of the call to solidarity

Besides the multiple meanings of solidarity which have been coded, I also coded other frames as long as they were linked to solidarity in the specific claim. By doing so, the coding not only accounts for the various meanings of solidarity, but also accounts for how actors use other frames in their statements on solidarity. For instance, an actor claims solidarity with a crisis country, because it is unjust how the high unemployment rate affects the population. Then, the claim is coded with the frame 'justice'. Another example is the frame of 'financial solidity'. This is an in-vivo frame, taken from the coding material, because actors often used this frame instead of claiming austerity, structural reforms or financial consolidation. Actors claim that solidarity is important in the crisis and will be shown, but only if financial solidity is implemented and demonstrated by the crisis countries. Therefore, the claim is coded as solidarity related, but the frame that is used in order to justify the claim is 'financial solidity'.

The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the discourse network analysis (DNA) (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56) and since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into network data. Actors argue with particular concepts and this communicative action can be understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. By referring more or less to one concept, this could be understood as a repetitive account on arguing for a specific policy solution (Haunss 2017; Leifeld 2016a). Other actors might use the same concept in the debate and build up a relation to the concept too. Since actors have different interests, we could assume that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors. Based on shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network analysis can detect a specific actor or concept cluster within networks in order to examine which actors or concepts are relatively close to or distant from each other. Lastly, actors and concepts can be studied in affiliation networks, showing two types of networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). The network graphs 2 and 3, as well as the network statistics regarding the eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987), are computed and visualised with the R package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006).

**Table 22: Number of claims and articles in German newspapers in the Euro crisis (Appendix Chapter 5)**

	Claims in SZ	Claims in Welt	Claims (total)	SZ	Welt	Articles (total)
2010	27	19	46	73	49	122
2011	47	30	77	122	75	197
2012	63	30	93	136	71	207
2013	37	24	61	98	84	182
2014	10	8	18	84	62	146
2015	40	32	72	144	110	254
2010–15	224	143	367	657	451	1,108

**Table 23: Number of claims and articles in German newspapers in Europe's migration crisis (Appendix Chapter 5)**

	Claims in SZ	Claims in Welt	Claims (total)	SZ	Welt	Articles (total)
2010	8	6	14	37	23	60
2011	24	26	50	49	39	88
2012	10	8	18	59	28	87
2013	46	60	106	73	55	128
2014	54	74	128	95	80	175
2015	219	138	357	394	223	617
2010–15	361	312	673	707	448	1,155

**Table 24: Eigenvector centrality in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis (Appendix Chapter 5)**

Euro crisis (2010–15)		Europe's migration crisis (2010–15)	
Actors and Meanings	Value	Actors and Meanings	Value
financial solidity	1	political solidarity	1
A. Merkel	0,798	Die Grünen	0,491
J. M. Barroso	0,284	SPD	0,423
CSU	0,284	CSU	0,394
CDU	0,284	A. Merkel	0,343

R. Brüderle	0,213	conservative	0,307
SPD	0,166	C. Malmstroem	0,300
social democrat	0,162	CDU	0,263
conservative	0,155	Die Linke	0,257
G. Westerwelle	0,142	demarcation	0,227
conditionality	0,113	T. de Maiziere	0,214
economic solidarity	0,070	D. Avramopoulos	0,171
political solidarity	0,048	legal regulations	0,157
monetary solidarity	0,026	cultural solidarity	0,154
necessity	0,024	social democratic	0,131
cultural solidarity	0,024	M. Schulz	0,128
responsibility	0,023	social solidarity	0,123
F. Hollande	0,010	security	0,100
Cypriot government	0,007	far right	0,058
E. Macron	0,007	V. Orbán	0,029
O. Rehn	0,004	sovereignty	0,017
Die Grünen	0,003	E. Kopacz	0,002
R. Sikorski	0,003	H. Seehofer	0,000
misuse of solidarity	0,000	social cohesion	0,000
AfD	0,000	monetary solidarity	0,000
		misuse of solidarity	0,000
		justice	0,000
		H.-P. Friedrich	0,000
		German government	0,000
		G. Müller	0,000

Note: The scale of the eigenvector centrality score is between 0 and 1. The closer to one, the more central the concept or actor in the network. The concepts are displayed in italics to increase the readability of the table.



## 6 Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to shed light on solidarity in Europe in times of crisis. The goal was to theorise solidarity from a discursive perspective and develop a conceptual approach to analyse actors' public statements on solidarity. The suggested approach builds upon previous studies and offers a new and comprehensive approach for studying solidarity in its discursive manifestations. The need for such a new approach was made clear in light of the fact that previous work on solidarity seldom considers the discursive construction of solidarity. Although solidarity is a common term in social and political theory, as well as being widely used in everyday language, the research on solidarity so far has hardly taken into account that a) solidarity has to be appealed to in order to be relevant in political conflicts, b) actors attribute various meanings to solidarity and reinterpret the concept amid changing contexts, and c) solidarity operates across different scales that might stand in conflict with one another. Hence, one aim was to differentiate solidarity into various meanings and scales and investigate the actor constellation in solidarity discourses.

This newly developed approach distinguishes between the meaning and scale of solidarity. While the meaning dimension refers to the content of solidarity, the scale dimension captures who is encompassed by the call to solidarity. Hence, both dimensions are connected. There cannot be a claim to solidarity that invokes a certain meaning, but does not include a scale of solidarity and vice versa. The discursive construction of solidarity approach was then later applied in various ways to the solidarity discourse in Germany and Ireland during two crises: the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis, respectively. The following two tables (Table 25 and Table 26) provide an overview, showing the most prevalent scales and meanings of solidarity. For this purpose, I left out the other justifications that have been coded and analysed in the Chapters 3-5. The colouring of the fields shall illustrate the dominant intersections of meanings and scales of solidarity, differentiated into the two crises discourses.

**Table 25: Number of meanings and scales of solidarity in the Euro crisis**

	Intergovernmental EU	local	national	other	Supra-national EU	transnational	total
<b>cultural solidarity</b>	14	0	1	0	8	8	31
<b>social solidarity</b>	4	1	18	0	1	6	30
<b>monetary solidarity</b>	47	0	11	2	10	0	70
<b>political solidarity</b>	21	0	1	0	11	1	34
<b>economic solidarity</b>	22	0	6	0	0	4	32
<b>legal solidarity</b>	3	0	0	0	4	0	7
<b>misuse of solidarity</b>	27	0	2	0	3	0	32
<b>total</b>	138	1	39	2	37	19	236

Note: 0–10 (white), 11–20 (light grey), 21–30 (dark grey), >30 (black).

Table 26: Number of meanings and scales of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis

	global	Intergovern- mental EU	Inter- national	National (exclusionary)	National (inclusionary)	other	transnational migrant/ refugee	Transnational	total
<b>cultural solidarity</b>	1	19	3	4	9	0	68	6	110
<b>social solidarity</b>	0	2	0	2	2	2	54	4	66
<b>monetary solidarity</b>	0	8	9	6	0	3	4	1	31
<b>political solidarity</b>	2	155	6	4	0	0	55	6	228
<b>economic solidarity</b>	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	2	6
<b>legal solidarity</b>	0	3	0	0	0	0	6	2	11
<b>misuse of solidarity</b>	0	5	0	5	0	0	0	2	12
<b>total</b>	3	192	21	21	11	5	188	23	464

Note: 0–10 (white), 11–20 (light grey), 21–30 (dark grey), >30 (black). These numbers are not identical to the results of [Chapter 2](#), because the Irish discourse is included in this table.

Two main differences in the ideational structure of the solidarity discourses can be identified. *First*, the Euro crisis discourse is more nuanced in respect of the number of meanings and scales of solidarity. Five meanings of solidarity have between 30 and 35 mentions in the Euro crisis. Only legal solidarity at the end of the ranking (7 mentions) and monetary solidarity on the first position (70 mentions) are exceptionally often or seldom invoked, respectively. This shows that the Euro crisis solidarity discourse is structured around various meanings with a strong focus on monetary solidarity issues. Given that the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 was a central institutional innovation that was intended to contain the financial crisis by sharing credit-liability among the EU member states, the strong visibility of monetary solidarity claims is not surprising. The intergovernmental EU scale is the most dominant scale of solidarity. For almost every meaning of solidarity, the intergovernmental EU scale is the most referred scale. This underlines the strong discursive and policy focus on dealing with the Euro crisis among the respective member states negotiating the crisis management between the government representatives. The national and supranational scales are only partially relevant. For instance, social solidarity is predominantly claimed on the national scale, while political solidarity is also debated on the supranational EU level. While social solidarity indicates that redistributive mechanisms are mainly addressed in the welfare nation-state, political solidarity arguments for an 'ever closer union' particularly resonated on the supranational level, but had negligible discursive leverage in terms of institutionally pushing the EU towards a new supranationalism.

*Second*, the migration crisis discourse is highly centred on the meaning of political solidarity and oscillates between the intergovernmental EU and the transnational scale in relation to migrants and refugees. While the latter scale also attracts cultural and social solidarity as further meanings in the discourse, the intergovernmental scale is almost exclusively addressed in claims on political solidarity. This clear discursive focus shows that Europe's migration crisis was first and foremost a political crisis, created by the asymmetrically developed EU migration and asylum policy (Monar 2014). The question of how to deal solidarily with incoming asylum seekers, despite the one-sided responsibility for (Southern) European border countries and an unwillingness to harmonise national migration policies, was debated since the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs. In particular, the tension between a common market including the free movement of goods, capital, services

and people (Schengen) and the externalisation of border control to the border countries displays the solidarity conflict in the EU. Therefore, while the debate on political solidarity – namely on new political instruments and mechanisms that create more cooperation between member states – can be said to have peaked in the ‘summer of migration’, it rests on previous public discussions. The focus on the intergovernmental scale shows, on the one hand, that member states still have the biggest say in migration policies, especially so in times of crisis. On the other hand, it shows that supranational claims on political solidarity are hard to fulfil due to the lack of supranational authority in the EU. The attempt to establish the EU solidarity scheme based on a proposal of the EU Commission, as well as the heated debate that followed, and its ultimate failure underline the fundamental conflict on migration issues in the EU.

Nonetheless, the considerable amount of claims on the transnational level regarding social and cultural solidarity demonstrates not only that the migration debate entails member states discussing migration policies, but also that solidary actions regarding migrants and refugees are claimed and publicly covered. In particular, the year 2015 gave prominence to the voluntary actions of individuals and self-organised groups and the defence of human rights for migrants, all of which helped to put issues of migration into the public eye. Discussing solidarity in the context of migration showed that migration is a transnational phenomenon. Acting in solidarity means addressing migrants and refugees in a rather precarious situation, while at the same time it shows that human activities traverse borders – whether national or regional. In this sense, it is still a political question how actors should act and how institutions should be created to set up a new solidary structure that can deal with transnational human activities and migration movements. In addition to providing an overview and reflection on some of the key findings of the new meso-discursive approach to solidarity, I want to highlight six findings that broadly relate to the individual chapters of the thesis. Some of these findings are present in more than one chapter while others are shown in chapters, but have not been the principal focus of the chapter.

## **6.1 Contributions**

*First*, I show that the recent crises experiences in Europe have triggered a new scholarly debate on the state and transformation of solidarity in Europe. In the [Prelude](#), I review four

recent contributions to the debate on solidarity and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. Their biggest strength is that they shed new light on the concept. By investigating solidary attitudes and actions on the individual level (Della Porta 2018; Lahusen and Grasso 2018a), and as an institutional mechanism and guiding principle on the macro level (McNamara 2017; Schelkle 2017), such research demonstrates the diverse ways in which the concept of solidarity can be operationalised. These studies also use the different crises as a starting point to engage in a discussion about how solidarity changes in times of crisis. While these works have proved both timely and useful, they are not without their flaws and limitations. My main concern is that much of this recent research refuses to engage in a stronger theoretical debate in terms of how actors make sense of the concept of solidarity and the different understandings of it that exist. Three of the four studies – with the exception of Schelkle – draw on ‘social solidarity’ as the predominant meaning of solidarity. This then narrows the scope of investigation into how solidarity is framed, understood, and enacted in times of crisis. In other words, if a concept is operationalised too specifically, then the question is whether it measures what the respondents and activists understand as solidarity, or what the researchers understand as solidarity. Therefore, I argue for a more open conceptualisation and suggest that the discursive construction of solidarity should be considered in future analyses.

*Second*, the meso-discursive approach to solidarity offers a novel perspective on solidarity. By using the discrete dimensions of meaning and scale, I can overcome the shortcomings of previous research that focused on macro-structural and micro-behavioural aspects of solidarity. The meso approach does not presuppose any definition of solidarity, and more importantly, it does not exclusively focus on one particular type of solidarity. By suggesting various meanings and scales of solidarity, as laid out in [Chapter 2](#), I show that the meaning of political solidarity and cultural solidarity are prominent concepts in the German solidarity discourse on Europe’s migration crisis. While social solidarity also plays a role in the pre-crisis debate, it is not as visible in the public debate as it is in the academic debate. This also shows that actors favour certain meanings in the migration context and do not randomly invoke meanings and scales of solidarity. The finding that political solidarity is the most visible meaning – both before and during the crisis – underlines the fact that a major driver of Europe’s migration crisis is in fact the incomplete EU migration and asylum policy.

The Dublin Regulations do not rest on a solidarity mechanism between member states in respect of how to deal with an increasing number of incoming asylum seekers. Hence, the solidarity debate largely focuses on this political-institutional gap in the asylum policies and how best to solve it. By applying the discourse network analysis to the study of meaning-scale networks, I have been able to illustrate the meso approach with my collected data.

*Third*, meanings of solidarity are also challenged by contra-solidarity claims. In [Chapter 3](#), the claims analysis of the ‘summer of migration’ in 2015 in the German and Irish media provided an in-depth discussion of pro- and contra-solidarity concepts. During the climax of the crisis, political, cultural, and social solidarity were shown to be the most prominent concepts in both media discourses. I showed that the crisis provided a ‘discursive window of opportunity’ through which to raise various claims on solidarity. The aforementioned political solidarity regarding the EU asylum policy was discussed, reports about volunteering acts by NGOs and citizens helping incoming refugees (social solidarity) were published, and claims on human rights and humanitarian values were articulated to promote cultural solidarity. The other ideational side of the discourse, however, opposed solidarity and instead raised security and demarcation claims. It showed that a renationalisation of border control, stricter surveillance of the Mediterranean, and even racist physical attacks on pro-solidarity activists and refugees have been covered in the media outlets. This sheds light on the contestation of solidarity in public discourses.

*Fourth*, I combined the agency and ideational dimension in the discursive institutionalist framework. While previous studies have claimed that either ideas or agents are not fully conceptualised (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Carstensen 2011), I examined both dimensions in the thesis and used three different approaches to study the actor constellation and ideational structure in public discourses. The literature on ideational leadership highlights the capacity of individual actors to deploy ideas and strategically frame issues to overcome resistance or build coalitions in order to reach their (policy) goals. Studies on discourse coalitions point out the cooperative aspect of behaviour as communication. Actors share ideas and strategically deploy concepts as communicative resources. Therefore, the discourse coalition shows how actors work together and stand in conflict with each other by referring to different ideas. The coalition magnet approach focuses on the ideational dimension and how ideas can shape public discourses. These three

approaches provide a conceptual lens through which one can see how ideational leaders deploy certain ideas, how discourse coalitions are bound together and how coalition magnets evolve in public discourses.

*Fifth*, meanings of solidarity are linked to other ideas in the crises discourses. I examined not only the presence of solidarity, but also how other ideas within the solidarity discourse are articulated and linked to solidarity. [Chapter 5](#) focuses on single ideas that form the ideational glue for discourse coalitions in public debates. Hence, they act as coalition magnets in discourse coalitions. In the German Euro crisis discourse, financial solidity was the coalition magnet and thereby solidarity was reinterpreted to justify austerity measures. In the migration crisis, political solidarity was the coalition magnet, but solidarity was contested by security and demarcation claims.

[Chapter 4](#) conceptually elaborated the coalition magnet approach. While Béland and Cox (2016) argue that influential ideas might act as coalition magnets in public debates, I argued that it is rather likely that more than one idea can be understood as coalition magnet. Therefore, I noted that ideas form ‘coalition magnet patterns’ in discourses. These larger patterns serve to structure discourses and show how ideas are reinterpreted and shape the public discourse. In particular, the analysis of the Euro crisis discourse demonstrated that solidarity is reinterpreted and linked to austerity claims in the German case, while solidarity is linked to responsibility in the Irish debate. These connected ideas comprise the main coalition magnet pattern in each case and thereby shape the public debate. The application of the discourse network analysis in studying the co-occurrence of actors and ideas in public debate thereby proved to be a valuable methodological tool.

*Sixth*, the appearance of actors is strongly driven by their position in (national) government. Government actors were the most visible ones in the Euro crisis and migration crisis debates, as well as in the German and Irish discourse. This supports previous work that shows that Government representatives are the winners of ‘Europeanised public debates’ (Koopmans 2007). Moreover, EU executives also play a role in the solidarity-crisis discourses, but more so in the Irish than in the German discourse. Consequently, conservative party actors, who have been in (coalition) governments in Germany since 2005, in Ireland since 2007, and hold key positions in the European Commission, strongly influence both crises discourses. They shape the discourse by referring to the coalition

magnets like financial solidity, monetary solidarity or political solidarity. By doing so, they act as ideational leaders in the Euro crisis ([Chapter 4.5](#)) and are members of the main discourse coalition in each crisis ([Chapter 5.4](#)). This underlines the crucial and powerful role that Germany plays in the Euro crisis discourse (Bulmer 2014; Matthijs 2016). Moreover, the German debate is strongly structured by domestic actors. Few non-German politicians like Barroso or Hollande are present in the German solidarity discourse, while the Irish discourse is more diverse and yet still strongly influenced by the appearance of German actors. The identified actor constellation also highlights that the potential giver of solidarity (Germany) and German actors are more present in the Euro crisis discourse. Since German actors predominantly articulate the conditions under which solidarity can be granted, they set the tone for how solidarity is framed in public discourses. Interestingly, the actor presence in the German migration discourse highlights that if Germany demands solidarity from other EU member states, the number of ideologically different actors in the main discourse coalition increases ([Chapter 5.4](#)). The German parties – except the AfD – claimed that solidarity is needed in the migration crisis. This sheds light on shared and conflicting perceptions about the idea of solidarity in hard times.

## 6.2 Limitations

This thesis has its theoretical and empirical limitations, three of which I would like to discuss in greater detail: (1) the theoretical approach to solidarity; (2) the case selection; and (3) the media selection.

(1) I avoided a substantive definition of solidarity and argued that solidarity can be identified by looking at statements including the term solidarity. This is tautological to some extent: I look for solidarity and what I find in the data material is solidarity. The identification and differentiation of solidarity in various meanings then is the consequential result. However, two reasons justify this decision. *First*, solidarity is a contested concept, meaning that is conceptualised in various ways. Choosing a single definition of solidarity to guide my empirical analysis of solidarity would have strongly inhibited my goal of analysing the discourse on solidarity. In this case, I would have only analysed one specific understanding of solidarity without taking into account that actors might understand solidarity differently. If I had followed the majority view of previous research on solidarity, I

would have focused on 'social solidarity'. However, the meaning of social solidarity was hardly prominent in both crises discourses. This is influenced by the types of crises I examined. Nonetheless, social solidarity could have been a predominant idea in the Euro crisis due to the high unemployment rates in the crises countries, or the severe cuts in the social sector. Hence, the meso-discursive approach offered the opportunity to analyse the various meanings and scales of solidarity. The findings of the thesis can provide the basis for a more deductive examination of solidarity in future studies.

*Second*, limiting the analysis to a nominalistic approach offers the opportunity to know when actors claim solidarity, because they mention the term. On this basis, the conceptual decision to not follow a substantive account on solidarity is less problematic, since I analyse data material that contains statements with the intentional decision by actors to use the word solidarity. Consequently, solidarity can be differentiated into various meanings. Since this is the first study to analyse solidarity discourses more closely and across crises and countries, it provides an important initial step for future studies on solidarity in discourses. Further studies could look into crises discourses without the specific focus on solidarity, but still consider meanings of solidarity in their discourse analysis. These meanings of solidarity could also be applied in more qualitative inquiries into how activists or citizens understand solidarity, or how they make sense of their civic or volunteering activities. The suggested *discursive construction of solidarity approach* is not limited to the nominalistic approach that was followed in this thesis.

(2) Analysing the discourses in Germany and Ireland in both crises limits the explanatory significance of the findings. Although both countries can be placed within the creditor-debtor constellation that has strongly shaped the Euro crisis and might be characterised as strongly or weakly affected by the migration crisis, one could still criticise the case selection. For instance, it might be said that Italy or Greece are more suitable choices not only with regard to comparisons with Germany, but also in terms of the solidarity discourses evident in both crises. In fact, Greece and Italy were both affected by the Euro crisis and the migration crisis. However, then the question of how solidarity discourses are affected by a country's crisis involvement could not have been addressed. Greece and Italy experienced a severe economic and financial crisis and had to also deal with a high number of incoming asylum seekers in a short period of time. Moreover, Italy faces economic

stagnation and low growth for two decades (Romei 2018). Even though Italy is often included in the acronym 'GIIPS' denoting the debtor countries, it was never a bailout country. The economic problems still facing Italy are not only related to the Euro crisis. As such, investigating how a crisis situation creates solidarity claims does not fit in the Italian case. Greece could have been selected, but the literature on the Greek sovereign debt crisis is already well-established and comprehensive; indeed, the topic has been examined from multiple perspectives and in respect of various issues (Blyth 2015; Copelovitch *et al.* 2016; Doudaki *et al.* 2016). By contrast, Ireland seems to represent something of a lacuna in the research on the Euro crisis. Ireland did not fit into the crisis country narrative that many pundits and researchers invoked ([Chapter 4](#)). Moreover, the research there is on Ireland in the Euro crisis has mainly focused on political-economic aspects (Hardiman and Regan 2013; Regan and Brazys 2018; Roche *et al.* 2017), leaving aside discourse-related questions (but see Leupold 2016). Hence, Ireland is an interesting case in exploring how actors refer to and demand solidarity from other actors, and what kind of solidarity is debated in the Irish media.

Additionally, and more pragmatically, my language skills limit the reading and coding of texts. I do not speak Italian or Greek and thereby cannot select Greek or Italian newspapers for the political claims analysis. Any English or German translations of the text, or national newspapers that are published in English or German, would not represent a broad readership and large circulation. These would only be read by (German- or English-speaking) minorities and are even more elite-centred than the other quality daily newspapers in the respective countries.

(3) Finally, we come to the issue of media selection. The analysis of national daily quality newspapers is elite-centred, relies on a pre-selection of 'newsworthy' claims, and includes a 'structural bias' towards the visibility of national executives in these outlets. Moreover, newspapers might have lost their function as gatekeepers to the public in the digital age. Even though such objections are valid to some extent, two reasons justify the focus on daily quality newspapers. *First*, print media is still the main gatekeeper and is perceived as an influential actor in public debates (Jandura and Brosius 2011; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Nossek *et al.* 2015). Key actors in politics, the economy, and society still try to be as visible as possible in the media arena. Being interviewed in a widely read magazine, or

writing an opinion editorial in a daily newspaper, is still seen as an important way to legitimise actions, criticise others, or address the general public. Moreover, the media itself also plays a role in the framing of solidarity and thereby influencing the public debate. Since this thesis was chiefly interested in how political, social, and economic actors frame solidarity, and which of them is most present, looking at print media outlets was the most important source.

*Second*, printed newspapers are still relevant in the media arena, because ‘thresholds for audience members are particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large’ (Wessler *et al.* 2008: 5). While the rise of social media at the start of the 2000s and the strong increase in the number of registrations on Facebook or Twitter sparked considerable interest in analysing social media data, scholars have shown that the available (big) data is not less biased than the selection of offline media data. Social media outlets are more often read by younger social groups, include algorithms that pre-select content for specific viewers, creating ‘filter bubbles’, and while readers have to buy the printed issue, social media users have to register and give personal information to the company for free (Eady *et al.* 2019; Golder and Macy 2014; Hargittai 2018). While the analysis of solidarity claims on social media platforms would be an interesting avenue for future research, selecting these sources requires further reflection on the data availability, data quality, and scope of online communication. The interaction of different public arenas (plenary debates, printed media, and social media platforms) might be very interesting to study in relation to the diffusion processes of solidarity statements.

### **6.3 Outlook**

I wish to conclude by setting out three different pathways that might be of interest for future studies: the relation between populism and solidarity; citizen communication on solidarity; and long-term changes in the idea of solidarity. *First*, one of the indirect findings of the thesis is that populist parties and politicians are hardly present in the solidarity discourses. Even though it seems that populism is spreading almost everywhere and is being extensively debated across the social sciences (de Vreese *et al.* 2018; Manow 2018; Rooduijn 2019), the discursive appeal to solidarity is not really prominent in these parties. In the context of the present thesis, this might be explained by the case selection. The AfD was a Eurosceptic party

at its inception and turned into a more right-wing populist and anti-immigration party since 2014 (Lewandowsky 2015; Schmitt-Beck 2017). As I show in [Chapter 4](#) for the German discourse, if the AfD is present, then it is by opposing solidarity and demanding the re-introduction of the Deutsche Mark (DM). During the migration crisis, right-populist parties such as the AfD were rather on the margins of the discourse and far from being the driving force in the debate on solidarity.

Accordingly, one might ask: why does claiming solidarity not appeal to right populists?<sup>39</sup> It would be interesting to investigate this further by looking systematically at partisan conflicts on solidarity and exploring various issues like social policies, citizenship, and integration issues, or immigration and asylum policies. Therefore, it could be substantiated how party ideologies influence the framing of solidarity in different policy fields. This might also identify frames that are more or less likely featured in populist communication styles.

*Second*, future studies could analyse how citizens frame solidarity. Beyond the focus on elites and the framing of solidarity in media outlets, research has yet to examine how citizens deploy the concept of solidarity. Hence, the micro discourse level is currently missing from the research on solidarity. As such, future studies could consider reader's comments in the online media outlets, statements (tweets or Facebook comments) on social media platforms, or discussions on blogs. These studies could also be conducted *face-to-face* by using focus groups and narrative interviews in order to analyse the meaning-making process on solidarity particularly around specific issues and policies. These insights could not only complement previous studies on solidarity discourses, but also inform survey and experimental studies that use various items to measure solidarity on the individual level. Accordingly, changing perceptions on solidarity or developing new understandings of solidarity could be captured in future surveys and might increase the validity of the data collection and analysis.

*Third*, solidarity could be investigated beyond the crisis narrative. Linking the study of solidarity to crisis phenomena became most prominent in recent years due to the multiple

---

<sup>39</sup> One answer might be the dominance of the positive framing of solidarity. As noted in the appendix of chapter 2, if actors refer to solidarity, they usually support it. Opposing solidarity in a direct manner seems hardly invoked by actors. This 'positive bias' is identified despite the often demonstrated partisan journalism of media outlets (Wallaschek 2019b).

crises in the EU. Analysing solidarity from a historical perspective might reveal long-term changes and show whether and how crises influence understandings of solidarity. This thesis has demonstrated that the framing of solidarity hardly changed fundamentally. Political solidarity became more prominent during the migration crisis in 2015, while other meanings became less visible. However, neither the appearance of a new meaning of solidarity nor the disappearance of an existing meaning amid times of crisis have been observed. Hence, meanings of solidarity seem to be rather stable and built upon pre-existing understandings of solidarity. Potentially, ideational changes might occur over a longer period of time and in specific policy areas like national welfare policies. Future studies could reconstruct the idea of solidarity in respect to national social policies in EU member states, and analyse how the understanding of solidarity might evolve due to the increasing Europeanisation of social policies. Regarding European affairs, one could investigate how and why the idea of 'Social Europe' became a promising paradigm for scholars, civil society actors, and politicians on the left in their attempt to promote European solidarity and a 'social pillar' in the EU. However, more recently, pundits and scholars have declared the death of 'Social Europe' (Crespy and Menz 2015; Höpner 2018). Why do others still argue for it in response to the multiple crises of the EU (Fernandes and Vandenbroucke 2018; Kofod 2017)? How can we explain the rise and fall of 'Social Europe' and the recent struggles over its future? Subsequent studies could seek to combine a historical institutionalist approach with a discursive institutionalist approach in order to investigate solidarity beyond times of crisis.

In a recent interview with the public broadcasting station *Deutschlandfunk Kultur*, the sociologist Stephan Lessenich claimed that 'solidarity is work' and criticised calls to solidarity that are solely expressed on social media platforms (Lessenich 2019). The writer Bini Adamczak, on the other hand, recently stated that 'solidarity is more difficult to achieve under conditions of fragmentation, but at the same time, it is also more pressing and reasonable – it is its actual terrain' (Adamczak 2018). Both interviewees point out crucial challenges that face the study of solidarity. How is solidarity in the digital age possible and what are its manifestations and limitations? Is it an instance of solidarity if we 'like' a post that supports NGO activists rescuing asylum seekers in the Mediterranean? How can people show solidarity with colleagues, neighbours, and foreigners if a growing number of people live under precarious conditions? On what grounds can solidarity be established?

Despite the latent pessimistic tone in their claims, both statements share a discursive appeal to solidarity. Lessenich and Adamczak would not invoke solidarity, and would not criticise the digitalisation and fragmentation of solidarity in contemporary (European) societies, if it did not matter. While this thesis cannot offer a definitive answer to the initial question ‘What does solidarity mean?’, it has hopefully provided some genuine and original insight into the field of solidarity.



## 7 Bibliography

- Adamczak, B. (2018) *Wovon wir reden, wenn wir von Solidarität reden*, available at [https://www.akweb.de/ak\\_s/ak641/35.htm](https://www.akweb.de/ak_s/ak641/35.htm) (accessed December 2018).
- Allen, K. and O'Boyle, B. (2013) *Austerity Ireland: The failure of Irish vapitalism*, London: Pluto Press.
- Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2001) 'Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: does the type really matter?', *Acta Sociologica* 44(4): 283–299.
- Baldwin, P. (1990) *The politics of social solidarity. Class bases of the European welfare state, 1875–1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ban, C. (2016) *Ruling ideas: How global neoliberalism goes local*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Banting, K. G. and Kymlicka, W. (eds) (2017) *The strains of commitment: the political sources of solidarity in diverse societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bauböck, R. (2018) 'Refugee protection and burden-sharing in the European Union', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1): 141–156.
- Bauer, M. W. and Becker, S. (2014) 'The unexpected winner of the crisis: The European Commission's strengthened role in economic governance', *Journal of European Integration* 36(3): 213–229.
- Bayertz, K. (1998) 'Begriff und Problem der Solidarität', in K. Bayertz (ed.). *Solidarität: Begriff und Problem*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 11–53.
- Bayertz, K. (1999) 'Four uses of solidarity', in K. Bayertz (ed.). *Solidarity*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 3–28.
- Bechtel, M. M., Hainmueller, J. and Margalit, Y. (2014) 'Preferences for international redistribution: The divide over the Eurozone bailouts', *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 835–856.
- Beckert, J., Eckert, J., Kohli, M. and Streeck, W. (2004) 'Einleitung', in J. Beckert, J. Eckert, M. Kohli, and W. Streeck (eds). *Transnationale Solidarität: Chancen und Grenzen*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 9–14.
- Béland, D. (2009) 'Back to Bourgeois? French social policy and the idea of solidarity', *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 29(9/ 10): 445–456.
- Béland, D., Carstensen, M. B. and Seabrooke, L. (2016) 'Ideas, political power and public policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(3): 315–317.
- Béland, D. and Cox, R. H. (eds) (2011a) *Ideas and politics in social science research*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Béland, D. and Cox, R. H. (2011b) 'Introduction: Ideas and politics', in D. Béland and R. H. Cox (eds). *Ideas and politics in social science research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–20.
- Béland, D. and Cox, R. H. (2016) 'Ideas as coalition magnets: Coalition building, policy entrepreneurs, and power relations', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(3): 428–445.
- Béland, D. and Katapally, T. R. (2018) 'Shaping Policy Change in Population Health: Policy Entrepreneurs, Ideas, and Institutions', *International Journal of Health Policy and Management* 7(5): 369–373.
- Benford, R. D. (2013) 'Master frame', in D. A. Snow, D. Della Porta, B. Klandermans, and D. McAdam (eds). *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9780470674871.wbepm126.
- Benford, R. D. and Snow, D. A. (2000) 'Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology* 26(1): 611–639.
- Berger, J. (ed.) (2005) *Zerreiht das soziale Band? Beiträge zu einer aktuellen gesellschaftspolitischen Debatte*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.

- Berman, S. (1998) *The social democratic moment: Ideas and politics in the making of interwar Europe*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2003) *Interpreting British governance*, London: Routledge.
- Biermann, F., Guérin, N., Jagdhuber, S., Rittberger, B. and Weiss, M. (2019) 'Political (non-)reform in the Euro crisis and the refugee crisis: a liberal inter-governmentalist explanation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(2): 246–266.
- Blyth, M. (2002) *Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blyth, M. (2003) 'Structures do not come with an instruction sheet: Interests, ideas, and progress in political science', *Perspectives on Politics* 1(04): 695–706.
- Blyth, M. (2015) *Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blyth, M., Helgadottir, O. and Kring, W. (2016) 'Ideas and Historical Institutionalism', in O. Fioretos, T. G. Falletti, and A. Sheingate (eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.8.
- Bonacich, P. (1987) 'Power and centrality: A family of measures', *American Journal of Sociology* 9(5): 1170–1182.
- Boräng, F. (2015) 'Large-scale solidarity? Effects of welfare state institutions on the admission of forced migrants', *European Journal of Political Research* 54(2): 216–231.
- Borgatti, S. P. and Halgin, D. S. (2011) 'Analyzing affiliation networks', in J. Scott and P. J. Carrington (eds). *The SAGE handbook of social network analysis*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, pp. 417–433.
- Börner, S. (2013) *Belonging, solidarity and expansion in social policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2018) 'From the Euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics', *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 83–108.
- Boswell, C. and Hampshire, J. (2017) 'Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach', *European Journal of Political Research* 56(1): 133–150.
- Brazys, S. and Regan, A. (2017) 'The politics of capitalist diversity in Europe: Explaining Ireland's divergent recovery from the Euro crisis', *Perspectives on Politics* 15(02): 411–427.
- Brecht, B. (1931) *Das Solidaritätslied*, available at <https://www.spd-geschichtswerkstatt.de/wiki/Solidarit%C3%A4tslied> (accessed April 2019).
- Breidahl, K. N., Holtug, N. and Kongshøj, K. (2018) 'Do shared values promote social cohesion? If so, which? Evidence from Denmark', *European Political Science Review* 10(01): 97–118.
- Brunkhorst, H. (2002) *Solidarität: Von der Bürgerfreundschaft zur globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- Bulmer, S. (2014) 'Germany and the Eurozone crisis: Between hegemony and domestic politics', *West European Politics* 37(6): 1244–1263.
- Bundesregierung (2018) *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 19. Legislaturperiode*, available at <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/koalitionsvertrag-zwischen-cdu-csu-und-spd-195906> (accessed March 2019).
- Burroughs, E. (2015) *Political and media discourses of illegal immigration in Ireland*, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

- Byrne, A. (2017) 'EU's top court dismisses Hungary and Slovakia refugee complaint', *Financial Times* 6 September, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/9116ebbc-92de-11e7-bdfa-eda243196c2c> (accessed December 2017).
- Calhoun, C. (2002) 'Imagining solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, constitutional patriotism, and the public sphere', *Public Culture* 14(1): 147–171.
- Carstensen, M. B. (2011) 'Paradigm man vs. the bricoleur: Bricolage as an alternative vision of agency in ideational change', *European Political Science Review* 3(1): 147–167.
- Carstensen, M. B. and Schmidt, V. A. (2016) 'Power through, over and in ideas: Conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(3): 318–337.
- Checkel, J., Friedman, J., Matthijs, M. and Smith, R. (2016) 'Roundtable on ideational turns in the four subdisciplines of political science', *Critical Review* 28(2): 171–202.
- Checkel, J. T. and Katzenstein, P. J. (2009) *European identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ciornei, I. and Recchi, E. (2017) 'At the source of European solidarity: Assessing the effects of cross-border practices and political attitudes', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55(3): 468–485.
- Clauset, A., Newman, M. E. J. and Moore, C. (2004) 'Finding community structure in very large networks', *Physical Review E* 70(6), doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.70.066111.
- Closa, C. and Maatsch, A. (2014) 'In a spirit of solidarity? Justifying the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in national parliamentary debates', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(4): 826–842.
- Copelovitch, M., Frieden, J. and Walter, S. (2016) 'The political economy of the Euro crisis', *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7): 811–840.
- Copsey, N. (2015) *Rethinking the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Crespy, A. and Menz, G. (2015) 'Conclusion: Social Europe Is dead. What's next?', in A. Crespy and G. Menz (eds). *Social policy and the Euro crisis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 182–210.
- Crespy, A. and Schmidt, V. (2014) 'The clash of titans: France, Germany and the discursive double game of EMU reform', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(8): 1085–1101.
- Crum, B. (2013) 'Saving the Euro at the cost of democracy?', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(4): 614–630.
- Csárdi, G. and Nepusz, T. (2006) 'The igraph software package for complex network research. Version 1.0.1', *InterJournal Complex Systems*: 1695.
- de Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C. and Stanjer, J. (2018) 'Populism as an expression of political communication content and style: A new perspective', *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 23(4): 423–438.
- de Wilde, P. (2013) 'Representative claims analysis: Theory meets method', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(2): 278–294.
- de Wilde, P. (2014) 'The operating logics of national parliaments and mass media in the politicisation of Europe', *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 20(1): 46–61.
- de Wilde, P., Zürn, M. and Koopmans, R. (2014) 'The political sociology of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism: Representative claims analysis', *WZB Discussion Paper SP IV 2014-102*, available at <https://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/iv14-102.pdf> (accessed June 2016).
- Della Porta, D. (ed.) (2018) *Solidarity mobilizations in the 'refugee crisis': Contentious moves*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Delors, J. (1989) *Statement on the broad lines of Commission policy (Strasbourg, 17 January 1989)*, available at [http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address\\_given\\_by\\_jacques\\_delors\\_to\\_the\\_european\\_parliament\\_17\\_january\\_1989-enb9c06b95-db97-4774-a700-e8aea5172233.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_jacques_delors_to_the_european_parliament_17_january_1989-enb9c06b95-db97-4774-a700-e8aea5172233.html) (accessed July 2018).
- Deutschmann, E., Delhey, J., Verbalyte, M. and Aplowski, A. (2018) ‘The power of contact: Europe as a network of transnational attachment’, *European Journal of Political Research* 57(4): 963–988.
- Dolezal, M., Hutter, S. and Becker, R. (2016) ‘Protesting European integration: Politicisation from below?’, in S. Hutter, E. Grande, and H. Kriesi (eds). *Politicising Europe: Integration and mass politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 112–134.
- Doudaki, V., Boubouka, A., Spyridou, L.-P. and Tzalavras, C. (2016) ‘Dependency, (non)liability and austerity news frames of bailout Greece’, *European Journal of Communication* 31(4): 426–445.
- Draghi, M. (2012) *Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi. Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London 26 July 2012*, available at <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html> (accessed October 2016).
- Dryzek, J. S., Honig, B. and Phillips, A. (eds) (2006) *The Oxford handbook of political theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Durkheim, E. (2012) *Über soziale Arbeitsteilung: Studie über die Organisation höherer Gesellschaften*, 6. edition., Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- Eady, G., Nagler, J., Guess, A., Zilinsky, J. and Tucker, J. A. (2019) ‘How many people live in political bubbles on social media? Evidence from linked survey and Twitter data’, *SAGE Open* 9(1), doi:10.1177/2158244019832705.
- Entman, R. M. (1993) ‘Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm’, *Journal of Communication* 43(4): 51–58.
- Estlund, D. M. (ed.) (2012) *The Oxford handbook of political philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- European Commission (2015) *Refugee crisis: European Commission takes decisive action - press release*, available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-15-5596\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm) (accessed September 2015).
- European Commission (2017a) *European agenda on migration: Good progress in managing migration flows needs to be sustained*, available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3081\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3081_en.htm) (accessed January 2018).
- European Commission (2017b) *Relocation: EU solidarity between member states (November 2017)*, available at [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20171114\\_relocation\\_eu\\_solidarity\\_between\\_member\\_states\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20171114_relocation_eu_solidarity_between_member_states_en.pdf) (accessed November 2018).
- European Council (2015) *Justice and Home Affairs Council, 22/09/2015: Main results*, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/09/22/> (accessed September 2015).
- Eurostat (2018) *Annual aggregated data: Asylum and first time asylum applicants*, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tps00191> (accessed September 2018).
- Farahat, A. (2015) ‘Der Umbau der europäischen Sozialbürgerschaft: Anmerkungen zum Urteil des EuGH in der Rechtssache Alimanovic’, *Verfassungsblog*, available at <https://verfassungsblog.de/der-umbau-der-europaeischen-sozialbuergerschaft-anmerkungen-zum-urteil-des-eugh-in-der-rechtssache-alimanovic/> (accessed March 2019).
- Fernandes, S. and Vandenbroucke, F. (2018) ‘Social Europe: From slogan to reality’, *Fondation Robert Schumann Policy Paper* (487): 1–5.

- Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J. and Rucht, D. (2002) *Shaping abortion discourse. Democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferrera, M. (2006) *The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics of social protection*, Reprint., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferrera, M. (2014) 'Solidarity in Europe after the crisis', *Constellations* 21(2): 222–238.
- Fisher, D. R., Waggle, J. and Leifeld, P. (2013) 'Where does political polarization come from? Locating polarization within the U.S. climate change debate', *American Behavioral Scientist* 57(1): 70–92.
- Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa (ed.) (2014) *Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik: Theorie, Methode und Analysen kritischer Europaforschung*, Bielefeld: transcript.
- Forst, R. (1999) 'The basic right to justification: Towards a constructivist conception of human rights', *Constellations* 6(1): 35–60.
- Foucault, M. (2012) *Der Wille zum Wissen*, 19. edition., Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- Frankfurt, H. (1987) 'Equality as a moral ideal', *Ethics* 98(1): 21–43.
- Frieden, J. and Walter, S. (2017) 'Understanding the political economy of the Eurozone crisis', *Annual Review of Political Science* 20(1): 371–390.
- Gajewska, K. (2009) *Transnational labour solidarity: Mechanisms of commitment to cooperation within the European trade union movement*, London: Routledge.
- Gallie, W. B. (1956) 'Essentially contested concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56: 167–198.
- Galpin, C. (2017) *The Euro crisis and European identities: Political and media discourse in Germany, Ireland and Poland*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Geddes, A. (2010) *The politics of migration and immigration in Europe*, Reprint., London: SAGE.
- Geddes, A. (2018) 'The politics of European Union migration governance', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(S1): 120–130.
- Gelissen, J. (2000) 'Popular support for institutionalised solidarity: A comparison between European welfare states', *International Journal of Social Welfare* 9(4): 285–300.
- Genschel, P. and Jachtenfuchs, M. (2018) 'From market integration to core state powers: The Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis and integration theory: Crises in core state powers', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1): 178–196.
- Gerhards, J., Lengfeld, H. and Häuberer, J. (2016) 'Do European citizens support the idea of a European welfare state? Evidence from a comparative survey conducted in three EU member states', *International Sociology* 31(6): 677–700.
- Gerhards, J., Lengfeld, H., Ignácz, Z. S., Kley, F. K. and Priem, M. (2018) 'How strong is European solidarity?', *Berlin Studies on the Sociology of Europe* (Working Paper No. 37).
- Gilmartin, M. (2015) *Ireland and migration in the twenty-first century*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Girvan, M. and Newman, M. E. J. (2002) 'Community structure in social and biological networks', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 99(12): 7821–7826.
- Glynn, I. and O'Connell, P. J. (2017) 'Migration', in W. K. Roche, P. J. O'Connell, and A. Prothero (eds). *Austerity and recovery in Ireland. Europe's poster child and the Great Recession*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 290–310.
- Göhler, G., Iser, M. and Kerner, I. (eds) (2011) *Politische Theorie: 25 umkämpfte Begriffe zur Einführung*, 2. edition., Wiesbaden: VS.
- Golder, S. A. and Macy, M. W. (2014) 'Digital footprints: Opportunities and challenges for online social research', *Annual Review of Sociology* 40(1): 129–152.

- Grande, E., Hutter, S., Kerschner, A. and Becker, R. (2016) 'Framing Europe: Are cultural-identitarian frames driving politicisation?', in S. Hutter, E. Grande, and H. Kriesi (eds). *Politicising Europe: Integration and mass politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 181–206.
- Green, S. (2004) *The politics of exclusion: Institutions and immigration policy in contemporary Germany*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Greussing, E. and Boomgaarden, H. G. (2017) 'Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe's 2015 refugee crisis', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43(11): 1749–1774.
- Große Kracht, H.-J. (2015) "Die bedeutendste Entdeckung unserer Zeit" (Charles Gide). Postliberale Solidaritätsdiskurse im Frankreich des 19. Jahrhunderts', in M. Kneuer and C. Masala (eds). *Solidarität: Politikwissenschaftliche Zugänge zu einem vielschichtigen Begriff*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 29–50.
- Habermas, J. (1990) 'Justice and solidarity: On the discussion concerning stage 6', in T. E. Wren (ed.). *The moral domain. Essays in the ongoing discussion between philosophy and the social sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 224–252.
- Habermas, J. (2013) 'Im Sog der Technokratie. Ein Plädoyer für europäische Solidarität', in J. Habermas (ed.). *Im Sog der Technokratie*. Berlin: Suhrkamp, pp. 82–111.
- Hajer, M. A. (1993) 'Discourse coalitions and the institutionalization of practice: The case of acid rain in Great Britain', in F. Fischer and J. Forester (eds). *The Argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning*. London: Duke University Press, pp. 43–76.
- Hajer, M. A. (1995) *The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hajer, M. A. (2002) 'Discourse analysis and the study of policy making', *European Political Science* 2(1): 61–65.
- Hall, P. A. (1993) 'Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Great Britain', *Comparative Politics* 25(3): 275–296.
- Hall, P. A. (1997) 'The Role of interests, institutions and ideas in the political economy of industrialized nations', in M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman (eds). *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 174–207.
- Hall, P. A. (2012) 'The economics and politics of the Euro crisis', *German Politics* 21(4): 355–371.
- Hall, P. A. (2014) 'Varieties of capitalism and the Euro crisis', *West European Politics* 37(6): 1223–1243.
- Hall, P. A. and Taylor, R. C. R. (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalism', *Political Studies* 44(5): 936–957.
- Hamann, U. and Karakayali, S. (2016) 'Practicing Willkommenskultur: Migration and solidarity in Germany', *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* 2(4): 69–86.
- Hanneman, R. A. and Riddle, M. (2011) 'Concepts and measures for basic network analysis', in J. Scott and P. J. Carrington (eds). *The SAGE handbook of social network analysis*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, pp. 340–369.
- Hardiman, N., Araújo, J. F. and MacCarthaigh, M. (2017) 'The Troika's variations on a trio: Why the loan programmes worked so differently in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal', *UCD Geary Working Paper 2017/11*.
- Hardiman, N. and Regan, A. (2013) 'The politics of austerity in Ireland', *Intereconomics* 48(1): 9–14.
- Hargittai, E. (2018) 'Potential biases in big data: Omitted voices on social media', *Social Science Computer Review*, doi:10.1177/ 0894439318788322.

- Hartlapp, M., Metz, J. and Rauh, C. (2014) *Which policy for Europe? Power and conflict inside the European Commission*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haunss, S. (2017) '(De-)Legitimizing discourse networks: Smoke without fire?', in S. Schneider, H. Schmidtke, S. Haunss, and J. Gronau (eds). *Capitalism and its legitimacy in times of crisis*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 191–220.
- Hay, C. (2006) 'Constructive institutionalism', in R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder, and B. A. Rockman (eds). *The Oxford handbook of political institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56–74.
- Hay, C. (2011) 'Ideas and the construction of interests', in D. Béland and R. H. Cox (eds). *Ideas and politics in social science research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–82.
- Hayward, J. E. S. (1959) 'Solidarity: The social history of an idea in nineteenth century France', *International Review of Social History* 4(2): 261–284.
- Helbling, M., Hoeglinger, D. and Wüest, B. (2010) 'How political parties frame European integration', *European Journal of Political Research* 49(4): 495–521.
- Hix, S. (2008) 'Towards a partisan theory of EU politics', *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(8): 1254–1265.
- Hondrich, K. O. and Koch-Arzberger, C. (1992) *Solidarität in der modernen Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer.
- Honneth, A. (1992) *Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) 'A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science* 39(01): 1–23.
- hooks, b. (1986) 'Sisterhood: Political solidarity between women', *Feminist Review* 23: 125–138.
- Höpner, M. (2018) 'Illusion: Das Soziale Europa kommt', *IPG - International Politik und Gesellschaft*, available at <https://www.ipg-journal.de/schwerpunkt-des-monats/illusionen/artikel/detail/illusion-das-soziale-europa-kommt-3030/> (accessed October 2018).
- Huang, R. (2016) *RQDA: R-based Qualitative Data Analysis*, available at <http://rqda.r-forge.r-project.org/> (accessed December 2016).
- Hutter, S., Grande, E. and Kriesi, H. (eds) (2016) *Politicising Europe: Integration and mass politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jäckle, S. and König, P. D. (2017) 'The dark side of the German "welcome culture": Investigating the causes behind attacks on refugees in 2015', *West European Politics* 40(2): 223–251.
- Jandura, O. and Brosius, H.-B. (2011) 'Wer liest sie (noch)? Das Publikum der Qualitätszeitungen', in R. Blum, H. Bonfadelli, K. Imhof, and O. Jarren (eds). *Krise der Leuchttürme öffentlicher Kommunikation*. Wiesbaden: VS, pp. 195–206.
- Janning, F., Leifeld, P., Malang, T. and Schneider, V. (2009) 'Diskursnetzwerkanalyse. Überlegungen zur Theoriebildung und Methodik', in V. Schneider, F. Janning, P. Leifeld, and T. Malang (eds). *Politiknetzwerke: Modelle, Anwendungen und Visualisierungen*. Wiesbaden: VS, pp. 59–92.
- Jay-Z (2007) *Blue magic, 2007*, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0O3USgkwiJA> (accessed August 2018).
- Jenson, J. (2010) 'Diffusing ideas for after neoliberalism: The social investment perspective in Europe and Latin America', *Global Social Policy* 10(1): 59–84.
- Johnston, A. and Regan, A. (2016) 'European monetary integration and the incompatibility of national varieties of capitalism', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54(2): 318–336.

- Jones, E. (2014) 'Identity and solidarity', in E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill (eds). *The Oxford handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 690–702.
- Jones, E., Kelemen, R. D. and Meunier, S. (2016) 'Failing forward? The Euro crisis and the incomplete nature of European integration', *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7): 1010–1034.
- Jones, E. and Matthijs, M. (2017) 'Democracy without solidarity: Political dysfunction in hard times – Introduction to special issue', *Government and Opposition* 52(02): 185–210.
- Juncker, J.-C. (2015) *State of the union address 2015: Time for honesty, unity and solidarity*, available at [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2015\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2015_en) (accessed September 2015).
- Kahler, M. and Lake, D. A. (2013) 'Introduction: Anatomy of crisis: The great recession and political change', in M. Kahler and D. A. Lake (eds). *Politics in the new hard times: The great recession in comparative perspective*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–26.
- Kaiser, J. and Kleinen-von Königslöw, K. (2017) 'The framing of the Euro crisis in German and Spanish online news media between 2010 and 2014: Does a common European public discourse emerge?', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55(4): 798–814.
- Kasperek, B. and Speer, M. (2015) 'Of hope. Hungary and the long summer of migration', *Bordermonitoring.eu*, available at <http://bordermonitoring.eu/ungarn/2015/09/of-hope-en/> (accessed June 2016).
- Kaufmann, F.-X. (2005) *Sozialpolitik und Sozialstaat: Soziologische Analysen*, Wiesbaden: VS.
- Kersting, W. (1998) 'Internationale Solidarität', in K. Bayertz (ed.). *Solidarität: Begriff und Problem*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 411–429.
- Khayatzadeh-Mahani, A., Labonté, R., Ruckert, A. and de Leeuw, E. (2019) 'Using sustainability as a collaboration magnet to encourage multi-sector collaborations for health', *Global Health Promotion* 26(1): 100–104.
- KhosraviNik, M., Krzyzanowski, M. and Wodak, R. (2012) 'Dynamics of representation in Discourse: Immigrants in the British press', in M. Messer, R. Schroeder, and R. Wodak (eds). *Migrations: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. Vienna: Springer, pp. 283–295.
- Kiess, J., Norman, L., Temple, L. and Uba, K. (2017) 'Path dependency and convergence of three worlds of welfare policy during the Great Recession: UK, Germany and Sweden', *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 33(1): 1–17.
- Kingdon, J. W. (1995) *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*, 2. edition., New York: Longman.
- Kneuer, M. and Masala, C. (2015) 'Politische Solidarität: Vermessung eines weiten und unerschlossenen Feldes', in M. Kneuer and C. Masala (eds). *Solidarität: Politikwissenschaftliche Zugänge zu einem vielschichtigen Begriff*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 7–25.
- Kofod, J. (2017) 'A more social Europe – no need to reinvent the wheel', *EurActiv*, available at <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/opinion/a-more-social-europe-no-need-to-reinvent-the-wheel/> (accessed March 2019).
- Kolers, A. H. (2012) 'Dynamics of solidarity', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20(4): 365–383.
- Koopmans, R. (2007) 'Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates', *European Journal of Political Research* 46(2): 183–210.

- Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (1999) 'Political claims analysis: Integrating protest event and political discourse approaches', *Mobilization. An International Journal* 4(1): 203–221.
- Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (2010) *The making of a European public sphere. Media discourse and political contention*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, H. et al. (eds) (2012) *Political conflict in Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kriesi, H. and Grande, E. (2015) 'The Europeanization of the national political debate', in O. Cramme and S. B. Hobolt (eds). *Democratic politics in a European Union under stress*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67–86.
- Kriesi, H., Tresch, A. and Jochum, M. (2007) 'Going public in the European Union: Action repertoires of Western European collective political actors', *Comparative Political Studies* 40(1): 48–73.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004) *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*, 2. edition Reprint., Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Kuhn, T., Solaz, H. and van Elsas, E. J. (2018) 'Practising what you preach: How cosmopolitanism promotes willingness to redistribute across the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(12): 1759–1778.
- Lahusen, C. and Grasso, M. (eds) (2018a) *Solidarity in Europe: Citizens' responses in times of crisis*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lahusen, C. and Grasso, M. (2018b) 'Solidarity in Europe: Comparative assessment and discussion', in C. Lahusen and M. Grasso (eds). *Solidarity in Europe: Citizens' responses in times of crisis*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 253–282.
- Leifeld, P. (2013) 'Reconceptualizing major policy change in the advocacy coalition framework: A discourse network analysis of German pension politics', *Policy Studies Journal* 41(1): 169–198.
- Leifeld, P. (2016a) 'Discourse network analysis: Policy debates as dynamic networks', in J. N. Victor, A. H. Montgomery, and M. Lubell (eds). *The Oxford handbook of political networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190228217.013.25.
- Leifeld, P. (2016b) *Policy debates as dynamic networks: German pension politics and privatization discourse*, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.
- Leifeld, P. and Haunss, S. (2012) 'Political discourse networks and the conflict over software patents in Europe', *European Journal of Political Research* 51(3): 382–409.
- Leitner, S. and Lessenich, S. (2003) 'Assessing welfare state change: The German social insurance state between reciprocity and solidarity', *Journal of Public Policy* 23(3): 325–347.
- Lessenich, S. (2019) „Solidarität ist Arbeit“, available at [https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/soziologe-ueber-unterstuetzung-per-mausklick-solidaritaet.1008.de.html?dram:article\\_id=437836](https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/soziologe-ueber-unterstuetzung-per-mausklick-solidaritaet.1008.de.html?dram:article_id=437836) (accessed January 2019).
- Leupold, A. (2016) 'A structural approach to politicisation in the Euro crisis', *West European Politics* 39(1): 84–103.
- Lewandowsky, M. (2015) 'Eine rechtspopulistische Protestpartei? Die AfD in der öffentlichen und politikwissenschaftlichen Debatte', *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 25(1): 119–134.
- Liebert, U. (2016) 'European identity formation in (the) crisis', in H. Zimmermann and A. Dür (eds). *Key controversies in European integration*. London: Palgrave, pp. 98–106.
- Lovering, I. A. (2017) 'Bruised but not beaten: The persistence of austerity in Europe', *Journal of European Integration* 39(6): 707–722.

- Lünenborg, M., Fritsche, K. and Bach, A. (2011) *Migrantinnen in den Medien: Darstellungen in der Presse und ihre Rezeption*, Bielefeld: transcript.
- Maatsch, A. (2014) 'Are we all austerians now? An analysis of national parliamentary parties' positioning on anti-crisis measures in the eurozone', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(1): 96–115.
- Manatschal, A. and Freitag, M. (2014) 'Reciprocity and volunteering', *Rationality and Society* 26(2): 208–235.
- Manow, P. (2018) *Die politische Ökonomie des Populismus*, Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Martinsen, D. S. and Vollaard, H. (2014) 'Implementing social Europe in times of crises: Re-established boundaries of welfare?', *West European Politics* 37(4): 677–692.
- Matthijs, M. (2016) 'Powerful rules governing the euro: The perverse logic of German ideas', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(3): 375–391.
- Matthijs, M. and McNamara, K. (2015) 'The Euro crisis' theory effect: Northern saints, Southern sinners, and the demise of the Eurobond', *Journal of European Integration* 37(2): 229–245.
- Mau, S. (2005a) 'Democratic demand for a social Europe? Preferences of the European citizenry', *International Journal of Social Welfare* 14(2): 76–85.
- Mau, S. (2005b) 'Leerstelle europäische Solidarität?', in J. Berger (ed.). *Zerreiht das soziale Band? Beiträge zu einer aktuellen gesellschaftspolitischen Debatte*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 245–272.
- McNamara, K. R. (1999) *The currency of ideas: Monetary politics in the European Union*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- McNamara, K. R. (2017) *The politics of everyday Europe: Constructing authority in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mehta, J. (2011) 'The Varied roles of ideas in politics: From "whether" to "how"', in D. Béland and R. H. Cox (eds). *Ideas and politics in social science research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–46.
- Merkel, A. (2015) *Sommerpressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel. Thema: Aktuelle Themen der Innen- und Außenpolitik*, available at <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html> (accessed June 2016).
- Mewes, J. and Mau, S. (2013) 'Globalization, socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism: European perspectives on attitudes toward the exclusion of immigrants', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 54(3): 228–245.
- Monar, J. (2014) 'Justice and Home Affairs', in E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill (eds). *The Oxford handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 613–626.
- Münkler, H. (2004) 'Enzyklopädie der Ideen der Zukunft: Solidarität', in J. Beckert, J. Eckert, M. Kohli, and W. Streeck (eds). *Transnationale Solidarität: Chancen und Grenzen*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 15–28.
- Munoz-Dardé, V. (1998) 'Brüderlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit', in K. Bayertz (ed.). *Solidarität: Begriff und Problem*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 146–171.
- Musarò, P. and Parmiggiani, P. (2017) 'Beyond black and white: The role of media in portraying and policing migration and asylum in Italy', *International Review of Sociology* 27(2): 241–260.
- National Assembly of France (1789) *Declaration of the rights of man - 1789*, available at [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th\\_century/rightsof.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp) (accessed October 2015).
- Newman, M. E. J. (2004) 'Fast algorithm for detecting community structure in networks', *Physical Review E* 69(6), doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.69.066133.

- Newman, M. E. J. (2006) 'Modularity and community structure in networks', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 103(23): 8577–8582.
- Nooy, W. de, Mrvar, A. and Batagelj, V. (2011) *Exploratory social network analysis with Pajek*, Revised and expanded 2. edition., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nosseck, H., Adoni, H. and Nimrod, G. (2015) 'Is print really dying? The state of print media use in Europe', *International Journal of Communication* 9: 365–385.
- OECD (2018a) *General government debt*, doi:10.1787/ a0528cc2-en.
- OECD (2018b) *General government deficit*, doi:10.1787/ 77079edb-en.
- Offe, C. (1998) 'Demokratie und Wohlfahrtsstaat: Eine europäische Regimeform unter dem Streß der europäischen Integration', in W. Streeck (ed.), *Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie: Herausforderungen für die Demokratietheorie*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 99–136.
- Offe, C. (2016) *Europa in der Falle*, 2. edition., Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Ojala, M. and Harjuniemi, T. (2016) 'Mediating the German ideology: Ordoliberal framing in European press coverage of the Eurozone crisis', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 24(3): 414–430.
- Pernicka, S. and Hofmann, J. (2015) 'Ein soziales Europa? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen transnationaler Solidarität von Gewerkschaften', in M. Kneuer and C. Masala (eds). *Solidarität: politikwissenschaftliche Zugänge zu einem vielschichtigen Begriff*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 133–162.
- Pons, P. and Latapy, M. (2005) 'Computing communities in large networks using random walks', in P. Yolum, T. Güngör, F. Gürgen, and C. Özturan (eds). *Computer and information sciences - ISCIS 2005: 20th international symposium, Istanbul, Turkey, October 26-28, 2005 ; proceedings*. Berlin: Springer, pp. 284–293.
- Raghavan, U. N., Albert, R. and Kumara, S. (2007) 'Near linear time algorithm to detect community structures in large-scale networks', *Physical Review E* 76(3), doi:10.1103/ PhysRevE.76.036106.
- Regan, A. and Brazys, S. (2018) 'Celtic phoenix or leprechaun economics? The politics of an FDI-led growth model in Europe', *New Political Economy* 23(2): 223–238.
- Reinemann, C., Stanyer, J., Scherr, S. and Legnante, G. (2012) 'Hard and soft news: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings', *Journalism* 13(2): 221–239.
- Rennkamp, B., Haunss, S., Wongs, K., Ortega, A. and Casamadrid, E. (2017) 'Competing coalitions: The politics of renewable energy and fossil fuels in Mexico, South Africa and Thailand', *Energy Research & Social Science* 34: 214–223.
- Risse, T. (2010) *A community of Europeans? Transnational identities and public spheres*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Roche, W. K., O'Connell, P. J. and Prothero, A. (eds) (2017) *Austerity and recovery in Ireland. Europe's poster child and the great recession*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Romei, V. (2018) 'Why Italy's economy is stagnating', *Financial Times* 13 November, available at [https:// www.ft.com/ content/ b3c85b34-e10a-11e8-a6e5-792428919cee](https://www.ft.com/content/b3c85b34-e10a-11e8-a6e5-792428919cee) (accessed March 2019).
- Rooduijn, M. (2019) 'State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus', *European Journal of Political Research* 58(1): 362–372.
- Rorty, R. (2007) *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*, 25. edition., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sales, R. (2002) 'The deserving and the undeserving? Refugees, asylum seekers and welfare in Britain', *Critical Social Policy* 22(3): 456–478.

- Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2017) 'From a deficit of democracy to a technocratic order: The postcrisis debate on Europe', *Annual Review of Political Science* 20(1): 351–369.
- Sangiovanni, A. (2013) 'Solidarity in the European Union', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 33(2): 213–241.
- Sangiovanni, A. (2015) 'Solidarity as joint action', *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 32(4): 340–359.
- Scharpf, F. W. (2002) *Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?*, Reprint., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scheepers, P. and Grotenhuis, M. T. (2005) 'Who cares for the poor in Europe? Micro and macro determinants for alleviating poverty in 15 European countries', *European Sociological Review* 21(5): 453–465.
- Schelkle, W. (2017) *The political economy of monetary solidarity: Understanding the euro experiment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schellinger, A. (2016) *EU labor market policy: Ideas, thought communities and policy change*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schieder, W. (1972) 'Brüderlichkeit, Bruderschaft, Brüderschaft, Verbrüderung, Bruderliebe', in O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. Koselleck (eds). *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, pp. 552–581.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism and the Euro area crisis', *Journal of European Public Policy* 22(2): 177–195.
- Schmale, W. (2017) 'European solidarity: A semantic history', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire* 24(6): 854–873.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2008) 'Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse', *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 303–326.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2009) 'Explaining democracy in Europe', *Comparative European Politics* 7(3): 396–407.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2011) 'Reconciling ideas and institutions through discursive institutionalism', in D. Béland and R. H. Cox (eds). *Ideas and politics in social science research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47–64.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2012) 'Discursive institutionalism. Scope, dynamics, philosophical underpinnings.', in F. Fischer and H. Gottweis (eds). *The argumentative turn revisited. Public policy as communicative practice*. London: Duke University Press, pp. 85–113.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2016) 'Reinterpreting the rules "by stealth" in times of crisis: A discursive institutionalist analysis of the European Central Bank and the European Commission', *West European Politics* 39(5): 1032–1052.
- Schmidt, V. A. and Thatcher, M. (eds) (2013) *Resilient liberalism in Europe's political economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. (2017) 'The "Alternative für Deutschland" in the electorate: Between single-issue and right-wing populist party"', *German Politics* 26(1): 124–148.
- Scholz, S. J. (2008) *Political solidarity*, University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Schuman, R. (1950) *The Schuman declaration – 9 May 1950*, available at [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en) (accessed August 2017).
- Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2016) 'The end of the conservative German welfare state model', *Social Policy & Administration* 50(2): 219–240.
- Senninger, R. and Wagner, M. (2015) 'Political parties and the EU in national election campaigns: who talks about Europe, and how?', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 53(6): 1336–1351.

- Serricchio, F., Tsakatika, M. and Quaglia, L. (2013) 'Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(1): 51–64.
- Snow, D. A. (2007) 'Framing processes, ideology, and discursive fields', in D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell companion to social movements*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 380–412.
- Sommer, M. (2013) 'Europe needs a change of course', in A.-M. Grozelier et al. (eds). *Roadmap to a social Europe*. London: Social Europe Ltd., pp. 83–85.
- Statham, P., Koopmans, R., Giugni, M. and Passy, F. (2005) 'Resilient or adaptable Islam? Multiculturalism, religion and migrants' claims-making for group demands in Britain, the Netherlands and France', *Ethnicities* 5(4): 427–459.
- Statham, P. and Trezn, H.-J. (2013) *The politicization of Europe: Contesting the constitution in the mass media*, London: Routledge.
- Steenland, B. (2008) 'Why do policy frames change? Actor-idea coevolution in debates over welfare reform', *Social Forces* 86(3): 1027–1054.
- Stiller, S. (2010) *Ideational leadership in German welfare state reform: How politicians and policy ideas transform resilient institutions*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Stiller, S. and van Gerven, M. (2012) 'The European employment strategy and national core executives: Impacts on activation reforms in the Netherlands and Germany', *Journal of European Social Policy* 22(2): 118–132.
- Stjernø, S. (2009) *Solidarity in Europe: The history of an idea*, Reprint., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Teney, C. and Helbling, M. (2017) 'Solidarity between the elites and the masses in Germany', in K. G. Banting and W. Kymlicka (eds). *The strains of commitment: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 127–151.
- Teney, C., Lacewell, O. P. and De Wilde, P. (2014) 'Winners and losers of globalization in Europe: Attitudes and ideologies', *European Political Science Review* 6(4): 575–595.
- Tesche, T. (2017) 'Europe's banking union: What progress has been made?', *LSE EUROPP – European Politics and Policy*, available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/11/03/europes-banking-union-what-progress-has-been-made/> (accessed November 2018).
- Thelen, K. and Steinmo, S. (1992) 'Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis', in S. Steinmo, K. A. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (eds). *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–32.
- Thielemann, E. (2014) 'Burden-Sharing', in E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill (eds). *The Oxford handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 810–824.
- Thomann, E. and Rapp, C. (2018) 'Who deserves solidarity? Unequal treatment of immigrants in Swiss welfare policy delivery', *Policy Studies Journal* 46(3): 531–552.
- Tooze, J. A. (2018) *Crashed: Wie zehn Jahre Finanzkrise die Welt verändert haben*, München: Siedler.
- Trenz, H.-J. and Grasso, M. (2018) 'Toward a new conditionality of welfare? Reconsidering solidarity in the Danish welfare state', in C. Lahusen and M. Grasso (eds). *Solidarity in Europe: Citizens' responses in times of crisis*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 19–42.
- UNHCR (2015) 'UNHCR viewpoint: "Refugee" or "migrant" - Which is right?', [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/8/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/8/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html> (accessed June 2016).

- UNHCR (2019) *Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Mediterranean Situation*, 2019, available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean> (accessed January 2019).
- Van Dalen, A. (2012) 'Structural bias in cross-national perspective: How political systems and journalism cultures influence government dominance in the news', *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 17(1): 32–55.
- van Oorschot, W. (2000) 'Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public', *Policy & Politics* 28(1): 33–48.
- van Oorschot, W. (2006) 'Making the difference in social Europe: Deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states', *Journal of European Social Policy* 16(1): 23–42.
- Vollmer, B. (2014) *Policy discourses on irregular migration in Germany and the United Kingdom*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vollmer, B. and Karakayali, S. (2018) 'The volatility of the discourse on refugees in Germany', *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 16(1–2): 118–139.
- Wallaschek, S. (2016a) 'Sammelbesprechung: Krise der Solidarität - Solidarität in der Krise.', *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 10(1): 93–102.
- Wallaschek, S. (2016b) 'Solidarität in der Europäischen Union. Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Debatte', *Widerspruch: Münchner Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 35(62): 97–114.
- Wallaschek, S. (2018a) 'Solidarity in Europe in times of crisis', *Journal of European Integration* 1–7.
- Wallaschek, S. (2018b) 'Umkämpfte Solidarität und die Krise der EU', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 65(4): 413–420.
- Wallaschek, S. (2019a) 'Framing solidarity in the Euro crisis: A comparison of the German and Irish media discourse', *New Political Economy* 1–17.
- Wallaschek, S. (2019b) 'The discursive appeal to solidarity and partisan journalism in Europe's migration crisis', *Social Inclusion* 7(2): Forthcoming.
- Wallaschek, S. (2019c) 'The Discursive Construction of Solidarity: Analysing Public Claims in Europe's Migration Crisis', *Political Studies* 1–19.
- Weir, M. (1992) 'Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation', in S. Steinmo, K. A. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (eds). *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 188–216.
- Wendler, F. (2014) 'End of consensus? The European leadership discourse of the second Merkel government during the Eurozone crisis and its contestation in debates of the Bundestag (2009–13)', *German Politics* 23(4): 446–459.
- Wenzelburger, G. (2011) 'Political strategies and fiscal retrenchment: Evidence from four countries', *West European Politics* 34(6): 1151–1184.
- Wessler, H., Peters, B., Brüggemann, M., Kleinen-von Königslöw, K. and Sifft, S. (eds) (2008) *Transnationalization of public spheres*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wildt, A. (1998) 'Solidarität - Begriffsgeschichte und Definition heute', in K. Bayertz (ed.). *Solidarität: Begriff und Problem*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 202–216.
- Wonka, A. (2016) 'The party politics of the Euro crisis in the German Bundestag : Frames, positions and salience', *West European Politics* 39(1): 125–144.
- Zaun, N. (2016) 'Why EU asylum standards exceed the lowest common denominator: The role of regulatory expertise in EU decision-making', *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(1): 136–154.
- Zaun, N. (2018) 'States as gatekeepers in EU asylum politics: Explaining the non-adoption of a refugee quota system', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1): 44–62.

## 8 Appendix: Codebook

### 8.1 The method: Political claims analysis

The coding of the newspaper articles follows the political claims analysis (PCA) of Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; Koopmans and Statham 2010), and used the package RQDA in the R environment (Huang 2016). The main idea of the PCA is that articles and reports in newspapers contain many different statements by various actors. Instead of focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis, or only the content (Burroughs 2015; Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2017), the link between a statement and the speaker is emphasised. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Claims are defined as ‘the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors’ (Koopmans 2007: 189). The components of a claim can be differentiated by following a logic of questions regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY’ (de Wilde 2014: 52). These questions are the grammar of claims and help the coder to identify the claim, making the coding transparent and comprehensible.

In my project, I focus on four core codes in a claim: 1) the speaker; 2) the action; 3) the issue; and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all four codes in a statement, the potential claim is not coded. The other components that de Wilde mentions are coded if detectable. The codes and sub-codes allow for a detailed coding and subsequent analysis (Table A1).

Following the PCA logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims, but also no claims at all. There are two limitations for the coding processes: First, I do not code claims that refer to events of migration that are older than six months from the date when it is reported in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration processes in the 19<sup>th</sup> century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in each newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each article. Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes, the claim is seen as a new one.

The category claimant is the actor in the statement and has different forms: It could be a politician who states something in an interview or a journalist who writes an opinion

article. Collective actors such as the national government could be a claimant too. Crucial is that the subject of the statement is clearly identifiable. The claimant has further sub-categories: claimant type, claimant scope, claimant function, claimant nationality and the claimant party affiliation. The action of the claimant must also be reported or stated in the text. That could be a verbal statement, passing a bill in the parliament, demonstrating or even violent attacks. The action has to happen in a specific context - this is the issue. The issue has to refer (somehow) to the crisis situation in Europe. Issues which are relevant for other regions in the world are not coded; except if they affect Europe or are situated in a European context, e. g. a claim that Syrian refugees have to get asylum in EU-countries. The last core code is position which is important in order to see what the claimant thinks about/acts upon the issue and what s/he demands. This means that the claim should be related to either pro- or contra-solidarity (or neutral by arguing for both sides). The following Table A1 gives an overview about the main and sub-categories.

**Table A1: categories in the PCA**

1. Time & source	2. Claimant	3. Action	4. Issue	5. Addressee	6. Frame
A_year	C_claimant	H_action	I_issue	K_addressee_type	R_position
B_source	type		J_Issue	L_addressee_scope	S_justification
	D_claimant scope		scope	M_addressee_function	T_justification_scale
	E_claimant function			N_addressee_nationality	
	F_claimant party			P_addressee_party	
	G_claimant nationality			Q_addressee_evaluation	
	X_special claimants				
	XX_person				
	XXX_parties				

The following statement by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the Euro crisis illustrates the coding of a claim:

Merkel also briefly talked about the Greek debt crisis. The long-lasting infringement of the stability pact has brought Greece into this situation and not the [financial – S.W.] speculation. Therefore, short-term solidarity was not the solution. There is no alternative to a rigorous austerity programme. (Angela Merkel, Welt, March 2010).

German Chancellor Merkel is the speaker (claimant), even though she is indirectly quoted in the centre-right newspaper in 2010 (source and time). She makes a verbal statement (action) about the Euro crisis (issue) and expresses her opinion that austerity measures are unavoidable in Greece (position is coded as contra-solidarity with the justification ‘financial solidity’ and the justification scope is ‘international\_intergovernmental\_EU’). The following claim by Michael Roth is an example from the migration crisis discourse:

“We need more solidarity. We need more humanity”, claimed Michael Roth, the German Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. “We are very, very open to develop a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before”, he emphasised (Michael Roth, Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 2015).

The speaker is Michael Roth and coded as SPD politician (claimant), he makes a verbal statement (action) in the German centre-left newspaper in 2015 (source and time), talks about the migration crisis (issue) and his position is pro-solidarity. Thus, the statement is a claim. Additionally, the justification of the claim is coded. Since Roth talks about a new European political mechanism that should foster cooperation among the EU member states, the justification of the claim is coded as ‘political solidarity’. The justification scope is ‘international\_intergovernmental\_EU’.

## 8.2 Keyword search string

Regarding the coding procedure, no inter-coder reliability test could be obtained, because I had no financial capacity to fund other researchers to code with me. This methodological challenge is addressed by extensive coder training (Krippendorff 2004), my own previous experiences and applications of the method, as well as the guidance offered by the codebook of de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn (2014), who have coded newspaper articles and parliamentary debates in a similar manner. My codebook builds upon the codebook by de Wilde et al. and adjusts the categories and codes for my dissertation project respectively.

The reported results in the study are based on the following keyword lists in the database Factiva. For the German Euro crisis debate: '(Eurozone\* or finanz\* or Wahrung\* or Schuld\* or Kredit\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*)'. For the Irish Euro crisis debate: '(Eurozone\* or financ\* or currency\* or \*debt\* or \*credit\*) and (solidar\* or mutual w/1 support\* or cooperat\*) and (EU or Europ\*)'. For the German migration crisis debate: '(Fluchtlings\* or Flucht\* or Migrant\* or Einwander\* or Zuwander\* or Asyl\*) and Solidar\* and (EU or Europ\*)'. For the Irish migration crisis debate: '(Refugee or escape or Migrant\* or Migration\* or Immigrant or Immigration\* or Asyl\*) and (solidar\* or mutual w/1 support\* or cooperat\*) and (EU or Europ\*)'. An asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. Duplicates of articles were excluded from the article population.

Accordingly, I applied a nominalistic approach in the selection and coding 'solidarity statements'. This means that I have only coded claims with the word stem 'solidar\*' or close synonyms. Using 'Solidar\*' in the keyword search has the disadvantage that the threshold for selecting articles is rather high. By applying the nominalistic approach, the meanings of solidarity can be grasped from the actor's claims. In a deductive-inductive coding process and based on previous studies on solidarity, I started coding preliminary understandings of solidarity and then included new ones, joint similar concepts, and reconsidered existing meanings during the coding procedure. This helped to grasp the various meanings of the contested concept of solidarity. However, looking at the concrete term 'solidarity' might create a 'nominalistic fallacy'. Two reasons justify this decision and minimise the concerns: First, since the focus of this study is on solidarity, the study makes a more valid contribution by setting a rather strict threshold for the selection of articles and claims. Second, the high threshold positively influences the coding procedure, because the coding decision about whether the coded claim is about solidarity is already made. Consequently, the coding concentrates on the framing of the solidarity. This increases the validity and reliability of the coding procedure for solidarity as a polysemic concept (Beland and Cox 2016).

### 8.3 Categories of the PCA

The codebook applies to both crisis discourses and to both countries. There are slight adjustments to claims in the Euro crisis and migration crisis. These are marked by the terms *Euro* for the Euro crisis and *migration* for the migration crisis behind the sub-codes. In the following, all the codes and sub-codes are listed that I marked in the material. The tables give an overview on the number of codes per country and per crises discourse.

#### 8.3.1 Time and source

*A\_Year – the year of the claim*

A01\_2010

A02\_2011

A03\_2012

A04\_2013

A05\_2014

A06\_2015

**Table A2: Year category in the PCA**

Year\crisis	Euro crisis		Migration crisis	
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
2010	46	53	14	3
2011	77	51	50	8
2012	93	41	18	3
2013	61	37	106	11
2014	18	20	128	12
2015	72	49	357	136
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

*B\_Source – the newspaper in which the claim was coded*

B01\_Süddeutsche\_Zeitung

B02\_Welt

B03\_Irish\_Times

B04\_Irish\_Independent

**Table A3: Source category in the PCA**

Year\ newspaper	Süddeutsche Zeitung		Welt		Irish Times		Irish Independent	
	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis
<b>2010-15</b>	224	361	143	312	179	116	72	57
<b>Total</b>		585		455		295		129

### 8.3.2 Claimant

*C\_Claimant type –characterises the claimant generally and how the claimant is organised*

C01\_unorganised – a not clearly defined group or collective of persons, states, etc.

C02\_individual – a person speaking for her/himself

C03\_organisation – an organisation or institution making a claim (including spokespersons) (WTO)

C04\_representative(s) – person who has a position in an organisation/institution (not a spokesperson) (Sigmar Gabriel as party leader of the SPD)

**Table A4: claimant type category in the PCA**

Type\ crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>Unorganised</b>	6	4	19	6
<b>Individual</b>	151	74	166	31
<b>Organisation</b>	45	36	113	42
<b>Representative</b>	165	137	375	94
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

*D\_Claimant scope – defines the territorial scope of an actor*

D01\_local –acts beneath the national level (mayor of Berlin)

D02\_national – acts on a national level (German Government)

D03\_global – acts on a global level (UN)

D04\_EU – acts on the EU level (Council of the EU)

D05\_other – acts in another context, which is none of the above (G77)

D06\_unclear – territorial scope of claimant is unclear

**Table A5: Claimant scope category in the PCA**

Scope\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>Local</b>	35	12	162	4
<b>National</b>	297	199	410	135
<b>Global</b>	2	3	15	10
<b>EU</b>	31	36	73	24
<b>Other</b>	1	1	10	0
<b>Unclear</b>	1	0	3	0
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

*E\_Claimant function – in which role a claimant acts/works/ is perceived*

E01\_international organisation – representatives of UN, WTO, etc.

E02\_European Commission

E03\_European\_Council

E04\_European\_Parliament

E05\_IO-agency – relatively independent body in an IO (UNHCR or Frontex)

E06\_IO-bank – international bank (World Bank)

E07\_IO-court – European Court of Justice, Human Rights Court

E08\_government – any sort of government on national or local level (including ministers, the Chancellor, the whole cabinet) or expressions like “Berlin says...” for the national government

E09\_legislative – any sort of legislative on national or local level (including the individual representative or a party fraction)

E10\_judiciary – any sort of judiciary

E11\_business – business company or employers' association (Bosch, BDI)

E12\_trade\_unions – unions in every possible sector (DGB)

E13\_religious\_actor – mostly persons with an office (Imam, pope, bishop)

E14\_civil\_society – any non-governmental organisation, group or social movement (Amnesty; Occupy Wall Street)

E15\_citizen/people – a normal person without any special position in politics (“Max Mustermann/Jane Doe”)

E16\_experts/scientists – persons who are defined or named as experts for certain topics or a research group in a scientific context (Andrew Moravcsik)

E17\_public\_figure – a person which is best known as commentator in talk shows or newspapers, this could also be an actor/actress (Emma Watson, Tony Judt)

E18\_other\_politician/party – a politician who is in a party that is not in a parliament. In the German case this category is for the Federal President, too.

E19\_media/journalist – the claimant is an editor of a newspaper or the newspaper itself comments an event (Heribert Prantl, Glenn Greenwald)

E20\_ECB – European Central Bank (euro)

E21\_polity – some organisations make claims without naming a special person. So if the organisation “speaks”, this category fits (UN decides that...)

E22\_central\_bank – claimants from other central banks such as the Federal Reserve Bank or the Bank of England (euro)

E23\_private\_finance – financial actors such as banks, hedge fund manager or investment banker (euro)

E22\_migrants\_refugees – if the claimant is clearly identifiable as migrant or refugee who is speaking, then I code this category (migration)

E23\_UN\_secretary (migration)

E40\_other – persons or organisations which do not fit in any of the categories

**Table A6: Claimant function category in the PCA**

Function\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>International organisation</b>	0	5	3	0
<b>European Commission</b>	11	18	42	12
<b>European_Council</b>	4	2	6	7
<b>European_Parliament</b>	10	7	17	2
<b>IO-agency</b>	1	1	10	8
<b>IO-court</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Government</b>	92	81	230	77
<b>Legislative</b>	43	20	61	4
<b>Judiciary</b>	2	0	1	0
<b>Business</b>	8	0	3	0
<b>Trade unions</b>	6	2	5	0
<b>Religious actor</b>	1	1	43	3
<b>Civil society</b>	4	4	29	19
<b>Citizen/people</b>	30	16	72	9
<b>Experts/scientists</b>	31	14	17	4
<b>Public figure</b>	19	3	17	2
<b>Other politician/party</b>	17	5	25	6
<b>Media/journalist</b>	75	58	74	13
<b>ECB</b>	3	3	0	0
<b>Polity</b>	0	0	0	1
<b>National central bank</b>	2	3	0	0
<b>Private finance</b>	7	7	0	0

<b>Migrants/refugees</b>	0	0	2	1
<b>UN secretary</b>	0	0	0	1
<b>Other</b>	1	1	16	4
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

*F\_Claimant party – party affiliation of the claimant (F01 to F09 are the most important parties in Germany, F10 to F15 in Ireland, remaining categories are for party families in other countries)*

F01\_CDU

F02\_SPD

F03\_FDP

F04\_Die\_Linke

F05\_Bündnis\_90/Die\_Grünen

F06\_Piratenpartei

F07\_NPD

F08\_AfD

F09\_CSU

F10\_Fianna\_Fáil

F11\_Fine\_Gael

F12\_Labour\_Party

F13\_Sinn\_Féin

F14\_Socialist\_Party

F15\_Green\_Party

F16\_other – any party which does not fit in other categories (e. g. religious party)

F17\_general\_partisan – coalition governments or federal government

F18\_socialist – socialist or communist parties

F19\_green – green party from other countries (Grüne Alternative Österreich)

F20\_social democrat – social democratic parties from other countries (British Labour Party)

F21\_liberal – liberal parties from other countries (NEOS – Das Neue Österreich)

F22\_conservative – conservative parties from other countries (Tories/Conservatives)

F23\_far right – far right parties (Lega in Italy or RN in France)

F\_none – if the claimant has no party affiliation or if it is not possible to find out, then the category “none” is used

**Table A7: Claimant party category in the PCA**

Party\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
CDU	34	31	61	6
SPD	24	7	46	9
FDP	11	3	8	0
Die Linke	6	0	7	0
Die Grünen	15	2	20	0
Piratenpartei	0	0	0	0
NPD	0	0	1	0
AfD	3	1	2	1
CSU	10	2	70	1
Fianna Fáil	0	11	0	1
Fine Gael	0	13	0	8
Labour Party	0	16	0	3
Sinn Féin	0	1	0	0
Socialist Party	0	1	0	0
Green Party	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	2	1
General partisan	9	5	23	9
Socialist	10	8	12	2
Green	1	0	0	0
Social democrat	12	1	28	7
Liberal	3	2	13	1
Conservative	35	25	57	20
Far right	1	1	9	2

<b>None</b>	193	121	314	102
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

*G\_claimant\_nationality*

Euro crisis

G01\_Germany

G02\_Ireland

G03\_Great Britain

G04\_Greece

G05\_France

G06\_Italy

G07\_Switzerland

G08\_Belgium

G09\_Luxemburg

G10\_USA

G11\_Spain

G12\_Chile

G13\_Portugal

G14\_Slovakia

G15\_Poland

G16\_Finland

G17\_Cyprus

G18\_Netherlands

G19\_Austria

G20\_Latvia

G94\_European - any institution or organisation which is related to the European context

G95\_Multinational - international organisations like the United Nations Organisation, Amnesty International or a group of states (if possible, I use the location of headquarters/stock exchange registration for companies)

G96\_other

G98\_Unclear – if the origin of the claimant is unknown and cannot be identified

Migration crisis

G01\_Germany

G02\_Ireland

G04\_Spain

G05\_Greece

G06\_Turkey

G07\_Sweden

G08\_Italy

G09\_Austria

G10\_Cameroon

G11\_France

G12\_Denmark

G13\_Malta

G14\_Norway

G15\_Luxembourg

G16\_Netherlands

G18\_Poland

G19\_Portugal

G20\_Great Britain

G21\_Argentina

G22\_Bulgaria

G25\_Hungary

G26\_Czech\_Republic

G27\_Slovakia

G28\_Poland

G29\_South\_Korea

G30\_Slovenia

G91\_other\_Africa

G92\_other\_Asia

G93\_other\_Europe

G94\_European - any institution or organisation which is related to the European context

G95\_Multinational - international organisations like the United Nations Organisation, Amnesty International or a group of states (if possible, I use the location of headquarters/stock exchange registration for companies)

G98\_Unclear – if the origin of the claimant is unknown and cannot be identified

**Table A8: Claimant nationality category in the PCA**

Nationality\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
Germany	237	59	444	23
Ireland	0	129	0	67
Great Britain	3	7	7	5
Greece	22	7	19	4
France	26	15	14	1
Italy	5	1	37	11
Switzerland	2	0	0	0
Belgium	7	1	0	0
Luxemburg	4	7	8	3
USA	3	1	0	0
Spain	6	1	7	0
Chile	1	0	0	0
Portugal	8	6	3	3

Slovakia	3	0	4	5
Poland	5	3	14	11
Cyprus	8	2	0	0
Austria	3	0	11	1
Finland	5	4	0	0
Netherlands	1	1	4	2
Latvia	2	0	0	0
Argentina	0	0	7	1
Bulgaria	0	0	4	0
Cameroon	0	0	1	0
Czech Republic	0	0	10	2
Denmark	0	0	1	0
Hungary	0	0	9	13
European	6	4	12	9
Malta	0	0	3	1
Norway	0	0	0	2
Slovenia	0	0	2	1
South Korea	0	0	0	1
Sweden	0	0	11	4
Turkey	0	0	1	0
Multinational	1	2	19	1
Other	3	0		
Other African country	0	0	2	1
Other Asian country	0	0	3	0
Other European country	0	0	6	0
Unclear	6	1	10	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

### *X\_special claimants*

This code is identified during the coding process. Some claimants are more relevant or visible than other ones. To identify these potentially central claimants, I code these persons with their full name (e. g. Angela Merkel, Ban Ki Moon).

### *XX\_persons*

This code is similar to the code above, but includes all persons with their full name who made a claim. Moreover and to increase readability in the respective network graphs, the first names are shortened.

### *XXX\_parties*

This code only includes the name of the politicians and party organisations. A politician had to make at least two claims in order to be coded as single politician. Politicians with one claim are subsumed under the name of the party organisation. Claimants without a party affiliation are coded as 'no party affiliation'.

## **8.3.3 Action**

### *H\_Action –describes the action of the claimant*

H01\_verbal\_statement – the person gives an interview or the newspaper writes “US President Obama said...”

H02\_written\_statement – statements from opinion articles, press releases or research studies

H03\_executive\_action – orders of the government to deport refugees or sign treaties

H04\_judicial\_action –delivering a judgment or accuse a person through a lawyer

H05\_legislative\_action –passing laws (parliamentary speeches are verbal statements)

H06\_protest/violence – any form of physical action like a demonstration, an attack on a refugee camp. These actions can be peaceful or violent

H07\_Other – any form of action which does not fit in any of the categories above

**Table A9: Claimant function category in the PCA**

Action\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
Verbal statement	197	150	419	100
Written statement	147	94	174	44
Executive action	4	2	27	13
Judicial action	0		0	0
Legislative action	7	1	0	0
Protest/violence	10	1	36	7
Other	2	3	17	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

### 8.3.4 Issue

*I\_Issue – the topic of the claim*

I01\_integration – how persons interact with foreigners; cultural differences, homogeneity of the people, learning specific language skills, religious conflicts (migration)

I02\_migration – statements about persons who want to cross or have crossed (national) borders (irregular or regular) (migration)

I01\_economy – statements related to the crisis due to economic aspects (Euro)

I02\_finance – statements related to the crisis due to finance (Euro)

**Table A10: Issue topic category in the PCA**

Issue\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
Integration	0	0	53	12
Migration	0	0	620	161
Economy	122	73	0	0
Finance	245	178	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

*J\_Issue scope –the territorial limitation of the issue of the claim*

J01\_local – issues beneath the national level

J02\_national – issues related to the national level (national immigration laws)

J03\_global – all issues which capture the global level (Geneva refugee protocol)

J04\_regional EU – issues related to the European Union level (Schengen; immigration regulation discussed among EU member states)

J05\_other – issues which do not fit in any of the categories above

J06\_unclear – if it is not clear which limitation the issue has

**Table A11: Issue scope category in the PCA**

Scope\crisis	Euro crisis		Migration crisis	
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>Local</b>	1	0	99	4
<b>National</b>	76	95	139	34
<b>Global</b>	2	1	14	2
<b>EU</b>	288	155	384	118
<b>Other</b>	0	0	37	15
<b>Unclear</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

### 8.3.5 Addressee

This code is similar to the claimant aspects. An addressee is coded whenever the claimant refers to him or her in the statement and demands something. However, ‘demanding’ has to be understood freely. For instance, an addressee is coded when a claimant calls upon another actor to change his or her position on a certain topic; this also relates to criticisms (think about criticising the government in longer interviews or in parliamentary speeches). Nonetheless, many claims do not contain addressees. Thus, it is not a core category. If there is no addressee clearly identifiable, I code ‘none’.

### *K\_Addressee Type*

K01\_Unorganised – unorganised collective or not specified member of this collective serving as a representative (e. g. farmers, a farmer)

K02\_Individual – a person speaking on his or her own behalf

K03\_Organisation - ('DGB') including spokespersons.

K04\_Representative(s) - ('X, the President of France') but no spokespersons.

K98\_None – no identifiable addressee.

**Table A12: Addressee type category in the PCA**

Addressee type\crisis	Euro crisis		Migration crisis	
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>Unorganised</b>	0	2	19	2
<b>Individual</b>	5	10	24	12
<b>Organisation</b>	93	93	190	52
<b>Representative</b>	19	16	37	4
<b>None</b>	250	130	403	103
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

### *L\_Addressee Scope*

L01\_Global

L02\_Regional\_EU

L03\_Regional\_Other

L04\_National

L05\_Local

L97\_Unclear

L98\_None

**Table A13: Addressee scope category in the PCA**

Addressee scope\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
Global	0	1	3	2
Regional_EU	15	19	90	30
Regional_other	0	0	10	3
National	101	101	117	27
Local	1	0	37	4
Unclear	0	0	13	4
None	250	130	403	103
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

*M\_Addressee Function*

M01\_International\_Organisation

M02\_European\_Commission

M03\_European\_Council

M04\_European\_Parliament

M05\_IO-agency

M06\_IO-bank

M07\_IO-court

M08\_Government

M09\_Legislative

M10\_Judiciary

M11\_Business

M12\_Trade\_union

M13\_Religious Actor

M14\_Civil\_Society

M15\_Citizens/People

M16\_Experts/scientists

M17\_Public\_Figure  
M18\_Other\_politician/party  
M19\_Media/Journalist  
M20\_ECB (euro)  
M21\_Polity  
M23\_Private\_finance (Euro)  
M25\_Migrants\_refugees (migration)  
M98\_Other  
M99\_None

**Table A14: Addressee type category in the PCA**

Addressee function\crisis	Euro crisis		Migration crisis	
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>International organisation</b>	4	4	22	4
<b>European Commission</b>	4	3	6	5
<b>European Council</b>	1	0	3	2
<b>European Parliament</b>	0	0	0	1
<b>IO-agency</b>	0	0	0	1
<b>IO-court</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Government</b>	64	63	104	16
<b>Legislative</b>	8	1	7	1
<b>Judiciary</b>	0	1	0	0
<b>Bureaucracy</b>	0	0	1	1
<b>Business</b>	3	1	0	0
<b>Trade unions</b>	0	1	0	0
<b>Religious actor</b>	1	0	4	0
<b>Civil society</b>	0	0	3	0
<b>Citizen/people</b>	4	10	6	3
<b>Experts/scientists</b>	1	0	1	1
<b>Public figure</b>	0	0	0	0

<b>Other politician/party</b>	3	1	1	0
<b>Media/journalist</b>	1	1	0	2
<b>ECB (euro)</b>	1	4	0	0
<b>Polity</b>	22	26	80	25
<b>Private finance (Euro)</b>	0	5	0	0
<b>Migrants/refugees (migration)</b>	0	0	20	7
<b>Police/military (migration)</b>	0	0	1	0
<b>Other</b>	0	0	10	1
<b>None</b>	250	130	404	103
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

*N\_Addressee Nationality*

Euro crisis

N01\_Germany

N02\_Ireland

N03\_Greece

N04\_Slovakia

N05\_Spain

N06\_Cyprus

N07\_Poland

N08\_Portugal

N09\_Great\_Britain

N10\_Italy

N11\_France

N12\_Hungary

N13\_Luxemburg

N94\_European - any European institution or organisation related to the European context

N95\_Multinational – international organisation (United Nations, Amnesty International etc., location of headquarter/stock exchange registration for companies)

N98\_Unclear

N99\_None

Migration crisis

N01\_Germany

N02\_Ireland

N04\_Greece

N05\_Italy

N06\_Malta

N07\_Hungary

N08\_Netherlands

N09\_Syria

N11\_Sweden

N12\_Great Britain

N13\_Nigeria

N15\_Luxembourg

N90\_other\_Africa

N91\_other\_Europe

N92\_other\_Latin\_America

N94\_European - any European institution or organisation related to the European context

N95\_Multinational – international organisation (United Nations, Amnesty International etc., location of headquarter/stock exchange registration for companies)

N98\_Unclear

N99\_None

**Table A15: Addressee nationality category in the PCA**

Addressee nationality\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
Germany	43	17	78	4
Ireland	0	37	0	13
Greece	43	38	2	0
Slovakia	3	3	0	0
Spain	5	1	0	0
Cyprus	3	1	0	0
Poland	0	1	0	0
Portugal	0	2	0	0
Great Britain	0	1	2	2
Italy	1	0	27	2
France	2	0	0	0
Hungary	1	0	13	1
Luxembourg	1	0	2	0
Malta (migration)	0	0	2	0
Netherlands (migration)	0	0	1	1
Syria (migration)	0	0	1	1
Sweden (migration)	0	0	1	0
Nigeria (migration)	0	0	1	0
Other African countries (migration)	0	0	1	0
Other European countries (migration)	0	0	6	5
Other Latin American countries (migration)	0	0	1	0
European	13	16	82	26
Multinational	1	4	48	15
Unclear	1	0	3	0
None	250	130	402	103
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

*P\_Addressee Party*

P01\_CDU

P02\_SPD

P03\_FDP

P04\_Die\_Linke

P05\_Bündnis\_90/Die\_Grünen

P06\_Piratenpartei

P07\_NPD

P08\_AfD

P09\_CSU

P10\_Fianna\_Fáil

P11\_Fine\_Gael

P12\_Labour\_Party

P13\_Sinn\_Féin

P14\_Socialist\_Party

P15\_Green\_Party

P16\_other

P17\_general\_partisan

P18\_socialist

P19\_green

P20\_social democrat

P21\_liberal

P22\_conservative

P23\_far right

P24\_general\_partisan\_German – German government is addressed in the claim

P25\_general\_partisan\_Irish – Irish government is addressed in the claim

P26\_general\_partisan\_Greek – Greek government is addressed in the claim

P98\_none

**Table A16: addressee party category in the PCA**

Addressee party\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
CDU	9	8	12	1
SPD	2	0	13	0
FDP	0	0	0	0
Die Linke	0	0	0	0
Die Grünen	0	0	3	0
Piratenpartei	0	0	0	0
NPD	0	0	0	0
AfD	2	0	1	0
CSU	2	1	10	0
Fianna Fáil	0	5	0	0
Fine Gael	0	3	0	0
Labour Party	0	0	0	0
Sinn Féin	0	0	0	0
Socialist Party	0	0	0	0
Green Party	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	1	0
General partisan	3	4	51	13
German general partisan (euro)	21	8	-	-
Irish general partisan (euro)	0	12	-	-
Greek general partisan (euro)	11	17	-	-
Socialist	7	1	0	0
Green	0	0	0	0
Social democrat	12	2	5	0
Liberal	0	0	0	0
Conservative	5	5	9	2
Far right	1	1	2	1

None	292	184	566	156
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

Note: The sub-codes 'German general partisan', 'Irish general partisan' and 'Greek general partisan' have only been coded for the Euro crisis discourse.

#### *Q\_ Evaluation of Addressee*

This variable captures the opinion of the claimant about the addressee. If the addressee is supported, it is coded 'positive'. If the addressee is criticised by the claimant, it is coded 'negative'. If there is an addressee, but no clear opinion about him/her, the coding is neutral. If there is no addressee, 'none' is coded.

Q01\_Positive

Q02\_Neutral

Q03\_Negative

Q99\_None

**Table A17: Addressee evaluation category in the PCA**

Addressee evaluation\crisis	Euro crisis Germany	Euro crisis Ireland	Migration crisis Germany	Migration crisis Ireland
<b>Positive</b>	25	28	20	5
<b>Neutral</b>	30	46	89	32
<b>Negative</b>	62	47	157	32
<b>None</b>	250	130	407	104
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>173</b>

### **8.3.6 Framing**

*R\_position – claimant's evaluation of the issue (core category)*

R01\_pro\_solidarity – the claimant takes a cooperative stand, s/he/it wants to help other people or countries

R02\_contra\_solidarity – claimant acts egoistic, rejects calls to solidarity

R03\_neutral – claimant is neither pro nor contra explicitly or argues for both sides

**Table A18: Position category in the PCA**

Position\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>Pro</b>	285	199	493	137
<b>Contra</b>	61	26	144	32
<b>Neutral</b>	21	26	36	4
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

*S\_justification*

Rainer Forst (1999) states that every human being has the moral right to justification. Every action of a government, a collective actor or an individual has to be justified to those influenced by the action. Robert Entman makes a similar claim in regard to framing. Judgements and “suggested remedies” should be taken into account to understand the intend of the statement (Entman 1993: 52). In my project, the justification is understood as such a judgement and proposed solution. This means that a claimant should not only have a position about an issue, but should also provide a justification why s/he claims X or Y. However, this is not a core category, because many actors demand something without giving reasons (de Wilde *et al.* 2014).

S01\_cultural\_solidarity – based on common religious traditions, same language, cultural norms, universal moral claims

S02\_social\_solidarity – reference to redistribution, welfare benefits or neighbourhood support

S03\_monetary\_solidarity – based on financial support and financial risk-sharing

S04\_political\_solidarity – acting together in political contexts to create new modes of cooperation (instruments, policies, laws).

S06\_economic\_solidarity – support or help in an economic sense in the EU or in certain economic sectors

S07\_legal\_solidarity – different than S09, because it claims solidarity based on legal regulations (e. g. EU directive 2001 to help other member states if they face danger, severe problems, sanctuary)

S08\_misuse\_of\_solidarity – since another actor claims solidarity in a wrong way/for a wrong reason, the claimant does not want to show solidarity

S09\_legal\_regulations – bound by legal rules, having to act in a certain way (Dublin III-Regulations)

S10\_economic\_prosperity - to foster wealth, prosperity, richness, economic growth (euro)

S11\_sovereignty – claiming unrestricted authority on (national) territory, no external intervention in domestic state issues (euro)

S12\_justice – fair treatment of people (euro)

S13\_necessity – acting without personal conviction, but because s/he has to

S14\_self-interest – acts only in own interests, does not care about others

S15\_financial\_solidity/stability – focus on austerity measures

S16\_responsibility – a moral duty to act

S17\_conditionality – action takes place only under predefined circumstance

S18\_distrust – does not trust other people/countries and what they do (migration)

S19\_security – secure borders, border surveillance, fight against terrorism (migration)

S20\_demarcation – against any crossing of borders of people, opening borders for refugees or helping asylum seekers (migration)

S21\_social\_cohesion– support or declining help because social cohesion has to be preserved (migration)

S80\_other

S98\_none

**Table A19: Justification category in the PCA**

justification\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
<b>Cultural solidarity</b>	20	11	80	30
<b>Social solidarity</b>	10	20	46	20
<b>Monetary solidarity</b>	40	30	26	5
<b>Political solidarity</b>	21	13	166	62

<b>Economic solidarity</b>	21	11	6	0
<b>Legal solidarity</b>	3	4	9	2
<b>Misuse of solidarity</b>	21	11	11	1
<b>Legal regulations</b>	6	2	23	2
<b>Economic prosperity</b>	5	3	8	0
<b>Sovereignty</b>	4	0	13	9
<b>Justice</b>	3	5	23	2
<b>Necessity</b>	18	8	0	0
<b>Self-interest</b>	17	8	4	1
<b>Financial solidity</b>	63	17	0	0
<b>Responsibility</b>	10	23	0	0
<b>Conditionality</b>	8	14	0	0
<b>Distrust</b>	0	0	1	1
<b>Security</b>	0	0	42	14
<b>Demarcation</b>	0	0	51	6
<b>Social cohesion</b>	0	0	23	2
<b>Other</b>	2	2	24	1
<b>None</b>	95	69	117	15
<b>Total</b>	367	251	673	173

### *T\_Justification scale*

The justification scale elaborates the justification category. Claiming solidarity (or not) does not automatically reveal for whom solidarity is claimed. The justification scope focuses on who is included in the claim for or against solidarity. Does the solidarity claim only include the national community, does the demand to act in solidarity refer to EU member states or to refugee groups and open borders movements? The category shall capture these different notions of justificatory claims.

T01\_national(exclusionary) – refers to national community and national politics

T02\_international\_intergovernmental\_EU – justification refers to EU member states (either one specific or a group of EU member states or the Council of the EU)

T03\_transnational\_supranational\_EU – refers to the EU as a polity

T04\_transnational\_with\_specific\_group – refers to specific social groups such as Syrian refugees, religious minorities, LGBT-activists, political dissidents, but does not refer to the general category of 'refugees and asylum seekers'

T05\_local

T03\_global – refers to the global community or global institutions (migration)

T04\_transnational\_migrants\_refugees – it refers to migrants/refugees (migration)

T05\_international\_countries\_of\_origin –home countries of migrants/refugees (supporting the economy of home countries instead of opening borders and giving asylum to refugees) (migration)

T07\_international\_North Africa –countries in North Africa who are often addressed with regard to refugee movements, crossing the Mediterranean and arriving in Europe (e. g. Tunisia or Libya) (migration)

T08\_transnational\_EU citizens – widens the T01 scope by especially referring to citizens of the EU as “we” standing together to help (each other) (migration)

T09\_transnational\_Irish emigrants – in the migration situation, the claim is concerned about the Irish emigrants and how they are affected by the crisis (migration)

T10\_international\_conflict zone countries – support for those countries who are close to a conflict zone, have to deal with many migrants, refugee camps (e. g. Libanon) (migration)

T11\_national\_diverse population (inclusionary) – referring to a multiculturalist society that needs or provides solidarity (migration)

T80\_other

T98\_none

**Table A20: Justification scope category in the PCA**

Scale\crisis	Euro crisis	Euro crisis	Migration crisis	Migration crisis
	Germany	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
National(exclusionary)	39	43	105	25
International intergovernmental EU	178	118	216	62
Transnational supranational EU	37	13	0	0
Transnational with specific group	0	0	26	2
Local	1	0	0	0
Global	0	0	3	1
Transnational migrants refugees	0	0	153	56
International countries of origin	0	0	9	1
International North Africa	0	0	8	0
Transnational EU citizens	16	7	5	1
Transnational Irish emigrants	0	0	0	2
International conflict zone countries	0	0	10	4
National diverse population(inclusionary)	0	0	10	2
Other	1	1	11	2
None	95	69	117	15
Total	367	251	673	173

## **Declaration**

I herewith declare that this thesis is my own work and that I have used only the means and sources listed. I also certify that this thesis was written without the use of any unauthorised aids. All citations have been marked as such. I permit the review of this thesis via qualified software for the examination in case of accusations of plagiarism. No part of this thesis has been accepted or is currently being submitted for any other degree or qualification at this university or elsewhere.

Bremen, April 16<sup>th</sup> 2019

Stefan Wallaschek